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SECRET

June 20, 1970

TALKING POINTS

1. If we make an announcement Wednesday on the Israeli aircraft decision and our diplomatic initiative, we ought to be sure our evacuation plans and forces are in the best possible position.

--Should the carrier (Roosevelt) and amphibious force be brought closer to Lebanon? [It has been held within 50 hours over the weekend.]

--Are any airborne elements that might be needed readily available?

--Ask that evacuation plans for Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait be reviewed and any problems connected with them raised.

2. Lebanon intervention. The President in last Wednesday's NSC on the Mediterranean asked that we look closely at what the U S should do if President Helou asked for help against aggression. The plan before us was developed last fall. The main purpose today is (1) to review it and (2) to decide what more needs to be done to meet the President's request.

3. Turning to the Lebanon intervention plan, these questions need to be asked

--Would the necessary staging bases be available?

--Can we assume today, as last fall, that the Soviets will not react militarily?

--Even if we assume the Soviets will not move overtly, would the U.S. Navy be prepared, with the naval forces it has available, to take the risk?

--Has the position of the fedayeen improved since last fall to the point where the forces described in the plan could do the job? Or would they become hopelessly mired in a guerrilla war?

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4. What is the consensus? Is this a workable plan--in purely technical terms apart from the political question of whether we should intervene or not?

5. What are some of the issues in deciding whether the U S should intervene?

-- Would we have the support of allies? Of Arab moderates?

-- What would be the costs of not intervening?

-- Would intervention enhance the U.S position vis-a-vis the USSR?

6. No paper has been prepared on this issue. Suggest that an ad hoc group--perhaps most of the same people who have worked on the contingency plan--prepare a paper on the pros and cons of intervention. Then maybe that paper could come to the Special Review Group. After all, the membership is the same as the senior-level WSAG.

7. The Jordan paper is quite parallel to the Lebanon paper. Perhaps the ad hoc group should do a paper on the policy implications of intervention in Jordan. [The annex to the paper now contains arguments against intervention. Should the arguments for be added?]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS

June 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM Harold H. Saunders
Richard T. Kennedy

SUBJECT. WSAG on Lebanon and Jordan--June 22

There are four items on the agenda. You should be able to dispose of the first two quickly.

1. Lebanon evacuation plan. The plan [Lebanon Paper--Tab C] has been reviewed and updated, so that is not the main issue (although you will want to be sure everybody is satisfied with it).

The main point for discussion is whether to move the necessary military elements into better position to react if Wednesday's announcement triggers a reaction in the area. The Roosevelt and the necessary amphibious force are being held within 50 hours over the weekend, and airborne elements have been preliminarily readied. It should be decided Monday whether to move within 24 hours or so.

Recommendation Ask JCS to report on status and feasibility.

2. Other evacuation plans. There is a possibility that evacuation from Libya (4,000), Saudi Arabia (6,000) and Kuwait might be necessary as well in the wake of Wednesday's announcement.

Recommendation That you simply instruct that all evacuation plans be reviewed and any reasonable readiness precautions taken.

3. Lebanon intervention. This is the main purpose of the meeting. (We assume it was the President's question at the NSC last Wednesday which led you to call this meeting.) This deals with the question of the U.S. response if President Helou asks for U.S. assistance in the event of overt aggression by other Arab states.

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The full plan is summarized at Tab G under the "Lebanon Paper" tab. You should begin by reading the analytical summary at the Tab immediately following this memo.

There are two separate questions

--Is the plan as presented militarily workable?
Can we intervene?

--Should we intervene if asked?

The contingency planning papers address only the first question--military feasibility--and its assumptions should be questioned at the meeting.

The hard issue which has to be faced next is whether we should intervene if asked. The contingency studies have not addressed that question. State internally has drafted a paper addressing essentially the pros and cons of a response to a request for our intervention, but that is not part of this package.

Recommendation. We suggest that you call for a quick paper addressing the pros and cons of intervention, and the political costs and risks to be done by an ad hoc group for presentation to the Special Review Group. (The membership of the ad hoc group would be the same as the WSAG Mid-East Group and the Special Review Group membership would be the same as the WSAG. Using the Special Review Group to address this question would avoid bureaucratic argument over the role of the WSAG.)

