

TELCON

Bryce Harlow

Mr. Kissinger

4-17-69 9:35 AM

K said if we need some hawkish speeches, how quickly can H produce them. K said some guy jumping up and down and saying why don't you do something - 31 boys killed, etc. H asked if K really wanted something like that. K said we may but he is not sure. H said he could produce rapidly. K said we might need some speeches to keep pot boiling a bit so people do not think it is all over. K asked if H could do it at various gradations. H said yes.

jm

Telecon
Bus Mossbacher
9:50 April 17, 1969

Bus said "your calling to apply for a job at Dartmouth." HAK said "yes, as Riot Control Director." HAK said at this point he didn't think he would ever go back to Harvard. He was sick about the way the faculty handled the situation. Maybe in a year he would change his mind. Mossbacher said he hoped he wouldn't have the chance to change his mind in a year.

HAK said the President was going to do the presentation of credentials this morning but had a sore throat and would like to limit the whole thing. He wants to save his voice for the press conference. HAK said he would be there to help move it along and wondered if M could help also. The President wanted to receive them in the Roosevelt room, walk through the Oval Room and then escort each one to his car. M said this could be done.

*

TELCON
Joe Sisco
Mr. Kissinger
4-17-69 9:55 AM

S said he would get to K during course of morning (thru Hal) a piece of paper he has done - he would like K's informal reaction before going thru channels. S said he would like to do it this way in order to cut the time span in form of memo to the President, but it would have no status. K said fine.

K said President wanted him to talk to S about something totally out of Middle East area, having to do with Korean business. K asked what would happen if we put it before the Security Council. S said you would get a series of speeches but you could not get formal action by the SC which would condemn this. S said you might get 7 to 8 positive speeches which would condemn Korean action but no vote. In S's judgment we could not get nine votes so question of Soviet veto would not become operative. K asked how quickly we could bring it to a vote. S said timing is flexible - if you wanted to move quickly and got wound up, you could get it inscribed and a series of speeches within 24 hours. S said he was clear that we could not get a condemnation. K said suppose we wanted to demonstrate that we could not get it. S said you can demonstrate it, but it will be played as political ~~draw~~ defeat of Nixon and S strongly recommends against it. K said so they would ask for an investigation. S said he does not think we could even get that.

K asked S to get a half page over on what he thinks. S asked how soon K needed it and K said this morning. S said he would get to work on it.

Telecon
Peter Flannigan
4:25, April 17, 1969

F said DuBridge was crying in his beer -- we are going to have an uprising in the universities because we have not gotten a man for him and the Long situation. Stevers and Piori (sps?) turned it down. We have two alternatives that Teller doesn't object to and they are Carter and John Wheeler. HAK thought Wheeler had more prestige but DuBridge doesn't like him. F said if DuBridge is complaining about not having someone, we'll give him Wheeler. They both agreed that Long would have been a distinguished appointment for Kennedy or Humphrey but not for us. F asked if HAK had any further suggestions. HAK said he didn't.

TELCON

Kermit Lansner (newsweek)

Mr. Kissinger

4-17-69 3:15 PM

L said he was calling about the call K had made to Kay Graham - L understands K was annoyed. K said that was a little strong. K said the statement about Dobrynin being baffled interested him. L said he has made some inquiries but did not ask name of source. One of Washington guys (15 years experience) got it from a competent government source. L said when he questioned him, he said source was impeccable. L said he did not want to push to too far. Source apparently said even the Russians must be confused - Rogers gives them soft line one ~~and~~ day and next day Kissinger gives hard line. L said he worries about things like this. K said amazing thing is that he never has seen Dobrynin on his own initiative and he has ~~never~~ never talked to him about SEA. K said he thought it was so outrageous the Russians must have put it out. L said if he goes back and finds out on what evidence this man says it, it may be that it came through the Russians. K said he has never talked to Dobrynin within any time frame relevant to conversations with Rogers - unless Rogers has had conversations with him that K does not know about and he does not think that is possible. K said his contacts with Dobrynin are very rare and mainly at social functions. K said he had been thinking about what could possibly have led to this and the only thing he could ~~at~~ think of was that someone from the Russian Embassy came to see him to deliver a letter from a man whom K had seen in his office - it was a thank you letter. It occurred on a Wednesday - the day after the news story broke that K was in charge of a China review and the Emb man asked K what we were doing about China. Man also asked about pulling out of SEA and K said we would certainly have an interest in it. K is ~~xxx~~ sure Rogers would have said that too. L said he does not want to push this. K said there is nothing that can be done about it now.

