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3 (memo)	Rosen to HAK	3/7/69	B
4 (memo w/attach.)	Smith to HAK	2/28/69	B
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ENDC

TALKING  
POINTS

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TALKING POINTS

REVIEW GROUP

Thursday, March 6, 1969

ENDC and Key Countries on the NPT

I. ENDC

- A. This is, of course, an extremely complicated question. I recognize that much work has gone into preparing this paper.
- B. We will, of course, need to develop some positions before the ENDC begins on March 18. Our discussions should focus on what decisions need to be made by the President.
- C. Can we first agree that the only issues requiring NSC attention are the test ban, the production cut-off and the sea beds?
- D. For these three issues, can we agree that there are really three questions that need to be answered:
- (1) On security grounds would we like to see early agreement on a proposal?
  - (2) What are the prospects for agreement if the U.S. puts forward a proposal and does (or does not) push it?
  - (3) What are the implications for our general political posture of alternative U.S. positions?

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E. If there is agreement on this list, we might want to discuss each of the issues in turn.

F. Test Ban

1. With regard to our security concerns, I take it that while there are some arguments in favor, on balance there is agreement that a test ban would not now be in our interest.
2. There also appears to be agreement that the Soviets are unlikely to accept on-site inspection and that even if they did, negotiations could take several years, especially if we did not push hard.

3. With regard to tactics, we appear to have four choices:

- a. Repeat our previous position but not press hard;
- b. ~~Remain silent on the issue;~~
- c. Announce that we are studying our position;
- d. Announce that we no longer favor a test ban.

4. In regard to the tactical issue, does the paper present an adequate statement of pros and cons? (We believe it does but can be shortened as in our revised paper.)

G. Production Cut-Off

1. Is there some way that we can simplify the issues for the President? For example, could we agree that the issue which needs to be urgently addressed is: Should the U.S. now reaffirm its support for a cut-off-transfer

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agreement? If so, should we reiterate the existing proposal or revise it to incorporate some or all of the suggested changes?

2. With regard to our national security interests, I take it there is a difference of opinion. Are the pros and cons adequate? (We believe it does but can be shortened.)
3. There appears to be a consensus that agreement is unlikely because of Soviet opposition.
4. With regard to the tactics, does the paper adequately deal with the issue of whether we express support for any cut-off proposal? (We believe it does but can be shortened.)  
What would be the pros and cons of tabling a new proposal in addition to the specific arguments for particular changes given in the paper?

H. Sea Beds

1. The argument on security grounds is not clear. Are there in fact positive reasons on security grounds why we should favor this proposal? Are there strong reasons on security grounds to oppose it? Do we accept the judgment of the paper that agreement in this area is likely if we press?
2. As regards to the tactics, the question appears to be whether we should put forward a specific proposal or continue to discuss factors. Are the pros and cons adequately stated under Question 2? (We believe they are, but shortened.)

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3. Is Question 3 on the limits of the territorial-sea one that the Security Council needs to consider? Could we agree before we put forward any specific limit?

II. Key Countries on the NPT

- A. This does not appear to be an issue which needs to go to the NSC at this time. The courses of action recommended all appear to be within the scope of what is authorized by NSDM 6.
- B. Perhaps the paper should be referred to the Under Secretaries Committee for approval and the monitoring of implementation.
- C. The question of the Israeli letter could then be handled as a separate operational matter.

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SUMMARY  
ENDC PAPER

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

March 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Morton H. Halperin *MH*

SUBJECT: Comments on Review Group Procedure at March 6  
Review Group Meeting

In view of the concerns expressed by General Rosson and others at the last meeting of the Review Group, you may wish to call to the attention of the group changes that have been made in the procedures:

- (1) Reaffirm that the Group will meet regularly on Thursday at 2:00 p. m.
- (2) Under the new procedure papers will be due from the IGs or Ad Hoc Groups six days before the Review Group meeting. This should permit adequate time to prepare for the Review Group meeting.
- (3) The NSC will normally not consider a subject until 13 days after the Review Group meeting, beginning in April. This will give us time to revise the paper based on the Review Group discussion and still have it out to the NSC members one week before the meeting.
- (4) To assist in forward planning, we will be distributing, on a regular basis, a calendar of scheduled NSC and Review Group meetings and of due dates for studies.
- (5) You may wish to mention that, at least for certain items, the NSC staff will prepare an agenda discussion paper for consideration by the Review Group and distribution to members. The purpose of this paper would be to indicate in advance the issues to be discussed and the subjects about which the President may solicit policy advice. You may wish to say that we are considering preparing such a document and ask for the comments of the members of the Group.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

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March 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Spurgeon Keeny *SK*  
Morton Halperin *MH*

SUBJECT: Review Group Meeting, March 6, 1969

There are two items on the agenda for the Review Group meeting:

1. ENDC

ENDC opens on March 18. The three major items on the agenda are the test ban, cut-off of the production of fissionable material, and arms control of the seabeds. On each of these issues there is substantial interagency disagreement. There are no agency positions stated in the paper but we know that the JCS are opposed to agreements on each of the three items and object to our publicly supporting agreements. The AEC supports the JCS position on the first two items. ACDA notes that in the past we have publicly supported a test ban and a production cut-off and argues that we should continue to support these proposals. ACDA believes we should advance a specific proposal on the seabeds going beyond our current willingness only to discuss "factors" in such a proposal. The position of State and DOD at high levels is not known, although State is likely to support the ACDA position. On security grounds there is no urgent reason for going forward and legitimate difference as to whether any of the proposals are in our interests. The basic issue is one of the President's public and international posture. Does he wish to appear publicly as backtracking from proposals to control the arms race which were endorsed by his predecessors? There is a great deal of obfuscation which can be done and we can certainly put forward a position without pushing it if we decide to do so. Your talking points are designed to narrow down and sharpen the issues.

