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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Vice President's Report to the National Security Council on His Visit to East Asia

The Vice President will report to the National Security Council at 10:00 a.m. September 1 on the results of his visit to Korea, the Republic of China, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand.

You will want to congratulate the Vice President on the outstanding job that he did in reaffirming our commitments under the Nixon Doctrine and expressing our determination to help our Asian friends defend themselves against aggression. He also handled very well the difficult job of pointing out the Congressional and public opinion problems which you and the Administration currently face, and enlisting their patience and cooperation. The only difficult situation was in Korea, where President Park showed surprising insensitivity to your need to get a majority of the Congress and the public on your side in continuing to honor our Asian commitments.

Following are brief highlights of each of the Vice President's stops, with suggested questions for you to raise in the discussion.

Republic of Korea

-- President Park insisted that U.S. troop reductions be held to the 20,000 already agreed until ROK force modernization was completed, and would not compromise. However, following the Vice President's press remarks on possibly having all U.S. troops out in five years, the ROKG agreed to meet with our representatives in Seoul to discuss troop withdrawal along with the modernization program -- failure to do so would have left the withdrawal time-table entirely in our hands.

You might wish to ask:

-- What is the Vice President's estimate of President Park's position
-- will he come around?

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-- What recommendations does the Vice President have in obtaining a greater degree of ROK cooperation in working out our withdrawals ?

Republic of China

-- There were no problems, and the atmosphere was very good despite the Vice President's forewarning that military aid to the GRC would be cut to help provide for Cambodia. President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo expressed unease about U.S. -Peking contacts and urged the grant of F-4s and submarines to defend against what they called an imminent Chinese Communist threat. The Vice President discounted this because of the firmness of our commitment.

You might wish to ask:

-- Can we expect any problems in our relations with the GRC on aid reductions ?

-- What steps might we take to ease the blow ?

Republic of Vietnam

-- The reports so far available all point to a successful and uncontroversial visit, with Thieu having expressed satisfaction over the visit and on the depth of U.S. support. Most press coverage was balanced, sensible, and relaxed.

You might wish to ask:

-- What changes for the better had the Vice President noted since his last visit? What military, political, and economic problems remain ?

-- What is the state of the relations between Thieu and Ky? Will these raise difficulties for us ?

Cambodia

-- By the Vice President's presence and his affirmation of continued U.S. support for Cambodia (he cited our \$40 million MAP and other aid) he gave Lon Nol and other Cambodian leaders a real psychological boost. In response, they emphasized their determination to fight on, but hoped that their substantial economic and military needs could be met. The loan of six

U.S. helicopters to Cambodia which the Vice President informed them of privately was received with much gratitude.

You might wish to ask:

-- What is the Vice President's estimate of the capacities of the Cambodian leaders and their ability to hang on?

-- What are his judgements concerning the military and political viability of Cambodia over the longer run?

Thailand

-- The Vice President asked for Thai cooperation in avoiding statements which might complicate Administration relations with the Hill and feed U.S. isolationist sentiment, thus impairing our ability to furnish aid under the Nixon Doctrine. He assured them of our intention to help them help Laos and Cambodia through indirect means, and listened to their estimate of the security situation in Laos, Cambodia and Burma.

You might wish to ask:

-- Do the Thai leaders now fully understand our problems with Congress and public opinion?

-- Are they now convinced that we wish to help them in steps undertaken to help safeguard security in Laos and Cambodia?

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SUBJECT: *The VP Report to the NSC on Conclusion of his Trip to Asia, August, 1970*

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NSC

TOP SECRET

August 31, 1970

Mr. President:

Attached for tomorrow's NSC meeting are two briefing papers. At Tab A is a memorandum for the first item on the Agenda, the Vice President's report on his trip to East Asia. At Tab B is a memorandum on the second agenda item, a brief review of the Middle East situation.

