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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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
June 9, 1970

Mr. President:

Attached is your book for tomorrow morning's
9:30 a.m. NSC meeting on the Middle East.

In the attached memorandum, I have drawn
together for you the key issues involved.

Your talking points for the meeting are at the
first tab in the book.



Henry A. Kissinger

Attachments

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*

SUBJECT: Mid-East Issues--NSC Meeting Wednesday, June 10

The situation in the Middle East is now the most dangerous we face. It is difficult to see how the situation in Southeast Asia could produce a major-power war. It is easy to see a number of ways the situation in the Mid-East could. Moreover, the question of the U. S. position there giving way to Soviet predominance is no longer academic. The decisions to be faced now will have an important effect on how the situation develops.

Implications of the Soviet Presence in Egypt

The character of the Soviet move in the UAR should not be underrated.

You may hear the argument made (by Defense) that this move was precipitated by Israeli action or that it is purely defensive and does not threaten Israel. These arguments do not meet the main point: This is a unique turn of Soviet policy--never before have the Soviets put their own forces in combat jeopardy for the sake of a non-Communist government.

It is argued that now the Soviets have rescued Nasser both of them may be prepared to negotiate seriously. This seems doubtful. Having scored a psychological gain with apparent impunity, it has generally been the Soviet tactic first to consolidate their gains and then to press forward, testing the ground as they move.

The problem, therefore, is not simply that the Soviet military presence may have, at a minimum, limited Israeli military options. The problem is that the USSR has established a new kind of foothold in the UAR and the U. S. has a strong interest in preventing its consolidation and expansion.

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RAC

Some Common Perceptions -- A Critique

You will hear argument over what the U.S. interest requires and how far the U.S. should go in trying to check the USSR. Some of this argument rests on assumptions that should be carefully examined.

1. The Israeli view is that if Israel and the U.S. will only stand fast, the USSR and the Arabs will decide to negotiate. This means that the U.S. must give Israel all the equipment it needs and make no concessions to the USSR.

The problem with this is that the Israelis have not really offered the Arabs a negotiating position the Arabs could even consider accepting. So the Arabs feel they have no choice but to fight. Thus the U.S. is left backing Israel in a war of attrition that seems likely to lead only to another war -- probably involving the USSR -- without any negotiating escape to offer Moscow.

2. The Defense Department view is that all we have to do is to get the Israelis off the Suez Canal to begin the process of reaching a settlement and that will prevent further erosion of U.S. influence. Their argument is that the U.S. has no interest in the Mid-East great enough to warrant a nuclear showdown with the USSR. The U.S. is militarily over-extended and has every interest in avoiding involvement in the Mid-East. Besides, the Arab-Israeli problem is not susceptible of military solution.

The problems with this view are that: (a) If the U.S. shows that it does not have enough interest in the Mid-East to warrant a showdown, then the USSR will never back off. (b) If Israel does not believe the U.S. will defend its existence against the USSR, Israel will have no incentive whatsoever to agree to a settlement based on withdrawal from present lines.

3. It is also commonly said that the Soviets are acting in the UAR purely in a defensive capacity and that the U.S., therefore, need not be concerned because the Soviets will not threaten Israel.

Yet it would be logical for the USSR to extend its influence as far as possible. The near term Soviet objective in the Middle East is to destroy Western influence. The main enemy is not Israel but the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Therefore, it must be assumed that the USSR will do all it can to that end -- over and above defending their client.

4. It is sometimes argued that the U. S. can only preserve its position in the Arab world by forcing Israeli withdrawal and placating the Arabs. The supposition here is that if there is a peace settlement the Arab radicals will cease to be a threat.

Arab radicalism, however, is not just a product of the Arab-Israeli impasse. It exploits that impasse for its own ends, but it has roots of its own and will still be present to attack Western interests if there is a settlement. Moderate Arabs may fear a Nasser freed of Sinai preoccupations almost as much as Israel. It is probable that after a settlement the thrust of Arab radicalism will be against Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

Considerations of Strategy

The problem is to develop a strategy that will bring into balance the following elements:

1. The Israeli quest for security. Israel views its margin as relatively narrow. Despite its clearcut military superiority on the present scene, its capacity to survive a long war of attrition is limited. Israel feels it must have some breadth of options in trying to cut off a war of attrition or it will feel hemmed in and compelled to strike out. The problem is to put enough pressure on Israel to demonstrate that its stand-fast strategy will not work and yet not so much as to make the Israelis feel in desperation they have lost the option to move preemptively.

2. The Arabs have two problems:

--The general problem is that Israel is asking Arab recognition as an entry price to a negotiation in which Israel will hold out for substantial acquisition of Arab territory. The Arabs--entirely apart from their political problems in giving up a principle--do not want to surrender their most valuable negotiating asset until they are sure they will get their territory back for it.

--The moderates' particular problem is that the radicals are exploiting anti-Israeli feeling to win the Arab world. They must have ambivalent feelings about a settlement. On the one hand, they want an honorable settlement.

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

STATE _____

NODIS

DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO AMBASSADOR BEAM IN MOSCOW

EYES ONLY - FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. You should inform the Foreign Ministry immediately that you expect to receive in the next few days a message of the highest importance from the Secretary to Gromyko concerning the Middle East, which you are instructed to deliver to Gromyko personally. You therefore will appreciate it if steps are taken to plan for your appointment with Gromyko on very short notice.
2. When informed by Department to proceed, you should convey following oral message from Secretary promptly to Gromyko.
 - A. BEGIN TEXT. Dear Mr. Minister: The United States Government has taken note of the repeated assurances of the Soviet Government that the USSR continues urgently to desire a peaceful settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. It has also been noted that the Soviet

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On the other, they cannot look complacently on the prospect of a Nasser whose forces are no longer tied down by Israel and are backed by Soviet combat personnel.

3. The problem of dealing with the Soviets is to balance between giving them a sense of the dangers of the present situation without denying them an escape. They do not want a confrontation with the U. S. , and they will eventually have to help the Arabs get their territory back if they are to enhance their standing in the Mid-East. At the same time, they have an interest in controlled tension and in maintaining as large a military foothold in the area as they can.

Some Policy Issues

Against the background of the above considerations, it is important to examine some of the policy issues raised:

1. Is a political settlement really an alternative to confronting the USSR, or are the two correlated? The argument has been made (by Defense) that, since we want to avoid a confrontation with the USSR, the only alternative is a political settlement.

--On the one hand, a settlement is conceivable in which the radical Arabs are freed to turn their weapons against the moderates. The Syrians if no longer tied down by Israel would turn against Jordan and Lebanon; the Iraqis would turn against the moderates and Iranian interests in the Persian Gulf; Nasser against the Saudis and the moderates in the Gulf. Back of this would be a strong Soviet military position in the UAR. Nasser backed by the Russians would be a potent anti-Western, anti-moderate force. In other words a settlement is possible which would enhance rather than check Soviet opportunity.

--On the other hand, some methods of confronting the Soviets could create a situation in which Soviet influence expanded while the U. S. position was narrowed. If, for instance, the U. S. simply backed Israel in a long war of attrition, Arab reaction against the U. S. would gradually

whittle away at U. S. influence, and the Arabs would have no one to turn to but the USSR.

The question is not whether we should confront the USSR or try for a political settlement. The question is how we can confront the USSR in trying for a political settlement and how we can improve chances for a political settlement by confronting the USSR.

2. A second issue is: Is a settlement conceivable through negotiations between the belligerents? Is any settlement conceivable that is not imposed?

--On the one hand, the argument has been made (by State) that the interests on both sides must be brought together so a genuine accommodation can be reached. Unless both sides face up by themselves to the requirements of this accommodation, there cannot be a settlement that will last.

--On the other hand, it can be argued that the problem is not that the two sides fail to understand each other's interests but that they understand those interests too well. The Arabs know the Israelis want territory in a settlement. The Israelis know that the Arabs will only grudgingly--and therefore with some thought of eventual reversal of position--accept Israel's existence. That is why there is not sufficient will on either side to reach a settlement.