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## 2. NPT Countries

The NSSM asked for a study of what our policy should be toward key countries following the President's decision to seek ratification by us of the treaty. The recommended courses of action are in every case quite moderate and none involve putting pressure on the countries to sign or ratify. This is basically an operational problem which could now be assigned to the Under Secretaries Committee. In effect, we would be assigning the responsibility to that Committee for implementing NSDM 6 using the guidance of this paper. You may want to discuss this with Elliot Richardson before the RG meeting.

A letter by the President to the Israeli Prime Minister is suggested. This should be handled as a normal operational matter, with a draft coming from State to the President.

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Tab A

ENDC Agenda

In recognition of the views expressed by the members of the Committee, in response to the recommendations of the General Assembly, taking into account the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the agreement announced on 1 July 1968, for bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, which was welcomed by members of the Committee, the Co-Chairmen recommended the following provisional agenda which was adopted by the Committee on 15 August 1968:

"1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

"Under this heading members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons, and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear free zones, etc.

"2. Non-nuclear measures.

" Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

"3. Other collateral measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the seabed, etc.

"4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The Committee also noted the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject at any time.

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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 3, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR NSC REVIEW GROUP MEMBERS

Attached is the NSC paper on Preparations for the ENDC prepared in response to NSSM 20. This paper will be the subject of discussion at the NSC Review Group meeting in the conference area of the White House Situation Room Thursday, March 6, at 2:00 P. M.

  
Richard M. Moose

Attachment

cc: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

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NPT  
KEY COUNTRIES

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March 1, 1969

STUDY REQUESTED BY NSSM 13

At the present time 87 countries have signed the NPT and nine have deposited their instruments of ratification. Ratification by the United States, especially if followed soon thereafter by Soviet ratification, could lead within a relatively short time to several key signatures. In particular, positive decisions on NPT signature by the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan would be facilitated by our ratification. The signatures or ratifications of several additional influential countries will in turn become more likely after Germany and Japan have signed; this is especially true of such countries as Switzerland and Sweden in Europe and Australia and Indonesia in Asia. In any case our ratification will help to impart a momentum to the treaty which itself will have a beneficial influence on the deliberations of other countries.

There are three general courses of action at our disposal as we attempt to maximize the impact of our ratification. Each country's particular attitude toward the NPT, together with the status of its consideration of adherence to the treaty, will dictate the most useful course to be adopted toward that country.

The first course of action is essentially passive, and would apply to some countries in either of two categories: (1) those for whom U.S. ratification itself will probably be sufficient to bring about a positive decision, at least in conjunction with Soviet ratification. We believe this is probably the case with a number of smaller countries, such as Austria, Jamaica and Malta who are most likely simply waiting for a resumption of the treaty's momentum; and (2) those whose early signature and ratification are so unlikely that there would be no practical point to any special US efforts.

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This group would include such countries as Cuba, Tanzania, Zambia, Communist China and Albania.

The second course of action available to us is that of low-key diplomatic approaches. We would request our embassies in countries where such a course seems desirable to convey to the local government our hope that the treaty will come into force soon and thus begin to achieve its purposes. Our Embassies could review the world-wide security and economic considerations in favor of the treaty, drawing as appropriate upon the UN Secretary General's Report on non-proliferation. Each set of instructions would, of course, be written so as to take into consideration our knowledge of the particular country's attitude toward the treaty and, where applicable and potentially productive, would ask the Embassy to focus its remarks on that country's specific concerns by reiterating previous statements we have made either privately or in public testimony. Each of our Ambassadors would retain discretion regarding the utilization of particular arguments to ensure that no argument was used which was likely to back-fire in discussions with individual officials. The level within the host government at which this approach is made would also be left in most cases to the discretion of the Embassy. This type of low-key representation will be applicable to almost all countries which are in general favorably disposed toward the treaty and which would not resent some further prodding.

The third alternative course of action is that of uniquely tailored approaches for particular countries which we believe require and warrant more intensive treatment. These approaches could include any of the following elements: (1) letters from high-level U.S. officials, in cases such as Japan, where the suggestion has been made by the Japanese themselves, and Israel, where there is a precedent for such action; (2) coordination of our approach with other interested and influential governments, and (3) even the possibility of exercising leverage. In looking at the possibility of exercising leverage, we have of course borne in mind paragraph two of NSDM 6. Accordingly, such a course of action is seriously considered only in those cases where (1) the country has an existing nuclear program; (2) the country cannot be

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persuaded to adhere to the treaty through routine diplomatic persuasion alone; and (3) the country's failure to sign could have a crucial effect on the considerations of other countries.

Since the degree and type of influence which the U.S. can bring to bear varies so greatly from case to case, there is attached a series of individual country studies. Each study is in three parts: (1) a brief description of the status of the country's consideration of the NPT and any specific problems it has with the treaty; (2) a description of the specific areas of special and applicable influence available for use with the country, especially by the U.S.; and (3) a recommendation in light of these factors as to which alternative course of action should be pursued regarding that country.

It should be noted that in addition to the more immediate actions recommended for each country, the U.S. can also take steps over the longer term to demonstrate that non-nuclear parties to the NPT have ready access to the benefits of Articles IV (peaceful uses generally) and V (benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions). For example, the U.S. can make a point of responding with speed to any request for assistance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy from parties to the treaty. We should on the other hand be cautious in stimulating requests from countries which are clearly recalcitrant. We can also attempt to enhance the status of parties by supporting, where it seems appropriate and practicable, their representation in international bodies and their qualified candidates for positions of leadership in these bodies. In general, we should be careful to respond to specific requests for assistance having in mind the possible effects on the attitudes of countries considering either signature or ratification. Such visible demonstrations of the positive benefits of the treaty for its parties would play a significant role in inducing persistent hold-outs eventually to adhere. Another general factor likely to affect the prospects for wide adherence to the treaty is the extent to which significant nuclear arms control negotiations are taking place.

