

GROS

"CZECHOSLOVAKIA"

December 31, 1968

Mr. Eugene Gros  
Scientific Information  
Consultants, Ltd.  
661 Finchley Road  
London N.W. 2, England

Dear Mr. Gros:

Thank you very much for your letter of December 24 and the enclosed memo concerning the problems in Europe in the aftermath of the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Kissinger is presently out of the city, but I will bring the report to his attention upon his return.

Sincerely,

~~Henry A. Kissinger~~

*Larry Speilburger*  
*Sally Doherty*



# Scientific Information Consultants Ltd

661 FINCHLEY ROAD LONDON NW2 TELEPHONE SWISS COTTAGE 2217

EG/JVW

24th December, 1968.

Prof. Dr. Henry Kissinger,  
Hotel Pierre,  
Fifth Avenue/61st Street,  
New York, N.Y.,  
U. S. A.

DEC 31 1968

Dear Sir,

I have much pleasure in enclosing herewith a brief memo concerning the political, economic, cultural and social problems in Europe in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The situation is extremely complex and for obvious reasons many of the events are not reported in the press. It is hoped that the enclosed memorandum will make some contribution towards understanding the events in the Soviet bloc countries.

The views expressed in this report are based on very reliable information and my own interpretation of events, drawing on my experience of over twenty years in screening, abstracting, translating and reporting on scientific and industrial developments in the Soviet bloc countries. I have never been satisfied to rely on printed material alone and have always made an effort to establish personal contacts with authors whose material I used. As a result I maintain personal contacts with many leading authors in various Soviet bloc countries, including the USSR.

The very latest reports from Czechoslovakia seem to indicate that the resistance of the population to the Russian occupation and interference is undiminished and that full emergency plans have been made to cope with the situation if the squeeze from the Russians became tighter. It is for the first time that the extensive network of underground activity originally prepared with Soviet guidance to counter the possibility of a Western occupation of the country, is now being prepared to work against the Soviet Union on an unprecedented scale. People in the know in Czechoslovakia believe that much will depend on the attitude of the new American administration, and that the Russians would be more amenable to compromise if the line adopted towards them is hard, even very hard, but by no means rigid.

Directors: E. Gros. G. Gros

Prof. Dr. Henry Kissinger

2.

24th December, 1968.

I myself have an engineering background. I studied in Czechoslovakia and in Paris, and in the immediate post-war period I began specializing in industrial reporting and then later on began to concentrate almost exclusively on Soviet bloc scientific and industrial developments. For many years I worked as an adviser and a contractor to the U.S. Embassy in London and other Government organizations and bodies, in addition to commercial publishing on my own account.

I hope that you will find my report useful and I would appreciate any comments which you may have to make.

Yours very truly,



Eugene Gros

encl.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL  
PROBLEMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE RUSSIAN  
OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by Eugene Gros

Scientific Information Consultants Ltd.,  
661 Finchley Road, London, N.W.2.,  
England.

	Page
1. Cultural Relations	2
2. Information Media	3
3. Trade Relations with the USSR	3
4. Trade with Eastern European Countries	4
5. Gold	5
6. Finance	5
7. Political Problems and News Media	5
8. Diplomatic Personnel	7
9. Defence Considerations	9
10. Screening and Interpretation of Technical and Scientific Literature	10
11. Saving of Strategically Important Raw Materials	10

---

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL  
PROBLEMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE RUSSIAN  
OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

---

The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent events have revealed an urgent need for reassessing policies to be followed towards the Soviet Union and other Communist bloc countries. The conditions in these countries are very complex and therefore it is imperative that in formulating policies towards individual Communist bloc countries, due consideration should be given to political, economic, social and cultural aspects, in addition to strategic considerations and sentiment.

One of the most fundamental political changes inside Czechoslovakia produced by the invasion is that the Soviet Union completely lost any support from the ranks of lower paid working classes and other sections of the population on which, traditionally, they could always rely either for active support or at least passive acceptance. Even the lowest paid and most under-privileged people in Czechoslovakia who believed that they had nothing to lose suddenly realised that everybody has something to lose as a result of the Soviet occupation.

