

**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY**

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
001	report	<b>Intelligence Memorandum</b> MR Case NLN 09-H-01; Doc. ID 11096 Pages: 11 <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> <i>Per Ltr. 7/30/2012</i>	4/17/1969	B
002	memo	<b>CIA Operations center to WH Sit. Room</b> MR Case NLN 09-H-01; Doc. ID 11097 Pages: 1 <b>SANITIZED</b> <i>per Ltr. 11/13/2013 3.3(b)(1)</i>	4/16/1969	B
003	memo	<b>For the Record</b> MR Case NLN 09-H-01; Doc. ID 11098 Pages: 13 <b>SANITIZED</b> <i>per Ltr. 10/27/2016 3.3(b)(1)(5)</i>	4/15/1969	B

FILE GROUP TITLE	<b>NSC Institutional Files, Meeting Files</b>	<b>Box H-0035</b>
------------------	-----------------------------------------------	-------------------

FOLDER TITLE	<b>[06] Review Group N. Korean Downing of U.S. Aircraft 4/15/69</b>
--------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------

RESTRICTION CODES

- |                                                                                                      |                                                                                              |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy                                          | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information.                                                         | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.   |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.                      | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.                                       |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.                                           |

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE POLICE

The following officials will be attending a meeting in the Situation Room at 6:30 p.m. today:

Richard Pedersen  
Donald McHenry  
Winthrop Brown  
James Leonard  
Charles Havens  
Adm. Tazewell Shepard  
G. Warren Nutter

Maj. Gen. George Pickett  
LTG F. T. Unger

R. Jack Smith

Edward W. Proctor

(We understand that Winthrop Brown, Charles Havens, Adm. Shepard and Gen. Pickett will be attending a 5:30 p.m. meeting in the Situation Room and will stay on for the 6:30 meeting.)

Thelma Seibert  
NSC Secretariat  
X-3440

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
RS

LDX'd AT ~~1170~~ 9:10 PM To

Sec STATE

" Defense

UNDER Sec STATE

DIR CIA

CH JCS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 15, 1969

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET / NODIS~~


MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT: NSC Consideration of the North Korean Downing of a  
U. S. Reconnaissance Plane

The President wishes to consider, within the National Security Council, the political, diplomatic and military options available to him in connection with the downing of the U. S. reconnaissance plane by the North Koreans.

In order to accomplish this in timely fashion the Korean Task Force will prepare a paper containing these options to be considered by the Review Group at 6:30 P. M. on Tuesday, April 15, and by the full National Security Council at its regular Wednesday meeting at 10:00 A. M. , April 16.

  
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Under Secretary of State

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET / NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/82  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 RS

~~Top Secret~~

Sensitive



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS

~~Top Secret~~

54

TS No. 199100/69

17 April 1969

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

NW 09-H-01/11096 Per Ltr. 7/30/2012

By DM/MLH NARA, Date 1/27/2014

[p. 1 of 11]

## WARNING

~~This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.~~



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
17 April 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions

1. The North Korean attack on the US EC-121 aircraft, like the seizure of the Pueblo, appears to have been a unilateral action taken without advance notice to either Moscow or Peking. This state of affairs will condition Soviet and Chinese Communist attitudes and reactions to US courses of action in this situation as it did in the Pueblo crisis. There is one major difference between these two incidents, however, that complicates the problem of developing effective US responses that would produce the desired impact on North Korea and its Communist neighbors. In contrast to the Pueblo affair, which contained elements susceptible to negotiation, the present situation does not lend itself to bargaining or exchange. Moreover, the possible objectives of US actions, apart from straightforward retaliation, involve the principles of maintaining the right to use international airspace and deterrence against future such hostilities. Neither principle is particularly applicable to the North Korean problem particularly in terms of securing specific responses by Pyongyang.

2. The problem of developing meaningful and effective US courses of action is also complicated

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Office of Strategic Research.

by the assumptions and motivations underlying North Korea's action. The Kim Il-sung regime almost certainly planned this move in advance calculating that the potential advantages in taking this risk far outweighed the dangers of possible US military reprisals. This judgment, and North Korea's evaluation of future US initiatives, probably are strongly influenced by the Korean's interpretation of the US response to the seizure of the Pueblo. Kim Il-sung evidently has persuaded himself that the US is overextended in Vietnam and elsewhere and that North Korea therefore can engage in such deliberate acts of defiance with relative impunity. The North Koreans probably made the decision to attack the reconnaissance aircraft on the assumption that there would either be no US military response or at the most only a limited one, in the nature of a one-time retaliatory action.

3. We believe that two main factors contributed to North Korea's complacent appraisal of risks. Kim Il-sung's style of rule has long been characterized by a willingness to accept risks and by a strong reliance on bluff and intimidation. He has taken pride in his militant "revolutionary" stance and has ridiculed Peking and Moscow for their caution in dealing with US power. A major theme of North Korean propaganda, particularly since the Pueblo incident, is that a determined small nation can defeat a "mighty imperialist." A more specific motivation for the shutdown probably resides in Kim Il-sung's desire to offset the failure of his attempts over the past two years to launch a so-called "people's war" in the South and to undermine and disrupt the South Korean government and economy. Kim, moreover, evidently believes his long-term ambitions regarding South Korea require a high level of tension with the US. Periodic provocations, he

hopes, will contribute to the disillusionment of the American public with overseas burdens and bring about a reduction and eventual withdrawal of US forces from South Korea.

4. In view of these North Korean assumptions and ambitions, it is doubtful that any of the US courses of action considered below would have any decisive or lasting effects, either in achieving stated US objectives or in inducing Pyongyang to modify its long-term policies. Embassy Seoul has suggested that if the US response takes the form of a military threat or even a limited strike, "the benefits to North Korea will be manifold." A very tough populace will be spurred to greater feats of production and sacrifice, and the disputes within the North Korean leadership that have been hinted at in recent pronouncements may be stilled in the face of tangible external pressure. Such gains for the regime, in the Embassy's judgment, would outweigh the physical losses anticipated from a limited US retaliatory strike.

5. Show of force: The North Koreans probably would view actions such as demonstrative air and naval maneuvers in proximity to North Korea essentially as a repetition of the US response to the Pueblo seizure. They would be inclined to interpret such demonstrations as indicating US unwillingness to resort to any direct application of force that might carry high risks of a resumption of major hostilities. The North Koreans would attempt to extract maximum propaganda advantage from a show of force in the Military Armistice Commission forum and elsewhere. It is unlikely, however, that they would feel compelled to challenge this US air and naval presence by direct air or surface action.

6. Military actions not involving combat probably would not deter the North Koreans from increasing

harassment and other forms of pressure in the Demilitarized Zone area. In fact, they might view an intensification of such pressure as an effective means of stimulating international concern over the danger of major hostilities, thus bringing heavy pressure to bear on the US to withdraw the show of force. We believe that there is little prospect that this course of action would induce the North Koreans to apologize publicly for the shutdown or undertake to avoid such actions in the future.

7. Military Combat Options:

We believe it is unlikely that any of these actions would accomplish the objectives of future deterrence or maintenance of the right to use international airspace. The North Koreans would use all the capabilities at their command to inflict maximum losses on any US strike forces. They would respond with virulent propaganda attacks and would mobilize the limited diplomatic assets available to them to discredit the US action and build pressure for its prompt termination. We do not believe, however, that the North Koreans would undertake major retaliatory military actions against US/South Korean military targets or civilian facilities in the South, although we cannot exclude the possibility that they might attack a target of opportunity, such as a US naval unit engaged in hostile action against North Korea.

8. Pyongyang's initial reaction probably would be to play for time in which to assess the nature of US intentions. They would seek to engage the US in protracted talks in the MAC, partly as a device to forestall further and more dangerous US reprisals and partly to exploit that forum for attracting international sympathy and support.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sensitive

9. Further clues as to North Korea's probable reaction to US combat options are provided by its behavior in the weeks immediately following the Pueblo seizure. There was a significant decline in North Korean harassment activities in the DMZ area until the late spring of 1968. A captured member of the large North Korean infiltration team that landed on South Korea's east coast last November has testified that a major seaborne infiltration operation originally scheduled for February 1968 was canceled after the seizure of the Pueblo in late January.

The USSR

10. Soviet reactions to US moves short of combat-type actions would probably be similar to those immediately after the Pueblo incident, when Soviet policy was aimed at limiting the scale of US reaction and providing strong verbal support to North Korea while keeping clear of involvement in the crisis. Moscow would probably react to US actions with some purposefully visible military preparations at the upper end of the noncombat scale, in large part because it could not be certain the US did not intend to apply direct force. We believe the USSR would be extremely careful, however, to avoid involvement with US reconnaissance aircraft and would limit itself to shadowing a US naval show of force in the Sea of Japan. If Moscow concluded that this was the extent of the US reaction, it would probably be satisfied to confine its response to a stream of propaganda abuse.

11. Soviet reaction to US combat actions would, of course, be stronger. The nature and extent of the reaction would depend largely on what type of move the US made and especially on whether or not the Soviets felt it was a one-shot action or one of a series of moves which would ultimately threaten the existence of the North Korean regime. The Soviets would probably be skeptical of any US assurances that no further actions were contemplated, but their desire to avoid involvement would probably induce them to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.

Sensitive  
~~TOP SECRET~~

12. If US actions included the sinking of a North Korean patrol craft or the downing of an aircraft outside Korean territory, Moscow could be expected to denounce the US and press for United Nations actions condemning the US and demanding that it terminate such actions. Moscow might also feel compelled to announce through Red Star or some similar medium the increased combat readiness of Soviet Far Eastern forces and to make much of the fact that the US actions occurred in proximity to Soviet borders. This would be calculated to impress on the US the seriousness of Moscow's concern and to deter further US actions.

13. Raids in force across the DMZ or similar measures that threatened to lead to major hostilities would doubtless call for a stronger Soviet response. Moscow would probably feel it necessary to augment naval and air units in the Sea of Japan and would certainly increase its military readiness. The Soviets might well provide equipment to North Korea on a crash basis as a demonstration of their commitment to the mutual assistance treaty. Moscow, however, probably would accompany such measures with counsels of restraint to the North Koreans, although the effectiveness of Soviet influence would be questionable.

14. An action of longer duration, such as a naval blockade or mining of ports, would create the greatest possibility of a US-Soviet confrontation. Moscow would certainly feel such actions so close to its borders would call for a significant demonstration of military preparedness and strength in the area. The Soviets would probably interpret such moves as a challenge to themselves as well as to the Koreans. We think Moscow would still attempt to avoid a military confrontation, but in view of increased Soviet presence in the area, the risk of unintended or accidental US-Soviet clashes would be increased even if the Russians made no attempt to challenge a blockade directly.

#### Communist China

15. Peking's reaction to noncombat military actions probably would closely follow the lines set in China's cautious treatment of the Pueblo affair.

In view of the strained relations between Peking and Pyongyang, the Chinese would have little incentive to provide more than a routine verbal display of support for North Korea and denunciation of the US. Noncombat US actions probably would be interpreted by Peking as confirming its over-all view of US policy, particularly its conviction that the US is unwilling to face the risks of major military escalation in either Korea or Vietnam.

16. US combat type actions would reinforce Peking's extreme caution. The Chinese leaders almost certainly would not feel bound by their treaty with North Korea to undertake a military response and they probably would even be reluctant to provide more than token military assistance. There is no reason to believe that the Chinese would be any less determined to avoid a direct military confrontation with the US in this situation than they were in the Pueblo crisis. Peking, of course, would be alert to exploit any signs of North Korean dissatisfaction with Moscow's reaction and support and an opening of this kind might result in more generous material assistance than the Chinese would otherwise be disposed to provide.

North Vietnam

17. The Hanoi leaders probably would have ambivalent feelings regarding the implications of US actions in Korea. Hanoi radio quickly praised the North Koreans for their "glorious achievement" in downing the US aircraft. The North Vietnamese probably would interpret a noncombat response as further evidence for their long-cherished conviction that the US is overextended in Vietnam and cannot contemplate a wider conflict. They would also hope that the Korean incident would further fuel the fires of American public discontent with the Vietnam war. On the other hand, Hanoi is very sensitive to the danger that North Korean provocations might precipitate a vigorous US military reaction that would have the effect of deflecting public attention from the Vietnam struggle and enable the US administration to adopt a more demanding military and negotiating posture.

South Korea

18. The Seoul government probably would display the same frustration and uneasiness regarding noncombat actions that marked its reaction to the US handling of the Pueblo crisis. Any public expression of this dissatisfaction, however, would be tempered by Seoul's recognition that one of Pyongyang's major objectives is to shake South Korean confidence in US protection and to drive a wedge between South Korea and the US. Combat-type actions, on the other hand, would be warmly welcomed by Seoul as evidence of a major change in the US attitude toward North Korean pressure and provocations. South Korea might press the US to go beyond these measures and undertake at least a limited joint ground assault across the DMZ aimed at inflicting a highly damaging military and political defeat. ||

General World Reaction

19. As in the case of the Pueblo, the great majority of nations and governments will regard this aircraft incident as largely irrelevant to their interests and security. They will discern no major international principle which requires them to become involved in any significant way. Their main preoccupation will be the danger of some chain of events that might lead to a confrontation between the US and the USSR. ||

20. Most American allies in West Europe would be prepared to provide public support for any US diplomatic initiatives, on the ground that the North Koreans had violated international law, but they would be alarmed at any move toward military retaliation for what they regard as a relatively minor episode in the cold war. They would avoid association with the use or the threat of force and might try to bring pressure to bear on the US if they judged such US action to be imminent. |

21. In general, Latin American opinion would follow that of Western Europe. Most of these nations would be willing to support the US up to a point, but to them, the shoot-down and its possible

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sensitive

consequences would seem remote from their interests and security. Most nations in Africa and in non-Communist Asia would tend to adopt a plague-on-both-houses attitude, and their double-standard neutralism would tend to make them view US reprisals as a form of "colonial" pressure. Nationalist China, South Vietnam and Thailand, of course, would voice support for the US in varying degrees of firmness. Japan would be extremely sensitive to any use of homeland or Okinawan bases as staging areas for US retaliatory action. Japanese leftists have already tried to embarrass the Sato government on these issues. The Japanese leadership would be deeply concerned about possible adverse effects of US actions regarding Korea on the sensitive questions of Okinawan reversion and extension of the US-Japan security treaty.

-9-

Sensitive

~~TOP SECRET~~

NLN 09-H-01/11096:p.10 of 11

H035/06/001

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

17 April 1969

Comment

DPRK spokesmen have continued to deny the presence of North Korean agents in the South, attributing subversive activities to South Korean "patriots." Pyongyang's "support" for the South Koreans' struggle is defined as building up the "revolutionary base" in the North--strengthening the North economically, so that its prosperity will serve as inspiration to the southerners, and building up North Korean defenses in preparation for the "great revolutionary event" of unification. The DPRK defense buildup has been stressed especially since the October 1966 conference of KWP.

A direct North Korean military role is envisaged if the United States "provokes a war." Pyongyang has long called upon the North Korean army to be prepared to drive the Americans out of South Korea and unify the country if war should come. Since the October 1966 party conference, Pyongyang has been describing the DPRK army's role as "liberation" of the South--in the event of "U.S. aggression"--so that unification can be accomplished. Exhortations to the North Korean "people" to help "liberate" the South by strengthening the "revolutionary base" in the North economically have appeared in Pyongyang propaganda throughout the period under review.

A Pyongyang domestic radio commentary on 12 April 1968, pointing to the progress of the South Korean "struggle" since "the advances of the revolutionary armed guerrilla units" and the Pueblo incident, introduced a new formula:

1. "If the working class and people in South Korea ask for support from the northern half of the republic, the DPRK army and people "having been fully prepared," will "join forces with the South Korean people" to sweep out U.S. imperialism and unify the country."

2. (Kim Il-song speech on September 7, 1968, celebrating twentieth anniversary of DPRK.) "We must force the US imperialist aggressors out of South Korea and accomplish the unification of the fatherland, thereby fulfilling our national and international duties."

(Kim Il-sung speech 7 Sept-68 on 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of DPRK)

3. "The struggles should all be preparation to the decisive struggle for winning power. This decisive struggle can be brought to victory only by a forcible method. Under the leadership of our Party, the entire people in the northern half of the Republic will do all they can to render support to the South Korean people in the revolutionary struggle."

1969

4. (15 April Pyongyang broadcast on Kim Il-song's birthday)

" To drive the US imperialist aggressors out of our land, liberate South Korea and unify the fatherland is the lofty revolutionary duty assigned to our generation and the supreme national task."

5. (7 January 1969 Korean news agency report on Tricontinental Solidarity Week)

"The Korean people will drive the US imperialist aggressors out of South Korea and surely achieve the unification of the fatherland and the nation-wide victory of the revolution, thereby actively contributing to the anti-imperialist, national liberation struggle of the tricontinental peoples and discharging national and international duties assigned to them."

6. (11 March 1969 Korean news agency broadcast of Foreign Ministry statement)

"If the US imperialists, ignoring our warning, keep aggravating the situation and persistently take the road of war, the Korean people under the wise leadership of Comrade Kim Il-song, the great leader, will sweep away the US imperialist aggressors and accomplish the historic cause of national unification without fail."

April 17, 1969

The following joint statement was issued today by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird:

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are issuing this joint statement for two reasons.

First, we want to inform all nations that we shall continue to support the unrestricted right of free and peaceful movement of ships and aircraft of all types in international waters and international airspace.

Secondly, we want to explain to the American people why the safety and security of our country make it necessary that we continue to conduct intelligence and information collection activities in international waters and in international airspace in various parts of the world.

Prudence and our national responsibilities require that we obtain necessary information on a continuing basis on such matters as the force disposition of present or potential enemies, radar capabilities, aircraft and ship movements, and related information that could affect the safety and security of peaceful international commerce and of our military personnel deployed overseas.

An informed assessment of the military activities of other nations, peacefully obtained, can reduce chances for mistake and miscalculation, and at the same time reduce the pressures for armaments and arms races; for ignorance breeds fear.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/82  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
RS

We are concerned that if (provocative) actions are taken by nations against ship and aircraft movements which do not violate the rights and territory of other nations the result could be a heightening of world tensions and an increased possibility of conflict stemming from misconception and miscalculations.

To put this matter into perspective, our citizens should understand that the conduct of intelligence collection is, of course, not an exclusive right of the United States. To the extent of their capabilities and interests, many other nations, particularly the Soviet Union have exercised and continue to exercise their rights of free movement in international waters and international airspace to conduct similar activities.

We cannot and will not surrender the right of freedom of peaceful movement in international waters and international airspace for ourselves or for other nations. Also, we cannot and will not abandon our peaceful efforts to obtain information affecting the vital interests of our nation.