K said the second thing he objected to in the story was that he was contemptuous of amateurish dabblings. K said it would be absurd of him to make any statements about Cabinet members. K has highest regard (both humanly and otherwise) for Rogers and would challenge anyone to say anything else. L said annoyance or impatience might have been a better word, but K might object to that too. K said he would. L said in interviewers notes there was some reference to blabbermouthing which K used appropos of one of Laird's statements. L said also at Overseas Writers thing, K said something about there goes another Cabinet ~~member~~ member. This apparently came up in connection with a question about Rogers and trading off our ABM for Russian ABM. K said in the beginning they were pitting him against Laird and then when they brought in Rogers, he said there goes another Cabinet officer.

*

K said he does feel there are a lot of leaks around and he does not appreciate foreign policy being made by press leaks, but that is different from being impatient with substance of what Rogers and Laird are saying as individuals. L said everyone is as exercised as K about this story in different way than K. They feel whether ~~is it~~ it is a question of manner or stringency of intelligence, this comes through in interviews with K. K said he has seen a number of people from Newsweek because he has a high regard for the magazine and because he likes the people on Newsweek staff. On the other hand, K is under enormous pressure and talks in shorthand.

L referred to Lloyd Norman's interview with K - protocol of interview was strictly respected. L said it was a fascinating interview.

L said the point of the story was not anti-Kissinger or anti-anything. K understood that. K said he may have an arrogant manner, but the first statement about Dobrynin is just not true - literally or in spirit because that would be an ~~insane~~ insane way to run a government. K said re the second point about being contemptuous of amateurish dabbings, L has explained to K and there is nothing that can be done about it. L said he thought their usage was overly harsh and that was unfortunate. L said perhaps there is something instructive about this - K did project some sort of impatience or annoyance. L will be doubly careful in the future.

K thanked L for calling.

jm

TELCON
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4/17/69 3:45 p. m.

HAK had a call from Kermit Lansner about the NEWSWEEK story about which he had complained to Kay Graham.

It appears they got the first item from an "impeccable governmental source" who, so far as HAK could tell, was wrong on both counts. The item referred to Rogers' saying to Dobrynin he is so eager to get out of Vietnam he can taste it; and then HAK's telling Dobrynin that we propose to stay in South East Asia.~~xxxx~~ Since HAK knows Rogers didn't make the first statement, the so-called "impeccable governmental source" is now peccable. HAK went on to say that no matter what our private views would be, he can't imagine our saying a thing like that on either side of that argument.

HAK said Lansner told him to call Rogers and tell him of his affection and that he felt sorry if there was embarrassment to either HAK or Rogers.

On the second point, apparently at the Overseas Press Club--when they asked HAK a lot of questions about Laird. And then they asked "how about Rogers' statement?" At that point HAK said "now here comes Rogers -- first you pit me against Laird, and now you pit me against Rogers." Actually that was the statement where HAK said Rogers spoke for the President.

Rogers said he thought HAK had done all he could -- they'll probably be more careful now. HAK said the first item was really stupid for them to believe -- that the fast way to get out of Vietnam is to tell the Russians we are so eager to get out we can taste it. HAK said he told him (1) he never sees Dobrynin; (2) the people who know what the Secretary says to Dobrynin are so few--and those who know don't talk--that it has to be speculation.

Rogers mentioned that "the speech went well yesterday; there were no repercussions." HAK said in fact the tone he gets out of the news stories is very good. It is restrained and calm.

Rogers asked how Mel's speech went, and HAK said he hadn't heard anything yet.

mz

TELCON

Secy Rogers

Mr. Kissinger

4-17-69 12:40 PM

R said he told Elliot if he has to testify today he could say we were going to appear at Panmunjom tonight at 9:00. K said he thinks that is right. K said he mentioned the problem to the President after they had talked and he wants to go ahead. R asked if we would have a meeting before President makes decision and K said yes. K said we have this contingency ~~group~~ group which will look at two options - doing nothing and this. Then tomorrow afternoon the President will want to meet with his senior advisers again and look at those two things. K said President has put off time for doing it, if at all, to Monday.