What is even more important, the traditionally very good cultural relations which existed over many decades between the Czechs and the Slovaks on the one hand and the Russians on the other, and were accepted by the people as a whole, have suffered a severe setback and it will take a long time for these wounds to heal, even superficially. In contrast to Poland, where natural animosities existed since the first division of Poland in the 18th century, there was no historical reason for the Czechs and Slovaks to hate the Russian people as people, and for that reason they were always sympathetic to Russian culture, as distinct from Russian politics. Even the very left-wing Communists among the Czechs and Slovaks who had great faith in the Russians before the invasion were completely shattered and lost all confidence in the Russian Communists after the invasion; many of these people are even more bitter about the Russian betrayal than others who never trusted the Russians too much. It will depend to a very great extent on the Soviet policy during the next few months whether the very small number of politicians who are at present prepared to support the Russians under any conditions will widen. There was reason to fear that the unity of the people in Czechoslovakia might disintegrate slowly, but it appears that, on the contrary, the unity is maintained or may even get stronger. The workers have expressed unanimously their sympathy with the students in their strike after November 17th. One must not over-estimate the importance of the differences between the political views of the individual leaders because, for the time being at least, they are forced by the various classes of the Czech people, and especially the working class, to resist many of the Russian demands to which they might have agreed.

Another vitally important feature of the events in Czechoslovakia during and after the invasion was that, for the first time in history, Soviet political and military actions were exposed to the fullest reporting by the world news media. In this a vital role was played by the official Czech news media, especially the Czech radio, so that Western news media were able to give very full radio and television coverage to the events and bring home to the millions of people who never realised what a Soviet invasion means, the realities of

such an invasion in a very graphic and dramatic manner. It is very difficult to appreciate how many people in the Warsaw Pact countries did, at the time of the Czech invasion and immediately afterwards, listen to Czech and Western broadcasts and what influence these broadcasts had on them, but it can be said with reasonable certainty that more and more people in those countries are becoming accustomed to rely on Western news media for information. Another extremely important factor is obviously the fact that the very full reporting by the world press has opened the eyes of millions of very intelligent but also very naive people in the West to the realities of the situation.

This report deals briefly with the main aspects of East-West relations.

#### 1. Cultural Relations.

It has taken many years to establish cultural relations with various bodies in the USSR, and even now there are very few people in Western countries who have succeeded in establishing and maintaining personal relations with personalities in the Soviet Union. The limited experience of those who have established and maintain such personal relations - as distinct from purely official ones - has shown that, generally speaking, Soviet scientists, economists and other personalities are very eager to learn and understand life and attitudes in Western countries. Many of these who come on these exchanges are highly skilled and talented specialists in their own fields, and it is extremely important to the Western democracies that as large a number as possible of such people gain a balanced opinion about life and attitudes in Western countries, and the more personal contacts the better. Western people should not expect from Russians the same frankness as they expect from their own colleagues in the Western countries. There have been occasions when Western people publicised too freely and too naively information given to them in confidence by their Russian colleagues or guests, and therefore visiting Russians cannot be blamed for being very, very careful before being frank. From the Western point of view such "frankness" is less important than the fact that Russian professional people should have the opportunity of gaining a balanced view on life in the West and, as a result, develop less dogmatic and less hostile attitudes towards Western activities, aims and aspirations when they return to their own country. Professional people who had the opportunity of working with their Russian colleagues in conjunction with international conferences on various subjects have found that very many of their top professional people are extremely human and have a very strong sense of responsibility. Therefore any rash breaking off of cultural contacts would only serve the policies of the Soviet rulers who have never been very happy about personal relationships and friendships with people in Western countries. Therefore, breaking off cultural relations will only deprive professional people in the USSR from keeping in touch with their Western colleagues, and it will deprive Western professional people of the very small trickle of private information thus gained. The top, policy-making stratum of Soviet officialdom will always find a way to visit any Western country if they choose to do so. Of course, one must always be aware that a certain percentage of those seeking such contact may have other, ulterior, motives for doing so.

The situation in the individual Communist bloc countries apart from Russia differs greatly from country to country. Therefore each country has to be treated individually. Basically the treatment should consist of keeping open channels of communication and personal relations, both by making it

easy for the people in the individual countries to visit their Western colleagues and for Western professional people to visit conferences and various international meetings in Communist bloc countries, and to exchange views with their colleagues in those countries, many of whom have no opportunity whatever to travel to Western countries.

## 2. Information Media.

Very few people in the West know enough of the complexity and subtlety of information media in Communist bloc countries which also differ from one country to the next. In addition to continuously changing in many cases what was true two months ago may no longer be true today. Therefore the reports published by the newspapers and other media will have to be interpreted with great skill and caution if one wants to get a bit nearer to the facts. A good example of the continuous changes in the reporting of the news media is the situation in Czechoslovakia. Another example on the difficulties of interpreting news media is Rumania, where the newspapers are extremely cautious and are trying very hard not to offend anybody. On the other hand sensitive topics are freely discussed and criticised and the people are much better informed than one would assume from reading their newspapers.