We intend to continue the free and peaceful use of international waters and international airspace to protect our security.

Finally, our ~~citizens~~ <sup>people</sup> should know that such intelligence collection missions are undertaken only after an intensive review as to their essentiality to our national security requirements. No mission is authorized until it has been reviewed at high levels in the State Department, Defense Department and by White House representatives.

C O P Y

1608

*Mr. Eagleburger*  
*4/16*



s/s 5928

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Attention: Mr. Eagleburger

In accordance with your request I am attaching a compilation of aggressive statements made by Kim-il-Sung and an up-dated UNC report of North Korean violations of the Military Armistice Agreement signed 27 July 1953.

*John P. Walsh*  
John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
*RS*

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY  
COUNCIL



Distr.  
GENERAL

S/8217  
2 November 1967

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 NOVEMBER 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey, on behalf of the United States Government as the Unified Command, established by Security Council resolution 84 - 7 July 1950 (S/1588), the enclosed report from the United Nations Command regarding the current situation along the Demilitarized Zone in Korea. This report is made pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council to draw to the attention of the Council and all Members of the United Nations the recent sharp increase in the scope and intensity of the North Korean military attacks and other armed activity in Korea in violation of the Military Armistice Agreement signed 27 July 1953.

I request that this report be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Arthur J. GOLDBERG

67-25514

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 RS

1...

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
ON THE INCREASE IN VIOLATIONS BY NORTH KOREA OF THE  
MILITARY ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IN KOREA

The Government of the United States, in its capacity as the Unified Command, deems it necessary to submit this special report of the United Nations Command to call the attention of the Security Council to a drastic increase in violations by North Korea of the Military Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 and subsequent agreements pertaining thereto. So far this year there has been a total of 543 incidents, in contrast to 50 incidents in 1966, resulting from the infiltration into the Republic of Korea from North Korea of armed agent teams for the purpose of setting ambushes, laying mines, and performing raids near the Demilitarized Zone and engaging in other subversive activities in the interior of the Republic of Korea. These deliberate actions by North Korean armed personnel, apart from causing serious casualties, constitute clear evidence of North Korea's continued unwillingness to keep faith with the Armistice provisions and raise serious doubts about its attitude toward the promotion of peace and stability in the area.

Infiltration by land

The series of recent violations by North Korean armed personnel have taken place inside the territory of the Republic of Korea - some within the two-kilometer wide Demilitarized Zone south of the Military Demarcation Line, some in Republic of Korea territory to the south of that zone. North Korean armed raiders and reconnaissance teams - ranging from small groups of six to nine men up to a group of about sixty, in one case - have entered the Republic of Korea by overland infiltration across the Military Demarcation Line. There, in carefully planned and reconnoitered operations, they have attacked DMZ police forces and installations of the United Nations Command rightfully located within the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone. In addition, North Korean infiltrators have concealed numerous mines in the roads of the United Nations Command portion of the Demilitarized Zone and south of the Demilitarized Zone. In one recent incident, North Korean personnel attacked with automatic weapons an engineering unit of the United Nations Command just south of the Demilitarized

/...

Zone, inflicting numerous casualties. This unit was engaged solely in road construction and other work in the neutral joint security area near Panmunjom where meetings of the Military Armistice Commission are held. In another instance, North Korean agents used high explosive charges to demolish two barracks buildings occupied by United Nations Command Forces two and a half kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone.

#### Infiltration by sea

Since early June of this year, in addition to overland infiltration, numerous North Korean armed bands have been landed from the sea in several areas in the southern part of the Republic of Korea. Once ashore, they have attempted unsuccessfully to organize a form of guerrilla activity. Over twenty of these armed infiltrator bands have been identified. Nearly all of these North Korean infiltrators have been captured, killed or dispersed by the effective action of the Republic of Korea National Police, supported by Republic of Korea military forces, and, most importantly, by the universal and most effective assistance of the civilian population. In order to carry out these operations, the North Koreans have assembled a fleet of very fast agent-team delivery boats. From the examination of those boats which have been captured, they are seventy-five to eighty-five feet in length, armed, and capable of carrying thirty to forty personnel with equipment.

#### Identity of infiltrators

There is no question that the infiltrators, both in the Demilitarized Zone and in the interior of the Republic of Korea, have been introduced from North Korea.

They are clothed and equipped with weapons and accoutrements manufactured or acquired in North Korea. They speak for the most part with North Korean accents. Every one of the infiltrators captured in actions this year has admitted freely that he was trained in and dispatched from North Korea.

/...

Casualties caused by infiltration

As a result of this North Korean infiltration by land and by sea, there have been 144 military and civilian persons killed and 332 wounded by North Korean infiltrators, as shown by the following table of incidents and casualties:

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967 (to 18 October)</u>
Significant incidents:			
DMZ area	42	37	423
Interior of ROK	17	13	120
Exchanges of fire:			
DMZ area	23	19	117
Interior of ROK	6	11	95
North Koreans killed within ROK	4	43	224
North Koreans captured within ROK	51	19	50
UNC personnel killed within ROK	21	35	122
UNC personnel wounded within ROK	6	29	279
ROK National Police and other civilians killed	19	4	22
ROK National Police and other civilians wounded	13	5	53

Violations of the Armistice Agreement

The North Korean infiltration into the Demilitarized Zone and the interior of the Republic of Korea, apart from causing heavy human casualties, has involved in every case violations of the letter and/or spirit of the Armistice Agreement of 1953.

In the first instance, North Korea's failure to respect the integrity of the territory of the Demilitarized Zone and the interior of the Republic of Korea constitutes a violation of paragraph 7 of the Armistice Agreement.

Secondly, the action of North Korean infiltrators bringing automatic weapons, grenades, explosives and other lethal armaments into the Demilitarized Zone and the interior of the Republic of Korea constitutes a violation of paragraphs 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Armistice Agreement.

Thirdly, the North Koreans have shown themselves unwilling to co-operate with the machinery established by the Armistice Agreement (the Military Armistice Commission and its related organization), machinery designed to supervise the implementation of the Agreement and to investigate and settle through negotiations any violations of the Agreement.

The incidents outlined above clearly come under the purview of the Military Armistice Commission. The United Nations Command has attempted to use the Commission for its stated purpose, i.e. to supervise implementation and investigate violations of the Agreement. For their part the North Korean authorities have shown themselves unwilling to co-operate in enabling the Commission to carry out its assigned mission. They have, for example, almost invariably refused to permit Joint Observer Teams, the composition and duties of which are set forth in the Armistice Agreement, to investigate violations; nor has the North Korean Senior Member consented to follow orderly procedures for the conduct of Commission business. The North Korean Senior Member consistently disavows any responsibility for violations of the Armistice Agreement, even when confronted with incontestable evidence to the contrary, and while refusing investigation by Joint Observer Teams. Instead, he has used the Commission to conduct propaganda attacks, seeking to shift responsibility for the incidents to United Nations Command forces.

### Conclusions

The United Nations Command has shown great forbearance in the face of the North Korean performance in the Military Armistice Commission. The United Nations Command has also exercised the greatest restraint in the face of armed North Korean attacks, despite the great dangers involved for the lives and security of its own personnel and armed forces and civilians of the Republic of Korea.

Such military actions as have been taken by the Command stem from the overriding necessity to take appropriate measures in self-defence to ensure the safety of the people of the Republic of Korea and United Nations Command personnel. These

defensive measures have been taken and will continue to be taken so long as North Korean actions in violation of the Armistice Agreement make them necessary. An improved defensive security system is being constructed south of the Demilitarized Zone to aid in preventing infiltration and raids.

The United Nations Command reaffirms its readiness and determination, consistent with the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, to preserve peace and security in Korea. To this end, the United Nations Command will continue to ensure the safety and security of the people of the Republic of Korea. The United Nations Command, moreover, will continue to seek the co-operation of North Korean representatives on the Military Armistice Commission in order to undertake more meaningful measures for the reduction - in number and scope - of Armistice violations, to conduct joint investigations of specific incidents, to decrease tensions in the Demilitarized Zone, and to establish a more peaceful atmosphere throughout Korea.

UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY  
CHECK TEXT AGAINST DELIVERY

Press Release bSUN-7 (68)  
January 26, 1968

Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States  
Representative to the United Nations in the Security Council on  
Korea, January 26, 1968.

-----

The United States has requested this meeting, as I stated in my letter to you, to consider the grave threat to peace which the authorities of North Korea have brought about by their increasingly dangerous and aggressive military actions in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953, of the United Nations Charter, and of international law.

We have asked that the Council be convened at an hour when peace is in serious and imminent danger - when firm and forthwith action is required to avert that danger and preserve peace.

A virtually unarmed vessel of the United States Navy, sailing on the high seas, has been wantonly and lawlessly seized by armed North Korean patrol boats, and her crew forcibly detained. This warlike action carries a danger to peace which should be obvious to all.

A party of armed raiders, infiltrated from North Korea, has been intercepted in the act of invading the South Korean capital city of Seoul with the admitted assignment of assassinating the President of the Republic of Korea. This event marks the climax of a campaign by the North Korean authorities, over the past 18 months, of steadily growing infiltration, sabotage and terrorism in flagrant violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

Mr. President, these two lines of action are manifestly parallel. Both stem from North Korea. Both are completely unwarranted and unjustified. Both are aimed against peace and security in Korea. Both violate the United Nations Charter, solemn international agreements, and time-honored international law. And both pose a grave threat to peace in a country whose long search for peace and reunification in freedom has been an historic concern to the United Nations and of my country.

We bring these grave developments to the attention of the Security Council in the sincere hope that the Council will act promptly to remove the danger to international peace and security. For Mr. President, it must be removed and without delay. And it will be removed only if action is taken forthwith to secure the release of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its 83-man crew and to bring to an end the pattern of armed transgressions by North Korea against the Republic of Korea. My Government has stated at the highest level our earnest desire to settle this matter promptly and peacefully and if at all possible, by diplomatic means.

It is testimony to this desire that in fidelity to the Charter my Government has brought this matter to the Security Council which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and which, together with other organs of the United Nations, has a special, an historic concern for peace and security in Korea.

It is imperative, therefore, that the Security Council act with the greatest urgency and decisiveness. The existing situation cannot be allowed to stand. It must be corrected and the Council must face up to its responsibility to see it corrected. This course is far more preferable to other remedies which the Charter reserves to Member States.

Let me now turn to the facts concerning these two aspects of North Korean aggressive conduct on which the Council's action is urgently required.

At 12 noon on January 23, Korean time, the United States ship Pueblo manned by a crew of six officers, 75 enlisted men, and two civilians, and sailing in international waters off the North Korean coast, was confronted by a heavily armed North Korean patrol boat identified as submarine chaser number 35.

The strict instructions under which the Pueblo was operating required it to stay at least 13 nautical miles from the North Korean coast. While my country adheres to the three-mile rule of international law concerning territorial waters, nevertheless the ship was under orders whose effect was to stay well clear of the twelve-mile limit which the North Korean authorities have by long practice followed.

The USS. Pueblo reported this encounter and its location at the time in the following words -- and I wish to quote exactly what was reported by radio at the time of the encounter -- "USS Pueblo encountered one SO-1 class North Korean patrol craft at 0300Z" -- that is at 12 noon Korean time -- and then, I am repeating its broadcast -- "Position 39-25.2 NL 127-55.0 EL. DIW." I might explain that DIW means "Dead in Water", the standard terminology meaning that all engines are stopped and the vessel was stationary.

Now, with your permission, Mr. President, I should like to refer to this map provided for the convenience of the Council and show the exact location of the Pueblo as given in these coordinates. If the Members of the Council will look at the map, you will see a number 3 Blue. Number 3 Blue is approximately 25 nautical miles from the port of Wonsan. It is 16.3 nautical miles from the nearest point of the North Korean Mainland on the Peninsula of Hodo-Pando, and 15.3 nautical miles from the Island of Ung-do.

More

Now, at the

Now, at exactly the same time, the North Korean submarine chaser number 35 which intercepted the Pueblo reported its own location in the number 3 Red -- and this is a report now from the North Korean submarine chaser number 35 monitored by us -- and that location was 39 degrees 25 minutes North latitude and 127 degrees 56 minutes East longitude. You will note the positions. In other words, these two reported positions are within a mile of one another and show conclusively that according to the North Korean report, as well as our own, that the Pueblo was in international waters.

The report of its location by the North Korean craft, made by International Morse Code, was followed ten minutes later by the following oral message from the North Korean craft to its base, and I quote it: "We have approached the target here, the name of the target is GER 1-2."

Now, we talk about the Pueblo and that is the name by which the ship is, of course, known. But the technical name for this ship is GER 2 and this name was painted on the side of the ship.

The message continued, and I again quote the Korean radio message in Korean words: "Get it? GER 1-2; did you get it? So our control target is GER 1-2. I will send it again. Our control target is GER 1-2."

Inasmuch as the location of the Pueblo is of course a matter of vital importance, it is important to the Council to know that the information available to the United States as reported by our vessel to our authorities and to the North Korean authorities as reported by its vessel and transmitted by its own ship was virtually identical, with only this small margin of difference. And interestingly enough, the North Korean ship reported the Pueblo to be about a mile farther away from the shoreline than the United States' fix of its position. That distance between the Blue and the Red is about a mile. So you see, the North Korean broadcast, monitored, was reporting what I have stated to this Council.

Mr. President, we have numerous other reports during this encounter consistent with the location I have described. And information other than coordinates corroborative of what I have said is by voice monitor, information on coordinates, as I said, was by International Morse Code.

The North Korean patrol boat, having made its approach, used international flag signals to request the Pueblo's nationality. The Pueblo, replying with the same signal system, identified herself as a United States vessel. The North Korean vessel then signalled: "Heave to or I will open fire on you." The Pueblo replied: "I am in international waters."

More

The reply was not challenged by the North Korean vessel, which under international law, if there had been an intrusion -- which there was not -- should have escorted the vessel from the area in which it was. However, that vessel then proceeded for approximately an hour to circle the Pueblo which maintained its course and kept its distance from the shore. At that point three additional North Korean armed vessels appeared, one of which ordered the Pueblo: "Follow in my wake." As this order was issued, the four North Korean vessels closed in on the Pueblo and surrounded it. At the same time two MIG aircraft appeared overhead and circled the Pueblo. The Pueblo attempted peacefully to withdraw from this encirclement but was forcibly prevented from doing so and brought to a dead stop. It was then seized by an armed boarding party and forced into the North Korean port of Wonsan.

Now, reports from the North Korean naval vessels on their location and on their seizure of the Pueblo at this point show that the Pueblo was constantly in international waters.

At 1:50 P.M. Korean time, within a few minutes of the reported boarding of the Pueblo, North Korean vessels reported their position at 39-26 NL 128-02 EL or about 21.3 miles from the nearest North Korean land. This is the point on the map here. And we would be very glad, Mr. President, to make this map available for the records of the Security Council.

Now, Mr. President, I want to lay to rest -- completely to rest -- some intimations that the Pueblo had intruded upon the territorial waters and was sailing away from territorial waters and that the North Korean ships were in hot pursuit. This is not the case at all and I shall demonstrate it by this map.

Now, we will show by times and the course of the vessel exactly what occurred and you will see from this that the location of the Pueblo was constantly far away from Korean shores, always away from the 12-mile limit until it was taken into Wonsan by the North Korean vessels. The locations of the Pueblo are shown on the blue line and the location of the SO-1 035, the first North Korean vessel, on the red line.

Now, the Pueblo far from having sailed from inside territorial waters to outside territorial waters, was cruising in an area -- in this area -- and this will be demonstrated by the time sequence -- and when I say, "this area" I mean the area that is east and south of any approach to the 12-mile limit.

At 0830 Korean local time, the Pueblo was at the location I now point to on the map. It had come to that point from the southeast, not from anywhere in this vicinity. And that is point one on the map so that our record will be complete. Point two on the map shows the position of the North Korean submarine chaser number 35 as reported by her at 10:55, and you will see that she is close to -- the North Korean vessel, not the Pueblo -- the 12-mile limit.

More

Point number three is the position reported by the Pueblo at 12 o'clock noon and you will see that she is a considerable distance from the 12-mile limit which is the dotted line.

Red point number three is the position reported by the North Korean submarine chaser number 35 at 12 o'clock noon when it signalled the Pueblo to stop. In other words, this is the position of the North Korean vessel, this is the position of the Pueblo; and the position of the North Korean vessel that I point to, the red line, the position reported audibly by the North Korean vessel. There is very little difference in these two reports.

Point number four is the position reported by the North Korean vessel at 13:50, 1:50 P.M., when she reported boarding the Pueblo. And you will recall that I just told the Council that the Pueblo, seeking to escape the encirclement, did not move in the direction which would have transgressed the 12-mile limit.

Now, all of this is verified not by reports solely from the Pueblo; all of this is verified by reports from the North Korean vessels which were monitored and I think it is a very clear picture of exactly what transpired.

Here, too, Mr. President, with your permission, we will make this available.

Mr. President, it is incontrovertible from this type of evidence, which is physical evidence of International Morse Code signals and voice reports, that the Pueblo when first approached and when seized, was in international waters, well beyond the 12-mile limit; and that the North Koreans knew this.

Further compounding this offense against international law, and the gravity of this warlike act, is the fact that the North Koreans clearly intended to capture the Pueblo, knowing that it was in international waters and force it to sail into the Port of Wonsan. This aim is made clear by messages exchanged among the North Korean vessels themselves which we monitored, including the following: "By talking this way, it will be enough to understand according to present instructions we will close down the radio, tie up the personnel, tow it and enter port at Wonsan. At present we are on our way to boarding. We are coming in." This is an exact voice broadcast from the ship which acknowledges the instructions that it was following.

Now, Mr. President, in light of this, this was no mere incident, no case of mistaken identity, no case of mistaken location. It was nothing less than a deliberate, premeditated, armed attack on a United States naval vessel on the high seas, an attack whose gravity is underlined by these simple facts which I should now like to sum up.

More

The location of the Pueblo in international waters was fully known to the North Korean authorities since the broadcasts were not only between its own ships but were directed to its shore installations.

The Pueblo was so lightly armed that the North Koreans in one of the conversations which we have monitored even reported it as unarmed.

The Pueblo was therefore in no position to engage in a hostile, warlike act towards the territory or vessels of North Korea; and the North Koreans knew this.

Nevertheless, the Pueblo, clearly on the high seas, was forcibly stopped, boarded and seized by North Korean armed vessels. This is a knowing and willful aggressive act -- part of a deliberate series of actions in contravention of international law and of solemn international arrangements designed to keep peace in the area, which apply not only to land forces but to naval forces as well. It is an action which no Member of the United Nations could tolerate.

