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File - General
Purpose
Forces
(Rossoff)

I. Introduction

Any major review of the Defense program should consider various levels of general purpose forces and military objectives around the world. This paper describes nine worldwide strategies for general purpose forces, and the forces, costs and probable military options associated with each strategy. The purpose of the discussion and analysis is to describe the approximate overall costs of a wide range of strategies for general purpose forces. No particular strategy or force structure is recommended.

Conclusions on our strategy for general purpose forces and changes in force levels must follow from careful and comprehensive analysis of our foreign policy objectives in various areas of the world and of foreign and domestic political implications. The analysis in this paper is designed mainly as a tool to be used in such a political review. As an illustration of the kind of review that would be appropriate, a preliminary political analysis of each strategy is attached to this paper as an appendix.

II. Background

U.S. strategic forces are designed to deter aggression by creating the threat of nuclear retaliation, and to limit damage to the U.S. in a nuclear attack; they include SAC bombers, ICMBs, Polaris submarines and continental air and missile defense systems. U.S. general purpose forces are designed to defend and control territory and sea and air lines of communications; these forces include most of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and about half the Air Force.

General purpose forces and their support are by far the most costly element in the defense budget, as shown in the following table.

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ESTIMATED POST-VIETNAM DEFENSE BUDGET
WITH APPROVED PROGRAMS
(\$ Billions)

<u>Type Forces</u>	<u>DoD Component</u>				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy/ Marines</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Other</u>	
<u>Strategic Forces</u>	4.1	2.7	11.5	.1	18.4
<u>General Purpose Forces</u>					
Land Forces	13.3	1.5	-	-	14.8
Tactical Air Forces	-	6.6	6.3	-	12.9
ASW & Escort Forces	-	6.3	-	-	6.3
Other Naval Forces	-	3.1	-	-	3.1
Airlift/Sealift	.1	.7	2.2	-	3.0
R&D, Intelligence & Communications	1.0	1.0	1.3	-	3.3
Aid to Allies	.1	-	-	.7	.8
Subtotal GPF	14.5	19.2	9.8	.7	44.2
<u>Other Costs a/</u>	.8	1.8	1.7	5.5	9.8
<u>TOTAL</u>	19.4	23.7	23.0	6.3	72.4

a/ Includes intelligence, communications, R&D and administrative costs and retirement pay not directly identifiable with strategic or general purpose forces.

Characteristics of General Purpose Forces

The need for large general purpose forces stems mainly from the judgment that it is in our national interest to help deter attacks on friendly countries and to help defend them if they are attacked. This is so because only a small part of our current force would be required for direct defense of the U.S. The overall level and cost of our general purpose forces thus depends mainly on what types of possible crises and wars overseas we wish to prepare for, what countries we wish to assist, and to what degree these countries can do the job themselves.

For these reasons general purpose forces cannot be determined by setting an overall objective -- such as the Assured Destruction concept for strategic forces -- and then directly comparing worldwide enemy and friendly forces relative to the stated objective. The U.S. forces required are not derivable in any obvious way by direct comparisons

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of U.S. and Soviet or Chinese forces. (For example, we maintain a large tactical aircraft carrier force, although no Communist country has any tactical aircraft carriers.) Instead, U.S. forces depend on our interest in dealing militarily with particular contingencies around the world.

Another distinguishing characteristic of general purpose forces is that the aggregate firepower of these forces does not directly convert itself into the ultimate objective, which is defense or control of territory. Although it is necessary to use firepower to destroy enemy targets in order to control territory, manpower is also required in relation to the space or territory involved, the cooperation of the population, the size of the enemy land force, and the type of control desired. The current war in Vietnam, where we have practically unlimited firepower compared to the other side, is a good example of these special characteristics of general purpose forces. This characteristic explains why beyond a certain point we cannot substitute air or artillery support, or even tactical nuclear weapons, for Army maneuver units. It is also another factor that makes general purpose force levels dependent on a judgment as to the areas of the world we wish to defend or control with general purpose forces.

The requirement for general purpose forces is also dependent on a judgment as to what point on the spectrum of aggression -- from political subversion to outright full-scale invasions -- one believes more general deterrents, including fear of nuclear war, come into play. Some people believe, for example, that an overt large-scale invasion of Germany would so clearly threaten U.S. vital interests as to be outside the range of actions the Soviets would view as a rational risk. On the other hand, North Korean infiltration across the Korean DMZ is apparently not deterred by anything but direct defense. This emphasizes further the dependence of general purpose force requirements on basic political judgments on the kinds of scenarios that are worthy enough of attention to justify spending money on.

In making these judgments, a key factor is an evaluation of the options that are available if an attack occurs that is beyond our immediate capability to meet with general purpose forces. In such a situation, we can either try to stop the attack with nuclear weapons, or give up some allied territory until enough forces are mobilized to regain it.

If the other side also has large numbers of nuclear weapons, as is the case in Europe, the use of nuclear weapons does not necessarily provide a significant net advantage to the defender; in particular, if nuclear attacks inflict large casualties on both sides' deployed forces, the side with the greater reinforcement capability would hold the advantage. Even if the other side has no nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons cannot necessarily compensate for grossly inadequate land forces. Furthermore, large-scale use of theater nuclear weapons not only increases the risk of escalation, but causes great collateral damage any many civilian casualties.

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Mobilization to regain territory initially lost is generally possible, but normally involves very large resources and high casualties. Also, an attempt to restore territory already lost to an enemy attack could involve a great risk of escalation if the enemy had nuclear weapons.

To some extent, our general purpose forces actually deployed overseas in peacetime take on a political significance beyond their purely military function, because of the degree to which overseas forces symbolize the commitment of the U.S. to the area involved. In addition, overseas deployments are important as the main cause of defense expenditures entering the balance of payments. However, less than 25 percent of the cost of the programmed general purpose forces stems from forces planned to be deployed overseas. Therefore, our budgetary costs are determined mainly by the degree to which we wish to reinforce various areas of the world, not by political or symbolic commitments to maintain overseas deployments.

Current General Purpose Forces Program

The currently approved program for general purpose programs is based on the objective of meeting simultaneously a Chinese attack in Asia (either in Korea or Southeast Asia) and a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe, while maintaining the ability to meet a minor contingency in the Western Hemisphere. The following table shows a very rough breakdown of the costs of the currently approved general purpose forces, in terms of the estimated cost of forces for each major region, and a strategic reserve that is required for possible reinforcements of any region.

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ESTIMATED COSTS OF PROGRAMMED GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES ALLOCATED BY REGION ^{a/}
(\$ Billion)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u> ^{c/}	<u>USMC</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>R&D, Comm & Intelligence</u> ^{d/}	<u>MAP</u>	<u>Total</u>
Forces in Europe ^{b/}	3.0	1.9	.1	1.9	.5	.2	7.6
Other Forces Held	3.0	3.1	.1	.4	.2	-	6.8
Mainly for NATO							
Subtotal NATO	6.0	5.0	.2	2.3	.7	.2	14.4
Forces Held Mainly For Asia	4.6	7.0	.8	3.5	.3	.4	16.6
Forces for Minor Contingency	.5	.4	.5	1.0	-	-	2.4
General Strategic Reserve	2.3	3.5	.8	1.7	-	-	8.3
Other ^{e/}	-	-	-	-	2.3	.2	2.5
GRAND TOTAL	13.4	15.9	2.3	8.5	3.3	.8	44.2

- ^{a/} Costs shown for each region are estimates of about what could be saved if force requirements for that region were entirely dropped, but all other requirements remained.
- ^{b/} Includes proportional cost of training base and other support in U.S.
- ^{c/} Includes airlift/sealift forces.
- ^{d/} Includes all Services.
- ^{e/} Includes costs not allocated by region.