It is also becoming increasingly important to improve the quality of the information available in English on scientific, technological, medical, economic and political developments in the Soviet bloc countries. The volume of material published in these fields in the Soviet Union is so vast that indiscriminate translation would defeat the object because it would clog up the channels of communication with much information which is of a low priority or low quality. It is necessary to bring in much more sophistication in the processing, analysis and interpretation of Russian and other Communist bloc specialised literature, so as to achieve the best utilisation of the limited manpower available in this field in the USA and Great Britain. Few people realise that the American lead in screening, abstracting and translating Soviet bloc literature was an important contributory factor in maintaining leadership in the fields of science, technology and medicine.

The scope of activities in this field has widened. By patience and diplomacy it would even be possible to influence some of the basic research carried out in Communist bloc countries, and perhaps even in the Soviet Union, and as a result reduce to some extent duplication of effort and cost of this research. In many cases this cannot be achieved by the official negotiations but by patient personal persuasion of the individuals concerned.

## 3. Trade Relations with the USSR.

Although trade with the USSR is of some significance to various Western countries, the overall volume of this trade is not excessively large. Even if the countries concerned would wish to make cuts in this trade they could do so only to a limited extent. I personally consider it vitally important that Western industrialists, engineers, scientists and economists should be sufficiently familiar with the range and quality of Soviet products and technology. The simplest and cheapest way of achieving this is through normal trade where the seller, if he wants to sell, has to supply the relevant information and data on the goods he is trying to sell. This is particularly important for sophisticated equipment involving advanced technology. Even in the case of such highly sophisticated products as jet aircraft or even supersonic transport aircraft,

there is a very good argument for allowing and even encouraging some of the wellknown Western airlines to buy and operate a small number of Russian built aircraft on a purely commercial basis. It is highly unlikely that the number of planes thus purchased would be large enough to affect significantly the commercial interests of Western aircraft manufacturers.

There is one aspect of trade with the Soviet Union which requires drastic revision, namely, that of financing deliveries to the Soviet Union by long-term credits at low interest rates. At present when there is such a high demand all over the world for investment capital and credit, it is necessary to consider carefully whether there is sufficient justification for granting such long-term loans to the Soviet Union.

A further aspect of trade relations with the USSR which has to be studied is the Soviet policy of presenting the carrot of "lucrative" orders from the Soviet Union for gaining political advantage and playing off one country against another. An example of this is the sudden sharp criticism of Great Britain for "taking a hostile attitude" towards Russia, whilst simultaneously generating hopes in France that the French industry will receive large Russian orders.

#### 4. Trade with Eastern European Countries.

The trading position of most Eastern European countries is complicated by the existence of a large volume of unprofitable trading with the USSR and other COMECON countries.

From the long-term, economic and political points of view it would be very desirable to establish for each of these countries teams of specialists whose terms of reference would be to study the long-term industrial and economic prospects of each of these countries and to spotlight projects which would be profitable and desirable for each, in particular projects which will make them less dependent on the USSR. The interest of Western countries will be served by any project which will help to develop the resources of these countries for their own respective benefits, and direct their trade to the natural, commercially most profitable market and not markets imposed on these countries by the Soviet Union. The Czech example has shown that the Soviet bloc countries cannot solicit or accept Western development loans at present. There is no reason, however, why these countries should not be granted long-term credit facilities for any equipment or know-how on projects aimed at improving their consumer goods industry, or their standard of living. From the long-term, economic and political points of view it might be desirable and even profitable to supply to some manufacturers in these countries advanced technological know-how in the consumer goods industry and public services, so as to help to raise their standard of living and lessen their dependence on the Soviet Union.

In a nutshell: in addition to existing lists of goods which must not be exported to Communist bloc countries, there should be additional guide lines listing projects in each of these countries which would qualify for favourable commercial and financial terms. The favoured projects would be related to the consumer goods industry and other industrial projects which will lessen the dependence of these countries on the Soviet Union. A great deal could be achieved by supplying management know-how and commercial assistance for marketing certain products in the West. For instance, in Czechoslovakia

there is a great surplus of foundry capacity which could be used, for instance, in Western Germany, where there is a relative scarcity of foundry capacity and no commercial interest in expanding it. Similarly, there is a great surplus of lost wax casting capacity for producing stainless steel or other high-melting-point precision castings which could be utilized to the advantage of Western clients. Surplus capacity is often played down for reasons which have nothing at all to do with capacity and feasibility.