If the second is at all true, then it remains for outsiders to devise a situation in which settlement of key issues--withdrawal and the recognition of Israel--is virtually forced on the parties along with security measures that make the settlement as enforceable as possible. If there is to be a settlement, it will have to be imposed, regardless of what facade of negotiation may be erected around it for tactical purposes.

3. The next issue is: How can Israel's aircraft requests best be related to the process of achieving a settlement? The two horns of the dilemma are:

--On the one hand, Israel will feel under the greatest pressure to resist a settlement based on withdrawal if it feels that it will not have the means to defend itself. Israelis would judge that their military needs in such a settlement would at least not diminish because it would be giving up its improved defensive positions.

--On the other hand, providing aircraft to Israel now would jeopardize U.S. ability to work with the Arabs for a settlement. Moreover, if the Israelis had what they wanted from the U.S., there would be little incentive to accede to U.S. pressures for a settlement.

Without some commitment from the U.S. that Israel will have the means of defense, it is impossible to expect Israel even to consider withdrawal. The difficulty, therefore, is to combine this assurance with the implied threat of its withdrawal so as to produce the Israeli concessions necessary to peace.

4. The ultimate issue is: Can the U.S. induce Israel to withdraw to essentially pre-war borders in the context of a settlement?

--On the one hand, it is possible to argue (as Defense does) that Israel is so heavily dependent on the U.S. for military supplies and financial support that it cannot stand up against the threat of losing them. The other side of this argument is that nothing short of the clear threat of losing them will move Israel.

--On the other hand, it can be argued (as State does) that the only thing that will change Israel's policy is Israel's own realization that that policy will not work. The task of the U.S. is not just to threaten Israel's lifeline; that would leave Israel with no choice but to stay where it is behind its most defensible lines. The task of the U.S. is to make clear that neither Israel nor the U.S. can win in the present situation but to demonstrate that abundant U.S. support is possible in a changed situation.

The first approach to Israel should not be the threat of cutting off aid; Israel needs the assurance of U.S. support. The moment of truth comes when Israel says it will have to forego U.S. support if the price is withdrawal. Does the U.S. then cut off aid? The realistic choice at that point--having made a substantial offer to demonstrate good faith--is between an absolutely minimal flow of aid and a very substantial flow and not between aid and no aid.

The Principal Options

The considerations above seem to eliminate the extremes. Backing Israel without qualification would give the Israeli Cabinet a controlling voice in setting the conditions for a U.S. -Soviet confrontation. Cutting ourselves off from Israel would leave Israel no incentive for a political settlement and would enhance the Soviet position. The two options that will be advanced at the NSC are:

1. The Defense Department proposal [a memo from Secretary Laird is in your briefing book] would involve denial of aircraft to Israel until Israel had agreed to a phased withdrawal. When Israel's future aircraft requirements are to be met, they should not be met with more attack aircraft like the Skyhawks and Phantoms but with fighter-interceptors more exclusively designed for defense. The Defense proposal would have us work step by step from a de facto cease-fire to partial Israeli withdrawal, demilitarization of vacated territories, reopening the Suez Canal to all nations and the beginning of formal peace negotiations.

The three main conclusions on which Defense bases this position are:

- There is no acceptable military solution to the present impasse. The indigenous belligerents can only fight to a stand-off. Soviet involvement could lead to a nuclear confrontation triggered either by a U.S. -Soviet clash or by Israeli introduction of nuclear weapons in desperation.
- The U.S. also has an interest in checking the spread of Soviet influence. U.S. sale of more attack aircraft now will contribute to further Soviet success in the Arab world.
- The expansion of the U.S. commitment to Israel by promising or implying that U.S. forces would be used directly to support Israel under any circumstances is unacceptable. If Israel surfaces nuclear weapons, the U.S. cannot afford to be involved.

The problem with this approach--viewed in the light of what is written above--is that it is likely to increase Israeli hysteria and the probability that Israel would feel compelled to fall back on nuclear weapons or to

strike out, thereby triggering another war. It would provide no incentive for Israel to reach a settlement. It would encourage the Soviet feeling that they are achieving their objective, and there would be nothing to restrain them from further advances. Even if a settlement were achieved on this basis, it would leave the USSR strong and no sense among the moderate Arabs that they could depend on the U.S.

2. The State Department proposal [a memo from Secretary Rogers is in your briefing book] would involve a limited commitment of aircraft now pending outcome of a new effort to get negotiations started along with a clearly implied promise of continuing aircraft shipments in the fall. To understand this proposal, it is necessary to look in detail at the steps that would be taken:

--Tell Israel that the U.S. is going to make a direct approach to Nasser urging (a) acceptance of a cease-fire from July 1 to September 15 and (b) agreement to get indirect talks started under Jarring. If Nasser responds positively we would expect a positive Israeli response.

--Offer Israel three additional Phantoms each in July and August; as replacements, earmark four Phantoms and four Skyhawks per month for delivery starting in September through year's end. This would be subject to review only if negotiations between the parties showed signs of success. We would in any case make contingency plans for delivery sooner if there is a dramatic shift in the balance; other military requirements would continue to be met.

--Make a direct approach in Cairo urging (a) a ceasefire and military standstill [no further fortification on the Canal] from July 1 to September 15 and (b) agreement to begin indirect negotiations under Jarring promptly on the basis of a simple acceptance by both sides of the 1967 UN resolution. Israel would have to say it is willing to withdraw in accordance with the resolution and the Arabs would have to state their willingness to recognize Israel's existence if it withdraws.

--Inform Nasser that we are limiting ourselves for the time being not to go beyond the 50 Phantom and 100 Skyhawk level committed in 1968 and 1966 but that further deferral of additional sales is only feasible in the context of a cease-fire and negotiations. [This would be true because 6 Phantoms from the original contract for 50 are of a special configuration not to be delivered until 1971, and 3 have been lost. Original Skyhawk deliveries are not scheduled for completion before September.]

--After Cairo had been approached the USSR would be urged to support our effort. However, the primary emphasis would be on direct contacts between Washington, Cairo, Tel Aviv (and Amman). [Secretary Rogers' memo recognizes that more must be done to "reflect our resolve to the USSR," but it recommends only that you direct him and Secretary Laird to make a high priority study of this aspect.]

There are several problems with this approach:

--Above all, the success of any formula on aircraft will depend on how the Israelis interpret our intent. As the proposal is now stated, it is difficult to see how it can succeed whichever way the Israelis read it.

On the one hand, if the Israelis think that they are assured of only 6 more planes (in effect only 3 more than we promised in March because 3 would be replacements as promised then) they will have no incentive to talk about withdrawal. For them even to contemplate withdrawal would require them to be assured of the equipment to defend themselves behind less defensible borders than they have now.

On the other hand, if they think they will get the whole package if negotiations are going badly (and therefore would not be seriously jeopardized by the U. S. providing additional planes), they will have no incentive to make the negotiations go well.

Either way, this formulation seems likely to assure the failure of the diplomatic effort.

--As for the Soviets, this would seem too little to be of military consequence and too hesitant to convince them that the U.S. means to match their escalation to the point of checking it if necessary. If the Soviets read our March announcement as uncertain--even though the principle of replacement was there--they will read this as equally so.

--The Arab reaction will depend on what policy Nasser wants to pursue. What he does will depend on whether he thinks we will really press Israel to withdraw. He will have serious doubts that we could seriously expect to accomplish very much with 6 aircraft. In his view, presumably, we would either have to threaten to cut Israel off or promise substantial support after withdrawal. He is looking for decisive U.S. action, not half-way moves. He knows that the only decisive step that will count is U.S. determination to press Israel back to essentially pre-war borders.

For the sake of illustrating a modification of the State proposal to take care of some of the above objections, I am attaching a possible "third option."