R said at an embassy last night Dean Acheson came over to him and said he was a hawk but not to let them do anything - when you have finished you will not have accomplished anything. K said we cannot consider what was done yesterday as a decision to do it but if there is even a two per cent chance that the President will do it, we have to work out contingency plans. K said he will do no less than continue reconnaissance with armed escort. R said he has filled in no one over there so when Alex shows us at meeting he will be blank on it. K said he will say military retaliation and not say what it is, or ~~nothing~~ doing nothing - we will not even ask for recommendation. K said we ~~have~~ will have scenario tomorrow and all meet again.

K mentioned telcon on Paris meeting - four points interesting. K said he has not seen ~~actual~~ actual report. R said one thing he thinks the President is not quite filled in on is that he does not realize the NVN are having some problems. K said he has been telling him.

jm

TELCON
Secy Rogers
4-17-69 12:00 N

R said on question of timing, people working on it think it could be prepared ~~by~~ but if we had 48 instead of 24 hours it would be better. K said meeting is scheduled for 9:00 tonight. President is eager to show some action and some ~~rebuff~~ rebuff in case we go ahead with ~~wa~~ what ~~was~~ was discussed yesterday. K is certain he will not wait 48 hours. R said we will have to ask that it be ~~put~~ put over - it could be put over until 9:00 tomorrow night. K said o.k. K said if there is no chance of doing tomorrow morning, how about 9:00 tomorrow morning. R said they may not show up at all. K said we can hand our protest to joint duty officer. K asked whether they have already been told that we will not show up. K said why don't we show up and hand them protest. R said under the rules we have to accept 24 hours in advance. K said it is now 21 hours before the meeting so we could just accept for 9:00. R asked whether we should give facts of Defense Department statement and protest. K said that is basically what the President wants - we want to be on record of putting facts before them and having it rejected. R said some of his people feel facts are mixed up but we can ~~eliminate~~ eliminate anything we are not sure of. K said we know their facts are wrong. R said he will see if they can do it - they will ~~xx~~ try to. K said President feels very strongly about it. He needs it in order to have option to do the other thing so that he can say it was put before them and rejected.

jm

TELCON

Secy Rogers

Mr. Kissinger

11:50 AM 4-17-69

K said he had just been with the President and after thinking about it a bit, President feels we should try to make a protest and to do at Panmunjom after all. K said he wants record of having protested and having done something and asked R if he could get that laid on. R said he did not know - meeting is on the 18th and it is now 2:00 in the morning there. R said he would check and let K know but he thought it was a little late. R said he did not like the idea of compensation. K said we did not have to do that - just protest. R said we were going to have protest in UN. K said Pres does not want it in the UN. R said it is just a letter. K said Pres is concerned that someone will put it before the SC. R said he thought that could be avoided. R said in any event, he would look into the other thing and let K know.

K asked whether he had State Dept man - R said Alex is the one to handle.

jm

TELCON

President - Kissinger

4-17-69 11:20 PM

P said he did not have figure on how many Americans were killed. K said it is on other chart. P said (after finding it) that it was not high enough figure and he would not use it.

P asked why in protest there was no demand for compensation. K said Bill was opposed to it. P said he thought protest was little too mild. K said we deliberately made it mild. P said we will see how press reacts - it is his feeling that ~~is~~ it is somewhat mild - whole thing is an empty gesture.

P and K discussed Sihanouk matter. Pres said it was pretty good. K said it was practically an invitation.