I might add, in light of the comments of the distinguished Soviet Representative on the adoption of the agenda, that Soviet ships engage in exactly the same activities as the Pueblo sail much closer to the shores of other states. And one such Soviet ship right now is to be found in the Sea of Japan, and currently is not far from South Korean shores.

More

I turn now to the other grave category of aggressive actions taken by the North Korean authorities: their systematic campaign of infiltration, sabotage and terrorism across the Armistice Demarcation Line, in gross violation of the Armistice Agreement -- not only in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone but also in many cases deep in the territory of the Republic of Korea -- culminating in the recent raid against the capital city of Seoul, the Presidential Palace and the person of the President of the Republic.

The gravity of this campaign has already been made known to the Security Council. Last November 2nd I conveyed to the Council a report from the United Nations Command in Korea, summing up the evidence of a drastic increase in violations by North Korea of the Korean Armistice Agreement and subsequent agreements pertaining thereto. This report, Security Council Document S/8217 noted that the number of incidents involving armed infiltrators from North Korea had increased from 50 in 1966 to 543 in the first ten months of 1967; and that the number of soldiers and civilians killed by these infiltrators had increased from 35 in 1966 to 144 in the same period of 1967. The further report of the United Nations Command for the whole year 1967, filed today, shows a total of 566 incidents for 1967 and a total of 153 individuals killed by the North Korean infiltrators. The United Nations Command in its report has further pointed out that, although North Korea had refused all requests by the United Nations Command for investigation of these incidents by Joint Observer Teams pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, the evidence that the attacks had been mounted from North Korea is incontestable. This evidence is subject to verification by these reports which are on file with the Security Council.

The terrorist campaign, Mr. President, has now reached a new level of outrage. Last Sunday, January 21, security forces of the Republic of Korea made contact with a group of some 30 armed North Koreans near the Presidential Palace in Seoul. In a series of engagements both in Seoul and between Seoul and the demilitarized zone, lasting through January 24 about half of this group were killed and two captured. It has now been ascertained that the infiltration team totaled 31 agents, all with the rank of lieutenant or higher, dispatched from the 124th North Korean army unit; that these agents had received two years' training in including two weeks of training for the present mission, in special camps established in North Korea for this purpose; and that their assigned mission included the assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea.

I might add, Mr. President, that the North Korean authorities make no secret of the political strategy and motivation behind these attacks. Their daily propaganda vilifies the Government of the Republic of Korea and denies its very right to exist. Yet, Mr. President, this same Government of the Republic of Korea is recognized by 77 governments is a member of numerous specialized agencies of the United Nations, and enjoys observer status at the United Nations headquarters.

Mr. President, it is obvious that this long series of attacks by North Korean infiltrators across the demilitarized zone -- and by other groups of North Korean armed personnel which, traveled by sea, have penetrated into even the southern portions of South Korea -- has steadily increased in its tempo and its scope -- until it threatens to undermine the whole structure of the armistice regime under which peace has been preserved in a divided Korea for fourteen years.

In the interest of international peace and security, this deterioration cannot be allowed to continue. It must be reversed promptly. The Armistice Agreements must be restored to their full vigor, and the weight of the influence of the Security Council must be exerted to this vitally important end.

Mr. President, these are the facts of the threat to peace created by North Korea's aggressive actions on sea and land. With all earnestness I ask the Security Council to act firmly and swiftly to rectify this dangerous situation and eliminate this threat to peace. Despite the most serious provocation - a provocation which every nation would recognize as serious and dangerous - my Government is exercising great restraint in this matter. We seek to give the processes of peaceful action all possible scope. We believe those processes can work swiftly and effectively, if the international community -- including the Members of this Council, individually and collectively, so will it.

But, Mr. President, these peaceful processes must work. The present situation is not acceptable and it cannot be left to drift. This great and potent organization of peace must not let the cause of peace in Korea be lost by default to the high-handed tactics of a lawless regime. Such a course would be an invitation to catastrophe.

Therefore, let the Security Council, with its great influence, promptly and effectively help to secure forthwith the safe return of the Pueblo and her crew; and to restore to full vigor and effectiveness the Korean Armistice Agreement.

Fellow Members of the Security Council, we have a clear and urgent responsibility under the Charter to help keep the peace. I trust the Council will discharge this responsibility.

\* \* \* \* \*

UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL



~~WJG~~  
Distr.  
GENERAL

S/8366  
27 January 1968

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

---

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1968 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey, on behalf of the United States Government as the Unified Command, established by Security Council resolution 84, 7 July 1950 (S/1588), the enclosed report from the United Nations Command regarding serious violations by North Korea of the Military Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 which have occurred since the issuance of the last report of the United Nations Command on 2 November 1967 (S/8217).

I request that this report be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Arthur J. GOLDBERG

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The Government of the United States, representing the United Nations Command in Korea, deems it necessary to submit this special report of the United Nations Command to call the attention of the Security Council to the recent grave and serious violations by North Korea of the Military Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 and subsequent agreements. Far from having made any attempt to stop serious violations since the last United Nations Command report issued on 2 November 1967, North Korea has continued to infiltrate armed agents into the Republic of Korea for the purpose of setting ambushes and performing raids in and near the demilitarized zone and engaging in subversive activities throughout the country. The most recent incidents, however, are of such magnitude as to create a grave threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Attempted assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea

On 18 January of this year the North Korean régime dispatched a specially trained team of thirty-one agents armed with submachine-guns, grenades and explosives through the demilitarized zone into the Republic of Korea with orders to attack the residence of the President of the Republic of Korea in Seoul and to assassinate President Chung-Hee Park. This team of commando-trained assassins penetrated to the very outskirts of the city of Seoul before the warnings of local citizens and the actions of the national police thwarted their attempt on the President's life. The team had reached within 800 metres of the President's residence when halted.

During their progress south through the territory of the Republic of Korea, the North Korean agents held four civilians prisoner for five hours. During this time, the North Koreans interrogated the civilians and threatened their lives and their village, should they inform the authorities of the presence of armed North Korean agents. Despite these threats, the four civilians promptly reported the encounter to the authorities of the Republic of Korea.

Through interrogation of a captured agent it was learnt that the members of this team had been especially recruited from units of the North Korean army and trained for two years for missions of this type and for two weeks for this specific mission of assassination and terror. This single agent also had knowledge of 2,000 similar agents being trained in eight specialized camps throughout North Korea to deliberately attack the Republic of Korea.

On 22 January a loudspeaker broadcast by the North Koreans in the DMZ boasted that "the North Korean combat unit advanced from Kwung-Bok to Sudae-M. The unit killed a Korean national policeman and the Chief of Police and destroyed four military trucks.... The combat unit escaped from Park's clique and continued their mission." However, by 24 January the North Koreans had corrected their mistake and re-established their usual, improbable story that "the South Korean armed guerrillas attacked the desperately resisting enemies in Seoul".

As a result of this initial attack, and other attacks by armed aggressors from North Korea, eighteen military and civilian persons were killed and thirty-nine wounded by North Korean infiltrators, as shown by the following table of incidents and casualties:

Incidents and casualties

	1 Jan.- 0600, 26 Jan. 1968	18 Oct. 1967- 31 Dec. 1967
Significant incidents, DMZ area	19	22
Significant incidents, interior of ROK	22	1
Exchanges of fire, DMZ area	8	5
Exchanges of fire, interior of ROK	17	1
Casualties, North Korean killed within ROK	21	4
Casualties, North Korean captured within ROK	1	7
UNC military casualties, killed within ROK	11	9
UNC military casualties, wounded within ROK	35	15
ROK national police and other civilians killed within ROK	7	0
ROK national police and other civilians wounded within ROK	4	0

The above figures, taken together with those contained in the last report of the United Nations Command issued 2 November 1967, show that in the entire year 1967 North Korea caused 566 significant incidents in which 153 individuals were killed by North Korean infiltrators.

Conclusions

The fact that this type of "porous war" has been planned and directed from the highest level of the North Korean régime has been illustrated on many occasions by constant reference to these aggressive policies by leaders of the régime. The most recent, and blatantly open statement of this intentional aggression was in the 16 December 1967 speech by the régime premier, Il-Sung Kim, who said "the northern half of the Republic is the revolutionary base for accomplishing the cause of national liberation on a nation-wide scale" and who expects his people to "accomplish the revolutionary cause of unification of the country at all costs".

When the United Nations Command, in an attempt to negotiate this serious problem as prescribed by the Military Armistice Agreement and to restore peace and security to the area, raised the issue at the 261st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on 24 January 1968, the representative of the North Korean side refused to address the incident in a serious and responsible manner. Concrete evidence, including a filmed interview of the captured North Korean agent and large quantities of North Korean arms and munitions, was dismissed by the representative of North Korea who claimed the attack on Seoul was perpetrated by South Korean citizens. In actual fact, the success of defensive measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Korea was in large part due to the wholehearted co-operation and participation of private South Korean citizens. This report clearly shows that North Korea is carrying out a programme in deliberate violation of the Armistice Agreement. The North Koreans have continued to refuse to co-operate in using the machinery established by the Armistice Agreement for the purpose of supervising the Armistice Agreement, making efforts to effect redress through this machinery so far futile.

DRAFT

REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, committed during the first eight months of 1968 and reported by the United Nations Command in its submission of October 3, 1968 (S/8893), were exceeded both in frequency and magnitude during the final four months of the year. The United Nations Command considers these North Korean acts of infiltration, terrorism and subversion to have been of such seriousness as to warrant a further report to the United Nations.

United Nations Command and Republic of Korea defensive forces have successfully minimized the effects of the most recent North Korean acts of aggression. Nevertheless, <sup>these acts and</sup> their high cost in human life are a source of grave concern since they demonstrate North Korea's intention to risk further escalation of the already high level of tension on the Korean peninsula.

NORTH KOREA'S RECORD OF ARMISTICE VIOLATIONS  
AND ARMED INCIDENTS DURING 1968

The year 1968 witnessed 761 serious incidents in the UNC half of the Demilitarized Zone and throughout the Republic of Korea as a result of North Korean infiltrations, making it the most violent year since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in 1953. (See Appendix)

The attempted assassination of the President of the Republic of Korea in his Seoul residence on January 21 by a 31-man commando team of the North Korean 124th Army Unit was documented and reported to the Security Council in the United Nations Command Report of January 27, 1968 (S/8217).

Continued North Korean acts of violence during the spring and summer months (through August) were documented and reported to the President of the Security Council by the United Nations Command in its report of October 3, 1968 (S/8839).

4/15/82  
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
RS

September witnessed a sharp increase in the number of North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement. During this single month, there were 88 incidents south of the Military Demarcation Line. Fifty-five of these incidents resulted in exchanges of gunfire during which 42 North Korean infiltrators were killed south of the Military Demarcation Line, making this the bloodiest month since 1953. During one such engagement, on September 24, seven North Korean intruders were killed, the largest number of casualties in any single incident in the Demilitarized Zone.

In October, United Nations Command forces engaged North Korean infiltrators south of the Military Demarcation Line on 41 occasions, as a result of which 29 infiltrators were killed. During November and December there were another 72 incidents of North Korean infiltration across the Military Demarcation Line in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. Twenty-three of these incidents involved exchanges of gunfire, as a result of which 14 more North Korean infiltrators were killed.

The largest North Korean intrusion since the end of the Korean War occurred on October 30 and November 1 and 2, when approximately 120 North Korean commandos crossed the seaward extension of the Military Demarcation Line and infiltrated into the Republic of Korea in the vicinity of Ulchin and Samchok, two small villages on the east coast of the Republic of Korea, about 50 miles south of the Military Demarcation Line. According to the testimony of captured commandos, they had been ordered to: infiltrate and terrorize designated villages, liquidate "reactionary" Republic of Korea citizens, organize clandestine espionage networks, recruit or kidnap Republic of Korea citizens to be taken to North Korea either for intelligence exploitation or for training as intelligence agents, intimidate Republic of Korea citizens into executing oaths of allegiance to various North Korean communist organizations, and collect intelligence data and other information which would facilitate the planning of further operations against the Republic of Korea.

The commandos were all members of the 124th North Korean

had trained the infiltrators who had attempted to assassinate President Park in January, 1968. They had received three months training for this specific mission in Sangwongun, near the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, and one month of guerrilla training in Yongsam-ni, North Korea, before being sent on their illegal mission. They were heavily armed with submachine guns, hand grenades and explosives, and carried large quantities of equipment including propaganda material and Republic of Korea currency, both genuine and counterfeit.

Their presence became known on November 3 when loyal Republic of Korea citizens reported their attempts to propagandize villagers and force them into cooperating through such terrorist tactics as beatings and murder. The Republic of Korea armed forces, national police and militia reacted promptly and, with the active support and cooperation of the local citizenry, began a two-month-long pursuit of the infiltrators. In their anxiety to escape, these intruders committed acts more inhumane than any reported since the end of the Korean War: on November 13, a Republic of Korea postman was killed and his body savagely mutilated by bayonets; on November 17, a family of five, including two infants, was brutally slain, the children's brains having been beaten out by rocks or blunt instruments; on November 25, another family was massacred; and on December 2, a 58-year old nun from a Buddhist Temple was stabbed 21 times, causing her death.

Altogether, 122 Republic of Korea personnel were killed or wounded in defense of their country during the Ulchin-Samchok operation. These included 23 civilians murdered and 4 wounded; 30 soldiers killed and 45 wounded; one marine killed and 4 wounded; 8 members of the militia killed and 6 wounded; and one member of the national police killed.

The North Korean aggression cost them 107 dead. Seven others, all officers of the North Korean Army, 2Lt Chong Tong-Ch'un, 2Lt Ko T'ung-Wun, 2Lt Kim Kwang-Chun, Jr., Lt Cho Ung-T'aek, 2Lt Yi Hyong-Su, Jr., Lt Kim Chong-Myong, and 2Lt Kim Ik-P'ung, were taken alive or surrendered. Their confessions

have plainly revealed the North Korean regime's full responsibility for the operation, exposing as totally false North Korean propaganda claims that the commandos were "South Korean patriots."

APPENDIX

THE LEVEL OF NORTH KOREAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY  
AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Significant Incidents:				
DMZ - South of the Military Demarcation Line	42	37	445	542
Interior of ROK	17	13	121	219
Exchanges of Fire:				
DMZ - South of the Military Demarcation Line	23	19	122	236
Interior of ROK	6	11	96	120
North Koreans killed in ROK	4	43	228	321
North Koreans captured in ROK	51	19	57	13
UNC Military killed in ROK	21	35	131	162
UNC Military wounded in ROK	6	29	294	294
ROK National Police and other civilians killed in ROK	19	4	22	35
ROK National Police and other civilians wounded in ROK	13	5	53	16

SUPPLEMENT to UNC REPORT (1968)

Since the UNC report covering North Korean violations of the Armistice Agreement during 1968 was prepared, the North Koreans have committed a number of additional violations, the most serious of which occurred on March 15, 1969. On that day a ten-man work party of the United Nations Command was fired upon by North Korean guard posts and patrols while replacing a military demarcation line marker in the extreme western sector of the Demilitarized Zone, after normal prior notification to the North Koreans of the work party's task and date the work would be done.

Paragraph 4 of the Armistice Agreement states in part: "The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the military demarcation line..." Administrative agreements spelling out details for the implementation of this instruction were reached between the two sides on August 24, August 31, and September 17, 1954. In accordance with the procedure established therein the UN Command had, on March 12, informed the North Koreans that the marker in question would be replaced on March 15. The work party involved wore proper identification and their activities were easily recognizable. Twenty-three minutes after they had begun to work, the North Korean guard post began firing across the military demarcation line with small arms and machine guns on the work party and its local security detachment several hundred yards to the rear, killing one UN Command soldier and wounding four more.

At the March 26 and April 5 meetings of the Military Armistice Commission the UN Command Senior Member proposed that Joint Observer Teams be convened to observe future military demarcation line marker emplacements along the

military demarcation line and insisted on assurances from the North Koreans that they would not again interfere with legitimate work in the Demilitarized Zone. The North Korean Senior Member failed to reply directly either to the proposal on Joint Observer Teams or to the request for assurances.

October 8, 1968, article for magazine Tricontinental, Havana.

"To fight down U.S. imperialism, all countries, big and small, should strike blows at U.S. imperialism."

"Wielding an olive branch in one hand and arrows in the other, the U.S. imperialists maneuver to swallow up the revolutionary countries one by one through armed aggression and subvert the ideologically weak countries through ideological and cultural aggression, combining nuclear blackmail with 'peaceful penetration' and repression with appeasement and deception."

"U.S. imperialism is the most barbarous and most heinous imperialism of modern times."

"The U.S. imperialists pursue the invariable aim of putting the whole world under their control. It is to realize this aim that the U.S. imperialists incessantly perpetrate armed invasion and subversive activities against the socialist and newly independent countries, and brutally suppress the liberation struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This wild, aggressive design of U.S. imperialism must be frustrated decisively."

August 12, 1967, article in same publication.

"U.S. imperialism is the most heinous and shameless plunderer ever known in history."

Celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the DPRK

September 7, 1968

Comrades! The struggle of our people to drive the U.S. imperialist aggressors out of South Korea and unify the fatherland is developing in close connection with the anti-imperialist, anti-U.S. struggle which is being unfolded dynamically on a worldwide scale.

South Korea is not only a complete colony of the U.S. imperialists but also their military base for invading the whole of Korea and Asia, and our country is one of the most fierce battle giants in the anti-imperialist struggle where we stand face to face with the chieftain of world imperialism. We must force the U.S. imperialist aggressors out of South Korea and accomplish the unification of the fatherland, thereby fulfilling our national and international duties. (applause)

U.S. imperialism is the Korean people's sworn enemy, who has engaged in aggression against our country for over 100 years now, ever since the intrusion of the USS General Sherman. The U.S. imperialists, despite the shameful defeat in their first attempted aggression, ceaselessly perpetrated aggression and barbarous plunders in our country, committing so many indelible crimes against the Korean people. Before liberation, the U.S. imperialists supported the occupation of Korea by Japanese imperialism and its colonial rule and, after liberation, they replaced the Japanese imperialists to occupy South Korea directly and lorded it over there as new colonial rulers.

The U.S. imperialists have enforced the most reactionary, colonial, military fascist rule in South Korea for over 20 years. They have reduced South Korea to their complete colony and military base of aggression and plunged the South Korean people into a living hell where poverty and hunger, terrorism, and massacre prevail. All sorts of brutalities committed by the U.S. imperialists in the southern half of our country ever since its liberation have left a most disgraceful page in the aggressive history of modern imperialism.

Kim Il-song Speech of 8 February 1968  
BHIS Daily Report, Asia and the Pacific 9 Feb 1968 p 8866

Of late particularly, U.S. imperialism and the Pak Chong-hui clique are raising frenzied war clamors in connection with the incident of the seizure of the armed espionage ship Pueblo. They brought a large number of their aggressive armed forces into South Korea and along the eastern coast of our country and are taking a war posture and openly declare that they would invade the northern half of the republic.

