

**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY**

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Briefing	re: MBFR and CES MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 04-H-02/1 <b>SANITIZED</b> <small>PAC PAC REVIEW 3/4/2009</small>	12/1/71	B
2	Memo	Odeen to HAK MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 04-H-02/2	11/30/71	B
3	Paper	Issues Paper on MBFR and CES MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 04-H-02/3 <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> <small>Per Ltr. 4/26/2013</small>	12/1/71	B
4	Report	MBFR Analytical Summary MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 04-H-02/4 <b>EXEMPTED</b> <small>Per Sec. 3.3(b)(5)(6); Ltr. 9/7/2012</small>	n.d.	B

FILE GROUP TITLE  
NSC Institutional Files, Meeting Files

**Box H-32**

FOLDER TITLE  
[06] NSC Meeting CES/MBFR (NATO Ministerial) December 1, 1971

RESTRICTION CODES

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy  | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information.   | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.   |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.                      | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.                                       |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.   |

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1 (briefing)	re: MBFR and CES	12/1/71	A
2 (memo)	Odeen to HAK	11/30/71	A
3 (paper)	Issues Paper on MBFR and CES	12/1/71	A
4 (report)	MBFR Analytical Summary	n.d.	A

FILE LOCATION

H-Files      Box H-32      folder 6

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION  
November 26, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: J.M. W.H.  
Jack Merritt/Bill Hyland

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on NATO

Attached is the draft material for the NSC meeting on NATO. We are providing this early in order to get the benefit of your guidance in preparing the final materials which will be available on your return.

We have included:

- draft Talking Points; and,
- a draft Issues Paper.

Not included is any reference to Secretary Laird's possible briefing on burdensharing. By separate memorandum John Court has recommended you ask Laird to brief. We await your decision on this issue.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958

*R. H. G.*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE


November 30, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President  
The Attorney General  
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT: Issues Paper for NSC Meeting, December 2.

Attached for your information is an outline paper on MBFR and a European Security Conference that will serve as the basis for discussion at the NSC meeting on December 2.

  
Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958

RFLx

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE



Sym

Hahn

Kis

MBFR - Goes back into SO<sub>2</sub> - Camp  
up many times -

This Admin - first to analyze -  
Looked at 4 broad

Operative man - shall we fix on 1  
option or study more - If we fix  
on 1 it will be regret - that is bad.

Need to force allies to examine sec.  
aspects - study options.

CE5 - A nightmare - First would cover  
all aspect - May solid II -

Need to incorporate some good ideas for State  
page

2 levels of delay - Berlin or West agreement - Don  
to min also could delay by prelim. conf.

Royce - Can delay - Told me - no conf in 1972 -  
wait until the protocol. Brown - blame Sov for delay

Pres - Can we delay into 73

Royce - yes - but will have no smth -  
Not necessarily bad - can turn to advantage -  
Prelim. conf. at some point - low level - No  
conf.

Land - Nato MCD will follow our lead - Brit  
to lead laid on their stove. We should  
continue work on MBFR. Can get Cong. support  
for another ~~Day~~ year - But we should prepare  
our position so we can take lead.

Royce - Sov. don't really have an interest in MBFR.  
Want a conf. Major For. Pol. item.

Land - Brown good move - But USSR in Def.

Munn - Allies suspect we may be trying to lay base  
for unit cut - also need to keep up  
pressure on Force Imp. - Sov. try to split US +  
allies

K - Allies do fear we will reluctantly reject MBFR

Land ~~So~~ - Smith's spend story of possible for cut

Rogers what about Bund 5ba

Land - 4 ways to show bond - ① allow take over Resp. ② improve Jones. ③ offset.

Roy - Will over - offset shortly - But need to face grants of program.

Buy Help by improve from

~~Land~~ - Land - do an intent to get their Jones story - long term. Must keep pressin altho to do more.

Moses - Some improv. - but spotty.

Pres - Warm but Fair - ?

Helms - No changes since last summer.

Land - One Jones in best shape since pre-V.N. 50,000 auto will hurt - 10,000.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

November 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Philip Odeen/<sup>POW</sup>Hal Sonnenfeldt<sup>HS/WH</sup>

SUBJECT: Materials for the NSC Meeting on MBFR and CSCE  
(NATO's new term for CES)

Attached are your materials for the NSC meeting on Wednesday, December 1, 1971. Included are:

1. Your Talking Points.
2. Your memorandum to the President.
3. The President's Talking Points.
4. The Issues Paper.
5. Analytical Summary of the Options Evaluation Report.
6. Analytical Summary of the NSSM 138 (CES) Report.

The nature of the meeting has been changed following the President's announcements that he will be visiting with the heads of government of our major Allies in the near future.

The review of U.S. positions on MBFR and CSCE was accordingly set in a broader framework of Allied concerns. The aim of reaching definitive U.S. policy positions has been somewhat overtaken by the need for preparations to make the most from the President's consultations with our Allies.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 9/15/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958

RAL

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

TOP SECRET

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...  
*A*

EUROPEAN CONFERENCE --  
AGENDA AS NOW ENVISAGED

WARSAW PACT

NATO

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <p>1. Renunciation of the threat or use of force; respect for existing borders;</p> <p>2. Expansion of economic, scientific-technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;</p> <p>3. A permanent "organ" for questions of security and cooperation in Europe, including reduction of armed forces.</p> | <p>1. Principles which should govern relations between states, including renunciation of the use of force;</p> <p>2. (a) Economic, scientific, technical cultural and environmental cooperation;<br/>(b) Freer movement of people, ideas and information;</p> <p>3. <u>Possible</u> establishment of a permanent body (through publicly stated to date only as a means of embarking on multilateral negotiations).</p> |
|--|--|

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/20  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958

*R76x*

HAK TALKING  
POINTS

TOP SECRET

HAK TALKING POINTS

NSC MEETING ON MBFR AND CES

December 1, 1971

Mr. President:

In preparation for the NATO Ministerial Meetings in early December the U.S. should review its positions on MBFR and CES [or CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) as it is now called in NATO].

How we proceed in NATO will be conditioned by:

- Your meetings with several of our Allied heads of government,
- Any Pact initiatives which result from the Warsaw Pact meeting on MBFR and CSCE on Tuesday, November 30, 1971,
- The status of the NATO Explorer's Mission to Moscow.

The major issues we should discuss are those issues on which we will be questioned by our Allies in December:

- Our response will be sought at the Meetings to the analysis of MBFR Options, which we recently transmitted to NATO;
- Our Allies will want to know any U.S. preferences on when MBFR negotiations could start and the pace they should take;
- Finally, they will ask about U.S. attitudes toward a European Conference, including the relationship of a CSCE and MBFR.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958

RJGx

Our NATO Allies will feel justified in pressing us on these topics primarily for two reasons:

-- We promised the Alliance a report on our study of MBFR options, but we have not made U.S. preferences clear;

-- Several Allies have maintained that they cannot adopt definitive policy positions on MBFR or CSCE until the U.S. positions are known.

In fact the actual concerns of our Allies, and notably the Germans, has been that the U.S. might either be secretly working toward a bilateral arrangement with the Soviets or that we might be preparing for a unilateral cut. It is important to give reassurance to our Allies that the U.S. is not planning such moves.

MBFR Options Evaluation

Let us consider first the status of our evaluation of MBFR Options.

We have recently completed an interagency study of four basic types of MBFR options which may be categorized as:

-- Limited [10% & 20%] symmetrical percentage reductions in ground forces with variants including tactical air forces in equal percentages with ground forces;

-- Major [30%] symmetrical percentage reductions in ground forces with variants including tactical air forces again in equal percentages with ground forces;

-- Common ceiling options based in one case on equipment and in another on manpower;

-- A "mixed package" option (which is composed of dissimilar force elements) built on NATO aircraft and Pact tanks.