P said talking point paper was good and he would use as basis for what he says tomorrow. K said Yost will transmit message tomorrow to President of SC. P said we can say we have ordered resumption of flights and K said yes. P said he did not know in what other ways the UN could help. K said Yost is consulting with other members on this matter. P said what if he is asked whether he is going to take this to UN. K said this depends on whether we see any indication that it can succeed. P said what if asked whether he plans any further action. K said we are reviewing situation and it depends on reaction to protest. P said he was trying to think of some way to get off the hook quickly and asked K to think about it and send it over in the morning.

jm

TELCON

The President

Mr. Kissinger

4-17-69 8:00 PM

P said another call that might be useful in lining up support would be to Rockefeller. P suggested K give him a call and use his own judgment as to how much you want to disclose. K said he talked to Mel - as result of consultations he finds they are content with what President is doing - there is no pressure to do anything more. President said he (Laird) has been brave ~~valider~~ soldier - he has taken a lot of heat on these things and you can't just let State get credit for checking with Congress and being the good guys and Mel the bad guy. That is why President asked him to check with them - he understands them and knows what we are trying to do. President asked whether Laird still thought we ~~xxxx~~ had to do this. K said yes. However, K said they were talking on phone that was not secure. Laird still believes it is right thing to do but no longer thinks there is Congressional pressure ~~xx~~ to do it. K said he thought Rockefeller would support it but he will check with him. P said it was not high priority - give him a call tomorrow.

President said he is still affirmative. He has to be sure we are leading the charge with other people coming along a bit. K said it is about the boldest course President can take. In long run it may turn out not to be so risky. Pres said when you come right down to it here's the Soviet Union finally flushing Czech Revolution down the drain and no one gives a dam; here we are on isolated basis and we do not do a thing with 31 lives missing. Pres said he looked at editorial in Star - he really thinks we should have gotten across the fact there was no question about where plane was. K said he (pres) could nail that down tomorrow. President agreed. P said they made check and no question whatever and they know it. K said Korean radar showed it was 40 miles off the coast and Russian radar showed 60. They know we are not playing provocation into a crisis. Russians have their hands full in Czech now - they have to be ready for next few days against some riots. K said there will be some reaction in the ~~Ex~~ West. President said he doubted Britain, France and the rest would do anything. ~~Rxxxxx~~ K said there might be some bad editorials against them but they will have their hands full for a few weeks.

K said if we do this, we have to be ready to go very, very far in case it leads to ground action. I think we can stop if we are willing to look down and that is a very tough one to bite early in Administration and I owe it to you to say that. K said his judgment is that it will not come to that.

Pres said he trusts Mel is not backing off. K said he is uneasy about it. K said if Pres says he wants to do it, Mel would agree to do and take public responsibility for it. President said Rogers ~~would~~ would not. K said he believes to do this will make or break ~~President's~~ President's Administration - they owe it to Pres and must stand behind him.

President said take the people on the other side - take Kennedy, country will be strongly against him. ~~They will say, K, said~~ K said they will say Pres risked another ground war in Asia. K said Pres will have to say we will not tolerate another ground war in Asia - to ~~Drek~~ Dobrynin we will have to say more. When it happens, we might have to go to tactical nuclears and clean it up. All hell will break loose for two months, but at end of road there will be peace in Asia. K said that is something that is easy for him to say.

Pres discussed press stories - they are not praising us, they are trying to get us to do something. They are eroding self-confidence of this country. President said that is another problem that is not answered by option 2. K said he has come to feel that option 2 with lunch is not feasible. This gives other side incentive not to make public as there is nothing they can do about it. Pres said that leaves option 2 without lunch. K said yes and then do that two weeks after. K said this is low risk course and he would favor if there were no VN war going on and if we had not slipped back so much in last 10 years. Because there is VN and because there is general erosion of moral fiber of country, President said a bold move is indicated. K said in his view we may be forced into an even bolder move a year from now if we do not do this one. President said you mean VN - K said that and anything else that might happen.

P said if question comes up tomorrow, should he ~~not~~ indicate that we are going to continue reconnaissance. K said absolutely. Pres said he thought he should say too that we can't expect Americans to ~~take~~ take these activities when they are in open sea and open air unless Government backs them up. K said unless Government protects them. P said he would put in context of looking toward future. Pres said he could ~~say~~ use some of option 2 at press conference tomorrow. ~~K~~ K said he could say he will protect but not how.