Several qualifications to this concept of the programmed force should be understood. First, what is meant by preparing to fight a major war in Asia and NATO has been gradually specified in more detail, and various limitations imposed. These limitations have not all been accepted by the JCS. For example, the current program does not provide for fighting a sustained war in Europe. Thus, provision is made for 90 days of ammunition, equipment, attrition aircraft and other supplies; additional forces for a sustained defense and counterattack are not provided simultaneously with an Asian war. Also, the forces in Europe and rapidly deployable from the U.S. are not adequate for meeting a full-scale surprise attack following a concealed mobilization. The NATO-oriented force is thus conceived of as providing for an intermediate level of conventional capability -- short of the capability to meet a worst-case conventional attack, but adequate for deterrence and for initial defense in the most likely contingencies.

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Another important qualification is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's estimate of force requirements to meet the strategy of "two major and one minor contingencies" is considerably higher than the approved program, as shown in the following table.

POST VIETNAM DEFENSE BUDGET
(\$ Billions)

<u>Type Forces</u>	<u>Approved Program</u>	<u>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</u>
Strategic Forces	18.4	23.5
General Purpose Forces	44.2	58.0
Other Costs	<u>9.8</u>	<u>9.8</u>
TOTAL COSTS	72.4	91.3

In addition to differences in interpretation of the strategy, differences in force requirements estimates stem from the JCS' tendency to use more conservative planning assumptions in certain areas. In Europe, for example, the JCS assume that the Soviets are able to use Category III divisions effectively early in a mobilization and that Warsaw Pact aircraft are able to fly roughly twice as many sorties per day as NATO aircraft. The JCS tend to discount more heavily the effectiveness of many allied forces (in Korea, for example) and to assume that base rights in allied countries cannot be relied on (in ASW force planning, for example). The JCS also tend to advocate a greater emphasis on certain types of missions, such as deep interdiction bombing. In some cases, they assume that we must keep a large residual force after a high intensity war, such as in the case of SSNs.

It is also important to understand that the currently approved program for general purpose forces is the result of an evolution over the years to adapt an existing force structure to the stated strategy. Many elements of the force structure are as much a product of individually justified decreases and increases to an existing force, as they are a result of any overall determination of the requirements for a strategy. This effect is very important, for example, in the tactical air program, which now costs about \$13 billion per year (excluding related airlift and ASW forces). The tactical air forces have been kept at about the same number of wings and total aircraft for seven years, but have been increased very substantially in cost by nearly one-for-one replacement of older aircraft with much more expensive aircraft. (The F-4 costs more than twice the F-100, and the F-X will cost 2.5 times the F-4 -- all in 1968 prices.)

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Finally, an important consideration is that the costs of our baseline general purpose forces probably cannot be reduced substantially by further qualitative buildups of Allied forces, if the current strategy is retained. Some reductions of U.S. land forces, especially in Korea, should be facilitated by Allied buildups. Beyond this point, however, a reduction in U.S. land forces could only be based on major quantitative increases in Allied forces, especially in Central Europe and Thailand; such a major buildup is probably not politically feasible. Furthermore, for economic and technical reasons, our Allies cannot substitute for our naval and air forces to a significantly greater extent than at present. As shown in the table on page 2, U.S. land forces will only represent about a third of the cost of our programmed general purpose forces. Thus, even a one-quarter cut back in active U.S. land forces (about the maximum possible cut due to Allied buildups) would cut the overall cost of general purpose forces by less than eight percent, and the Defense budget by less than five percent.

III. Alternative Strategies

This section describes nine alternative strategies for general purpose forces. In order to estimate the overall costs of a strategy, a specific force structure must be developed. Therefore, as a by-product of the analysis, certain possible imbalances in the programmed forces for the current strategy are pointed out. However, the analysis in this study is not refined enough to serve as a basis for detailed force structure decisions. Furthermore, there are many political and other factors, beyond the scope of this analysis, which might require significant modifications to the force structure for any particular strategy. Therefore, even if an overall strategy were decided upon, much further study would be required before specific force structure decisions were made. For these reasons, the numbers in the attached table are not valid without the qualifications and explanation in the text.

The nine worldwide strategies were constructed by first postulating two to four strategies for each of the major regions of the world potentially requiring large U.S. forces (Central and Southern Europe, the Middle East, Korea and Southeast Asia), and then combining these regional strategies into various worldwide strategies. For each regional strategy, U.S. force requirements were estimated, including logistics support, aid to allies, shipping and ASW protection. These regional requirements were then combined with a Strategic Reserve, designed to hedge against underestimates, to arrive at a worldwide U.S. force. The worldwide force includes requirements for training, attrition replacement, rotation base, and other support requirements, and is not therefore a simple addition of the regional requirements.

While the detailed force structures for any particular strategy would need much refinement, as discussed above, we believe that the overall level of cost is adequate for each strategy; a Strategic Reserve is built in to each worldwide force to hedge against underestimates and to provide confidence of meeting the strategy.* It should be recognized, however, that, for the reasons discussed earlier, a JCS estimate of the costs of these strategies would probably be considerably higher, just as the JCS force recommendations for the current strategy would cost about 30 percent more than the programmed force. Furthermore, as mentioned above, there are factors outside the scope of this analysis which might cause more forces to be maintained for a particular strategy than are included here. Thus, the actual cost of each strategy could well be higher than estimated.

The study is based on the assumption that the Vietnam war ends with an allied government in control of Vietnam, but with no major U.S. forces stationed in Southeast Asia in peacetime. This assumption is not critical in determining the overall level and cost of the various strategies. If Vietnam were neutral, fewer forces would be required for defense of Vietnam but larger forces might be required for defense of Thailand. If U.S. forces were stationed in Vietnam, in most strategies their cost would be largely offset by a reduced reinforcement requirement.

The following is a summary of the nine worldwide strategies and their costs. More detail is provided by the table at the end of the paper which gives the detailed forces and cost for each worldwide strategy. The worldwide strategies range from complete withdrawal to the Western Hemisphere (Strategy 0) to conventional defense against aggression anywhere in the world (Strategy 4). The "in-between" strategies represent judgments on the priority of U.S. interest, the intentions of the Communists, and the risk of relying on nuclear weapons or temporarily giving up allied territory.

* The techniques and assumptions used to estimate force requirements and costs are described in detail in a backup paper.