One of our tactical objectives throughout will be to separate countries that have associated themselves in groups

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in connection with NPT signing. An example is the situation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, none of which has signed. As long as Argentina and Chile do not sign, it is easier for Brazil to be a hold-out. We may thus be able to get at the Brazilian problem in the long-term by influencing Argentina and Chile. Argentina, for example, should be interested in the fact that nuclear advanced countries of Europe have signed the treaty, including particularly Italy.

In addition to consultations with our allies, particularly those who are members of Euratom, before the US deposits its instrument of ratification, we believe that we should also ascertain Soviet intentions regarding the timing of their ratification.

Soviet spokesmen have in the past suggested that the Soviets would delay ratification until after FRG signature, if not ratification. It is possible the Soviets will defer ratification until the FRG signs. However, if it appears that FRG signature may be delayed until after the Bundestag elections in October 1969, it is also possible that the Soviets will ratify beforehand in order to exert additional pressure on the FRG and others to sign.

Recently there have been some hints that the Soviets would act promptly after the US does. A possibly significant indication is the Czech decision to ratify in the next few weeks.

It would not be prudent to leave this question up in the air. As the Italians have pointed out to us, with the UK having already completed ratification, if the US deposited its ratification and assuming the quota of the 40 additional ratifications, it would be left up to the decision of the USSR whether or not the NPT comes into force. It seems doubtful that the Soviets would consider their best interest served by holding up ratification and preventing the NPT from entering into force. Nevertheless, it would seem advisable for the US to raise the question officially with the Soviets before the US completed ratification.

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SECRETAlgeria:

Algeria has refrained from signing the NPT on the grounds that the Treaty discriminates against non-nuclear weapon parties, that it does not provide for disarmament by the nuclear weapon parties, and that security guarantees provided to non-nuclear parties are inadequate. In part, Algeria's position on the NPT reflects its desire to assert its non-alignment and independence on an important international issue that it feels does not directly affect its own interests. (We doubt that Algeria perceives any near-term peaceful uses benefits that it might want to gain through the NPT.) An important factor is the Algerian view of its role as a champion of the Arab cause in the continuing war against Israel. The latter's adherence to the Treaty would remove an obstacle to action by Algeria, but it would not necessarily, in itself, induce Algeria to sign.

The U.S. has no diplomatic relations with Algeria and negligible influence over Algeria's position on an issue like the NPT. The Soviets have leverage through extensive trade and assistance; but they would probably be reluctant to use it in the case of Algeria. Moreover, Algeria's independent line on the NPT to a degree reflects the Algerians' sensitivity to the influence the Soviets already exercise in their country. Although France has not attempted to dissuade other countries from adhering to the Treaty, its aloof attitude has undoubtedly had an effect on Algeria.

Recommended Action:

In any general US/USSR consultations on the NPT, we should inform the Soviets that we intend to exercise whatever influence we may have to move the GOA toward adherence and would hope that the Soviet Union would do likewise.

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SECRETArgentina:

Argentina's stated position has been that it fears the NPT will impede progress in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although it has shown no disposition to adhere in the near future, Argentina has not actively opposed the treaty, and Foreign Ministry officials claim that the Armed Forces constitute the primary opponents of Argentine signature. The Armed Forces' position derives from a general reluctance to foreclose options, not from an advocacy of any particular program. Recently the Argentine Embassy in Washington indicated interest in following NPT developments more closely in order to advise Buenos Aires of the advantages or disadvantages of adherence to the treaty.

There is relatively little that the US can do in the immediate future to encourage Argentine signature of the NPT. The adherence of the FRG, Italy and Switzerland plus evidence that parties to the treaty enjoy assured access to the benefits of peaceful uses technology might help induce Argentina to sign. To a great extent the GOA is being influenced by the attitude of Brazil toward the treaty, particularly insofar as prestige factors are concerned. However, this attitude might be offset by adherence of the sophisticated European powers. Chile's adherence would also make it easier for Argentina to adhere to the Treaty even though Brazil does not.

Recommended Action:

Continuing low-key representations on advantages of Treaty. We would attempt to stimulate GOA to appreciate value of taking position independent of Brazil.

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SECRETAustralia:

Although the GOA favors nonproliferation in principle, voted for the June 12 UNGA Res., and was constructive about the treaty at the NNC and 23rd UNGA, it has qualms about several aspects of the NPT, especially the safeguards provisions which it fears will interfere with Australia's general capability for R&D. Questions asked by various Australian officials about certain provisions of the treaty revealed that one of the considerations to which they would attach particular weight in recommending for or against adherence is the extent to which the treaty would prevent the GOA from conducting basic research and making contingency plans for developing atomic weapons. Given its geographic location and long-range concern about U.S. withdrawal from the West Pacific, Australia is concerned about Japanese, ChiCOM and Indian nuclear weapon capabilities. We have received some indications that Australia might sign, while making it clear that its signature did not signify a commitment to ratify.

The Australians are anxious to obtain maximum benefits from peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Prime Minister Gorton vigorously pressed for commitment by the U.S. to a joint feasibility study for a Plowshare project at Cape Keraudren. We agreed, in a diplomatic note implying that ultimately a U.S. decision on the project would have to be considered in conjunction with our NPT responsibilities, (as well as the project's relationship to the Limited Test Ban Treaty). Gorton objected in the strongest terms to our making public the text of our note, and there was also a request that we should withdraw the note. Our Ambassador was instructed to assure him that the note was not intended to put pressure on the GOA to sign the NPT, and that the U.S. does not intend to use the Cape Keraudren project in any way to bring pressure on the GOA to sign the NPT. The Ambassador explained that our references to the NPT arose out of our concern with the possible attitude of prospective signatories especially among the developing countries of the world, and our wish to alert the GOA to a problem we foresaw the possible need to deal with at a later stage. We agreed not to publish the note, but declined to withdraw it.