Also, instead of destroying surplus food in Common Market countries, such food could be used to relieve shortages in Eastern Europe and other poor areas of the world.

5. Gold.

One of the big problems about allowing an increase in the fixed price of gold is the fact that one of the countries which would greatly benefit from an increase in the price of gold is Russia. A partial solution of the problem could be to offer the one major non-Communist gold producing country, i. e. South Africa, some indirect compensation (tariff concessions or any other benefit which can be quantized) so that South Africa retains an interest in increasing her gold production and selling the output to reserve banks instead of selling to the highest bidder on the free market. Some arrangement on these lines could provide a solution to this very pressing problem without giving a bonus to the Soviet Union.

6. Finance.

It would be desirable to make a study and publish reports on trade relations between individual Communist bloc countries and also of the great differences which exist between the commerce inside the individual Soviet bloc countries which differ radically from each other. Due to the differing degree of nationalisation of retail trade and other factors, such as whether a manufacturing plant is allowed to deal with foreign clients direct, or whether they have to deal through centralised trade organizations.

7. Political problems and news media.

Due to the fact that the confidence of the population in Soviet inspired news media has been thoroughly shaken, more and more people in Eastern Europe tend to rely on information from Western radio stations. To retain the interest and confidence of this vast audience in Western news media it is very important that broadcasts which are specifically intended for these countries should be sober, responsible and free of exaggerations. One of the reasons why the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was a failure politically was that due to the brilliant performance and courageous action of the Czech and Slovak newsmen and radio and television reporters the Czech public was fully informed of what was going on. It is vital that adequate steps are taken to report immediately and fully to the native populations and the world any similar recurrence, for instance, in Rumania.

It would be advisable to sponsor studies of various agreements covering regions at present under Soviet control or within the area of Soviet expansion. The aim should be to have immediately available information to counter Soviet arguments on various "rights" which they claim for themselves. To quote instances from the recent past: When the Russians claimed that they have the right to intervene in West Germany if they consider it a "threat to peace",

some Professor Brown of Smith or some other university should have written an article that East Germany is not only a threat to peace but actually an aggressor, and consequently the Western allies have a right to intervene in East Germany and possibly also in Hungary and Bulgaria because these countries were enemy countries during the war. Of course, such statements must not be made officially. It is enough to just indicate that such views are being held and considered without giving any hint or indication on whether these views reflect in any way official thinking, or whether they are only the views of one individual who published them.

More prominence should be given to comparisons of conditions in individual Soviet bloc countries as is done, for instance, at present in Czech news media where it is pointed out that many of the "crimes" which served as a pretext for the Russian invasion are also perpetrated by the other Warsaw Pact countries, for instance, the effort of Poland, East Germany and Hungary to gain tourist trade from the West, was no smaller than that made by Czechoslovakia, and there is little reason to believe that the West Germans who want to Czechoslovakia are any more or any less fifth column than those who go to any other Soviet bloc country.

Another interesting event, for instance, was that after the Israeli commando raid in Egypt when they blew up a transformer near the Aswan Dam, the Russians warned that "their interests are at stake". This is very interesting because on many occasions when the interests of various Western countries were "at stake" in various parts of the world the views of the Soviet Union were completely different. It is politically important to record these data and publicise them again and again when appropriate.

In numerous past crises Western statesmen weakened their positions by making their intentions public far too early, for instance, announcement of the British withdrawal from Aden. In the case of Czechoslovakia the Russian decision to invade would have been a much more difficult one if they would have been less sure of Western, in particular American, reaction and forced to consider the possibility, even if very remote, of there being a stiff resistance from Western countries. It is one thing to make a decision that if a certain contingency arises certain action would or would not be taken, but quite a different thing to let the adversary believe that in the case of such a contingency no action will be taken.

For instance, it is known from a very reliable source that on the critical evening of Saturday, August 24, during the negotiations between the Russians and the Czechs in Moscow, there was a complete change in the Soviet attitude during the negotiations between the Russians and Czechs in Moscow as soon as it became known that President Johnson left Washington for the weekend; from that minute onwards the Russians completely dropped any pretence of negotiation and simply dictated terms. Apparently the Russians seemed to assume that if the President leaves Washington it means no American action, in spite of the fact that this is not true at all and the President can act wherever he may be.