Henry A. Kissinger

Attachments

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INFORMATIONTOP SECRET

August 31, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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SUBJECT: Agenda Item 1 - The Vice President's Report on
His Visit to East Asia - NSC Meeting, September 1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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August 31, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Agenda Item 2 -- Tour d'Horizon of the Middle East -- NSC Meeting, September 1st

Purpose of the Meeting

An NSC meeting has been convened for Tuesday, September 1st, at 10:00 a.m. The first part of the meeting will consist of a trip report by the Vice President on his Far Eastern tour. Following completion of this report and a discussion generated by this report, covered in a separate memorandum, a brief tour d'horizon of the Middle East situation will be conducted. Particular emphasis will be placed on future U.S. actions in the face of further evidence of violations of the standstill cease-fire.

Background

There continues to be mounting evidence of Egyptian/Soviet missile movements towards the Canal during the period prior to and following the acceptance of the U.S. standstill cease-fire proposal. While there have been some disputes -- in large part flowing from different perspectives -- over the timing and interpretation of evidence about these movements, there remains little doubt that there has been a substantial change in the military situation along the Canal in the wake of the U.S. peace proposal.

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Egyptian/Soviet Violations

Egyptian and Soviet violations can be considered in the context of three benchmarks:

1. The period following the acceptance by the parties of the cease-fire but prior to its effective date.

The Intelligence Community agrees that in the week or so before the cease-fire was implemented (August 7) there was a substantial forward deployment of surface-to-air missiles into and within what became the Egyptian cease-fire zone. We have previously confirmed, on the basis of satellite photography, that between July 28 and August 10 some 23 additional Egyptian-manned SA-2 sites and 5 Soviet-manned SA-3 sites were occupied and that 15 new SA-2 sites were constructed in the area. (Each SA-2 site has 6 missiles, each SA-3 site has 4 missiles.)

2. The period of the night the cease-fire was implemented.

We have been unable, using evidence provided by the Israelis and our own photography, to tell precisely when specific violations of the cease-fire occurred during the fuzzy period just before and immediately following the implementation of the cease-fire. Nevertheless, there does seem to be enough evidence to suggest strongly that some Soviet and Egyptian activity may not have been completed until several hours after the cease-fire military standstill deadline. For its part, Israel has made a public point of their opinion that there were substantial Egyptian and Soviet violations immediately after the cease-fire went into effect.

3. The period since implementation of the cease-fire.

Some of the above debate has been overtaken by events. There is new evidence of continuing Soviet-Egyptian violations of the cease-fire during the period August 9 to date. Satellite photography developed on August 29 suggests that in addition to the 1 SA-2 site moved into the cease-fire zone which was confirmed earlier and about which we complained to Egypt and the Soviet Union, there now appear to be between 7 and 8 additional SA-2 sites. Further, there is evidence that at least 3 or 4 of these were definitely emplaced well

after the cease-fire went into effect. More importantly, recently analyzed photography now confirms that 5 or 6 Soviet-manned SA-3 sites have been moved within the cease-fire zone, in addition to the 5 SA-3 sites which were picked up earlier. There remains some question as to precisely when these SA-3 sites were moved.

Israeli Violations

The Israelis have been flying almost daily reconnaissance flights over the Egyptian cease-fire zone. This is clearly in violation of the cease-fire. The Egyptians have also accused the Israelis of improving their fortified positions on the East Bank.

The Israelis have also carried on military operations at about the same level along their other borders and cease-fire lines. They have justified this on the basis of the need to discourage and pre-empt continuing Fedayeen activities along these borders. Jordan has formally protested the Israeli operations to the U. N.

Implications

-- Whatever the precise pattern of events, the strategic military situation along the Canal has been modified in the wake of our cease-fire proposal and after the cease-fire was accepted.

-- The Egyptians have moved their air defense complex forward to cover their artillery and forces along the Canal and thus threaten Israel's strategic position. There are also intelligence reports that Soviet-supplied 203 mm long-range howitzers are now being emplaced along the Canal to reenforce substantial Egyptian shorter range artillery emplaced along its length. Israeli Doctrine relies on air suppression of Egyptian artillery along the Canal. The forward movement of the Soviet/Egyptian SAM complex will significantly complicate Israel's ability to suppress Egyptian artillery in the future and thus jeopardize the viability of Israel's East Bank defensive positions. It will permit selected massing of Egyptian artillery to neutralize these defenses at given points along the East Bank.

