

Unofficial translation

It has been considered appropriate in Moscow to urgently express to Mr. Nixon in a confidential way some considerations with regard to the situation in the Middle East. In so doing we take account that Mr. Nixon too has publicly spoken out in favor of an exchange of opinion with the Soviet Union regarding the Middle East, attaching special significance to the problems of this area.

We on our part also believe that a Soviet-American exchange of opinion on this point would be advisable.

The situation shaping up now in the Middle East causes serious concern in Moscow because of the absence in that area of any real movement towards a stable political settlement. Pertinent facts are well known and there is no need to dwell upon them in detail.

The Soviet Union, as Mr. Nixon is undoubtedly aware, throughout the entire present Middle East conflict has consistently advocated its settlement by political means and consequently has maintained and continues to maintain contacts with the Governments of Arab states which we believe has contributed to a constructive evolution in the approach by those countries to the problem of settlement with Israel.

It is known that the Arab states, first of all the UAR, have formally recognized the UN Security Council

Resolution of November 22, 1967 and declared with all clarity their readiness to implement the provisions contained therein. Moreover, the UAR has spoken in favor of working out a timetable for a stage-by stage implementation of the resolution, mentioned above, i.e. of all its provisions and has put forward concrete considerations in that regard. Finally, one cannot but note the constructive nature of the recent answer by the UAR Government to the "7 points" introduced by Secretary of State Rusk last November of which Mr. Nixon, we believe, is informed.

We would like to point out that in the answer, alongside with the confirmation of the already mentioned positive aspects in the UAR position some additional concrete explanations of the Egyptian position are contained on such questions of principle as termination of the state of belligerency, freedom of navigation, refugee problem, guaranteeing of the implementation of the commitments with regard to settlement and UN participation in the process of actual settlement. The UAR answer is in full accord with the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

Thus, there can hardly be doubt in anyone's mind as to the good will on the part of the Arab states and their readiness for a just political settlement of the conflict which would ensure stabilization of the situation in the Middle East.

Now, what is Israel's position? Are there any real positive changes in it? One has to state that, in fact, there are no changes at all. Moreover, the Israeli forces do not cease armed provocations in the areas of the Suez Canal and the Jordan river; public statements by the leaders of Tel-Aviv testify to the fact that expansionist mood influences more and more the policy of Israel.

The basic question of the Middle Eastern settlement is, undoubtedly, the necessity of a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories seized by them. There cannot be two opinions with regard to the primary importance of the solution of this question. However even when the officials of the American Government tell us that Israel has no territorial claims against the Arab countries and would be ready for a settlement on the basis of the demarcation lines in accordance with the Armistise Agreement of 1949, the Israelis themselves subsequently disavow such an assertion. We would like to inform Mr. Nixon that this was clearly stated, for example, by the Israeli UN representative in a conversation with a Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR which took place in New York on the initiative of the former.

Moscow would like to hope, that Mr. Nixon shares our apprehensions as to what dangerous consequences such a defiant behaviour of Israel could lead to in the long run.

The Arab countries show their readiness for a peaceful

settlement and for contributing constructively to its achievement. The conversations between the Foreign Minister of the USSR and the leaders of the UAR, which took place several days ago, fully confirm such a conclusion. At the same time one should keep in mind that in the conditions of the continued aggression on the part of Israel the Arab countries, naturally, have taken and are taking maximum efforts to strengthen their military power. And nobody can blame them for doing so in the face of such a position of Israel.

In Israel, and not only in Israel, one can hear notions to the effect that time allegedly works for Israelis and therefore they could be in no hurry with the settlement of the conflict. This is a dangerous delusion. And if Israel does not show prudence, one cannot exclude any surprises, such a turn of events which would not only be contrary to the interests of the Middle Eastern countries, naturally, including Israel, but also would create a crisis situation extending beyond the limits of that area. Under these circumstances it is the duty of all statesmen sincerely interested in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, to take urgent and determined measures to prevent a new flare-up there through the speediest achievement of a just, peaceful settlement on the basis of the Resolution of the Security Council unanimously adopted on November 22, 1967. We proceed also from the assumption that Mr. Jarring's mission serves these purposes and in our

opinion it should be supported in every possible way.

The Soviet Union, in pursuing its policy of strengthening international peace and security which was again demonstrated by its contribution to the beginning of settlement of the Vietnam conflict will continue to do everything depending on it to prevent a new flare-up of crisis in the Middle East.