An interesting point deserving much study is what do the Russians mean by "Communist Commonwealth" and how are they going to implement or try to implement their ideas.

About four countries would be interested in approaching the possibility of a convertible currency, and these are: Eastern Germany, probably, due to the large volume of trade which it has with West Germany; Rumania because they mine gold and oil, and their large volume of trade with the West; Czechoslovakia because its industry is of a structure designed for export and not for self-sufficiency; Hungary. Bulgaria and Poland are much less interested in convertibility.

The realities of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia were graphically brought home to people in Western Europe and the United States by the excellent television, radio and press coverage of the events as they unrolled. Books which will be written on this subject by individual writers will hardly ever be able to convey the same dramatic picture of the events as the news media did whilst the events happened. For this reason it would be a very good idea to use this material for documentary films to be shown again and again in educational establishments and in training service personnel. Watching such films for one hour is likely to have considerably more impact than conventional lectures on East-West relations for weeks.

Based on the same philosophy the writer of this report is planning to compile a "scrapbook of Czechoslovakia" which will consist almost exclusively of cuttings from newspapers in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Austria, Germany, Britain, USA, etc., arranged in a chronological order.

#### 8. Diplomatic Personnel.

In appointing diplomatic personnel it is very important to find people who have a thorough knowledge of the respective country and its problems. The immense difference this can make is clearly evident from the highly successful work of the present British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, who is a known scholar in Czech, Slavonic and political studies and has a large number of personal acquaintances in the country. Of course, this is an exceptional case and not always easy to achieve. It is ironical but true that in a Communist controlled country like Czechoslovakia the Russians were grossly misinformed because they had extensive official but very few private contacts, whilst the British authorities and public were well informed due to a large extent to the numerous private and official personal relations. There is no doubt that good personal relationships existed also with people from other countries in Western Europe.

Personal contacts between Western diplomatic personnel and individuals in Soviet bloc countries are likely to be restricted for a long time to come, but it will obviously be easier to establish and maintain a limited degree of useful personal contacts with people who are sufficiently familiar with the local conditions and have the skill, tact and restraint which is necessary under the given conditions.

A very important task is to widen the circle of people who are invited to various functions at the Western embassies. Very frequently such functions are restricted to political personnel and Government officials. It is very important to organize non-political functions for various professional strata of the population. When a top specialist or a top personality in any particular field visits the Soviet Union or a Soviet bloc country a reception or a cocktail party be given to which the respective people working in their own fields, or

in allied fields, be invited, whatever that field may be (economics, science, labour relations, the film industry, etc.). Of course, here again, one must anticipate certain restrictions but inevitably it will be a different set of people.

The Western powers can make a positive contribution to reducing brutality to individuals in Soviet bloc countries by issuing statements to the effect that anybody who engages in such brutality will be refused visas or entry permits into Western countries. Many of the people who are very good at bullying others lack personal courage and at least some of them will be afraid that they will have to account for their deeds at some future date.

**9. Defence Considerations.**

The invasion of Czechoslovakia proved that in final analysis there is only one thing which top Soviet leaders seem to respect, namely, force. They give considerable lip service but are obviously not very much concerned about world opinion, the standard of living of people, even their own people, or humanitarian considerations.

The invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia has shown up both the strength and the weakness of the Soviet defence system. A major weakness is their inadequate logistics and the insecurity of the supply lines and means of communication. It is a fact that the populations in the territories where the Soviet supply lines and lines of communication pass are hostile to the Russians. The vital supplies to the borders of what the Russians now call the "Communist Commonwealth" are transported by pipelines, rail or road, which are highly vulnerable to sabotage. It will be necessary to pay much more attention than hitherto to commando raids deep in enemy territory because in final analysis these are likely to be much more successful and ultimately cost less lives than aerial bombardment.

The fact that Russians rely on local supplies rather than on their own logistics will make it more imperative to devise some system of protecting essential food and fuel supplies for the civilian population from confiscation by occupying forces.

When judging the breakdown of the logistics during the Czech invasion it is necessary to bear in mind that although the logistics broke down completely inside Czechoslovakia, there were no reports about breakdowns in Hungary, Poland and East Germany in the logistics supporting the invasion.