4. Jordan intervention. This is the one item of business left over from the more active phase of the Jordan crisis ten days ago. It closely parallels the Lebanon intervention plan except for the increased reliance on airborne troops. The issues are much the same. The paper is under the "Jordan Paper" Tab.

Recommendation. Since the assumptions underlying this paper--and the issues--are much the same as those for the Lebanon paper, we suggest that you simply make that point and then ask that the same kind of paper on the policy question be done for Jordan as asked for on Lebanon above.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

U.S. INTERVENTION IN LEBANON AGAINST AGGRESSION

Situation. An overt move of Arab forces (regular, regular in fedayeen uniform or fedayeen obviously backed by regular forces) into Lebanon. The distinguishing characteristic of this situation is that the U S. and the Lebanese Government would be in a position to claim to be acting against external aggression. The U.S. military plan would be much the same (though probably with more forces) as for quelling civil war in Lebanon against covert outside support, but assumptions about international political reaction (and availability of staging bases) would be different.

Key Assumptions of this Plan

1. Bases in NATO countries and/or Cyprus would be available. [This is judged unlikely if the U S. were intervening to quell a civil uprising but possible--though not assured--in the event of overt aggression.]
 - a. First priority--Turkey
 - b. Second priority--use of UK sovereign base areas in Cyprus
 - c. Third priority--Greece and/or Italy
2. The airbase at Lajes, Azores, would be available as a transit point.
3. Responsible Lebanese officials would request U S military assistance and U S forces would be acting in collaboration with--not against the opposition of--organized Lebanese units.
4. The USSR would not initiate overt military or naval operations.
5. Effective UN action is not anticipated.

Comment The above assumptions are critical to the feasibility of the plan and must be examined in detail. For instance, the attached paper (page entitled "Limitations if Forward Staging Bases Not Available")

concludes "If none of the above bases is available because of the denial of host governments, deployment of Army and Air Force forces is not possible" except for the Marine Battalion Landing Team from the Sixth Fleet. Three central questions should be discussed

1. Availability of bases

Lajes--probably

Turkey--almost certainly not

Cyprus--very unlikely [It is possible that the UK might allow their use, but the Cypriot reaction would probably be so sharp as to jeopardize their sovereign base status.]

Greece--[This would be a close decision. If a strong case could be made that U.S. intervention was principally to block expansion of Soviet influence, Greece might go along.]

Italy--about the same as Greece.

If the Azores base only is available, airborne assault is not feasible. Forces must be landed and fuel must be available in Beirut. It would be 2 days before 1 airborne infantry battalion--a full brigade is needed for the operation--could be landed and 5.4 days before a tactical fighter squadron could operate. Use of Greek bases in addition would cut this time to 4.3 days. A Marine Battalion Landing Team from the Fleet could be landed to secure the airport.

2. Soviet reaction. Given the buildup of the Soviet position in the UAR and in the Mediterranean, can we assume--as we did in writing these plans last fall--that the Soviets will not react militarily? It is still a question whether the Soviets would attack U.S. forces, but how many risks would the U.S. Navy be prepared to take with the Fleet against Soviet subs?

3. Fedayeen. The fedayeen opposition may be potentially stronger--and popular support greater--now than when this plan was written last fall. Are the forces involved really adequate if they confront not only a cross-border invasion but a popular uprising as well?

The Forces Required

<u>INITIAL</u>	<u>FOLLOW-ON</u>	<u>On CALL</u>
1 Airborne Infantry Brigade	1 Airborne Division (-)	As required and requested by COMUSJTF
3 Tactical Fighter Squadrons	2 Tactical Fighter Squadrons	
3 Tactical Airlift Squadrons	10 KC-135 Aircraft	
1 Reconnaissance Squadron	1 Tactical airlift Squadron	
10 KC-135 Aircraft	**Amphibious Task Force with 1/3 Marine Divi- sion/Wing Team	
*Amphibious Task Force with 1/9 Marine Division		
*1Attack Carrier Strike Group		
*Sixthflt		
**CINCLANT		

NOTE. In addition, the following major forces are available for augmentation from USCINCEUR.

