

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1 MEMO	FROM HENRY A KISSINGER TO THE PRESIDENT (4 pp.)	9/23/70	A
2 NOTE	NOTE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE US (2 pp.)	[9/70]	A
3. PAPER	PAPER ON SRAEL (5 pp.)	[9/70]	A
4 * REPORT	REPORT ON CUBA (17 pp.) SANITIZED PER SAC REVIEW 3/3/2005	9/22/70	A

FILE LOCATION

H FILES Box H-29 FOLDER 6

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: WSAG Actions - Jordan

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
RHC

The following actions have been taken:

Diplomatic

--Jordan - We advised King Hussein that we would look promptly and with sympathy on requests for material assistance.

--Ambassador Brown has informed the King that his request for help is being actively discussed.

--Iran - Ambassador MacArthur has seen the Shah and has exchanged views on the situation with him.

--Israel - We are getting regular Israeli assessment of the situation and are obtaining reconnaissance and intelligence data from the Israelis.

--USSR and UAR - In response to the September 18 Soviet approach indicating that they believe all states both within and outside the region should avoid intervention and seek to bring an end of the fighting, Assistant Secretary Sisco conveyed an oral note September 20 urging the USSR to press the Syrians to withdraw. No further approaches to the Soviets have been made.

--The UN - The Jordanians have decided not to go to the UN for now. This action is in abeyance. After review, we still see no advantage in pressing.

--A diplomatic scenario has been prepared and reviewed in the WSAG for actions the U. S. would have to take if the Israelis strike.

--A scenario and talking points for Congressional briefing have been prepared, both a factual briefing before a strike and a policy briefing after.

Military Supply

--Defense has prepared a package of material which Hussein might need; the material has been identified and can be shipped quickly. Defense and CIA have developed plans for air shipment of this material to Jordan if this is needed.

--A contingency plan has been prepared for the equipment Israel might need if the Israelis strike the Syrians and if the cease-fire breaks down on the Suez line.

--Contingency plans for coping with a possible Soviet counter to an Israeli attack on the Syrians have been reviewed in the WSAG.

Military Measures

--A "heads up" message has been sent to all commands to increase intelligence watch and general readiness.

--Airlift - Five C-130s have been moved from Incirlik to preposition them for evacuation; ten additional C-130s have been moved to Europe.

--The Fleet - Major elements of the Sixth Fleet have been positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean.

--The Saratoga and Independence are south of Cyprus along with the amphibious force with one Marine battalion landing team embarked.

--The Guam with another Marine unit embarked and with helicopters will pass through Gibraltar Straits on Saturday, 26 September.

--The Carrier Kennedy is enroute to the Mediterranean and will pass through Gibraltar Straits on 25 September.

--An additional tanker and four destroyers have been ordered to the Mediterranean to support the Kennedy.

--Six additional land-based ASW aircraft have been positioned in the Mediterranean area.

--Officers from the Sixth Fleet flew Sunday night to Tel Aviv for a very successful intelligence exchange on target information.

--The Fleet has been instructed to prepare plans for reconnaissance of the battle area and for attacking Syrian forces.

--Army Forces

--Airborne Brigade is on alert in Germany, one battalion could be in Jordan in less than 8 hours.

--Elements of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg are on alert.

--Other Steps

--CIA/State have completed a study of likely outcomes of the contest between the King and the Fedayeen, the impact on the Middle East peace initiative and the implications for U. S. policy and action.

--Press guidance is being coordinated with State and Defense. Contingency statements have been drafted for use if Israel strikes.

--Sitreps are being issued every four hours.

--A paper on possibilities for providing economic assistance to Jordan has been prepared.

--Hospital units have been prepared for shipment U S aircraft have been earmarked to carry them to Jordan.

MEMO TO PRES.

An originally-planned NSC meeting
turned into a
Meeting of Principals of WSAG
on Jordan

9/23/70

1080 lutz
J. Davis


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 22, 1970

GENERAL HAIG

Admiral Moorer would like to bring
General Vogt to the NSC meeting tomorrow.

Approve 2 Disapprove



Jeanne W. Davis

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NSC

Rogers wants
to bring Jesse
for M.E. portion.

Approve

Disapprove

Per Jeanne Davis

LIST OF INVITEES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1970, 9 30 A.M - CABINET ROOM

Secretary of State William P Rogers

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco

Admiral Thomas H Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms

? ~~Lt. General John W. Vogt, Director, J-3 (Operations), Joint Staff~~

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President

Gen. Alexander M Haig, NSC Staff

~~Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff~~

(Mr. Clinton B. Conger, CIA, to set up charts)

22110

9/23 NSC mtg

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
SUBJECT National Security Council Meeting

A

The purpose of this memorandum is to confirm the message passed to your office by telephone earlier this morning -- that the NSC meeting previously scheduled for 3 00 P.M. Friday, September 18, has been postponed until 9 30 A.M. Wednesday, September 23.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

NUMBER MO DA HR

22110 09 18 10

TO: PRES _____
HAK X

FROM: ELIOT _____
ROGERS _____
LAIRD _____

CLASSIF: U X _____ EXDIS
C X _____ NODIS
LOU _____ EYES ONLY
S _____ RES DATA
TS _____ CODEWORD
_____ SENSITIVE
_____ PARIS MTG
_____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 09/17/70 Butterfield, A.

