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2 Report	Lebanon	n.d.	A
3 Report	Libya	n.d.	A
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5 Report	Lebanon	n.d.	A

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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TAB A

"Issues for Decision" paper -- going with HAK package only.
Copies going through Secretariat for inclusion in NSC books.

TAB B

Memo on "Arab-Israeli Impasse -- Where are We Going" included in HAK package only. Copies going through Secretariat for inclusion in NSC book.

ELEMENTS OF A TENTATIVE COURSE OF ACTION

Assumption: The U. S. position would be improved if Israel accepted its position.

Objective: To persuade Israel to accept that position -- Israel will withdraw if adequate security arrangements are negotiated -- and to try to mediate an Israel-Jordan settlement.

Assessment: This would require heavy pressure -- or costly inducement -- on Israel. The odds are probably against success. But this harder option ought to be examined. Some of its elements might be:

1. Four Power talks: Stand firm on our present position and plan to désengage as quickly as possible, though perhaps waiting until after the Arab summit (December 20). Maybe Christmas recess is a natural opportunity.
2. US-Israel consultations: Tell Eban that we:
 - are prepared to désengage from Four Power talks;
 - believe our interests require a settlement;
 - ask Israel to cooperate with us on a Jordan settlement;
 - assure Israel that we will not further change our negotiating position and ask Israel to accept the essentials of that position (will withdraw if satisfactory security arrangements negotiated).

At the time of the talks with Eban, we would still be a couple of weeks short of our military and economic aid decisions. They would then be considered in the light of Israel's response.

3. US-USSR talks on UAR. Leave these where they are until after we have sorted ourselves out with Israel. If Israel's response gave us something to work with, we could tell Dobrynin -- if there had been no response in the meantime -- that Israel had done all that could be expected and we proposed ending the US-USSR talks unless Moscow was in a position to deliver Egyptian agreement. If we get nowhere

with Israel (as is likely), we can let the USSR talks stay where they are.

4. US-Jordan consultations: Discuss elements of a Jordan-Israel settlement in precise terms to see how far we have to press Israel.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Middle East, December 10

The NSC meeting is intended primarily as a basic review of where we have been and where we are going on policy toward an Arab-Israeli settlement. The meeting also provides, in the context of broader Middle East issues, an opportunity to review work done in the Washington Special Actions Group on the situation in Lebanon where possible shifts toward the radical Arab side may pose operational problems for us.

As you know, I have been concerned with resumption of the Four Power talks that we may be walking into a dangerous situation. We began on State's recommendation that we would just talk about general principles. Now we have stated a precise position on the UAR-Israel border. We are now heading into a situation where we will be asked to impose on Israel terms of a settlement that, in the Four Power talks, could be eroded to the point where we would not consider them a balanced position. We need now to step back and look at the broader issues and options to get a clear picture of where we are going. This perspective will enable us to appraise present strategy and set a new course if necessary.

Attached and tabbed are:

-- Your talking points which will introduce the subject and structure the discussion. I would propose to lead off by summarizing the deliberations of the Washington Special Actions Group concerning possible U.S. responses to contingencies arising from radical pressures on Lebanon's moderate government, which you asked me to report on. Then I suggest you ask Mr. Helms to brief on the general situation in the Mid East. I would then outline the Middle East settlement situation and

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settlement situation and issues. When I complete my outline of the issues, I suggest that you again call on appropriate participants at the meeting for their views. I recommend that you not announce our decision at the meeting, but that you indicate your desire to reflect further on the discussion before making your decision. Your talking points proceed in this way.

-- An Issues for Decision paper summarizing the major issues raised by our policy toward an Arab-Israeli settlement.

-- Maps of the Area.

You need to read only your Talking Points and the Issues for Decision paper. My briefing will summarize the Lebanon paper. An Analytical Summary of the Middle East negotiating situation and a summary of the Lebanese contingency considerations of the Washington Special Actions Group are in a separate background book.

Briefly summarized the topics for discussion are:

1. Lebanon

- Possible contingencies and U.S. responses.
- Israeli action as an alternative to U.S. intervention.

2. Middle East Negotiations

The issues as to whether we should

- Back off from negotiations, leaving to local forces responsibility for the terms of a settlement.
- Continue the present combination of negotiations.
- Develop an untried combination of negotiations.

- [3. Libya If there is time, I would be prepared to report briefly on the Washington Special Actions Group deliberations on Libya. If not, I shall report to you separately by memorandum.]

RN TALKING POINTS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON




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December 10, 1969

Mr. President:

Attached is a revised set of talking points for your use at the NSC meeting today on the Middle East. This revised paper provides for ten-minute briefings by Secretaries Rogers and Laird on their European trip.



Henry A. Kissinger

Attachment

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REVISED PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING - DECEMBER 10, 1969
MIDDLE EAST

1. Call on Secretary Rogers to give the group a ten-minute briefing on his European trip.
2. Call on Secretary Laird to give a ten-minute briefing on his European trip.
3. We have begun a new round of Four Power talks (US-USSR-UK-France) on the Middle East.
4. I want to review the situation and prospects and to look at our options as we go into these talks.
5. [Call on Mr. Helms for a briefing on the situation in the Middle East.]
6. [Call on Mr. Kissinger to outline Middle East issues.]
7. [When Mr. Kissinger has completed his presentation you might wish to call on Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson for their views. (Under Secretary Richardson has had the greatest opportunity to familiarize himself with the details of the current situation.) Then you might call on Secretary Laird, Ambassador Yost and Assistant Secretary Sisco.]

If there is time you may wish to turn to these topics, but it is not essential.

8. It will be useful also to review the deliberations of the Washington Special Actions Group concerning possible responses to contingencies in Lebanon:

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-- Lebanon is quiet now but still under pressure from the radicals.

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9. [Call on Mr. Kissinger to outline Washington Special Actions Group consideration of Lebanon contingencies.]
10. In concluding, you would like to consider these issues before making any decisions.
11. [If there is time, ask Mr. Kissinger to outline briefly the Washington Special Actions Group consideration of Libya.]

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THE PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING - DECEMBER 10, 1969
MIDDLE EAST

1. We have begun a new round of Four Power talks (US-USSR-UK-France) on the Middle East.
2. I want to review the situation and prospects and to look at our options as we go into these talks.
3. It will be useful also to review the deliberations of the Washington Special Actions Group concerning possible responses to contingencies in Lebanon:

-- Lebanon is quiet now but still under pressure from the radicals.
4. [Call on Mr. Kissinger to outline Washington Special Actions Group consideration of Lebanon contingencies.]
5. [Call on Mr. Helms for a briefing on the situation in the Middle East.]
6. [Call on Mr. Kissinger to outline Middle East Issues.]
7. [When Mr. Kissinger has completed his presentation you might wish to call on Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson for their views. Then you might call on Secretary Laird, Ambassador Yost and Assistant Secretary Sisco.]
8. In concluding, you would like to consider these issues before making any decisions.
9. [If there is time, ask Mr. Kissinger to outline briefly the Washington Special Actions Group consideration of Libya.]

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RJG

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HAK TALKING POINTS

TOP SECRET

HAK TALKING POINTS

NSC MEETING -- MIDDLE EAST

I. Introduction

A. There are two subjects on the agenda:

-- Issues raised by contingency planning that grew out of the recent crisis in Lebanon.

-- A review of where we stand in our effort to help achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement.

B. On the first issue, I simply want to report on the contingency plans which were reviewed and approved by the Washington Special Actions Group.

C. On the second, as the Four Power talks resume and as we await the Soviet reply to our last proposal in the US-USSR talks, it seems a useful time to take stock.

[D. You have said you would brief on Libya if there is time. We can easily cover this by Memorandum if you do not.]

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TOP SECRET

LEBANON

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MID-EAST

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III ARAB-ISRAEL

- A. Introduction: With Four Power talks resuming and US-Soviet talks in suspense, this seems a useful time to take stock.
- B. Background: Since January our efforts to achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement have passed through three phases:
- in February, we began exploratory talks with the UK, France and USSR about a set of general principles that could be given to Ambassador Jarring to get negotiations started.
 - In April, we advanced a position on some of the specific terms of an Israel-UAR settlement--excluding boundaries.
 - In October, we advanced a specific position on the UAR-Israeli border.
- C. The present problem: Resumption of Four Power talks opens the door now to pressure on us to impose a settlement on Israel.
- It, therefore, seems a good moment to stand back for a moment and look at our present course and its alternatives in perspective.

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D. Preview of options: Just to establish a framework for discussion of the issues, we have three broad options:

- Let negotiations peter out.
- Continue the present combination of negotiations.
- Develop a new combination of negotiations.

Against that background, here are the main issues.

E. A basic question behind any strategy is an assessment of whether it is possible to improve the U. S. position in the Arab world by dissociating ourselves from Israel's positions?

How permanent would that improvement be? What do the Arabs really want?

-- Some argue that if Israel could just be persuaded to withdraw to its pre-war borders that would bring peace with the Arabs and lead to an improvement in our position in the Arab world.

-- Others argue that the objective of the Arab radicals-- especially the militant Palestinians-- is to end Israel's existence as a Jewish state, not just to regain conquered Arab territory. Thus, even if we engineer a settlement in which Israel withdraws to pre-war borders, the settlement is unlikely to last and the U. S. will still be defending Israel against an Arab crusade.