As for the intrusion of the armed espionage ship Pueblo into our territorial waters, it is a gangster-like piratic act, a flagrant encroachment upon the sovereign state and a link in the chain of premeditated maneuverings of the U.S. imperialists for unleashing a new war in Korea.

If the U.S. imperialists continue to try to solve this matter by means of threat and blackmail by mobilizing their armed forces, they will get nothing therefrom. If there is anything it will be only corpses and death. (prolonged, resounding thunderous applause)

We do not want war, but are never afraid of it. Our people and people's army will return retaliation for the "retaliation" of the U.S. imperialists, all-out war for all-out war. (prolonged, thunderous applause) The U.S. imperialists must be fully aware that if they aggravate the situation and persistently take the road of war despite our warnings, they will suffer a heavier defeat this time. (prolonged, stormy applause)

All the recent developments show that a war may break out again at any moment in our country by U.S. imperialism. All the officers and men of the people's army, worker-peasant red militiamen, and the entire people should further heighten revolutionary vigilance against the aggressive machinations and possible war provocation by the U.S. imperialists and firmly guard their posts maintaining a mobilized posture at all times. In all domains and at all units the military might of the country should be further strengthened and full combat preparations be made so that the aggressors can be crushed at one stroke if they recklessly pounce upon us.

Kim Il-song statements.

Speech to Fourth Supreme People's Assembly, December 16 1967.

"U.S. imperialism is the chief enemy of peace, democracy, national independence and socialism."

"The Government of the DPRK and the Korean people will resolutely fight against the imperialist forces of aggression headed by ~~the~~ U.S. imperialism, and will continue to wage a stubborn struggle to drive the U.S. imperialist aggressors out of South Korea."

"It is our lofty national duty and the supreme task of the nation to force the U.S. imperialist aggressors out of our territory, liberate South Korea, and unify the fatherland by pooling strength with the South Korean people."

"We must accomplish the South Korean revolution, unify the fatherland in our generation, and hand down a unified fatherland to the coming generations."

Kim Il-song Report to Party Conference  
KCNA International Service in English 5 October 1966  
Printed in FBIS Daily Report for Far East Supplement 12 October 1966 p 2-4

"US imperialism is the enemy number one of the world's people in their struggle. It is the primary task facing the socialist countries and the communist and workers parties to enlist and concentrate the broad anti-imperialist forces in the struggle against US imperialism. Only by fighting it resolutely can world peace be safeguarded and the revolutionary struggle of the people attain victory." (p 3)

"The position of each communist and workers party in the present period is scaled in a large measure by its approach to US imperialism... We should not tolerate any act of compromising with US imperialism, renouncing principle in international affairs." (p.3)

"It is also wrong only to shout against US imperialism instead of taking specific actions to stop its aggression." (p,3)

"The basic strategy of the US imperialists in their aggression in Asia is designed to blockade and attack the Asian socialist countries, concentrating increasing numbers of American armed forces in this region and mobilizing the forces of Japanese militarism and their subordinate nations and puppets, and to prop up their colonial rule by containing the rapidly growing forces of revolution in Asia. This machination on the parts of the US aggressors aggravates the situation in all parts of Asia to the extreme and gravely endangers universal peace." (p.2)

"In the present situation, the US imperialists should be dealt blows and their forces be dispersed to the maximum in Asia and Europe, Africa and Latin America, in all countries, big and small -- in all parts and on every front in the world -- and they should be bound hand and foot everywhere they are so that they may not run wild. Only in this way, can we succeed in crushing the strategy of the US imperialists to shatter the socialist countries and the international revolutionary forces one by one by concentrating their forces on this or that area or country." (p.4)

Excerpts from Kim Il-song's Report on the  
20th Anniversary of the Korean Workers Party

October 11, 1965

The South Korean revolutionaries will make their appearance in due course as a powerful leading force of the South Korean people by developing their revolutionary organizations extensively and uniting the masses of the people of all strata under the banner of anti-U.S. national salvation. The revolution in South Korea has to deal with a strong enemy armed to the teeth and many difficulties still lie ahead. However, the South Korean revolutionaries, by surmounting all trials and continuously expanding and strengthening their revolutionary ranks, will prepare revolutionary forces, powerful enough to eventually defeat the antirevolutionary violence and will lead the South Korean people to victory in the people's democratic revolution against the U.S. aggressors and their servitors.

The South Korean people have a tradition of fighting bravely against foreign aggressors and internal reactionary forces. The lofty militant spirit displayed by the South Korean people, together with all the Korean people, in numerous patriotic and revolutionary struggles including the Imjin patriotic war against the Japanese aggressors, the Kabo peasant war, 1 March movement, 10 June independence movement and the Kwangju student movement, shines brilliantly in the history of our country. The South Korean people, having such a glorious tradition of struggle and tempered in the national salvation resistance struggle against the U.S. imperialists and their minions, will certainly win great victory in their arduous revolutionary struggle.

The South Korean people are not alone in their struggle. They have a powerful revolutionary base in the northern part of Korea and enjoy the active support of the people in the north. Our party and the people in the north will do everything in their power to support the revolutionary struggle of the South Korean people and resolutely fight together with them for the complete liberation and independence of the country. When the South Korean people emerge victorious in the revolution and take political power into their hands, our motherland will be unified by the united might of the socialist force in North Korea and the democratic force in South Korea.

We are convinced that the revolutionaries and patriotic people in South Korea will splendidly discharge the historic mission assigned to them in the struggle of all the Korean people for the country's unification and for the nationwide victory of the revolution by winning victory in the revolution in South Korea through their heroic struggle with the powerful assistance of the people in North Korea.

Our immediate supreme task at the moment is to liberate South Korea from the bondage to U.S. imperialism and achieve the unification of the country by accelerating socialist construction and fortifying our revolutionary base all the more firmly in the northern part of the country, by supporting in every way the revolutionary struggle of the South Korean people and by continuously strengthening solidarity with the international revolutionary forces. To this end we must strengthen the party, further reinforce the ranks of revolution and carry on all our revolutionary struggles and construction work more vigorously.

~~SANITIZED COPY~~11097  
EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

16 April 1969

## INFORMAL MEMORANDUM

TO: White House Situation Room

[REDACTED] have no immediate knowledge of the location of the Netherlands-build ship [REDACTED] attempting to find the exact location.

2. The ship left the Netherlands on 28 March flying the Dutch flag and manned by a Dutch crew, and is scheduled to arrive in Hong Kong on 30 April - 1 May.

3. CIA analysts estimate that the ship is currently in the vicinity of Capetown, South Africa.

4. [REDACTED] the estimated Capetown location and is also attempting to establish the exact location of the ship.

CIA Operations Center

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

Per sec. 3.3(b)(1) Hr. 11/13/2013

By [REDACTED] NARA, Date 9/21/2017

NLW 09-H-01/11097 [P. 1 of 1]

SANITIZED COPY

On Monday, April 14, at approximately 5 p.m., a 4-engine, propeller-driven, Navy EC-121 aircraft took off from its base at Atsugi, Japan, for a reconnaissance mission in the Sea of Japan. The aircraft had thirty Navy personnel and one Marine enlisted man aboard. It was unarmed and its mission was a routine reconnaissance track over international waters. During the first three months of 1969, there were 190 flights similar in nature flown in this general area. Standing instructions for this kind of mission were that the aircraft was not to approach closer than 40 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea. In this particular instance, the aircraft commander was under orders from CINCPACFLT to approach no closer than 50 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea.

During its mission there were communications between the aircraft and its base. From a variety of sources, some of them sensitive, we are able to confirm that at all times during its mission the aircraft was far outside any claimed territorial airspace of North Korea.

All evidence now available to us, including North Korean claims and debris sightings, leads us to believe that the aircraft was shot down by North Korean aircraft.

Shortly after the Department of Defense received its first report that this reconnaissance aircraft may have been downed over the Sea of Japan by North Korean aircraft, a USAF C-130 search and rescue aircraft

departed Tachikawa Air Force Base, Japan. At 1:41 a.m. a flight of USAF F-106 aircraft departed Osan Air Force Base, Korea, for the area of the alleged incident to perform the mission of combat air support for the search and rescue aircraft. A USAF KC-135 tanker aircraft from Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, was also launched to provide air refueling support for the F-106 aircraft.

The HC-130 search and rescue aircraft was relieved by a US Navy P-3 from Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan, and another HC-130 from Tachikawa Air Force Base, which departed about 7:30 a.m. The rescue aircraft ran search patterns in the area and dropped flares during the night. Crew members reported dim lights, but there was no confirmation of any survivors. The aircraft were searching in an area approximately 95-100 nautical miles southeast of Chongjin, North Korea.

Other aircraft, including HC-97s, C-130s, and HU-16, HH-3 helicopters, another P-3, and additional HC-130s from Tachikawa Air Force Base, Japan, Anderson Air Base, Guam, Clark Air Force Base, P.I., Naha Air Base, Okinawa, and Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station in Japan were sent to join the search. Approximately 26 aircraft participated in the search and rescue missions by daylight Wednesday.

The US Navy also dispatched the USS DALE, and USS HENRY W. TUCKER, at 8:30 p.m. Tuesday night from Sasebo Naval Base, Japan, to assist in the search and rescue mission. The Destroyer USS HENRY W. TUCKER will be joined by a Navy SH-3A helicopter.

At noon on Tuesday, Secretary of State Rogers talked with Ambassador Dobrynin of the Soviet Union and requested his government's assistance in the search and rescue effort. Subsequently on Tuesday, it was reported from the search area that two Soviet destroyer-type ships were operating in the immediate vicinity of the search area where a US P-3 patrol aircraft had sighted debris in the water. The P-3 assisted in directing the Soviet ships to the scene of the debris. As of that time (approximately 10 pm), however, there still was no confirmation of any survivors. Reconnaissance missions of this type have been flown for more than twenty years in The Sea of Japan. There was nothing unusual about this mission. In recent years, these missions have been approved by high government authorities in the State and Defense Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House. Each of these missions constitutes a lawful use of international airspace.

SECRET  
UNCLASSIFIED

DRAFT STATEMENT - April 15, 1969

ALL TIMES ARE EST

On Monday, April 14, at approximately 5 PM, a 4-engine, propeller-driven, Navy EC-121 aircraft took off from its base at Atsugi, Japan, for a reconnaissance mission in the Sea of Japan. The aircraft had thirty Navy personnel and one Marine enlisted man aboard. It was unarmed and its mission was a routine reconnaissance track over international waters. Standing instructions for this kind of mission were that the aircraft was not to approach closer than 40 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea. In this particular instance, the aircraft commander was under orders from CINCPACFLT to approach no closer than 50 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea.

During its mission there were communications between the aircraft and its base. From a variety of sources, some of them sensitive, we are able to confirm that at all times during its mission the aircraft was far outside any claimed territorial airspace of North Korea.

Shortly before 1 AM on Tuesday, April 15, the Department of Defense received a report that this reconnaissance aircraft had been downed over the Sea of Japan by North Korean aircraft. Thereafter, a USAF C-130 search and rescue aircraft departed Tachikawa Air Force Base, Japan. At 1:41 AM a flight of USAF F-106 aircraft departed Osan Air Force Base, Korea, for the area of the alleged incident to perform the mission of combat air support for the search and rescue aircraft. A USAF KC-135 tanker aircraft from Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa, was also launched to provide air refueling support for the F-106 aircraft.

UNCLASSIFIED  
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 RS

The HC-130 search and rescue aircraft was relieved by a US Navy P-3 from Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan, and another HC-130 from Tachikawa Air Force Base, which departed about 7:30 AM. The rescue aircraft ran search patterns in the area and dropped flares during the night. Crew members reported dim lights, but there was no confirmation of any survivors. The aircraft were searching in an area approximately 95-100 nautical miles southeast of Chongjin, North Korea.

Other aircraft, including HC-97s, C-130s, and HU-16, HH-3 helicopters, another P-3, and additional HC-130s from Tachikawa Air Force Base, Japan, Anderson Air Base, Guam, Clark Air Force Base, P.I., Naha Air Base, Okinawa, and Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station in Japan were sent to join the search. Approximately 26 aircraft participated in the search and rescue missions by daylight Wednesday.

The US Navy also dispatched the USS DALE, and USS HENRY W. TUCKER, at 8:30 PM Tuesday night from Sasebo Naval Base, Japan, to assist in the search and rescue mission. The Destroyer USS HENRY W. TUCKER will be joined by a Navy SH-3A helicopter.

At noon on Tuesday, Secretary of State Rogers talked with Ambassador Dobrynin of the Soviet Union and requested his government's assistance in the search and rescue effort. Subsequently on Tuesday, it was reported from the search area that two Soviet destroyer-type ships were operating in the immediate vicinity of the search area where a US P-3 patrol aircraft had sighted debris in the water. The P-3 assisted in directing the Soviet ships to the scene of the debris. As of that time (approximately 10 PM), however, there still was no

confirmation of any survivors.

Since this particular track was first flown in November 1968, there have been a total of nine such missions flown. Six of them since January 1969. Each of these missions has been approved by high government authorities in the State and Defense Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House. There have been almost 1,000 reconnaissance flights within 60 nautical miles of the East Coast of North Korea since January 1968. Each of these missions constitutes a lawful use of international airspace.

*HOUDERK*

APRIL 16, 1969 ALL TIMES ARE EST

ON MONDAY, APRIL 14, AT APPROXIMATELY 5 P.M., A 4-ENGINE PROPELLER-DRIVEN, NAVY EC-121 AIRCRAFT TOOK OFF FROM ITS BASE AT ATSUGI, JAPAN, FOR A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE SEA OF JAPAN. THE AIRCRAFT HAD THIRTY NAVY PERSONNEL AND ONE MARINE ENLISTED MAN ABOARD. IT WAS UNARMED AND ITS MISSION WAS A ROUTINE RECONNAISSANCE TRACK OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS. DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF 1969, THERE WERE 190 FLIGHTS SIMILAR IN NATURE FLOWN IN THIS GENERAL AREA. STANDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THIS KIND OF MISSION WERE THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS NOT TO APPROACH CLOSER THAN 40 NAUTICAL MILES TO THE COAST OF NORTH KOREA. IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, THE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER WAS UNDER ORDERS FROM CINCPACFLT TO APPROACH NO CLOSER THAN 50 NAUTICAL MILES TO THE COAST OF NORTH KOREA.

DURING ITS MISSION THERE WERE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE AIRCRAFT AND ITS BASE. FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES, SOME OF THEM SENSITIVE, WE ARE ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT AT ALL TIMES DURING ITS MISSION THE AIRCRAFT WAS FAR OUTSIDE ANY CLAIMED TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE OF NORTH KOREA.

ALL EVIDENCE NOW AVAILABLE TO US, INCLUDING NORTH KOREAN CLAIMS AND DEBRIS SIGHTINGS, LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT THE AIRCRAFT WAS SHOT DOWN BY NORTH KOREAN AIRCRAFT. AS OF THIS HOUR, REGRETFULLY, THERE HAS BEEN NO REPORT OF SURVIVORS.

SHORTLY AFTER THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECEIVED ITS FIRST

*(over for last sentence)*



1A

SEA OF JAPAN BY NORTH KOREAN AIRCRAFT, A USAF C-130 SEARCH AND RESCUE AIRCRAFT DEPARTED TACHIKAWA AIR FORCE BASE, JAPAN. AT 1:41 A.M. A FLIGHT OF USAF F-106 AIRCRAFT DEPARTED OSAN AIR ~~BASE~~ BASE, KOREA, FOR THE AREA OF THE INCIDENT TO PERFORM THE MISSION OF COMBAT AIR SUPPORT FOR THE SEARCH AND RESCUE AIRCRAFT. A USAF KC-135 TANKER AIRCRAFT FROM KADENA AIR ~~BASE~~ BASE, OKINAWA, WAS ALSO LAUNCHED TO PROVIDE AIR REFUELING SUPPORT FOR THE F-106 AIRCRAFT.

THE HC-130 SEARCH AND RESCUE AIRCRAFT WAS RELIEVED BY A US NAVY P-3 FROM IWAKUNI ~~MARINE CORPS~~ AIR STATION, JAPAN, AND ANOTHER HC-130 FROM TACHIKAWA AIR ~~FORCE~~ BASE, WHICH DEPARTED ABOUT 7:30 AM. THE RESCUE AIRCRAFT RAN SEARCH PATTERNS IN THE AREA AND DROPPED FLARES DURING THE NIGHT. CREW MEMBERS REPORTED DIM LIGHTS, BUT THERE WAS NO CONFIRMATION OF ANY SURVIVORS. THE AIRCRAFT WERE SEARCHING IN AN AREA APPROXIMATELY 95-100 NAUTICAL MILES SOUTHEAST OF CHONGJIN, NORTH KOREA.

OTHER AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING HC-97s, C-130s, AND HU-16, HH-3 HELICOPTERS, ANOTHER P-3, AND ADDITIONAL HC-130s FROM TACHIKAWA AIR ~~FORCE~~ BASE, JAPAN, ANDERSON AIR BASE, GUAM, CLARK AIR FORCE BASE, P.I, NAHA AIR BASE, OKINAWA, AND IWAKUNI ~~MARINE CORPS~~ AIR STATION IN JAPAN JOINED THE SEARCH.

THE US NAVY ALSO DISPATCHED THE USS DALE, AND USS HENRY W. TUCKER, AT 8:30 PM TUESDAY NIGHT FROM SASEBO NAVAL BASE, JAPAN, TO ASSIST IN THE SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION. THEY ARE IN THE SEARCH AREA NOW.

AT NOON ON TUESDAY, SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS TALKED WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN OF THE SOVIET UNION AND REQUESTED HIS GOVERNMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN THE SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORT.

PASS TO PA DESK

LAST PAGE - 11AM OO release

SUBSEQUENTLY ON TUESDAY, IT WAS REPORTED FROM THE SEARCH AREA THAT TWO SOVIET DESTROYER-TYPE SHIPS WERE OPERATING IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE SEARCH AREA WHERE A US P-3 PATROL AIRCRAFT HAD SIGHTED DEBRIS IN THE WATER. US AIRCRAFT ASSISTED IN DIRECTING THE SOVIET SHIPS TO THE SCENE AND IN THE RECOVERY OF SOME DEBRIS. RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN FLOWN FOR MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS IN THE SEA OF JAPAN. THERE WAS NOTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT THIS MISSION. IN RECENT YEARS, THESE MISSIONS HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY HIGH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN THE STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE WHITE HOUSE. EACH OF THESE MISSIONS CONSTITUTES A LAWFUL USE OF INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

April 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: North Korean Fish Factories

In September 1967 the North Koreans ordered two fish processing vessels of 7,050 tons capacity each, to be completed in 1969 and to cost about \$7 million each. The Keungong San is completed and left Dutch waters in the last week of March en route to North Korea. The other will not be completed until November 1969.