-- Although the initial controversy surrounding Israeli charges of a violation of the cease-fire immediately after its implementation may never be verified, we now know that subsequent violations have occurred afterwards. Furthermore, positive evidence of the forward movement of the SA-3s into the cease-fire zone confirms that the Soviets, rather than restraining the Egyptians, have actually participated in the violations. They have violated not only the cease-fire but warnings by the highest U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State. The new evidence on the SA-3s further complicates the situation.

-- The Soviet/Egyptian missile movements have been carried out despite two types of warnings in our discussions with them:

1. Prior to the cease-fire, Secretary Rogers stipulated to the Soviets that missiles with their personnel should not be placed within 30 kilometers of the Canal for this could not be considered "defensive".

2. Subsequent to the cease-fire, the Soviets/Egyptians have violated both the spirit and the substance of the cease-fire prohibitions within the 50 kilometer zone.

-- On August 24th, the Egyptians in effect rejected a U.S. demarche requesting that a newly occupied site be restored to an unoccupied condition and that the construction work on two other sites be halted. The Egyptian response preceded the more recent confirmation of additional violations. We have yet to receive a definitive Soviet response to the demarche. In the interim, we have provided the evidence of the earlier violations to the Israelis and requested that they say nothing publicly until the UAR has had an opportunity to respond.

-- Related to the foregoing, on August 29th, the Soviets, at the Deputy Foreign Minister level have protested our U-2 reconnaissance flights along the Israeli side of the Suez Canal. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Vino Gradov, these flights run the "risk of special surprises" and full responsibility for "possible consequences" lies with the U.S. Concurrently, Brezhnev delivered an unusually mild speech on the Middle East which seems to commit the Soviet prestige to a peace settlement.

3. To the extent that the credibility of our promise to stand behind the cease-fire is undermined, we lose leverage on the negotiations. What will move the Israelis to give up conquered territory is a U.S. promise of support for the new frontier. This will, in turn, depend on the general validity of our promises.

Options for the Future

In the face of the most recent evidence of continued cease-fire violation, there appear to be the following choices for U.S. action:

1. Do nothing and press ahead in our efforts to get negotiations underway. This could lead to sharp escalation as a result of continued violations by both sides and Israeli retaliatory action against the forward SAM sites through ground action across the Canal, a surge of Israeli air activity or a combination of both.

2. Launch a diplomatic protest through routine diplomatic channels. In the face of the most recent evidence, such action may not satisfy Israeli concerns and involves the same risks as the "do nothing" course.

3. Launch a diplomatic protest at the Foreign Minister level. This would appear to be the minimum action necessary in the light of the seriousness of the violations and the need to convince the Israelis that we are serious about enforcing adherence to the cease-fire provisions.

4. Launch a diplomatic protest at the Foreign Minister level, combined with action to step up arms deliveries to Israel. This course of action would go farther toward assuaging Israeli concerns and demonstrating U.S. determination to the Soviets/Egyptians. At the same time, it could run the risk of contributing to Arab intransigence and suspicion.

5. Support an Israeli refusal to go ahead with negotiations until a status quo ante within the cease-fire zone had been re-established. This action would require the removal of the SA-2 and SA-3s whose establishment after the cease-fire was confirmed.

6. Inform the Israelis that they are free to take whatever reprisal action they deem appropriate to achieve a status quo ante.

The proposal could be adopted with or without a decision to provide additional assistance to the Israelis. It would probably generate a request from them. This would lead to a severe crisis with risks of U. S. -Soviet confrontation.

Conduct of the Meeting

Director Helms will be prepared to provide a current assessment of cease-fire violations by all parties. The assessment should be followed by a discussion of the implications of these violations and, finally, a consideration of the choices available to us for future action.

