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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Governor Harriman
Mr. Vance

The attached memorandum proposes that we use, as a central negotiating criterion for the talks with Hanoi, what each side is able (or thinks it will be able) to achieve on the battlefield.

Among the values of having and using such a criterion are the following:

- a. It links military prospects on the ground with posture at the conference table.
- b. It offers a ready response to those who propose making unrealistic demands upon the NVN/VC side, or making unnecessary concessions by the US/SVN side.
- c. It provides a simple basis for understanding and support of the course of negotiations by responsible authority within the United States Government.
- d. It suggests practical working boundaries within which the elements of a realistic yet acceptably safe settlement could conceivably be negotiated.

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A. J. Goodpaster

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SUBJECT: Central negotiating criterion for talks with Hanoi

1. In considering possible avenues for negotiation, a criterion of central importance will be what each side is able (or thinks it will be able) to achieve on the battlefield. In schematic, generalized terms:

a. Efforts to get either side to give up through negotiations what it is able to achieve on the battlefield--especially achievements having direct, positive value to the side--will certainly encounter the highest order of resistance.

b. Conceivably, what one side or the other is not able to achieve on the battlefield--together with achievements which are not of themselves of direct, positive value--should be more susceptible to negotiation.

2. Negotiation may not be wholly impossible in the case of 1a above. Some objectives, though possibly attainable, may involve too high a price in lives, resource costs, and political pressures. Moreover, if the objective is one that could be tolerated by the other side if pursued by non-violent means, peaceful arrangements constituting a mutually acceptable alternative to continued combat might conceivably be worked out in negotiations. Within the scope of 1b above, negotiation should be easier. Even in this case, however, one must expect hard and long argument over just what one side or the other can or can not achieve on the battlefield.

3. The following paragraphs present the above concept in more concrete terms.

4. We have now weathered the worst the Communists could throw at us, in the Tet offensive, with full advantage of surprise and concentration. Short of GVN collapse or U.S. cave-in, they cannot achieve on the battlefield a takeover in South Vietnam, (and in fact

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their prospect is for a gradual reduction in the area and population under their control, and in their covert strength within the areas that are GVN-controlled or are contested).

5. On the other side, they have weathered our bombardment of the North and our operations in the South with sufficient capability to sustain a continuation of the war on a substantial scale, and preserve a significant structure and apparatus in the South for an extended period. (However, even though they may deny it, the probable prospect is for gradual reduction of their holdings and their infrastructure).

6. If they are prepared to accept that they cannot achieve take-over in the South by force of arms and violence, then the essential purposes served by their effort in SVN are reduced to two:

a. Infliction of destruction, losses and damage upon the GVN-controlled SVN and on US, SVN and Free World armed forces.

b. Protection and preservation of VC structure and membership.

7. They pursue these purposes at heavy costs in loss of lives, in damage to their LOC (south of 19°) and in expenditure of economic effort to the detriment of the well-being of their people.

8. If they are prepared to forego 6a, above (which does not seem to have direct, positive value in itself for them), and if safeguarding arrangements could be found for 6b, they could save themselves through a negotiated solution for the costs they are sustaining in losses, damages and resource-expenditures, at no loss to what they can achieve on the battlefield.

9. On our side, the complete extirpation of VC guerrilla, local and mainforce units, plus NVA forces in SVN, appears improbable. Short of VC/NVA termination of violence, some level of terror, insecurity, periodic sabotage and destruction can be expected to continue, together with some residual of Communist infrastructure despite any efforts we and the SVN are likely to make. (However, while VC/NVA capabilities of these kinds will continue, they may be expected to be decreasing, as US/SVN military and pacification operations proceed).

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10. If the foregoing is accepted, our purposes also reduce to two, paralleling those of the Communists:

a. Infliction of destruction, losses and damage upon the VC/NVN, particularly their armed forces.

b. Protection and extension of the population and area of SVN under government control.

11. We too are paying in loss of lives as well as heavy economic and political costs for our pursuit of these purposes. We have no major interest in 10a as such. If 10b could be safeguarded and assured by other means, we could save the losses and much of the heavy costs we are now bearing, at no loss to what we can probably expect to achieve on the battlefield.