Attainment of a real progress in the political settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict as well as further progress in peace settlement in Vietnam would undoubtedly affect in a most positive way the entire world situation and would create more favorable conditions for the development of the Soviet-American relations.

The main obstacle on the way to the achievement of a Middle Eastern settlement continues to lie in the negative position of Israel. Therefore the basic task now is to apply necessary influence on Tel-Aviv so that it adopt a realistic position. The United States, undoubtedly, have considerable opportunities for doing so and Moscow hopes that Mr. Nixon will examine the considerations expressed by us with due attention.

To facilitate finding a solution to the Middle Eastern crisis the Soviet Government has prepared a plan containing new proposals which are fully based on the above mentioned resolution of the Security Council and take into account the recently emerged moments favorable to the achievement of an agreement on a peace settlement in the Middle East.

The plan and considerations related to the dangerous situation in the Middle East are also being conveyed by the Soviet Government to the Governments of France and Great Britain.

From time to time we exchange opinions with the present Administration on the Middle Eastern question. In particular, some time ago we drew its attention to the ever more dangerous situation connected with the militant, uncompromising and short-sighted position of Israel. However despite of it we would like already now to bring our concern in that respect to the knowledge of Mr. Nixon as well.

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Israel and the Arab countries - neighbours of Israel, that would be prepared to participate in the implementation of such a plan, reaffirm their adherence to the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, and declare their readiness to implement all its provisions.

They agree further that there will be worked out by way of contacts through Mr. Jarring a timetable and an order for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the territories occupied during the conflict of 1967 and that there will be outlined an agreed plan for the implementation by the sides of other provisions of the Security Council Resolution, having in view the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, under which each state in that region will be able to live in security.

The purpose of these contacts could be to agree upon specific arrangements to implement the above Security Council Resolution.

1. An agreement be reached on simultaneous declaration by the Government of Israel and by the Governments of the Arab states-neighbours of Israel which will participate in the implementation of the plan, of their readiness to terminate the state of belligerency between them and attain a peaceful settlement after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. In this connection Israel states her readiness to begin, starting from a fixed date, the withdrawal of troops from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the conflict in summer of 1967.

2. On the day of the beginning of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops, to be carried out by stages under the supervision by the UN observers, the above mentioned Arab countries as well as Israel deposit with the UN appropriate documents on the cessation of the state of belligerency on the respect for and the recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in this area and of their right to live in peace, in secured and recognized boundaries, i.e. in accord with the above mentioned Resolution of the Security Council.

In accordance with an agreement to be reached through Mr. Jarring provisions would also be agreed upon concerning secured and recognized boundaries (with appropriate maps attached), concerning the ensuring of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, a justful settlement of refugee problem, the ensuring of territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area (possibly through measures, including establishment of demilitarized zones).

It is understood that such an agreement will be viewed in accordance with the Resolution of the Security Council as something of a whole, relating to all the aspects of a settlement throughout the Middle Eastern area, as a "package".

3. The Israeli forces within the subsequent month (as an example) withdraw from a part of Arab territories to certain intermediate positions on the Sinai peninsula, on the western bank of the Jordan river (as well as from the Syrian territory - from the area of El Quneitra).

On the day, when the Israeli forces reached predetermined lines on the Sinai peninsula (for instance, 30-40 kilometers from the Suez canal); the Government of the UAR brings its forces into the Suez canal <sup>and begins the clearing up of the canal</sup> for the resumption of navigation.

4. Within the second month <sup>as an example</sup> ~~(conditionally)~~ the Israeli forces are withdrawn to the lines which they occupied prior to June 5, 1967, upon which administration of the respective Arab countries is completely restored on the vacated territories, its troops and police forces are introduced.

On the date of the beginning of the second stage of withdrawal of Israeli troops the UAR and Israel (or the UAR alone if her Government agrees) declare their agreement to the deployment of UN troops near the line which existed before June 5, 1967, on the Sinai peninsula, at Sharm El Sheikhand in Gaza sector, that is a situation which existed in this area in May 1967 is restored.

The Security Council takes a decision to dispatch UN troops in accordance with the UN Charter and confirms the principle of freedom of navigation through the Tiran straits and the Gulf

of Akaba for vessels of all countries.