SUBJECT: Postponement of NSC meeting from 3:PM Sept. 18 to 9:30 AM Sept 23

ENCLOSURES: () () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME: Mrs. Davis

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY	<u>X</u>		
DIR SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ()
MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
RECOMMENDATIONS ()
JOINT MEMO ()
APPROPRIATE ACTION (X)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
CONCURRENCE ()
DUE DATE: 09/18/70

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

DATE	FROM	TO

ACTION REQUIRED

Response has been
notified
JMD

MICROFILM DATA
DO. ✓
INIT. RT
DATE
SEP 21 1970
ORIG) NSC
TO) PAF
WHC
SUBF ✓

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
NOTIFY: _____
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)

NSC _____ STAFF APPROVAL
PAF _____ HAK APP'L
WHC X HAK MARGINALIA
SUBF X X NS3 FORM REQUIRED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

DICK KENNEDY

PETE VAKY

✓ JEANNE DAVIS

FROM:

Al Haig *(Signature)*

SUBJECT:

Wednesday's NSC Meeting

The President desires that next Wednesday's NSC meeting include the following agenda items with the approximate time allocations as shown:

- Europe Topic Originally Scheduled - Approximately 30 minutes
- brfy*
Situation in Jordan - Approximately 30 minutes
- wo*
Problem in Cuba - One hour

Please give me recommendations for setting up the meeting, briefing and participants. During the last two agenda items, participants should be held to the minimum -- perhaps only the briefer and the principal members of the NSC. There is to be no wide circulation of the fact that the last agenda item has been added to the meeting.

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under provisions of E.O. 12958

RFG

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Ed -

I imagine this will go in a regular briefing
book - so here is a copy for your files.

nancy

— The addition in conference of a dollar ceiling under section 501 of the Defense Procurement Act would seriously erode my position at a time when the situation in the Middle East is extremely dangerous and volatile

— A large ceiling would be widely misunderstood as the actual amount of aid to Israel. It would be received in the Arab world (and perhaps at home) with dismay. It would be seized upon by the Soviets in their effort to drive even deeper the wedge between the United States and the moderate Arab states.

— A small ceiling, on the other hand, would be a serious blow to my position with respect to the Soviets. Moreover, in the context of the statutory language of 501, it would imply that the United States will counteract Soviet aid only up to some specified sum. This would be a further inducement to the Soviets to continue and perhaps increase the extent of their military support to the UAR, Syria and Iraq. It would encourage the Soviet strategy of a war of attrition with Israel. It would complicate our delicate relations with the Israelis with whom we are at this moment negotiating military credits in anticipation of the authority contained in section 501. A small ceiling might induce Syrian and Iraqi intervention in the open conflict in Jordan, a conflict whose outcome is vital to the United States.

— In the extreme crisis with which I must deal on an hour to hour basis, alteration of 501 now, by the addition of a ceiling, would be a disastrous handicap. I urge in the strongest possible terms that section 501 be retained in conference without a specified dollar limit.

I appreciate that this is not the normal method of authorizing military credit, but this is not a normal situation. Moreover, section 501 is the only statutory authority I have with which to assist Israel's defense effort.

NSC Ed

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

DICK KENNEDY
PETE VAKY
JEANNE DAVIS

FROM: Al Haig 19/

SUBJECT: Wednesday's NSC Meeting

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under provisions of E.O. 12958
RFLx

NSC

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: This Morning's NSC Meeting on Jordan

I have been informed that State has prepared a draft response to the Israeli "note verbale." They have done this without giving us an opportunity to carefully assess its implications. I therefore recommend that at this morning's meeting of principals we confine ourselves to the general approach that should be taken with respect to the Israeli note and that you instruct State to pass their draft response to the Washington Special Actions Group for more thorough and coordinated staffing.

I will ^{promptly} ~~probably~~ convene the WSAG and provide you on a priority basis with a detailed inter-departmental assessment of the State draft with the view toward insuring that no precipitous action is taken until all aspects of this crucial issue have been thoroughly vetted.

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R76x

Sensitive
NSC

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, September 23, 1970

The regular agenda for the meeting includes:

- The situation in Jordan.
- Cuba.

I have provided a separate meeting book for each subject.

- The Jordan paper is in the Red book; the Cuba paper is in the Blue book.