12. The NVN may not yet be convinced that the GVN can avoid collapse, and that we can avoid cave-in, and we may not yet be convinced that they can sustain the war for an extended period. After they have tested our mettle in a "fight and talk" situation for a period of weeks or months, and after we have seen what they are able to do following the present cycle of apparent re-building from their Tet losses, clearer judgments can be made. If serious progress in negotiations should be delayed for such a period, the time elapsed should permit a judgment as to whether the NVN have used the bombing halt to build up forces and supplies in the South to levels which constitute "taking advantage" of the bombing cessation. Also during this period, and until a settlement based upon non-resort to violence has been developed, it would be important for us to avoid agreements and deescalating actions that would adversely affect our military situation vis-a-vis that of the North Vietnamese, or ease the military pressure on them in SVN.

13. Many questions remain unanswered by this sketchy criterion. Not the least of these is whether the SVN, post-settlement, facing an NLF political drive perhaps supported by a residual level of terror and violence, could sustain itself. Locations for withdrawn forces, cease-fire terms, and verification methods are further concrete questions to be addressed. Moreover, this criterion does not touch the question of which issues should be negotiated by the SVN, and which by the U.S., or by the two in combination.

14. Nevertheless, and in summary, this criterion does appear

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to provide boundaries within which the elements of a realistic yet acceptably safe settlement could conceivably be developed in a serious yet safeguarded effort to negotiate. A conceivable illustrative pattern of agreement and action might be:

a. The NVN/VC cease the use of force to achieve a take-over of SVN, withdrawing NVN units to the North; cease terrorism, armed attack, sabotage and destruction; and accept assurances against reprisals against VC personnel and peaceful organization in the South.

b. The US/SVN cease the use of force to eliminate the VC totally; cease armed attack on VC and NVA forces; and accept assurances that peaceful administration, extended throughout SVN, will not be interfered with.



A. J. Goodpaster

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File - Vietnam

20 Dec 68

Henry -

The attached guidance document, which I have provided to all senior commanders and senior staff in SVN, provides I believe a conceptual framework competent to serve as a basis for understanding and assessment of the military/security component of the Vietnam issue.

Andy
Goodpastor

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PLANNING BASIS FOR COORDINATION OF ALLIED EFFORTS
IN THE MILITARY/SECURITY FIELD

1. A rough planning basis for coordination of operations against all elements of the communist structure is set out in outline below. It is intended for use as appropriate in planning future operations and in work with senior Vietnamese counterparts. There is nothing new as such in it. Rather, it is an attempt to pull together in a systematic, coherent and reviewable formulation many factors and methods already well-recognized.
2. The basic premises are that we are entering a period in which we not only must but also can attack the communists--root, trunk and branch--throughout the country. There must be a full spectrum of coordinated allied operations against the full spectrum of communist forces, organizations, activities and facilities. The latter constitute, and must be attacked, as a single coordinated system. The several components of this communist system, which embraces the familiar "political struggle, military struggle and proselyting campaign," are mutually supporting but are also by the same token mutually dependent and hence mutually vulnerable.
3. The aim must be nothing less than the destruction of the communist system in all its elements. Operations as envisaged have a cumulative effect, whereby the results of early operational phases combine, with increasing momentum, to achieve full subsequent destruction.
4. Principal components of the communist "system" are set forth below, together with practical and effective tasks for the neutralization or destruction of their usefulness.
 - a. VC/NVA main and local force major units (battalion and larger). Tasks are:
 - (1) Keep them away from cities and towns.
 - (2) Keep them off the RF/PF; when and if they attack the CIDG, smash them.
 - (3) Attack them to inflict losses, drive them out of base areas, and drive them out of SVN or, better yet, destroy them.

PLANNING BASIS FOR COORDINATION OF ALLIED EFFORTS;
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b. VC/NVA local companies, platoons, squads and guerrilla groups. Tasks are:

- (1) Break up their preparations for the operations of main and local force units.
- (2) Destroy them.
- (3) Prevent their mining or boobytrapping of movement routes.

c. VC infrastructure and administrative organization. Tasks are:

- (1) Break up their preparations for operations of main and local force units.
- (2) Progressively eliminate them.

d. VC/NVA base areas, both the major base areas and the local base areas of local units. Tasks are:

- (1) Enter, and locate and seize caches.
- (2) Inflict losses on forces located there, and drive them out.
- (3) Deny their use as a safe refuge, or an area from which to mount and launch operations.

e. VC/NVA supply, commo-liaison and evacuation routes. Tasks are:

- (1) Locate them.
- (2) Block them.
- (3) Impose personnel and materiel losses.

f. VC/NVA "spring board" areas from which to launch attacks on population centers and other key target areas. Tasks are:

- (1) Disrupt preparations (supply, reconnaissance, communications, medical).
- (2) Deny their use to main and local force units.

g. VC controlled or influenced population, ranging from committed adherents to passive or unwilling compliants. Tasks are:

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(1) Keep VC local elements out of relatively secure and contested hamlets.