There were two forms of analysis performed for these options, one used a computer to simulate a dynamic conflict situation and the other used static ratios of opposing forces, based on several categories of manpower and weapons.

Neither of these analyses can be taken as more than very approximate models of the actual situation. They are limited in many ways, but they are the best analytical efforts we have been able to produce thus far. They are still not entirely complete and other analytical approaches need to be explored. But they do provide useful insights. Both methods of analysis concurred that there was a detrimental trend for NATO from symmetrical percentage reductions and that there was a significant adverse military effect on NATO from large symmetrical percentage reductions. The analyses diverge somewhat over the military significance of limited reductions, such as a 10% symmetrical reduction, but NATO clearly would not gain anything.

The common ceiling options were shown to be favorable to NATO, because the ceilings were set very close to current NATO levels. This produced pronounced asymmetrical reductions for the Pact. The main difficulty with these options is their probable non-negotiability.

The mixed package option had to be analyzed using subjective military judgment, since our computer based models generally cannot evaluate trade-offs between dissimilar force elements, especially ground and air elements. However, a static force ratio comparison was made.

Both analyses concluded that the particular mixed packages studied <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ so small (at most it would involve 42 F-4 aircraft and 899 Soviet tanks) that no significant military effects would result.

Summing up then, the general conclusion of the existing U.S. analysis of MBFR options is that no option clearly met the criterion of undiminished military security for NATO and <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ also realistically viable for negotiation.

This fact strongly conditions what we are prepared to say to our Allies about our preferences for negotiations. It would be possible for the U.S. to press, in December, for early negotiations, but the second defeat of a Mansfield Amendment for Europe has bought us a little time. Unless we develop a strong Western consensus on what should be sought through MBFR and how it should be attained, the Alliance will be susceptible to divisive Soviet negotiating tactics and serious splits could develop.

We are in a position now to set the pace on MBFR; if we concentrate on explaining our analyses to our Allies, we can build more of a Western consensus on MBFR and at the same time convey the continuing interest of the U.S. in the security of Western Europe.

TOP SECRET

*Not just phase?  
What do we want?*

5

If it was decided to enter any MBFR negotiations early on, the pace of any negotiations would, in light of what I have outlined, have to be deliberate and drawn out to give the Alliance a chance to reach agreement at each step. In any event, a phased approach to negotiations has been given careful U.S. study, and we have found that it could give us a lot of flexibility.

Another major issue which we should address is the interconnection between MBFR and a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These two topics have been kept on separate tracks, but it is important to think about them together, regardless of whether we choose to connect them in practical terms. First let me focus on the Conference specifically.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

CSCE

*Timing<sup>6</sup> of talk  
Nature of talks  
Security component*

The issues related to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will almost certainly be high on the agenda of the NATO discussions, as well as your meetings with European leaders.

The current situation is:

-- If the second phase of the Berlin talks between the Germans is successful, as seems likely, we will face the question of whether to move into preparations for a European Conference.

-- Most of our Allies, including the Germans, are willing to accept the completion of the second Berlin phase, as sufficient progress to begin the discussion with the East on a Conference.

-- Our position, however, is that the Berlin agreement must be completely wrapped up, that is, the final four power protocol must be signed before beginning preparations for a European Conference.

The most immediate issue, therefore, is whether to hold to our position, or give into the lesser position adopted by some if not all of the Allies:

TOP SECRET

-- If we begin conference preparations without full implementation of the Berlin agreement, we risk losing the Berlin achievements. The Conference could accomplish Soviet objectives of ratifying the status quo in Eastern Europe and gaining influence over Western policy -- that is, presenting a European security system as an alternative to NATO.

-- On the other hand, sticking to our linkage of the final protocol signature as the precondition to beginning the preparatory talks on a Conference will be difficult to achieve in the face of the European desire to show progress on a Conference.

-- Moreover, this position, in effect, puts on greater pressures to ratify the German treaties in the Bundestag especially if the Soviets continue to insist on implementing the Berlin agreement simultaneously with the Soviet-German treaty ratification.

If we do prevail in the NATO discussions, the timetable of convening the first stage of conference preparations might be as late as April, when the Bundestag completes ratifications of the treaty, or they disapprove it.

We would have to consider whether it would be prudent to delay

for a short while, e. g., until after the Moscow summit in May.

Character of a Conference

These issues of timing are not merely procedural, because there is agreement that we are not ready to begin substantive discussions with the East.

-- NATO preparations thus far have brought out divergent approaches.

-- For example, some favor a short conference, with longer preparatory sessions to achieve agreement.

-- Others favor a series of meetings, alternating Ministerial meetings with working levels session.

However, the basic divergence is over what a Conference would accomplish.

The first alternative is the Soviet approach -- a conference for the sake of atmospherics.

-- While none of the Allies explicitly favor this, their lack of agreement on what steps we could take to give a conference some substance makes the Soviet approach difficult to resist.

A second approach favored by France is to exclude all security issues, and concentrate on measures of "cooperation;" that is, economic,

scientific and cultural exchanges.

-- This would circumvent some of the Soviet security issues -- such as a renunciation of force agreement -- but would also be euphoric.

-- Real East-West economic issues are not likely to be resolved in a Conference of some thirty nations.

A Third Approach would be to try to move from declarations and agreements to more concrete measures.

-- For example, if the Soviets propose agreement on non-use of force, we would examine what restrictions on movement of military forces might be appropriate to implement such a declarations.

-- We might consider establishing some kind of machinery to carry out agreed measures.

-- This approach is not yet worked out, and would need much more time to develop with the Allies.

-- In this scenario we would probably want to hold a deputy foreign minister meeting, say around April, so that we can work out a common Western framework for the Conference.

In summary , we have the following questions:

1. Whether to retain the condition that the Berlin agreement must be fully completed before we can begin any multilateral preparations for a

European Conference.

2. Whether to aim for postponing these preliminary discussions until after the Moscow summit.

3. What approach to take toward the outcome of a conference:

- a. A purely atmospheric conference, minimizing our losses as proves feasible.
- b. A conference that excludes security issues in favor of cooperation in non-military areas.
- c. A conference on both security and cooperation, but with a set of concrete proposals, rather than broad agreements.

Returning now to the interconnection between MBFR and CES, if the approach taken toward a CES is to focus on agreements on both security and cooperation, it would be possible to use such a forum to reach agreements which precede the type of collateral constraints we have discussed for MBFR. I am not endorsing such a concept, but it should be introduced for discussion. It would imply delaying actual force reductions until after the more general political discussion on European security had been carried out and some agreements reached.

MEMO FOR THE  
PRESIDENT

MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger 

SUBJECT: NSC Consideration of NATO Issues:  
(1) Mutual Force Reductions  
(2) European Security Conference

The meetings of NATO Ministers next week (December 8-10) will be dominated by two issues: the question of a Western position on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and preparations for a European Conference on Security and Cooperation. On both subjects our Allies will be looking to the U.S. for an indication of how we wish to deal with them.

-- Both of these issues bear importantly on Western security interests. If not handled properly the results could be highly dangerous. It is important that we maintain our focus on the implications for the military balance of any force reductions and on the substance of European security, rather than drift into ill-defined negotiations that will only work to the Soviet advantage.

-- On neither of these issues is the Western Alliance in a position to move ahead; there is no consensus on the aims of either mutual force reductions or a European conference.

-- We need more time to develop concrete proposals.

-- Finally, multilateral negotiations of this sort on European issues should come after, not before your meeting in Moscow. Moreover, we should have some greater assurance of a satisfactory outcome in SALT.