5. After the completion of withdrawal of Israeli troops to the lines of state demarkation through the Security Council, or through signing a multilateral document, the documents of the Arab countries and Israel, deposited earlier, are finally put into effect.

The Security Council, on the basis of the UN Charter provisions, takes a decision to guarantee the Arab - Israeli boundaries (as a variant, guarantees by the four powers - permanent members of the Security Council, are not excluded).

В Москве сочли желательным в доверительном порядке высказать безотлагательно г-ну Никсону некоторые соображения по поводу обстановки на Ближнем Востоке. При этом мы учитываем, что и сам г-н Никсон публично высказывался в пользу обмена мнениями с Советским Союзом относительно Ближнего Востока, придавая особое значение проблемам этого района. Со своей стороны, мы также считаем целесообразным советско-американский обмен мнениями на этот счет.

В Москве вызывает серьезную озабоченность ситуация, складывающаяся сейчас на Ближнем Востоке ввиду отсутствия там какого-либо реального сдвига в направлении достижения устойчивого политического урегулирования. Факты, имеющиеся на этот счет, хорошо известны и нет нужды подробно останавливаться на них.

Советский Союз, как это, должно быть, известно г-ну Никсону, на протяжении всего нынешнего ближневосточного конфликта последовательно выступает за его

урегулирование политическим путем и, исходя из этого, поддерживал и поддерживает контакты с правительствами арабских стран, что, как мы считаем, способствовало конструктивной эволюции в подходе этих стран к проблеме урегулирования с Израилем.

Известно, что арабские государства, прежде всего ОАР, официально признали резолюцию Совета Безопасности ООН от 22 ноября 1967 года и со всей определенностью заявили о своей готовности выполнить содержащиеся в ней положения. Более того, ОАР высказалась за составление плана поэтапного выполнения указанной резолюции, т.е. всех ее положений, и выдвинула конкретные соображения на этот счет. Наконец, нельзя не отметить конструктивный характер недавнего ответа правительства ОАР на "7 пунктов", выдвинутые государственным секретарем Раском в ноябре с.г., о котором г-н Никсон, надо полагать, осведомлен.

Мы хотели бы напомнить, что в этом ответе, помимо подтверждения уже отмеченных позитивных моментов в позиции ОАР, дополнительно конкретизируется египетская позиция по таким принципиальным вопросам, как прекращение состояния войны, свобода судоходства, проблема беженцев, гарантии выполнения обязательств по урегулированию, участие ООН в процессе фактического урегулирования. Ответ ОАР полностью соответствует резолюции Совета Безопасности от 22 ноября 1967 года.

Таким образом, вряд ли у кого-либо могут возникнуть сомнения в наличии доброй воли со стороны

арабских государств и их готовности к справедливому политическому урегулированию конфликта, что обеспечило бы стабилизацию положения на Ближнем Востоке.

А какова позиция Израиля? Имеются ли какие-либо действительно реальные позитивные сдвиги в его позиции? Приходится констатировать, что по сути дела никаких сдвигов нет. Более того, израильские войска не прекращают вооруженные провокации в районе Суэцкого канала и реки Иордан; публичные заявления руководителей Тель-Авива свидетельствуют о том, что экспансионистские настроения оказывают все большее влияние на политику Израиля.

Основным вопросом ближневосточного урегулирования является, безусловно, необходимость полного вывода израильских войск с захваченных ими арабских территорий. Не может быть двух мнений в отношении первостепенной важности решения этого вопроса. Однако даже когда официальные лица Американского правительства говорят нам, что Израиль не имеет территориальных претензий к арабским странам и был бы готов на урегулирование на основе разграничительных линий в соответствии с перемирием 1949 года, то вслед за этим сами израильяне фактически дезавуируют такое утверждение. Мы хотели бы информировать г-на Никсона, что об этом недавно было четко заявлено, например, израильским представителем <sup>В</sup>ООН в беседе, состоявшейся по его инициативе с заместителем министра иностранных дел СССР в Нью-Йорке.

В Москве хотели бы надеяться, что г-н Никсон разделяет наши опасения по поводу того, к сколь опасным последствиям может в конечном счете привести столь вызывающее поведение Израиля.