(2) Progressively enter VC controlled hamlets to deny their use by VC forces, infrastructure and administrative organization.

(3) Turn the populace against the NVA and VC, especially local forces, guerrillas and VCI, as security is improved.

(4) Preempt the VC by recruiting young men from the hamlets and villages for the armed forces, and men and women of all ages for the self-defense corps.

5. The foregoing tasks do no more than outline an attack upon the principal contributions made by each main element of the enemy system to some or all of the others. The listing is not complete, nor has any attempt been made to tailor it in detail to the widely varying military conditions we face in the different parts of the country.

6. For further consideration of how to operate against these components of the communist structure, several different types of terrain and territorial areas must be distinguished:

a. Densely populated areas containing major cities and towns and including the coastal plains and the delta, with frequent smaller included areas of marsh, wooded terrain, rough and uncultivated areas, and occasional mountain spurs thrusting into or breaking up the flat coastal and delta area. These areas vary widely in the nature and extent of the waterways within them, with areas of the delta facilitating water movement and limiting land movement to the greatest extent. The basic objective throughout these areas must be to eradicate all VC/NVA military force as well as guerrillas and infrastructure, eliminating the bases and "operating areas" included within the overall area (generally in the rough terrain) and denying use of the area for com-mo-liasion routes, or for routes of combat unit movement, stockage of supplies, and evacuation. An accompanying objective is to establish GVN control throughout the area.

b. Intermediate and outlying areas inland from the coastal plain, with little population, including but extending beyond the

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piedmont; the highlands have some elements in common with these areas. Here the basic objective is to prevent the enemy from utilizing the area effectively as a base for the rest, refit, training and resupply of his forces, and for mounting attacks against the populated areas. VC settlements and hamlets must be brought under GVN control, and communist military forces kept under attack and progressively destroyed. Maximum protection and security must be provided for population under GVN control.

c. Remote jungle and mountain terrain, essentially uninhabited. Here the basic objective is to interdict and disrupt the enemy's use of the area, for example, for supply and infiltration routes, and for deep major base installations. His forces should be kept under attack at every opportunity, and particularly when the enemy attacks CIDG camps.

d. Isolated towns and cities, each involving vulnerable and often long lines of communication. These present individual and difficult problems. However, they must be garrisoned, protected and kept under government control. VC forces in the area and within range to strike the cities must be prevented from doing so, and progressively eliminated.

7. It is necessary to target on each of the elements of the communist "system," taking full account of the different geographical and population areas, and applying our forces and resources with full coordination of responsibility and effort. A broad formulation which can serve as a planning point of departure is the following:

a. Role of major allied combat forces (RVNAF, U. S. and FWMAF - ground, naval, and air).

(1) Prevent any VC/NVA main and local force units from attacking principal cities and towns; also prevent them from attacking territorial forces. The offensive actions which follow are the key.

(2) Engage every VC/NVA main and local force unit whenever and wherever it assembles and/or moves.

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(3) Seek out every VC/NVA main and local force unit located in the TAOR, and progressively destroy it.

(4) Enter and operate in enemy base areas supporting main and local force units; find and eliminate caches and prepared positions.

(5) Conduct operations against supply, commo-liaison and evacuation routes in conjunction with territorial forces.

(6) Conduct operations, in conjunction with local forces, against VC/NVA local forces, guerrillas, advanced parties, porters, and infrastructure which are engaged in preparing "spring boards."

(7) Participate with territorial forces, police and others in cordon and search operations and other anti-infrastructure activities.

b. Role of territorial forces (RF/PF).

(1) Provide local security (i.e., security of hamlets, villages, towns, LOC, installations, etc.) against company and smaller enemy forces; upgrade hamlet security.