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SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE WORLDWIDE STRATEGIES
POST-VIETNAM

	<u>Strategy</u>	<u>Average^{a/} Annual GPF Cost</u>	<u>Average^{a/} Annual Defense Budget</u>
0	Withdraw to Western Hemisphere	10.4	35.8
1	Maintain worldwide capability except against direct Chinese or Russian invasions; token U.S. force for NATO, rely on nuclears; do not meet conventional Chinese invasion in Asia.	19.5	47.7
2A	NATO-oriented; match Pact in likely contingencies; same as 1 in rest of world.	29.4	57.6
2B	Asia-oriented; meet Chinese invasion in SEA or Korea; same as 1 for NATO.	31.8	60.0
2A-B	Meet either Pact or Chinese invasion, but not both simultaneously. Larger central reserve.	35.7	63.9
2C	Approximates currently approved strategy; meet Pact and Chinese invasion simultaneously.	41.7	70.0
2D	Same as 2C, except meet Chinese in Korea and Southeast Asia simultaneously.	43.5	71.7
3	Meet enemy capabilities worldwide; provide for sustained defense and counterattack in NATO.	63.2	91.4
4	Same as 3, but less reliance on allies.	72.7	100.9
	Current strategy: two major and one minor contingencies.	44.2	72.4

a/ Peacetime costs only; includes no war costs for Vietnam.

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A. Strategy 0. In this strategy, we presume no objectives for general purpose forces outside the Western Hemisphere.

The force structure provides for a quick intervention in a minor peacekeeping contingency in the Western Hemisphere, and a reserve capability to invade Cuba. Adequate active and reserve manpower (over 500,000 in land forces) is also provided for control of internal disorders in the U.S. The worldwide base structure and communications network is essentially eliminated, and research and development on projects related to general purpose forces are substantially cut. No logistics support is provided for allies.

This is the only strategy in which the support structure -- R&D, communications, bases, etc. -- is substantially cut. Therefore the cost of this strategy is a "baseline" from which to measure the cost of being prepared to operate worldwide general purpose forces.

B. Strategy 1. In this strategy, we maintain a worldwide capability for support of allies and for U.S. intervention in limited conflicts (such as attacks from neighboring countries, insurgencies, and prevention of Communist coups), but rule out full-scale conventional wars directly involving major Chinese or Russian forces.

In this strategy we assume that direct invasions by China or the Soviet Union of countries on their peripheries are deterred by our nuclear capability, and are thus too unlikely to justify maintenance of U.S. general purpose forces. Instead, the force is designed mainly for "proxy wars" in which the Soviets and Chinese support countries like North Korea, North Vietnam, Egypt or Bulgaria, and for U.S. interventions such as in the Dominican Republic or Lebanon. The emphasis is on building up and supporting allies to handle these threats themselves, with only U.S. logistics support.

In Europe, the U.S. retains a small force of one division and one wing, plus our surface-to-surface Pershing missiles and nuclear support of allies. This involves a total of about 70,000 U.S. personnel in Europe, compared to the 300,000 currently there. The allies could, of course, decide to buildup their forces to replace the U.S. forces, but this seems unlikely. If the allies retained the same force they currently have, the NATO land force in the Center Region would be about 500,000 men, compared to over 700,000 for Pact in Eastern Europe; in addition, the Pact would be superior in reinforcement capability and tactical air capability.

The NATO force would be restricted in conventional capability to meeting fairly limited probes. In the event of full-scale conventional attack, NATO could try to stop the attack by using nuclear weapons. Since the Soviets would also have large numbers of nuclear weapons,

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however, as well as larger land reinforcements, the Soviets could probably seize most NATO territory anyway if they were willing to take high casualties and risk further escalation. If the Soviet Union did seize most NATO territory (whether nuclear weapons had been used or not), the U.S. could of course try to mobilize and regain it. This would be extremely costly, however, and possibly infeasible. This strategy in Europe thus depends mainly on the assumption that the Soviets are deterred from any overt attack on Western Europe.

In Asia, we equip the Republic of Korea forces to meet a North Korean attack or infiltration with only U.S. logistics support. This includes provision of sufficient tactical aircraft as well as land forces, so that the probability of direct involvement of U.S. forces would be minimal. Similarly, in Southeast Asia, Vietnamese and Thai forces are equipped to meet insurgency or attacks by the North Vietnamese. The U.S. Strategic Reserve, however, contains enough forces to intervene directly, if the local forces proved less capable than expected; in particular, enough U.S. air forces would be available virtually to meet the whole air requirement in case of catastrophic failure of the allied air forces. The majority of the existing U.S. base structure in the area is retained, both for logistics support of the allies and in case direct U.S. intervention were required.

Japan, Taiwan, India and the Philippines would defend themselves with their own forces, although limited U.S. land or air forces could be committed from the Strategic Reserve if necessary. In addition, U.S. naval forces would provide support in case of a war at sea, as indicated below.

In the event of a direct Chinese invasion of Korea or Southeast Asia, conventional defense of most allied territory would not be possible; commitment of the U.S. Strategic Reserve should, however, permit retention of an area around a major port, such as Pusan, Bangkok, or Saigon. Later mobilization of U.S. forces could probably regain most allied territory, but at a higher cost in casualties and resources. Alternatively, nuclear weapons could be used to try to stop the Chinese attack, but success could not be guaranteed if the Chinese were willing to take very high casualties; in this case, civilian casualties and property destruction would also be high.

In the Middle East, provision is made for logistics support of Israel against her Arab neighbors. No provision is made for defense of Iran against a direct Russian invasion.

The U.S. also maintains land and air forces and strategic lift for very rapid intervention simultaneously in the Western Hemisphere or elsewhere in two minor contingencies.

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The Strategic Reserve, consisting of three active and five inactive divisions, three CVAs and three land-based wings, would, as indicated above, enable us to assist our Asian allies directly if their forces were less effective than expected, and would also permit reinforcement of Israel or our "minor contingency" forces if necessary. A reserve capability to invade Cuba would be retained.

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces and escort forces (ASW and AAW) are provided to protect U.S. naval forces and military shipping, and an austere level of economic support shipping for our Asian allies (including Japan). Our European allies are assumed to provide their own escort requirements.

C. Strategy 2A. In this strategy, we maintain about the same level of forces for NATO as are now programmed (both in Europe and in CONUS), but in Asia we follow the strategy described above in Strategy 1 (i.e., assist our Asian allies against aggression from their neighbors, but do not plan on conventional defense against a full-scale Chinese conventional attack).

This force would permit a rough numerical balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact in immediately available forces, and during a buildup in a period of political tension and crisis. However, it probably would not permit conventional defense against a surprise Pact attack following a successfully concealed mobilization. In addition, it would not provide for a sustained defense and full-scale counterattack, since neither the logistics support for a long war nor the additional forces needed for a major counterattack would be available.

In sum, this strategy would provide about the same political and military options in Europe as are now available. It would raise the threshold required for a successful Pact attack to a high level, would permit a serious military response to a Soviet force buildup in a crisis, and would probably permit initial defense of most NATO territory in a conflict beginning through miscalculation; it would not provide a complete conventional capability in all possible circumstances. We would of course retain the option of major mobilization to increase our forces, if the political situation became more threatening and if enough time were available before a war started.

A variant of this strategy would involve the same total force for NATO, but with fewer forces stationed in Europe in order to reduce BOP costs. This would further reduce the ability of NATO to deal with a surprise attack.

In Asia, the situation would be as described in Strategy 1. However, the larger U.S. force stationed in CONUS, although NATO-oriented, might have some additional deterrent value for Asia as well.

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In the Middle East, additional air forces are provided in this strategy to support Israel if the Soviet Union should threaten to deploy tactical aircraft to Egypt or Syria. Logistics support for Israeli forces is also provided, as in Strategy 1. No provision is made for defending Iran against a Russian invasion, but commitment of part of the NATO-oriented forces and the Strategic Reserve would enable us to defend Iran if we were not fighting in Europe or Asia at the same time.