From the defence point of view it is important to allow normal trading between the Soviet Union and the major capitalist countries. It is cheaper and more convenient to get familiar with the quality and potential of an industry through the commercial market than to acquire the same information through other channels. This is particularly true of sophisticated equipment in fields where development costs are very high as, for instance, aircraft, electronics, certain precision equipment, etc. It is unlikely, for instance, that the number of aircraft purchased from Russia by Western airlines will ever be high enough to become a serious competitor to Western aircraft manufacturers.

Much

**10. Screening and interpretation of technical and scientific literature.**

Much more effort and sophistication will be required in this field.

Excessive complete translations of Russian works are not a satisfactory solution because of inadequate specialised manpower, too high costs and the swelling of the volume of reading matter beyond the point of saturation. It is very interesting for the British or American specialists to know what their Russian colleagues are doing but they must also have sufficient time to read about work in their own and other Western countries. In practical terms this means that much more attention has to be paid to formulation and stabilisation of policies for selection and processing various types of material which is available. Many of the methods at present in use are too patchy and too wasteful.

**11. Saving of strategically important raw materials.**

Much could be done in this field by sponsoring research projects on the entirely novel topic "design for scrap" which would study the possibility of design modifications which would ensure that in due course when the equipment is scrapped, individual parts or components which have a high content of costly alloys should be appropriately marked so that they can be returned to the normal production cycle as a recoverable or a useful component, or as a high-quality alloy and not mixed up with other low grade scrap. Also the designers should give some thought as to how to dismantle the equipment in order to re-utilize at least some of the very high priced parts when the equipment is scrapped. This is a completely new concept of "designing with taking into consideration scrap value at the end of service life", but it is conceivable that it could save vast sums of money and resources.

U.S. POLICY AND THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

William E. Griffith

Revised from a paper delivered at a conference on "The Impact of the Czechoslovak Events on Current International Relations" of the Center for International Studies, New York University, for publication in a forthcoming volume of the conference papers, edited by Prof. I. William Zartman.

Center for International Studies  
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Research Project on Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution

January, 1969

Recent U.S. policy toward Czechoslovakia has been in my view short-sighted and shameful. In order to explain briefly why it deserves in my opinion to be characterized by what may be thought to be such strong adjectives, I must begin by outlining my own analytical assumptions. What were the causes for the 1967-1968 Czechoslovak developments? What would their implications have been for the USSR and the U.S.?

Czechoslovakia was liberalized in 1962-1968 by the interaction of five factors.\* The first was de-Stalinization, which destroyed Novotny's prestige by making public his complicity in crime. The second was the 1962 serious economic recession, caused by the increasing inefficient centralized Stalinist economic model: low worker productivity, disruption in foreign trade patterns, extensive Soviet-directed aid to the third world, and low agricultural productivity. This recession convinced the Czech and Slovak intelligentsias that drastic economic reforms, the end of wage egalitarianism, and massive infusion of high-level western technology were necessary in order again to make Czechoslovak exports internationally competitive, and that since Novotny would not agree to these reforms because they would threaten his political power, he must go. The third was the re-coalescence and return to power of the Czech and Slovak intelligentsias, to the leftist, social democratic traditions of Masaryk and the First Republic, and, let it not be forgotten, to the pre-1929 moderate traditions of Czechoslovak Communism. The fourth was the development in the Czech intelligentsia of a less unfavorable attitude toward the West Germans and of a more unfavorable one to the East Germans and the Russians. This reversal was caused by (a) the realization that, however politically undesirable, there was no other source for both western technology and investment credits than West Germany, which was largely democratized; and (b) resentment at Ulbricht's and Moscow's support of Novotny and at rigid soviet control over Czechoslovakia, plus realization of the technological inferiority of the USSR to the West. The fifth factor, the Slovak nationalist revolt and demand for autonomy and equality was the immediate incident cause of Novotny's fall.

---

\*See, for more extensive analysis and bibliographies, my "Eastern Europe after the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia" RAND P-3983, October 9, 1968.

The invasion was primarily an assertion of Great Russian imperialism, not "proletarian internationalism." Indeed, the Thermidor of Bolshevism may well become a peaceful transition into Great Russian Fascism: imperialism, anti-intellectualism, anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism.

In the short run, a fortiori since they seem determined to move toward more extremism in general at home and abroad, the Soviet leaders thus probably had no alternative. In the long run, however, their prospects in Eastern Europe seem to me to be less favorable. The invasion will not only not solve but will probably make it more difficult for Moscow to solve Soviet and East European technological backwardness and to contain indefinitely East European nationalism.