(2) Engage every VC force of company and smaller size whenever and wherever it assembles and moves.

(3) Seek out every VC force of company and smaller size within the TAOR and progressively destroy it.

(4) Enter and operate in base areas and "operating areas" of VC company and smaller units.

(5) Participate in operations against supply, commo-liaison and evacuation routes.

(6) Participate in cordon and search and other infrastructure operations.

c. Role of police and other elements concerned with local security (RD, SDC).

(1) Perform police functions.

(2) Defend selves and governmental cadre.

(3) Conduct anti-infrastructure operations.

(4) Participate in cordon and search operations.

(5) Provide surveillance against covert entry of sabotage and terror teams.

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8. Air and naval forces, in addition to conducting operations closely coordinated with ground combat operations (in pursuit of 7a, above), are employed in such further attacks on the components of the communist system, or on the system as a whole, as air interdiction of the enemy's external lines of communication, and naval interdiction through coastal surveillance.

9. Accompanying the whole range of actions outlined above must be a comprehensive, intensive and incisive campaign of psychological operations. Against VC/NVA forces the objective is to demoralize them, to erode and destroy their will to fight, to facilitate their rallying and to attack them to the SVN people and government. For the population under communist control or influence, the objective is to turn them against the VC/NVA, creating a climate hostile to these forces.

10. A specific application of the foregoing relates to the 1969 pacification plan and the prior November - January pacification offensive, both recently directed by President Thieu. Primary goals are stated in terms of upgrading contested hamlets to bring them into a secure condition. In the selection of contested hamlets, and VC hamlets as well, for upgrading action--and specifically for attack on infrastructure, guerrillas and local forces--a high priority should be given to hamlets along the specific routes by which main force units move from base areas to attack cities and other major objectives in SVN, transport and position supplies, and evacuate their dead and wounded. The effort will thereby contribute directly to the pacification process, and at the same time make a critical contribution to impeding, curtailing and preempting communist main force operations in and through the area.

11. The ARVN corps commander, together with his U. S. counterpart, has a crucial and unique role in assuring the coordination and adequacy of operations against the enemy. He and his U. S. counterpart (together with any FWMAF commanders in his CTZ) exercise command over all major allied combat forces in the CTZ. The corps commander likewise exercises command over the SVN territorial forces subordinate to sector and subsector commanders (province and district chiefs) in his CTZ. It is

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imperative that he demand and bring about full coordination between these forces and cooperation between their respective commanders. Likewise he serves as chairman of the Phung-Hoang committee for his CTZ, and is thus in position to give direction to anti-infrastructure operations. These operations also must be kept in careful coordination with those of the military forces.

12. There are two obvious corollaries for U. S. commanders at Field Force/CSA level. The first is that they must advise the ARVN corps commander on accomplishing what paragraph 11 calls for. And the second--even more fundamental--is that they must demand and obtain full and intimate coordination between their U. S. military forces structure, their ARVN advisory structure, and their sector-subsector-territorial forces advisory structure--and between all of them and the corresponding GVN structures. No small chore!!

AJG

2 December 1968

(Revision of 16 October Paper)

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Joint Chiefs of Staff

Addressee	Classification	Date & Copy No of Document
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger	TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE	1 Jan 1969

Subject

Strategic Options

Orig	CC	Other	Enclosure
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Date Received	Received by
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1 January 1969

Dear Henry:

Herewith are my views on strategic options which I prepared on the request of Frank Lincoln. I am providing a copy to Mr. Laird.

I regard the enclosed paper as being highly sensitive and I would appreciate your treating it accordingly.

With best wishes for the New Year,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Earle".

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

STRATEGIC OPTIONS

I

GENERAL

1. United States national security policy is one of the two or three most important and most pressing problems confronting the Government today. There are many reasons supporting the foregoing judgment, but I shall cite only four. These are:

a. The rapid and continuing build-up of Soviet strategic nuclear weapon systems;

b. The war in Southeast Asia and the future security situation in the Western Pacific;

c. The increasingly dangerous Arab-Israeli confrontation in the Middle East; and

d. The relationship of the United States to NATO in the years to come.