I recommend that you structure the meeting by discussing the Jordan situation (Red book) first--this discussion would be essentially in the nature of an updating of the situation and a discussion of the Israeli response to our answers to their questions.

I recommend that the discussion begin with a briefing by Mr. Helms. I suggest also that you ask Admiral Moorer to brief on our current military readiness. Then you might want to turn to the Secretary of State.

At the conclusion of the discussion on Jordan, I recommend that you turn to the subject of Cuba. This discussion also would begin with a briefing by Mr. Helms. Following the briefing, I suggest that you ask each of the participants for their interpretation of the situation. If you wish, I will sum up the discussion after everyone has spoken, on the basis of the memo I am attaching to the Blue book for your use only.

I recommend that you do not make any decision at the meeting on our position on the Cuba problem until you have had time to read again the memorandum I have given you (in the Blue book).

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under provisions of E.O. 12958

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM. Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

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I recommend that you structure the meeting by discussing first the Jordan situation (red book) for about ~~30~~ minutes -- this discussion would be essentially in the nature of an updating of the situation and a discussion of the Israeli response to our answers to their questions. *5401*

I recommend that the discussion begin with a briefing by Mr. Helms. I suggest also that you ask Admiral Moorer to brief on our current military readiness. Following the introductory briefings, I would summarize the issues as a prelude to general discussion by the participants.

At the conclusion of the discussion on Jordan, I recommend that you turn to the subject of Cuba. This discussion also would begin with a briefing by Mr. Helms. Following the briefing, I suggest you ask each of the participants for their interpretation of the situation. If you wish, I will sum up the discussion after everyone has spoken. *on the basis of the memo I am attaching to the blue book for your use only*

I recommend that you do not make any decision at the meeting on our position on the Cuba problem until you have had time to read carefully again the memorandum I have given you (in the blue book), and we have had time to discuss it further.

*clear your mind
meet by turn
to US Secretary
of State*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT. NSC Meeting, September 23, 1970

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under provisions of E.O. 12958

RFCx

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ISRAELI NOTE

ACTIONS TAKEN

SECRET/NODIS

TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING SELECTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

-- Since our peace initiative was launched in June, the Palestinian guerrillas and those Arab Governments, including Syria, opposed to a settlement with Israel have sought to destroy our initiative.

-- The situation came to a head in Jordan when King Hussein, who along with Nasser had accepted the US initiative, sought to assert control over the fedayeen "state within a state" in Jordan.

-- By September 19 the King was slowly gaining the upper hand. Iraq, although it has a large number of troops in Jordan and is pro-fedayeen, has remained passive; the UAR has avoided choosing sides; and the Soviets have limited themselves to exhortations for an end to the civil strife and against outside intervention.

-- Beginning late September 19 a new situation has been created by a massive invasion of Jordan from Syria (300 tanks plus artillery and infantry). The invading forces have established themselves in northern Jordan where the fedayeen have been strong.

-- At stake is the regime of King Hussein, a moderate Arab leader friendly to the United States and prepared if he can to make peace with Israel. If he falls, the prospects are for radicalization and possible partition of Jordan among elements hostile to Israel and the United States. If Hussein falls,

there will remain little hope for an Arab/Israeli settlement in the foreseeable future.

-- On September 20 we urged the Soviets to prevail upon the Syrians to withdraw from Jordan, warning that if they did not there was danger that the conflict would be broadened. and affirming our own decision to avoid this. The Soviets have been totally unresponsive.

-- In these circumstances we have been consulting with other governments, including the British, the French and the Israelis.

-- We have been informed that Israel has decided to move militarily against the Syrian forces in northern Jordan in view of the threat which would be posed to its security by a radical regime and a large Syrian military force on its eastern border.

-- We view sympathetically this Israeli position to defend its national interests. We will be helpful in quietly providing Israel materiel assistance, while seeking minimal public association with this Israeli action in order to protect to the extent possible our interests in the Arab world.

-- We see our principal responsibility as keeping the Soviets from intervening. We are informing the Soviets that we have no plans or our own to intervene, and are warning them against intervening. We are making clear that the problem results

from Syrian aggression and that the solution lies in Syrian withdrawal from Jordan. We will of course also support withdrawal of Israeli troops once the military ^{operation} occupation is completed should the Israelis feel that they must go in on the ground as well as in the air.

-- As for possible actions we might take, we are making contingency plans should it become necessary to evacuate US nationals from Jordan. If, contrary to our expectations, the situation should require a larger direct US role, we will consult the Congress in advance.

SECRET/NODIS

We have just learned that Israeli armed forces have commenced action against Syrian military forces which had invaded Jordan. This invasion by Syria, we were aware, would be considered by Israel as a threat to Israel's security, and we have been working and will continue to work intensively in diplomatic channels to bring about Syrian withdrawal.