Background

MBFR: The Western initiative, dating back to 1968, for negotiations on the reduction of forces in Central Europe was largely academic until last Spring when Brezhnev offered to begin negotiations. As a consequence of the Soviet response, we have intensified our study of the issues. Within the Alliance there has been a sharp revival of interest in negotiations

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958



because of: (1) the Soviet response on MBFR; (2) the on-going U.S. and FRG negotiations with the Soviets; and, (3) the Mansfield proposals for unilateral reductions.

Our own studies have shown that almost every model for reductions that would be negotiable with the Soviets would damage the Western military position. Small reductions that minimize the adverse consequences are almost impossible to verify, whereas larger reductions do major damage mainly because the Soviets withdraw only to Western Russia while we withdraw across the Atlantic.

Though these conclusions are not surprising, they are being submerged in other considerations. For various reasons MBFR negotiations have become a highly political issue in Europe.

-- Many Allies (and some in our own government) believe that our Congressional critics can be placated by MBFR negotiations.

-- Others believe that MBFR is an instrument for European detente, and should be pursued for this purpose.

-- In addition, some of our Allies suspect that we want to arrange a bilateral reduction with the USSR and wish to forestall this through early negotiations.

Our objective, therefore, must be to impress the Allies that we are not interested in reductions for the sake of a better atmosphere and to assure them that no bilateral bargain will be made with the USSR. We want to force our Allies to recognize the problems and implications of MBFR and to focus on the security consequences to the Alliance's military posture. Unless maintenance of a military balance is the principal criteria for judging MBFR, we will be engaged in the impossible task of trading military security for some vague and undefinable degree of detente.

A Conference on European Security and Cooperation. This issue has been pressed with varying degrees of urgency by the Soviets since 1954, and for good reason. As they define it, such a Conference would issue declarations of non-aggression, recognize existing borders, and agree on increased economic cooperation. Their aim is to solidify the status quo in Eastern Europe, while extending their own influence in the Western Alliance.

On this issue there is growing Allied pressure simply to move to negotiations. The Alliance consideration of the subjects to be discussed and what the Western position would be has been limited and without consensus. Negotiations at this point would almost certainly result in a Soviet-style conference agreeing on broad generalities.

We need to redirect the work of the Allies so that principles of security are translated into specific measures. If we can do this, a negotiation later may actually enhance the Western position.

### Priorities and Timing

We have set no precondition for MBFR, but the Soviets are clearly dragging their feet by refusing thus far to accept Brosio as the NATO "explorer" of MBFR principles. Until they do agree to receive Brosio we need make no further effort to open negotiations; we should use the time for the Alliance to digest the analytical result of our studies. We have just completed a major study and transmitted it to NATO. One approach which deserves further discussion involves phased negotiations, with extensive discussion of principles in the early stages and prior to negotiations on reductions.

On a European conference we are committed to begin the preparations once the Berlin issue is completed. Some Allies, notably Britain and France, and perhaps West Germany, would be willing to move toward a conference as soon as the current phase of the Berlin talks, between East and West German, is completed (perhaps late this week). We want to stick to the condition of completely wrapping up Berlin. The Soviets appear to be insisting that Berlin will be held open until their German treaty is ratified in Bonn. If so, preparations of a European conference will be put over until the spring and, thus, should be held up until your meeting in Moscow. In this case, agreement to begin a European conference might be a summit decision.

### Proposed Conduct of the Meeting

Since we can anticipate pressure from the Allies to show "movement" at the Ministerial meeting, it will be important for you to impress on the NSC meeting that we will not move until we are assured that in both issues (MBFR and a conference) we can develop a common Western

position that insures that our security interests will be maintained intact.

(You may wish to say that both issues should be delayed until after the summit.)

I suggest that you conduct the meeting as follows:

-- Call on Director Helms to brief on the outcome of the November 30 Warsaw Pact meeting on MBFR and the European conference.

-- Call on me to outline the issues and alternatives.

-- Make clear that you do not want a substantive movement on these issues now.

-- Discuss the conclusions we draw from the MBFR options analysis and Allied reactions, calling first on Secretary Rogers.

-- Discuss the sequence of MBFR negotiations, once started.

-- Discuss the preconditions (Berlin) for a Conference.

-- Discuss the character of the Conference we want.

Your Talking Points are written in the above fashion.

PRESIDENTS'  
TALKING POINTS

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *ly*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT

NSC MEETING ON MBFR AND CSCE

December 1, 1971

The purpose of this meeting is to review the results of the U.S. study efforts on MBFR and CSCE and to examine our positions on these two topics, especially in preparation for the December NATO Ministerial Meetings.

I would first like to ask Director Helms to give us a summary of any information points from the Warsaw Pact meeting.

[Helm's Briefing]

I would like Dr. Kissinger to outline issues and alternatives.

[Kissinger's Briefing]

It seems clear that we need to move very slowly in relation to both the European Conference and MBFR. We need to develop a common understanding which clearly maintains security interests. Let's take up the issues connected with MBFR first of all.

MBFR Options Analysis

What kind of response can we expect from our Allies as they absorb what we have sent them? Secretary Rogers.

[Rogers' Views]

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02  
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC  
under provisions of E.O. 12958

*RTR*

[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer, and Director Helms.]

I would like your feelings on the proper course for further U.S. efforts. Secretary Rogers.

[Rogers' Views]

[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer, and perhaps Director Helms.]

MBFR Negotiations

Secretary Rogers, what is your view of how we might phase the negotiating process? [That is, do we want a preliminary stage dealing with principles.]

[Rogers' Views]

[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird.]

European Conference

One issue revolves around the preconditions for the start of multilateral preparations for a European Security Conference. We have been holding to the final signing of the four power protocol on Berlin as a precondition.

Secretary Rogers, what preconditions do you feel we should require?

[Rogers' Views]

[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird, and possibly Admiral Moorer and Director Helms.]

There are several outstanding proposals within the Alliance for the form a conference should take, which means this issue would have to be resolved before substantive discussions with the East are begun.

But I want to know what form of a European Conference could serve U.S. interests? Secretary Rogers. [e.g. a conference involving (1) only detente; or, (2) economic cooperation; or (3) substantive security issues?]

[Rogers' Views]

[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer and Director Helms.]

This has been a most interesting and useful meeting. I will consider the issues and your remarks and let you know my decisions soon.

ISSUES  
PAPER

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

ISSUES PAPER  
NSC Meeting on MBFR and CES  
December 1, 1971

The major purpose of this meeting is to review the positions on MBFR and CES the United States should take at the NATO Ministerial Meetings set for December 8-10; the topics of MBFR and CES will be major issues for discussion within the Alliance. In particular, U.S. thinking will be solicited on MBFR in conjunction with the U.S. analysis of four MBFR Options recently transmitted to NATO.

The principal issues to be considered by the NSC are as follows:

- the U.S. response to our MBFR Options analysis;
- whether we favor early MBFR negotiations;
- what pace MBFR negotiations should follow;
- the attitudes toward a CES.

Allied Attitudes

Our NATO allies expected more definitive inputs from the U.S. on MBFR by the end of summer; in particular, we had promised to transmit to NATO papers on MBFR Elements and MBFR Options. The Elements paper was largely overtaken by the development of the NATO Principles and Guidelines for the NATO "Explorer" on MBFR, Manlio Brosio<sup>1/</sup>. There was, however, still great interest in the U.S. Options Paper.

The interest turned to anxiety and that to "angst", especially on the part of the FRG, as the U.S. continued to delay its options study. Strong European concerns have been voiced that the U.S. might either be gearing up for a bilateral agreement with the Soviets, or planning a unilateral disengagement from Europe.

1/ Brosio has not yet been received by Soviets. They are expected to receive him eventually, but appear in no hurry, even though they have been informed of the desire to have him report his findings at the December NATO Meetings.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5  
NN 04-H-02/8805 Per Ltr. 4/26/2013  
By Dm/wll NARA, Date 12/30/2014

Internally these pressures from our Allies for clearer indications of U.S. intentions on MBFR were interpreted as an Allied desire for clear U.S. leadership, including a preferred U.S. option. To the contrary, it seems more plausible that the Allies, quite properly, are fearful of the potential of a mishandled MBFR; they want to be reassured that they will be consulted, and that MBFR will move at a pace consistent with a Western understanding of and consensus on MBFR.