2. In my view, the world security situation is unstable. Since the United States is a global power, armed conflict anywhere in the world is, as a generality, contrary to our national interests. It does not follow that we should perform the part of "world policeman." However, it does underscore the need for and importance of decisions by our Government during the next 12-24 months as to those strategic options which will best serve our national security interests during the next decade.

3. The term "strategic option" has been used by many people to express different concepts. I define a strategic option as follows: One of several conceivable courses of national politico-military-economic-psychological action which, with a specified expenditure of resources and a selected mix of means, is designed to achieve a calculable level of U.S. politico-military objectives, related to U.S. national security, in a foreign country or geographic region.

PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS

4. Over-all Policy: An interesting hypothesis has been advanced that American foreign policy has historically followed a cyclic pattern of "introversion" and "extroversion." Professor Huntington has pointed out that the proponent of this thesis forecast that, if the pattern continued, the late 1960's would see the United States moving into a period of "introversion."

It is certainly true that there are many current signals warning the existence of moves by many Americans, for many reasons, toward neo-isolationism. At first thought, then, it might appear profitable to study and fix upon over-all U.S. security policy. The extremes of the strategic options available are easily defined:

- a. Isolationism, withdrawal and ~~disengagement~~ from external commitments; and
- b. Activism, full participation, and constant intervention.

Comment: When put this baldly, I think it becomes obvious that no government could or should adopt either option. The one would eventually have us prisoners in our own hemisphere; the other would have us assume the role of "world policeman." The realities of domestic politics and international relations argue that the course best suited to further our national security interests lies somewhere between the two extreme options, and would not necessarily be plotted geometrically as a straight line.

Put another way, the problems in the national security area with which our Government must cope are too numerous, too widespread globally, and too complex to be solved by application of a single formula. On the other hand, the strategic options adopted as optimum solutions to our several national security problems must be carefully measured against each other to insure that, in sum, they make a coherent whole -- or, at the least, a not incoherent whole.

5. Strategic Arms Limitation: There are heavy pressures, domestic and foreign, for the U.S. and the USSR to agree on some formula which would limit and, perhaps, reduce strategic

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nuclear weapon systems. Some arguments advanced are cogent, others merely emotional. I believe that the following factors are valid:

a. Neither the U.S. nor the USSR can launch a nuclear attack on the other (first strike capability) in such a fashion as to preclude a response in kind (second strike capability) of sufficient weight to inflict massive damage on the attacker. The degree of damage incurred will vary, of course, depending on the target systems attacked, readiness of forces to launch, defenses, etc. In brief, the era of "mutual nuclear deterrence" foreseen by a number of people over ten years ago is here.

b. The financial burden imposed by increasingly numerous and sophisticated strategic weapon systems is very heavy and getting heavier. This trend will probably continue.

c. Even a massive Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system can be overpowered by a properly configured strategic offensive force. That is, there is currently no known method of building a "leakproof" aerospace defense system.

Comment: Many other factors than those cited are pertinent to the subject of limitations of strategic weapon systems. Among these are the rapid increase in the Soviet ICBM force, evidence that they may be developing a new and improved ABM system, and recent tests of Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MRV's) which, with additional effort, could lead into a Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability.

Moreover, while the items listed all appear to support strategic arms limitations, this is not necessarily true. The problem of insuring national security while limiting the numbers of certain weapons is exceedingly complex -- much more complex, certainly, than the same problem uncomplicated by any limitations other than those imposed by ourselves. For example, we must have high confidence in our ability to verify that agreed limitations are being observed by the Soviets. In this era of rapid technological advances, verification is itself a problem of major dimensions.

I believe it possible to devise a program of limitation of strategic nuclear weapon systems which would enhance our security position; however, it will not be easy to negotiate such an agreement with the USSR.

In light of the above, I advocate that this option be carefully and thoroughly studied in order that the opportunities, advantages, disadvantages and the inherent dangers be determined.

6. The Middle East: The greatest danger to world peace today is probably the situation in the Middle East. The causes are well known and need not be repeated. A contributing and troublesome factor is the role being played by the Soviet Union which, to me, seems ambivalent. On the one hand, they talk peaceful settlement; on the other they have rapidly replaced the equipment lost by the extremist Arab states during the June 1967 war.

Neither the Israelis nor the extremist Arab states have been helpful. Indeed, the recent Israeli commando raid on Beirut Airport has increased tensions to the breaking point and will probably trigger another round of reprisals.