Арабские страны проявляют готовность идти на мирное урегулирование и конструктивно способствовать его достижению. Состоявшиеся на днях беседы министра иностранных дел СССР с руководителями ОАР вполне подтверждают этот вывод. Вместе с тем следует иметь в виду, что в условиях продолжающейся агрессии со стороны Израиля арабские страны, естественно, прилагают и прилагают максимальные усилия к наращиванию своей вооруженной мощи. И никто не может осуждать их за это при такой позиции Израиля.

В Израиле, да и не только в Израиле, можно услышать рассуждения, что, дескать, время работает на израильтян и поэтому они могут не спешить с урегулированием конфликта. Это — опасное заблуждение. И если Израиль не проявит благоразумия, то нельзя исключать любых неожиданностей, такого поворота событий, который не только был бы не в интересах стран Ближнего Востока, в том числе, разумеется, и Израиля, но и создал бы кризисную ситуацию, выходящую за рамки данного района. В этих условиях долг всех государственных деятелей, искренне заинтересованных в стабилизации положения на Ближнем Востоке, принять неотложные, решительные меры к предотвращению

там нового взрыва путем скорейшего достижения справедливого мирного урегулирования на основе единогласно принятой резолюции Совета Безопасности от 22 ноября 1967 года. Мы исходим также из того, что этим целям служит миссия Ярринга, которой, по нашему мнению, следует оказывать всемерную помощь.

Советский Союз, следуя политике укрепления всеобщего мира и безопасности, что он вновь продемонстрировал своим вкладом в дело начала урегулирования вьетнамского конфликта, будет и дальше делать все от него зависящее, чтобы не допустить возникновения нового кризиса на Ближнем Востоке.

Достижение реального сдвига в политическом урегулировании ближневосточного конфликта, равно как и дальнейший прогресс в деле мирного урегулирования во Вьетнаме, безусловно, сказалось бы самым положительным образом на обстановке в мире в целом и создало бы более благоприятные условия для развития советско-американских отношений.

Основным препятствием на пути к достижению ближневосточного урегулирования продолжает оставаться негативная позиция Израиля. Поэтому главной задачей сейчас является оказание соответствующего воздействия на Тель-Авив с тем, чтобы там заняли реалистическую позицию. Соединенные Штаты располагают, несомненно, значительными возможностями для этого, и в Москве надеются, что г-н Никсон со всей серьезностью отнесется

к высказанным нами соображениям.

С целью облегчения нахождения решения ближневосточного кризиса Советское правительство подготовило план, содержащий новые предложения, которые целиком основываются на упомянутой резолюции Совета Безопасности и учитывают появившиеся в последнее время моменты, благоприятствующие достижению договоренности о мирном урегулировании на Ближнем Востоке.

Данный план и соответствующие соображения по поводу опасной ситуации на Ближнем Востоке направляются Советским правительством также правительствам Франции и Англии.

Время от времени мы обмениваемся мнениями с нынешней администрацией по ближневосточному вопросу. В частности, недавно мы обратили ее внимание на складывающуюся на Ближнем Востоке все более опасную ситуацию, связанную с воинственной, неуступчивой и недальновидной позицией Израиля. Однако независимо от этого мы хотели бы уже сейчас довести и до сведения г-на Никсона нашу озабоченность по этому поводу.

Израиль и арабские страны-соседи Израиля, которые будут готовы принять участие в осуществлении такого плана, подтверждают свое согласие с резолюцией Совета Безопасности от 22 ноября 1967 года и заявляют о готовности осуществлять все ее положения.

При этом они соглашались, что будут установлены путем контактов через Ярринга расписание и порядок вывода израильских войск с территорий, оккупированных во время конфликта 1967 года, и вместе с тем <sup>будет</sup> намечен согласованный план выполнения сторонами других положений резолюции Совета Безопасности, имея в виду установление справедливого и прочного мира на Ближнем Востоке, при котором каждое государство в данном районе может жить в безопасности.

Целью этих контактов могло бы быть согласование конкретных мероприятий по выполнению указанной резолюции Совета Безопасности.

I. Достигается согласие об одновременном заявлении правительства Израиля и правительств арабских

стран-соседей Израиля, которые будут участвовать в осуществлении данного плана, о готовности пойти на прекращение состояния войны между ними и достижение мирного урегулирования после вывода израильских войск с оккупированных арабских территорий. В этой связи Израиль заявляет о своей готовности начать с зафиксированной даты вывод войск с арабских территорий, оккупированных в результате конфликта летом 1967 года.