MBFR

A. Introduction

The U.S. has promised NATO that it would transmit its analysis of MBFR options; the options studied may be stated briefly as follows:

-- Limited (i. e. 10% & 20%) symmetrical percentage reductions in ground forces with variants including tactical air forces in equal percentages with ground forces;

-- Major (i. e. 30%) symmetrical reductions in ground forces with variants including tactical air forces in equal percentages with ground forces.

-- Common ceiling options based on (1) equipment (tanks and aircraft) and (2) manpower, both at about current NATO levels;

-- "Mixed packages" (Options composed of dissimilar force elements) of NATO aircraft and Pact tanks.

Two types of analysis have been performed for these options and their variants. One analysis (called a "dynamic" analysis) used a computer based model of opposing forces in aggregated terms which makes adjustments as each period of time passes in a simulated conflict. Another analysis (called "static force ratio" analysis) used comparisons both of the ratios of numbers of men and equipment and ratios of weighted weapons values (such "values" or weapons scores reflect the performance of a weapon).

A subjective military assessment was made on the mixed package options in lieu of a dynamic analysis. Also dynamic analysis has not yet been performed for common ceilings based on manpower.

A set of nuclear options has also been developed, but has not yet been analyzed in detail. Nuclear options as such have not been mentioned in discussions with the Allies. U.S. nuclear policies have been a sensitive subject within the Alliance, and there is an agency consensus that although we should study nuclear options, we should not be the ones to raise the subject without extremely compelling reasons.

The Verification Panel met on November 19, 1971 to consider the basic issues of MBFR in the light of our analytical findings. It was determined that the NSC should consider:

- What preferences the U.S. has among options,
- Whether we want early MBFR negotiations,
- What negotiating pace we favor if negotiations are undertaken.

Additionally the Verification Panel decided what should be sent to NATO. It was decided to send the complete package of analytical results to NATO following appropriate editing of the text from the MBFR Options Evaluation Report. It was also decided not to send any of our options with a nuclear focus, although further internal work will be performed on these options.

A. Results of U.S. Analysis

The following results were the outcomes of models which are quite limited in their reflection of actual military situations. The models do, however, provide some quantitative framework for comparison and discussion. No single definitive measure was produced for weighing the various MBFR options; results were presented which required the reader to make his own evaluation of the relative risks or benefits involved.

In addition there were the standard caveats relating to the choice of detailed assumptions which had direct bearing on the results received. This could not be summarized, but the assumptions were debated thoroughly at the working level. As many reservations as there may be with respect to these analyses, they can be argued carefully, based on the assumptions that were made. The U.S. analyses represent the most advanced work available on this subject.

### 1. Dynamic Analysis

The variables selected as critical indicators of NATO's ground capability were the simulated times for the movement of the Front Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) to the Rhine River and to the Weser River. Similarly the measures of effectiveness for the air campaign were assumed as the time to local air superiority (which was defined for analysis as an overall force ratio of 1.5 to 1), the time to theater air superiority (requiring a force ratio of 3 to 1), and the net percent Pact advantage in close air support delivered during the simulated war. [The Pact had local air superiority at D-Day, with a ratio of 1.7 to 1 and retained it throughout the conflict.]

The results for the dynamic analysis are currently only available for a scenario where the Pact had a two week lead in mobilization and attacked NATO after three weeks (i. e. D-Day is Pact M+21 and NATO M+7).

The results for the dynamic analysis of the symmetrical percentage reduction options indicated a degradation of NATO's simulated military situation which increases with the size of ground force reductions. Only the common ceiling option (6,000 tanks and 1,200 aircraft) does not degrade NATO's military capability; however, this option was judged to be virtually non-negotiable.

The dynamic analysis also indicated that with symmetrical percentage reductions there would also be an increasing degradation of NATO's reserve force capability. Alternatively NATO could reconstitute its reserve forces by thinning forces along its defensive frontage, but neither approach avoids some detrimental effects.

The dynamic air analysis was evaluated separately from the ground campaign, although there was interplay between the two in the war gaming models. The results are quite similar to those found for ground forces.

The air reduction area was taken as the NATO Guidelines Area (which was used for ground reductions) and the UK, Denmark, France, and Hungary. The reason was to get approximately the same number of aircraft for NATO and the Pact in a reduction area. On reflection this area has some political and tactical disadvantages, so that an alternative area should be studied.

Option 4, the limited mixed package was assessed on the basis of subjective military analysis. The evaluation was that with strategic warning available no reduction in NATO and Pact capabilities would occur. This evaluation was qualified, however, as follows:

- It was limited to 50 NATO aircraft,
- It assumed that the withdrawn U.S. squadron would be maintained as a dual-based unit in a high state of readiness,
- It assumed verification of Soviet tank reductions,
- It assumed completion of sufficient shelters to protect remaining NATO tactical aircraft and dual based squadrons.

## 2. Static Force Ratio Analysis

Analysts performing the static force ratio analysis felt that the inter-agency definitions of reductions were not precise enough to identify specific forces. Their reductions in ground forces were accordingly independently structured in three different ways:

- Reduction in Total Manpower. This reduction is accomplished by reducing first the personnel not assigned to identifiable combat or support units and then if necessary personnel assigned to service support units. It was not possible to identify unassigned personnel for stationed Soviet forces and consequently reductions for these forces were taken

from service support units.

-- Reduction in Manpower Assigned to Combat Units. This reduction was accomplished by reducing combat units of divisional, brigade, or battalion size whose total manpower is the appropriate percentage of the total manpower in major combat units.

-- Reduction Keyed to Medium Tanks. This reduction was made by reducing combat units of divisional, brigade, or battalion size whose total count is the appropriate percentage of the total number of tanks in the major combat units of each country. This excluded reductions of tanks in war reserves.

It was confirmed that the selection of the particular units to be reduced tends to determine how given MBFR options govern the ratios present following reductions as much as the nominal options themselves.

The static force ratio results can be summarized as follows:

-- 10% reductions in total manning have no predictable effect on military security unless more restrictions on the units to come out are made, since reductions can often be carried out using support of national command manpower which does not contribute directly to the combat capability of forces in war or result in any major reduction in equipment.

-- 10% reductions in major combat unit manpower favor NATO in that they would involve a higher cut in the number of Warsaw Pact combat manpower and medium tanks reduced than in NATO forces without necessarily weakening NATO security.

-- 10% cuts in medium tanks strength can be accomplished by the Pact in a way that would result in NATO having to cut more manpower than the Pact since some Pact units have a much higher ratio of tanks to manpower than most NATO units.

-- Option 1A would probably favor the Warsaw Pact more than Option 1 since it would increase the number of U.S. and U.K. force cuts relative to other forces.

-- Option 2 (30% symmetrical) produced changes in total force ratios with roughly the same trends as the analysis of Option 1 and Option 1A, but with more pronounced effects.

-- The common ceiling options were all favorable to NATO, but again their negotiability was strongly questioned.

-- In Option 4, either the trade of 589 Soviet medium tanks (with their associated manpower and equipment) for one squadron of U.S. F-4s (24 aircraft), or the trade of 899 Soviet medium tanks for one U.S. and one U.K. squadron of F-4s ( a total of 42 aircraft), would improve NATO's M-Day land force position relative to the Warsaw Pact. They could, however, be carried out by cutting only two to three Warsaw Pact divisions and would not significantly correct NATO's present inferiority in tank strength.