Comment: The strategic options available are several. Among them are:

a. Join with the USSR (if they will play) in forcing a peace settlement;

b. Withdraw our present degree of backing to the Israelis and force them to face up to the realities and weakness of their isolated position;

c. Increase our backing of the Israelis in order to increase our influence with them to move to a peaceful settlement;

d. Adopt a neutral and evenhanded attitude toward both parties and work through the UN to achieve a peace settlement, not merely an armistice.

Of these options -- and there are others -- I personally favor a if the USSR will play its part honestly. If not, d seems to me to have advantages lacking in b and c.

At any rate, this problem demands early and careful study.

7. The Western Pacific: There are five problems, ranging from short-term to long-term, facing us in the Western Pacific: the war in Southeast Asia, the Japanese Treaty and Okinawa bases, the status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Korea, and the provision of stability and security in the Western Pacific area in the years to come.

Comment: a. The resolution of the Vietnamese war is, of course, the most pressing of our problems in the Far East. Since the nature of the problem has been so thoroughly discussed, there is no need to repeat the details of the military and political aspects. Suffice it to say that, in my judgment, the outcome will be satisfactory only if it results in the withdrawal of all NVA units and NVA cadre and fillers from South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to North Vietnam. If negotiations fail to eliminate North Vietnamese presence in these three countries, the war will in effect have been lost because, regardless of the political settlements reached, it is my view, that the continued military presence of North Vietnamese outside of their own national boundaries will ultimately result in a renewal of conflict and the downfall of the Government of South Vietnam -- and eventually, domination of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

I believe the U.S. Government must devise and provide to our negotiating team in Paris a list of minimum objectives to be sought by them.

b. The Japanese Treaty comes up for renewal in 1970. Among the issues which must be solved is the continued use of Japanese and Okinawan bases for our military forces in the Far East. Complicating the problem is the pressure being exerted both in Japan and Okinawa by certain political groups for the return of Okinawa to Japan, the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa, and in some circles, denial to us of the use of Okinawan bases.

I am of the opinion that the Japanese Treaty to date has been of far greater value to Japan than to the U.S. For over twenty years the Japanese have enjoyed practically a free ride in the security area, and in that period they have devoted their resources to building toward being the third economic power in the world. Japan is wealthy, has a numerous and energetic population and should bear a far greater burden both of the defense of Japan and the establishment and maintenance of stability and security in the Far East. The issue to me is clear: As a part of the Treaty renewal negotiations, Japan must be induced to undertake a truly cooperative and responsible attitude and contribute more in the security area.

I advocate that the U.S. Government start now to devise the details of the security arrangements we wish to have with Japan in the future.

c. The status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) is related to the problem of the Japanese Treaty and Okinawan bases. Should we lose the use of the Japanese and Okinawan bases, or even if we do not, we should acquire other locations under U.S. sovereignty for bases which will support our forces in time of tension or conflict in the Far East. The TTPI comprise the only base sites which can be brought under U.S. control. Action was taken this year by the Departments of State and Defense with the appropriate Congressional committees to initiate a program which would move the TTPI from the United Nations trusteeship status to a political affiliation with the U.S. Our efforts in 1968 were not successful. It is necessary, therefore, for the new Administration to renew consultations with the Congress to achieve the desired end speedily. Time is running out for us.

d. The Korean problem breaks into two basic parts: The continued stationing of two American infantry divisions there, and the tensions created by the continued infiltration of North Koreans into South Korea to instigate subversion, coupled with a continued buildup of North Korean forces. The cost of maintaining the American forces in Korea is substantial; their static mission in that country prevents their use elsewhere and further reduces our strategic flexibility; and they provide a ready means of embroiling us willy-nilly in a renewal of the Korean war. Moreover, it can be argued that the Koreans have demonstrated in South Vietnam that they have come of age militarily, and are capable of defending themselves against North Korea with some additional materiel assistance from us.

The threat posed by North Korea to South Korea is partly real and partly psychological. The Blue House incident made a deep impression on President Pak and the continued infiltration of teams of subversive agents and saboteurs maintains tensions within South Korea which disturb the equanimity of the government. To date, the Korean people have stood up well and have cooperated wholeheartedly with the government to ferret out and destroy the infiltrators. However, Korean officials feel that if these actions continue unabated, the subversives may instigate an internal subversive movement which would threaten governmental stability.