F. Issue: Assuming that an Arab-Israeli settlement must remain our objective no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best strategy for achieving this? There are two broad choices:

1. Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of a settlement, leaving to outsiders the problem of guaranteeing those terms once agreed.

-- Those who favor this approach believe that there will be peace only when the people of the area face up to the realities of their situation.

-- Those who oppose say that: this is the strategy tried from November 1967 to January 1969, without achieving peace. Radical forces have steadily grown stronger to the detriment of US interests, and the level of hostilities has intensified.

2. Generate international pressures for the terms of a settlement.

-- Those who favor this approach argue: The Near Easterners are too suspicious of each other to initiate negotiations but might respond to a diplomatic alternative if it were offered.

. The situation is too dangerous for us not at least to determine decisively what price each side would be willing to pay for peace.

-- Those who oppose feel that:

. International diplomatic action has raised Arab hopes too high without being able to produce results and diverted the Arabs from coming to terms with Israel.

. If international pressure is generated, the U.S. will be expected to impose terms unilaterally on Israel-- because in the last analysis there is no significant international pressure except for U.S. influence in Israel and Soviet influence in the UAR.

G. Issue: Assuming the U.S. has an interest in generating whatever international pressure may be possible, what is the best way of achieving this? We have two broad choices:

1. Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the terms of a settlement and then press Israel to accept (the USSR pressing the UAR).

-- Those who favor this approach argue that:

. this is the only way to avoid isolation at the UN and in the Near East.

. even if the consensus does not achieve a settlement now, its mere existence will constitute steady pressure on the belligerents to reach a political settlement.

-- Those who oppose argue that:

. the U. S. is unlikely to achieve consensus on a position which comes close to meeting Israel's requirements, but . we will be expected to impose it on Israel. Thus the very process of reaching consensus makes it harder to persuade Israel to accept.

. The belligerents have too much at stake to respond to vague pressure.

-- or let them peter out --

2. Break off the talks now/to cut our losses but also to generate pressure on the USSR and the Arabs to face up to the necessity to discuss reasonable terms.

-- Those who favor this course argue that:

. Talks which donot produce a package that the belligerents-- if they were inclined toward genuine compromise--could consider seriously will unnecessarily raise their hopes and may delay their coming to terms with reality.

. The negotiating process itself increases our isolation and makes it more difficult to achieve a balanced position. By breaking out of multilateral negotiations we would at least cut that loss, and we would somewhat increase the pressure on the USSR to take a more reasonable position.

-- Those who oppose this course argue:

. It is the situation--not just the talks--which isolates us. Breaking the talks without substituting something in return, especially right before the Arab Summit (December 20), would increase the Arab sense of desperation and conviction that they have no course but heightened military preparation.

. The U.S. does not have an interest in another war over Israel's right to hold its conquered territory. Our interest is in Israel's security so we should try to put ourselves in a position where we are holding out only for Israel's security within unexpanded borders. To achieve that position will require further negotiation.

H. Issue: If the U.S. wishes to continue negotiations what is the best forum? The three options reviewed last February remain the logical choices:

1. Four Power talks.

-- Those who have argued for this course started with the fact that last January-February the U.S. was under heavy international--and special French--pressure to join in Four Power talks. There was strong sentiment at that time for taking a more active role to see whether outsiders could help the belligerents formulate at least a framework to get negotiations started.

. The argument now is that having agreed to these talks we would now take some loss to stop them.

-- Those who have opposed argued that:

. this is the forum in which the U.S. is most likely to be pressed to move away from a position that has any chance of acceptance in Israel.

. Moreover, the British and French are the least likely of the Four to help persuade either side to accept, and the French at least are an anathema in Jerusalem.

2. US-USSR Talks

-- Those who argued for entering these talks did so on three grounds:

- a. For global reasons, the U. S. had an interest in seeing whether it could negotiate seriously on a range of important issues.
- b. The USSR's persistent requests since September 1968 to talk about a Mid-East settlement suggested that Moscow might be uncomfortable in the Mid-East and might participate seriously in trying to work out a reasonable arrangement. While we maintained a proper skepticism, it made sense to probe far enough to see what was possible.
- c. The USSR should pay at least as much of the price for a settlement as the U. S. in expanding its influence with its clients.

-- Those who opposed this course argued mainly that the USSR did not want a real peace; it simply wanted to persuade us to press Israel to give back the territory of Moscow's clients. Since the USSR was not likely to

act seriously, it did not make sense to formalize the USSR's role in the Mid-East by giving it a place at the peace table.

3. U. S. mediation

-- Those who argued for felt in general that:

. The U. S. should exploit its exclusive ability to move Israel and not share credit for a settlement, if any.

. Nasser really wanted peace but that he could not say so publicly so he would welcome a private U. S. mediation effort.

. It made no sense to involve the USSR in any exchange on a Jordan-Israel settlement.

-- Those who argued against argued that:

. Chances of success were slight, and the U. S. would incur the main blame for failure.

. The U. S. would also be accused of bad faith if it advanced a proposal, Israel rejected and the U. S. went on aiding Israel.

- I. Issue: If we persist in the US-USSR and Four Power talks, what should be our strategy? We have two basic choices and two options for executing each.

A. Let the talks peter out:

Option 1 -- stick to present position even if Israel rejects it.

--Some argue that this is the course most likely to isolate us. It would put us in a position where we would be pressed to continue military and economic support for Israel while Israel rejects the U. S. concept of what would constitute a fair settlement.

--Others argue that this is the only position that would avoid a confrontation with Israel. It would enable us to stand on a position we regard as fair. We could blame failure on all sides and maintain that we are only providing enough aid to maintain Israeli security.

Option 2 -- stick to present position, pressing Israel to accept it.

--Some argue that this would be the best possible possible position to be in if possible short of a negotiated settlement. We would have produced Israeli agreement to a position we regard as fair.

--Others argue that since Israeli agreement is unlikely, this course is really the same as the first with all its disadvantages. We might use a good deal of influence

with Israel--possibly eroding its position--and yet not

have produced an Arab offer of peace.

B. Press the talks to fruition:

Option 3 -- achieve big-power consensus but not impose on Israel.

--Some argue that it would improve our position with the Arabs just to take a position closer to theirs than our present one.

--Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our position but on what we did with Israel. If we refused to press it on Israel--and it would be more difficult than our present position to sell to Israel--we would be called hypocritical.

Option 4 -- achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.

--Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could be achieved because imposition is necessary and it is essential to have at least the USSR aboard for imposition on the USSR.

--Others argue that:

. The process of achieving consensus would dilute the substance of the consensus to the point where it would be all but impossible to impose it on Israel.

. The U. S. would be left with a position it could not regard as balanced and faced with the question of whether to go on aiding an Israel which rejected it. In the unlikely event we succeeded in imposing it on Israel, we would have in effect made ourselves responsible for enforcing the agreement.

J. To summarize the options, they are:

1. Back off from negotiations, leaving to local forces responsibility for the terms of a settlement.
2. Continue the present combination of negotiations.
3. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.

K. The choice among these must be made in the light of four conflicting U. S. interests:

1. Arab-Israeli settlement. The U. S. has varied interests in the area which are more easily pursued in peace than in tension.
2. Not worsening relations with the Arabs. U. S. investment in oil is heavy and Western Europe and Japan depend on Mid-East oil supply. Whether or not the Soviets dominate this area depends on whether the Arabs feel they have a Western alternative.
3. Israel's survival. We are committed to Israel's survival, though not necessarily in its present expanded borders.

4. Avoiding a confrontation with the USSR. Neither the U. S. nor the USSR wants one. The problem is to avoid situations where we are forced toward one.

LIBYA

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MID-EAST -- SUMMARY AND ISSUES FOR DECISION

ISSUES FOR DECISION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

The Problem. Continuation of the Arab-Israeli impasse is gradually narrowing broader U.S. options in the Mid-East -- partly because the U.S. is identified closely with Israel. Those most concerned with our eroding position believe it is essential, therefore, to dissociate ourselves from Israel.

The Negotiating Situation. Since January, we have moved from exploratory talks on the general principles of a settlement to giving the Soviets on October 28 a specific position on the UAR Israel border. That position -- regarded as our fallback when we first started talking specifics with the Soviets in April -- stated that Israel would withdraw to the pre-war border provided satisfactory arrangements were negotiated to enhance Israeli security at three sensitive points -- Gaza, Sharm al-Shaikh and the Sinai. This progression has taken us further from Israel's position -- but not yet far enough to have dissociated ourselves from a position as Israel's lawyer.

The Options. Review of the issues leads to three broad options:

1. Back off from negotiations, leaving to local forces responsibility for the terms of a settlement.
2. Continue the present combination of negotiations.
3. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.

The Issues.

1. Analysis of these options boils down to these two propositions:
 - a. We cannot dissociate ourselves from Israel credibly without trying to press peace terms on Israel. Even if we take a stand on peace terms that we regard as fair, the Arabs will see us as hypocrites if Israel rejects them and we go on supplying military and economic aid. If we do that, our position will continue to erode, and events will drift steadily toward another Arab-Israeli clash.