The capability to intervene simultaneously in two minor contingencies would be maintained, as in Strategy 1.

Anti-submarine warfare and escort forces are provided to protect U.S. naval forces and shipping, and an austere level of economic and support shipping both for the Asian and European allies.

D. Strategy 2B. This strategy is essentially the reverse of 2A, the previous strategy, in terms of relative emphasis on NATO and Asia. It provides a capability to defend against a Chinese attack in Korea or Southeast Asia, but relies on nuclear deterrence in Europe, as in Strategy 1.

In Europe, a small U.S. force of about one division and one wing is kept in Europe. The situation would be as described in Strategy 1, except that the presence of a larger U.S. force in CONUS, although Asia-oriented, might have some additional deterrent value for Europe as well.

In Asia, the force is designed to defend against a major Chinese attack on Southeast Asia (Thailand and Vietnam) or Korea, but not both simultaneously. The indigenous land forces are built up qualitatively to the maximum extent possible, but a major quantitative buildup is not assumed. This permits U.S. land forces for initial defense to be limited to five divisions in the first 30 days in SEA, and none in Korea. U.S. forces supply the bulk of the air power, however, a total of over 600 fighter-attack sorties per day indefinitely. An additional Strategic Reserve of U.S. forces is also maintained in case local forces prove less effective than expected. A U.S. force is also provided for a counterattack to restore territory lost in the initial phase of the war.

Forces for the Middle East and minor contingencies are the same as described above for Strategy 2A. Anti-submarine and escort are also provided to protect U.S. military forces and shipping, and an austere level of economic support shipping for the Asian allies.

E. Strategy 2A-B. This strategy is a combination of Strategies 2A and 2B, described above. We would plan to fight the Chinese in Asia or the Warsaw Pact in Europe, but not both simultaneously. The capabilities in the Middle East and the rest of the world would be the same as described above in 2A and 2B.

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To carry out this strategy, we maintain a large number of forces in CONUS, some of which would be deployable either to Asia or to Europe. Since the greater initial requirement would be in Europe, most of this "swing force" would be more rapidly deployable to Europe than to Asia. The total force is larger than for either Strategy 2A or Strategy 2B, because of the need to meet the largest single requirement in any one theater for a particular kind of force, as well as the need to retain forces deployed in Europe and thus not available for Asian contingencies.

In both Europe and Asia the capabilities would be essentially as described above in Strategies 2A and 2B. However, since only 2-1/3 divisions are actually deployed in Europe in peacetime, the capability to meet a surprise attack would be lower. On the other hand, the availability of a larger total force would improve the capability in Europe in a buildup situation.

The allied forces in Asia, supplemented if necessary by the U.S. Strategic Reserve, would be able to meet attacks by North Korea and North Vietnam as described in Strategy 1, even while the U.S. was engaged in Europe. Logistics support for the Asian allies is provided for this contingency. The allies would not, however, be able to meet a simultaneous Chinese attack. If the Chinese invaded while we were engaged in Europe, by commitment of the U.S. Strategic Reserve, the U.S. and allied forces should however be able to hold an area around a major port, as described in Strategy 1.

Forces for the rest of the world and naval forces would be the same as described above in Strategy 2A. The large U.S. force in CONUS, although mainly oriented to NATO and Asia, would provide as a by-product a greater capability for reinforcement in Iran, Israel or elsewhere if we were not simultaneously engaged in Europe or Asia.

F. Strategies 2C and 2D. These two strategies are roughly the same as the currently approved strategy. In both 2C and 2D, we would plan to engage the Chinese in Asia and the Soviets in Europe simultaneously, while maintaining a force for a minor contingency. In Strategy 2C, we would plan on fighting the Chinese either in Korea or Southeast Asia; while in 2D we would plan on fighting in both SEA and Korea simultaneously.

In Europe, this strategy is the same as described above in the discussion of Strategy 2A, and would provide the same capabilities and limitations. In this case, however, the significantly larger total force, although partly Asia-oriented, would enable us to send greater reinforcements to Europe if we were not simultaneously fighting in Asia, and if we were willing to degrade temporarily our capability to meet a Chinese attack.

In Asia, we would be able, under Strategy 2C, to meet a Chinese invasion in either Southeast Asia or Korea as described above in Strategy 2B, but while also holding the necessary forces for Europe.

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Also, as in Strategy 2B, we would maintain the capability to assist the Korean forces to contain a North Korean attack while we were fighting the Chinese in Southeast Asia, or to assist the Thai and Vietnamese forces to resist a North Vietnamese attack while we were fighting the Chinese in Korea.

In Strategy 2D, we would maintain the capability to fight the Chinese in both SEA and Korea simultaneously, also while holding the necessary Europe-oriented forces. This requires mainly an increase in tactical air and naval forces, since the Korean land forces are equipped to handle the Chinese land threat with only U.S. logistics and air support. (It should be noted that this is in the context of a simultaneous full-scale Chinese invasion of both Korea and SEA.)

The capabilities for the Middle East and the rest of the world would be the same as described above in Strategy 2A and 2B. Again, however, the larger total size of the force would provide greater flexibility to reinforce the Middle East or elsewhere if we were not engaged in Europe and Asia.

G. Strategies 3 and 4. These two strategies are designed to meet with conventional forces all the major conventional attacks the Communist world is probably capable of launching. Strategy 4 differs from Strategy 3 only in the degree of reliance placed on allied forces and bases; in Strategy 4 military assistance and reliance on allies and bases in allied countries is reduced to a low level (except in Central Europe), and U.S. forces are increased as necessary.

The forces are calculated so as to allow the U.S. to fight successfully in either of two situations. If there is a Chinese attack in Asia, and a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe, the forces are provided to give an initial hold or enclave defense of allied territory in Asia while a defense and counterattack in Europe is executed. If there is no war in Europe, the forces are designed to defend and counterattack in Asia, while holding the necessary forces for a sustained defense of Europe. In addition, forces are provided for the defense of Iran and Israel (but only to the extent these threats are feasible while the other attacks are taking place) and for minor contingencies.

In Europe, this strategy differs from the one described above in two important respects. First, enough active forces and lift are provided to counter a surprise attack following concealed mobilization. Second, forces and logistics are provided for a sustained defense and major counterattack to restore territory initially lost. This includes provision of equipment, ammunition and other logistics support for the Central European allies as well as U.S. forces.

In Southern Europe, 3-1/3 U.S. divisions are required in Strategy 4 because of reduced military assistance and less reliance on local forces.

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In Asia, the strategy differs from the ones previously described by extending the area defended in Southeast Asia to include Burma. Also, in Strategy 4, six additional U.S. divisions are provided in SEA and four in Korea because of lower equipment levels and lesser reliance on allied land forces.

In the Middle East, the strategy provides for assistance to Iran in case of Soviet invasion and for Israel in case of Soviet air support for the Arabs. Strategy 4 requires more U.S. land forces for Iran because of decreased reliance on local forces.

Because of the larger total force, this strategy would provide the U.S. more flexibility for limited offensive operations than any of the other strategies. For example, since forces for a counterattack in Europe would be available, they probably could also be used at NATO's initiative if this were politically desirable. On the other hand, a U.S. buildup to the level of forces in this strategy might lead to a counteracting buildup of Soviet forces.