Conduct of the NSC Meeting

I recommend that you make clear at the end of this meeting that you will need time to decide and that no action should be taken yet. This is necessary to maintain your control over timing of any action and to give you time to consider refinements (or alternatives) to the course of action proposed. In any case, you should have a final look at a detailed course of action before implementation begins.

In your briefing book are talking points and the memos from Secretaries Laird and Rogers. Also, there is a good short CIA paper on the Soviet impact on the Arab-Israeli balance. A much fuller study has been completed but this fairly reflects its conclusions.

Attachment: "A Third Option"

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A THIRD OPTION

The purpose of this illustrative course of action is to show how two shortcomings in the State proposal might be met: (1) Instead of dribbling out the aircraft, it offers a large number at once with the thought of withholding delivery. (2) It addresses the Soviet problem more directly. This would involve the following:

--Make this approach directly to Nasser: The U.S. is prepared to press Israel to withdraw essentially to pre-war borders provided Nasser is willing to commit himself to us now and in a formal agreement later to specific arrangements for establishing and enforcing peace. The U.S. is the only government that can attempt this. To do this the U.S. will have to provide assistance to Israel; if Nasser asks us to squeeze Israel and to withhold aid at the same time, he is asking the impossible. If we can achieve Israeli agreement to withdraw, we would ask Nasser to have his representative meet with the Israelis and Jarring to negotiate detailed security arrangements. The U.S. would take an active part in that negotiation. The U.S. would expect that, after agreement, Soviet combat personnel would be withdrawn. In conclusion, Nasser has an important choice to make: If he uses our provision of aircraft to Israel as a pretext for encouraging attacks on U.S. installations elsewhere, then Israel will get the planes without being pressed to withdraw.

--Make this approach to Israel: (1) The U.S. will prepare beginning in September to provide another 25 Phantoms and 40 Skyhawks to be added to present deliveries at the present rates but this must remain secret; the U.S. is prepared to discuss additional requirements in January 1971; the U.S. is prepared to discuss a five-year program of economic assistance. (2) Soviet involvement introduces an element which Israel alone cannot handle regardless of how much equipment the U.S. supplies. Since the U.S. is potentially involved, the U.S. must have a voice in determining the issue on which it becomes involved. The U.S. cannot base that involvement on Israel's right to negotiate major changes in its boundaries. (3) The U.S. therefore wants the Prime Minister's assurance that Israel will withdraw to pre-war borders if the Arabs commit themselves to live at peace and agree to arrangements for enforcing the peace which do not involve Israeli acquisition of territory. [Discussions on military

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and economic assistance could proceed, but no deliveries or disbursements would take place until the Israelis had responded satisfactorily. U.S. leverage would rest on the statement that the U.S. cannot go on supporting Israel unless Israel commits itself to withdraw in a peace settlement and the implied threat of reducing deliveries to a minimal flow.]

--Tell the USSR the same thing we tell the UAR. Suspend for the time being any plans to reduce the size of the Sixth Fleet. Perhaps reinforce the Sixth Fleet with additional anti-submarine warfare capability.

Comment: The purpose of this approach would be to face the USSR with a Vietnam-type involvement against a well-supplied Israel but at the same time to provide an escape via a settlement. The USSR would have to weigh the disadvantage of letting the U.S. out of its present box against the disadvantage of that sort of involvement. The USSR could expect enough tension to remain for its exploitation even after a settlement. This approach would have for the U.S. the advantage of going far enough on the key issues -- boundaries -- to justify realistic hope for a settlement while at the same time offering a sizeable enough inducement to Israel to make an Israeli concession conceivable.

This would seem to combine the best mix of responses to the basic considerations of strategy described above. It would provide Israel with a substantial incentive to cooperate while making clear that the U.S. will not back an Israeli strategy that is likely to produce a U.S. confrontation with the USSR. It is a strong enough response, however, to indicate to the USSR that we mean to stand firm. It would have promise for the Arabs of U.S. pressure on Israel to withdraw.

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TALKING POINTS

1. There have been a number of important developments since the NSC's last consideration of the Middle East:

- Soviet involvement in the UAR.
- Renewed Israeli pressure for aircraft.
- Nasser's peace appeal.
- Steady escalation in the fighting.

These confirm the judgment many of us have held for some time -- that the Middle East is now the most dangerous situation we face.

The purpose of today's meeting is to review these developments and to discuss U. S. options for further action.

2. Ask Mr. Helms to brief on the impact of Soviet involvement on the Arab-Israeli military balance.
3. Ask Dr. Kissinger to describe the issues and options.
4. Ask Secretary Rogers (who may ask Assistant Secretary Sisco) to present the State Department proposal.
5. Ask Secretary Packard and Admiral Moorer for Defense Department and JCS comment.
6. Throughout this discussion, probe for answers to these questions:
 - How can the USSR be made to feel that the continuation of the present course will be less satisfactory than a settlement?
 - How can reassurance for Israel be combined with pressure on Israel?
7. Conclude the meeting by instructing that no further action be taken until you have had time to reflect on the discussion.

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HAK TALKING POINTS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

June 9, 1970

HAK:

Just before you speak, Dick Helms will have briefed on the implications of the Soviet presence on the military balance.

Therefore, I have assumed you will want to speak mainly on the issues.

I have included a critique of the common perceptions, but I am not sure you want to use this at the meeting. You could just skip that and pick up with either the "considerations of strategy" or the issues themselves.

HHS
HHS

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6/9/70 5 pm

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HAK

TALKING POINTS

I. INTRODUCTION

Two proposals have been made in the course of discussions in the NSC Special Review Group:

--A proposal to deny aircraft to Israel until it agrees to a phased withdrawal, beginning with a token Israeli withdrawal from the Canal to launch negotiations. [Defense]

--A proposal to make a limited commitment of aircraft now pending outcome of a new effort to get negotiations started along with a clearly implied promise of continuing aircraft shipments in the fall. [State]

Secretaries Rogers and Packard may wish to elaborate on these later.

What I propose to do now is to describe the issues that have been raised by these proposals as they have been discussed at three meetings of the Special Review Group:

II. SOME COMMON PERCEPTIONS

It may be useful to begin by examining some common perceptions that have often been stated:

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1. The Israeli view is that if Israel and the U. S. will only stand fast, the USSR and the Arabs will decide to negotiate. This means that the U. S. must give Israel all the equipment it needs and make no concessions to the USSR.

The problem with this is that the Israelis have not really offered the Arabs a negotiating position the Arabs could even consider accepting. So the Arabs feel they have no choice but to fight. Thus the U. S. is left backing Israel in a war of attrition that seems likely to lead only to another war -- probably involving the USSR -- without any negotiating escape to offer Moscow.

2. Another view discussed is that the U. S. has no interest in the Mid-East great enough to warrant a nuclear showdown with the USSR. The problems with this view are that: (a) If the U. S. shows that it does not have enough interest in the Mid-East to warrant a showdown, then the USSR will never back off. (b) If Israel does not believe the U. S. will defend its existence against the USSR, Israel will have no incentive whatsoever to agree to a settlement based on withdrawal from present lines.

3. It is also commonly said that the Soviets are acting in the UAR purely in a defensive capacity and that the U. S., therefore, need not be concerned because the Soviets will not threaten Israel.

Yet it would be logical for the USSR to extend its influence as far

Result - Intensity

Offensive consequences

as possible. The near term Soviet objective in the Middle East is to destroy Western influence. The main enemy is not Israel but the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Therefore, it must be assumed that the USSR will do all it can to that end -- over and above defending their client.

4. It is sometimes argued that the U.S. can only preserve its position in the Arab world by forcing Israeli withdrawal and placating the Arabs. The supposition here is that if there is a peace settlement the Arab radicals will cease to be a threat.

Arab radicalism, however, is not just a product of the Arab-Israeli impasse. It exploits that impasse for its own ends, but it has roots of its own and will still be present to attack Western interests if there is a settlement.