Talking Points

You may wish to utilize the following talking points in the conduct of the meeting:

-- This morning's meeting has been convened to review the Middle East situation in light of the most recent evidence of cease-fire violations within the Egyptian cease-fire zone.

-- Call on Director Helms to present a current update of the intelligence picture in the Middle East, with emphasis on recent evidence of Soviet/Egyptian cease-fire violations.

-- Ask Admiral Moorer for his assessment of the strategic implications of the forward emplacement of the Soviet/Egyptian SAM installations within the cease-fire zone and current Israeli capabilities to retaliate.

-- Ask Secretary Packard for a brief update on the status of our military deliveries to Israel.

-- Ask Secretary Rogers/Assistant Secretary Sisco to provide the group with an update of the most recent diplomatic interplay, to include:

1. The status of our demarche to the Soviets/Egyptians on the earlier evidence of cease-fire violations.
2. The status of our communications with the Israelis on their cease-fire violations.
3. An assessment of the implications of the Soviet warning on our U-2 flights.
4. An assessment of the implications of the most recent evidence of cease-fire violations in the Egyptian cease-fire zone.
5. An assessment of current Soviet, Arab, and Israeli attitudes with respect to the U. S. initiative.

-- Conduct a pro and con discussion of each of the following options for future U. S. action:

1. The "do nothing" course.
2. Diplomatic protest through diplomatic channels.
3. Diplomatic protest at Foreign Minister level.
4. Diplomatic protest at Foreign Minister level, combined with stepped-up U. S. arms deliveries.
5. Delay negotiations pending return to status quo ante.
6. Tell Israel it is free to take remedial action on its own without additional U. S. arms -- with additional U. S. arms.

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

August 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Samuel M. Hoskinson

SUBJECT: Middle East Situation

I have prepared the attached memo with the thought that you might find it useful to have a summary of the military and diplomatic situation as the peace talks get underway in New York. The memo is addressed from you to the President in case you wish to pass it along to him.

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SMH.tmt 8/25/70

SECRET/NODIS

August 31, 1970

TO: GENERAL HAIG FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAL SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: Background for Discussions on Mid-East

I have pouched to you this afternoon a fuller CIA memo on the latest intelligence analysis of Soviet and UAR standstill violations. To simplify, they boil down to the following when all the uncertainties of photo interpretation are stripped away.

1. The major developments revealed by this latest intelligence analysis relating to Soviet SA-3 sites are as follows:

- As of August 22, the intelligence community had identified 5 operational SA-3 sites. These were the 5 sites carried in our listing as of establishment of the cease-fire.
- Since August 22, the intelligence community has discovered two additional SA-3 sites. These are not fully developed sites; the usual revetments are absent, but the missiles and guidance equipment are arranged in their normal pattern. In looking back over earlier photos, analysts conclude that deployment at one site was partially completed between August 7 and 10. It was totally completed by August 18 (though we did not realize this until after the photo missions of August 23-24). Deployment

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to the other site probably was not started until after August 10. It was totally completed by August 18 (though, again, we did not realize this until after the August 23-24 missions).

--In addition, the intelligence community has discovered SA-3 equipment in three and possibly 4 SA-2 sites. Assuming that our intelligence people made no mistakes, SA-3 equipment has replaced SA-2 equipment at these sites.

--Therefore: At a minimum, there seem to be two clearcut Soviet violations. One was a case of completing deployment to a site after the standstill. The other was a case of moving an entire SA-3 unit to a new site after the standstill. Beyond this, there are 3-4 cases that are violations by strict definition of the standstill--cases where SA-3 equipment has replaced SA-2. In short, we are now talking about 10 or 11 SA-3 units in the standstill zone, while the Israelis--as far as we know are still only aware of 5.

2. While the above look like major new developments, the Egyptians have continued to develop new SA-2 sites.

--Our analysts now identify 57 or 58 SA-2 sites occupied by SA-2 equipment. As of August 10, they identified 51.