B. U.S. Conclusions and Intentions on MBFR

Timing of Negotiations

It would be possible for the U.S. to press for early negotiations on MBFR at the December NATO Ministerials. The argumentation on this issue is given below:

Advantages

-- It would help ease Congressional pressures for troop reductions in Europe (but following another Senate defeat, these pressures are temporarily in check).

-- It would allow the U.S. and NATO to retain the initiative on MBFR.

Disadvantages

-- The NATO Alliance would be very susceptible to Soviet propaganda in negotiations unless there were a strong Western consensus on what would be sought through MBFR and how it was to be attained.

-- Although the Allies wish to know what the U.S. wants to do on MBFR, a move toward early negotiations, without a clear indication of the specific objectives envisioned, especially reduction objectives, would probably alarm them.

-- The general conclusion of our analysis is that no option can clearly meet the criterion of undiminished military security for NATO and is also realistically viable for negotiation.

-- We are in a position to set the pace on MBFR; if we concentrate our efforts on explaining our analysis to our Allies, we can help to build more of a Western consensus on MBFR, while at the same time serving to convey the U.S.'s continuing interest in the long run security of Western Europe.

Pace of Negotiations

If negotiations should be undertaken, then the pace of negotiations could be regulated both by the process for negotiations and the ultimate reductions aims sought. MBFR which is a gesture of good will on the part of the West might involve token reductions and be negotiated relatively briefly with a minimum of discussion on principles and collateral constraints. Our analysis has shown that such cuts are not attractive from a military standpoint, but it might be preferable to dropping the whole subject if the Soviets are interested in MBFR primarily for the purpose of a platform for propaganda.

Another general alternative would be for some limited reduction aims which could be pursued through deliberate and protracted discussions, perhaps including formal agreements on principles and collateral measures. This approach would be attractive if the Soviets are seriously interested in improving the political climate between East and West, but are not especially interested in large changes in force levels.

Finally a protracted negotiation approach would be essential for discussions which aim toward major force reductions in a serious spirit of arms control. Such negotiations run the risk of reaching an impasse or having to fall back to some form of token reduction.

From a U.S. point of view, the concept of phasing MBFR negotiations and reductions can have several potential advantages:

-- It could permit the negotiating process to start without initial reference to actual reductions.

-- It could permit the U.S. and the West some control -- perhaps a large measure -- over the pace of negotiations leading to reductions, and of the reduction process itself.

-- It could permit reductions of different nationalities or different categories of forces to be handled sequentially or simultaneously.

-- It could permit progressively greater stabilizing measures and constraints, as well as clauses allowing reentry of forces in time of crisis, to be sought as progressively greater reductions are discussed.

In addition, a phased approach can be a useful means to meet certain Allied concerns with MBFR. It could provide time to develop a Western Caucus on MBFR stages in light of the results of each preceding stage. It could also provide a means to meet the problem of participation in the negotiating process. For example, an "inner circle" of other interested countries could participate in an assessment phase following each stage of reductions.

There are also potential disadvantages:

-- The Warsaw Pact may be reluctant to agree to constraints before any reductions are agreed to, since NATO stands to gain more from the constraints that have been considered.

-- The other side or our allies could also seek to control the process to accelerate or slow down reductions at a time when it was not to U.S. advantage.

-- A discussion of principles, or of constraints, could involve subjects we might wish to avoid at that stage (e.g., Forward Based Systems).

#### Further Work

The most promising area for further study of alternatives for MBFR appears to be the exploration of more ways to address those force elements which both sides see as destabilizing. This approach would concentrate attention on making reductions in offensively oriented weapons, that is weapons systems which can project military power into the territory of the other side.

We know that the Soviets are concerned about our forward based strike aircraft, and we know that the Allies are fearful of Pact tanks and missiles. Our first "mixed package" options (involving dissimilar force elements) involved NATO aircraft and Pact tanks, but they appear too small. The analysis of such options is inherently very complex and to date we have no standardized methods to analyze such reductions. This means we would have to rely to a large measure on subject military judgment to evaluate such options militarily.

Also this kind of reduction would inherently involve arduous negotiations, since the force to be reduced are not easily comparable. Such negotiations could run the risk of reaching an impasse or having to fall back to a token cut.

C. MBFR in a CES?

The possibility exists for negotiation of MBFR as a part of a CES. The arguments are given as follows:

Advantages

- It would allow European nations not directly involved to have a voice;
- It would give a broader more political framework for force reductions;
- It would give a very substantive focus to a security conference.

Disadvantages

- Pan-European discussions of security would be unwieldy and immensely complex.
- Nations not having a direct role could cause problems with little to lose from their standpoint.
- Many of the topics would be too sensitive to be suitable for discussion generally at a security conference, and would have to be handled separately anyway.

The consensus of the agencies is to avoid placing MBFR in a CES, although mention of MBFR at a CES would be unavoidable.

CES

A. Introduction

An overview of the issues surrounding a Conference of European Security are the following:

-- What should our basic attitude be toward a CES, if we assume early completion of all phases of the Berlin negotiations make CES a live issue in the next months.

Our choices seem to be:

1. A Conference that simply promotes detente, as the Soviets propose.
2. A Conference that excludes security issues in favor of European "Cooperation." (The French approach.)
3. An approach that emphasizes more security issues and practical measures of implementation including the possible establishment of follow-on machinery.

The underlying issue is what U.S. interests can be served by CES, where it fits into larger scheme of SALT, summit, MBFR and East-West detente.

What we are really deciding is not only whether to hold MBFR or CES, but whether to organize East-West relations in multilateral framework for the inevitable second stage after Berlin, or whether to allow bilateralism to grow. MBFR and CES are highly risky, but may be manageable. Bilateralism adds the risks of loss of U.S. influence and control and, perhaps most important may contribute to a fission of U.S. and Western Europe and division within Western Europe. If we believe these are real risks -- i. e., that Ostpolitik will drive the French into the arms of Russia and split Britain and France from Germany -- then we should be willing to accept the risks inherent in CES and MBFR.

B. Alternative Forms for a CES

If we continue along our present lines we will end up with either (1) a Conference on the Soviet type -- with no substantive meaning or (2) with some agreed declarations that seem to safeguard our positions, but in fact will probably be of no great value and may be sources of dispute over interpretation.

-- If we continue along this line, the only saving grace is that we can stay in line with most of our Allies, who, for differing reasons, are willing to have a Conference. In particular, the French see the Conference as a means to defer hard security issues of troop levels and divert attention into "cooperation"; only after a long period of relaxed atmosphere would they approach security issues. (The French, of course, are not adverse to ratifying the status quo, especially in Germany.)

-- The Germans, on the other hand, see both CES and MBFR as part of a "process" of testing the Soviets and establishing detente by stages. The Conference would have to deal with some security issues and not be consigned to cooperation questions only. In reality the Germans are under pressure to "accelerate" a Conference as the next installment payment to Moscow for the treaty.

-- In addition there is a procedural split: the French want several stages but the Germans are inclined to complete preparations, including actual agreements, and then have one meeting. We incline to the German position, but the French are gaining support for a compromise of reasonably thorough preparations, then first ministerial, followed by subcommittee work, and final ministerial.

One alternative within the context of our present course is to try to add agenda items such as freer movement of people which supposedly limits the damage of Soviet gains on a non-use-of-force agreement.

-- The Allies do not oppose this outright but have little stomach for debate with the Soviets or confrontation; the French would solve this by dealing only with economic, cultural, scientific exchanges, etc.

Agenda

If there is no shift from this course we will go into preparatory talks with the following agenda.