Inasmuch as the threat we prepare to meet with conventional forces is essentially the same in Strategies 3 and 4, the difference in total cost between the two shows how expensive it is not to rely on allies. In going from Strategy 3 to Strategy 4, the cost of aid to our allies is reduced by \$1.1 billion but the cost of U.S. forces is increased by \$10.6 billion. This 10:1 cost tradeoff results in a net increase of \$9.5 billion in the Defense budget.

IV. The Balance of the Current Force Structure

While the primary purpose of this paper is to provide rough aggregate estimates of the cost of alternative strategies, the analysis has also indicated some probable imbalances in the programmed force structure for the current strategy. This is not surprising in view of the historical evolution of the current force structure, as discussed in Section III. The changes in force structure indicated by this analysis, for the current strategy, would require increases in some areas and decreases in others, and would result in a net decrease of about \$.7 to \$2.5 billion per year (depending on whether provisions were made to defend Korea and SEA simultaneously against a Chinese attack).

It is quite possible, of course, that for a variety of political or other reasons, it may not be desirable to make some of the reductions that would be indicated for any given strategy. This is another reason for emphasizing that the costs shown in the previous section for each strategy are probably minimum costs, subject to significant increases if additional forces are maintained. For example, if we were to maintain the current strategy by making the increases in the areas indicated by the analysis, but without making the indicated decreases, we would have to spend about \$3.9 billion per year more than for the current program.

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The detailed analysis in the backup paper describes how the force structures for each strategy were developed. The following is a summary of the reasons which underly the possible imbalances in force mix relative to the current program.

A. Support of Allies

There is currently a major imbalance in the general purpose program in the inadequate funding of logistics support for some of our major forward defense allies (especially Korea, Thailand, Greece and Turkey). This problem has two parts: inadequate equipment and very limited provision for stockpiles of ammunition and other supplies for use by allied forces in wartime. As a result of these limitations, the large manpower strength maintained by some of our allies cannot be fully effective. Since the current strategy requires the U.S. to assist these countries if they are attacked, the lack of effectiveness of the allied forces increases the requirement for U.S. forces. This is an extremely inefficient arrangement, since it costs only a fraction of the cost of a U.S. division to support an allied division of equal capability. For example, the average U.S. division force (25-40,000 men in peacetime) costs \$600-700 million per year to maintain in peacetime, while the entire Military Assistance Program for the Korean armed forces, over 500,000 men, has been about \$160 million per year.

The major part of the necessary increased costs would consist of building stockpiles (or production base) for ammunition and supplies for use in wartime by the allies, and held in U.S. control in peacetime. This would not, therefore, require a large increase in the Military Assistance Program as such. The increases required in the actual Military Assistance Program itself (for more and better equipment), while extremely important, would cost only about \$300 million per year more than the current program. The program would still, therefore, be considerably lower than in the early sixties.

The total indicated increase in expenditures for support of allies (both MAP and logistics) would be about \$3.2 billion per year for the current strategy.

B. U.S. Land Forces

The analysis indicates that, even with the improvements in allied forces discussed above, the programmed U.S. force does not provide for enough total divisions to meet the current strategy. The main reason is that neither requirements for sustained defense and counterattacks nor for a Strategic Reserve had been adequately considered. However, given the improvements in allied forces, the indicated requirement for fully ready active divisions is somewhat lower than provided in the program. Instead, what appear to be needed are some "ready reserve" divisions, available in 4-6 weeks, possibly kept in cadre status in peacetime.

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The net effect would be an increase in the total cost of land forces of about \$700 million per year; costs for personnel and operations would be somewhat lower than programmed, but costs for equipment and logistics would be considerably greater. The active peacetime strength would be about 100,000 men lower than programmed, but ideally the reduction would be mostly in draftees and one-term recruits, while the long-term professional personnel would be about the same as programmed.

The level of both active and reserve divisions is of course very dependent on the strategy. The above comments on mix of divisions therefore pertain only to the currently approved strategy.

C. Tactical Air

The analysis indicates that, for the current strategy, the cost of tactical air forces could be reduced by about \$3.6 billion per year, or about 28 percent. The biggest indicated reductions would be in sea-based air.

There are several important reasons for this result of the analysis. As discussed in Section III, the cost of the tactical air forces has been increased greatly by one-for-one replacement of old aircraft with new aircraft. This trend has also increased our capability. Increases in offensive capability have been especially great, not only because of new aircraft but from improved conventional ordnance and improved electronics equipment.

At the same time, it has become apparent that the Communist tactical air forces, while modernizing and improving their interceptors, have not developed a greatly increased offensive capability. For instance, the U.S. and Free World payload capability has increased far more rapidly than that of the Communist world over the last nine years.

It is not surprising that we have been improving our capabilities faster than the Communists, since we have been spending far more on tactical air. The Soviet tactical air program costs only about one-third of what the U.S. program costs, even though the Soviet tactical air inventory is numerically about 75 percent of the U.S. inventory.

Because of the extremely large qualitative differences between U.S. and Communist aircraft, total inventory measures are a poor measure of capability. Matching -- or exceeding the Communists in capability does not require us to match them on a one-for-one basis in aircraft inventory (although today the U.S. has about 7,100 active tactical aircraft compared to about 5,400 for the USSR, and the total Free World inventory is about equal to the Communist world inventory).

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Communist aircraft are very specialized. They have an excellent capability to defend their home territory against deep penetration by high altitude bombers. However, their offensive conventional capability is poor due to the limited range and low payload of their aircraft and the lack of modern nonnuclear bombs, missiles, and computerized bomb delivery systems. On the average, current Free World aircraft can carry 2.2 times as much payload as Communist aircraft. Moreover, Communist aircraft do not have the electronic countermeasures equipment that our theater commanders believe is essential for offensive operations.

A major part of our tactical air requirements are determined by how much interdiction and close air support we wish to provide. This is especially true in Asia, where the air threat is very limited. There are, however, strong reasons for not spending large sums on tactical air programs for major interdiction campaigns. In Europe especially, the transportation network is so large relative to Communist movement requirements that it is doubtful that even a massive interdiction effort could have much early impact on the course of the war. Furthermore, the specialized Communist air forces are ideally designed to counter the deep penetrations required for large-scale interdiction strikes, thus making them costly in attrition and ineffective sorties.

As for the mix of land and sea-based air, this issue depends to a great extent on our ability to count on using land bases. While there is considerably disagreement over the exact ratio of the cost of land and sea-based air (ranging from slightly more expensive for sea-based to 2.5 times more expensive, depending on the assumptions), it is probable that we should plan on using land-based air in areas where we have major and clear air requirements and air bases are available. However, if bases are not available, either because of political limitations or because of lack of adequate facilities, we can make use of the greater flexibility of sea-based air. The assumption made in this analysis, based on studies of the available bases, is that land-based air can and should be used for Central and Southern Europe, Thailand and Vietnam, and Korea, and that mainly sea-based air would be needed for all other contingencies and for most of the Strategic Reserve. (The sea-based air in the Strategic Reserve would permit initial use of sea-based air in Asia or Southern Europe, if necessary.) On this basis, some shift in favor of land-based air might be indicated for the current strategy. In this area in particular, however, there are many additional factors that would have to be considered before any such decision could be made.

D. ASW Carriers, Escort Ships and other Naval Forces

A similar choice concerning land-based and sea-based air arises in the case of anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Sea-based air for ASW is more expensive than land-based, but does not depend on the availability

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of bases. Virtually all the significant parts of the sea can economically be covered by long-range land-based ASW aircraft operating from bases in allied countries.