--At least four of these 6 or 7 newly identified SA-2 sites have appeared since August 11 (three of these since August 22).

The above--especially the Soviet moves when the Israelis learn of them-- will certainly compound the disagreement centering around Dayan in the Israeli Cabinet over whether to send their representative back to the Jarring talks before they get some satisfaction on the standstill violations. That is the fundamental tactical issue we face.

You will have seen Sisco's three options:

1. Continue to support the ceasefire and the Jarring talks, pressing the Soviets and the UAR to stop their violations but in effect acquiescing in them.
2. Continue to support the ceasefire and urge Israel to observe it but tell the Soviets we would support Israel in suspending participating in the Jarring discussions until the UAR and USSR removed the missiles introduced during the ceasefire period and ceased all further violations.
3. Tell the USSR that we will no longer cooperate in pursuing the peace talks or in the continuation of the ceasefire and would support Israel in a return to the military and political situation pre-August 7 unless the violations are corrected and no further violations occur.

As a refinement of the third option above, you or someone else could tell the Soviets privately that we have the latest information on their violations, that the Israelis are likely to abstain from any serious talk when we give

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them this information and suggest that they make some movements that we can point to as response to our approaches; if we cannot move Israel there will be no settlement and we cannot as a practical matter move Israel without Soviet cooperation.

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FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Middle East Situation

I thought you might find it useful to have a summary of the military and diplomatic situation as the Middle East peace talks get underway in New York. This is the context within which the talks have begun.

Egyptian and Soviet Violations

The intelligence community knows that in the week or so before the cease-fire (August 7) there was a substantial forward deployment of surface-to-air missiles into and within what became the Egyptian cease-fire zone. We can confirm, on the basis of satellite photography, that between July 28 and August 10 some 23 additional Egyptian-manned SA-2 sites and five Soviet-manned SA-3 sites were occupied and that 15 new SA-2 sites were constructed in the area. * But we can not, even using the evidence provided by the Israelis, tell precisely when these changes occurred. Nevertheless, there does seem to be enough evidence to at least strongly suspect that some of this Soviet and Egyptian activity may have not been completed until immediately after the cease-fire military standstill deadline.

The Israelis have made a big public point out of their opinion that there were substantial Egyptian and Soviet violations immediately after the cease-fire went into effect. The evidence indicates that in fact, although we can not be absolutely sure, this may be true. But the more important point is that this was only the tailend of an attempt to alter the military balance on the eve of the cease-fire and in opposition to the spirit of the peace initiative. Clearly the Soviets and Egyptians moved rapidly to take military advantage of the diplomatic situation and to some extent managed to cut down the margin of Israeli air superiority along the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal and make more vulnerable the Israeli positions along the Canal.

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There is evidence of continuing Egyptian violations of the military standstill provision of the cease-fire agreement. Our intelligence analysts have determined, on the basis of both U S and Israeli intelligence, that missile-related movement and construction activity occurred on at least seven and possibly three additional sites (for a total of ten) during the period August 9 through 18. The preliminary analysis of the photography from the most recent U-2 mission on August 22 indicates that this activity is continuing. It is important to note, however, that all this activity concerns the Egyptian-manned SA-2 sites and that there has been no change observed in five Soviet-manned SA-3 sites within the cease-fire zone since the military standstill deadline.

Israeli Violations

The Israelis have been flying almost daily reconnaissance flights over the Egyptian cease-fire zone. This is clearly in violation of the cease-fire. The Egyptians have also accused the Israelis of improving their fortified positions on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Both sides have probably been responsible for the periodic firings across the cease-fire line.

The Israelis have also carried on their military operations at about the same level along their other borders and cease-fire lines. They have justified this on the basis of the need to discourage and preempt the continuing fedayeen terrorist activities along these borders. The Jordanians have formally protested the Israeli violations of their cease-fire line to the UN.