2. В день начала вывода израильских войск, осуществляемого по этапам под наблюдением представителей ООН, упомянутые арабские страны, а также Израиль депонируют в ООН соответствующие документы о прекращении состояния войны, об уважении и признании суверенитета, территориальной целостности и политической независимости каждого государства в данном районе и их права жить в мире, в безопасных и признанных границах, то есть в соответствии с указанной резолюцией Совета Безопасности.

В соответствии с договоренностью, которая будет достигнута через посредство Ярринга, будут согласованы также положения, касающиеся безопасных и признанных границ (с приложением соответствующих карт), обеспечения свободы судоходства по международным водным путям в данном районе, справедливого урегулирования проблемы беженцев, обеспечения территориальной неприкосновенности и политической независимости каждого государства в данном районе (возможно с помощью мер,

включающих установление демилитаризованных зон).

Имеется в виду, что эта договоренность будет рассматриваться в соответствии с резолюцией Совета Безопасности как нечто целое, относящееся ко всем аспектам урегулирования по всему району Ближнего Востока, в виде "пакета".

3. Израильские войска в течение последующего месяца (условно) отходят с части арабских территорий на определенные промежуточные рубежи на Синайском полуострове, на западном побережье реки Иордан (а также с сирийской территории, из района Эль-Кунейтра).

В день, когда израильские войска достигнут заранее обусловленных промежуточных рубежей на Синайском полуострове (например, 30-40 километров от Суэцкого канала), правительство ОАР вводит войска в зону Суэцкого канала и начинает расчистку канала для возобновления судоходства.

4. В течение второго месяца (условно) израильские войска отводятся на линии, которые они занимали до 5 июня 1967 года, после чего на освобожденных территориях полностью восстанавливается администрация соответствующей арабской страны, вводятся ее войска и полицейские силы.

В день начала второго этапа отвода израильских войск ОАР и Израиль (или только ОАР в случае согласия ее правительства) заявляют о согласии на размещение войск ООН вблизи линии до 5 июня 1967 года на Синайском полуострове, в Шарм Аш-Шейх и в секторе Газы,

то есть восстанавливается положение в этом районе, существовавшее в мае 1967 года.

Совет Безопасности принимает решение о направлении войск ООН в соответствии с Уставом ООН и подтверждает принцип свободы судоходства через Тиранский пролив и по Акабскому заливу для судов всех стран.

5. После завершения вывода израильских войск на линии межгосударственного разграничения через посредство Совета Безопасности, либо путем подписания многостороннего документа, окончательно вводятся в действие депонированные ранее документы арабских стран и Израиля.

Совет Безопасности, опираясь на положения Устава ООН, принимает решение о гарантиях арабо-израильских границ (не исключается и вариант гарантий четырех держав — постоянных членов Совета Безопасности).

Monday evening, December 30, 1968

In addition to handing me the enclosed materials, Tcherniakov and I had a conversation which covered the following points, among others:

(1) He expressed dismay over the Joseph Alsop column in the Washington Post that morning, which had been to the effect that a military victory was not only possible but desirable in Vietnam. Tcherniakov disputed this as unrealistic.

(2) He brought up the subject of Czechoslovakia, saying that not many people realized it but that if Soviet troops had not entered Czechoslovakia in August, the Germans would probably have commenced hostilities themselves within two or three years. He went to some pains to emphasize that the situation in Czechoslovakia today is not a military occupation even though Soviet troops are there. He mentioned the stability, independence and autonomy of Hungary, and emphasized that the Russian entry of Czechoslovakia was much less objectionable to the West than the Hungarian incident.

I noted that, although the German threat may have seemed realistic to him, it would be extremely difficult for anyone in the United States to believe the German threat theory as a justification for the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.

(3) He expressed as his personal opinion, emphasizing he was not authorized to say so, that the German plan to have their election in West Berlin in the spring would be regarded as "a matter of death and life" by the Soviets -- a matter of utmost gravity.

It has been considered appropriate in Moscow to urgently express to Mr. Nixon in a confidential way some considerations with regard to the situation in the Middle East. In so doing we take account that Mr. Nixon too has publicly spoken out in favor of an exchange of opinion with the Soviet Union regarding the Middle East, attaching special significance to the problems of this area.

We on our part also believe that a Soviet-American exchange of opinion on this point would be advisable.