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- b. If we press peace terms on Israel seriously and not just for the record, this would lead to a confrontation with Israel. There might be ways of tempering this to some degree, but it would almost certainly involve at least the implied threat of not continuing substantial military support or helping meet the \$1.2 billion balance of payments deficit. That could trigger an Israeli attack in one last desperate effort to cut Egyptian forces down and topple Nasser.
2. If we did decide to press the terms of a settlement on Israel, what would be the most useful forum to work from? The analysis isolates these factors:
 - a. In the Four Power talks our position will be whittled away to the point where it will be even less acceptable to Israel than it is now. Yet the British and the French have little to contribute in pressing agreed terms on either Israel or the UAR.
 - b. The usefulness of the US-USSR talks will depend on whether Moscow's reply to our last proposal offers promise that Moscow is willing to press Cairo toward balanced terms.
 - c. If neither of these forums provides a real opportunity to probe the positions of the belligerents or to generate pressure on them, we might be better off trying a mediation effort of our own. In any case, it makes more sense to handle the Jordan-Israel settlement by ourselves than to involve the Soviets, who have no interest in a Jordan settlement and would only exploit their involvement by championing an extreme Arab position.

Perspective. The past ten months have given us a number of excellent means for probing positions on all sides of this intractable problem. Now the various consultations we have launched are bringing us to the point where continuing on our present course without deciding what our destination should be could bring us the worst of two worlds.

1. TYPE OF DOCUMENT: Memo for NSC Members
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 : NLN-H-25-5-3-7

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2. SUBJECT: Arab-Israeli Impasse

3. DATE: December 8, 1969

4. CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/NODIS

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
December 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Emergency Preparedness

SUBJECT: The Arab-Israeli Impasse

The attached paper, prepared in this office, is distributed in order to help focus discussion of the issues that will be considered at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, December 10. There has been informal discussion, but this paper has no interagency status and is being distributed only as a guide to the kinds of issues that will be dealt with.



Henry A. Kissinger

Attachment

cc: The Attorney General
The Under Secretary of State
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Ambassador Yost

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE: WHERE ARE WE GOING?

I. Background

A. Steps taken by the U. S. since January.

1. The February NSC review covered two basic options: letting local forces play themselves out and taking the initiative to help find a settlement. The first was rejected, and it was decided to enter a series of exploratory talks with the UK, France and the USSR to try to achieve agreement on a set of general principles to govern a settlement. The objective was to give these to the UN representative, Ambassador Jarring, as a basis on which to bring the belligerents together.
2. In April, a proposal was approved to advance in the US-USSR talks U. S. positions on specific terms of a settlement other than borders. The talks had concentrated on trying to establish a framework for a UAR-Israel settlement. They had reached a point where an early impasse seemed likely unless discussions could become more specific. But the U. S. still refused at this point to state a position on borders, leaving that subject exclusively to negotiation between the belligerents. The Four Power talks recessed in June awaiting results of the US-USSR exchange.
3. A September-October policy review considered the proposal to advance in the US-USSR talks a U. S. position on borders. On October 28 the position was given to the USSR that Israel should withdraw to the pre-war UAR-Israel boundary on the condition that Israel's security requirements be met through demilitarized zones in the Sinai and special arrangements for Gaza and free passage through the Straits of Tiran. The position on borders -- considered our fallback position until then -- was designed to emphasize to the USSR that Israel could be pressed to withdraw only if the UAR were pressed to commit itself to arrangements

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that Israel would regard as providing security somewhat commensurate to that provided by the present ceasefire lines. Our proposal was cast so as to leave the details of the security arrangements Israel would require for negotiation between Israel and the UAR.

B. Situation in the area.

1. The June 1967 ceasefire is in effect dead. A situation of limited warfare exists on the Israeli-UAR and Israeli-Jordanian ceasefire lines carried out by the military forces of both sides and by the fedayeen (Palestinian commandos) on the Arab side. Military action on the UAR front has intensified sharply since last spring. The Lebanese crises of the past six months have increased activity on that front, and it is likely to be added as a third active front in the months ahead.
2. The fedayeen have steadily increased their influence. This was demonstrated most forcibly in the Lebanese crisis when they succeeded in bringing the moderate Lebanese government to acquiesce in their guerrilla attacks from Lebanese soil.
3. Arab frustrations at the lack of a settlement have mounted and with them the fatalistic attitude that another war is inevitable. This has strengthened the hand of Palestinian militants and the more radical governments. In this atmosphere, the remaining moderate governments feel increasingly beleaguered and uncomfortable in their close association with the U.S.
4. The Arab summit which begins December 20 will give the radicals a forum to press for renunciation of a political settlement and declaration of an intensified struggle against Israel.
5. The prospects in the absence of a settlement are for a gradual acceleration of the present limited, relatively static war on the ceasefire lines toward more general hostilities. Israeli occupation of additional Arab territory

as a buffer, particularly in Jordan and perhaps in Lebanon, is probably not imminent but cannot ultimately be ruled out. Israel can be expected to remain capable of inflicting much greater damage on the Arabs than it receives, but neither side will be capable of imposing a clear cut and total military capitulation on the other.

C. Where we stand now.

1. The US-USSR talks have been dormant since October 28 because the USSR still has not responded to the U. S. fallback position stated on October 28. It seems unlikely that Moscow would flatly reject our proposal, although the UAR would make it difficult for Moscow to accept. The USSR probably wants to keep the talks going, although it may regard the Four Power forum as an easier one for the moment in which to whittle away our position. Moscow might just leave our proposition unanswered for a time.
2. Four Power talks have just resumed, initially to concentrate on aspects of a Jordan-Israel settlement. Israel has objected sharply to both the resumption and the subject. The U. S. has told Israel it would not advance a specific position until after discussions with Foreign Minister Eban, but it is now unclear whether that conversation will take place. In these talks:
 - a. The signs are clear that the French will not stand with us and the British, while wanting to avoid a break with us, are wavering. They each disagree with us to some degree in objective, procedure and substance.
 - They assess the chances of a settlement as slim and are mainly interested in bolstering their positions in the Arab world.
 - They are much more inclined than we to see a Four Power consensus as significant pressure on Israel and the Arabs, but they would expect us to

use the full extent of our influence with Israel to press for acceptance of the consensus.

--They will press us to move away from our position on procedures that significant details of the settlement should be left to the belligerents to negotiate.

--They will probably even press us to more pro-Arab positions on the location of borders, demilitarized zones and securing free passage through waterways.

b. The USSR--because it knows the limits on what it can persuade Cairo to accept--is less eager to rush into details that it would have to press on the UAR, but would surely join the UK and France in whittling away our position on substantive issues insofar as they are dealt with.

3. The U.S. has yet to decide on a proposal that we become an active intermediary between Israel and Jordan in an effort to promote a settlement on that front. Israel has objected sharply to Four Power involvement, partly because it involves the USSR for the first time in a Jordan settlement.

II. Purpose of the Present Policy Reappraisal.

- A. Before addressing strategy in the coming talks, it is useful to step back and look again at broader issues and options.
- B. From that perspective, we can then address strategy in the Four Power talks and in the US-USSR talks if they are resumed.

III. A Basic Question: Is it possible to improve the U.S. position in the Arab World by dissociating ourselves from Israel's bargaining positions? How permanent would that improvement be? What do the Arabs really want?

- A. Some would argue that the main Arab aim is to regain the territory conquered by Israel in 1967. Therefore, if Israel could just be persuaded to return to its 1967 borders, reasonable Arabs would live and let live with Israel, and the Arab extre-

mists would be isolated. While almost no one is optimistic about the chances for a settlement in the near future, some would argue that only this kind of approach has a chance of arresting the trend toward radicalism throughout the area and erosion of the U.S. position. Even if the Israelis did not withdraw, it would improve the U.S. position with the Arabs to speak out in favor of withdrawal.

- B. Others would argue that the objective of the Arab radicals --especially the militant Palestinians--is to end Israel's existence as a separate Jewish state. They would regard Israel's withdrawal to pre-war borders as just a step toward their objective. Thus, even if we urge a settlement in which Israel withdraws to pre-war borders, the settlement is unlikely to last. And as long as Israel occupies Arab territory, the U.S. position is unlikely to improve significantly.
- C. The U.S. negotiating position attempts to take both of these views into account. That position is built around the proposition that Israel should withdraw only if Arab governments recognize Israel's existence and commit themselves to control the radicals who would try to undercut a settlement. But two questions remain:
1. Can we dissociate ourselves from Israel? Since the Arabs regard us as the creators of Israel, will they regard anything short of cutting off all material support as convincing evidence that we have actually dissociated ourselves? What the Arabs want at a minimum is return of the conquered territories. They will be less impressed by our formal position than by what we will do to implement it, such as cutting off Israeli military supplies.
 2. Has the fedayeen movement acquired so much momentum of its own that it--along with the radical governments (e.g., Syria)--would be capable of toppling any government (e.g., Jordan's) that accepted any conditions the U.S. might be able to persuade Israel to accept? Would that neutralize any gains the U.S. might make from efforts to press Israel to accept the terms of a settlement?

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IV. Issue: Assuming that an Arab-Israeli settlement must remain our objective no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best strategy for achieving this?

A. There are two broad choices:

1. Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of a settlement, leaving to outside powers the question of guaranteeing those terms once reached.

2. Generate international pressures on the terms of a settlement themselves.

B. Option 1 -- Letting local forces assume responsibility for a settlement.

1. Those who favor this approach argue that the only durable arrangement for Arab-Israeli coexistence will be one that grows out of recognition on both sides of what is necessary if they are to live together. As long as the Arabs hope that outsiders will bail them out, they will not face up to the reality that Israel is here to stay. As the Arabs learn that no one but the U. S. can deliver Israel, they will learn to deal with us, thus enhancing our position.