III. CONSIDERATIONS OF STRATEGY

The problem is to develop a strategy that will bring into balance the following elements:

Talmon's thesis

1. The Israeli quest for security. Israel views its margin as relatively narrow. Despite its clearcut military superiority on the present scene, its capacity to survive a long war of attrition is limited. Israel feels it must have some breadth of options in trying to cut off a war of attrition or it will feel hemmed in and compelled to strike out. The problem

*Survival
↓
prognosis*

is to put enough pressure on Israel to demonstrate that its stand-fast strategy will not work and yet not so much as to make the Israelis feel they have lost the option to move preemptively.

2. The Arabs have two problems:

--The general problem is that Israel is asking Arab recognition as an entry price to a negotiation in which Israel will hold out for substantial acquisition of Arab territory. The Arabs--entirely apart from their political problems in giving up a principle--do not want to surrender their most valuable negotiating asset until they are sure they will get their territory back for it.

--The moderates' particular problem is that the radicals are exploiting anti-Israeli feeling to win the Arab world. They must have ambivalent feelings about a settlement. On the one hand, they want an honorable settlement. On the other, they cannot look complacently on the prospect of a Nasser whose forces are no longer tied down by Israel and are backed by Soviet combat personnel.

3. The problem of dealing with the Soviets is to balance between giving them a sense of the dangers of the present situation

*What is rel. between
Israeli security +
settlement.*

without denying them an escape. They do not want a confrontation with the U.S., and they will eventually have to help the Arabs get their territory back if they are to enhance their standing in the Mid-East. At the same time, they have an interest in controlled tension and in maintaining as large a military foothold in the area as they can.

IV. SOME POLICY ISSUES Against the background of these considerations, it is important to look at some of the policy issues raised:

1. Is a political settlement really an alternative to facing down the USSR
or are the two correlated?

--On the one hand, a settlement is conceivable in which the radical Arabs are freed to turn their weapons against the moderates in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf and the Soviets are left in place to provide an umbrella for them. In other words, a settlement is possible which would enhance rather than check Soviet opportunity.

--On the other hand, some methods of facing down the Soviets (such as simply backing Israel in a long war) could create a situation in which Soviet influence expanded while the U.S. position was narrowed.

The question, therefore, seem to be not whether we should confront the USSR or try for a political settlement. The question is how we can

confront the USSR in trying for a political settlement and how we can improve chances for a political settlement by confronting the USSR.

2. A second issue is: Is a settlement conceivable through negotiations between the belligerents? Is any settlement conceivable that is not imposed?

--On the one hand, the argument has been made that interests on both sides must be brought together so a genuine accommodation can be reached. Unless both sides face up by themselves to the requirements of this accommodation, there cannot be a settlement that will last.

--On the other hand, it can be argued that the problem is not that the two sides fail to understand each other's interests but that they understand those interests too well. The Arabs know the Israelis want territory in a settlement. The Israelis know that the Arabs will only grudgingly--and therefore with some thought of eventual reversal of position--accept Israel's existence. That is why there is not sufficient will on either side to reach a settlement.

If the second is at all true, then it remains for outsiders to devise a situation in which settlement of key issues--withdrawal and the recognition of Israel--is virtually forced on the parties along with security measures that make the settlement as enforceable as possible.

Security enhanced

3. The next issue is: How can Israel's aircraft requests best be related to the process of achieving a settlement? The two horns of the dilemma are:

--On the one hand, Israel will feel under the greatest pressure to resist a settlement based on withdrawal if it feels that it will not have the means to defend itself. Israelis would judge that their military needs in such a settlement would at least not diminish because it would be giving up its improved defensive positions.

--On the other hand, providing aircraft to Israel now would jeopardize U.S. ability to work with the Arabs for a settlement. Moreover, if the Israelis had what they wanted from the U.S., there would be little incentive to accede to U.S. pressures for a settlement.

4. The ultimate issue is: Can the U.S. induce Israel to withdraw to essentially pre-war borders in the context of a settlement?

--On the one hand, it is possible to argue that Israel is so heavily dependent on the U.S. for military supplies and financial support that it cannot stand up against the threat of losing them. The other side of this argument is that nothing short of the clear threat of losing them will move Israel.

--On the other hand, it can be argued that the only thing that will change Israel's policy is Israel's own realization that that policy will not work. The task of the U.S. is not just to threaten Israel's lifeline' that would leave Israel with no choice but to stay where it is behind its most defensible lines. The task of the U.S. is to make clear that neither Israel nor the U.S. can win in the present situation but to demonstrate that abundant U.S. support is possible in a changed situation.

STATE MEMO



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1970

8318

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Next Steps in the Middle East

We have conflicting objectives in the Middle East, the achievement of which poses dilemmas for the US at this present juncture. Our purpose is to find a course of action which: (a) stops the fighting on the principal fronts, or at least reduces the likelihood of confrontation between Israel and the USSR which would increase the possibility of a more direct US-Soviet confrontation; (b) offers a fresh and new approach to get negotiations started between the parties; (c) provides Israel with sufficient assurance regarding military assistance as an inducement towards military prudence and political flexibility, without causing a major break with the non-radical Arab regimes and jeopardizing the chances for success on the political front; and (d) neither reflects weakness to nor provokes undue escalation from Moscow.

To this end, the following courses of action are recommended as a "stop shooting, start talking" American initiative.

1. Ceasefire. We would propose to Israel and the UAR, and subsequently to as many other Arab frontline states as possible, agreement on a publicly declared ceasefire for a limited period from July 1 to September 15, the opening day of the UNGA, during which time major efforts will be made to get the parties to start talks on a political solution. Under such a ceasefire, Israel would continue to refrain from deep penetration raids. The UAR (USSR) would have to refrain from changing the military status quo (by emplacing SAM's or any other new installations) in a 25-mile zone on either side of the Suez Canal ceasefire line, and Israel would be required to observe a standstill on new installations on the East Bank of the Canal. While concentrating in the first instance on a UAR-Israeli aspect, we would also seek to broaden the limited ceasefire to include other

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GROUP 3

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fronts as well. However, the proposal described below to get talks started between the parties under Jarring's auspices, while linked to the ceasefire, can stand on its own. If Nasser agrees to get talks started on the basis we are suggesting, we should not permit the proposal to fall on the ground that the ceasefire has not been accepted. We should make this very clear to the Israelis when our entire proposal is explained.

2. Negotiations on a Political Solution. We would make another attempt to start the negotiating process by means of a new, fresh approach directly with the parties rather than through either the two- or four-power mechanism. We would propose to Israel and the UAR (Jordan) that indirect negotiations under Jarring's auspices begin promptly, in accordance with procedures determined by him, on the basis of the following agreed framework: (a) that they both accept the UNSC Resolution of November 1967 in all its parts and will seek to reach agreement on ways of carrying it out; and (b) that the UAR (Jordan) accept the principle of a just and lasting peace with Israel, including recognition on their part of Israel's right to exist and that Israel accept the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories in accordance with the SC resolution of November 22, 1967.

3. Military Assistance for Israel. Your decision in March to hold in abeyance Israel's request for additional aircraft was based on the judgment that Israel's qualitative superiority compensated amply for its numerical inferiority in planes. The direct Soviet involvement in an operational role has injected a new qualitative capacity and a reinforced quantitative capacity on the UAR side.

Our intelligence evaluations conclude that the new Soviet involvement has affected the military balance, though how much presently and in the future is not entirely clear. As a minimum, the Soviet presence has reduced the Israeli qualitative superiority, which in turn connotes a new Arab-Soviet ability to exhaust the Israelis through attrition. More importantly, the Soviet presence probably has rendered Israel's preferred strategy of preemptive attacks too costly to be tolerable. If the present standoff is maintained (i.e., Israel staying away from UAR rear areas

and the Soviets keeping out of the Canal combat zone), the result will be to restrict Israel's freedom of action in the air without, however, losing its air superiority over the Suez sector. If the Soviets decide to challenge the Israelis in the Suez sector, Israel's air power would be quickly worn down. Our intelligence prediction is that Israel, faced with prolonged attrition, would be forced either to abandon the Canal line or attempt major pre-emptive strikes.