The North Koreans paid 20 percent of the contract price down; the balance is covered by an eight year export credit guaranteed by the Netherlands Government. Our best information is that title will not pass to the North Koreans until delivery in North Korea.

The Keungong San is being sailed by a Dutch crew under Dutch flag. A North Korean crew had arrived in The Netherlands to take delivery of the vessel but, following a New York Times story that the United States Government was contemplating seizing the ship for use in the Pueblo negotiations, the shipyard announced that a Dutch crew would deliver it to North Korea.

We do not know the route which the Keungong San is taking, but are endeavoring urgently to find out. Her speed is approximately ten knots an hour.

We are advised by counsel that the legal position is as follows: Prior to 1945, seizure of a North Korean ship under existing circumstances could probably have been justified under international law as an act of reprisal. This was, however, changed by the United Nations Charter, Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, which proscribe this kind of use of force. This provision of the Charter has been consistently supported by the United States, which has, for example, regularly condemned reprisals by both sides in the Arab-Israeli crisis. The Security Council has, with our support, condemned reprisals by force on several occasions.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/82  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
RS

If, despite these considerations and the political consequences referred to below, it were decided to seize the Keungong San, the best justification we could make would be that the act was justified, not by reference solely to the shooting down of our plane, but as a response to a continuing series of lawless depredations, and as a last resort after we had exhausted all available channels and redress. We believe that this would require in this case, first, to make all reasonable efforts bilaterally with North Korea and through the United Nations before resorting to reprisal.

It would be a novel doctrine, the general acceptability of which would be doubtful. It is also doubtful whether the establishment of such doctrine would be in our long-term interest.

Thus, even if the title to the ship were fully North Korean, and she was sailing under the North Korean flag, manned by a North Korean crew, seizure of the ship on the high seas would involve major legal difficulties. We believe that such an action, even with respect to a North Korean ship and under great provocation, would give rise to widespread criticism of the United States from friend and foe. Moreover, the United States, as one of the great maritime nations, has a profound interest, both commercial and military, in the maintenance of the principle of the freedom of the high seas. This is the principle which we invoked in connection with the seizure of the Pueblo.

This situation would be aggravated in this case, since the ship is under Dutch flag and manned by a Dutch crew and probably still owned by a Dutch firm. Under international law, the flag is dispositive. The Dutch Government is directly involved in the transaction because of its guarantee of the payment loan.

To seize this ship, therefore, would cause us real difficulties with the Dutch Government, which has been and is a staunch and cooperative ally, and which was, as you know, disappointed because it was not possible for President Nixon to include The Hague in his European trip.

The Dutch also will not forget that after the release of the Pueblo crew, a senior official of the Dutch Foreign Office pointedly said to one of our Embassy officers that, while his Government had not hesitated to assist the United States in any way it could to obtain release of the Pueblo crew because of their humanitarian concern, he assumed, now that the crew was released, that the United States would take no steps to interfere with delivery of the ship by a Dutch crew to North Korea.

In early December, during security discussions with the Japanese, the Deputy Vice Foreign Minister asked if we had any plans with respect to the ships. We said that we had let the North Koreans know of our interest in them, to which the Vice Minister replied by stating quite formally that Japan "would regret it if we took any action against those ships on the high seas".

Moreover, other NATO allies would undoubtedly be critical of such action by the United States against a vessel under the flag of one of the smaller NATO partners. This would be particularly serious, coming as it would, after a most cordial NATO meeting with President Nixon, in which he gave renewed assurances of close consultation and cooperation with our NATO partners.

We feel that the only way in which we could hope to accomplish anything with respect to these ships without adverse effects on U.S. interests would be to approach the Dutch directly with the request that they cancel the sale, or at least delay the delivery. If action with respect to the ships is desired, we recommend that this should be done.

A draft telegram requesting our Embassy to make such an approach is appended for use if desired.

EA/K:WGBrom:lm

Cleared:

EUR - Mr. Springsteen (substance)  
EUR/FBX - Mr. Tenguy  
L - Mr. Aldrich

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

Intelligence  
Note - 274

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

APR 17 10 20 PM '69

April 16, 1969

- ALLEN
- BERGSTEN
- CHAPIN
- HALPERIN
- HOEDEK
- KEENE
- LEMNITZER
- LYNN
- MOOR
- MORRIS
- SANDERS
- SCHNEIDER
- SWANWELBY
- WIKY

To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S  
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *tlm*

Subject: Pyongyang's Motivations in Downing US Reconnaissance Plane

North Korean fighters shot down an American EC-121 reconnaissance plane with a crew of 31 over the Sea of Japan in the early afternoon of April 15, Korean time. Within two hours of the event, Radio Pyongyang broadcast a report of the downing which claimed that the plane had intruded deep into North Korean airspace for a reconnaissance "provocation." For good measure, the broadcast accused the US of a serious provocation in the DMZ the same morning. The North Korean representative to the Panmunjom Military Armistice Commission (MAC) proposed a meeting on April 18, presumably to discuss the alleged provocations.

Intrusion Charge Fabricated. Although the North Koreans asserted that the plane had violated their airspace, the aircraft was under orders to remain at least 50 nautical miles from North Korean territory. The wreckage of the plane has been sighted 90 miles off the coast of North Korea. The intrusion charge, nevertheless, is difficult to refute because Pyongyang can and probably will claim that it chased the intruder out of its airspace into the Sea of Japan.

Birthday Present for Kim? It is probably more than coincidence that the downing occurred on Kim Il-song's 57th birthday. The swift announcement of the North Korean action and the coordinated follow-through at Panmunjom

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/82 by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958 RS

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

GROUP 1  
 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

have the earmarks of a planned action. Although the North Koreans probably would not have known in advance of the US reconnaissance mission, the frequency of such missions off the North Korean coast would permit them to pick any date they desired with a good chance of intercepting an American aircraft.

The attack on the US plane fits in with Kim Il-song's domestic and international strategies. It dramatizes for home consumption the allegation that the US is creating a tense situation in Korea which must be met by heavy North Korean defense expenditures, and it diverts attention from the lack of North Korean success in reunifying the country through a revolution in the South. It demonstrates to the world the wisdom of Kim's thesis which holds that small countries can defeat US "imperialism" piecemeal if they keep up the struggle.

No Specific Link to US Actions. Pyongyang has singled out no American action which might justify an attack on a US reconnaissance plane over international waters. North Korean propaganda has condemned a US/ROK joint military exercise in South Korea during March, has criticized congressional testimony of Secretaries Rogers and Laird, and denounced the South Korean Prime Minister's discussions in Washington in early April. But thus far North Korea has drawn no clear relationship between these American activities and the downing of the plane.

The most likely North Korean motivation, then, is self-gratification and increased prestige for Kim Il-song at the expense of the United States, following a plan based on Pyongyang's Pueblo experience. Secondly, the

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

North Koreans may have wished to halt American reconnaissance operations, for reasons of "face" or military security.

Pyongyang may also believe that its hostile act against an American reconnaissance plane based in Japan serves the foreign policy goal of adding to the controversy over renewal of the US-Japan security treaty and use of Okinawa. It has given considerable propaganda attention in recent months to the necessity of opposing both Japan and the US in Asia, fully aware that the American defense commitment to South Korea is closely related to Japanese-US military cooperation.

SECRET



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 April 1969  
0917 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

JS 3.3(b)(5)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Missing US Navy EC-121 Aircraft

Reference: NMCC MFR 0625 EST, 15 April 1969, same subject

1: The following events and actions have been taken in regard to the shutdown of a US Navy EC-121 aircraft with crew of 31 aboard reported in referenced MFR.

2. Mission Background. The mission was sent by CINCPACFLEET under the direction of CINCPAC. The risk assessment was made by CINCPACFLT, approved by CINCPAC and further approved DEPSECDEF and JCS.

[REDACTED]

- a. Intercept actions likely
- b. Defensive patrols almost certain
- c. Possibility of direct US involvement moderate and indirect involvement low.

d. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] two North Korean fighter aircraft flew from Hoemun-ni airbase eastward over the Sea of Japan. The fighters appeared to effect intercept of the EC-121 aircraft when the track of the fighters and the mission aircraft were reported as merged. The North Korean aircraft then returned to their home station. Subsequently, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service quoted broadcasts from Pyongyang, Korea, as saying that the Korean People's Army shot down a large-sized US reconnaissance plane which intruded into their airspace to perpetrate actions of reconnaissance.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5  
By [Signature] NARA, Date 9/22/2012  
12009-H-01/11098 [P. of 13]

[REDACTED]

4. Search and Rescue (SAR). (a) Additional HC-130 and a P-3A SAR aircraft will be in the rescue area at approximately 150900 EST. These aircraft will relieve HC-130 SAR aircraft on station; (b) Destroyers (DD) Dale and Tucker underway from Sasebo, Japan, at 1500759 EST with an estimated 24-hour time enroute; (c) Tanker and combat air patrol aircraft are orbiting in the area; (d) At 150755 EST CINCPAC reports that SAR aircraft reports sighting survivors and smoke flares in the area; CINCPAC has notified 5th Air Force to order other reconnaissance aircraft to remain over South Korean land mass south of 37 degrees north.

5. Two unidentified destroyer size or larger ships were sighted by search aircraft at 150255 EST Apr in the approximate search area moving at a high rate of speed in a northerly heading. Other reports indicate USSR TU-16's over the Sea of Japan in a probable reconnaissance of the shutdown area.

*Robert L. Baughan Jr.*


ROBERT L. BAUGHAN, JR.  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

DISTRIBUTION:

1	WHSR	ADDO	28
2	SECSTATE	CCOC	29
3	SECDEF		
4	DEPSECDEF		
5	ASD/ISA		
6	ASD/PA	STATE REP	34
7-10	CJCS (4)	PAC DESK	35
11-13	DJS (3)	J-4	36
14	SJCS	J-5	37
15	J-30	PA REP	38
16	J-31		
17	J-32		
18	J-33		
19	J-34		
20	J-35		
21	PAC DIV		
22, 23	AOC (2)		
24	NFP		
25 & 39	AFCP (2)		
26	MCCC		
27	DDO		

JS 3.3(b)(5)

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 22 Oct 2016 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: 3.3(b)(5)  
MDR: 12 -M- 3602



~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 April 1969  
0625 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Missing US Navy EC-121 Aircraft

1. At 150054 EST the NMCC received a report that a US reconnaissance aircraft had possibly been downed over the Sea of Japan by North Korean aircraft. The incident reportedly occurred at 142347 EST. The position of the alleged shoot-down is indicated on the attached map (Incl 1) as well as the planned flight route of a US Navy reconnaissance EC-121 aircraft flying in the area at the time.
2. At 150141 EST a flight of USAF F-106 aircraft departed Osan AB, Korea, for the area of the alleged incident to perform the mission of combat air support for search and rescue (SAR) aircraft. At 150122 EST a USAF C-130 aircraft departed Tachikawa AB, Japan, to perform SAR with an estimated time en route to the suspected area of 2 hours. A USAF KC-135 tanker aircraft from Kadena AB, Okinawa, is also airborne to provide air refueling support for the F-106 aircraft.
3. No US Navy ships are reported near the area of the alleged incident. At 150258 EST COMSEVENTHFLT directed two destroyers to proceed to the area at best speed to conduct search and rescue. These ships will depart from the naval base at Sasebo, Japan, when ready for sea.
4. Fifth Air Force has alerted conventional forces to maximum readiness for deployment to forward operating bases in Korea. Deployment is to be expected not earlier than 151000 EST.
5. Reports from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service quotes broadcasts from Pyongyang, Korea, as saying that the Korean People's Army shot down a large-size reconnaissance plane of the United States which intruded into their airspace to perpetrate acts of reconnaissance.
6. The position given in the initial report to the NMCC places the alleged incident approximately 90 nautical miles from the coastline of North Korea.
7. Inclosure 2 is the DOD/STATE news release concerning the incident.


- 2 Incls  
1. Map  
2. News release

~~TOP SECRET~~

*M. W. Kendall*  
M. W. KENDALL  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

SANITIZED COPY

SANITIZED  
3.3(b)(1)(5)



SANITIZED COPY

DOD/STATE PRESS RELEASE

The North Koreans have claimed that they have intercepted and shot down a US military aircraft. We can report the following.

Aerial search operations are underway in the Sea of Japan approximately 95 miles southeast of Chongjin, North Korea, for a four-engine, propeller-driven US Navy EC-121 aircraft with a reported 31 persons aboard.

The reconnaissance aircraft, based at Atsugi, Japan, has been missing since about midnight Monday, EST. The flight began at approximately 5 PM EST, April 14.


The aircraft commander was under orders to approach no closer than 50 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea.

Names of the men aboard the aircraft will be released following notification of next of kin. We have no additional details at this time.

*Incl 2*

SANITIZED COPY

SANITIZED  
3.3(b)(1)(5)



SANITIZED COPY



# WESTPAC -- NAVAL & MARINE FORCES

**SECRET**

9 APR 69

NAVY

OTHER CARRIERS SEE PAGE 11

JAPAN

1 PATROL SQ P-3 9  
 1 EARLY WARN SQ EC-121 6  
 EA-3 10  
 TA-3 1

PHILIPPINES

1 EARLY WARN DET EA-3 2  
 SP-2 6  
 3 PATROL SQ P-3 12  
 1 HVY ATK SQ AP-2 2  
 1 COMPOSITE DET RC-45 1  
 US-2 3  
 A-4 5

GUAM

2 EARLY WARN SQ C-121 1  
 EC-130 2  
 EC-121 1  
 WC-121 5

1 HVY PHOTO SQ RA-3 5  
 1 HVY PHOTO DET

AFLOAT WESTPAC

3 CVA

9 ATK SQ

6 FTR SQ

1 HVY RECON SQ A-4 72  
 2 PHOTO RECON DET A-6 24  
 E-1 29  
 KA-3 48  
 E-2 26  
 EKA-3 6  
 UH-2 8  
 3 3  
 3 8  
 9 9  
 10 10

OKINAWA

1 PATROL SQ P-3 9  
 1 COMPOSITE SQ UH-34 4  
 F-8 5  
 US-2 9

JAPAN  
1 MAG

1 FTR ATK SQ F-4 14

MARINES

OKINAWA  
 1 AIR REFUEL SQ KC-130 10  
 1 RLT REAR

29 00 6 SSBN 1 AH  
 13 SS/SSN 1 CA  
 1 BB 1 LPH

**SECRET**

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 April 1969  
0655 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Missing USN EC-121 Aircraft

Reference: a. NMCC MFR 0625 EST 15 April, same subject  
b. NMCC MFR 0917 EST 15 April, same subject  
c. NMCC MFR 1206 EST 15 April, same subject  
d. NMCC MFR 2025 EST 15 April, same subject

1. The NMCC has not received any information to indicate there were survivors of the EC-121 aircraft.
2. COMAFKOREA has reported that at 151122 EST, an HC-130 aircraft conducting SAR for the missing EC-121 aircraft overflew two surface vessels at 40-55N, 131-36E which were traveling north at a very slow speed, or, stationary in the water. The vessels were sweeping the area with searchlights and apparently engaged in rescue efforts. However, as the aircraft approached the vessels, the aircrew experienced radar interference and jamming of their high frequency radio set. Reference d reported USSR destroyers in the search area.
3. The US destroyer H.W. TUCKER, which arrived in the rescue area at 160540 EST, was overflown by Soviet Bear aircraft at 160000 EST. Twenty minutes later, USS DALE, the second DD in this group, was overflown by two Bear aircraft. The two Bears were photographed by two F-106 fighters which were conducting Combat Air Patrol (CAP). Two additional US destroyers, the USS STERETT and USS MAHAN, have sailed from Yokosuka, Japan, and are expected to arrive in the search area at 170040 EST.
4. US Air Force search aircraft dropped a URC-10 survival radio to the USSR DDs which was promptly recovered. At 160125 EST, the aircraft had established voice contact with the DDs and dropped smoke bombs on surface debris they wished recovered. The Russians responded and recovered the debris. Additionally, to aid in this effort, a Russian speaking crew member augmented an HC-130 aircrew that was launched from Osan AB, Korea, at 160130 EST.
5. The SAR aerial activity continues with three HC-130 aircraft, four C-130s, and two HC-97 aircraft. Continuous

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAP of the search area is being provided by F-4C and F-106 aircraft with air-to-air refueling accomplished by KC-135 tankers.


*M. W. Kendall*

M. W. KENDALL  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations, NMCC

1 Atch  
Map  
Distribution:

- WHSR
- SECSTATE
- SECDEF
- DEPSECDEF
- ASD/ISA
- ASD/PA
- CJCS (4)
- DJS (3)
- SJCS
- J-30
- J-31
- J-32
- J-33
- J-34
- J-35
- PAC DIV
- AOC
- NFP
- AFCP
- MCCC


JS 3.3(b)(5)

- DDO
- ADDO
- CCOC
- 
- STATE REP
- PA REP
- J-4
- J-5
- PAC DESK

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED COPY

SANITIZED  
3.3(b)(1)(5)



SANITIZED COPY



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 April 1969  
0710 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

o Subject: Missing EC-121 Aircraft

- Reference:
- a. NMCC MFR 0625 EST 15 April, same subject
  - b. NMCC MFR 0917 EST 15 April, same subject
  - c. NMCC MFR 1206 EST 15 April, same subject
  - d. NMCC MFR 2025 EST 15 April, same subject
  - e. NMCC MFR 0655 EST 16 April, same subject

CINCPAC advised the NMCC at 160625 EST that an HC-130 aircraft had made voice contact with the Russian DD 580 at the crash site. The Russians were asked if there were survivors and/or aircraft parts on board. The Russians advised they had no survivors on board, nor had any been seen; aircraft parts were on board, however. Permission was granted for a low altitude pass across the vessel and pictures were taken. The aircraft parts observed consisted of an aircraft wheel, ladder, and a shirt.

*M. W. Kendall*  
 M. W. KENDALL  
 Brigadier General, USA  
 Deputy Director for  
 Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

WH&R	PAC DIV
SECSTATE	AOC
SECDEF	NFP
DEPSECDEF	AFCP
ASD/ISA	MCCC
ASD/PA	DDO
CJCS (4)	ADDO
DJS (3)	CCOC
SJCS	
J-30	
J-31	
J-32	STATE REP
J-33	PA REP
J-34	J-4
J-35	J-5
	PAC DESK

JS 3.3(b)(5)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Surinder

April 15, 1969

**UNCLASSIFIED**

SECRET

TO: EA - Ambassador Brown

FROM: L - George H. Aldrich *GHA*

SUBJECT: Relationship of Armistice Agreement to the North Korean Shooting Down of a U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft

1. The question has been raised whether the North Korean shooting down of a United States reconnaissance plane over international waters off Korea involves a violation of the Armistice Agreement. This question is not free from doubt, and a reasonable argument can be made for both conclusions. The Agreement requires each side to "order and enforce complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control." With respect to air forces, paragraph 16 provided:

"This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both."