The problem of the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Korea is best dealt with in the next item. As to the threat posed by North Korea to South Korea, I believe we must continue our current program of aiding the South Korean Government by increased provision of arms and equipment to deal effectively with infiltrators from the North.

e. The question of how to provide stability and security in the Western Pacific area after the Vietnamese war has ended is complex. The vastness of the area and the diverse populations create of themselves complications. Nevertheless, I think it mandatory that some counterweight be established against the time when Communist China solves its internal problems and becomes a true nuclear power. Domestic attitudes may well make it impossible for the U.S. to take the leading role in melding the free countries of the Western Pacific into a security organization which would provide a balance to a hostile and aggressive Communist China. Of the Western Pacific nations, only Japan has both the population and the wealth to assume the position of senior partner. Obviously, it would be desirable for such an alliance to have its membership comprised of most of the other Western-oriented nations in the area. In sum, I think that a suitable alliance would consist of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. Perhaps some of the smaller states such as Cambodia, Burma, Singapore, and Malaysia would ultimately seek membership in such a pact. If such an organization could be formed, the U.S. might well stand behind it, preferably with the other nations providing the bulk of the military forces.

Admittedly, such a security pact may prove to be a chimera, for the forces tending to oppose formation of such an organization are probably at least as strong as those which would tend to create one. Nevertheless, I think it would be wise for the U.S. Government to undertake now a study of future security arrangements in the Western Pacific which would insure that our national interests in the area are protected.

8. NATO: The November meeting of NATO ministers in Brussels was successful in that member nations displayed renewed political cohesiveness and many pledged additional contributions to the mutual defense. The problem is whether this attitude, the aftermath of the shock of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, will last. Be it noted that this problem exists here in the United States as well as abroad. In the United States, disenchantment with NATO arose from a number of sources:

a. The rather widely held view (with which I agree) that we shoulder an unfair share of the defense burden;

b. Concern over our balance of payments (BOP) deficit;

c. The belief that growing detente between East and West makes NATO unnecessary. (This attitude was shaken by the Czechoslovakian affair, but it will return both in the U.S. and abroad.);

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d. The view that our world-wide commitments are too many, our forces stretched too thin, and our resources squandered for the security of others, without commensurate security return to us.

It seems almost a certainty that, in the coming session of the Congress, a number of senators will support legislation in some form to curtail our NATO commitment of forces.

Comment: Not as an article of faith but as a matter of judgment, I continue to believe that NATO contributes significantly to our security as well as to the security of Western Europe. Two world wars have proved to my satisfaction that we cannot, and will not, stand aloof when the conquest of Europe by a hostile power is threatened.

Several options have been offered. Among these are:

a. Stave off by every means possible further reductions in U.S. forces in Europe. Concurrently, urge our NATO allies to contribute more forces while we shave down headquarters, support forces, logistic facilities, etc., in order to reduce costs in foreign exchange to an acceptable level.

b. Reduce our forces substantially, perhaps to a Corps force of three Army divisions with commensurate air support.

c. Reduce our forces drastically, leaving only those troops required to provide tactical nuclear weapons support and to demonstrate to the Warsaw Pact our continuing military participation in NATO. Continue our strategic nuclear guarantee to NATO.

There are variants to the above, none of which are more attractive than these.

We have operated to date very much on the basis of option a. As noted above, at the recent Brussels session, member nations pledged greater defense efforts. I doubt that they will do more unless the USSR undertakes another adventure. We have during the past year "dual-based" substantial Army and Air Force units, and we have cut back in the support areas of EUCOM. In fact, SACEUR/USCINCEUR is concerned that actions taken to date, plus those planned, will seriously degrade his defense capability and, equally important, his ability to receive

augmentation forces in time of crisis.

Option b has a surface attractiveness. A properly supported Corps force has real combat power; it is sizeable enough to reassure the smaller European nations who fear an aggressive and resurgent Germany. On the other hand, the reduction in deployed forces should permit a fairly substantial saving in foreign exchange over the years. The flaw, in my opinion, is that a reduction of this magnitude in U.S. forces would probably trigger reductions by our Allies which, in the long-term, might unravel NATO.