On the international scene, the Soviets for the near future restored their domination in Czechoslovakia, thus also stifled any tendencies in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, or Bulgaria toward liberalization or independence, and checked a major potential success for West Germany. On the other hand, Moscow greatly worsened its relations with Yugoslavia, Romania (although the latter has much less room for maneuver) and West European Communist parties, who for the first time almost unanimously denounced the Soviet invasion, as have the Chinese and the New Left. (But even so Moscow recently got near-unanimous endorsement for its planned May 1969 international conference--a sign that opposition to its policies by Western Communists is subsiding.) Castro, dependent on Soviet aid, endorsed Moscow but only in order to try to push Soviet policy in a more militant, anti-American direction, and for the first time publicly asked for a Soviet military guarantee. The disintegration of NATO and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops from West Germany was at least delayed. West Germany, more fearful of Moscow, is less likely, as is Japan, to move away from the United States. Bonn also suspended its decision to begin ministerial-level discussions with East Berlin, a major Soviet and East German objective. Franco-American relations improved as a result of the French assessment of the invasion, the franc crisis, and rising Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and influence in Algeria. (Yet in the long run the invasion, by frustrating Bonn's eastern policies, and the franc crisis, which saw Bonn opposed to its allies, will probably aid German nationalism, a development toward which Moscow is not unfavorable.) The U.S. loss of international prestige and

it seems to me unlikely that any permanent reversal has occurred. Rather, the invasion has probably limited and slowed down tendencies that will reoccur.

This seems likely for reasons arising out of Soviet as well as East European affairs. As to the former, I share Professor Brzezinski's view that Soviet society is tending toward bureaucratic rigidity\* and that its countervailing forces of intellectual ferment, nationalities tensions, and economic revisionism make a full-scale reversion to Stalinist imperialism in Eastern Europe extremely difficult. Brezhnev has neither Stalin's complete power nor the former dictator's iron conviction that his own solutions should be imposed regardless of cost in life or rubles. Nor did Khrushchev. And the likelihood that even a new and more charismatic leader in Moscow could reconsolidate the Soviet political elite without the aid of wartime pressure is slim.

As to Eastern Europe, modernization furthers rationalization and popular pressures on their regimes, which may be controlled as in East Germany or acquire independent impetus as in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. If politicization outruns institutionalization it leads to political decay (e.g. Poland). Everywhere politicization and nationalism, combined with the demand for economic growth, threaten rigidly centralized regimes. Moreover, the attraction of Western Europe, and particularly the economic pull of Western Germany, can be temporarily contained but hardly obliterated.

Thus an interim period of repression and then a slower, more limited resumption of liberalization seem to me the most likely prospect for Eastern Europe. Even so, however, it will probably remain, as will Western Europe, the object, not the subject of world politics. Soviet evolution, the East-West relationship, and the German problem will overshadow although not necessarily override internal changes in Eastern Europe.

I now turn to a reassessment of Soviet policies in the light of the invasion. First, the present Soviet leadership has within the last few years adopted a more repressive policy at home and a more expansionist one abroad. Given this, and its refusal to loosen its grip on the northern East European states, it will apparently preemptively intervene

---

\*Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?", Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library (January-February 1966), pp. 1-15.

In Europe the military situation has changed significantly. For the first time in modern history Russian divisions are stationed on the Czechoslovak-Bavarian Border. Although this does not increase the size of the Warsaw Pact forces, it advances their forward deployment in an area confronting U.S. ground forces. (True, Czechoslovak military forces are presumably now less reliable to Moscow, but this hardly counterbalances the new forward Soviet deployment.) As a minimum this makes significant unilateral withdrawals of U.S. forces from Central Europe undesirable and unlikely in the near future. It also makes undesirable any further rundown of British, French, or West German forces as well as any unilateral decline for political gain in Western tactical atomic capabilities in Europe. Finally, the rapidity, massiveness, and reportedly high-level professional competence of the Soviet invasion require an urgent reassessment of the NATO early warning system.