2. Those who oppose argue that to accept this approach is to accept the probability of another Arab-Israeli war with all the dangers that it would have for world peace. Moreover, on the strictly local scene, they argue that this course rests on two questionable premises: (a) that the Arabs will be able to contain their frustration to the point of calculating their interests rationally and (b) that Israel can maintain sufficient military superiority to continue to impose high enough costs on the Arabs to make clear that a rational calculation of Arab interests would lead the Arabs to negotiate a settlement. Those concerned for the survival of Israel must question whether in the long run two million people can hope to outlast eighty million.

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C. Option 2 -- Generating international pressures for the terms of a settlement.

1. Those who favor argue, above all, that the U.S. cannot sit back without making some reasonable effort to avoid another war. Beyond that, the U.S. in 1967-68 tried standing aside and relying on local pressures and no progress toward peace was made while radical forces in the Middle East became stronger, threatening U.S. interests. The belligerents will surely not get together soon to negotiate if left to their own devices, so if there is any chance of a settlement at all it can only come with outside help in breaking the deadlock. Even if the international effort fails now, it may be useful to have available an international consensus on a diplomatic settlement if another war takes place or if the belligerents find the war of attrition too costly and wish a face-saving way to turn to negotiation.
2. Those who oppose argue that there is insufficient will on either side to achieve a negotiated settlement. Outside influence where vital security interests are concerned will remain marginal. It therefore exposes the U.S. unnecessarily to blame for failure and wastes U.S. influence when it undertakes an impossible task. If international pressure is generated, the danger is that the U.S. will be forced to try to impose terms unilaterally on Israel, will become Israel's defense lawyer if it cannot impose and will be isolated with Israel.

V. Issue: Assuming the U.S. has an interest in generating international pressures for a settlement, what is the best way of achieving this? Because of its widely varied interests in the Mid-East, the U.S. for twenty years has tried to maintain a position in all of the rival camps -- radical, moderate, Arab, Israeli. Continuation of the Arab-Israeli impasse is making it increasingly difficult to maintain influence in Arab capitals and leaving the U.S. more exclusively identified with Israel.

A. Working from where we are today, we have two broad choices:

1. Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the terms of a settlement and then press Israel to accept. (The USSR would be expected to press the UAR to accept, assuming the consensus still left some onerous conditions for the UAR to accept.) This effort would probably lead us to modify our present negotiating position by: (a) giving up our insistence on direct negotiations or even (b) possibly giving up our effort to settle now all the issues in the Palestine question--refugees, status of waterways, final status of Jerusalem--and trying simply to arrange Israeli withdrawal and security guarantees for the borders.
 2. Break off the talks now to cut our losses and generate pressure on the USSR and Arabs to face up to the necessity to discuss reasonable terms. Whether we stand on our present position or modify it will have some effect on whether the talks come to an impasse or not. But the principal decision now is whether we let the talks peter out as a matter of conscious policy. This could take one of two forms: (a) simply backing out of the talks on grounds that they were getting nowhere, or (b) backing out of the talks with the idea of making a unilateral effort to bring the parties together.
- B. The first approach--trying to achieve consensus and impose a settlement.
1. Those who urge this approach would argue that this is the only way to avoid diplomatic isolation and isolation with Israel in the Near East. They believe that--even if the consensus did not soon result in a settlement--it would help the U. S. position in the area to be on record with the Arabs in favor of a fair settlement and that such a consensus would provide an alternative for the belligerents to turn to in the future as the costs of the war of attrition mount.
 2. Those who have reservations about this course point out that the U. S. would be expected to impose the consensus on an Israel which would flatly reject it. In order to achieve a consensus, we would have to make concessions on the very points which Israel insists upon, so the process of achieving

consensus would make our job of imposing a settlement more difficult than ever. (For example, Israel insists on a genuine process of negotiation with the Arabs, but the British and French consider that unimportant. They are mainly interested in the borders and--at least the French--have not given detailed attention to such points as how effectively to enforce demilitarization.) Then the U.S. would be faced with the question of whether it could go on supporting with military and economic aid an Israel which had rejected an international consensus to which we had subscribed. If we continued support, much of the goodwill earned with the Arabs would be lost, and we would be accused of hypocrisy. We would be much better off standing on our present position--which is balanced--than diluting that position and then having to live with it.

- C. The second approach--breaking off negotiations or letting them peter out.
1. Some argue that the negotiating process itself has isolated us and breaking it off would cut those losses which stem from its dramatization of our support for Israel. The negotiating process leaves us the unpalatable choices of being Israel's lawyer or imposing a settlement on Israel while leaving us isolated in a four-power forum whose other members are not subject to our restraints nor do they have our responsibility. We have been "Israel's lawyer" in peacemaking efforts. While that identification is unavoidable because of the past U.S. role in support of Israel, active negotiations dramatize it, and the Soviets appear the champion of the Arabs. The U.S. position would improve marginally if we could at least lay aside our active role as Israel's lawyer. Moreover, breaking the negotiations could put pressure on the USSR to be more forthcoming since Moscow must take seriously the fact that its client would lose another war and the USSR would face the choice between helping and confirming Arab disillusionment with the Soviets. Also, the USSR must try to minimize the appearance of impotence that comes from its inability to force Israel to return Arab territory.
 2. Others argue that breaking off negotiations by itself--or letting them peter out--have only limited advantage. It might deprive the USSR of a means of showing it is trying to get Arab territory back and of a means of whittling away our position. However, the USSR probably figures that time is more on the Soviet than the U.S. side in terms of relative position in the Near East, so the Soviets can afford to wait, especially since the Arabs would regard the break-off as a pro-Israeli act. The U.S.

might cut its losses marginally, but it is U.S. support for Israel and not mainly the talks which isolates the U.S. The only way the effect of a disengagement from the talks might be softened is if the U.S. disengaged from material support of Israel at the same time.

VI. Issue: If the U.S. wishes to continue negotiations, what is the best forum?

A. In the first NSC review of policy toward the Arab-Israeli impasse last February, three possibilities were considered:

1. Four Power talks.

- a. Some argue that, since international opinion favors this approach, the U.S. would appear as the obstacle to peace if it blocked these talks. Involving the principal permanent members of the UN Security Council, they provide a natural way for involving the UN while still maintaining some control over its involvement. If a consensus is reached, the U.S. could insist that the other three share some of the burden of pressing it on the principal belligerents (Israel and the UAR).
- b. Others argue that these talks are more a liability than asset. An international opinion that cannot contribute in practical ways to bringing the parties together should have only limited claim on us. The British and French are leaning away from us in their own effort to curry favor with the Arabs and contribute nothing in drawing the UAR and Israel closer to agreement. These talks also bring the USSR into discussion of a Jordan settlement where it has no interests but improvement of its own position as champion of the Arabs. The USSR has no special concern about Jordan's losing another war. These talks are more irksome to Israel even than the US-USSR talks -- and even less likely to produce a settlement. The British and French (as well as the USSR) will whittle away our position so that any consensus reached is even more difficult to sell to Israel. If the U.S. is going to end up with the most difficult job -- pressing the terms of the consensus

on Israel--we gain little from sharing Arab credit with the USSR for whatever we may achieve. Moreover, we have moved step by step away from our January position, and we have to take a stand somewhere.

2. US-USSR talks

- a. Some argue that this is the appropriate forum because it represents the only two powers with both significant interests and significant influence. The USSR is under some pressure to cooperate since it is under pressure to help the UAR get its territory back. It would see its position gradually eroded if it could not get Arab territory back and seriously jeopardized if the UAR lost another war, as it inevitably would.

This procedure also offers a way to be sure that the USSR shares in the dissatisfaction which will follow any settlement because no settlement can fail to be unpalatable to both sides. Moreover, any fair settlement will require almost as much pressure in Cairo as in Jerusalem; not only does the USSR have more influence in Cairo than we but also it should be required to make itself just as unpopular with its clients as we do with ours.

- b. Others argue that this approach, if it succeeded, would enhance the position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. More important, Israel sees the USSR as its prime enemy, exploiting Arab resentment toward Israel to enhance its own position in the area. Israel argues that any terms Moscow could agree to would automatically not be in the Israeli--or U.S.--interest. Moreover, eight months of negotiation have not revealed serious evidence that Moscow is really interested in anything more than whittling away our position.

3. U. S. mediation. While this is theoretically possible on the UAR-Israel front, the U. S. has more interest in a Jordan-Israel settlement because of our friendship with Jordan. Moreover, with U. S. clients on both sides of the line, this offers a better prospect for U. S. mediation.
 - a. Some argue that the U. S. should not commit the Israel-Jordan negotiation to either the Four Power or the US-USSR talks because it introduces the USSR which can have no interest--and make no contribution --except making propaganda capital by posing as the champion of the Arabs. Moreover, the Israelis object sharply to Soviet involvement. Also, the same arguments that apply in general against Four Power talks--the lack of British and French influence--are reasons for not relying on them to produce movement toward agreement.
 - b. Others argue that the really difficult issues--the issues of a Palestine settlement--are on this front, and the U. S. would profit from diffusing the responsibility for terms on such problems as Jerusalem and the refugees that no one could accept.

VII. Issue: If we persist in the US-USSR and Four Power talks, what would be our strategy? We start from a position of concentrating on working out a framework for negotiation among the belligerents, leaving the specifics of a settlement for them to negotiate. The one element of substance we have dealt with in detail is the proposition that Israel should withdraw to the pre-war UAR-Israel border provided a satisfactory arrangement for securing that border can be negotiated.

