

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM

Date _____

To: _____

Subject:

Henry -

At your convenience,
Frank Shakespeare
would like to
talk to you
about "one or
two things"

Audy

13 Dec 69

Henry -

Here is a draft
that might serve
as a starting point
in preparing
instructions for Lodge
based on the "Mutual
Withdrawal" option.

Andy

SECRETInstructions for Ambassador LodgeGeneral

Your basic objective is to conduct substantive negotiations, in association with the South Vietnamese, to achieve a just and ~~desirable~~ ^{desirable} peace in SVN, based upon self-determination for SVN, free from outside interference and coercion. Consistent with this objective, you should press for prompt and meaningful progress on important questions of substance, including those discussed below. This Government will seek to maintain effective coordination between the course of action you pursue in Paris, U.S. military and other operations in SEA and other activities of the Government

Background

NVN is obligated to conduct serious and meaningful negotiations when the expanded talks begin. The cessation of all bombing in NVN which went into effect in November 1968 is directly linked to such talks on Hanoi's part. Moreover, this government considers that the NVN understands that such serious and meaningful talks can only continue if the GVN is a full participant, the DMZ is not violated by attacks through or over it against the forces of the US and its allies, and attacks are not conducted against SVN major cities. The effect of the foregoing is to make the continued cessation of the bombing of NVN dependent upon NVN fulfillment of these terms.

Specific Objectives

In the phase of negotiations now approaching, an effort to negotiate a mutual withdrawal of external forces should receive first priority. The US remains prepared to act in accordance with the Manila Communique, in response to verified action by the North Vietnamese. While the US is prepared to initiate substantial force withdrawals, based on explicit agreement, simultaneously with substantial verified withdrawals by NVA troops into NVN, further US withdrawals must be preceded by verified withdrawals of NVA forces. Specific magnitude and timing of withdrawals are matters for subsequent continuing guidance.

Any general cease-fire agreement must be inseparably linked to NVA force withdrawal, and must not constitute a "cease-fire in place." A limited verified cease-fire in the DMZ, to consolidate the understandings ^{reached in connection with} ~~relating to~~ the cessation of the bombing, is acceptable in principle.

The US will not seek to impose, nor press the GVN to accept a coalition government for SVN. Both sides must be free to raise for serious and meaningful discussion any topic relevant to the substance of peace in SVN. Failure to deal promptly with such matters will be considered inconsistent with the understanding to conduct serious and meaningful discussions.

It should be made clear to the North Vietnamese that actions by them taking military advantage of the situation

resulting from the bombing cessation, in a way which adversely affects the security of the forces of the US and its allies is inconsistent with continued cessation of the bombing.

In negotiations on matters effecting SVN, the GVN must be included on the basis of unrestricted pacification.

20 Dec 68

Fils - Vietnam

Henry -

Here is a paper I gave to Harriman + Vance when I was a member of our Paris delegation.

Although dated in spots, it still has some validity (I believe) as a means of linking what is done in Vietnam to what is done in Paris.

Audley