In short, the intelligence evaluations indicate that the weight of the Soviet presence has already reduced the material and psychological advantages previously enjoyed by the Israelis. Fundamentally, the Arab-Israeli military balance now depends on Soviet actions and decisions which have already created a situation in which Israel's air superiority could be rapidly neutralized.

In the light of the foregoing and your public and private statements regarding possible additional assistance to Israel if a change in the balance required, we recommend Israel be informed quietly and discreetly of the following.

(a) By the end of June, 44 Phantoms of the 50 will have been delivered. The other six, which are to be special reconnaissance models, have not been promised for delivery until early 1971. We, therefore, will (1) sell and deliver three additional Phantoms to Israel in July and three in August bringing the total to 50 (which Soviet and UAR intelligence will interpret as completion of the 1968 Phantom deal; only 88 Skyhawks have been delivered of the 100 committed in past contracts. The 12 remaining will be delivered over the next few months); (2) as replacements for past and future projected losses, earmark four Phantoms per month and four additional Skyhawks per month out of future production for delivery starting in September through the end of the year. This would be subject to review, only if negotiations between parties under Jarring's auspices had started and showed signs of success; and (3) make contingency plans for immediate delivery of F-4's and A-4's to Israel out of USAF inventories if there should be a dramatic shift in the balance.

(b) As part of your decision which I announced on March 23, we would also inform Israel of our intention to continue to respond affirmatively to other Israeli military requests in order to maintain the logistic pipeline. We would respond affirmatively to most items in their latest request--i.e., Hawk ground-to-air missiles, bombs, tanks, radar, acceleration of spare parts deliveries for F-4's and A-4's.

(c) A low key announcement would be made which made clear: (1) that for the next two months, during which we would make new efforts to launch a "stop fighting, start talking" proposal, the deliveries of aircraft by the U.S. to Israel would not bring them beyond levels committed on the basis of past contracts (not over 50 Phantoms and 100 Skyhawks); and (2) that we have made contingent provision for immediate delivery of additional or replacement aircraft to Israel if the need arises. As a condition, Israel must agree to affirm publicly that it is satisfied with the contingent arrangements made by the U.S., otherwise there is apt to be a strong reaction in the Congress. The announcement would be made shortly after we have launched our political initiative through diplomatic channels (see Scenario attached). We would insist on full cooperation from Israel with respect to our political proposal.

(d) We would inform Nasser that we are limiting ourselves for the time being not to go beyond the 50 Phantom and 100 Skyhawk level committed in the 1968 and 1966 contracts, but that further deferral of sale of additional aircraft is only feasible in circumstances of a ceasefire and his agreement to enter discussions under Jarring on the basis of the new American proposal.

4. U.S. Resolve Vis-a-Vis the USSR. One of our most serious problems is to reflect resolve and firmness to the USSR. The diplomatic efforts we have made with them, to underscore how seriously and how potentially dangerous their decision is to commit operational personnel in Egypt, have elicited no visible reaction or clarifications from the Soviets. There are increasing signs that the Soviets are prepared to live with and derive the political benefits from turmoil in the Middle East, and that they are operating on the assumption that they can press for unilateral political advantage while we are heavily involved in Southeast Asia. We believe more must be done privately in the area, and publicly over the coming weeks to reflect our resolve to the USSR. I recommend that you direct

SECRET/NODIS

5

Secretary Laird and me to make a high priority study of this aspect immediately covering the whole range of our relations with the USSR. Both political and contingent military steps should be studied. What do we do if the Soviets challenge the Israelis in the Suez area? All of us are agreed this means a "new ballgame", but precisely what are the options open to us? If Cairo and Moscow refuse to accept our proposals for a ceasefire or for the start of negotiations between the parties, what political and military steps should we take? Should we break off the Two and Four Power talks rather than continue giving the present impression that the door to a political solution is still open? Should we slow down our efforts to achieve understandings on certain bilateral matters? In addition to giving Israel more military help, which in itself is unlikely to deter the Soviets, can we dramatize efforts to make the Sixth Fleet more modern and effective, or can we fly routine patrols between Sixth Fleet carriers and Israel? Are such steps possible given the atmosphere on the Hill? How do we begin to educate the American people that the Middle East is a principal test between the US and USSR over the next few years?

In the meantime, we are limited largely to diplomatic efforts which are not apt to make much impact on the USSR.

Enclosed is a brief scenario and detailed instructions required to carry out the recommendations contained in this paper.


William P. Rogers

Enclosure:

Scenario

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

SCENARIO

Step I. Consultations with the Israelis.

A. We would first advise the Israelis of the full details of our new political initiative to achieve a ceasefire and to get talks started under Jarring's auspices. We would also make clear that we do not expect any response from the Israelis, pending our efforts to get Nasser's agreement. At the same time, the Israelis would be informed that we would expect a positive reply from them if Nasser accepts our proposal. Israel would be informed that we would regard very seriously any leaks or any other attempt to sabotage our new peace initiative. Finally, we would inform the Israelis of our decisions regarding military assistance.

B. The above would be communicated in two ways: (a) Secretary Rogers to Ambassador Rabin; and (b) Ambassador Barbour to Prime Minister Meir.

Attached is the suggested cable which would be used as guidance. (TAB A).

Step II. Proposal Made Directly to UAR in Cairo.

A. A personal message would be sent to Foreign Minister Riad by Secretary Rogers incorporating our new peace proposal. (TAB B).

B. We would provide the suggested text of our peace proposal to the UAR as a draft report to the Secretary General which Jarring could use as the new basis for getting negotiations started between the parties under his auspices. We would leave it to Jarring to work out the locus for such talks.

C. In addition, in order to maximize the effect of our proposal, Bergus would be instructed to see Nasser to explain the position and make the following points orally:

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(1) For the ceasefire to be effective, both sides must agree to a standstill, i.e., no troop movements, new installations, etc., in the Canal Zone. (2) The Egyptians should realize the extent of the political concessions being asked of Israel. (3) The US will remain engaged and believes there can be no peace without withdrawal and vice versa. (4) We would be prepared to support extension of the same procedure to Syria if that country accepted the November 22 Resolution. (5) The question of aircraft for Israel is still under review, and we are limiting ourselves to fulfilling past commitments--i.e., not providing Israel at this time with Phantoms beyond the 50 contracted for in the past but the UAR should understand that we cannot hold this position indefinitely in the absence of a ceasefire and the beginning of active talks between the parties under Jarring's auspices.

Step III. Similar Proposal Made to Hussein at Same Time It Is Presented to Nasser.

Hussein would be extremely angry with us if our peace proposal came to him second hand or after we had presented it to Nasser. He, therefore, should receive it at the same time as Nasser. Moreover, regardless of Hussein's limitations, he might be helpful in encouraging a positive reaction from Cairo.

A draft instruction to Amman is at TAB C.

Step IV. Seek UK and French Support in Cairo.

We would inform the British and French at the time of our approach in Cairo and ask that they be prepared to lend support to our efforts with the parties, if we judge this desirable in light of our initial exchanges.

A suggested message is attached (TAB D).

Step V. Engaging the Soviets.

Secretary Rogers would call in Dobrynin and Beam would see Gromyko, about 24 hours after we had presented the proposals to Nasser and Hussein, to urge them to support our effort in Cairo (TAB E). However, the primary emphasis would be on direct contacts between Washington, Cairo, Amman and Tel Aviv.

Step VI. SYG Thant would be brought in on the proposal at an early stage and his help solicited.

Step VII. A short public announcement would be made of the decisions taken.

Step VIII. Engaging the Moderate Arabs.