- A. We have two basic choices and two stances in executing each:
 1. Let the talks peter out:
 - Option 1: Stick to our present position without Israel's agreement to it.
 - Option 2: Stick to our present position but press Israel to accept it.

2. Press the talks to fruition:

--Option 3: Change our present position to achieve big-power consensus but not press the consensus on Israel.

--Option 4: Change our present position to achieve consensus and try to impose that consensus on Israel.

B. Option 1--stick to our present position without Israeli agreement to it, letting talks peter out.

1. Some argue that this is the only position that would avoid the unpalatable choice of enforcing a settlement which will antagonize Israel without gaining the goodwill of the Arabs. It would enable us to stand on a position we regard as fair. We could blame failure on all sides and maintain that we are only providing enough aid to maintain Israeli security.

2. Others argue that this is the course most likely to isolate us from the Arabs. It would put us in a position where we would be pressed to continue military and economic support for Israel while Israel rejects the U.S. concept of what would constitute a fair settlement. This almost certainly would end our participation in the peace-making effort to avoid another Arab-Israeli clash.

C. Option 2--stick to present position, letting talks peter out but pressing Israel to accept our position.

1. Some argue that this would be the best position to be in if possible short of a negotiated settlement, whether or not the Arabs and Soviets accept. We would have attempted to produce Israeli agreement to a position we regard as fair. The Arabs and Soviets would be on weak ground if they rejected it. It would buy us some time in the Arab world and could lead eventually to a real negotiating situation. It would keep us relatively uninvolved.

2. Others argue that we would delude ourselves if we started down this track expecting Israeli agreement. Since Israeli agreement is unlikely, this course is really the same as the first with all its disadvantages. They point out that this would not necessarily produce movement toward a

settlement, so we might have used a good deal of influence with Israel--thereby eroding its position--and yet not have produced an Arab offer of peace. In the absence of a settlement, it would not help us in the Arab world in the longer run.

D. Option 3--achieve big-power consensus (either 2-power or 4-power) but not impose it.

1. Some argue that it would improve our position with the Arabs just to take a position closer to theirs than our present one.
2. Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our position but on what we did with Israel. If we refused to press it on Israel--and it would be more difficult than our present position to sell to Israel--we would be called hypocritical.

E. Option 4--achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.

1. Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could be achieved because imposition is necessary and it is essential to have at least the USSR aboard for imposition on the UAR.
2. Others argue that the process of achieving consensus would dilute the substance of the consensus to the point where it would be all but impossible to impose it on Israel. This would bring us to a major collision with Israel. Moreover, the U.S. would be left with a position it could not regard as balanced and faced with the question of whether to go on aiding an Israel which rejected it. In the unlikely event we succeeded in imposing it on Israel, we would have in effect made ourselves responsible for enforcing the agreement.

VIII. Summary of Options.

A. Letting negotiations peter out, leaving to local forces responsibility for the terms of a settlement. This could be done for the following purposes:

1. to lower our profile while

- a. continuing to provide military and economic aid for Israel or
 - b. reducing support for Israel either as long-run pressure or as a demonstration of even-handedness;
2. as a tactical step
 - a. to produce a shock effect in continuing negotiations (particularly with the USSR); or
 - b. to clear the path for a new or untried combination of negotiations.
- B. Continue present combination of negotiations with the following choice of tactics:
1. stick to our present position without Israel's agreement to it (which could bring the negotiations to an inconclusive end);
 2. stick to our present position but press Israel to accept it;
 3. change our present position to achieve big-power consensus on Israel;
 4. change our present position to achieve consensus and try to impose the consensus on Israel.
- C. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.
1. U. S. mediation (at least on the Israel-Jordan front) by itself with US-USSR talks in suspense;
 2. U. S. mediation in combination with US-USSR talks.

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ISSUES FOR DECISION

I. Background

A. Since January our efforts to achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement have passed through three phases:

- In February, State recommended exploratory talks with the UK, France and USSR about a set of general principles that could be given to Ambassador Jarring to get negotiations started. The position then was to refuse to get into any details on the terms of a settlement, leaving them for the belligerents to negotiate.
- In April, State recommended that we advance a position on some of the specific terms of an Israel-UAR settlement -- excluding boundaries -- to keep the US-USSR talks from stalling. The position then was to refuse to discuss boundaries but say that the pre-war Israel-UAR border was not excluded in negotiation between the belligerents.
- In October, State recommended that we advance a specific position on the UAR-Israel border. This had been regarded as our fallback position in April. This position stated that Israel would withdraw to the pre-war border provided satisfactory arrangements were negotiated to enhance Israeli security at three sensitive points -- Gaza, Sharm al-Shaikh and the Sinai.

B. Resumption of Four Power talks opens the door now to a recommendation that we try to impose a settlement on Israel. Since the UK, France and the USSR differ with us somewhat on substance and distinctly on procedures, our position would be so whittled away that it is even less acceptable to Israel than it is now.

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ISSUES FOR DECISION

- C. The purpose of this policy review is to stand back for a moment and look at our present course and its alternatives in perspective--at least so strategy in the resumed talks can reflect our present appraisal. .
- II. A basic question behind any strategy is an assessment of whether it is possible to improve the U. S. position in the Arab world by dissociating ourselves from Israel's conquests? How permanent would that improvement be? What do the Arabs really want?
- A. Some argue that if Israel could just be persuaded to withdraw to its pre-war borders that would bring peace with the Arabs and lead to an improvement in our position in the Arab world.
- B. Others argue that the objective of the Arab radicals-- especially the militant Palestinians--is to end Israel's existence as a Jewish state, not just to regain conquered Arab territory. Thus, even if we engineer a settlement in which Israel withdraws to pre-war borders, the settlement is unlikely to last and the U. S. will still be defending Israel against an Arab crusade.
- C. My conclusion: As a government, we cannot afford to give up the objective of a settlement. But we should be governed in devising our strategy by recognition that the time for a settlement that could improve our position may well have passed until some new development alters the shape of the problem--for instance, evolution of a coherent Palestinian movement speaking with one voice, or another Arab defeat. We should not put ourself in the position of being expected to deliver what is not possible.
- III. Issue: Assuming that an Arab-Israeli settlement must remain our objective no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best strategy for achieving this? There are two broad choices:
- A. Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of a settlement, leaving to outsiders the problem of guaranteeing those terms once agreed.

1. Those who favor this approach believe that no outside force can impose peace; there will be peace only when the people of the area face up to the realities of their situation.
 2. Those who oppose protest that the one thing wrong with this strategy is that it was tried from November 1967 to January 1969, and there is little evidence that it achieved anything. To the contrary, radical forces have steadily grown stronger to the detriment of U. S. interests and the level of hostilities has intensified.
- B. Generate international pressures for the terms of a settlement.
1. Those who favor this approach argue that the Near Easterners are too suspicious of each other to initiate negotiations but might respond to a diplomatic alternative if it were offered. The situation is too dangerous for us not at least to determine decisively what price each side would be willing to pay for peace--instead of just guessing.
 2. Those who oppose feel that international diplomatic action has raised Arab hopes too high without being able to produce results. It has thereby diverted the Arabs from coming to terms with Israel. If international pressure is generated, the U. S. --and not any broad international body--will be expected to impose terms unilaterally on Israel--because in the last analysis there is no significant international pressure except for U. S. influence in Israel and Soviet influence in the UAR. If we cannot impose terms on Israel, we will become isolated with Israel.
- C. Recommendation: In operational terms, this issue could be stated this way: Is the purpose of the present diplomatic effort to produce pressure on the belligerents to negotiate or to produce an international consensus which would itself constitute pressure? Our position should be based on the

following judgments:

1. The most effective pressures will be the pressures of the situation. The belligerents will seek a military or a political solution depending on their estimate of which is more likely in the situation to get them what they want at a price they can pay. Outsiders are working at the margins.
2. For outside pressures on any belligerent to be justifiable they can be applied only on behalf of terms that are as fair as possible for both sides and have some possibility of producing a real settlement.
3. The first purpose of international consultations whether bilateral or multilateral, therefore, is not to produce pressure but to develop the most reasonable position on peace terms possible for the belligerents to accept, reject or negotiate over.
4. Insofar as it is realistic to talk about outside pressures, it is bilateral--not multilateral--pressure that has significance.

IV. Issue: Assuming the U. S. has an interest in generating whatever international pressure may be possible, what is the best way of achieving this? We have two broad choices:

- A. Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the terms of a settlement and then press Israel to accept (with the USSR pressing the UAR if there are any onerous conditions left for Cairo to accept).
 1. Those who favor this approach argue that this is the only way to avoid isolation at the UN and in the Near East. They believe that, even if the consensus does not achieve a settlement now, its mere existence will constitute steady pressure on the belligerents to reach a political settlement.