We wish to note that Syria has long rejected a just settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute on the basis supported by the overwhelming majority of the world community, the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. More recently Syria, unlike the UAR, Jordan and Israel rejected our peace initiative based on that resolution. The military action of Syria has not only posed a threat to the security of both Jordan and Israel, but has placed in further jeopardy the slender hopes the people of the area and men of good will everywhere had placed in the initiative based on the November 1967 resolution. We look to the early withdrawal of all troops from Jordan not there at the request of the Jordan government so that those countries of the area which want peace can press ahead in their efforts to make it. We have no intention of embarking on other than diplomatic steps in order to end the fighting unless powers outside the area become involved.

SECRET/NODIS

PROS AND CONS OF
ISRAELI STRIKE

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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C U B A

22 September 1970

DCI BRIEFING FOR
23 SEPTEMBER NSC

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN CUBA


(Locator Map, Chart of Cienfuegos Bay, and Photo)

I. Mr. President, the Soviets are developing a facility at Cienfuegos--on the south coast of Cuba--to support their naval operations in the Caribbean and the Atlantic. There is clear evidence of this in the port improvements and construction activity we have observed during the past month, and the work has proceeded to a point making it possible that Soviet naval units--including nuclear-powered submarines--may soon be operating regularly from Cienfuegos.

A.

25X1


TOP SECRET




1. Other port improvements include the installation of three anti-aircraft sites, and a new long-range communications facility is under construction on a promontory north of Cayo Alcatraz, an island in the eastern portion of the bay.

2. At this facility, holes for a large antenna array have been dug some time since August 15.

3.




25X1



B. On Cayo Alcatraz, new barracks and recreation facilities have been built, probably for Soviet naval personnel.

TOP SECRET



25X1

[REDACTED]

B. Ships of a Soviet naval task force--the third to visit Cuban waters in the past 14 months--are still at Cienfuegos, and their activities provide further indications that the Soviets intend to make more permanent use of the port.

25X1

[REDACTED]

1. One of the seven Soviet ships which reached Cienfuegos on September 9 and 10 was an Alligator-class amphibious landing ship, which brought to Cuba two 84-foot barges.

2.

25X1

[REDACTED]


3. A Soviet cruiser and destroyer, both armed with guided missiles, left Cienfuegos on September 15, in company with a merchant tanker, but the other ships of the task force--the landing ship, the submarine tender, and two salvage ships--are still in the harbor.

+ LBNA

-3-

TOP SECRET

25X1




II. No Soviet submarines have been detected with this task force, but the first Soviet squadron to operate in Cuban waters in July, 1969, included a nuclear-powered N-class attack submarine and two F-class diesel units.

A. A second task force which visited Cienfuegos last May included an E-Two class nuclear cruise missile submarine and two more diesel types.

B. We have been receiving and checking out reports of Soviet submarines and submarine bases in Cuba--including underground submarine pens--since the Soviets first began moving into the island early in 1962, but none of these reports could be substantiated until that first task force visit in July of 1969.

C. During the 1962 missile crisis, we knew that several Soviet diesel submarines were headed for Cuba. We cannot judge whether the USSR actually intended to establish a submarine force in Cuba at that time,

25X1



III. There has already been some review of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations during and after the 1962 crisis, to determine whether any of the understandings reached at that time would have a bearing on the latest developments.

A. There was, of course, no formal bilateral agreement putting an end to the crisis, because President Kennedy conditioned a no-invasion pledge on adequate inspection procedures to verify the removal of offensive weapons and guard against their re-introduction.

1. This, the Cubans and the Soviets never accepted.

B. The understanding between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev made no reference to submarines.

1. The Soviets now would no doubt contend-- and correctly--that they made no undertakings except to remove the missiles and the bombers.

C. Unilaterally, however, the U.S. Government surrounded the settlement with statements which went much farther than this. The President's public statements and formal communications at that time refer explicitly

25X1




to the unacceptability of the presence in Cuba of any offensive weapons capable of striking targets in the United States, without distinction as to delivery systems or whether they are nuclear or conventional.

To cite a specific example, President Kennedy said in a press conference on September 13, 1962: "If Cuba should... become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

2. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told a press conference on April 23, 1963: "President Kennedy has made it utterly clear that we would not accept a re-introduction into Cuba of weapons which could strike at its neighbors, including the United States."

IV. The current Soviet naval activity in Cuba coincides with a general warming trend in Cuban-Soviet relations, and with recent statements by Fidel Castro to the effect that Cuba would welcome closer military ties with the Soviet Union.