It was clearly understood during the negotiations of the Armistice Agreement that the phrase "contiguous waters" referred to a twelve-mile side strip adjacent to the coasts of Korea and that normal air and naval activity outside of twelve miles would be permitted. However, it is not clear from either the text or the negotiating history whether attacks outside of the twelve-mile limit would constitute violations of the Armistice. Clearly attacks unrelated to the security of Korea would not involve Armistice violations, but for attacks on a ship or aircraft whose function is clearly related to the support of the U.N. Command, there is no clear answer.

A second problem in the present case is the fact that the aircraft was not operationally under the U.N. Command and flew out of Japan. A technical reading of the Armistice Agreement could easily result in the conclusion that attacks on non-U.N. Command aircraft were not violations. On the other hand, since the states involved in the Korean War

**UNCLASSIFIED**

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
*RS*

were, in effect, bound by the Agreement signed by their military representatives, it is probably more reasonable to consider that all armed forces of these states are bound, at least insofar as they are operating in direct support of one side in Korea.

2. The question has also been asked whether any forceful response by the United States would involve a violation by us of the Armistice Agreement. I believe that it would, at least unless limited to an action against a ship or aircraft found more than twelve miles from the Korean coast. As noted above, the Agreement applies to all forces of the opposing sides. That should be understood to cover forces in Korea or other forces with a direct functional relationship to those forces. Attacks within Korea by our side or by the other must be considered Armistice violations without regard to the command structure of these forces. Thus, a responsive use of force in Korea would inevitably involve an Armistice violation. However, use of force by one side against the other outside the twelve-mile limit may arguably be either a violation of the Armistice Agreement or not. If that responsive use of force is related to hostile acts within Korea, the better conclusion probably is that it constitutes an Armistice violation.

In conclusion, I would point out that, as a matter of law, little if anything turns on the question of armistice violations. A violation by one side gives rise to no right for the other side to use force in response. Any resort to force must be justified under general international law. As you know, within the framework of the U.N. Charter, states are generally prohibited from using force against another state except in self-defense or when authorized by appropriate U.N. organs or by a regional organization.

L - Mr. Aldrich:lm



Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET 197

W

✓

PAGE 01 SEOUL 01907 161556Z

52  
ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00 NSCE 00 USIE 00 CIAE 00 /070 W

099478

O 161415Z APR 69  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5797  
INFO CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

SECRET SEOUL 1907

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

- ALLEN
- BERGSTEN
- CHAPIN
- HALPERIN
- HOBDEK
- KEENE R
- LEMNITZER
- LYNN
- MOOB
- MORRIS
- SANDERS
- SNEIDER
- SONNENFELDT
- VAKY

1. THE FOLLOWING ESTIMATE OF NK MOTIVES IN ATTACKING PLANE AND THEIR POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION, AND SOME SUGGESTIONS ARE PRESENTED IN EFFORT TO CONTRIBUTE TO CONSIDERATION OF THIS VEXING PROBLEM.

2. FIRST, WE ASSUME THAT THE "GO" ORDER FOR THE NK INTERCEPTORS CAME FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS AND THAT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF SPONTANEITY IN VIEW OF REPETITIVE NATURE OF THE FLIGHTS. (WE ASSUME THEY WERE REPETITIVE.) A FURTHER ASSUMPTION IS THAT NORTH KOREA, HAVING MADE THE DECISION, ANTICIPATED EITHER NO MILITARY RESPONSE OR ONLY A LIMITED ONE. THEIR EXPERIENCE IN THE PUEBLO AND BLUE HOUSE AFFAIRS WOULD JUSTIFY THIS ASSUMPTION ON THEIR PART.

3. AS WE CITE MOTIVES AND GUESS AT REASONING WE ARE AWARE THAT SOME OF OUR IDEAS MAY BE CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON AS "WAY OUT", BUT WE SHOULD ALL KEEP IN MIND THAT NK REGIME HAS LONG BEEN THAT FAR OUT AND IS ACCUSTOMED TO ACCEPT RISKS AND BRAZEN ITS WAY THROUGH THEM. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT EACH OF THESE "VICTORIES" MAKES THEIR LEADER WHOM THEY NOW CALL "THE RED SUN OF ASIA" AND "THE EVER-VICTORIOUS IRON-WILLED GENIUS" MORE DANGEROUS. HOPEFULLY, BY NOW WE UNDERSTAND THAT LEGAL NICETIES WILL NOT PROTECT SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT WHICH VENTURE WITHIN HIS REACH.

4. AS TO NK MOTIVES AND REASONING:

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 RS

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 SEUL 01907 161556Z

A. IF THE US RESPONSE TAKES THE FORM OF A MILITARY THREAT OR A LIMITED STRIKE, THE BENEFITS TO NK WILL BE MANIFOLD. DOMESTICALLY, A VERY TOUGH POPULACE WILL BE SPURRED ON TO GREATER FEATS OF PRODUCTION THAT MAY NOW BE CRUCIAL. ADDITIONALLY, THE DISPUTES IN NK WHATEVER THEY ARE, THAT HAVE BEEN HINTED AT IN RECENT NK PRONOUNCEMENTS MAY BE STILLED IN THE FACE OF TANGIBLE EXTERNAL PRESSURE. SUCH GAINS TO THE REGIME WOULD OUTWEIGH THE PHYSICAL LOSSES ANTICIPATED FROM A LIMITED U.S. STRIKE.

B. REPORTS OF U.S. WAR-WEARINESS OVER VIET-NAM AND OF A GROWING UNEASINESS ABOUT OUR MILITARY WISDOM MAY HAVE LED THE NK LEADERSHIP TO THINK SUCH AN ACT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE US PUBLIC TO WASH THEIR HANDS OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM. THEY MAY FEEL THE PUEBLO HEARINGS HAVE DONE MUCH TO EXPEDITE THIS SENTIMENT AND HOPE THAT YESTERDAY'S STRAW WILL PROVE THE FINAL ONE.

C. REGARDLESS OF WHAT FOLLOWS, THE FACT THAT A CLAIMED INTRUDER BELONGING TO THE MIGHTIEST AIR FORCE IN THE WORLD WAS SHOT DOWN IS A PROPAGANDA TRIUMPH NOT TO BE DISPARAGED, ESPECIALLY WHEN ACHIEVED IN CLOSE CONJUNCTION WITH THE LEADER'S BIRTHDAY; AND PARTICULARLY SO IN THE CASE OF A REGIME WHICH BASES ITS PHILOSOPHY ON THE THEORY THAT THE U.S. GIANT CAN BE BROUGHT DOWN BY THE CONCERTED ATTACKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LILLIPUTIANS. INCONCLUSIVE RETALIATION BY THE U.S. WOULD ONLY ENHANCE THE DESIRED IMAGE.

D. THE ABSENCE OF FORCEFUL RETALIATION WILL OF COURSE INCREASE RESENTMENT AND FRUSTRATION IN THE ROK. ON THE OTHER HAND, FROM THE NK POINT OF VIEW, ESCALATION RESULTING FROM RETALIATION CAN ONLY LEAD LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL SEGMENTS OF THE US TO QUESTION WHY WE ARE GETTING INVOLVED IN AN ACTION AS A RESULT OF THE POSITION OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT WHOSE LOCATION IS DISPUTED.

E. THE WORLD CONF. OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IS DUE SOON. NK RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS HAVE GROWN WARMER AFTER A BRIEF CHILL FOLLOWING PUEBLO. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DOUBT THE CHINESE ARE THE MORE COMPATIBLE IDEOLOGICAL BEDFELLOWS. AT THIS POINT IN TIME WITH A GROWING AND MILITANT ROK/US PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH THE SPECTER OF A DEEP AND PERHAPS IRREVOCABLE CPR/USSR SPLIT MUST BE PARTICULARLY FOREBODING. IF A THREAT TO NK COULD FORESTALL A FINAL SPLIT ITS PROVOCATION MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE.

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03. SEOUL 01907 161556Z.

F. N.K. UNDOUBTEDLY KNEW THE PLANES FLEW OUT OF JAPAN. THEY HAVE NEVER MADE ANY SECRET OF THEIR DISTRUST FOR, OR FEAR OF, US/JAPAN MILITARY COOPERATION. CREATING AN INCIDENT INVOLVING U.S. PLANES EX-JAPAN MAY HAVE BEEN SEEN AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO THROW MORE SAND INTO AN ALREADY CONGESTED MACHINE.

G. U.S. OPPOSITION TO RETALIATORY POLICES AS CURRENTLY PRACTICED IN THE M.O.E. MAY WELL INHIBIT U.S. REACTION.

H. AN EFFECTIVE NO-RESCUE SHOOT-DOWN AT SEA, WHICH THEY APPEAR TO HAVE ACHIEVED, WOULD PUT THEM IN A SATISFACTORY POSITION FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT TO CONTEST U.S. CLAIMS THAT THE INCIDENT OCCURRED IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE.

5. MY CONCLUSION IS THAT THE ~~ADVANTAGES TO NK IN TAKING THE RISK APPEAR TO THEM TO OUTWEIGH OURS IN RESPONDING MILITARILY.~~ THE ONLY IMMEDIATELY USEFUL OPTION APPEARS TO BE THAT IMPLIED BY YOUR ACTION THUS FAR--ADOPTION OF A POSTURE OF CALM AND OBJECTIVE INQUIRY AND ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A DISINTERESTED SOVIET INVOLVEMENT BY SEEKING COOPERATION IN AN AIR-SEA RESCUE OPERATION. HERE WITHIN THE ROK, IF WE NOTE AN EXCESSIVE REACTION, WE CAN IF WE DESIRE MAKE CERTAIN POINTS TO WHICH I BELIEVE THE ROKG WOULD BE ATTENTIVE. WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE THE LOCAL PRESS ON OUR BACKS, FOR A TIME, BUT THAT IS NOT AN UNBEARABLE BURDEN.

6. IF LEVERAGE ON NK IS BEING SOUGHT, I REGRET TO SAY THAT IT APPEARS TO EXIST ONLY IN THE FORM OF THEIR ~~GREAT ATTACHMENT TO THE MAC MEETINGS, TO WHICH THEY SUMMON THE UN/US REGULARLY,~~ AND I CANNOT SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHAT EFFECT OUR RELUCTANCE TO MEET THEIR SUMMONS WOULD PRODUCE. ALSO, THERE IS THE POSSIBLE EFFECT THAT U.S. INTEREST IN THE MOVEMENT OF THEIR SHIPSSD BUILDING IN EUROPEAN YARDS AND THEIR FREEDOM OF THE SEAS WOULD HAVE ON THEM. ~~MAXIMUM ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE, TO THE EXTENT THE JAPANESE AND OTHERS TRADING WITH THEM WOULD COOPERATE,~~ IS ANOTHER RESPONSE WORTH CONSIDERING BUT I THINK WE KNOW THE ANSWERS WE WOULD GET TO PROPOSALS OF THAT NATURE.

7. ALL OF THE FOREGOING IS APART FROM THE VALUE OF SUCH AIR MISSIONS AND EXERCISES NEAR THEIR COASTS, WHICH I HAVE CONSISTENTLY CHALLENGED, AND TO WHICH I SHALL RETURN IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

SECRET



Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 04 SEOUL 01907 161556Z

8. IN CONSIDERING HOW TO DEAL WITH A REGIME OF THIS NATURE I TEND TO REDUCE MY CHOICE TO THE DESIRABILITY OF ISOLATING THEM IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY, INCLUDING OF COURSE NOT PLACING UNPROTECTED TUBS AND ANTIQUATED AIRCRAFT WITHIN THEIR REACH WHILE AT THE SAME TIME UNDERTAKING AN EFFORT TO AFFECT THE ENTRAILS OF THE REGIME BY INDUCING OUR ROKI FRIENDS TO MAKE GESTURES TOWARD POSTAL EXCHANGE, CULTURAL EXCHANGE, AND FAMILY CONTACTS, WHICH I HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED TO DEPARTMENT.

GP-1.

PORTER

SECRET

SECRET  
UNCLASSIFIED

Intelligence

Note - 273

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

- ALLEN
- BERGSTEIN
- CHAPIN
- HALPERIN
- HOEDEK
- KEENEY M
- LEMNITZER
- LYNN
- MOOR
- MORRIS
- SAUNDERS
- SNEIDER
- SONNENFELDT
- VAKY

RECEIVED  
APR 16 10 13 PM '69

April 15, 1969

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

TH

Subject: North Korea: Estimated Reactions of Selected East Asian Countries and the Soviet Union to Possible US Courses of Action

In this IN we estimate the probable reactions of Communist China, the USSR, North Korea, South Korea and Japan to two alternative courses of action which the US may consider in connection with the shootdown of a US reconnaissance aircraft by the North Koreans in the Sea of Japan on April 15, 1969. One alternative considered is a mild US reaction employing diplomacy and foregoing the use of force; the other alternative is a stronger US reaction including the use of force.

Communist China. If the incident results in diplomatic rather than military action, Peking may well respond in a fashion similar to its handling of the Pueblo affair in January 1968. At that time Peking took a relatively cautious approach which gave support to North Korea but avoided any resounding public commitment to Pyongyang.

A somewhat stronger Chinese propaganda reaction can be expected in the event that the US retaliates militarily against North Korea or if rescue operations result in a clash between North Korean and US forces. However, the Chinese undoubtedly would wish to avoid a widening of the conflict, particularly at a time when Peking is in the final stages of its Party Congress and concerned with a Soviet threat along the Sino-Manchurian border. Though Peking would probably take certain defense measures such as increased

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 RS

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

SECRET

- 2 -

air patrols, Chinese military backing to the North Koreans seems unlikely unless Peking perceives a direct threat to its own security.

The Soviet Union. In response to a US diplomatic offensive the USSR will render Pyongyang full support, as it did at the time of the Pueblo crisis. Whatever it may think of the justness of the North Korean case, the USSR will publicly deride US claims. Moreover, because of its desire to preserve its role as protector of other communist states, the USSR (although it could not prevent UN discussion of the issue) would veto any UN resolution calling for an international investigation, as it did in 1960 in the case of the shoot-down of the RB-47 off the Soviet coast. Any step the US might take in the diplomatic realm would probably not be regarded by Moscow as a threat to its interests and any such step would be unlikely to have an adverse effect on bilateral US-Soviet relations.

As it demonstrated at the time of the Pueblo incident, the USSR regards any US military presence near its borders as a potential threat to itself. Moscow will probably take steps through private channels to dissuade the US from taking military action against North Korea, warning inter alia of the dangers of provoking Chinese intervention.

Any military action against a target in the upper half of North Korea would be regarded as posing a possible threat to Soviet airspace and perhaps territory. Any action elsewhere in North Korea would be vigorously condemned by the USSR. In neither instance, however, would a Soviet military response be likely unless Soviet airspace was violated, although the intensity of Soviet reactions may be determined in part by Peking's response. Moscow would, under any circumstance, replenish any losses of materiel Pyongyang might suffer.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

To add force to its condemnation of the US for military actions against North Korea, the USSR would probably take some steps to reduce contacts with the US, perhaps in the area of cultural exchanges and would exploit US actions to draw world attention away from its actions in Czechoslovakia. Only in the event that the US engaged in repeated attacks on North Korea or that general war broke out in Korea would the USSR be likely to curtail for more than a short period those contacts with the US which it regards as important.

Japan. If the US limits itself to a rescue operation and diplomatic measures such as a protest to Pyongyang, the impact in Japan will be minimal. A short-lived show of force and no further engagement with the North Koreans, e.g., the retention of naval and air forces in the Sea of Japan for three or four days after the rescue operation, would cause a more intense reaction, reflecting Japanese popular fear of involvement in war.

The longer and stronger the US military response, the less the Sato government will welcome it, because of the catalysing effect on opposition campaigns against the Security Treaty even if bases in Japan and Okinawa were not involved. The left wing opposition (the JCP and JSP) would welcome a US military response. It would come just as Sohyo's spring wage struggle is peaking and provide an emotional curtain raiser for Okinawan reversion demonstrations planned for April 28. By linking the plane incident and its aftermath with other issues, the left wing would hope to raise the level of public anxiety and excitement sufficiently to compel demonstrations by Komeito, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the conservative labor federation, Domei. The immediate objective would be to force Sato's resignation.

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

Should the US response come from units based in Okinawa, local reversionists could be expected to cover up their differences and pump life into their plans for the annual April 28 reversion rally. Use of Okinawa would also enhance opposition efforts for reversion in Japan, and embarrass the Sato government.

Should the US make a military response from bases in Japan, the Sato government would presumably state publicly that it had been consulted under the Security Treaty and had agreed. However, GOJ embarrassment would be acute and would probably be leaked to the press. Sato would probably come under fire from those in his own party who would like to replace him and he might be forced to step down.

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

North Korea. Any protests or demands we raise through diplomatic channels directly with the North Koreans are likely to be brushed aside in a flood of counter-charges about alleged American provocations. The North Koreans have already laid the groundwork to deal with our accusations by requesting a Military Amistice Commission (MAC) meeting for April 18. Pyongyang Radio's announcement of the plane downing claimed that the aircraft had intruded deep into North Korean airspace and added without elaboration a charge of simultaneous US provocation on the DMZ. The North Koreans obviously intend to press these charges if we accept the MAC meeting.

Protests or demarches through third countries or in the UN are not likely to have any effect on Pyongyang, judging by their handling of the Pueblo incident.

The North Koreans probably do not expect military retaliation by the United States. They probably chose the EC 121 as a target in the belief -- buttressed by the Pueblo experience -- that they could humiliate the United States at minimum risk. Had they desired a direct confrontation, an attack across the DMZ would have been the simplest provocation.

Nevertheless, the North Koreans have the will and the capability to defend themselves vigorously and at considerable cost to an attacking force. As an indication of North Korean reaction, the Pyongyang announcement of the plane downing warned that the North Korean People's Army would "retaliate immediately to any provocative acts of the U.S. imperialist aggressors with a hundredfold revenge." This broad deterrent statement parallels other North Korean warnings to the US recently, for example in connection with the joint US/ROK mobile

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

exercise conducted in March. Its operational meaning has never been tested, but it suggests at the minimum a readiness to deal with retaliatory efforts with all the military means available.