It is inconsistent to assume that bases would not be available to us for ASW, since the current strategy depends on cooperation with our allies, and almost all of the costs of GPFs are for the defense of our allies' territory.

A reduction in the number of CVAs and CVSs would permit a corresponding reduction in the number of logistics support ships and destroyer escorts.

The annual cost savings for these ASW and support force changes would be about \$2.5 billion per year for the current strategy.

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DO NOT USE OR CITE THIS TABLE WITHOUT
ACCOMPANYING TEXT AND QUALIFICATIONSSummary of Force Structure and
Costs of Alternative Strategies

Description	0	1	2A	2B	2A-B	2C	2D	3	4	Currently Approved Program FY74 Baseline
Costs Per Year (\$ Billion)										
Land Forces	2.4	4.6	9.8	8.2	11.3	15.5	15.5	26.0	34.0	14.8
Tactical Air Forces	2.3	4.6	6.6	7.6	8.2	9.3	11.1	14.8	15.6	12.9
ASW/Amphibious & Other Naval Forces	2.9	4.8	6.0	6.9	6.9	6.9	7.0	9.8	10.3	9.4
Airlift/Sealift F&B, Command- ations & Intelligence	1.3	1.4	1.6	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.9	4.1	3.6
Ad to Allies	1.4	2.8	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.3
Military Assist- ance Program & Other Logistics	-	.8	.8	.9	1.1	1.1	1.1	.9	.4	.8
For Allies b/	-	.5	1.4	2.5	2.5	2.9	2.9	5.2	4.6	-
Total OPF	10.4	19.5	29.4	31.8	35.7	41.7	43.5	63.2	72.7	44.2
Strategic Forces	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4
Other Costs	7.0	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8
TOTAL DEFENSE BUDGET	35.8	47.7	57.6	60.0	63.9	69.9	71.7	91.4	100.9	72.4

Force Structure

Land Forces										
Active Divisions	2	5 1/3	12 1/3	8 1/3	13 1/3	15 1/3	15 1/3	21 1/3	29	19 1/3
Reserve Divisions	7 1/3	5	8	18 2/3	13 2/3	23 2/3	23 2/3	27 2/3	30 1/3	10
Total Divisions	9 1/3	10 1/3	20 1/3	27	27	39	39	49	59 1/3	29 1/3
Active Army/Marine Strength	257,000	482,000	871,000	682,000	956,000	1,091,000	1,091,000	1,465,000	1,803,000	1,193,000
Tactical Air Forces										
Fighter/Attack	830	1,525	2,565	2,890	3,040	3,625	4,645	5,752	5,765	5,455
Active Inventory	6	8 2/3	16 2/3	20 1/3	21 2/3	27	39 2/3	47 2/3	46 2/3	34 1/3
USMC/USAF Wings	3	6	8	8	8	8	8	10	12	15
Aircraft Carriers										
Other Naval Forces										
Nuclear Subs	17	41	62	62	62	62	62	90	90	62
ASW Aircraft	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
Carriers										
Patrol Subs	71	108	138	156	150	156	166	173	213	230
Amphibious Lift (LSTs)	10	20	24	24	24	24	24	24	37	24
	1	1	1	1 2/3	1 1/3	1 2/3	1 2/3	1 2/3	1 2/3	1 2/3
Airlift/Sealift										
C-5s	48	48	64	90	90	112	112	144	256	96
C-141s	0	0	32	224	224	224	224	224	224	224
C-130s	123	128	192	368	368	424	424	424	504	424
PDL Ships	0	3	7	22	22	36	36	42	70	30

Does not include cost of "prestige" items for allies which could cost several hundred million per year.
Includes ammunition and consumable supplies held under U.S. control for wartime use by allied forces.
The FY74 approved program cost is high because of large procurement in first two years.
Includes AG and Reserve.

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APPENDIX

POLITICAL EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

STRATEGY O

A U.S. withdrawal to the Western Hemisphere would have an immense foreign policy impact worldwide. To allies, neutrals, and potential adversaries alike it would mean that the U.S. were in effect reneging on all nonnuclear commitments except the Rio Treaty and retiring into "Fortress Hemisphere." Although we would maintain our strategic nuclear forces, they would scarcely be credible in the face of the massive American pullback. We would be telling the world that we were weary and disillusioned after three decades of global responsibilities, almost wholly preoccupied with domestic problems, and prepared to live on a planet sliced into regional blocs.

1. Europe

Implementation of Strategy O would signal to the USSR and the Western Europeans, nearly total U.S. disengagement if not disinterest in the defense of Western Europe. The credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee and the defensive and deterrent value of NATO's conventional forces would both drop sharply. This would stimulate if not invite the USSR to use force or threat of force against all or part of Western Europe (starting with the FRG) with the objective of: (a) incorporating it into the "Socialist Commonwealth;" or (b) reducing it to a position similar to that of Finland; or (c) pushing it into neutralism.

For the Western Europeans the best hope of maintaining their full independence and sovereignty would lie in a rapid and massive expansion of their nuclear and conventional capabilities, and an integrated defense system. This would take time, be expensive, encounter uncertainties as to feasibility, and would most probably have to be carried through in the face of Soviet cries of provocation and threats of preemption. Certainly any initiative that led to FRG control of nuclear weapons would sharply increase the likelihood of Soviet aggression.

The more possible and probable course for the Western Europeans vis-a-vis the USSR would be armed but accommodating neutrality. The U.K. and France, given their geographical positions and nuclear capabilities, might be able to maintain this course. The FRG would also have the strength and incentive to attempt this course. But the lesser powers of Europe would in all probability feel compelled to emphasize accommodation over arms, and accept the status of Finland as the least unacceptable alternative.

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2. Asia

Certain that the U.S. has neither the will nor capability to intervene, Asian Communist countries would be tempted to press more militantly for their objectives. This could run from bald assistance to insurgencies up through (less likely) massive conventional attacks on allies or neutrals. The remaining deterrence to Communist aggression would be the capabilities of the target nations themselves and the possibility of U.S. strategic retaliation in extreme circumstances (e.g., all-out attack on Japan or Australia). Specifically, there would be greatly increased threats in all three likely East Asian theaters: South Korea, Indochina/Thailand, and Taiwan.

Having seen the U.S. all but abandon its nonnuclear commitments, our allies would probably lose faith in our nuclear umbrella also. They could go in two directions: accommodation with Asian Communist powers or rapid building of regional security arrangements coupled with pressures for nuclear proliferation. The former course is more likely in Southeast Asia. Japan might opt for a combination of accommodation and nuclear power. South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand would have both more reason and capability to remain non-Communist through greater national defense efforts, attempts at regional collaboration and a search for a substitute nuclear shield.

Neutral nations would go to even greater lengths to accommodate Asian Communist powers in an attempt to preserve at least nominal independence.

3. Other Regions

The impact of Strategy O in the Middle East and North Africa would be along the lines described in the case of Western Europe. With the Soviet Union clearly the only power both capable and willing to assert itself in the area, the states of the area would have no alternative to accommodation. Regional security arrangements are unlikely and the area's independent military potential is in any case low. Egypt and Algeria would feel encouraged or even impelled to draw closer to the USSR and use its support in actions against Israel, on the one hand, and Morocco and Tunisia on the other. The pressures on Israel to build its own nuclear capability would be irresistible. Iran would be more vulnerable to Soviet pressure.