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- A. The Cienfuegos project probably was discussed when Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was in Cuba last November, and again when Raul Castro visited the Soviet Union in April of this year.
- V. The only full-fledged submarine base the Soviets ever established on foreign soil was the one in Albania in the late 1950's, before the Albanians split with Moscow.
- A. The Soviet Navy has demonstrated in Alexandria, Egypt, however, that it can support submarine operations from friendly ports without establishing actual bases overseas.
1. Soviet diesel submarines now operate in the Mediterranean on six-month patrols, thanks to a three-week stop in Alexandria midway in the deployment.
 2. The distinction between support facilities and an outright naval base is important to the Soviets because of their long-standing propaganda against so-called "imperialist and colonial exploitation" of overseas bases.

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
B. It is possible that the Soviets intend to use Cienfuegos primarily as a harbor, making little use of shore facilities. With the ships they now have in position there, they can make minor repairs and provide limited service to submarines of any type.

1. The capabilities of the support ships-- together with the facilities now available at Cienfuegos--such as pier space, mooring buoys, fuel storage, barracks, and recreation-- can substantially extend the range and duration of Soviet submarines patrolling in the Atlantic and the Caribbean.

VI. To be specific, a Cuban support facility will save Soviet submarines about 2,500 miles of transit cruising to and from potential patrol areas off the east coast of the United States, compared to operations from the Northern Fleet bases near Murmansk.

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A.



1.

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
B. Similarly, cruise missile and torpedo attack submarines could increase their time on-station by operating from Cienfuegos.

1. These submarines might also take advantage of the longer patrols to carry on surveillance and other intelligence operations along the U.S. east coast.

C. The existence of a Cuban support facility would also give the Soviets the option--in the event of a crisis--of prepositioning submarines and their support ships outside the areas where American anti-submarine warfare coverage is most effective.


1. In this context, the Soviets have shown considerable interest in seaborne support of submarine operations in the equatorial waters of the Atlantic near Cape Verde.

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2. In preparation for such mid-ocean resupply and maintenance, the Soviets have acquired more than seven years of merchant marine experience in supporting their fishing fleets off Newfoundland from a base in Havana Bay.


3. It is also worth noting that Soviet submarines operating from Cienfuegos could patrol the Gulf of Mexico without having to enter through one of the narrow passages into the Caribbean from the Atlantic




D. On the negative side, of course, Cienfuegos is relatively vulnerable to close surveillance by the United States, and equally vulnerable to attack in time of war.

VII. If the Soviets intend to develop Cienfuegos into a permanent base for the support of ballistic missile submarines--similar to our installations at Holy Loch and Rota--they will need additional facilities which are not there now.

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




A. A ballistic missile submarine requires repair shops and storage for nuclear weapons, as well as special missile loading equipment.

1. Certain repairs for ballistic missile submarines also require specialized missile support ships, or missile handling facilities ashore.

B. As yet, we have detected no preparations at Cienfuegos for facilities such as these.



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MEMO TO PRES.

September 22, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Soviet Naval Facility in Cuba

I. The Current SituationA. The Soviet Facilities

Photographic intelligence indicates the USSR is constructing a naval support base, apparently for submarines, in Cienfuegos Bay, Cuba. Definite identification of this activity was first made from U-2 photography taken September 16.

The facilities at present consist of a Soviet submarine tender moored to four heavy buoys in the bay. Two Soviet submarine support barges, a landing ship, a heavy salvage vessel, and a rescue vessel are in the harbor. Other ships that had been there--a tanker and two missile anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ships--have departed. Construction on Cayo Alcatraz, an island in the bay, consists of two single story barracks, sports area (soccer field, basketball and tennis courts), an offshore wharf and a swimming area. Three AAA sites and a communications antenna array are also in the harbor area.

None of this construction or naval activity was in the area on August 15, the last prior date on which U-2 photography of the bay was available. All of this was thus accomplished in the intervening four-week period, suggesting that it was done on a crash basis.

The installation is similar to what we have in Holy Loch, and is of semi-permanent nature. It would appear at this point to have the capability of servicing submarines, including nuclear subs, and of providing rest and recreation facilities for naval crews as well as permanent support personnel. No other naval support capabilities are evident at this point.

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B. The Background

Circumstantially, this construction appears to be part of a series of events involving Soviet-Cuban military relations which have stretched over the last year:

- In July 1969 a Soviet naval group, including a nuclear submarine, visited Cuba for two weeks.
- The Soviet Minister of Defense visited Cuba for eight days from November 12-19, 1969, the first visit by a Soviet Defense Minister to the Western Hemisphere.
- Raul Castro, the Cuban Minister of the Armed Forces, visited the USSR for one month from April 4 to approximately May 13.
- On April 22 and again on August 23 Castro made public remarks welcoming close military ties with the Soviets.
- Three flights of Two TU-95 Bear surveillance/reconnaissance aircraft were made to Cuba on April 18, April 25 and May 13.
- A Soviet naval task force paid a two-week visit May 14 to Cienfuegos. Two units called at Havana subsequently for a ceremonial visit.
- On August 4, in a note for you, the Soviets complained of new exile activities and asked if the 1962 understanding was valid, we replied that it was.
- The current ships now in Cienfuegos were first noticed moving to that area on August 28.

II. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

There is a wide spectrum of views regarding the military significance of this development. The JCS believe that the military impact would be significant equating, in the case of submarines, because of increased on-station time, to approximately one-third of the size of the Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarine (SLBM) force. Additional advantages they cite include:

- The establishment of SLBM patrol stations in the Gulf of Mexico,
- The option of keeping all missile submarines (SSBN) in port at Cienfuegos and either launch from port or deploy rapidly as the situation dictates,
- The lessening of personnel hardship and the concomitant increase of SSBN crew effectiveness by significantly decreasing at-sea time.

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II. Military Significance (cont inued)

The JCS further believe that this action fits into an overall Soviet pattern which indicates increasing Soviet hostility toward the U.S. and a willingness to take greater risks in pursuing their objectives. In support of this contention they note, among other Soviet actions, the following:

- the continued construction of strategic missiles and SSBNs during SALT,
- dramatic increases in Soviet naval forces and operations in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean,
- virtual Soviet control of UAR on defense and the challenge to the US peace initiative by violation of the standstill provision with a massive buildup of missiles along the Suez Canal,
- the Soviet fleet visits and flights of TU-95/Bear D reconnaissance aircraft to Cuba, and
- improvements in Soviet military capabilities across-the-board while ostensibly cooperating in a number of diplomatic moves.

I share the JCS's concern with Soviet intentions. I also share their concern over the increasing Soviet military capabilities vis-a-vis the U.S. and this is a matter which we are carefully analyzing. However, I believe the development of the port of Cienfuegos into a base capable of supporting nuclear submarines would add only marginally to the total Soviet capability for attacking the US with nuclear weapons. The fact of the matter is that there are always some Soviet subs off our East Coast with the capability to launch missiles against most targets in the U.S. If they want, the Soviets can increase this number at any time by simply increasing their force levels. Having a base at Cienfuegos makes it easier to achieve such an objective but at considerably higher risks considering past U.S. reactions to Soviet military activities in Cuba. Unlike 1962, the Soviets have a massive land base missile capability which continues to grow.

If my view that the increase in military capabilities of the Cienfuegos base would be only marginal is correct, then the Soviet action becomes even more puzzling Why run such high risks for such low returns in increased military capability? This strongly suggests that this Soviet move is perhaps more politically-motivated than militarily.

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III. SOVIET INTENTIONS

There are several basic questions:

- Why, at this time, have the Soviets embarked on a venture that they should know has a low flashpoint in terms of American sensitivity?
- Why, beforehand, did the Soviets seek to reaffirm the 1962 post missile crisis understanding on the flimsy pretext of the threat to Cuba?
- Having reaffirmed the essentials of the 1962 understanding, why did the Soviets almost immediately proceed to violate the spirit if not the precise letter of that understanding?
- Finally, how does the move into Cuba relate, if at all, to the larger posture of Soviet behavior, especially in the Middle East?

There are several possible explanations:

1. It could be that this move in Cuba is simply to show the flag, perhaps to impress Latin America generally, having done that, the venture will be terminated, in other words, there would be no longer-term implications or consequences intended.

The main problem with this interpretation is that establishing a semi-permanent facility goes well beyond showing the flag. No Soviet leader could imagine that such a move could be passed over by an American administration.

2. It could be a move in the SALT context, to establish a presence to be bargained away for the removal of US forward bases which the Soviets have pressed for in SALT.

The problem with this argument is that the prospective SALT agreement currently on the table is one that, in itself, is quite attractive to the USSR. To raise the sensitive issues of Cuba risks upsetting SALT, at a minimum, it would establish a far more belligerent atmosphere for negotiations. If the Soviets did accept a trade-off in the end, it would once again demonstrate to Castro and Latin Americans generally, that the Soviets exploited Cuba for their own strategic purposes.

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III. Soviet Intentions -- possible explanations (continued)

3 A deliberate confrontation. If the above two explanations are implausible, we must assume that the Soviets are well aware of the crisis potential of their action. It is possible that the Soviets some time ago looked ahead and saw the Middle East escalating to a dangerous point. They could have reasoned that it was to their strategic advantage to widen the arena of potential conflict with the US, in part to put pressures on us from at least two points.

-- They could foresee that these two crises would come to a head in a pre-election period, when the US might be under some internal constraints

-- They lied to us as in 1962 to create an "understanding" for the record beforehand, later to be used against us in some distorted fashion.

-- In this scenario, the Soviets, typically, have not thought through their tactics of a double crisis, but in their arrogance, will brazen it through.

-- It could be argued that for some years, now, as their strategic power has grown, the Soviet leaders have wanted to even the score from the humiliation of 1962.