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There is very little external leverage which might induce Australia to sign the NPT. The signature of Japan, and possibly Indonesia as well, may be a prerequisite for an Australian decision to sign. U.S. ratification and the example of the U.K. in early ratification will be an influence on Australia.

To the extent that Australian opposition rests on uneasiness about our commitment to defend Australia, continued reassurances on this point may help to promote a more favorable attitude toward the treaty. However, opposition to the treaty appears to exist more among those officials concerned with nuclear technology than at the political level.

Recommended Action:

We should be prepared to discuss further with the GOA, if it shows any desire to do so, questions of interest to the GOA regarding the NPT. This could be done either by our Embassy or, perhaps at an appropriate time after U.S. ratification by sending a high-level team of technical experts from the AEC, DOD and ACDA. We should also be prepared to reassure Australia regarding our commitment to its defense as appropriate occasions arise.

However, because of the demonstrated sensitivities of the Australian Prime Minister about any appearance of U.S. pressures, particularly regarding the NPT, we do not think it would be advisable at this time to take any formal or high-level initiatives regarding US-Australian consultations on the NPT.

Regarding the relationship of the Cape Keraudren project to Australian signature of the NPT, we do not believe any further decisions need be made at this time. In the event the feasibility study does show that the project can proceed, we may then be faced with deciding whether our overall interests would best be served by going ahead even if the GOA has not signed the NPT. On the one hand, Prime Minister Gorton would undoubtedly strongly resent any attempt by us to make our participation in the project contingent upon Australian signature of the NPT and the net result could be not only a serious strain

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in our relations with Australia but also a lessening of the chances of GOA acceptance of the NPT. On the other hand, U.S. conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions with benefits resulting for Australia before it signed the NPT would probably be characterized by some NPT supporters as contrary to the spirit (although not the letter) of the treaty, and such countries as Mexico and Sweden would probably utilize this project to support their efforts to subject all nuclear explosion services to international regulation; moreover, as to countries that had not decided to adhere to the NPT, our action might reduce the incentives to ratify since the assurance of availability of peaceful nuclear explosion benefits in Article V of the treaty is widely viewed as one of the advantages of the NPT. These considerations would be applicable although the project would be a research and development experiment under the US plowshare program. If the GOA has not signed the NPT by the time the Cape Keraudren project becomes a confirmed possibility, we will have to assess whether there are any further diplomatic means of encouraging Australian adherence without permitting the issue to be cast in terms which Gorton may view as "coercion."

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Brazil:

Brazil is not expected to sign the NPT in the near future. Its non-adherence reflects the strong personal opposition of the Foreign Minister, and is psychologically identified with patriotic nationalism. Although based on considerations of national prestige, Brazil's position has been rationalized by a refusal to accept limitations on nuclear research and development, including research on nuclear explosive devices for peaceful uses, which Brazil argues is important to the country's development. By opposing the super-powers on the NPT, Brazil hopes it can add to its credentials as a potential world power and a leader in Latin America. The Brazilian position on the NPT is also interwoven with domestic political issues.

As in the case of other countries with whom we have agreements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, Brazil has received assistance from the United States. Brazil is one of the 26 countries which has received a research reactor grant of \$350,000. In addition, it has received 4 equipment grants totalling \$318,000 directly from the US and 5 U.S. financed equipment grants totalling \$71,500 through the IAEA. There are also presently 3 research reactors in operation in Brazil. A Trilateral Agreement (US/Brazil/IAEA) has been concluded under which these facilities will be subject to IAEA safeguards.

Following the Punta del Esta meeting of American Presidents, the United States offered Brazil and the other Latin American countries additional possible programs. In the case of Brazil, we offered grants to bring senior Brazilian scientists to the US to work with the AEC at the professional level, cooperative research on thorium reactors, raw materials surveys, and joint studies in the fields of desalinization and irradiation. Although many of these programs could provide us with some potential long-term leverage, for the time being the nationalistic element in the Brazilian position would probably make US pressures counter-productive. As for Brazil's objection that the NPT prohibits acquisition of nuclear

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explosives for peaceful purposes, emphasis by us and other NPT adherents on the positive aspects of Article V might in time create an impression that remaining outside the treaty could limit Brazilian opportunities for economic development. It should be noted that while Brazilian actions relative to the NPT at the NNC and 23rd UNGA contributed to raising obstacles for the treaty, Brazil's official position at the ENDC and UNGA has not precluded its own eventual adherence. Brazil has simply reserved its decision to date.

Recommended Action:

No immediate action. We should be alert to opportunities to persuade Brazil that its abstention is contrary to its true long-term interests, and that its adherence could be a stimulant to increase US cooperation in the peaceful nuclear field. If Brazil continues to drag its feet, we should consider allowing our efforts in peaceful nuclear collaboration with Brazil to shrink to the minimum consistent with existing formal agreements. At no time, however, should it appear that the United States is unwilling to meet its existing firm commitments in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such action could cause other countries, including some of those adhering to the NPT, to question U.S. assurances concerning fuel supply and our willingness to meet long-term commitments. We should, however, be able to avoid the visible implication that US/Brazilian nuclear cooperation remains completely unaffected by Brazil's continued non-adherence. In any event, pending a more positive GOB attitude toward the treaty, we should do nothing to expedite new cooperation with Brazil in the peaceful nuclear field and should act deliberately on any new Brazilian requests, unless there are other overriding considerations. It should be recognized, of course, that the application of heavy-handed pressure could feed the nationalistic feelings already underlying the Brazilian position on the NPT, and could thereby prove counter-productive.