U. S. Actions

State has attempted, without much success, to keep the Israeli charges of cease-fire violations out of the press and, at least initially, in quiet diplomatic channels. The major effort has been to shift the focus from cease-fire violations to the peace talks. As you know, most of the public outcry has come from Israel and the Egyptians, at least publicly, have been playing the whole affair low-key and using it to help create an image that the Israelis are unwilling to get down to the serious business of the peace talks.

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As you know, once we determined that there had in fact been Egyptian violations of the cease-fire agreement rather strong demarches were made in both Cairo and Moscow. The Egyptians have, after careful consideration, responded to the effect that by their interpretation of the military standstill provision they have not violated the cease-fire agreement. They have assured us that they have not and will not introduce additional missiles into or construct new sites within the cease-fire zone. On the other hand, the Egyptians insist on reserving the right to "rotate" the same kind of missiles in and out of the cease-fire zone and to "maintain" and "repair" the present missile sites in the broadest sense. In part, they seem to be rationalizing their extremely loose interpretation of the cease-fire agreement on the basis that it is one-sided since there are no restrictions on the Israelis strengthening their offensive capabilities against the Egyptian air-defense system. In fact, they have specifically accused us of violating the cease-fire by supplying Israel with weapons and devices to attack the Egyptian air defenses. Finally, the Egyptians also alleged that the Israelis are fortifying some positions within the cease-fire zone and violating Egyptian air space.

Our response to this Egyptian answer has been to inform them that we simply do not agree with their loose interpretation of the military standstill provision of the cease-fire agreement. We have further pressed to them our hope that our clarification, which rules out the actions they have cited, will remove any misunderstandings and that strict adherence to the cease-fire will enable us to close out this chapter and turn our full attention to the peace talks.

The Egyptians have also been informed that we have already taken up the question of overflights with the Israelis and that we intend to raise their other charges in Tel Aviv. The Israelis have also been informed of our actions in Cairo.

The Soviets have not yet formally responded to our demarche on the Egyptian violations. You will recall, however, that Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov's initial response was to stall for time and to place the blame on Israel.

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Conclusion:

The talks in New York under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring have finally begun. But the diplomatic atmosphere is clouded by the deep animosity and suspicion that exists on both sides. In a broad sense, the whole affair over the cease-fire violations is only a manifestation of this fact which has held up the start of the talks and will be a constant threat to abort them.

As the originator of the peace initiative and the negotiator of the cease-fire agreement, the U.S. is caught in the middle. We can take considerable credit for what has been achieved so far--which is substantial--but we will also be blamed by the parties and others for the failures. Clearly the most difficult obstacles are still ahead of us on the road to a peace settlement.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Modified NSC Meeting on the Middle East

You are scheduled to meet on Tuesday, September 1st at
10:00 a. m. in your office with:

Secretary Rogers
Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard (in lieu of
Secretary Laird)
Attorney General Mitchell
Director of Central Intelligence Helms
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, Henry Kissinger

Purpose of the Meeting

The meeting is designed to convene selected members of the National Security Council for a tour d'horizon of the Middle East situation, with particular emphasis on future U.S. actions in the face of further evidence of violations of the standstill cease-fire.

Background

There continues to be mounting evidence of large scale Egyptian/Soviet missile movements towards the Canal during the period prior to and following the acceptance of the U. S. standstill cease-fire proposal. While there have been some disputes -- in

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large part flowing from different perspectives -- over the facts and interpretation of evidence about these movements, there remains little doubt that from the Israeli perspective at least there has been a substantial change in the military situation along the Canal in the wake of the U. S. peace proposal.

Egyptian/Soviet Violations

Egyptian and Soviet violations can be considered in the context of three benchmarks:

1. The period following the U. S. cease-fire proposal but prior to its effective date.

The Intelligence Community agrees that in a week or so before the cease-fire was implemented (August 7) there was a substantial forward deployment of surface-to-air missiles into and within what became the Egyptian cease-fire zone. We ~~can~~ *have also provided confirmed* on the basis of satellite photography, that between July 28 and August 10 some 23 additional Egyptian manned SA-2 sites and five Soviet-manned SA-3 sites were occupied and that 15 new SA-2 sites were constructed in the area.