The possibility of less rational action by the North Koreans cannot be dismissed, including counter-measures against US installations in South Korea either along the DMZ or bases in the ROK interior. However, they probably recognize that they are in no position to undertake prolonged hostilities with the United States, unless they are backed by either the Soviet Union or Communist China. They cannot be sure of support from either at this stage.

Republic of Korea. A low-key US response would meet with strong ROK disapproval and a sharp decline in South Korean confidence in the United States. Coming after what they regard as a weak response to the Pueblo and DMZ incidents, they would regard such a response as an open invitation to further and stronger North Korean provocation. Fear of such actions could lead the government to impose stricter internal security controls.

Conversely, of course, the ROK would welcome a strong US response, which would not only bolster their own confidence but be regarded by them also as enhancing US stature and position in East Asia.

SECRET

*Some for Both May.*

TALKING POINTS - NSC MEETING

April 16, 1969

KOREA

- I. At this meeting I would like to have a discussion for perhaps one hour of what our specific options and alternatives are.
- II. We might begin with the briefings that have been requested:
  - A. A briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the EC121 operation (5 minutes).
  - B. A briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the enemy situation (5 minutes).
  - C. A briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the full range of available military options (15 minutes).
  - D. A briefing by the Secretary of State on political considerations and options (15 minutes).
- III. Call on Dr. Kissinger to open the discussion.

the pros and cons of the alternatives which Gen. Wheeler has also discussed. It also presents a package of diplomatic actions which could accompany various levels of force and discusses the purposes of diplomatic action.

A. Should we engage in a military show of force, the purposes of diplomacy would be:

1. To underline seriousness with which we view North Korean action.
2. To demonstrate responsibility and restraint of U. S. reaction.
3. To establish legal basis for U. S. position.
4. To promote international acceptance of U. S. military action.
5. To secure domestic support for U. S. military action.

B. If we engage in single strikes or broader military action, the purposes of diplomacy would be:

1. To establish the legal basis for the U. S. action.
2. To neutralize international criticism and censure and to develop a modicum of international support for the action.
3. To seek public support for the U. S. action in Korea and for continued U. S. commitments elsewhere in Asia, particularly in Vietnam.

- V. The first options presented assume no military action and considered two basic alternative diplomatic postures.
- A. A high posture designed to seek a maximum of publicity and to mobilize public opinion.
  - B. A low posture of working behind the scenes to achieve some accommodation.
- VI. With a high or low posture we could seek to convey privately our genuine determination to react militarily to any future provocation.
- A. Diplomatic steps might include one or more of such objectives as:
    1. Conveying an explicit warning that the next incident would be responded to militarily.
    2. Conveying a maximum warning for deterrent purposes without being precise on military action ensuing.
    3. Demanding compensation for the lives of the men involved and for the plane.
    4. Maximizing international opprobrium against North Korea for its action.
    5. Seeking to reduce the level of international tension by treating the matter in relatively calm form (having already decided not to react militarily).

The paper also considered options with regard to the following:

A. Talks at Panmunjom

1. Accept the North Korean call for April 18 meeting, listen to their complaint, present our own position in a few sentences and then walk out. This has the advantage of maintaining the Panmunjom forum while walking out implies that we will not continue to accept Panmunjom as a forum for propaganda. It has the disadvantage of putting us in the apparent position of coming to hear North Korean charges.
2. Call our own meeting for an earlier date. This has the advantage of making us the plaintiff and having us speak first. The North Koreans would probably press their claim to convene the meeting and a procedural hassle could ensue.
3. Call for a closed meeting on the Pueblo model. This has the advantage of a forum for making a serious warning. However, it is not necessary and the ROK public would probably be angered.
4. Boycott Panmunjom. This has the advantage of being dramatic and denying the North Koreans a propaganda forum. But the disadvantages are that we would lose our only channel for direct contact.

B. UN Options

1. Calling a Security Council Meeting. This would gain maximum publicity but we could not obtain any action and we would force the Soviets to defend the North Koreans.
2. Present a letter to the Security Council. This gets our position on the record but with little publicity and appears perfunctory.

C. Approach to the Soviets. We could approach the Soviets in a more pressing fashion, depending on their apparent interest in avoiding a military conflict. However, the Soviets are unlikely to press Pyongyang very hard on this situation.

VII. Perhaps we should first discuss the overall pros and cons of taking any military action and then consider the diplomacy which we might pursue in the absence of military action and then in support of alternate courses of military action.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE  
UNCLASSIFIED

The attached is an urgent paper to be  
the subject of discussion at the National  
Security Council meeting 10:00 AM 16 April.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 *RS*

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE  
UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION  
IN RESPONSE TO KOREAN ATTACK ON US AIRCRAFT

This paper examines possible U.S. courses of military and diplomatic actions in response to the North Korean attack on the U.S. EC-121 aircraft. It first states assumptions regarding the possible survival of the crew and North Korean intentions, and then lists possible objectives of U.S. actions. Alternative military courses of action with associated diplomatic actions are discussed as follows:

1. Show of force
2. Single select military combat actions
3. Other military actions

Diplomatic alternatives are then discussed on the assumption that we are taking no military action.

I. Assumptions

- A. The aircrew has not been taken prisoner by North Korea. (Different courses of action would be required to seek the return of any crewmen captured.)
- B. The North Korean action was taken independent of any Communist tactics in Vietnam or elsewhere.

II. Possible Objectives of U.S. Actions

- A. Maintain our right to use international airspace.
- B. Deter similar hostile actions by North Korea or other countries.
- C. Exact redress by retaliation or compensation.
- D. Maximize international criticism of North Korea and minimize criticism of U.S. actions.
- E. Maintain domestic support for our overseas security commitments, including Vietnam.

NOTE: The courses of action described below are evaluated in terms of achieving one or more of these possible objectives and in terms of the risk of military escalation and the military costs of any operation.

III. Military Options (All actions considered are non-nuclear)

A. Military actions not involving combat courses of action

Possible Military Actions

1. Show of force using air and naval forces in proximity to but outside of North Korea.
2. Repeat EC-121 reconnaissance mission with combat escort.

Pro:

- a. Actions do not violate international law and therefore maintain law abiding image.
- b. Little risk of escalation to a point of resumption of full hostilities.
- c. Demonstrates our right to free use of international airspace.
- d. Avoids demonstrations and outcry from anti-war element at home.
- e. As compared to a show of force, the reconnaissance operation is more quickly mounted, is less costly in resource requirement, and is more credible.

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

Con:

- a. Little if any deterrent effect, and at considerable cost in resources.
- b. Carries no cost to North Korea and hence allows their unlawful acts to go unpunished.
- c. Erodes domestic support for overseas security commitments by failure of costly overseas complex to protect U.S. interests.
- d. Both operations involve diversion of resources from Vietnam but the air reconnaissance less so.
- e. Show of force would be viewed by North Koreans as unconvincing.

Diplomatic options to support show of force

1. Purposes of diplomatic action in support of show of force.

- a. To underline seriousness with which we view North Korean action.
- b. To demonstrate responsibility and restraint of U.S. reaction.
- c. To establish legal basis for U.S. position.
- d. To promote international acceptance of U.S. military action.
- e. To secure domestic support for U.S. military action.

2. Illustrative package of diplomatic actions to accompany show of force.

- a. Participate in Panmunjon talks: to keep channel to North Korea open, to underline directly

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

to North Koreans seriousness with which we view the incident; to demonstrate to world our willingness to use all peaceful avenues.

- b. Call Security Council meeting: to gain maximum publicity for our position; to establish legal basis for our position.
- c. Make strong statement to USSR: to urge them to put pressure on North Koreans to desist from further provocative acts.
- d. Approach friendly governments to appeal for support for our position, and to emphasize U.S restraints.
- e. Make public statement of facts of case: to express U.S indignation over North Korean action, and to make clear that U.S. will not tolerate further provocations.

B. Military Combat Options

The basic advantage of a military combat course of action is that it provides a greater opportunity to accomplish the possible objectives of deterrence, redress, and maintenance of our rights to use international airspace. However, any military course of combat action involving an attack on North Korea involves the risk of retaliatory action by North Korea.

Neither the Soviets nor the Chinese would be likely to take countermeasures that they believed would increase the chances of a confrontation with the U.S. The Chinese would probably make some demonstrative defense preparations in North China and Manchuria, and the Soviets, too, would begin marshalling some more naval and air power in the Far East and the Sea of Japan. They would still hope to avoid a direct clash with the U.S., but the chances of dangerous incidents, particularly involving Soviet naval forces, would increase.

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

A military course of action is also likely to evoke a more adverse international and domestic reaction. All of these combat options against the territory of North Korea would in ROK eyes stand in stark contrast to U.S. restraints when ROK interests have been involved.

A single selected military combat action, particularly, has the advantages of being less likely to lead to escalation of the conflict by the North Koreans than sustained combat actions. The North Korean air and air defense capabilities are such that losses must be expected in most options. In addition, North Korean capabilities give them the option of continuing the combat after we desired to break it off. The more serious the U.S. action, the greater is the risk of North Korean counteraction and escalation.

1. Destroy a North Korean aircraft off the coast of North Korea:

Pro:

- a. This action would extract redress from the North Koreans and tend to deter them from other acts of piracy in international airspace.
- b. It demonstrates U.S. determination to react in the face of clear provocation.

Con:

- a. The probability of finding a single aircraft in a position to destroy it without a response by the North Koreans which would escalate the action is extremely remote.

2. Selected airstrike against a military target, preferably one airfield.

Pro:

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

- a. The destruction of a specific military installation or complex would tend to deter further attacks on U.S. aircraft by the North Koreans. It exacts redress by retaliation and demonstrates our intent to maintain our right to use international airspace. It is a measured response.

Con:

- a. This action would be made in the face of a sophisticated North Korean Air Defense System of fighters, Surface to Air Missiles, and other Anti-aircraft means. There could be significant loss to the attacking force.
  - b. Were a carrier or other U.S. ship to be disabled, there is the probability of the action continuing in order to cover the withdrawal of the force.
  - c. The airfield from which the North Korean aircraft were launched to make the attack on the U.S. EC-121 is not favorably located to be an effective target. Its proximity to USSR makes this a difficult target to attack without chance of confrontation with the Soviets.
  - d. The action involves sustained risk of retaliation.
3. Shore bombardment of North Korean military targets by U.S. surface craft on either east or west coast.

Pro:

- a. This course is mentioned as a possible form of redress.

Con:

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

- a. Adequate air cover would be required to protect the naval task force from North Korean air reaction.
  - b. The North Korean response, within their capability, would be to launch air attacks against the U.S. Naval force. An air battle could ensue which could require U.S. aircraft from sources other than the Naval Task Force thereby escalating the conflict and widening the scope of the action.
4. Ground raid across the DMZ.

Pro:

- a. This would demonstrate to the North Koreans that excursion across the Demilitarized Zone were not their exclusive rights.
- b. It has the advantage of being a retaliation visible to the people of the ROK.

Con:

- a. This action, if of sufficient size and scope to be effective against the existing prepared North Korean defenses, could be mistaken for an attack designed to reopen the front in Korea and restart the Korean War.
- b. It invites further escalation by the ROK Government by precedent, which we have tried hard to avoid.
- c. It also is an Armistice violation with the inherent disadvantage of further eroding the effectiveness of the UN Armistice Commission.

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

- d. Ground actions are much harder to break off than air actions and the dangers of a ground attack escalating, compared to an air course of action, are considerably greater.

5. Attack military targets near DMZ by fire.

Attack suitable military targets closely adjacent to the DMZ. Utilizing artillery, HONEST JOHN, and/or tactical air.

Pro:

- a. This would constitute a positive act of retaliation.
- b. In the case of artillery or HONEST JOHN, forces are readily available without redeployment.
- c. This action could be conducted, particularly in the case of artillery or HONEST JOHN, with complete surprise.
- d. This action would involve a minimum expenditure of military resources and have minimum effect on Southeast Asia operations.

Con:

- a. This action could provoke retaliation in kind and lead to an expanding combat operation across the entire front.
  - b. This action might be interpreted by NK as the prelude to a ground attack across the DMZ thereby involving significant danger of escalation.
  - c. Attacks on such targets are not directly relatable to the right to use international airspace.
6. Attacks on NK naval vessels by U.S. submarines.

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

NK naval vessels, including submarine venturing into international waters, would be destroyed by US submarines.

Pro:

- a. This action would constitute a positive act of retaliation.
- b. This action would be directly relatable to the right to freely use the seas and air-space.
- c. This action would involve minimum expenditure of military resources.
- d. This action would probably receive a favorable degree of domestic and allied support.

Con:

- a. North Korean naval vessels rarely venture into international waters. NK submarines rarely operate submerged.
- b. NK surface naval vessels are small and of shallow draft such that they are very poor submarine targets.
- c. The possibility exists that a confrontation with Soviet surface ships or submarines might ensue.

7. Blockade of North Korean ports

Using surface ships a blockade of North Korean ports could be established to prevent the use of seas by North Korean ships and craft.

Pro:

- a. This would be an act of positive retaliation.
- b. This action would be directly relatable to the right of free use of the seas and the airspace.

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

Con:

- a. The effect of this action would be minimal on North Korea as their use of the seas has been halted since PUEBLO. A majority of their imports are by rail.
  - b. The problem of protection of the blockading force from air attack would be immense and would require extensive air resources.
  - c. Probability of continuing air battle would exist.
  - d. Probability of confrontation with USSR air, surface, or subsurface units would be high.
  - e. It would require action continuing over an extended period.
  - f. A blockade would have to extend to the Soviet border to be effective.
8. Mining or Threatening to mine North Korean waters

Warning all nations to vacate and stay clear of North Korean ports because they will be mined if North Korea does not provide adequate redress for their unprovoked, illegal action.

Pro:

- a. Would cut off seaborne commerce to North Korea, which although not extensive would be damaging to their interests (about 550 ships calls/year).
- b. Avoids the disadvantages of confrontation which go with blockade.
- c. Achieves redress.

Con:

- a. Likely to evoke widespread international reprobation.

- b. As a hostile act, could provoke retaliatory action and hence escalation.
  - c. Would require considerable SEA air resources.
9. Seize some North Korean assets abroad

Two fish factory ships built in the Netherlands look like the only substantial items. One is rounding the Cape of Good Hope en route to Korea with a Dutch flag and crew. The North Koreans have little cash tied up in her.

Pro:

- a. A forceful act of this sort would be responsive to public indignation.
- b. The North Koreans would be intimidated into keeping the rest of their fleet in port.

Con:

- a. Important legal and other principles would be violated. The Dutch would be outraged.
- b. Public opinion would ridicule our equating of a fishing vessel and a "spy plane."

Diplomatic Actions in Support of Military Combat Action

Purpose:

- 1. To establish the legal basis for the U.S. action.
- 2. To neutralize international criticism and censure and to develop a modicum of international support for the action.
- 3. To seek public support for the U.S. action in Korea and for continued U.S. commitments elsewhere in Asia, particularly in Vietnam.

Illustrative Package of Diplomatic and Political Actions:

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

- A. Panmunjom Take initiative to call MAC meeting at Panmunjom to establish that North Korean action constituted act of war and was in violation of the spirit of the Armistice Agreement.
- B. UN Actions
1. UN Security Council action either to gain prior approval of US military action (highly unlikely), to justify the action after the fact, or set the stage for the action.
  2. Present a letter to the UN justifying the US legal and political case.
- C. Possible Approach to the USSR
- Pro:
- a. Provides opportunity to assure the Soviet Union that the action is not directed at it. That the action is limited.
- Con:
- a. Could force Soviets to react in support of North Korea if they chose to remain uninvolved.
  - b. Would give warning if done in advance.
- D. Approach to friendly power to seek international support
- E. Major Presidential speech following the action to seek domestic and international support.
- IV. Diplomatic Options Without Military Actions

If we decided to take military actions, our diplomacy will be designed to support and exploit what is achieved by our use of force, and to minimize its ill effects. If there is no military action, our diplomacy must accomplish what it can in its own terms. This section examines this latter case.

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

We could adopt a "high posture" seeking a maximum of publicity for our diplomatic moves, mobilizing public opinion to deter future hostile actions and to make their past actions costly to the North Koreans. Alternatively, we could take a "low posture," working so far as possible behind the scenes to achieve some accommodation without involving our prestige or that of our opponents.

Whatever our posture, we could focus on a serious diplomatic effort to convey a genuine determination to meet the next provocation by force, or we could limit our objectives to maintaining our own image and our support, while denigrating our antagonist.

Diplomatic steps might include one or more of such objectives as:

1. Conveying an explicit warning that the next incident would be responded to militarily.
  2. Conveying a maximum warning for deterrent purposes without being precise on military action ensuing.
  3. Demanding compensation for the lives of the men involved and for the plane.
  4. Maximizing international opprobrium against North Korea for its action.
  5. Seeking to reduce the level of international tension by treating the matter in relatively calm form (having already decided not to react militarily).
- A. Talks at Panmunjom

We would accept the North Korean call for 18 April, made after the attack, or try to call our own meeting, or call for a closed meeting, or suspend meetings completely.

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

1. Accept the North Korean proposal to meet 18 April.

Pro:

- a. We would use the meeting to express indignation, by presenting a strong case and/or possibly by walking out.
- b. Our statement of our position could put on the record our right to use international airspace. It could carry as grave and explicit a warning as we might choose.
- c. Going to the table would show our respect for established procedures in settling disputes; walking out would effectively protest the abuse of these procedures.
- d. A walkout would cut off their efforts to humiliate us with long harangues and put them on notice that Panmunjom is not simply a forum for propaganda.

Con:

- a. Our attendance at North Korean invitation could be construed as an admission of provocative action.
  - b. Even if we walked out, the North Koreans would not be impressed.
  - c. Public warnings will not be believed unless reinforced in private; the public warning then becomes superfluous.
2. Ignore the North Korean proposal and try to call our own meeting.

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

Pro:

- a. We would then be presenting ourselves as the plaintiff which in fact we are. We would have the advantage of speaking first.
- b. We could obtain the other advantages of the preceding course through the content of our opening statement and, if we wished, by walking out as the North Korean began talking.

Con:

- a. The North Koreans would probably not attend a meeting convened by the US.
  - b. If there were a meeting, a procedural hassle could well ensue, producing considerable delay and diverting attention from substance.
3. Call for a closed meeting on the Pueblo model.

Pro:

- a. A closed meeting could be a forum for conveying a serious warning.

Con:

- a. We have nothing to negotiate if they have no prisoners. Warnings could be conveyed privately through other channels.
- b. ROK public opinion would again be angered by our closeting ourselves with the North Koreans as soon as we are hurt, even though President Pak could be made to understand.