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Chile:

Chile has said it cannot sign the NPT until "certain other countries" do so, meaning specifically Argentina and Brazil. Since Chile believes such countries would have to participate in order for the NPT to be effective, and since it has expressed to us the hope that its position will place greater pressure on reluctant countries, there appears little likelihood of Chile's changing its attitude toward the NPT in the near future unless further efforts at persuasion are undertaken.

Recommended Action:

After U.S. ratification, we should make low-key representations, urging Chilean adherence, stressing that Chile has nothing to lose and much to gain by being the first of the "ABC countries" to sign. We could draw attention to long-term advantages to Chile in the peaceful applications field from its adherence. We should attempt to capitalize upon the liberal outlook of the Frei Government.

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SECRETCommunist China:

There is no reason to believe that Communist China will sign the NPT in the foreseeable future. In fact, its opposition to it will probably continue to be reflected in the negative attitudes of such countries as Albania, Tanzania, and Zambia. Its non-adherence will also be cited by a number of Asian countries among their own reasons for not signing. It is difficult to predict when, and under what conditions, China's attitude toward the NPT and other arms control measures might change. In any case, Communist China's non-adherence will not be a vital factor for achieving the purposes of the treaty. Although Peking has made statements denouncing the NPT, we do not believe that in practice Peking will provide nuclear weapons to third countries or substantially assist them in becoming nuclear weapon states.

We have no influence over China's posture on the NPT. We can continue to encourage it to participate in international arrangements for arms control, in the hope that in time the Chinese leadership might recognize its stake in the outcome of discussions of these matters.

Recommended Action:

We can see no specific action which would be helpful at this time, but we should continue in our public statements to express the hope that Peking will choose to participate in arms control arrangements.

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SECRETEURATOM Countries:

In order to ensure compatibility with the EURATOM Treaty, the non-nuclear members of EURATOM (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the FRG) will not ratify the NPT until IAEA and the European Communities Commission have reached agreement on a safeguards arrangement. The FRG is the only one of the five not to have signed as yet.

The EC Commission has thus far not been able to obtain a mandate to open talks with the IAEA before all Five have signed the Treaty. Thus, the delay in FRG signature is at the moment the principal cause of delay on progress towards an understanding between the two organizations.

In an earlier attempt to facilitate EURATOM adherence to the treaty and to ease Allied concern regarding a possible cut-off of U.S. nuclear fuel, we told our European allies in an aide-memoire dated November 13, 1967 that we would take into account the status of EURATOM negotiations with IAEA before ratifying the NPT. However, in view of the delay in the FRG decision regarding signature, caused in large measure by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the importance of our ratification to the progress of the Treaty, we now feel that tying our ratification to the EURATOM/IAEA negotiations is impractical.

Recommended Action:

Consultations with our Allies before depositing U.S. ratification in order to explain, in light of our statement of November 13, 1967, why we plan to ratify soon.

If the U.S. fuel supply issue is raised, we should say that if the time deadline is not met, we do not interpret the Treaty as automatically requiring a cut-off of fuel supplies. This would depend on the circumstances.

We should work with the EURATOM countries and within the IAEA to facilitate a prompt and satisfactory conclusion to their negotiations.

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SECRETFrance:

France has given no indication that it intends to sign the NPT, and we do not expect it to do so as long as De Gaulle remains in power. However, the French Permanent Representative stated at the UNGA that France intends to "behave in the future in this field exactly as states adhering to the Treaty." We do not believe that France itself will engage in proliferation. There is a possibility that the French attitude toward arms control in general, and the NPT in particular, will change in the post-De Gaulle period.

There is little that the U.S. can do at the present time to influence France regarding the NPT. What persuasion we can bring to bear would best be utilized in seeking French cooperation in those areas where it is currently highly important, such as the relationship between EURATOM and the IAEA, and in assuring that France maintains its positive stance toward the principle of non-proliferation.

Recommended Action:

None.

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SECRETFRG:

The NPT represents a particularly difficult domestic political problem for the FRG. While the SPD and FDP favor adhering to the Treaty, a majority of the Chancellor's own party, the CDU/CSU, opposes it. Supporters of adherence stress, in addition to the inherent merits of the treaty, the danger of Germany becoming isolated from its allies and especially of impairing its relations with the U.S. The grounds for opposition have included (1) a reluctance to undertake an explicit obligation to the USSR to remain a non-nuclear weapons state without receiving a significant counter-concession from the Soviets; (2) concern that the "European option" preserved by U.S. interpretations of the Treaty does not provide a basis for the development of a European nuclear force short of the creation of a federated Europe; and (3) suspicion that the Soviets would use the treaty to interfere with the German peaceful uses program or in German affairs in general. Discussion of the NPT has recently focussed on Soviet references to the continuing validity of the "enemy states" articles of the U.N. Charter in a manner that might imply the assertion of a unilateral right to intervene in FRG affairs.

The Soviets in early February made a gesture that could alleviate this problem by stating that U.N. Security Council Resolution 255 (1968) would also apply to the Federal Republic. The Germans have told the Soviets that with certain additions the Soviet statement would be acceptable. One of these provides that the Soviets would conduct their relations with the FRG, without reservation, in accordance with Article 2 of the U.N. Charter (proscribing the threat or use of force). This suggestion will probably not be acceptable to the Soviets since it implies a retreat from their position regarding the continuing validity of the "enemy states" articles of the U.N. Charter (Articles 53 and 107).

There is a good chance that the FRG will eventually adhere. But it is unclear whether the Chancellor will be able to bring this about before the elections next September.

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We have in the past taken significant steps to make the Treaty more palatable to the German Government and to ensure, as far as possible, its eventual adherence. In addition to changes in the text of the Treaty, we have made public interpretations of Articles of the Treaty of particular concern to the Germans. Moreover, Secretary Rusk stated at Reykjavik our full understanding of the views of other NATO ministers that the North Atlantic Treaty is an essential factor in their countries' continuing adherence to the NPT.