2. The period of the night the cease-fire was implemented.

We have been unable, using evidence provided by the Israelis and our own photography, to tell precisely when specific

violations of the cease-fire occurred during the fuzzy period just before and immediately following the implementation of the cease-fire. Nevertheless, there does seem to be enough evidence to at least strongly suggest that some of the sighted Soviet and Egyptian activity may not have been completed until immediately after the cease-fire military standstill deadline. For its part, Israel has made a public point of their opinion that there were substantial Egyptian and Soviet violations immediately after the cease-fire went into effect.

3. The period since implementation of the cease-fire.

There is new evidence of continuing Soviet-Egyptian violations of the cease-fire during the period August 9 to date. This evidence developed on August 29 suggests that in addition to the 1 SA-2 site moved into the cease-fire zone which was confirmed earlier and about which we complained to Egypt and the Soviet Union, there now appear to be between 7 and 8 additional SA-2 sites. Further, there is evidence that at least 3 or 4 of these were definitely emplaced well after the cease-fire went into effect. More importantly, recently analyzed photography now confirms that 3 or 4 Soviet-manned SA-3

sites have been moved within the cease-fire zone, in addition to the 5 SA-3 sites which were picked up earlier. There ~~is still~~ ^{remains} some question as to precisely when these SA-3 sites were moved.

Israeli Violations

The Israelis have been flying almost daily reconnaissance flights over the Egyptian cease-fire zone. This is clearly in violation of the cease-fire. The Egyptians have also accused the Israelies of improving their fortified positions on the East Bank.

The Israelies have also carried on military operations at about the same level along their other borders and cease-fire lines. They have justified this on the basis of the need to discourage and pre-empt continuing Fedayeen activities along these borders. Jordan has formally protested the Israeli operations to the U. N.

Implications

-- Whatever the precise pattern of events, the strategic military situation along the Canal has been modified in the wake of our cease-fire proposal.

-- The Egyptians have moved their air defense complex forward to cover their artillery and forces along the Canal and thus threaten Israel's strategic position. There ^{are} ~~is~~ also ^{new evidence} ~~new evidence~~ that

Soviet-supplied 203 mm long-range howitzers are now being emplaced along the Canal to reenforce substantial Egyptian shorter range artillery already emplaced along its length. Israeli Doctrine relies on air suppression of Egyptian artillery along the Canal. The forward movement of the Soviet/Egyptian SAM complex will significantly complicate Israel's ability to suppress Egyptian artillery in the future and thus jeopardize the viability of Israel's East Bank defensive positions. It will permit selected massing of Egyptian artillery to neutralize these defenses at given points along the East Bank.

-- Although the initial controversy surrounding Israeli charges of a violation of the cease-fire immediately after its implementation may never be verified, we now know that subsequent violations have occurred. Furthermore, positive evidence of the forward movement of the SA-3s into the cease-fire zone confirms that the Soviets, rather than restraining the Egyptians, have actually participated in the violations. The new evidence on the SA-3's adds to the gravity of the situation.

-- The Soviet/Egyptian missile movements have been carried out despite two types of warnings in our discussions with them:

1. Prior to the cease-fire, Secretary Rogers stipulated to the Soviets that missiles with their personnel should not be placed within 30 kilometers of the Canal for this could not be considered "defensive".

2. ^{Subsequent to the ceasefire} ~~A~~ The Soviets/Egyptians have violated both the spirit and the substance of the cease-fire prohibitions within the 50 kilometer zone.

-- On August 24th, the Egyptians ^{in effect} rejected a U. S. demarche requesting that a newly occupied site be restored to an unoccupied condition and that the construction work on two other sites be halted. The Egyptian response preceded the more recent confirmation of additional violations. We have yet to receive a definitive Soviet response to the demarche. In the interim, we have provided the evidence of the earlier violations to the Israelis and requested that they say nothing publicly until the UAR has had an opportunity to respond.