We would explain our proposals to Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and urge that they urge Cairo's acceptance. This step would be taken some time after Cairo has had an opportunity to digest our proposals so as to avoid giving Nasser the impression a pressure campaign has been undertaken.

Step IX. Consideration would also be given to the possibility of enlisting of support of Yahya, Suharto, Ghandi, Tito, the Shah, Rumor, Ceausescu, Trudeau, and Thant at some later stage if this proves desirable and offers some prospect of having a positive influence on Nasser.

SECRET/NODIS

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
RE NEXT STEPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In view of the serious nature of developments in the Middle East in recent weeks, we have undertaken a thorough review of all aspects of the problem. We have concluded that the most immediate and compelling need in the area is for the parties to stop fighting and start talking. We are currently taking a number of steps to this end.

As part of the overall review, we have noted in particular the actions of the Soviet Union. Since the President's decision in late March to defer the sale of additional aircraft to Israel, the Soviet Union has installed SA-3's in the UAR and are operating them with its own personnel, and its pilots are flying operational missions. We consider this unprecedented direct Soviet involvement both serious and potentially dangerous. The Soviet Union has been made fully aware of our views in this regard, and the risk of miscalculation on its part.

We have also weighed carefully Israel's most recent request for the sale of additional aircraft. We have come to a judgment on this matter in light of three principal considerations: (a) that the Israelis should be assured that US support of its existence and security remains firm as does our intention to provide it with the necessary deterrent strength it may need; (b) that the overriding objective in the area in the days ahead is the need for prudence on the ground by all concerned and fresh efforts to achieve a stable peace through negotiations under Jarring's auspices; and (c) the strong desire of the United States to maintain its friendship with as many countries in the area as possible who desire our friendship.

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In light of these considerations, we have decided that the deliveries of Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft will continue for the period of time during which the efforts to get the parties to stop shooting and start talking will be pursued. It is not intended that Israel will be provided during this period with quantities which would bring the total number of US aircraft in its inventory above the level contemplated under previous contracts. At the same time, we have also made specific contingent arrangements to provide Israel in the future with replacements of aircraft if and as the need arises.

We have discussed this matter with the Israeli Government, and it has expressed satisfaction with the arrangements made.

A

SECRET/NODIS

TAB "A"

ACTION: Amembassy TELAVIV

INFO: USINT CAIRO
Amembassy AMMAN
USUN NEW YORK
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS

STATE _____

EYES ONLY - FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. You should at earliest opportunity seek appointment with Prime Minister, noting that you have highly sensitive matter to discuss, and requesting that meeting be limited to only you and her. Please inform Dept. by immediate telegram when appointment set.
2. You should speak to Mrs. Meir along following lines: BEGIN PRESENTATION. The events of recent months portend an ever-sharpening devolution in the Middle East unless all parties concerned make the most vigorous efforts. Military conflict has intensified and broadened in scope, and progress toward peace is at a standstill. We are at a critical point.
3. At the outset I wish to assure you we have had in the forefront of our concerns as we deal with the area's problems the vital security interests of Israel, its

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continued life as a free and sovereign nation. These are and will remain firmly among our primary interests in the Middle East.

4. We have concluded our study of the situation produced by the new Soviet military presence in Egypt and have determined the course of action we will follow. We wish now to share with you our plan of action.

5. Our approach is two-pronged; to be as responsive as possible to Israel's arms requests and to undertake political initiatives which will extricate us from the present dangerous impasse.

6. Pending the outcome of these political initiatives, as an interim measure we are prepared (a) to deliver 3 Phantoms in July and 3 in August; (b) as replacements for past and projected future losses, to earmark from future production beginning in September 16 additional Phantoms and 16 Skyhawks on a contingency basis for later sale to Israel if ceasefire and peace efforts, to be described, are unsuccessful; and (c) to work out a detailed contingency plan making it possible to deliver F-4's and A-4's rapidly to Israel out of U.S. inventories if the situation should require it. (At this point you should give the Prime Minister a piece of paper containing the language of this paragraph.)

7. We expect that Israel will continue to refrain from resuming deep penetration raids over Egypt. We believe the interim measures described must be kept secret, and we expect Israel to damp down public discussion of the aircraft issue by making clear it is satisfied adequate contingency arrangements have been made. We will keep the question of future aircraft sales under review and meanwhile count on Israel's cooperation with respect to publicity and to our negotiating proposals in the spirit of the request conveyed to FonMin Eban during his recent visit.

8. As for the political facet of our action, we present the following for Mrs. Meir's information. We do not expect any commitment to action by Israel at this time. We will very shortly put to President Nasser the following proposals:

- (a) that both Israel and the UAR subscribe to a restoration of the ceasefire;
- (b) that Israel and the UAR, on one hand, and Israel and Jordan on the other, begin discussions under Jarring according to whatever procedures he recommends and looking toward implementation of the November 22 Security Council resolution, on the basis of statements by both sides that they accept that resolution, that the UAR accepts the principle of a just and lasting

peace with Israel, including recognition on their part of Israel's right to exist and that Israel accepts the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories, in accordance with Resolution 242. When we say discussions under Jarring, we have in mind indirectly at the outset. Identical proposals will be put to King Hussein.

9. At this point you should hand Mrs. Meir two pieces of paper, one containing points (a) and (b) above, the other a draft illustrative report to the United Nations Secretary General which Ambassador Jarring might use as a procedural device for convening the parties. The text of this proposed report follows: BEGIN TEXT.

The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree: (a) that having accepted Resolution 242, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure.

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual

acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal, both in accordance with Resolution 242.

(c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective this date, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.

10. This is a major effort by the United States to get the Middle East moving toward peace. It would demand much of Israel but its ultimate reward would be beyond value for all of us. We do not ask for an Israeli reaction at this point. But if Nasser's answer is positive, we will seek and expect an affirmative Israeli reply.

11. We are informing Israel now of our moves in the straightforward spirit we believe should characterize our relations. We cannot overstress the importance we attach to discretion in this matter and to avoiding any actions which could prejudice Nasser's reaction. There must be an opportunity for movement by both sides without the glare of publicity. Pending Nasser's reaction, we urge Mrs. Meir to hold it within the circle of her closest advisers and particularly not to make it a matter for full cabinet consideration.

B

SECRET/NODIS

TAB "B"

ACTION: USINT CAIRO

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

STATE _____

NODIS

Subject: New Initiative on Political Settlement

1. You should request urgent appointment with FM Riad and deliver following personal message from Secretary Rogers. Inform Department by Flash message when appointment is set.

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

I have read carefully President Nasser's statement of May 1 and your subsequent remarks to Mr. Bergus. Mr. Sisco has also reported fully on his conversations with President Nasser and you, and we have been giving serious thought to what can be done about the situation in the Near East.

I agree with you that the situation is at a critical point and I think it is in our joint interest that the United States retain and strengthen friendly ties with all the peoples and states of the area. We hope this will prove possible and are prepared to do our

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part. We look to others concerned, and in particular to your government, which has so important a role to play, to move with us to seize this opportunity. If it is lost, we shall all suffer the consequences and we would regret such an outcome very much indeed. In this spirit, I urge that your government give the most careful consideration to the thoughts which I set forth below.

We are interested in a lasting peace, and we would like to help the parties achieve it. We have made serious and practical proposals to that end, and we have counseled all parties on the need for compromise, and on the need to create an atmosphere in which peace is possible. By the latter we mean a reduction of tensions as well as clarifications of positions to give both Arabs and Israelis some confidence that the outcome will preserve their essential interests.

In our view, the most effective way to agree on a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out SC Resolution 242. Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has recently said that Israel would be prepared to make important concessions once talks got started. At the same time, Egyptian participation in such talks would go far

towards overcoming Israeli doubts that your government does in fact seek to make peace with it. I understand the problems that direct negotiations pose for you, and we have made it clear from the beginning that we were not proposing such an arrangement be put into effect at the outset, although, depending on the progress of discussions, we believe the parties will find it necessary to meet together at some point if peace is to be established between them.