The President's discussion with Chancellor Kiesinger may afford additional indications of the FRG attitude.

We will need to study the results of the President's conversations before we can determine the details of further steps.

Recommended Action:

Avoid any appearance of pressure. Discuss the matter with the Germans and offer to approach the Soviets again regarding possible further helpful gestures. (It should be recognized that if Germany's signature is not forthcoming before the Federal elections, we in effect will enter a new situation regarding FRG NPT consideration whose elements it is difficult to foresee.)

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SECRETIndia:

India is not expected to sign the NPT in the foreseeable future. It desires to maintain its nuclear option in the face of the increasing nuclear threat from Communist China, especially in view of what it considers to be inadequate security assurances from the nuclear power signatories. The Indians also claim that the NPT contains an imbalance of obligations and does not fully protect the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear parties. Another factor in Indian opposition to NPT signature is the feeling that the NPT constitutes a derogation of India's claim to great power status. Nevertheless, the Indian Government continues to maintain it will not pursue a nuclear weapons program.

The most likely source of leverage as regards India's NPT signature is probably the Soviet Union's extensive conventional military aid program, but the Soviets have been most reluctant to apply any direct pressure. The U.S. could conceivably influence India through our economic assistance program, but in practice pressure of this kind is likely to prove counter-productive, especially if it cannot be concerted with the Soviets. The Indians have stated they will forego aid if necessary to avoid conflicts with the perceived security needs. Another avenue of influence at our disposal lies in the relationship which has developed between Indian and American scientists. The U.S. is helping India construct a nuclear power reactor at Tarapur. We are committed to supply fuel for its operation. After lengthy negotiations, we appear to be nearing agreement with India to undertake a trilateral agreement (US/INDIA/IAEA) for safeguards. Any requests for additional nuclear assistance, or for an increase in the scope of the present agreement, could provide us with potential influence, although this would probably

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have little or no effect on India's decision not to adhere. We would have to bear in mind the effect of our responses on other countries considering adherence.

The Indians are planning to build a large reactor themselves, but may have to seek outside assistance in key areas, thus providing us with possible leverage if we are approached. Any efforts to influence Indian nuclear policy should be conducted with maximum subtlety, since pressure which India feels impinges on its national pride or conflicts with its assessment of its national security requirements, is likely to cause a negative reaction.

Signature of the NPT by Pakistan would, to some extent, increase the pressure on India to sign.

Recommended Action:

None for the present, except to hold firm to our position that IAEA safeguards are required for any fuel or equipment we might supply to India. Consult with Soviets regarding desirability of concerted effort over longer term, recognizing that the Indians are likely to resist any combined influence which we and the Soviets could bring to bear regarding NPT adherence.

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SECRETIndonesia

Foreign Minister Malik announced some time ago that Indonesia would sign after the Non-Nuclear Conference. There has been no further official GOI indication of its intentions since the conference ended in September. However, in response to an Italian inquiry in January, the GOI replied that it did intend to sign but was vague on timing. The Germans, French, and Dutch have all been in contact with Indonesia regarding the possibility of cooperation in nuclear matters. Such approaches appear to have dealt solely with peaceful uses. Elements of the Indonesian military are seemingly reluctant to give up the theoretical option to produce nuclear weapons, but it is not clear whether this is a considered view or merely wishful thinking.

There is a reasonable chance that Indonesia will sign the NPT after the U.S. ratifies. This possibility would be further enhanced by FRG and other key country signatures. If Indonesia nevertheless fails to sign within a reasonable period, we should attempt to persuade the GOI, especially key military officers and economic officials, that the development of nuclear weapons is unrealistic for Indonesia and that the cost of the attempt would impair its prospects of playing a leading role in Southeast Asia as it desires. The positive aspects of the peaceful uses provisions of the treaty should be stressed and related to Indonesia's desire for regional prominence.

Recommended Action:

Representation after ratification, stressing regional importance of GOI's signature and positive arguments in peaceful uses area. Contact by attaches among military, stressing realistic alternatives available.

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SECRETIsrael:

Israel has not signed the NPT, even though all Arab countries except Algeria and Saudi Arabia have now signed. Officially the GOI position is that it has not yet reached a decision one way or the other on signature, and that it is studying the full implications of this step. The GOI declares, however, that it is not a nuclear power and will not be the first (area country) to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Moreover, Israel did vote affirmatively for the UNGA resolution last June commending the NPT.

Behind this official position Israel is actively working to improve its capability to produce nuclear weapons at short notice. In the absence of progress toward a peace settlement, Israel's leaders have probably decided Israel cannot afford to surrender the nuclear option. Until the Arabs show a disposition to negotiate with Israel, the GOI reasons that there may be advantages in not signing the NPT--it keeps the Arabs guessing as to Israel's deterrent power, and it could provide bargaining power in the context of a settlement. Elections this year in Israel add another factor working against the likelihood of a favorable decision by the Israeli Government on the NPT prior to that date.

The importance to the U.S. of Israeli adherence to the NPT lies not only in the very great effect of its adherence on the prospects for the general success of the Treaty, but also because, unlike other hold-outs, we believe Israel is actively working to give itself the capability to build a bomb. The longer Israel delays a decision on the NPT, the more momentum its weapons program is likely to acquire, and the more difficult it will be for the GOI to give it up. Should it become generally accepted that Israel possesses nuclear weapons (even if Israel has not conducted a test), it would reduce even further the prospects for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem, and it could well cause so many hold-outs to the Treaty throughout the world as to seriously vitiate the effectiveness of the Treaty.