As in the case of all GPF strategies, sub-Sahara Africa would be less affected than other regions. We have no treaty commitments, few significant interests, and are not really expected to intervene. The continent, along with Latin America, is less important to the Communists and less threatened by them than Europe or Asia. However, even in Africa, the drastic withdrawal postulated under this strategy would probably make at least some nations prone to accommodate the Soviet Union and China.

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Canada and Latin America might very well have an ambivalent attitude toward a U.S. retreat to this Hemisphere. On the one hand it would represent a U.S. intention to concentrate on our own and our neighbors' problems undistracted by far-flung responsibilities, an emphasis that Latin Americans have been urging for some time. On the other hand, bringing the full weight of American strength to bear on this Hemisphere should magnify fears of domination, even exploitation, by the U.S. Colossus.

STRATEGY 1

The maintenance of general purpose forces for lower-level conflicts coupled with substantial assistance to our allies would have distinctly less serious global foreign policy implications than the withdrawal to "Fortress Hemisphere" of Strategy O. Compared to today's strategy, we would project a more restrained approach to intervention, be carrying lighter overseas burdens, and attending more to domestic problems. On the other hand, we would still be demonstrating, and paying for, significant worldwide military capabilities, backed up by the mobilization capability of the U.S. economy, and U.S. nuclear forces. Large-scale Communist aggressions would still involve a significant risk of American response. All future CPF strategies will be viewed by other countries in light of the U.S. experience in Vietnam. Under this strategy the implication would be that the U.S. has been sobered -- but not completely soured -- by the war.

1. Europe

The credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee and the defensive and deterrent value of NATO's conventional forces would both decline, but not nearly as much as in Strategy O. The imbalance in conventional forces could encourage the USSR to apply political pressure designed to test and divide NATO. The U.S. nuclear guarantee, symbolized by the presence of a U.S. force of about 70,000 men, would probably remain sufficiently credible to deter massive invasion. However, our allies would have greater doubts about our will to use nuclear weapons and would be more vulnerable to Soviet pressures and nuclear threats. Without U.S. reinforcements, NATO (especially the FRG) would be particularly vulnerable in a crisis and buildup situation, even though the FRG could replace our troops if -- as is very unlikely -- it decided to do so.

The Western Europeans would probably see their options as: (a) increasing their own M-Day and reinforcement capabilities; (b) developing their own nuclear capabilities; (c) adopting a more accommodating stance vis-a-vis the USSR. Budget difficulties and perennial doubts about the feasibility of conventional defense make a force buildup an unlikely response, although it cannot be entirely ruled out. Any large-scale effort along the lines of a nuclear buildup would, as in Strategy O,

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encounter heavy financial costs, uncertainties as to feasibility, and the threat of Soviet counteraction, particularly if the FRG were to seek control of nuclear weapons. The probable net effect would therefore be to increase somewhat the pressures for accommodation with the USSR. American force reductions and increased doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee would work to reduce our influence in European affairs generally.

2. Asia

There should be little effect on possible Chinese nuclear threats, given our overwhelming strategic superiority. There would be a somewhat greater temptation for Asian Communist powers to provide more overt aid to insurgencies, especially in SEA, or resort to conventional attacks, feeling that they were less likely to meet significant American theater intervention, at least at the outset. However, they may already doubt that even with our current capabilities we would commit substantial U.S. forces to a war in Asia after our costly Korean and Vietnam experiences. The Communists would still face substantial defenses by our allies, supported by U.S. material assistance, and would run the risk of U.S. nuclear response.

The effect on Communist threats would vary by theater. There might be some increase in Southeast Asia. In Korea we would still be equipping the South to handle the North, and China would still fear U.S. nuclear retaliation if she intervened. The limited CPR logistics capabilities, the problems of long distance assault, and strong GRC defenses would continue to deter amphibious attacks on Taiwan-Penghus.

Unlike Strategy O, our allies would most probably pursue their present policies toward Asian Communist countries rather than opting for neutralism and accommodation. There is a somewhat greater possibility of the latter course in mainland Southeast Asia than in offshore Northeast Asia. South Korea, with U.S. assistance, should feel confident of handling North Korea and would count on U.S. response if China intervened. Taiwan would still feel militarily secure for the reasons cited. Japan's policy would not change, so long as it believed in our nuclear commitment. The reduced U.S. capabilities under this strategy might prompt greater self-help and regional cooperation.

There should be little impact on the neutral countries' foreign policies, except possibly in Cambodia where Sihanouk has said he will bend toward Peking if the U.S. leaves the mainland.

3. Other Regions

Strategy 1 would involve some decline in our position in the Mid East and North Africa. Iran would be more vulnerable to Soviet pressure. Israel would be somewhat less secure since the Arabs (and the Soviets) would feel U.S. intervention less likely.

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There would be little new impact on sub-Sahara African nations. The GPF capabilities maintained under this strategy would be sufficient for any U.S. intervention (assuming there were no simultaneous contingency elsewhere involving U.S. forces), which is unlikely in any event. To a lesser degree than Strategy O, some African states might lean toward pleasing the Communist powers.

Western Hemisphere reaction is likely to be favorable. We would be signalling that our backyard is our first priority without renouncing our world role. There would thus be less fear of overwhelming U.S. impact on our hemispheric neighbors than under Strategy O.

STRATEGY 2A

This strategy reaffirms Europe as our number one priority. Like Strategy 1 it suggests a more restrained role in Asia, partly as a result of our Vietnam experience and the growing self-sufficiency of our allies. Other countries would see us as concentrating somewhat more on domestic problems and being less interventionist outside of Europe. But rather than succumbing to neoisolationism as in Strategy O or cutting back drastically the U.S. under this strategy would be perceived as doing some hard-headed ordering of foreign priorities.

1. Europe

Both the Soviet Union and our allies would regard this strategy as a refocusing of our national effort and interests towards Europe. It would significantly reduce our allies' uncertainties about our will and ability to maintain our presence in Europe. It would impress upon both our allies and the USSR the high priority we accord to the continued independence and well-being of Western Europe. The Europeans would worry less about U.S. Asian adventures. On the other hand, our European allies would have no greater incentive than they have now to assume, individually and collectively, a greater role in their own defense.

2. Asia

This strategy would have essentially the same impact as Strategy 1: our allies might feel slightly less confident, and China might be more militant. However, we would still provide substantial assistance to allied forces and the larger GPF structure, although Europe-oriented, would give us the capability in extreme cases to meet an Asian contingency. The U.S. would be emphasizing Europe, but not withdrawing from the world in general. Thus there would be somewhat less change in Asian political developments than under Strategy 1.

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3. Other Regions

In the Mid East and North Africa the current situation would remain essentially unaltered. The credibility of our commitment to Israel in particular would continue undiminished.

There would be no appreciable changed foreign policy impact in sub-Sahara Africa.

There would be little new impact on the Western Hemisphere, except a general approbation that the U.S. is re-ordering its overseas priorities and might have more time and resources for its neighbors.

STRATEGY 2B

This Asia-oriented strategy would recognize that other demands on resources make it impossible for us to maintain large standing defenses for both major theaters. We would not justify this on the basis that we considered Asia more important than Europe, but rather than we judged the threat there more direct and our allies less capable of defending themselves.