A double crisis of this magnitude, however, has always been an intriguing theory but a dangerous strategy. No one can foresee the consequences of inter-actions between two areas of contention. There is not only the danger of uncalculated escalation but the significant risk of a double defeat.

Moreover, Cuba would seem the last place the Soviets would want to invoke in a Middle East crisis. Cuba is, after all, still an area where we have immense tactical advantage.

4. Soviet expansionism. This interpretation fits the Cuba move into the pattern of the projection of Soviet power to various points around the globe, and expansionism symbolized primarily by a naval presence. Under this theory the Soviets have been in the process of testing us for a reaction, and having estimated that we were relatively complacent, have decided to take a further step, following their earlier naval visits to Cuba and flights of bomber-reconnaissance aircraft.

-- The primary purpose of the Cuban move is not to create another confrontation, but to establish step-by-step the Soviet right to establish a naval presence in the area, much as they have done

in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf (not to mention the now-regular on-station patrolling of Y Class submarines within range of the East Coast)

- The Soviet actions are demonstrative and political for their own, not Cuban objectives, to show that the balance of power is now such that we can no longer effectively block Soviet power even in our own sphere of influence.
- The Soviets may have reasoned that it would be prudent to reaffirm the basic 1962 understanding, as a test of the limit of our permissiveness.
- The Soviets may have concluded that the Middle East crisis inhibited any forceful US reaction, especially in a pre-election period.
- In this interpretation, however, there is room for tactical retreats when the Soviets judge that the temperature is rising above that of tolerable level.

My own view is that this explanation, a test of expansionism, is probably the right one. In the last six months the Soviets could have concluded they could move forward without major risks as long as they did it piecemeal. If they are successful, however, as the news leaks out, the Soviets can demonstrate to much of the world that the correlation of forces has shifted significantly since their defeat in Cuba almost exactly eight years ago. In short, this is a calculated but highly significant political challenge.

The fact that on two separate occasions the Soviets have deliberately deceived us may be an important symptom of the mood of the Soviet leaders, and an index of their assessment of us. It suggests an ominous contempt and a judgment that we are not likely to react quickly or vigorously to Soviet challenges. Why they should hold such a view, if they do, is never easy to understand. It could relate to what they may perceive as our excessive eagerness in SALT and MBFR or perhaps their view of the domestic effects of Vietnam, or their distorted views of our social-economic "crisis".

In any case, the Soviets have been moving aggressively, first in the Middle East, and now in Cuba. They are likely to continue to do so until they receive clear and unmistakable warning signals.

IV. THE CUBAN ANGLE

Why did Cuba agree to lend its territory for this purpose? What does Castro get out of it?

Conceivably Castro may have asked for such a facility to obtain a more demonstrative show of support, or the base decision could have been the result of mutual initiative based on mutually perceived advantages. However, a more plausible thesis is that this was a Soviet initiative. The Soviets clearly have the leverage to obtain Cuban cooperation--either by blackmail in threatening to stop essential economic support or by bribes in the form of more economic and military aid. This would explain a number of otherwise puzzling reports we have received over the past year or so. For example, there have been increasing reports of Soviet attempts to increase their control and influence within the Cuban regime. There have been reports of Castro's uneasiness at this, and of his alleged comments about Soviet "coldbloodedness and ruthlessness". Failure of Castro's highly touted effort to harvest ten million tons of sugar is a heavy blow which damaged his charisma and control. The Soviets could well have felt that they could pressure him without being as concerned about his sensitivity as they have been in the past. In any event, they appear to have more influence and authority in Cuba now than at any time in recent years.

Whatever the case, the Cubans do receive--in return for use of their territory --Soviet military presence with its implicit promise of Soviet support and protection. They could conceivably use an expanded Soviet naval presence in the area to cover their clandestine subversive movements. They presumably have received expanded economic and military aid.

V. MEANING IN LATIN AMERICA

Existence of a Soviet base and Soviet naval power in the Caribbean is likely to be seen by Latin America as a sign of US weakness, especially if seen in conjunction with the recent Chilean elections. It would strengthen Soviet efforts to increase their influence in the region. It would encourage indigenous radical left elements while discouraging their opponents. It may tempt many of these American nations to become neutral vis-a-vis US or to turn to the Soviets to hedge their bets.

VI. ALLIED ACTIVITIES

Most of our allies have little taste for a major confrontation with the USSR, especially in an area quite remote from Europe, and over a situation that they may not perceive as a serious strategic threat. We could expect, as in 1962, little support and considerable advice to restrain our responses.

The main Europeans have a vested interest in the beginnings of detente. In the longer term, however, the Europeans and our other Allies could conclude that Soviet success in Cuba was an important index of the balance of power. At the same time, the Soviets also have a vested interest in the new German treaty and may also be inhibited from a deliberate confrontation with us.