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Because Israel views its nuclear option, and thus its position on the NPT, as an integral part of its national security, its decision on the NPT will not easily be influenced by outside suasion or pressure. If the U.S. decides that Israeli adherence to the NPT is of major importance to its policy objectives, we must be prepared to make this a crunch issue with Israel and to make it clear that if Israel elects to go the nuclear route it would cause a fundamental change in the US-Israeli relationship, including our long-standing concern for Israel's security. To make the Israelis believe in our determination, we would have to show that we are prepared to have the issue become public and to defend our position in the face of domestic pressures. Short of using U.S. influence on this scale, it will be futile, and probably counter-productive, for the U.S. to resort to half-way measures, such as attempting to use Israeli requests for conventional weapons as leverage on this issue.

If the U.S. decides it does not wish to employ pressure on this scale, there are perhaps some actions in the realm of low-key suasion that could have a marginal (but not decisive) effect on Israel's attitude toward the NPT. Through diplomatic approaches, we could try to sell the Israelis on the idea of signing the Treaty in the immediate future but withholding ratification until Israel's security concerns are more fully assured. We could explore with the USSR the possibility of limiting shipments of conventional weapons to the area in return for Israeli forbearance on nuclear weapons and signature of the NPT. We should consider the advantages and disadvantages of trying to meet directly some of Israel's probable concerns about the effect of the Treaty on current Israeli activities--exploring with the GOI the extent to which the Treaty would prevent the GOI from conducting basic research and making contingency plans for developing atomic weapons.

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Recommended Action:

Continuing high-level review within the U.S. Government as to the importance the U.S. attaches to Israeli adherence to the NPT, and the measures we are prepared to take to achieve this objective. In the meantime, a Presidential letter to the Israeli Prime Minister stressing the continuity of U.S. non-proliferation objectives under the new Administration and our hope that Israel will sign the NPT. Consult with UK, France, and USSR as to availability of other bilateral or multilateral approaches.

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Japan:

Japan is not likely to sign the NPT until well into 1969. The delay in U.S. ratification and the delay by certain other threshold countries (notably the FRG) in signing have removed much of the external pressure for Japanese signature. In addition, domestic political considerations will affect GOJ timing. The Japanese also have probed for our reaction to their linking their signature with Japanese membership on the ENDC. The treaty will probably not be ratified without a full debate in the Diet.

We expect U.S. ratification to have a positive effect on Japanese consideration of its NPT signature. Regarding a possible linkage between their signature and ENDC membership, we have told them that these two issues should be considered on their merits and remain unrelated. The Japanese subsequently appeared to accept our views against linking the two; nevertheless there seems little doubt that should Japan obtain an ENDC seat its signature would be facilitated. The GOJ has also expressed concern that, should they sign, the Soviets will no longer favor their joining the ENDC.

Recommended Action:

Low-key representation after ratification, stressing merits of treaty and special importance US, as principal architect of treaty, attaches to Japan's adherence. Continued efforts to achieve Japan's membership in the ENDC as soon as possible.

Pakistan:

Pakistan continues to withhold its signature, primarily because of India's non-signature, although it supports the NPT in principle. The domestic problems currently confronting the government add to the unlikelihood of early Pakistani signature. However, we do not preclude Pakistan eventually signing, even should India not.

Our influence on Pakistan regarding NPT adherence is extremely limited in the absence of Indian signature. Pakistani desire to play a leading role among the non-nuclear weapon nations could be brought to bear at some point in the future.

Recommended Action:

Low-key representation after U.S. ratification. In urging Pakistan to sign the NPT, we could make clear that it would remain free to decide when ratification should actually take place. We also could point out that Pakistan's adherence would constitute additional pressure on India to reconsider its position on the treaty. If we succeed in obtaining Soviet agreement to including Pakistan in the ENDC enlargement package, we should consider using this as a springboard for additional representations.

Portugal:

In July, 1968, Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira made clear that Portugal did not intend to sign the NPT. He asserted that UN-linked guarantees for non-nuclear states were not sufficient for Portugal. Portugal has little confidence in the UN, and is concerned with the possibility that increased African influence in the IAEA could lead to efforts to bar Portugal from the Board of Governors. Some Portuguese have expressed the fear that the Chinese Communists might someday make nuclear weapons available to their special friends in Africa such as Tanzania, which was one of the few countries to vote against UNGA endorsement of the NPT. It is unlikely that Portugal's new government will depart from its predecessor's negative attitude toward the NPT, but the change-over affords an opportunity for renewed discussions.

The U.S. has little leverage in dealing with Portugal. It is unlikely that we could induce Portugal to adhere to the NPT by any means short of strong support for its policy towards its African colonies, which we are unable to give. Even this step would not satisfy Portuguese fears that it would be treated unfairly in NPT implementation because of African influence over the decisions of relevant international bodies.

Recommended Action:

Low-key representation after ratification, stressing importance of adherence by all NATO allies.

South Africa:

Although South Africa voted in favor of the UNGA resolution commending the NPT, there is no indication that it intends to sign the Treaty in 1969. South Africa has expressed its reservations on the NPT in technical terms: it is a major producer of uranium and sees a need for more precise clarification of how IAEA safeguards will apply to source materials; it also seeks assurance that Article V will be applied in a non-discriminatory fashion. We believe, however, that South Africa is also concerned with the effect it believes NPT adherence might have on its long-term security. It is unlikely to surrender a defense option unless it perceives clear political advantages in doing so. And like Portugal, it is undoubtedly concerned about possible discrimination because of African influence in the UN and pressures to increase African representation in the IAEA.

The US can continue the efforts it has pursued in the past to reassure South Africa about specific technical points in the Treaty. We can cite our successful efforts at the 23rd UNGA to block the Africans' attempt to exclude South Africa from UNCTAD as evidence of our intention to assure South Africa equitable treatment in international organizations. For overriding political and economic reasons, we would not wish to offer increased support to the South African regime on such matters as the arms embargo or its gold market, if it should seek any such quid pro quo for its adherence to the NPT.