WARSAW PACT

NATO

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Force renunciation and respect for existing borders;                                      | 1. Principles which should govern relations between states, including renunciation of the use of force; but some disclaimer on borders;     |
| 2. Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;                  | 2. (a) Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;<br><br>(b) Freer movement of people, ideas and information; |
| 3. Establishment of a permanent "organ" for questions of security and cooperation in Europe. | 3. Possible establishment of a permanent body (not agreed in NATO).   |

Alternatives to the Present Course

1. Transform Conference into European Cooperation only -- economics, cultural, etc.

2. Adopt an approach to emphasize security issues, and creation of follow-on machinery.

The alternative of a Conference on European Cooperation might circumvent problems in dealing with the Soviet proposals on non-use-of-force and territorial integrity, but some euphoric fall-out is still likely from any conference; the main issues of cooperation are not suitable for a CES, but more plausible for the EC dealing with CEMA or even the ECE. The U.S. would be a spectator in this proposal and such a conference, if it dealt with economic relations, might raise divisive issues if the West had not straightened out its monetary and trade problems.

Emphasis on Security

-- Under this approach we could take a more positive attitude towards CES, in effect embracing it in order to press for (a) some element of arms control principles in the various conference declarations, which would then serve as a bridge to practical control measures of constraints on force movements, maneuvers, etc.; (b) to establish post-conference

machinery that would institutionalize the U.S. role in European security and provide a forum for Eastern Europeans to exercise some freedom of action and perhaps to influence Soviet policy.

-- Disadvantages are that the Allies might be apprehensive that we were trying to go too far in placating the Soviets by establishing a new security "system" as a new device for U.S. disengagement.

-- In addition, the Soviets would be in a position to force their demands, and then stall actual implementation of any practical measure and render any "machinery" ineffective.

In sum, the Alliance is not substantively prepared for a Conference other than the Soviet model. We need to reduce the rhetorical approach to concrete proposals before entering into East-West contacts.

#### Preconditions for a Conference

We are committed by NATO legislative history to begin multilateral talks in preparation for an actual Conference after the Berlin negotiations are completed.

The question is: does this mean all phases of Berlin negotiations? The French, British, and perhaps the Germans would be willing to begin preparations for CES after the inner-German talks are completed, even if the final Berlin protocol is delayed by Soviet linkage to the treaty ratification.

The Soviets accept the Berlin condition in practice, but are mounting pressures for a firm commitment to a Conference "as early as 1972" and moving to preliminary talks immediately. This is one motive in speeding up the inner-German negotiations.

-- If we expect the Conference to have any chance of achieving substantive results we should also defer preparatory talks until Berlin is completely wrapped up.

-- In addition there is advantage in waiting until after the Moscow summit to begin CES preparations.

D. MBFR and CES

Our position is that the two issues should be kept separate but this is up to the Soviets. They can drag out MBFR until Berlin is finished and then press for an immediate start toward CES. They probably will not turn down having MBFR begin first if we seriously press them, but they are certainly in no hurry.

The real issue is which of these two potential disasters we wish to address first.

-- MBFR is at least a substantive issue and deals with security; whereas CES is largely atmospheric.

-- On the other hand, our losses in MBFR are tangible and not to be recouped, whereas CES could be managed.

-- If MBFR risks serious losses, then there is much to be said for holding it off as long as possible: one means to do it is to switch to CES as the first East-West negotiation, after the summit, with MBFR deferred until after CES, which would form an umbrella of endorsement for MBFR.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF  
OPTIONS EVALUATION REPORT

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 04-H-02 [ID: 8806]**

(11 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(5)(6); ltr. 9/7/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 4 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM /mlt  
12/30/2014

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY  
OF NSSM 138 REPORT

NSSM 138  
A CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY  
(ANALYTICAL SUMMARY)

I. Assumptions, Objectives: CES Perspective

Following is a capsule summary of the present state of play:

-- We and the Allies have a commitment to begin multilateral phase of preparations for a Conference "as soon as feasible" after completion of the Berlin agreements (all phases);

-- Acceleration of Berlin talks makes CES a live issue; decisions at this NATO session and in the next 2-3 months will determine the direction of Allied policy.

-- Almost all West Europeans favor CES in some degree; French are willing to begin preparations now; Germans committed to "accelerate" preparations, but will not do so until Berlin is wrapped up, and preferably until their treaties are ratified; British inclined to believe CES is an unavoidable evil, to be disposed of as quickly as possible.

As it now stands, the Soviets will make some clear gains in such a Conference: ratification of political and territorial status quo in East Europe, greater influence in West Europe, possible deepening of trends toward American withdrawal, etc.

-- On the other hand, East Europeans -- Romania, Yugoslavia, and perhaps Poland -- want a conference to create psychological barriers to the Brezhnev doctrine.

Our objectives: (assuming a Conference is inevitable)

- To avoid allowing issues of a Conference to split US from Allies;
- Minimize damage to Alliance that flows from atmospherics of detente;
- Institutionalize US role as European power and participant in the East-West dialogue;
- Provide some help for East Europeans.

II. Alternative Approaches to CES

Assuming the US could delay, but not arrest, movement toward CES, there follow three illustrative approaches:

1. CES as Now Envisaged

- a. A Conference for the sake of detente;
- b. A Conference making some concessions but protecting Western interests.

2. A Conference on European Cooperation (i. e., without security issues).

3. A New Approach -- designed mainly to emphasize security issues and follow on machinery.

A. CES as Now Envisaged

1. The Agenda

WARSAW PACT

NATO

- 1. Force renunciation and respect for existing borders;
- 2. Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;
- 3. A permanent "organ" for questions of security and cooperation in Europe.

- 1. Principles which should govern relations between states, including renunciation of the use of force;
- 2. (a) Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and environmental cooperation;  
(b) Freer movement of people, ideas and information;
- 3. Possible establishment of a permanent body (through publicly stated to date only as a means of embarking on multilateral negotiations).

Pact and Allied positions on these items are:

a. Principles Governing Relations Between States. The core of the conference, from the Soviet viewpoint, is the first Warsaw Pact agenda item which would pledge respect for existing frontiers in Europe and force renunciation. To broaden the scope of this item, NATO Ministers proposed that

CES discussions should treat, in addition to force renunciation, general principles governing interstate relations, such as sovereign equality, political independence and territorial integrity, non-interference and non-intervention in internal affairs. Allied Ministers have affirmed that these principles would apply "regardless of political and social systems."

A declaration that reaffirmed such principles in a conference where the GDR was a full participant could have adverse implications for Quadripartite rights and responsibilities in Germany as a whole and Berlin, as could a declaration on frontiers. There would have to be disclaimer about non-recognition of the GDR and about non-recognition of frontiers by US, UK and France.

b. Cooperation. None expect that CES could negotiate specific agreements on economic, technical and scientific exchanges or environmental cooperation, though some believe discussions in CES, and also in a permanent body established by CES, might stimulate bilateral and multilateral efforts, as in ECE.

c. Freer Movements of People, Ideas and Information. The Soviets would resist any concrete concessions in this area, though there are tactical and propaganda advantages in keeping the issue in play, and there might be some significant Soviet concessions, if the Allies press firmly. We have suggested that the Allies, at CES and preliminaries, urge the Warsaw Pact states to:

- end radio jamming;
- relax exit restrictions on their nationals;
- permit freer circulation of books, magazines and periodicals; and
- allow foreign journalists normal working conditions.

Many Allies, however, would prefer to treat only easier issues, seeking initially little more than minor improvements in the closely controlled programs of East-West cultural exchanges, and hoping reduced tensions following CES would abet further progress.

d. Permanent Machinery. The Pact in June 1970 proposed that CES create a permanent "organ" to discuss questions of security and cooperation.

An illustrative US proposal (Annex I), tabled but not yet discussed in NATO suggested that either a permanent secretariat, or a negotiating forum with procedures roughly similar to those of the Committee of the Conference on

Disarmament (CCD) might be considered. A permanent body could not assume meaningful responsibility for maintenance of European security, but could open the way toward a continuing East-West dialogue.