4. Ignore the North Korean call for a meeting and announce that we will boycott Panmunjom until they behave.

Pro:

- a. Our most dramatic option in this group. It would be "stronger" than a walkout.
- b. North Korea would lose a propaganda forum they value.

Con:

- a. We could not directly confront the North Koreans with our charges.
- b. We would lose our only channel for direct contact with Pyongyang. Re-establishing it would be difficult.
- c. We would be criticized at home and abroad for subordinating the UN, which we represent in Korea, to "US interests."
- d. Our action would seem to many to be more harmful to peace than to North Korea.

B. United Nations Options

1. Call a Security Council Meeting

Pro:

- a. This would gain maximum publicity among all the choices.
- b. Our statements on our rights and on North Korean wrongs would move directly to sophisticated and interested audiences.

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

Con:

- a. We probably could not obtain "action" even in the form of a resolution.
  - b. The Soviets would be forced to defend the North Koreans even though they are well aware of the facts.
  - c. Debate in the present Council could be hard to manage. Thorny problems (e.g. a debate on "spy ships and planes") could arise and divert attention from our objectives.
2. Present a letter to the Security Council

Pro:

- a. A letter could not get out of hand like a meeting.
- b. It could assert all our claims and positions in an orderly manner, getting wide circulation.

Con:

- a. It would attract much less attention than a meeting.
- b. Though widely circulated, it would be little read.
- c. Unless supplemented, it could appear quite perfunctory.

C. Third Country Channels

1. Approach the Soviets to convey a serious warning and/or to pressure the North Koreans to adopt a less belligerent attitude and to behave more consistently with international law and practice.

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET  
SENSITIVE

Pro:

- a. The Soviets may be the only power with real influence (if it is real) in Pyongyang.
- b. The Soviets have a genuine interest in avoiding military conflict in Korea.

Con:

- a. The Soviets are not likely to judge the situation serious enough to call for serious arm-twisting.
  - b. If they did put real pressure on Pyongyang, they would resent the necessity and take it out on us elsewhere.
  - c. The most probable outcome would be Soviet resentment against our importuning and no measurable effect on North Korea.
2. Approach the North Koreans through other governments.

Pro:

- a. This could provide an alternative or supplement to closed meetings at Panmunjom if we want to deal frankly yet quietly.

Con:

- a. No third party will accept a charge from us to convey an official serious threat, however privately.

## Analysis of Courses of Action

1. The following courses of action must be analyzed in the light of the issues involved and our objectives in this incident in order to select that course of action best supporting issues and objectives. With these criteria, possible courses of action are set forth in an order of desirability in the attached spread sheet. This order is based on precedents established in the PUEBLO incident; and would have to be adjusted if a more positive approach is desired for this incident.

2. Two fundamental issues are the basics at stake in this incident; the principle of freedom of international air space and the right to gain redress of the wrong against a US aircraft and its crew. These are further influenced by the results to date in the PUEBLO incident and current activities in the DMZ, particularly with regard to MDL markers.

3. Our objectives in any action taken as a result of this incident are:

a. To receive appropriate redress for the illegal destruction of the aircraft and probable death of the crew.

b. To react to the extent required to prevent further incidents such as the PUEBLO seizure, MDL marker repair incidents and this aircraft destruction.

c. Within limitations imposed by accomplishment of objectives a and b, above, to prevent escalation of this incident into a larger conflict.

d. To cause minimum disruption on other military operations worldwide.

4. US Forces are in a position at the present time to implement courses of action 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 11, and 12. Courses of action 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, ~~11, 12~~ would require repositioning of forces and

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 *RS*

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
TOP SECRET

Tab A

REVISED

TOP SECRET

would probably involve withdrawing some naval forces from the SEA area. These latter courses of action would require a period of time for movement of forces and detailed planning. A combination of courses 1, 2, 3, 7, 11, and 12, could be implemented now and would be considered an appropriate initial response.

TOP SECRET

REVISED

Tab A

BRIEF OF COURSES OF ACTION

COURSES OF ACTION

2  
Diplomatic demand for appropriate redress.

3  
Conduct high altitude/ speed reconnaissance operations over North Korea.

4  
Conduct escorted reconnaissance flights in area with same type reconnaissance aircraft.

Show of Force.

CONCEPT

Demand redress through talks at Panmunjom.

Conduct SR-71 reconnaissance of North Korea. Use of 147 H/T Drones.

Repeat flight mission of downed plane, possibly closer to North Korean territory, with recon aircraft appropriately escorted by sufficient tactical fighter aircraft.

Air and naval show of force off North Korean coast.

ADVANTAGES

Proper first step indicates intent. No force required.

Demonstrates US resolve, no force required. Could provide updated OOB information.

Demonstrates resolve to exercise freedom of action in international air space. Provides self defense capability for forces involved.

Demonstrates resolve. Prompt follow-up to diplomatic action. Direct action.

DISADVANTAGES

Probably not successful.

Exposes another aircraft to risk of destruction, though remote, under conditions favorable to North Koreans.

Disrupts schedule of tanker aircraft support SEA Ops in order to support fighter aircraft. Offers increase risk of incident that could escalate into a reopening of hostilities in Korea.

Must produce desired results or we must use force to avoid appearance of bluff. Requires time to assemble requisite naval forces. Draws down on forces committed to SEA operations.

ACTION

inst North  
defenses

Land and carrier-based aircraft would conduct large scale formation flights from seaward toward North Korea, diverting while still well clear of North Korean territorial air space.

Soviets to  
resentations  
Koreans

Request Soviets to deliver protest and demand for redress.

North Korean  
off coast of  
a.

A North Korean aircraft flying to seaward would be intercepted and destroyed.

Air Strikes  
(RM)

Selected air strikes on military targets, preferably airfields, and industrial installations.

ADVANTAGES

Demonstrates resolve to exercise freedom of action in international air space.  
Puts pressure on North Korea air defense system.  
Could lull North Korea into false sense of security prior to actual strikes following long period of feints.

Is in line with current actions in regard to DMZ MDL markers.  
No force required.  
Does not commit US to any action.  
Could indicate to North Koreans a possibility of Soviet support of US position.

Response in kind for loss of US aircraft.  
Positive retaliation.

Positive, deliberate response.  
Destruction of military targets, measured attacks to limit destruction.

DISADVANTAGES

Could cause North Koreans to attack units over high seas or conduct preemptive attacks in South Korea. Risks involvement with Soviet air and naval units.

Soviets would probably refuse to become involved.  
Indication of weakness on part of US.

Could be deemed an act of war.  
Unlikely that target could be enticed into desired intercept area while US aircraft in the area in force.

~~Worldwide~~ Possible worldwide communist reactions. Probably reopen hostilities in Korea.

S OF ACTION

k, night attack on Korean airfield aircraft (see

mbardment of rean coastal by US surface either east or st (see TAB D)

aid across the

targets closely to DMZ by HONEST JOHN tactical air (see discussion of N target).

CONCEPT

Attack by A-6 type aircraft at night against a NK airfield near the east coast of NK.

Conduct bombardment against coastal targets by naval gunfire.

Ground force, US or ROK, raid across DMZ to capture or destroy unit or installation.

Attack suitable military targets near DMZ by fire.

ADVANTAGES

Demonstrates resolve relatively low risk.

Demonstrates resolve.

Positive retaliation. Surprise.

Gain intelligence, create confusion. Disrupt communications. Heavy fire support available.

Positive retaliation surprise. Attack by fire does not commit US infantry or armored units to a direct attack.

DISADVANTAGES

Could cause reopening of hostilities. Possible adverse reaction by third nations.

Significant risk of air retaliation. Could cause reopening of hostilities.

Truce violation. Could provoke retaliation in kind with possibility of escalation. If ROK forces used, gives them US approval to retaliate for many past provocations.

Truce violation. Could provoke retaliation in kind and possibly escalation.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

# Intelligence Note

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr.

Subject: Estimated Reactions of Selected East Asian Countries and the Soviet Union to Possible US Courses of Action Against North Korea

In this IN we estimate the probable reactions of Communist China, the USSR, North Korea, South Korea and Japan to two alternative courses of action which the US may consider in connection with the shutdown of a US reconnaissance aircraft by the North Koreans in the Sea of Japan on April 15, 1969. One alternative considered is a mild US reaction employing diplomacy and foregoing the use of force; the other alternative is a stronger US reaction including the use of force.

Communist China. If the incident results in diplomatic rather than military action, Peking may well respond in a fashion similar to its handling of the Pueblo affair in January 1968. At that time Peking took a relatively cautious approach which gave support to North Korea but avoided any resounding public commitment to Pyongyang.

A somewhat stronger Chinese propaganda reaction can be expected in the event that the US retaliates militarily against North Korea or if rescue operations result in a clash between North Korean and US forces. However, the Chinese undoubtedly would wish to avoid a widening of the conflict, particularly at a time when Peking is in the final stages of its Party Congress and concerned with a Soviet threat along the Sino-Manchurian border. Though Peking would probably take certain defense measures such as increased

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958 RS

SECRET

- 2 -

air patrols, Chinese military backing to the North Koreans seems unlikely unless Peking perceives a direct threat to its own security.

The Soviet Union. In response to a US diplomatic offensive the USSR will render Pyongyang full support, as it did at the time of the Pueblo crisis. Whatever it may think of the justness of the North Korean case, the USSR will publicly deride US claims. Moreover, because of its desire to preserve its role as protector of other communist states, the USSR (although it could not prevent UN discussion of the issue) would veto any UN resolution calling for an international investigation, as it did in 1960 in the case of the shoot-down of the RB-47 off the Soviet coast. Any step the US might take in the diplomatic realm would probably not be regarded by Moscow as a threat to its interests and any such step would be unlikely to have an adverse effect on bilateral US-Soviet relations.

As it demonstrated at the time of the Pueblo incident, the USSR regards any US military presence near its borders as a potential threat to itself. Moscow will probably take steps through private channels to dissuade the US from taking military action against North Korea, warning inter alia of the dangers of provoking Chinese intervention.

Any military action against a target in the upper half of North Korea would be regarded as posing a possible threat to Soviet airspace and perhaps territory. Any action elsewhere in North Korea would be vigorously condemned by the USSR. In neither instance, however, would a Soviet military response be likely unless Soviet airspace was violated, although the intensity of Soviet reactions may be determined in part by Peking's response. Moscow would, under any circumstance, replenish any losses of materiel Pyongyang might suffer.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

To add force to its condemnation of the US for military actions against North Korea, the USSR would probably take some steps to reduce contacts with the US, perhaps in the area of cultural exchanges and would exploit US actions to draw world attention away from its actions in Czechoslovakia. Only in the event that the US engaged in repeated attacks on North Korea or that general war broke out in Korea would the USSR be likely to curtail for more than a short period those contacts with the US which it regards as important.

Japan. If the US limits itself to a rescue operation and diplomatic measures such as a protest to Pyongyang, the impact in Japan will be minimal. A short-lived show of force and no further engagement with the North Koreans, e.g., the retention of naval and air forces in the Sea of Japan for three or four days after the rescue operation, would cause a more intense reaction, reflecting Japanese popular fear of involvement in war.

The longer and stronger the US military response, the less the Sato government will welcome it, because of the catalysing effect on opposition campaigns against the Security Treaty even if bases in Japan and Okinawa were not involved. The left wing opposition (the JCP and JSP) would welcome a US military response. It would come just as Sohyo's spring wage struggle is peaking and provide an emotional curtail raiser for Okinawan reversion demonstrations planned for April 28. By linking the plane incident and its aftermath with other issues, the left wing would hope to raise the level of public anxiety and excitement sufficiently to compel demonstrations by Komeito, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the conservative labor federation, Domei. The immediate objective would be to force Sato's resignation.

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

North Korea. Any protests or demands we raise through diplomatic channels directly with the North Koreans are likely to be brushed aside in a flood of counter-charges about alleged American provocations. The North Koreans have already laid the groundwork to deal with our accusations by requesting a Military Amistice Commission (MAC) meeting for April 18. Pyongyang Radio's announcement of the plane downing claimed that the aircraft had intruded deep into North Korean airspace and added without elaboration a charge of simultaneous US provocation on the DMZ. The North Koreans obviously intend to press these charges if we accept the MAC meeting.

Protests or demarches through third countries or in the UN are not likely to have any effect on Pyongyang, judging by their handling of the Pueblo incident.

The North Koreans probably do not expect military retaliation by the United States. They probably chose the EC 121 as a target in the belief -- buttressed by the Pueblo experience -- that they could humiliate the United States at minimum risk. Had they desired a direct confrontation, an attack across the DMZ would have been the simplest provocation.

Nevertheless, the North Koreans have the will and the capability to defend themselves vigorously and at considerable cost to an attacking force. As an indication of North Korean reaction, the Pyongyang announcement of the plane downing warned that the North Korean People's Army would "retaliate immediately to any provocative acts of the U.S. imperialist aggressors with a hundredfold revenge." This broad deterrent statement parallels other North Korean warnings to the US recently, for example in connection with the joint US/ROK mobile

SECRET

SECRET

- 6 -

exercise conducted in March. Its operational meaning has never been tested, but it suggests at the minimum a readiness to deal with retaliatory efforts with all the military means available.

The possibility of less rational action by the North Koreans cannot be dismissed, including counter-measures against US installations in South Korea either along the DMZ or bases in the ROK interior. However, they probably recognize that they are in no position to undertake prolonged hostilities with the United States, unless they are backed by either the Soviet Union or Communist China. They cannot be sure of support from either at this stage.

Republic of Korea. A low-key US response would meet with strong ROK disapproval and a sharp decline in South Korean confidence in the United States. Coming after what they regard as a weak response to the Pueblo and DMZ incidents, they would regard such a response as an open invitation to further and stronger North Korean provocation. Fear of such actions could lead the government to impose stricter internal security controls.

Conversely, of course, the ROK would welcome a strong US response, which would not only bolster their own confidence but be regarded by them also as enhancing US stature and position in East Asia.

SECRET

69.7  
This is NOT cleared by

Thomas L. Hughes

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Possible Courses of Action in Response to the Korean  
Shot-down

I. Diplomatic Actions

A. Demand for Redress at Panmunjom

Advantages

1. Invokes UN armistice agreement.
2. Proper first step in seeking redress.
3. Establishes channel of direct communication with North Koreans, to use for warnings on subsequent actions.
4. Provides immediate, although low-level, reaction in response to domestic public opinion and ROK concerns.

Disadvantages

1. Protest and demand for redress will be rejected by North Koreans.
  2. North Koreans will use Panmunjom meeting to debate facts and confuse public opinion on question of responsibility.
  3. Failure of protest will demonstrate futility of Panmunjom action and is not likely to deter further North Korean actions.
  4. Could possibly foreclose military countermeasures.
- B. UN Protest (linked possibly with request for UN review of North Korean violations of armistice agreement)

Advantages

1. Escalates diplomatic approach demonstrating more serious U.S. concern.

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958  
RS

2. Forces UN to consider pattern of North Korean violations of the armistice agreement if linked.

3. UN is much better vehicle for arousing international opinion than Panmunjom, even if Soviets veto.

4. Probably more satisfactory response in terms U.S. opinion, particularly those concerned about escalation of conflict.

5. ROK will be more satisfied.

Disadvantages

1. Recourse to UN not likely to result in North Korean redress or agreement on improved measures to maintain armistice.

2. UN debate is likely to lead to Soviet defense of North Korea and head-on confrontation with U.S.

3. UN debate likely to get enmeshed in issue of "spy" planes and ships, and other extraneous issues, particularly with current composition of UN Security Council.

4. UN weakness to bring about positive remedial actions in tension areas will be again exposed, leading to public frustration in U.S.

C. Diplomatic Approach To Soviets

Advantages

1. Puts Soviets on spot as responsible for its satellites.

2. Could lead to Soviet pressures to restrain North Koreans.

Disadvantages

1. Involves Soviets in situation that may prefer to remain disengaged.
2. Forces Soviets to support North Koreans particularly to avoid losing face vis-a-vis Peking.
3. Could be considered gesture indicating U.S. weakness.

D. No Immediate Diplomatic Action

Advantages

1. Leaves options open for military counteraction.
2. Leaves greater uncertainty as to U.S. intentions to take diplomatic or military course of action.

Disadvantages

1. Failure to make approach at Panmunjom or UN leaves doubts as to invocation of UN armistice agreement.
2. Makes more difficult utilization of UN machinery as well as special agreements with Japan relating to UN forces.
3. Failure to take diplomatic action could arouse criticism in U.S. and lead South Koreans to question lack of any U.S. response.
4. In absence of military actions, could be considered sign of U.S. weakness.

II. Military Action

A. Increased Reconnaissance Possibly Closer to North Korean Territory, with Tactical Fighter Support

Advantages

1. Demonstrates resolve to exercise freedom of action in international air space.
2. Challenges North Koreans.
3. Indicates to Pyongyang and Moscow U. S. preparedness to accept risks of escalation.
4. This is military action least likely to provoke major adverse domestic reaction and fears of renewal of Korean conflict.

Disadvantages

1. Offers increased, but still marginal, risk of escalation.
2. May not deter North Koreans from testing U. S. further once tactical fighter aircraft are withdrawn.

B. Show of Force Off North Korean Coast

Advantages

1. Demonstrates U. S. resolve.
2. Involves positive warning and challenge to North Koreans.
3. It permits escalation without serious risk of hostilities.

Disadvantages

1. North Koreans are not forced to do more than pull in their horns until show of force is concluded.
2. Time is required to assemble requisite naval force.

3. Draws down forces committed to Southeast Asian operations.

4. Failure to use reduces future credibility.

C. Punitive Military Actions (either against North Korean targets or across DMZ)

Advantages

1. Both constitute positive deliberate military response with specific, although limited military, advantages.

2. North Koreans may be deterred at least initially from further risk operations!

3. Moscow, Hanoi and Peking would understand U.S. preparedness to accept risks which could affect their calculations in other areas; quite possibly Vietnam.

4. Air strike reduces risk of ROK unilateral actions along DMZ.

Disadvantages

1. Both actions would be considered major violations of the armistice agreement and acts of war.

2. Selective air strikes would probably reopen hostilities in Korea.

3. The DMZ operations would possibly provoke retaliation in kind with the attendant risk of escalation.

4. The ROK would probably be less restrained in reacting to North Korean provocation than they have been in the past.

5. Due to the risk of escalation, major U.S. force redeployments to Korea would probably be required.

- D. Military Entrapment Exercises (U.S. could take measures in order to draw another North Korean action as an excuse for a major U.S. response)

Advantages

1. As above, with the addition that American response would be within the framework of the UN armistice agreement and other arrangements.

Disadvantages

1. As above, although with the increased probability of controlling the response to prevent further escalation.

- E. Attacks on North Korean Assets in International Waters

(There are no known North Korean ships outside North Korean territorial waters).