Recommended Action:

Representation after ratification, reviewing technical points made previously.

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Spain:

The Spanish Government has stated that it will take no final position on the NPT until our negotiations for the renewal of the U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreement have dealt satisfactorily with its desire for a treaty providing for U.S. security guarantees for Spain. Spain has indicated that the NPT poses no other serious problems so long as Spanish security is provided for.

It seems certain that the Spanish desire for a treaty providing security guarantees cannot be fulfilled, given U.S. unwillingness to assume new commitments in this field. If the revised Defense Agreement is satisfactory to Spain in other respects, however, and once the threat of withholding NPT signature is no longer useful to Spain as a negotiating ploy, it may be that Spain will see its way clear to sign the Treaty. Adherence by other current European non-signatories will also favorably influence Spain's decision.

Recommended Action:

None, pending renewal of the Defense Agreement. Thereafter, low-key approach to point out merits of broadest possible worldwide adherence.

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SECRETSweden

Sweden signed the NPT in August of last year. The Foreign Minister made a statement before Parliament in November, saying that Sweden would not ratify until the Soviet Union, the U.S., and Germany had ratified.

In spite of the Foreign Minister's statement, it may be possible to obtain Swedish ratification after the U.S. and USSR ratify and Germany signs. Sweden is aware of the FRG's EURATOM commitment regarding deferment of ratification and, therefore, that German ratification may take up to two years from the treaty's entry into force.

Recommended Action:

Low-key representations. Our European allies, particularly the UK, should be encouraged to make approaches. Representations could point out the probable time lag before FRG ratification and the benefit to the NPT of early ratification by threshold countries, following the example of Canada.

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Switzerland:

The Swiss Government was forced to reconsider its signature of the NPT after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We remain hopeful that Switzerland will sign in the not too distant future, especially in view of the recent Italian signature. We have received recent indications, however, that Swiss signature may be forthcoming only after West Germany has signed and both the U.S. and the USSR have ratified.

There appears to be little that the U.S. can do to encourage Swiss signature, besides contributing to the general momentum of the treaty. Should Germany remain a hold-out, the Swiss might respond to persuasion which would highlight the possibly helpful effect of their signature on FRG considerations.

Recommended Action:

Low-key representation, based on positive effect of Swiss adherence on FRG and other countries like Australia, South Africa and Latin American hold-outs.

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SECRETThailand:

Thailand has been guarded in its attitude toward the NPT, and has never stated that it would sign. It has said it is not satisfied with the peaceful uses provisions, and has placed special emphasis on what it considers to be the inadequacies of the security assurances given by the nuclear signatories. It has also expressed concern that neither France nor Communist China intends to sign. We understand that attitudes toward the treaty at the cabinet level are mixed.

Thai signature may well be forthcoming when the treaty achieves renewed momentum. If not, we might reemphasize the positive benefits afforded by the Treaty in the area of peaceful uses, possibly by sending a specialist to Bangkok. Thailand has recently sought to obtain the services of AEC scientists in working out problems with its research reactor and in framing a long-range program for the use of nuclear energy. Such contacts could provide a basis for influencing Thai nuclear policy in the future and should be encouraged.

Recommended Action:

Representation after ratification, stressing positive aspects of peaceful uses provisions. Encourage contacts with AEC.

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United Arab Republic:

The UAR signed the NPT on July 1, 1968. Although we believe it intends to ratify, there is a possibility it might delay pending signature by Israel.

If the UAR should hold back, we can expect to have very little direct influence on its ratification. We can have indirect influence in that regard to the extent that we are able to obtain Israeli adherence. We can coordinate our efforts regarding attitudes toward the treaty throughout the Middle East with the Soviets.

Recommended Action:

None directly, but discuss with Soviets possible initiatives leading toward area-wide adherence.

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PAPER

NSSM 13

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 5, 1969

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National Security Study Memorandum 13


TO:           The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
              The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:    Position of Key Countries on the Non-Proliferation Treaty

In connection with the President's decision to go forward with U. S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he has directed that a study be prepared reviewing the positions of key countries on the treaty and the alternate courses of action available to the U. S. to influence the decisions of these key countries to sign or ratify the treaty.

The President directed that the study be prepared by an NSC Ad Hoc Group, under the chairmanship of a representative of the Secretary of State, with representatives of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The study should be forwarded to the National Security Council Review Group by March 3, 1969.



Henry A. Kissinger

*cia Joseph 2/11/69*

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NSDM 6

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
SECRET

February 5, 1969

National Security Decision Memorandum 6

TO:           The Vice President  
              The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
              The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT:    Presidential Decision to Ratify Non-Proliferation Treaty

The President has decided to go forward with U. S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Until this decision is reported in a Presidential message to Congress, the Government's public position should be that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is still under consideration by the President and the National Security Council.

The President directed that, associated with the decision to proceed with U. S. ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there should be no efforts by the U. S. Government to pressure other nations, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, to follow suit. The Government in its public posture should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or ratify, while clearly dissociating itself from any plan to bring pressure on these countries to sign or ratify.

The President directed that the Government in its public posture should make clear that the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not create any new U. S. commitments abroad and that it does not broaden or modify any existing U. S. commitments abroad. The President desires that the nature of U. S. commitments abroad be decided when the need arises, based on the circumstances at the time.

*H. A. Kissinger*  
cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
      The Director of Central Intelligence

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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 4, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR NSC REVIEW GROUP MEMBERS

Attached is the paper on Positions of Key Countries on the Non-Proliferation Treaty prepared in response to NSSM 13 by an NSC Ad Hoc Committee chaired by ACDA. This paper is relevant to the NSC Review Group meeting scheduled for Thursday, March 6, at 2:00 P.M.

  
Richard M. Moose

Attachment

cc: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

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