With the above thoughts in mind, I put forward the following proposal for your consideration:

- (a) that both Israel and the UAR subscribe to a restoration of the ceasefire;
- (b) that Israel and the UAR, on one hand, and Israel and Jordan on the other, begin discussions under Ambassador Jarring according to whatever procedures he recommends and looking toward implementation of the November 22 Security Council Resolution, on the basis of statements by both sides that they accept that resolution that the UAR accepts the principle of a just and lasting peace with Israel, including recognition on its part of Israel's right to exist, and that Israel accepts the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories, in accordance with Resolution 242. I attach a draft illustrative report

to the Secretary General of the UN which Ambassador Jarring might use as a procedural device for convening the parties.

If this proposal is acceptable to the UAR we will undertake to seek Israeli acceptance.

I am sending a similar message to King Hussein.

I look forward to your early reply.

With all best wishes, Sincerely, William P. Rogers

2. Text of proposed report by Jarring to SYG:

The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:

(a) That having accepted Resolution 242, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedures and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preferences as to method of procedure.

(b) That the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal, both in accordance with Resolution 242.

(c) That, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective this date, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.

3. Following are talking points which you should make orally after presenting above message:

(a) If restored ceasefire is to be effective, both sides must undertake not to change military situation under cover of truce. There should be standstill on both sides, i.e., no major troop movements or introduction new installations or new elements such as new type missiles into combat area.

(b) Egyptians should bear in mind that we are asking Israelis make what they will consider very significant political concession in agreeing to enter indirect negotiations on implementation of resolution and in accepting principle of withdrawal prior to negotiations. This may seem to Egyptians no more than Israelis should do, but they should put themselves in Israeli shoes for a moment and realize that Israelis are taking on open-ended commitment with no assurance as to results. Same can be said of Egyptians, but latter hold key to peace, which gives them important negotiating leverage.

(c) USG is prepared remain engaged in process once negotiations begin. We continue maintain there can be no peace without withdrawal and vice versa.

(d) If Syria agrees to accept Resolution 242, we would ask that procedure outlined in President's message be extended to it, i.e., that Syria and Israel also begin indirect negotiations under Jarring's auspices to reach agreement on implementation of resolution.

(e) If queried re U.S. decision on aircraft for Israel, you should say this matter still under review and meanwhile we are limiting ourselves not to go beyond the 50 Phantom and 100 Skyhawk level committed in the 1968 and 1966 contracts. This means that we are not selling additional aircraft at this time to compensate for addition of Soviet-manned SA-3's and Soviet pilots. UAR should understand, however, that it will be impossible for us to keep aircraft question in abeyance in absence of ceasefire, standstill on new installations in Suez Canal area and talks started by parties under Jarring's auspices.

(f) You should say we hope agreement along such lines can in time help create favorable climate for restoration US-UAR relations.

(g) You should emphasize the need for an early response, making due acknowledgment of the time it has taken us to formulate this initiative but pointing out that a decision having been taken, it is imperative that we move quickly if it is to work.

(h) FYI. You should get across, without making threats, that this may be last opportunity UAR may have on such matters for long time to come. END FYI.

C

SECRET/NODIS

TAB "C"

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
INFO: USINT CAIRO
USUN NEW YORK
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE _____

NODIS

SUBJECT: New Initiative on Political Settlement

1. Following personal message from Secretary should be delivered to Foreign Minister Rifa'i on same day as Secretary's letter is delivered to Fon Min Riad in Cairo by Bergus. Cairo will advise by flash message when appointment with Riad set.

His Excellency Abdul Munim al-Rifa'i, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman.

Dear Mr. Minister:

Recent developments in the Middle East have convinced me that we must move quickly to break the current impasse with regard to a peace settlement, and we have been giving serious thought to what can be done about the situation.

That situation is at a critical point and it is in our mutual interest to achieve a just and lasting peace. We have made serious and practical proposals

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to that end, and we have counseled all parties on the need for compromise, and on the need to create an atmosphere in which peace is possible. By the latter we mean a reduction of tensions as well as clarifications of positions to give both Arabs and Israelis some confidence that the outcome will preserve their essential interests.

In our view, the most effective way to agree on a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out together under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out SC Resolution 242. Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has recently said that Israel would be prepared to make important concessions once talks got started. We understand the problems that direct negotiations pose for the Arabs, and we have made it clear from the beginning that we were not proposing such an arrangement be put into effect at the outset, although, depending on the progress of discussions, we believe the parties will find it necessary to meet together at some point if peace is to be established between them.

With the above considerations in mind, I put forward the following proposal:

(a) that both Israel and Jordan subscribe to a formal and public restoration of the ceasefire;

(b) that Israel and Jordan, on one hand, and Israel and the UAR on the other, begin discussions under Jarring according to whatever procedures he recommends and looking toward implementation of the November 22 Security Council Resolution, on the basis of statements by both sides that they accept that resolution, that Jordan accepts the principle of a just and lasting peace with Israel, including recognition on its part of Israel's right to exist, and that Israel accepts the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories, in accordance with Resolution 242. I attach a draft illustrative report to the Secretary General of the UN which Ambassador Jarring might use as a procedural device for convening the parties.

If this proposal is acceptable to Jordan and the UAR we will undertake to seek Israeli acceptance.

I am sending a similar message to Foreign Minister Riad.

I look forward to your early reply.

With all best wishes, Sincerely, William Rogers

2. Text of proposed report by Jarring to SYG:
Jordan (the UAR) and Israel advise me that they agree:
(a) That having accepted Resolution 242, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held

under my auspices, according to such procedures and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preferences as to method of procedure.

(b) That the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by Jordan (the UAR) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal both in accordance with Resolution 242.

(c) That, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective this date, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.

3. Following are talking points which you should make orally after presenting above message:

(a) If restored ceasefire is to be effective, both sides must undertake not to change the military situation under cover of truce. There should be standstill on both sides, i.e., no major troop movements or introduction new type of military equipment into combat area. As part of the ceasefire, it would be understood that both parties would refrain from and prevent any type of military action against one another.

(b) Jordanians should bear in mind that we are asking Israelis make what they will consider very significant political concession in agreeing to enter indirect negotiations on implementation of resolution and in accepting principle of withdrawal publicly prior to negotiations. This may seem to Jordanians no more than Israelis should do, but they should realize that Israelis are taking on open-ended commitment with no assurance as to results. Same can be said of Jordanians, but Arabs hold key to peace, which gives them important negotiating leverage.

(c) USG is prepared remain engaged in process once negotiations begin. We continue maintain there can be no peace without withdrawal.

(d) If Syria agrees to accept Resolution 242, we would ask that procedure outlined in Secretary's message be extended to it, i.e., that Syria also engage in indirect negotiations under Jarring's auspices to reach agreement on implementation of resolution.

(e) If queried re U.S. decision on aircraft for Israel, you should say this matter still under review and meanwhile we are limiting ourselves not to go beyond the 50 Phantom and 100 Skyhawk level committed in the 1968 and 1966 contracts. This means that we are not

selling additional aircraft at this time to compensate for addition of Soviet-manned SA-3's and Soviet pilots in UAR. Jordan should understand, however, that it will be impossible for us to keep aircraft question in abeyance in absence of ceasefire, standstill on new installations and talks started between parties under Jarring's auspices.

(f) You should emphasize the need for an early response, making due acknowledgment of the time it has taken us to formulate this initiative but pointing out that a decision having been taken, it is imperative that we move quickly if it is to work.

D

SECRET/NODIS

TAB "D"

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

STATE

NODIS

EYES ONLY - FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

SUBJECT: New Initiative on a Middle East Political
Settlement

1. You should deliver urgently following message at highest available level from Secretary to Foreign Secretary Stewart/Foreign Minister Schumann, indicating similar message being conveyed to other party. FYI: Additional paragraph for message to Schumann appears at end of following text, which otherwise is identical. END FYI.