2. Those who oppose argue that (a) the U.S. is unlikely to achieve consensus on a position which comes close to meeting Israel's requirements and yet (b) we will be expected to impose it on Israel. Thus the very process of reaching consensus makes it harder to persuade Israel to accept. The mere existence of an international consensus constitutes little pressure on two belligerents with interests at stake which they regard as vital.
- B. Break off the talks now to cut our losses but also to generate pressure on the USSR and the Arabs to face up to the necessity to discuss reasonable terms.
1. Those who favor this course argue that any talks which do not serve the purpose of producing a package that the belligerents--if they were inclined toward genuine compromise--could consider seriously will unnecessarily raise their hopes and may delay their coming to terms with reality. They argue that the negotiating process itself increases our isolation and makes it more difficult to achieve a balanced position. By breaking out of multilateral negotiations we would at least cut that loss, and we would somewhat increase the pressure on the USSR to take a more reasonable position.
 2. Those who oppose this course argue that it is the situation--not just the talks--which isolates us. Breaking the talks without substituting something in return, especially right before the Arab Summit (December 20), would increase the Arab sense of desperation and their conviction that we are deliberately leaving them alone to face an expansionist Israel. If no peace-making effort remained, the Arabs would feel that they have no course but heightened military preparation. Moreover, the U.S. does not have an interest in another war over Israel's right to hold its conquered territory. Our interest is in Israel's security so we should try to

put ourselves in a position where we are holding out only for Israel's security within unexpanded borders. To achieve that position will require further negotiation.

C. Recommendation: In operational terms, this issue could be stated as follows: Which is more likely to produce movement toward a settlement--putting pressure on the USSR and UAR now by threatening to cut off the talks or going along with the Four Power talks? We should work from the following position:

1. Talks are useful if they (a) help refine a position that the key belligerents might accept (more true of the US-USSR talks than of the Four Power talks) and (b) provide a stimulus for useful bilateral pressures on the belligerents to accept.
2. Breaking off the talks would be useful if it (a) increased the likelihood of key negotiators facing hard decisions and (b) reduced pressure on us to take popular but unsalable positions. The timing of this act would, of course, have to be related to events like the Arab summit.

V. Issue: If the U. S. wishes to continue negotiations what is the best forum? The three options reviewed last February remain the logical choices:

A. Four Power talks.

1. Those who have argued for this course started with the fact that last January-February the U. S. was under heavy international--and special French--pressure to join in Four Power talks. There was strong sentiment at that time for taking a more active role to see whether outsiders could help the belligerents formulate at least a framework to get negotiations started. There was less enthusiasm for the Four Power forum per se, and we entered that forum chiefly for non-Mid-Eastern reasons.

The argument now is that having agreed to these talks we would now take some loss to stop them.

2. Those who have opposed argued that this is the forum in which the US is most likely to be pressed to move away from a position that has any chance of acceptance in Israel. Moreover, the British and French are the least likely of the Four to help persuade either side to accept, and the French at least are an anathema in Jerusalem.

B. US-USSR Talks

1. Those who argued for entering these talks did so on three grounds:

--For global reasons, the US had an interest in seeing whether it could negotiate seriously on a range of important issues.

--The USSR's persistent requests since September 1968 to talk about a Mid-East settlement suggested that Moscow might be uncomfortable in the Mid-East and might participate seriously in trying to work out a reasonable arrangement. While we maintained a proper skepticism, it made sense to probe far enough to see what was possible.

--The USSR should pay at least as much of the price for a settlement as the US in expanding its influence with its clients.

2. Those who opposed this course argued mainly that the USSR did not want a real peace; it simply wanted to persuade us to press Israel to give back the territory of Moscow's clients. Since the USSR was not likely to act seriously, it did not make sense to formalize the USSR's role in the Mid-East by giving it a place at the peace table.

C. U.S. mediation

1. Those who argued for felt in general that the US held all the cards since moving Israel was the main job to be done, so the US should exploit its role as exclusive peacemaker and not share credit for a settlement, if any. They claimed that Nasser really wanted peace but that he could not say so publicly so he would welcome a private US mediation effort. They also argued that it made no sense to involve the USSR in any exchange on a Jordan-Israel settlement.
2. Those who argued against argued that chances of success were slight, and the US would incur the main blame for failure. The US would also be accused of bad faith if it advanced a proposal, Israel rejected and the US went on aiding Israel.

D. Recommendation: In operational terms, the question is whether we are better off continuing the Four Power talks or finding the least painful way to end them and turning to the US-USSR talks exclusively or to a combination of those and a U.S. mediation effort on Jordan. That our position be based on the following judgments:

1. The Four Power talks do not meet the criteria for useful talks established above in that two of the four (UK, France) cannot accurately reflect the positions of the belligerents and can contribute little in pressing them to accept whatever consensus might be reached.
2. The US-USSR talks would meet those criteria if the USSR were serious about pressing the UAR closer to a genuine compromise.
3. US mediation seems the only appropriate approach to the Jordan-Israel settlement. But, of course, the US would have to be prepared to apply bilateral pressure.

VI. Issue: If we persist in the US-USSR and Four Power talks, what should be our strategy? We have four choices:

- A. Option 1--stick to present position even if Israel rejects it.
1. Some argue that this is the course most likely to isolate us. It would put us in a position where we would be pressed to continue military and economic support for Israel while Israel rejects the U.S. concept of what would constitute a fair settlement.
 2. Others argue that this is the only position that would avoid a confrontation with Israel. It would enable us to stand on a position we regard as fair. We could blame failure on all sides and maintain that we are only providing enough aid to maintain Israeli security.
- B. Option 2--stick to present position, pressing Israel to accept it.
1. Some argue that this would be the best possible position to be in if possible short of a negotiated settlement, whether or not the Arabs and Soviets accept. We would have produced Israeli agreement to a position we regard as fair. The Arabs and Soviets would be on weak ground if they rejected it.
 2. Others argue that we would delude ourselves if we started down this track expecting Israeli agreement. Since Israeli agreement is unlikely, this course is really the same as the first with all its disadvantages. They point out that this would not necessarily produce movement toward a settlement, so we might have used a good deal of influence with Israel--thereby eroding its position if it agreed--and yet not have produced an Arab offer of peace.

- C. Option 3--achieve big-power consensus but not impose on Israel.
1. Some argue that it would improve our position with the Arabs just to take a position closer to theirs than our present one.
 2. Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our position but on what we did with Israel. If we refused to press it on Israel--and it would be more difficult than our present position to sell to Israel--we would be called hypocritical.
- D. Option 4--achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.
1. Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could be achieved because imposition is necessary and it is essential to have at least the USSR aboard for imposition on the USSR.
 2. Others argue that the process of achieving consensus would dilute the substance of the consensus to the point where it would be all but impossible to impose it on Israel. Moreover, the U.S. would be left with a position it could not regard as balanced and faced with the question of whether to go on aiding an Israel which rejected it. In the unlikely event we succeeded in imposing it on Israel, we would have in effect made ourselves responsible for enforcing the agreement.
- E. Recommendation: That our position be based on the following judgments:
1. It would be preferable to be isolated with a position which we regarded as balanced and which Israel might accept than to take a less balanced position which Israel would reject. If we have anything to contribute to the negotiating process, it is our influence with Israel.

2. That means we should not modify our present position on significant issues just for the sake of achieving Four Power consensus. US bilateral pressure on Israel is more significant than any general pressure that might be generated by Four Power consensus.
3. If the U.S. stands close to its present position and Israel rejects it, the U.S. will face a painful decision on whether to continue support for Israel.
4. It would put the U.S. in a reasonable position, therefore, if the U.S. could press Israel to accept its present position. In practical terms, that would mean Israel's saying that it does not intend to exploit its conquests to expand its borders and would withdraw to pre-war borders provided the Arabs would negotiate adequate security arrangements.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE: WHERE ARE WE GOING?

I. Background

A. Steps taken by the U. S. since January.

1. The February NSC review covered two basic options: letting local forces play themselves out and taking the initiative to help find a settlement. The first was rejected, and it was decided to enter a series of exploratory talks with the UK, France and the USSR to try to achieve agreement on a set of general principles to govern a settlement. The objective was to give these to the UN representative, Ambassador Jarring, as a basis on which to bring the belligerents together.
2. In April, a proposal was approved to advance in the US-USSR talks U. S. positions on specific terms of a settlement other than borders. The talks had concentrated on trying to establish a frame work for a UAR-Israel settlement. They had reached a point where an early impasse seemed likely unless discussions could become more specific. But the U. S. still refused at this point to state a position on borders, leaving that subject exclusively to negotiation between the belligerents. The Four Power talks recessed in June awaiting results of the US-USSR exchange.
3. A September-October policy review considered the proposal to advance in the US-USSR talks a U. S. position on borders. On October 28 the position was given to the USSR that Israel should withdraw to the pre-war UAR-Israel boundary on the condition that Israel's security requirements be met through demilitarization in the Sinai and special arrangements for Gaza and free passage through the Straits of Tiran. The position on borders -- considered our fallback position until then -- was designed to emphasize to the USSR that Israel could be pressed to withdraw only if the UAR were pressed to commit itself to arrangements

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that Israel would regard as providing security somewhat commensurate to that provided by the present ceasefire lines. Our proposal was cast so as to leave the details of the security arrangements Israel would require for negotiation between Israel and the UAR.