Option c is extremely dangerous. I cannot conceive of continuing a strategic nuclear guarantee to an Alliance over whose actions on the ground we have little or no control. Moreover, I do not believe that either our Allies or the Warsaw Pact would consider such a guarantee credible. In sum, the strategic nuclear deterrent which is fundamental to U.S. and Western European security would be gone.

I advocate, at least for the time being, that we continue to work on the basis of option a. Hopefully, we can in time arrange our support facilities so as to better match the requirements of SACEUR/USCINCEUR.



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 January 1969

Dr.
Kislinger

2 Jan 69

Henry -

You may be
interested in
this letter from
Bardow Gray. I
plan to talk
to him when he
returns to
Washington. B

December 23, 1968

General A. J. Goodpaster
Headquarters, President-Elect Nixon
430 Park Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Andy:

I was told Friday night by Stan Resor that you are already back in this country and my impression is that you are in New York. I'm taking the liberty to write to you primarily for the reason that I'm going to Hobe Sound, Florida, on the night of December 26 and plan to return to Washington on January 9. I can easily be reached by telephone there, incidentally, and the number is 305-546-2891.

If the opportunity presents itself, there are several things I would wish to discuss with you in addition to the organization of the National Security Council and its related elements. Among these are:

(1) The clear need, in my judgment, for the retention of a President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. You will recall that this was originally created under a different name by General Eisenhower.

(2) There is within Government, as you will recall, a special group which has had various titles but on which I represented the President. This, I believe, is a vitally needed mechanism. 303
cut

(3) The role of the scientist in the formulation of national security policy. This, in my opinion, is a matter of transcendent importance and is worthy of serious thought.

I'm delighted that the President-Elect has had the wisdom to bring you back to work on matters of this sort, and if there is any way I can be helpful, you know you only have to let me know.

It will interest you that Bobby Cutler spent the night with us last night. I am sure that he is prepared to make himself available.

Sincerely,

Gordon Gray

Henry

13 Jan 69

Here is a
draft you might
use to reply
to RN's memo
on Cambodia.

Andy

January 8, 1969

JAN 9 1969

MEMORANDUM

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: RN

In making your study of Vietnam I want a precise report on what the enemy has in Cambodia and what, if anything, we are doing to destroy the build-up there. I think a very definite change of policy toward Cambodia probably should be one of the first orders of business when we get in.

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January 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

From: Henry A. Kissinger

From General Goodpaster I have the following information responding to your memo of 9 January on what the enemy has in Cambodia and what, if anything, we are doing to destroy the build-up there.

1. The enemy has established 11 known base areas ^{at points} extending along the Cambodian-Vietnam border from Laos south to the delta. All are well documented, ^{They} and are employed for rest and sanctuary; ^{for} training, resupply and logistical storage; and for medical care of his sick and wounded.
2. Major units located in these areas include 3 divisions and the rear elements of a fourth in the areas nearest to Saigon, to its north and west; 3 regiments plus perhaps 2 additional on the border opposite the central highlands; an artillery regiment in each of these two areas; and numerous logistic units and smaller combat elements in these and the other base areas.
3. Our field command in SVN is convinced that the vast bulk of supplies entering Cambodia come in through Si^hanoukville, then move to the Phnom Penh area and are fanned out to the base areas, using the national highways which serve the southern base areas, and the Mekong ^{River} plus 3 large tributaries which give access to the northern areas.

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4. What we are doing about this is very limited. There is some air reconnaissance and very restricted ground reconnaissance , the latter along the border only, almost entirely in its northern half. In addition, under current rules of engagement, US forces operating in South Vietnam which are fired on from across the border are authorized to return fire and take counter-actions required in exercising the right of self-defense. Such occasions are very infrequent.

5. The command in the field has made several requests for authority to enter Cambodia to conduct pre-emptive operations and in pursuit of withdrawing forces that have attacked us. All such requests have been denied, or are still pending without action.

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14 Jan

Henry -

In the Eisenhower days, the members of the Planning Board had a letter from the President appointing them to that position (as an additional duty).

It was intended to give them an added sense of "Presidential perspective" - I believe it did so, to an appreciable degree.

I suggest you consider this. If you'd like, I'll get a copy. Andy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY

7 Jan 69

Henry

Leon Sloss is highly regarded in the military in Washington.

(This conforms to my own impression after limited association with him).

Andy

Truman Kelder