2 Airborne Battalions
Tactical airlift as required

Closure Times

Closure times below assume availability of staging bases and are computed from the day deployment commences and include the time necessary to close required support elements.

	<u>1st Increment Arrival</u>	<u>Closure Complete</u>
Initial Forces	48 hours	13 days
Follow-on Forces	13 days	33 days

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Feasibility

There are serious judgments to be made as to military feasibility on the grounds of

- limited availability of staging bases,
- possible fedayeen opposition;
- possible Soviet harrassment.

Comment These judgments need to be thrashed out at this meeting because they do not come clear in the papers provided. The first purpose of the meeting should be to reach some understanding on these judgments.

The Broader Implications

The question of feasibility will be the first of the judgments that would enter a decision on whether we should or should not respond affirmatively to a request to intervene.

Apart from that is a range of political issues

1. Would the U S. find adequate political support among Arab moderates and allies?

One of the elements of the 1958 landings was that the U.S.-- in the wake of contributing to Israeli withdrawal in the 1957 Arab-Israeli settlement--was intervening to block extension of Nasserist influence. A parallel British move took place in Jordan. In short, there was substantial support among moderates and allies. Today, the U S. would be intervening to block forces that--in the Arab public eye--are champions of the Arab cause. The U.S. would be intervening--in Arab eyes--to support Israel.

2 Would this move save moderate government in Lebanon?

The immediate answer is that it probably would not in the long run. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the government would face a population, much of which would regard it as in collusion with the U.S. and Israel to put down forces championing the Arab cause.

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The longer run answer is that probably the only development that can preserve a balanced government in Lebanon is an Arab-Israeli settlement.

3. Would such a move strengthen the U.S. position vis-a-vis the USSR?

Some may argue that only a sharp U.S. reaction can give the Soviets pause for thought about the dangers of confrontation with the U.S.

The counter argument is that all benefit would be lost if the U.S. either became mired down in a war with Arab guerrillas or withdrew leaving behind a Lebanese government about to fall.

4. What would be the costs of not intervening?

One cost would be the signal to other moderate governments that the U.S. is no longer prepared to intervene to protect its friends.

Another would be the related signal to the USSR. If much of our credibility with the USSR depends on persuading it that a confrontation with the U.S. is a danger, then this would lead Moscow to believe that danger is not real.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 22, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting on Middle East

Enclosed is a summary of conclusions for the WSAG meeting of June 22 on the Middle East.

This summary is being made available to you on an Eyes-Only basis for your personal use.

Jeanne W. Davis
Director
NSC Secretariat

Attachment

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WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING

June 22, 1970

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The WSAG reviewed the status of contingency planning for military-supported evacuation from Arab nations and for military intervention in response to possible requests for assistance from friendly Arab governments threatened with overthrow by outside and/or indigenous forces. The objective is to be able to provide the NSC a complete analysis of alternatives and implications in the event the NSC is faced with a decision on whether to take military action to meet a crisis in one or more Arab countries.

The WSAG Middle East Working Group will prepare a study setting forth the pros and cons of military intervention at the invitation of a friendly Arab government. The study will be a general one dealing with all countries in which the United States might be asked to take military action in support of friendly governments (including Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia). However, the study will identify special factors applicable only to individual countries. It should specify what the U.S. can reasonably expect to accomplish within a given time-frame. The study will be submitted for consideration at an early meeting of the Special Review Group.

For Libya and Kuwait the WSAG Middle East Working Group will prepare a chronological listing of steps to be taken and assignment of responsibilities for action in the event of a crisis. In addition, the Working Group will insure that the contingency plan for each country includes an annex specifying the number and location of U.S. nationals in that country. The JCS will prepare a listing of various alternative routes for staging troops to the Middle East, with information about the time factors involved.

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The WSAG agreed that it would be desirable to hold advance consultations with the UK to see if British bases on Cyprus might be available for staging U.S. troops. The State Department is to look further into the possibility of consulting with the British.

In connection with possible use of Greek facilities, the WSAG agreed that it was important that the studies and plans being prepared contain a full assessment of the availability of Greek bases under various contingencies.