## 2. Procedural Approaches

We prefer careful explorations followed, if appropriate, by more structured preparatory talks, at official level, that would draft agreed texts, leaving a minimum of disputed points for resolution at a short Ministerial conference.

The French favor shorter preparatory talks mainly on procedure and not on draft texts of possible agreement, leading to an initial meeting where Foreign Ministers would discuss the issues and establish official-level working groups. Thereafter, Foreign Ministers would reconvene to negotiate themselves the questions unresolved by the working groups. The French have gained more Allied support for this approach, which is consistent with France's general preference to enhance the appearance of an independent status in relations with the East.

## 3. Possible Results of CES as Now Conceived: Two Variants:

a. A Conference for the Sake of Detente. After extensive discussions touching only marginally on fundamental East-West differences, Ministers would agree on declaratory texts on general themes that do not bind participants to specific actions, and that

-- affirm generally accepted principles governing relations between states, including force renunciation and respect for existing frontiers;

-- declare the intent of participants to promote cooperation in all fields; and

-- establish a permanent body.

Participants might also express their views on regional disarmament questions, including MBFR.

Assessment. This approach, in effect, accepts the Soviet concept. The likely results would meet immediate political goals of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europeans, and corresponds to the current aims of France, most neutrals, and the smaller, more detente-oriented Allies states. Once an inter-German modus vivendi is reached, the FRG, too, will likely seek to enhance the detente climate by avoiding confrontation with the East.

b. A Conference Making Some Concessions but Protecting Western Interests. In this damage-limiting approach, the Allies would decline to meet major Soviet aims, including a declaration of respect for existing frontiers, unless the Soviets also make significant concessions, agreeing, for example, to freer movement. Preparatory sessions would be prolonged and probably marked by heated discussions, reflected in media reporting. Substantively, the conference might result in

-- a compromise, in which the Soviets make some concrete concessions on freer movement and accept a declaration on principles that would apply regardless of political or social systems, while the Allies agree to a formulation pledging "respect" for existing European frontiers.

-- modest Soviet concessions on freer movement;

-- agreement to pursue issues of economic and technical cooperation; and

-- establishment of permanent machinery.

Assessment. Some minimum goals of major participants would be met as a result of public reports of East-West debates in the course of CES, and the results of the conference would be portrayed as Western acceptance of the territorial situation in Eastern Europe, but not Soviet political domination.

#### B. A Conference on Cooperation in Europe

An alternative CES approach could entail limiting the agenda of the meeting to issues of cooperation in the economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental spheres. Issues of security, including renunciation of the use of force and principles governing interstate relations would be specifically excluded, and the title of the conference changed.

The conference would result in declarations of intent to promote cooperation leaving detailed agreements to subsequent bilateral and multilateral negotiations in other fora.

Assessment. The Soviets would probably resist an Allied proposal to change the terms of reference and to make such a change publicly clear. They might charge the Allies with bad faith, noting repeated public statements in NATO Ministerial communiques of willingness to begin preparations for a "conference on security and cooperation in Europe" under proper circumstances. Most Allied governments might also oppose such a change, fearing charges from important sectors of domestic opinion that NATO was reneging on a commitment at the very moment when fulfillment of the precondition (a satisfactory Berlin agreement) seemed in sight.

COMMENT: The idea that we can limit damage by introducing contentious issues such as freer movement of peoples, etc., is probably an illusion. Once Soviets pocket concessions about frontiers, non-use of force, etc., they have achieved their purpose and will probably be able to resist any major change in intra European cooperation. Damage-limiting strategy which is in effect our current policy is a weak rationale.

If a conference is inevitable (this is not necessarily so) and Allies really want it for the atmospherics of detente, there are stronger arguments for playing along rather than putting up weak and ineffective rear guard action. In this case, the French approach seems sound: move to a Conference without long wrangling session and close it out as soon as feasible.

The main tactical problem is that the heart of the Conference will be a declaration on non-use of force and respect for current borders; some of the Allies have already made this concession: in the Soviet and Polish treaties, the French Declaration of Principles, the Canadian-Soviet communique; and in effect, the Berlin treaties which include non-use of force. The main Soviet aim is to gain American signature. Present Allied position more or less concedes this Soviet position.

C. A New Approach: CES as a Step Toward Maintaining a US Role in Europe.

This new concept of CES departs from the damage-limiting approach we are now pursuing. It would entail a new US initiative in NATO and international CES planning aimed at:

-- increased emphasis on permanent machinery to provide an institutional framework involving the US intimately in a long-term process of East-West negotiation of issues of security and cooperation, while maintaining and improving present Western security; and

-- added weight to issues of security -- MBFR, and other arms control and disarmament matters.

Under this concept, moreover,

-- the US would exert leadership in approaching CES;

-- we could help offset Allied fears that the US is on the verge of massive disengagement, at a time when their doubts are reinforced by current international economic difficulties;

-- CES would be considered a positive step in the longer process of strengthening the transatlantic community, and maintaining its defenses, while the US and our Allies seek further relaxation of East-West tensions designed to enhance European stability on a basis that accords with Allied objectives by making clear the importance they attach to issues of security, and to progress in East-West cooperation in non-security matters, such as freer movement of people, ideas, and information, and economic and technical exchanges.

1. Agenda. To meet these objectives, the Allies could propose in the December 1971 Ministerial Communique the following CES agenda as an alternative to that advanced by the Pact:

a. Issues of East-West Security

(1) continuing arms control and disarmament efforts and renunciation of the use of force and universal respect for principles governing relations between states, regardless of political or social systems. It is possible that any consensus that emerged might be embodied in an East-West declaration, which might be pursued in permanent machinery established by CES (See Part II CIC, below).

(2) associated with the foregoing, or separately, statements of support for MBFR. If MBFR negotiations had begun prior to CES, reference could be made in CES to progress to date, based upon reports by participating MBFR states. Otherwise, CES could encourage states directly involved in MBFR to negotiate. Although MBFR could also operate under the "umbrella" of a CES (see Part III), the conference would have no authority to direct or approve the form or substance of MBFR negotiations.

b. Issues of East-West Cooperation

(1) freer movement of people, ideas, and information, stressing the importance the Allies attach to this issue:

(2) economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental cooperation. Economic issues for discussion could include a range of improvements on both sides to encourage increased trade and possible ties to Western international economic institutions. In the environmental sphere, support could be sought for strengthening ECE efforts. Beyond this, enhanced bilateral contacts in the other areas could be encouraged, as well as efforts in UN and other appropriate fora.

c. Permanent Machinery Established by CES

(1) Possible Functions

The US has tabled in NATO illustrative views on permanent machinery (Annex I). We proposed that such machinery might discuss problems of security, cooperation and arms control and disarmament, along the following lines:

(a) Security

-- as a framework for quiet diplomacy to resolve disputes endangering European security; and

-- for dealing with grievances, permitting states to raise actual or potential violations of a possible CES declaration on principles that should govern interstate relations.

(b) Cooperation

-- for discussion of policy issues that impede East-West cooperation in various fields, leaving detailed implementation to the ECE or other appropriate fora.

(c) Regional Disarmament

-- in connection with MBFR, while this issue undoubtedly would be referred to in CES, actual negotiations have been envisaged in a body comprising states directly concerned. Results of MBFR negotiations, however, could be reported by the states directly involved in MBFR negotiations to CES for noting, as appropriate; and

-- if agreed among the Allies, for discussion of complaints of non-compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements; and for examination and dissemination of reports produced under any arrangements that may eventually be developed on verification and collateral constraints.

Beyond the foregoing, it is possible that permanent machinery could evolve further, embracing additional functions in a continuing East-West dialogue. However, the USSR and others should not be allowed to manipulate or characterize CES permanent machinery as a substitute for NATO, or as superceding Western security arrangements generally.