B. Situation in the area.

1. The June 1967 ceasefire is in effect dead. A situation of limited warfare exists on the Israeli-UAR and Israeli-Jordanian ceasefire lines carried out by the military forces of both sides and by the fedayeen (Palestinian commandos) on the Arab side. Military action on the UAR front has intensified sharply since last spring. The Lebanese crises of the past six months have increased activity on that front, and it is likely to be added as a third active front in the months ahead.
2. The fedayeen have steadily increased their influence. This was demonstrated most focibly in the Lebanese crisis when they succeeded in bringing the moderate Lebanese government against its will into the active war against Israel. ;oil.
3. Arab frustrations at the lack of a settlement have mounted and with them the fatalistic attitude that another war is inevitable. This has strengthened the hand of Palestinian militants and the more radical governments. In this atmosphere, the remaining moderate governments are increasingly beleaguered and uncomfortable in their close association with the U.S.
4. The Arab summit which begins December 20 will give the radicals a forum to press for renunciation of a political settlement and declaration of all-out war against Israel.
5. The prospects in the absence of a settlement are for a gradual acceleration of the present limited, relatively static war on the ceasefire lines toward more general hostilities. Israeli occupation of additional Arab territory

as a buffer, particularly in Jordan and perhaps in Lebanon, is probably not imminent but cannot ultimately be ruled out. Israel can be expected to remain capable of inflicting much greater damage on the Arabs than it receives, but neither side will be capable of imposing a clear cut and total military capitulation on the other.

C. Where we stand now.

1. The US-USSR talks have been dormant since October 28 because the USSR still has not responded to the U. S. fallback position stated on October 28. It seems unlikely that Moscow would flatly reject our proposal, although the UAR would make it difficult for Moscow to accept. The USSR probably wants to keep the talks going, although it may regard the Four Power forum as an easier one for the moment in which to whittle away our position. Moscow might just leave our proposition unanswered for a time.
2. Four Power talks have just resumed, initially to concentrate on aspects of a Jordan-Israel settlement. Israel has objected sharply to both the resumption and the subject. The U. S. has told Israel it would not advance a specific position until after discussions with Foreign Minister Eban, but it is now unclear whether that conversation will take place. In these talks:
 - a. The signs are clear that the French will not stand with us and the British, while wanting to avoid a break with us, are wavering. They each disagree with us to some degree in objective, procedure and substance.
 - They assess the chances of a settlement as slim and are mainly interested in bolstering their positions in the Arab world.
 - They are much more inclined than we to see a Four Power consensus as significant pressure on Israel and the Arabs, but they would expect us to

use the full extent of our influence with Israel to press for acceptance of the consensus.

-- They will press us to move away from our position on procedures that significant details of the settlement should be left to the belligerents to negotiate.

-- They will probably even press us to more pro-Arab positions on the location of borders, demilitarized zones and securing free passage through waterways.

- b. The USSR--because it knows the limits on what it can persuade Cairo to accept--is less eager to rush into details that it would have to press on the UAR, but would surely join the UK and France in whittling away our position on substantive issues insofar as they are dealt with.
3. The U.S. has yet to decide on a proposal that we become an active intermediary between Israel and Jordan in an effort to promote a settlement on that front. Israel has objected sharply to Four Power involvement, partly because it involves the USSR for the first time in a Jordan settlement.

II. Purpose of the Present Policy Reappraisal.

- A. Before addressing strategy in the coming talks, it is useful to step back and look again at broader issues and options.
- B. From that perspective, we can then address strategy in the Four Power talks and in the US-USSR talks if they are resumed.

III. A Basic Question: Is it possible to improve the U.S. position in the Arab World by dissociating ourselves from Israel's bargaining positions? How permanent would that improvement be? What do the Arabs really want?

- A. Some would argue that the main Arab aim is to regain the territory conquered by Israel in 1967. Therefore, if Israel could just be persuaded to return to its 1967 borders, reasonable Arabs would live and let live with Israel, and the Arab extre-

mists would be isolated. While almost no one is optimistic about the chances for a settlement in the near future, some would argue that only this kind of approach has a chance of arresting the trend toward radicalism throughout the area and erosion of the U.S. position. Even if the Israelis did not withdraw, it would improve the U.S. position with the Arabs to speak out in favor of withdrawal.

- B. Others would argue that the objective of the Arab radicals --especially the militant Palestinians--is to end Israel's existence as a separate Jewish state. They would regard Israel's withdrawal to pre-war borders as just a step toward their objective. Thus, even if we urge a settlement in which Israel withdraws to pre-war borders, the settlement is unlikely to last. And as long as Israel occupies Arab territory, the U.S. position is unlikely to improve significantly.
- C. The U.S. negotiating position attempts to take both of these views into account. That position is built around the proposition that Israel should withdraw only if Arab governments recognize Israel's existence and commit themselves to control the radicals who would try to undercut a settlement. But two questions remain:
1. Can we dissociate ourselves from Israel? Since the Arabs regard us as the creators of Israel, will they regard anything short of cutting off all material support as convincing evidence that we have actually dissociated ourselves? What the Arabs want at a minimum is return of the conquered territories. They will be less impressed by our formal position than by what we will do to implement it, such as cutting off Israeli military supplies.
 2. Has the fedayeen movement acquired so much momentum of its own that it--along with the radical governments (e.g., Syria)--would be capable of toppling any government (e.g., Jordan's) that accepted any conditions the U.S. might be able to persuade Israel to accept? Would that neutralize any gains the U.S. might make from efforts to press Israel to accept the terms of a settlement?

- IV. Issue: Assuming that an Arab-Israeli settlement must remain our objective no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best strategy for achieving this?
- A. There are two broad choices:
1. Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of a settlement, leaving to outside powers the question of guaranteeing those terms once reached.
 2. Generate international pressures on the terms of a settlement themselves.
- B. Option 1 -- Letting local forces assume responsibility for a settlement.
1. Those who favor this approach argue that the only durable arrangement for Arab- Israeli coexistence will be one that grows out of recognition on both sides of what is necessary if they are to live together. As long as the Arabs hope that outsiders will bail them out, they will not face up to the reality that Israel is here to stay. As the Arabs learn that no one but the U. S. can deliver Israel, they will learn to deal with us, thus enhancing our position.
 2. Those who oppose argue that to accept this approach is to accept the probability of another Arab-Israeli war with all the dangers that it would have for world peace. Moreover, on the strictly local scene, they argue that this course rests on two questionable premises: (a) that the Arabs will be able to contain their frustration to the point of calculating their interests rationally and (b) that Israel can maintain sufficient military superiority to continue to impose high enough costs on the Arabs to make clear that a rational calculation of Arab interests would lead the Arabs to negotiate a settlement. Those concerned for the survival of Israel must question whether in the long run two million people can hope to outlast eighty million.

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C. Option 2 -- Generating international pressures for the terms of a settlement.

1. Those who favor argue, above all, that the U. S. cannot sit back without making some reasonable effort to avoid another war. Beyond that, the U. S. in 1967-68 tried standing aside and relying on local pressures and no progress toward peace was made while radical forces in the Middle East became stronger, threatening U. S. interests. The belligerents will surely not get together soon to negotiate if left to their own devices, so if there is any chance of a settlement at all it can only come with outside help in breaking the deadlock. Even if the international effort fails now, it may be useful to have available an international consensus on a diplomatic settlement if another war takes place or if the belligerents find the war of attrition too costly and wish a face-saving way to turn to negotiation.
2. Those who oppose argue that there is insufficient will on either side to achieve a negotiated settlement. Outside influence where vital security interests are concerned will remain marginal. It therefore exposes the U. S. unnecessarily to blame for failure and wastes U. S. influence when it undertakes an impossible task. If international pressure is generated, the danger is that the U. S. will be forced to try to impose terms unilaterally on Israel, will become Israel's defense lawyer if it cannot impose and will be isolated with Israel.

V. Issue: Assuming the U. S. has an interest in generating international pressures for a settlement, what is the best way of achieving this? Because of its widely varied interests in the Mid-East, the U. S. for twenty years has tried to maintain a position in all of the rival camps -- radical, moderate, Arab, Israeli. Continuation of the Arab-Israeli impasse is making it increasingly difficult to maintain influence in Arab capitals and leaving the U. S. more exclusively identified with Israel.

A. Working from where we are today, we have two broad choices:

1. Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the terms of a settlement and then press Israel to accept. (The USSR would be expected to press the UAR to accept, assuming the consensus still left some onerous conditions for the UAR to accept.) This effort would probably lead us to modify our present negotiating position by: (a) giving up our insistence on direct negotiations or even (b) possibly giving up our effort to settle now all the issues in the Palestine question--refugees, status of waterways, final status of Jerusalem--and trying simply to arrange Israeli withdrawal and security guarantees for the borders.
 2. Break off the talks now to cut our losses and generate pressure on the USSR and Arabs to face up to the necessity to discuss reasonable terms. Whether we stand on our present position or modify it will have some effect on whether the talks come to an impasse or not. But the principal decision now is whether we let the talks peter out as a matter of conscious policy. This could take one of two forms: (a) simply backing out of the talks on grounds that they were getting nowhere, or (b) backing out of the talks with the idea of making a unilateral effort to bring the parties together.
- B. The first approach--trying to achieve consensus and impose a settlement.
1. Those who urge this approach would argue that this is the only way to avoid diplomatic isolation and isolation with Israel in the Near East. They believe that--even if the consensus did not soon result in a settlement--it would help the U.S. position in the area to be on record with the Arabs in favor of a fair settlement and that such a consensus would provide an alternative for the belligerents to turn to in the future as the costs of the war of attrition mount.
 2. Those who have reservations about this course point out that the U. S. would be expected to impose the consensus on an Israel which would flatly reject it. In order to achieve a consensus, we would have to make concessions on the very points which Israel insists upon, so the process of achieving

consensus would make our job of imposing a settlement more difficult than ever. (For example, Israel insists on a genuine process of negotiation with the Arabs, but the British and French consider that unimportant. They are mainly interested in the borders and--at least the French--have not given detailed attention to such points as how effectively to enforce demilitarization.) Then the U.S. would be faced with the question of whether it could go on supporting with military and economic aid an Israel which had rejected an international consensus to which we had subscribed. If we continued support, much of the goodwill earned with the Arabs would be lost, and we would be accused of hypocrisy. We would be much better off standing on our present position--which is balanced--than diluting that position and then having to live with it.