2. BEGIN TEXT. Dear Colleague: As you know, we have been studying since the end of April the new dimension in the Arab-Israel conflict created by the USSR's decision to become directly involved with its own

SECRET/NODIS

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under provisions of E.O. 12958

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military personnel in the UAR. Part of our urgent evaluation of the entire Middle East complex has been our consideration of Israel's renewed request for additional aircraft.

We remain convinced that the problem which you and we face in the Eastern Mediterranean is essentially a Soviet political rather than military strategy; that neither Israel nor the neighboring Arab governments want a new war; and that every avenue toward military deescalation and movement toward a political solution must be exhausted for the purpose, inter alia, of thwarting the Soviet strategy.

Accordingly, the United States is undertaking a new political initiative directly with Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Amman. We have taken your views carefully into account in devising this move.

At the right moment we will need and be very appreciative of your strong support. In the initial phase, however, we think it better for the parties to consider our suggestion quietly and confidentially, without receiving possible impressions of pressure engendered by the U.S. During the initial phase, we ask that our approach be handled very confidentially. As soon as we have a preliminary idea of the parties' reactions, we shall advise you and shall want to consult with you.

Our initiative is as follows. (1) We are proposing to the UAR, Israel, and Jordan that they promptly begin discussions under Jarring's auspices, according to whatever procedures are recommended by him, for the purpose of the agreed implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution;

(2) We are proposing, as a basis for the commencement of Jarring's efforts, that the UAR, Israel, and Jordan make identical statements that they (a) accept Resolution 242 and (b) agree that the purpose of the discussions to be conducted by Jarring is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (i) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR, Jordan, and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and (ii) withdrawal of Israeli forces, both in accordance with Resolution 242;

(3) We are further proposing, as the basis for Jarring to begin, that the UAR, Israel, and Jordan subscribe to a full restoration of the ceasefire;

(4) We are indicating we would be prepared to see all these arrangements extended to Syria, if Syria accepts Resolution 242;

(5) The US undertakes, if the UAR accepts this proposal, to make every effort to secure Israel's acceptance.

In order to make the ceasefire effective, we are asking the parties, particularly the UAR, to undertake not to change the military situation and to avoid troop movements or new installations (such as new type of missiles) into the combat area.

For our part, we are indicating to the Egyptians that the US decision on aircraft for Israel is still under review and meanwhile we are limiting ourselves not to go beyond the commitments in the 1966 and 1968 contracts. This means that we are not selling additional aircraft at this time to compensate for Soviet-manned SA-3's and Soviet pilots. We are noting, however, that it will be impossible for us to keep the aircraft question in abeyance in the absence of a ceasefire, a standstill on new installations in the Suez Canal area, and the start of talks by the parties under Jarring's auspices.

We believe that our proposal, although difficult for both sides to accept, is balanced. Israel is asked to drop its refusal to negotiate matters of major substance through indirect talks, and also to accept explicitly the principle of withdrawal before the commencement of negotiations. The Arabs are asked to drop their insistence on reference to total Israeli

SECRET/NODIS

5

withdrawal explicitly to the June 5 lines as part of Israel's advance acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, and to acknowledge in advance that the purpose of talks under Jarring's auspices will be the establishment of peace, based inter alia on acceptance of Israel's right to exist.

I hope you will find our approach to the parties to be the correct one and will approve of our readiness to try to persuade the parties to make the major step needed of each side to move toward peace. END TEXT.

3. FOR PARIS. Following penultimate para should be inserted. BEGIN TEXT. I believe, dear colleague, that France is in a unique position to assist our effort when the correct moment comes. Of the Western powers, France today has the best relationship with the Arabs. Of the Western powers, France has, along with my country, something urgently desired and considered necessary by Israel: arms supplies and military aircraft. I would be most grateful if you could give the most serious consideration to the means by which France, in general terms, can help us when the time comes to persuade the parties and especially Israel to accept the proposal I have outlined above. END TEXT.

SECRET/NODIS

4. FYI: Approach to UAR, Israel, and Jordan being made on . You may inform host government we are outlining our proposal in general terms to Soviets--omitting information re deferral on aircraft to Israel--approximately 24 hours after proposal is made to UAR, and are requesting Soviet support.

SECRET

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

STATE _____

NODIS

DRAFT INSTRUCTION TO AMBASSADOR BEAM IN MOSCOW

EYES ONLY - FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. You should inform the Foreign Ministry immediately that you expect to receive in the next few days a message of the highest importance from the Secretary to Gromyko concerning the Middle East, which you are instructed to deliver to Gromyko personally. You therefore will appreciate it if steps are taken to plan for your appointment with Gromyko on very short notice.

2. When informed by Department to proceed, you should convey following oral message from Secretary promptly to Gromyko.

A. BEGIN TEXT. Dear Mr. Minister: The United States Government has taken note of the repeated assurances of the Soviet Government that the USSR continues urgently to desire a peaceful settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. It has also been noted that the Soviet

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RFX

Government has advised that its military support of the UAR is defensive in purpose, and has called upon the US Government to refrain from further steps to strengthen Israel militarily in order to reduce tensions, stabilize the situation in the area, and increase the prospects for a peaceful settlement.

B. In view of these stated positions of the Soviet Government, we assume that the Soviet Government will welcome and will support the following steps now being taken by the US:

- (1) We are proposing to the UAR, Israel, and Jordan that they promptly begin discussions under Jarring's auspices, according to whatever procedures are recommended by him, for the purpose of the agreed implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution;
- (2) We are proposing, as a basis for the commencement of Jarring's efforts, that the UAR, Israel, and Jordan make identical statements that they (a) accept Resolution 242 and (b) agree that the purpose of the discussions to be conducted by Jarring is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (i) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR, Jordan and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; and (ii) withdrawal of Israeli forces, both in accordance with Resolution 242.

(3) We are further proposing, as the basis for Jarring to begin, that the UAR, Israel, and Jordan subscribe to a full restoration of the ceasefire;

(4) We would be prepared to see all these arrangements extended to Syria, if Syria accepts Resolution 242;

(5) The US undertakes, if the UAR accepts this proposal, to make every effort to secure Israel's acceptance.

C. This US approach, in response to President Nasser's May 1 statement, is designed to reverse current trends which hold great danger for both Soviet and US interests. The US initiative will involve serious and difficult US efforts with the Israelis. We look for a positive reaction from the USSR as evidence of its intentions with respect to stabilizing the military situation and working for a peaceful settlement.

D. The Soviet Government should be left with no doubt as to the firm determination of the US to keep the military balance from shifting against Israel if the political initiative we are proposing fails. END TEXT.

3. If Gromyko raises question of aircraft for Israel or you consider it would be useful to take initiative, you may say Israel's request for 125 additional aircraft remains under review. Meanwhile, we are limiting ourselves not to go beyond the 50 Phantom and 100 Skyhawk level committed in the 1968 and 1966 contracts.

Prolonged deferral of decision not possible, however, in absence of ceasefire, standstill with respect to new military installations, including no deployment of SA-3 missiles, on both sides of the ceasefire lines, and progress on political front.

4. For your information, the US will have already presented this proposal to the UAR before your conversation with Gromyko, after having previously informed the Israelis of our approach to Cairo. We will also be briefing British and French, but are reserving judgment for now on timing of possible approaches to other governments.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET/NODIS

June 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

Office of the Vice President
Office of the Secretary of State
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Office of the Director, Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT: Next Steps in the Middle East

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from the Secretary of State on Next Steps in the Middle East. This paper will serve as the basis for discussion at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, June 10 at 9:30 a.m.

J. Davis

Jeanne W. Davis
Director
Secretariat

Attachment

cc: Office of the Attorney General
Office of the Under Secretary of State
Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

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under provisions of E.O. 12958
R. B. L.

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DEFENSE MEMO

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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