-- Related to the foregoing, on August 29th, the Soviets, at the Deputy Foreign Minister level have protested our U-2 reconnaissance flights along the Israeli side of the Suez Canal.

According to Deputy Foreign Minister Vino Gradov, these flights run the "risk of special surprises" and full responsibility for "possible consequences" lies with the U.S. Concurrently, Brezhnev delivered an unusually mild speech on the Middle East which seems to commit the Soviet prestige to a peace settlement.

Options for the Future

In the face of the most recent evidence of continued cease-fire violation, there appear to be the following choices for U.S. action:

1. Do nothing and press ahead in our efforts to get negotiations underway. This could lead to sharp escalation as a result of continued violations by both sides and Israeli retaliatory action against the forward SAM sites through ground action across the Canal, a surge of Israeli air activity or a combination of both.
2. Launch a diplomatic protest through routine diplomatic channels. In the face of the most recent evidence, such action may not satisfy Israeli concerns and involves the same risks as the "do nothing" course.
3. Launch a diplomatic protest at the Foreign Minister level. This course would appear to be the minimum action necessary

in the light of the seriousness of the violations and the need to convince the Israelis that we are serious about enforcing adherence to the cease-fire provisions.

4. Launch a diplomatic protest at the Foreign Minister level, combined with action to step up arms deliveries to Israel. This course of action would go farther toward assuaging Israeli concerns and demonstrating U.S. determination to the Soviets/Egyptians. At the same time, it could run the risk of contributing to Arab intransigence and suspicion.

5. Announce to all parties our decision to hold off on negotiations until a status quo antè within the cease-fire zone had been re-established. This action would require as a minimum the removal of the already sited SA-2 position together with those more recently confirmed sites.

6. Inform the Israelis that they are free to take whatever reprisal action they deem appropriate to achieve a status quo ante. The proposal could be adopted with or without a decision to provide additional assistance to the Israelis. It would probably generate a request from them. This course of action may be unavoidable in any event. Certainly the weaker our response appears to the Israelis, the more probable Israeli action becomes.

Conduct of the Meeting

Director Helms will be prepared to provide ~~the most~~ ^{the} currently ~~available~~ assessment of cease-fire violations by all parties. ~~The assessment~~ should be followed by a discussion of the implications of these violations and, finally, a consideration of the choices available to us for future action.

Talking Points

You may wish to utilize the following talking points in the conduct of the meeting:

-- This morning's meeting has been convened to review the Middle East situation in light of the most recent evidence of cease-fire violations within the Egyptian cease-fire zone.

-- Call on Director Helms to present a current update of the intelligence picture in the Middle East, with emphasis on recent evidence of Soviet/Egyptian cease-fire violations.

-- Ask Secretary Rogers/Assistant Secretary Sisco to provide the group with an update of the most recent diplomatic interplay, to include:

1. The status of our demarche to the Soviets/Egyptians on the earlier evidence of cease-fire violations.

2. The status of our communications with the Israelis on their cease-fire violations.

3. An assessment of the implications of the Soviet warning on our U-2 flights.

4. An assessment of the implications of the most recent evidence of cease-fire violations in the Egyptian cease-fire zone.

5. An assessment of current Soviet, Arab, and Israeli attitudes with respect to the U. S. initiative.

-- Ask Admiral Moorer for his assessment of the strategic implications of the forward emplacement of the Soviet/Egyptian SAM installations within the cease-fire zone and current Israeli capabilities to retaliate.

-- Ask Secretary Packard for a brief update on the status of our military deliveries to Israel.

-- Conduct a pro and con discussion of each of the following options for future U. S. action:

1. The "do nothing" course.
2. Diplomatic protest through diplomatic channels.
3. Diplomatic protest at Foreign Minister level.

4. Diplomatic protest at Foreign Minister level combined with stepped-up U.S. arms deliveries.
5. Hold off on negotiations pending return to status quo ante.
6. Tell Israel it is free to take remedial action on its own without additional U.S. arms -- with additional U.S. arms.