The situation shaping up now in the Middle East causes serious concern in Moscow because of the absence in that area of any real movement towards a stable political settlement. Pertinent facts are well known and there is no need to dwell upon them in detail.

The Soviet Union, as Mr. Nixon is undoubtedly aware, throughout the entire present Middle East conflict has consistently advocated its settlement by political means and consequently has maintained and continues to maintain contacts with the Governments of Arab states which we believe has contributed to a constructive evolution in the approach by those countries to the problem of settlement with Israel.

It is known that the Arab states, first of all the UAR, have formally recognized the UN Security Council.

Resolution of November 22, 1967 and declared with all clarity their readiness to implement the provisions contained therein. Moreover, the UAR has spoken in favor of working out a timetable for a stage-by-stage implementation of the resolution, mentioned above, i.e. of all its provisions and has put forward concrete considerations in that regard. Finally, one cannot but note the constructive nature of the recent answer by the UAR Government to the "7 points" introduced by Secretary of State Rusk last November of which Mr. Nixon, we believe, is informed.

We would like to point out that in the answer, alongside with the confirmation of the already mentioned positive aspects in the UAR position some additional concrete explanations of the Egyptian position are contained on such questions of principle as termination of the state of belligerency, freedom of navigation, refugee problem, guaranteeing of the implementation of the commitments with regard to settlement and UN participation in the process of actual settlement. The UAR answer is in full accord with the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

Thus, there can hardly be doubt in anyone's mind as to the good will on the part of the Arab states and their readiness for a just political settlement of the conflict which would ensure stabilization of the situation in the Middle East.

Now, what is Israel's position? Are there any real positive changes in it? One has to state that, in fact, there are no changes at all. Moreover, the Israeli forces do not cease armed provocations in the areas of the Suez Canal and the Jordan river; public statements by the leaders of Tel-Aviv testify to the fact that expansionist mood influences more and more the policy of Israel.

The basic question of the Middle Eastern settlement is, undoubtedly, the necessity of a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories seized by them. There cannot be two opinions with regard to the primary importance of the solution of this question. However, even when the officials of the American Government tell us that Israel has no territorial claims against the Arab countries and would be ready for a settlement on the basis of the demarcation lines in accordance with the Armistice Agreement of 1949, the Israelis themselves subsequently disavow such an assertion. We would like to inform Mr. Nixon that this was clearly stated, for example, by the Israeli UN representative in a conversation with a Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR which took place in New York on the initiative of the former.

Moscow would like to hope, that Mr. Nixon shares our apprehensions as to what dangerous consequences such a defiant behaviour of Israel could lead to in the long run.

The Arab countries show their readiness for a peaceful

settlement and for contributing constructively to its achievement. The conversations between the Foreign Minister of the USSR and the leaders of the UAR, which took place several days ago, fully confirm such a conclusion. At the same time one would keep in mind that in the conditions of the continued aggression on the part of Israel the Arab countries, naturally, have taken and are taking maximum efforts to strengthen their military power. And nobody can blame them for doing so in the face of such a position of Israel.

In Israel, and not only in Israel, one can hear notions to the effect that time allegedly works for Israelis and therefore they could be in no hurry with the settlement of the conflict. This is a dangerous delusion. And if Israel does not show prudence, one cannot exclude any surprises, such a turn of events which would not only be contrary to the interests of the Middle Eastern countries, naturally, including Israel, but also would create a crisis situation extending beyond the limits of that area. Under these circumstances it is the duty of all statesmen sincerely interested in stabilizing the situation in the Middle East, to take urgent and determined measures to prevent a new flare-up there through the speediest achievement of a just, peaceful settlement on the basis of the Resolution of the Security Council unanimously adopted on November 22, 1967. We proceed also from the assumption that Mr. Jarring's mission serves these purposes and in our

opinion it should be supported in every possible way.

The Soviet Union, in pursuing its policy of strengthening international peace and security which was again demonstrated by its contribution to the beginning of settlement of the Vietnam conflict will continue to do everything depending on it to prevent a new flare-up of crisis in the Middle East.

Attainment of a real progress in the political settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict as well as further progress in peace settlement in Vietnam would undoubtedly affect in a most positive way the entire world situation and would create more favorable conditions for the development of the Soviet-American relations.