1. Europe

This strategy would have essentially the same impact as Strategy 1. The credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee and the defensive and deterrent value of NATO's conventional forces would both drop and the Western Europeans would probably be unable or unwilling to take compensatory action, given the costs, uncertainties, and Soviet threats these would encounter. As in Strategy 1, the probable net effect would be an increase in the pressures for accommodation of the USSR and a decline in American influence. This effect might be magnified somewhat by Western European beliefs that we were shifting our priorities from Europe to Asia.

2. Asia

Maintenance of strong forces for Asia should increase deterrence of Communist conventional aggressions throughout Asia. It would bolster the confidence of our allies in our commitments and readiness to intervene, particularly coming on the heels of present doubts about continued U.S. willingness to stay in force in Asia after our Vietnam experiences. It would probably encourage neutrals to maintain their present course of independence from China and the West alike.

This strategy would not envisage the huge GPF for Asia that Strategies 3 and especially 4 postulate, and there would therefore be continued need for allied defense efforts. However, allied self-help

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efforts and regional security initiatives might slacken in the face of our Asian orientation and continued deployments, and the fact that we would have the capacity in one theater to defend, and later to counterattack, against the Chinese.

3. Other Regions

Our withdrawal from neighboring Europe and orientation to Asia might suggest a lesser willingness to intervene in the Mid East and North Africa even though we would maintain a capability to support Israel and Iran.

There would be no appreciable new foreign policy impact in sub-Sahara Africa.

There would probably be some disaffection in Canada over an Asian-oriented strategy. The reactions in Latin America are difficult to predict. We would be signalling a continued willingness to intervene in less-developed countries. Generally, this would cause varying responses among ruling elites and leftist challengers. Similarly, our allies might have less confidence in our coming to their aid than under strategies that projected Asian orientation or even larger GPF forces. However, our commitments would remain credible, and our friends should be encouraged to pursue self-help and regional security efforts. There would be negligible foreign policy effect on neutral countries.

The current situation would remain essentially unaltered in the Mid East and North Africa.

There would be few changed foreign policy implications for either sub-Sahara Africa or this Hemisphere. We would be setting no regional priorities and would have more than enough forces to intervene in any conceivable contingency in either region.

STRATEGY 2A-B

The large CONUS reserve for either of two theaters would reflect our desire to cut back on GPF expenses by running the risk of simultaneous crises in Europe and Asia. It takes account of the Sino-Soviet split. We would not be assigning priority to Europe or Asia, although somewhat reducing our European forces. However, other countries would probably believe that in a two-front crisis we would choose to intervene in Europe first because of more vital interests and less time for holding actions.

1. Europe

The current political situation would not be greatly altered. However, force reductions in Europe coupled with the possibility of our CONUS-based force being committed in an Asian crisis could result in

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some diminished confidence in our support. The Western Europeans could feel themselves vulnerable to a crisis and buildup situation in which U.S. forces were unavailable, whether because a simultaneous Asian crisis were deemed more immediately serious or because U.S. troops were actually engaged there. This contingency would not, however, appear sufficient to move the Europeans toward accommodating the USSR or dangerous attempts at building a greater independent nuclear capability. Indeed, it might impel them to improvement of their own reinforcement capabilities.

2. Asia

The foreign policy impact in Asia should not be greatly different than under present GPF planning. There might be somewhat less deterrence of Communist conventional threats than under the Asian orientation of Strategy 2B. But the U.S. would still have the capacity to intervene if it chose to do so.

STRATEGIES 2C and 2D

These approximate planned GPF structures and reflect present declared strategy and thus should not have greatly different foreign policy implications than the present strategy. They would indicate that the U.S. is willing to continue to shoulder present global burdens in the face of pressures for retrenchment. This could give pause to potential aggressors and some reassurance to allies. However, this strategy would do nothing to induce our friends to do more for themselves in the near term.

1. Europe

This strategy is closest to our current declaratory strategy and consequently would do little to alter the status quo in Europe. Western Europe would be unlikely to do more, individually and collectively, for its own defense and might be tempted to do less. Yet doubts about our will and ability to maintain substantial U.S. forces in Europe over the long run would continue.

2. Asia

The impact on enemies, friends, and neutrals should be similar to the Asian orientation of Strategy 2B. Our enemies would run clear risks of U.S. intervention. Our allies would both be reassured about U.S. commitments and tempted to do less nationally and regionally for their own defense. Neutral nations would not change course.

3. Other Regions

No change in the political situation in the Mid East and North Africa. There should be no perceptible new foreign policy impact on sub-Sahara Africa or the Western Hemisphere.

STRATEGIES 3 and 4

These large GPF strategies would suggest that the U.S. plans to pursue an activist and policing role around the globe. Far from being disillusioned by Vietnam, we would be viewed as maintaining even greater world capabilities and interests. Far from being preoccupied with domestic problems, we would increase our overseas involvement. Under either strategy, but especially Strategy 4, we would erase incentives for our allies to fashion their own security. And we would signal a clear readiness for U.S. unilateral interventions and an unwillingness to cede any friendly real estate to our adversaries. We would have great military flexibility and have much less need to resort to nuclear weapons. These strategies would most likely heighten worldwide tension between the U.S. and Communist regimes and provoke compensatory defense spending.

1. Europe

The USSR might regard such an increase in our capabilities as a threat to its position in Eastern Europe and would be likely to respond with concomitant increases.

The Western European reaction would be mixed. Strategy 3 or 4, unlike any of the preceding strategies, would lay to rest Western European fears of large reductions in our forces in Europe. Indeed, there would be a strong likelihood that most of our allies would do even less in their own defense than at present, although we might be able to prevent this by skillful presentation of our increased contribution. On the other hand, there would be fears of provoking the USSR and increased fears of U.S. dominance in European affairs. This could provoke some (e.g., France) to draw closer to the USSR.

2. Asia

The forces, deployments, and bases needed for these strategies would certainly deter China, North Vietnam and North Korea from conventional aggressions and make even aid to insurgencies a much riskier policy. Our presence could be so dominant as to frighten the Communist nations and mislead them about our intentions. This could fuel Asian arms races or lead to conflicts arising from miscalculation.

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Our allies -- especially under Strategy 4 -- would have little incentive to contribute further to their own defense or move toward regional cooperation. Certain of our friends -- e.g., South Korea -- might be tempted to adopt more militant policies toward their adversaries.

Neutrals would certainly be impressed by American concern about Asia as well as the rest of the world. Rather than being pleased, however, they might fear Chinese-American conflicts or American hegemony over Asia.

3. Other Regions

The buildup of U.S. GPFs would suggest a greater willingness to intervene in the Mid East and North Africa. This could generate Soviet countermoves, including greater arms shipments and more military and naval cooperation with the Arabs. Israeli and Iranian confidence in U.S. support would remain high. States such as Morocco and Tunisia might be encouraged to turn more to the West for support against Soviet-backed Algerian or Egyptian aggressive acts.

The very large general purpose forces and deployments for this strategy would imply an American readiness to intervene any place in the world where we considered the stakes high enough. Thus sub-Sahara Africa could believe that we had changed our recent hands-off approach (e.g., Nigeria). The impact on the Western Hemisphere nations would be less, but Cuba (and its protector, the Soviet Union) might see greater possibilities of U.S. invasion.

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