

→ Subj.: Congressional
Consultation

January 2, 1968

HAK

Subject: Congressional Consultations Prior to the Announcement
of the new NSC Organization

I have talked to Bill Macomber about the above subject (Macomber has been asked to stay on in his present job for the time being). Bill agrees that a few phone calls to appropriate Senators and Congressmen prior to the announcement would be a good idea. He has offered to do some of the consulting himself if you wish.

I suggest that you call Senators Fulbright, Jackson and Mundt. Macomber could take care of Senator Aiken, Congressman Morgan (Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee) and Congressman Adair (ranking Republican on the H~~ERC~~).

Macomber says that he sees no need for consultations with the Senate or House Armed Services Committees, but suggests that you ask Laird if he wants to touch base with anyone on the committees. (The Armed Services Committees have responsibility for the NSC legislation.)

LSE

*no action
HAIK*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

November 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY

Subject: Near East

1. Attached memcon on yesterday's Near East meeting with Gene Rostow. Also present were Joe Sisco (Assistant Secretary - IO), Pete Hart (Assistant Secretary - NEA) and Bob Grey (Staff Aide to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs).

2. I've done this in terms of my recollections of Rostow's talking points. We'll have something more substantial on arms for the next round.

Bill

~~William Leonhart~~

Attachment

TALKING POINTS

Near East

1. U. S. Policy seeks to bring about a basic Arab-Israeli settlement along the lines of the SC Resolution of November 22, 1967 (attached); and in the short-term to avoid escalation of armed incidents or reprisals.
2. Jarring Mission. U. S. strongly backs Jarring (Swedish Ambassador to Moscow) appointed under 11/22/67 SC Resolution as Secretary General's Special Representative. Jarring has concentrated on UAR, Jordan, and Israel but has failed to bring them together or to narrow policy conflict. Jarring will leave New York after GA and return to Moscow after another round of area talks. Department regards him as skilled and competent professional. Indications are that he will continue to serve in 1969.
3. UAR probably key to Arab position. Nasser has reinforced his domestic position, as Soviets have replenished his arms (fully back to pre-June 1967 levels). UAR motivations and actions, especially with regard to Suez, remain inconsistent and confused. Have rejected direct Israeli talks or formal peace treaty. May be some give in their position, but likely remain obscure until new Administration. Present US attitude on resumption of relations is that Cairo must take initiative, since it broke on false charge of US participation in war on Israeli side.
4. Jordan probably more flexible than UAR. Some reason believe Hussein holding secret talks with Israelis (possibly during frequent visits to London hospital). Central aims are return of West Bank, concessions on Jerusalem, containment of radical Arab domestic pressures. Soviets offering military and economic aid on soft terms which Hussein thus far refusing.

5. Israel beginning shift from straight territorial claims to concept of "secure and recognized boundaries" in context of contractual security agreements with Arab neighbors. Department believes Israeli leaders split on precise territorial demands and will probably not take hard decisions until concrete agreement prospects more in evidence. Substantial returns of Arab territory likely (90% mentioned). Jerusalem, Syrian Golan Heights, and Tiran Straits seen critical in Israeli thinking. Probably also waiting on new Administration.

6. Others: Saudi Arabia has crucial role, particularly on Gulf. Faisal maintains strong distaste for Egyptians, Israelis, and Russians, but appears beginning question US interest in area and in Saudis. Syria worst of radical Arabs and terrorist launching-pad. Only state in area to refuse receive Jarring. US lacks assets deal with character of its regime. Turkey exerts steadying influence but less active in area than formerly.

7. Soviet aims. Entirely unclear. Have proposed timetable settlements to be guaranteed by outside major powers. Probably wish avoid major Arab-Israeli hostilities or risk of direct confrontation with US. Continuing, lower-level "no war - no peace" tension in area possibly serves them best, as they seek political control of Near East and its oil.

8. ChiComs have recently appeared with some aid and arms shipments to Syrians and Aden radicals. Not serious yet but beginning.

9. Arms Balance, with Russian resupply to Arabs, rough equilibrium probably exists except in planes. UAR may have 4-1 overall advantage (2-1 in operational high performance aircraft). Current negotiations with Israelis for sale of F-4s designed remedy, but no agreement on terms, delivery dates, or conditions yet reached.

10. NPT. Israel has thus far refused sign. US ratification would perhaps increase pressure for signature, but not decisively, self-interest will control. Indications of very advanced nuclear technology.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ¹²

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

¹² U.N. doc. S/RES/242 (1967) (S/8247); adopted unanimously on Nov. 22.

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned, to report to the Council, to negotiate and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this