- C. The second approach--breaking off negotiations or letting them peter out.
1. Some argue that the negotiating process itself has isolated us and breaking it off would cut those losses which stem from its dramatization of our support for Israel. The negotiating process leaves us the unpalatable choices of being Israel's lawyer or imposing a settlement on Israel while leaving us isolated in a four-power forum whose other members are not subject to our restraints nor do they have our responsibility. We have been "Israel's lawyer" in peacemaking efforts. While that identification is unavoidable because of the past U.S. role in support of Israel, active negotiations dramatize it, and the Soviets appear the champion of the Arabs. The U.S. position would improve marginally if we could at least lay aside our active role as Israel's lawyer. Moreover, breaking the negotiations could put pressure on the USSR to be more forthcoming since Moscow must take seriously the fact that its client would lose another war and the USSR would face the choice between helping and confirming Arab disillusionment with the Soviets. Also, the USSR must try to minimize the appearance of impotence that comes from its inability to force Israel to return Arab territory.
 2. Others argue that breaking off negotiations by itself--or letting them peter out--have only limited advantage. It might deprive the USSR of a means of showing it is trying to get Arab territory back and of a means of whittling away our position. However, the USSR probably figures that time is more on the Soviet than the U.S. side in terms of relative position in the Near East, so the Soviets can afford to wait, especially since the Arabs

might cut its losses marginally, but it is U.S. support for Israel and not mainly the talks which isolates the U.S. The only way the effect of a disengagement from the talks might be softened is if the U.S. disengaged from material support of Israel at the same time.

VI. Issue: If the U.S. wishes to continue negotiations, what is the best forum?

A. In the first NSC review of policy toward the Arab-Israeli impasse last February, three possibilities were considered:

1. Four Power talks.

- a. Some argue that, since international opinion favors this approach, the U.S. would appear as the obstacle to peace if it blocked these talks. Involving the principal permanent members of the UN Security Council, they provide a natural way for involving the UN while still maintaining some control over its involvement. If a consensus is reached, the U.S. could insist that the other three share some of the burden of pressing it on the principal belligerents (Israel and the UAR).
- b. Others argue that these talks are more a liability than asset. An international opinion that cannot contribute in practical ways to bringing the parties together should have only limited claim on us. The British and French are leaning away from us in their own effort to curry favor with the Arabs and contribute nothing in drawing the UAR and Israel closer to agreement. These talks also bring the USSR into discussion of a Jordan settlement where it has no interests but improvement of its own position as champion of the Arabs. The USSR has no special concern about Jordan's losing another war. These talks are more irksome to Israel even than the US-USSR talks -- and even less likely to produce a settlement. The British and French (as well as the USSR) will whittle away our position so that any consensus reached is even more difficult to sell to Israel. If the U.S. is going to end up with the most difficult job -- pressing the terms of the consensus

on Israel--we gain little from sharing Arab credit with the USSR for whatever we may achieve. Moreover, we have moved step by step away from our January position, and we have to take a stand somewhere.

2. US-USSR talks

- a. Some argue that this is the appropriate forum because it represents the only two powers with both significant interests and significant influence. The USSR is under some pressure to cooperate since it is under pressure to help the UAR get its territory back. It would see its position gradually eroded if it could not get Arab territory back and seriously jeopardized if the UAR lost another war, as it inevitably would.

This procedure also offers a way to be sure that the USSR shares in the dissatisfaction which will follow any settlement because no settlement can fail to be unpalatable to both sides. Moreover, any fair settlement will require almost as much pressure in Cairo as in Jerusalem; not only does the USSR have more influence in Cairo than we but also it should be required to make itself just as unpopular with its clients as we do with ours.

- b. Others argue that this approach, if it succeeded, would enhance the position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. More important, Israel sees the USSR as its prime enemy, exploiting Arab resentment toward Israel to enhance its own position in the area. Israel argues that any terms Moscow could agree to would automatically not be in the Israeli--or U.S.--interest. Moreover, eight months of negotiation have not revealed serious evidence that Moscow is really interested in anything more than whittling away our position.

3. U.S. mediation. While this is theoretically possible on the UAR-Israel front, the U.S. has more interest in a Jordan-Israel settlement because of our friendship with Jordan. Moreover, with U.S. clients on both sides of the line, this offers a better prospect for U.S. mediation.
 - a. Some argue that the U.S. should not commit the Israel-Jordan negotiation to either the Four Power or the US-USSR talks because it introduces the USSR which can have no interest--and make no contribution --except making propaganda capital by posing as the champion of the Arabs. Moreover, the Israelis object sharply to Soviet involvement. Also, the same arguments that apply in general against Four Power talks--the lack of British and French influence--are reasons for not relying on them to produce movement toward agreement.
 - b. Others argue that the really difficult issues--the issues of a Palestine settlement--are on this front, and the U.S. would profit from diffusing the responsibility for terms on such problems as Jerusalem and the refugees that no one could accept.

VII. Issue: If we persist in the US-USSR and Four Power talks, what would be our strategy? We start from a position of concentrating on working out a framework for negotiation among the belligerents, leaving the specifics of a settlement for them to negotiate. The one element of substance we have dealt with in detail is the proposition that Israel should withdraw to the pre-war UAR-Israel border provided a satisfactory arrangement for securing that border can be negotiated.

A. We have two basic choices and two stances in executing each:

1. Let the talks peter out:

--Option 1: Stick to our present position without Israel's agreement to it.

--Option 2: Stick to our present position but press Israel to accept it.

2. Press the talks to fruition:

--Option 3: Change our present position to achieve big-power consensus but not press the consensus on Israel.

--Option 4: Change our present position to achieve consensus and try to impose that consensus on Israel.

B. Option 1 -- stick to our present position without Israeli agreement to it, letting talks peter out.

1. Some argue that this is the only position that would avoid the unpalatable choice of enforcing a settlement which will antagonize Israel without gaining the goodwill of the Arabs. It would enable us to stand on a position we regard as fair. We could blame failure on all sides and maintain that we are only providing enough aid to maintain Israeli security.

2. Others argue that this is the course most likely to isolate us from the Arabs. It would put us in a position where we would be pressed to continue military and economic support for Israel while Israel rejects the U.S. concept of what would constitute a fair settlement. This almost certainly would end our participation in the peace-making effort to avoid another Arab-Israeli clash.

C. Option 2 -- stick to present position, letting talks peter out but pressing Israel to accept our position.

1. Some argue that this would be the best position to be in if possible short of a negotiated settlement, whether or not the Arabs and Soviets accept. We would have attempted to produce Israeli agreement to a position we regard as fair. The Arabs and Soviets would be on weak ground if they rejected it. It would buy us some time in the Arab world and could lead eventually to a real negotiating situation. It would keep us relatively uninvolved.

2. Others argue that we would delude ourselves if we started down this track expecting Israeli agreement. Since Israeli agreement is unlikely, this course is really the same as the first with all its disadvantages. They point out that this would not necessarily produce movement toward a

settlement, so we might have used a good deal of influence with Israel--thereby eroding its position--and yet not have produced an Arab offer of peace. In the absence of a settlement, it would not help us in the Arab world in the longer run.

D. Option 3--achieve big-power consensus (either 2-power or 4-power) but not impose it.

1. Some argue that it would improve our position with the Arabs just to take a position closer to theirs than our present one.
2. Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our position but on what we did with Israel. If we refused to press it on Israel--and it would be more difficult than our present position to sell to Israel--we would be called hypocritical.

E. Option 4--achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.

1. Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could be achieved because imposition is necessary and it is essential to have at least the USSR aboard for imposition on the UAR.
2. Others argue that the process of achieving consensus would dilute the substance of the consensus to the point where it would be all but impossible to impose it on Israel. This would bring us to a major collision with Israel. Moreover, the U.S. would be left with a position it could not regard as balanced and faced with the question of whether to go on aiding an Israel which rejected it. In the unlikely event we succeeded in imposing it on Israel, we would have in effect made ourselves responsible for enforcing the agreement.

VIII. Summary of Options.

A. Letting negotiations peter out, leaving to local forces responsibility for the terms of a settlement. This could be done for the following purposes:

1. to lower our profile while

- a. continuing to provide military and economic aid for Israel or
 - b. reducing support for Israel either as long-run pressure or as a demonstration of even-handedness;
2. as a tactical step
- a. to produce a shock effect in continuing negotiations (particularly with the USSR); or
 - b. to clear the path for a new or untried combination of negotiations.
- B. Continue present combination of negotiations with the following choice of tactics:
1. stick to our present position without Israel's agreement to it (which could bring the negotiations to an inconclusive end);
 2. stick to our present position but press Israel to accept it;
 3. change our present position to achieve big-power consensus on Israel;
 4. change our present position to achieve consensus and try to impose the consensus on Israel.
- C. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.
1. U. S. mediation (at least on the Israel-Jordan front) by itself with US-USSR talks in suspense;
 2. U. S. mediation in combination with US-USSR talks.

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