VII. OPTIONS

If as I have suggested this is a serious political challenge, then we have no choice but to respond. In my view, our ^{major} options are:

1. Pursue a purely diplomatic effort to get the Soviets out. We would tell them that we know of their activity and remind them of our 1962 understandings which we expect them to respect and wait for their reply.
 - The advantages of this course are that the chance of immediate confrontation is minimized and we might be able to strike a bargain which would get them to leave, thus solving the immediate problem. If this strategy succeeds and the Russians leave in response to an offset to which we agree, Castro may even see himself as a pawn in the USSR game and be less likely to play in the future.
 - The disadvantages are that if we bargain to get their withdrawal the Soviets may see this kind of action as an easy route to follow for other concessions they want in the future. If they are testing us they may be willing to bargain yet engage in prolonged bargaining. Moreover, our low-key reaction may prompt them to go ahead on this project and even to make further waves in the Hemisphere or elsewhere. With the passage of time during our talks, we may end up facing Soviet submarines and weapons in Cuba -- a result similar to that in 1962.
2. Pursue a diplomatic course with Castro We would tell him that we cannot permit this kind of Soviet base in Cuba and that we expect him to get it out.
 - The advantages would be similar to those above but would include also the avoidance of the need to strike a bargain with the Russians and delay further the time of confrontation. If Castro believes we are serious he may be more willing to ~~comply~~ ^{comply} than the Russians.

It is Russian interests which are primarily at stake.

- The disadvantages are that we might have to strike some bargain with Castro which would be no less easy for us than striking one with the Soviets. Moreover, if the Soviets induced or pressured Castro into standing firm, the chances of a fait accompli would be great and we would face it without yet having made our position clear to the Soviets. They could take our delay in approaching them as a sign that we are unwilling to push them hard.
3. Move decisively diplomatically, making clear at the outset we are prepared to move to confrontation. We would tell the Russians directly and at a high level that we consider their action intolerable, that we expect them to remove the facility without delay and that we expect a prompt reply. If a satisfactory reply is not forthcoming we consider the entire 1962 understanding invalid. As a follow-up, we could call off SALT and go to the OAS -- as we did in 1962 -- either before or simultaneously with our approach to the Soviets. Some military steps--e.g., increased surveillance, sea patrols off shore, deployment of additional tactical air to the Southeast US--would signal our resolve and willingness to move to confrontation.
- The advantages of this course are that our resolve would be clear to the Soviets from the outset, but they could still move out without losing face (if we had not gone to the OAS). We would have made clear that we would not bargain for their withdrawal.
 - The disadvantages are that if they are testing us, they may still not believe our determination short of an ultimatum. We will have taken more time and will still have to confront them. If they really want a base, as if they are seeking some concession from us, they may be willing to sacrifice SALT and accept confrontation as a means of getting a concession for withdrawal. If we went to the OAS and were unsuccessful in getting Soviet withdrawal we would be losing twice.
4. Confront the Soviets immediately. We would give them an ultimatum and take immediate military measures to emphasize our intention to prevent their use or retention of the facility. If they did not respond we would publicly demand their withdrawal and within a short time, if they did not do so, take military action against the base.
- The advantages of this course of action are that our intentions would be unambiguous and the consequences clear to the Soviets from the outset. It would minimize the likelihood that the base would become operational and heavily defended. It would be easier for the Soviets to withdraw now when their investment is relatively small than it might be later with a more developed facility.

- The disadvantages are that a crisis could be precipitated early during a period when our forces are heavily oriented toward the Middle East. A public ultimatum gives the Soviets no graceful way out and we will have played our last card and foreclosed other options.

In my view the slow diplomatic approach has serious risks. It may seem safer but most likely it would result in a gradually escalating crisis leading ultimately to confrontation. At the same time, moving immediately to military confrontation may be needlessly risky until we have probed to see what the Soviets intentions really are. But whatever our initial course, we must be prepared to move toward confrontation if this is the price of Soviet withdrawal.

I recommend that you hear out all of the views on this subject but that you do not make a decision at today's meeting.

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RN TALKING POINTS

THE PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS

NSC MEETING - CUBA

September 23, 1970

[The purpose of this meeting is to get an assessment of the significance of the Soviet naval facility in Cuba, the issues this raises for the United States and the range of choices open to us. The meeting is not intended to result in a decision -- this will require considerably more study and analysis.]

1. I want to discuss now the Soviet naval facility in Cuba.

First I would like to have Director Helms report on what we know and his assessment of this Soviet move. Then I would like each of you to give me his interpretation.

2. [Ask Mr Helms to brief on the situation and give his assessment.]

3. [Ask each participant in turn for his interpretation.]

4. [Ask Dr. Kissinger to summarize.]

5. I will not make any decision today. We need to consider our course carefully and should meet again on this question.

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