The main obstacle on the way to the achievement of a Middle Eastern settlement continues to lie in the negative position of Israel. Therefore the basic task now is to apply necessary influence on Tel-Aviv so that it adopt a realistic position. The United States, undoubtedly, have considerable opportunities for doing so and Moscow hopes that Mr. Nixon will examine the considerations expressed by us with due attention.

To facilitate finding a solution to the Middle Eastern crisis the Soviet Government has prepared a plan containing new proposals which are fully based on the above mentioned resolution of the Security Council and take into account the recently emerged moments favorable to the achievement of an agreement on a peace settlement in the Middle East.

The plan and considerations related to the dangerous situation in the Middle East are also being conveyed by the Soviet Government to the Governments of France and Great Britain.

From time to time we exchange opinions with the present Administration on the Middle Eastern question. In particular, some time ago we drew its attention to the ever more dangerous situation connected with the militant, uncompromising and short-sighted position of Israel. However, despite of it we would like already now to bring our concern in that respect to the knowledge of Mr. Nixon as well.

Unofficial translation

Israel and the Arab countries - neighbours of Israel, that would be prepared to participate in the implementation of such a plan, reaffirm their adherence to the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, and declare their readiness to implement all its provisions.

They agree further that there will be worked out by way of contacts through Mr. Jarring a timetable and an order for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the territories occupied during the conflict of 1967 and that there will be outlined an agreed plan for the implementation by the sides of other provisions of the Security Council Resolution, having in view the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, under which each state in that region will be able to live in security.

The purpose of these contacts could be to agree upon specific arrangements to implement the above Security Council Resolution.

1. An agreement be reached on simultaneous declaration by the Government of Israel and by the Governments of the Arab states-neighbours of Israel which will participate in the implementation of the plan, of their readiness to terminate the state of belligerency between them and attain a peaceful settlement after the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. In this connection Israel states her readiness to begin, starting from a fixed date, the withdrawal of troops from the Arab territories occupied as a result of the conflict in summer of 1967.

2. On the day of the beginning of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops, to be carried out by stages under the supervision by the UN observers, the above mentioned Arab countries as well as Israel deposit with the UN appropriate documents on the cessation of the state of belligerency on the respect for and the recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in this area and of their right to live in peace, in secured and recognized boundaries, i.e. in accord with the above mentioned Resolution of the Security Council.

In accordance with an agreement to be reached through Mr. Jarring provisions would also be agreed upon concerning secured and recognized boundaries (with appropriate maps attached), concerning the ensuring of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, a justful settlement of refugee problem, the ensuring of territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area (possibly through measures, including establishment of demilitarized zones).

It is understood that such an agreement will be viewed in accordance with the Resolution of the Security Council as something of a whole, relating to all the aspects of a settlement throughout the Middle Eastern area, as a "package".

3. The Israeli forces within the subsequent month (as an example) withdraw from a part of Arab territories to certain intermediate positions on the Sinai peninsula, on the western bank of the Jordan river (as well as from the Syrian territory - from the area of El Quneitra).

On the day, when the Israeli forces reached predetermined lines on the Sinai peninsula (for instance, 30-40 kilometers from the Suez canal); the Government of the UAR brings its forces into the Suez Canal <sup>and begins the clearing up of the canal</sup> for the resumption of navigation.

4. Within the second month <sup>as an example</sup> ~~(unconditionally)~~ the Israeli forces are withdrawn to the lines which they occupied prior to June 5, 1967, upon which administration of the respective Arab countries is completely restored on the vacated territories, its troops and police forces are introduced.

On the date of the beginning of the second stage of withdrawal of Israeli troops the UAR and Israel (or the UAR alone if her Government agrees) declare their agreement to the deployment of UN troops near the line which existed before June 5, 1967, on the Sinai peninsula, at Sharm El Sheikhand in Gaza sector, that is a situation which existed in this area in May 1967 is restored.

The Security Council takes a decision to dispatch UN troops in accordance with the UN Charter and confirms the principle of freedom of navigation through the Tiran straits and the Gulf

of Akaba for vessels of all countries.

5. After the completion of withdrawal of Israeli troops to the lines of state demarcation through the Security Council, or through signing a multilateral document, the documents of the Arab countries and Israel, deposited earlier are finally put into effect.

The Security Council, on the basis of the UN Charter provisions, takes a decision to guarantee the Arab - Israeli boundaries (as a variant, guarantees by the four powers - permanent members of the Security Council, are not excluded).