With respect to U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in general, the new U.S. administration will presumably reassess the U.S. policy of peaceful engagement. Specifically, this means reevaluating such issues as ratification of the non-proliferation treaty, strategic weapons discussions with Moscow, and cultural and economic relations with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

The policy of peaceful engagement was a logical consequence of U.S. economic and military aid to Yugoslavia, which enabled Belgrade to consolidate its independent course. Begun by Truman and pursued by Eisenhower and subsequent Presidents, it was a policy of the possible, an attempt to act, even if slowly and in a limited fashion, rather than merely verbally to condemn. (The post-Stalin Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, including active engagement in Central and Western Europe, was its counterpart.) Peaceful engagement was not directed toward removing all Soviet influence from Eastern Europe and did not intend to substitute Western penetration for Russian control. Rather, its purpose was to heal peacefully the division of Europe into East and West "with the consent of the East European countries and the Soviet Union." Peaceful change in Eastern Europe became possible in part because of such Western acts of "measured firmness" as the Berlin airlift.\*

---

\*Speech by President Johnson, October 7, 1966, Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1966, pp. 622-623. Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," Foreign

9

Our reassessment of policy toward Moscow should also be brought into accord with our reassessment of our policy toward Peking. What Professor Barnett has proposed as "containment without isolation" of Communist China is similar to peaceful engagement toward it: a policy of the possible, of preparing for the day after Mao, by putting ourselves in a less hostile posture toward Peking and thus furthering moderation there. Now there is another, more immediately compelling reason, in my view, for revising now our policy toward Communist China: why, after the invasion, should we continue to not only relieve Moscow of its great fear, a U.S.-Chinese coalition, but also, in effect, join them in total hostility toward Peking? Our conflict of interest with China is less than the Soviet Union's: Moscow holds vast territories in Siberia and Central Asia which the Tsars took from the Manchu Emperors, and the shared Marxist-Leninist ideology exacerbates, not improves, the Sino-Soviet split. Let us, therefore, realize that we shall continue to be in a fundamentally competitive situation with both Moscow and Peking, and therefore adjust our posture toward both so that we may contribute toward their remaining competitive to each other as to us; thus we will have room for maneuver between them. After all, as Lord Salisbury wisely remarked: "Her Majesty's Government has neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies but only permanent interests."\*

I now return to my initial statement that U.S. policy--or more accurately the lack thereof--was short-sighted and shameful. It was in my opinion short-sighted because President Johnson did not foresee that if the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia he would be compelled nolens volens to acquiesce in postponement of the ratification of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and of the initiation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic weapons discussions. When in spring 1968 some of us proposed that the Soviets should be specifically informed that these two developments would (unfortunately) occur if they invaded, the counter-argument was that, because the NPT and the strategic weapons negotiations were more in our interest than in the Soviets', we should not use this threat. This assessment was mistaken, in my view, for two reasons. First the

---

\*Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Meeting Moscow's 'Limited Coexistence,'" The New Leader, Vol. LI, No. 24 (December 16, 1968), pp. 11-13.

What should the U.S. do now? First, it should make contingency plans for a sharp worsening of Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia, involving something like the Soviet forced removal of Svoboda, Dubček, etc. Such a plan in my view should involve informing the Soviets that this would mean the end of the NPT, for the West Germans and for us, and the end of the strategic weapons negotiations. We should privately inform Moscow that we would follow the same policy if they invade Yugoslavia and that in addition we would then aid Yugoslavia as they have aided North Vietnam, including preventing, if necessary by barring the Adriatic to the Soviet fleet, any interruption of our aid. Unless and until we are convinced by Moscow that they will not undertake such a sharp increase in their occupation pressure, we should continue our cuts in cultural exchange to the invading countries, intensify exchanges with East European countries who did not invade, and pursue, in general, those policies suggested above which have not been implemented. We should ratify the NPT this spring, provided that the Soviets indicate to us that the situation in Prague will not sharply deteriorate, if only to avoid the "Versailles syndrome." Although we should continue to encourage Western Europe, Japan, India, Israel, etc. to ratify the NPT, we should not do so to the extent that it is as detrimental to other U.S. interests in these areas as it has been to date. We should open the strategic weapons discussions while making publicly clear that we intend to maintain qualitative strategic and conventional superiority over the Soviet Union.

Some may say, with considerable truth, that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was not so unfavorable to U.S. interests--it reconsolidated NATO. True, but the continuation of the Czechoslovak experiment would have been in my view more advantageous for that country, for the U.S., since it is the U.S. interest to encourage liberalization in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. and, indeed, in the long run for Russia itself. Now, as before the invasion, our enlightened self-interest, a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind," and our realization that Czechoslovakia, even if, as Chamberlain put it, "a far-away country of which we know little," has some moral call on our conscience, should convince us that more can and should be done by Washington to try to influence Moscow to Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library that tragic country.