9

## 2. Assessment.

US adoption of a positive approach to CES could entail the following advantages and disadvantages:

### Advantages

-- would conform to the realities of the situation in Europe by giving at least equal attention to security issues;

-- because it would explicitly assert the continuing US role in the evolution of Europe, it would deny the Soviets their basic objective of getting the US out of Europe;

-- by emphasizing the continuing character of East-West negotiations Allied defense expenditures might be more easily sustained;

-- the basic situation of the East European states would not be altered, but their desire for a more independent voice in discussions surrounding a conference would be met;

### Disadvantages

-- there likely would be no immediate concrete results beyond those possible under other suggested approaches to CES;

-- a possible CES declaration on arms control and disarmament might strengthen public reluctance, in Allied countries, to support the substantial force improvements we seek; and

-- other disadvantages at worst could approximate those flowing from a conference making some concessions but protecting Western interests, but would be far less than from a conference for the sake of detente or a conference on cooperation.

## 3. Developing Allied Consensus.

A positive approach to a CES conforms more closely with the majority Allied view than our present approach. Therefore, we anticipate no difficulty in gaining Allied concurrence. Discussion of arms control and disarmament at CES conforms to current Allied thinking, and therefore poses no problem. Reference in CES to MBFR will be welcomed by most Allies.

SECRET

The following illustrative steps would facilitate building an Allied consensus around a US preference:

-- the US could underline the Berlin precondition, and clarify its attitude toward CES, and perhaps toward economic and defense aims generally, in a major address on European affairs by the Secretary sometime in November;

-- the US position would be conveyed to the Allies in time to allow for consultations at NATO in advance of the December Ministerial meeting;

-- the US would introduce into the Council draft formulations for the December Ministerial communique;

-- depending on the status of the Berlin agreement, NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers could meet in April 1972 to assess prospects for opening multilateral East-West talks and to discuss the substance and procedures for multilateral East-West talks; and

-- after conclusion of the Berlin accord, and following the President's visit to Moscow, East-West multilateral talks could open.

COMMENT: The basic issue here seems to be along the following lines: If we must go to CES, is there any conceivable way it can be turned to our marginal advantage, recognizing that in the short turn, at least, the Soviets will score major gains?

This "new" approach is, of course, an old idea favored by many observers. Its essence is that we use the inevitable Soviet "principles" as a bridge to some more practical measures; i. e., if the Soviets claim non-use of force, we propose restraint on force movements, possibly European observer teams, pre-announcement of maneuvers -- in short, many of the MBFR collateral measures. In this way, we at least give some substance to the vacuous declarations of a Conference.

Second, we establish an institution which will have little real power, but will have some psychological benefit for the East Europeans in that they can invoke the permanent machinery in times of tensions or crisis.

If there is anything in this proposal for a change in attitude, it is mainly in the possible longer term gains that would tend to blur the sharp divisions in Europe. Why the Soviets would agree to such potential danger is another issue, but it is, after all, their conference, and this "new" approach puts them on the tactical defensive. If introduced early in the preparations, it would certainly protract the preliminary discussions -- another possible advantage.

As reported in the study, the concept is still too vague; it lacks precision in what the Conference would produce in terms of arms control statements, practical implementation measures and the authority of the permanent machinery. If adopted, this would have to be clarified in some detail.

The disadvantages are understated, presumably because this is the favored option. The real disadvantages are

-- First, our Allies may well misconstrue our new enthusiasm as another form of superpower collaboration; they might be rather unimpressed by the claims that we would gain some concrete security measures; they would still think in terms of atmospherics, and conclude we were only looking for a rationalization of the same objectives.

-- If it became clear that we meant business, and really wanted some practical achievements, the Allies might retreat since the last thing they want is that CES become a contentious meeting.

-- The second disadvantage is that regardless of our aspirations we must deal with the Soviets who are not about to allow their pet project to be turned against them. Their interest is still in the fact of the Conference, rather than its concrete measures. We will still have to go through a first phase of declarations and pledges to get to the second stage or applications of arms control measures or a permanent institution. The Soviets will see to it that nothing effective happens.

In short, this is a gamble. But we would be no worse off for having made the attempt than if we supinely drift into the Soviet stype conference that now appears unavoidable.

In many ways, this approach to a CES is less damaging than the current prospects for two losers: MBFR and then a meaningless CES. If we were to move in this new direction on CES, logic would suggest that MBFR be deferred, and the CES would endorse it, though not control it. MBFR would thus be a tangible result of CES, and, if it dealt with principles of force reductions, these might be taken over by all Europe.

Operationally,

-- CES would not begin until after the Moscow summit: then preliminaries would take a few months and the actual conference would meet in, say, late 1972 or early 1973.

-- MBFR might begin before that, but if we chose to, we could use the CES as a means to defer MBFR.

### III. CES and MBFR

Most Allies and non-aligned states wish to establish a connection now between MBFR and CES. At the same time, most recognize that CES would be too unwieldy a forum for negotiation of so complex and sensitive a subject as MBFR, and that actual negotiations should be restricted to the states directly concerned.

The US has preferred to keep the two issues on separate tracks, in effect assuming that the tracks might cross at some point, but leaving open the option of separately initiating either CES or MBFR discussions. Our approach to MBFR, moreover, has recognized that

-- MBFR addresses the military confrontation of major powers whose forces and territory are directly involved; other states, though interested, have less at stake in such negotiations, and many would likely mount pressures for reductions without necessarily insisting on essential safeguards; and

-- involvement of non-aligned countries would complicate and delay MBFR negotiations, causing inter alia possible Congressional pressures for unilateral reductions.

Given the general preference expressed over past weeks by our Allies, however, for including MBFR in some fashion on a CES agenda -- based largely on their view that MBFR would provide a concrete issue of security for CES in discussion and evidence of movement toward detente -- we are virtually isolated on this issue, and will likely need to deal with it at Ministerial level in December.

Since we cannot prevent participants in CES from referring to MBFR, the alternatives are: (a) to strive for agreement among the Allies (and perhaps with the Soviets) for procedural arrangements to be made in the initial phase of CES that would avoid more than general reference in CES to MBFR; or (b) to deal with the substance of MBFR in CES.

COMMENT: Clearly, the latter is a non-starter and a potential disaster.

### IV. CES and SALT

Provided there is a satisfactory resolution on Berlin, the issue arises of the relationship between CES and SALT. The possibilities lie between the following alternatives:

-- linkage between achieving success in SALT and proceeding with CES; and

-- considering SALT along with other issues as part of the complex of US/Soviet relations which needs to be taken into account in assessing Soviet intentions in regard to CES.

Linkage would have the following implications:

-- while it may be argued that Soviet interest in CES could provide additional leverage in SALT, it is unlikely that this interest would affect the Soviet position on SALT issues, since they deal with fundamental matters of state security;

-- such linkage would run a considerable risk of damaging SALT at a stage in which the negotiations are both delicate and nearing fruition. Since we have consistently eschewed linking SALT with extraneous issues, a reversal on our part would cause the Soviets to question our basic objectives in SALT, thus delaying and diverting the talks -- precisely the opposite of what would be intended.

COMMENT: This part of the discussion is badly rigged by State and ACDA who are deathly afraid that SALT will be endangered. Yet, it makes absolutely no sense to think about European security in any real sense if the US and the USSR cannot make even a limited arrangement on strategic arms control. The original idea of including this discussion in the study was to emphasize this point, so that the US could at least tell the Allies of our reluctance to proceed with the actual CES if SALT had not reached some agreement. In fact, this is not a revolutionary position. Until the last NATO meeting, our preconditions for CES were the Berlin agreement and "progress" on other East-West issues, which was specifically defined to mean SALT. This latter condition was dropped under French pressures. All that would be involved in reviving it would be rather clear warnings that CES could not be expected to achieve anything if SALT was stalemated.