K said if Pres uses option 2 he will not loose much, if anything, but general trend is against Pres and this is problem. P will not be significantly worse off. K said his talks with Dobrynin had effect. P said with their troubles in Czech they may need us more than we need them. K said he did not think to do nothing is a calamity - Pres said as K points out, to do option 2 is not a calamity. Pres said with option 1 the gains are great and risks very great. ~~P~~ K said with option 2 there are no ~~risks~~ gains and no risk except perhaps down the road. K said the risk in option 2



- 3 -

over ~~period~~ period of time, which will be cumulative, will be greater than risk in option 1, which will be enormous in brief period. Pres agreed. P said everytime US fails to react, it encourages some pipsqueak to do ~~something~~ something. .

Pres said not to let Laird move off now - when they meet Saturday morning he does not want him wobbling around. K said he would talk to him. Pres asked why no pressure was being put on State by South Koreans. K said he thought our Amb was telling them to keep quiet. P speculated about effect this action would have on averting another Korean confrontation - can't brush off fact that they say they will take us on. K agreed they might do it. K talked of gain of taking on toughest character in Communist camp and facing him down - this would be ~~enormous~~ enormous. P said we will not take any more heat from moving too much force in - have to be ready to stop them.

P said he would read briefing book now for tomorrow

jm

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
10:10, April 17, 1969

HAK said just so he could avoid bothering Laird every 10 minutes could Laird suggest someone on his staff to work with HAK's people -- someone from Defense. HAK said the President wanted a contingency plan and HAK is forming a working group at the staff level. Laird said he would appoint Warren Nutter. HAK said anything on an operational matter, he would talk to Persley -- anything above that of course he would deal directly with Laird. LAIRD said he would call Nutter and notify him of the arrangement.

Laird had talked to Bill since he sent his (Laird's) statement over to HAK. He feels that he doesn't want to get into the legalities (that is Bill) of these kinds of flights now. The only problem as Laird sees it, is that we have to keep the President away from having to ~~make the~~ take the defense for this. This is a matter that Defense and State has to handle. The President shouldn't be shot down for making the decision on this.

HAK agreed with this and would put it to the President. Laird said he would try to avoid the subject in his speech today. HAK said if it came up in the Q & A he should say that these flights are cleared at a high level on a monthly basis and add his condolences for the families. Laird doesn't want people to think he is pressing for this statement but it would save the President from justifying these flights at his news conference. There is some merit in getting the President off this kind of a pitch.

*

TELCON
Under Secy Richardson
Mr. Kissinger
4/17/69 7 05 pm

Richardson, apparently referring to the Airlie conference last night, said "we did pretty well. " It was very cordial, and a worthwhile exercise. He was not pressed with what the President's plans are and didn't even come up about HAK's role. HAK said that must be a relief.

At that point Jonathan (Moore) told Richardson about a statement they were to sign off on concerning rescue ships moving in within 20 miles of the coast. (of Korea). Richardson can't figure out what this is about. HAK asked if we haven't put out an instruction that no announcement is to be made on Korean matters without clearance with us. HAK said he hadn't seen this one and he didn't think we should do it. At least he'd like to know what the explanation is. (HAK said we have located it--it has been called in here)
Richardson said they're being asked to clear off on the public release, but the measure itself doesn't make any sense.

At this point HAK had to take a call from Laird and HAK said he would call Richardson back.

TELCON

Secy Laird

Mr. Kissinger

4-17-69 7:10 PM

K said President is tentatively thinking of holding meeting of our small group at 9:00 on ~~Wednesday morning~~ Saturday morning.

L said he has done some checking that President asked him to do - almost everyone except for two feel the way he is handling himself and keeping his cool is most important thing that has happened for a long time. L said he thinks we should think about that a bit.

L said he would talk further about this tomorrow with K.

jm

SANITIZED COPY

TELCON
Secy Packard
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 9:35 AM

SANITIZED

PerSec 3.3(b)(1)

P said he has the information on MOL - both P and Laird would prefer to let it ride for a while. K said he would like P to send something over that he could study. P said it is their recommendation that MDL be continued as planned but it can be cut back substantially. K asked what P's personal view was. P said it would not be too bad to this - it would delay opportunity to get this sort of capability a year or so, but in view of all budgetary pressures, they could stand it. P said it is very important

[redacted] P said ~~it is~~ he would send a summary over to K; they would prefer not to make a decision until they see how Congress is going to treat them.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

ALM 07-13/7: PerSec 3.3(b)(1) PerLtr 11-19-09

By P. H NARA, Date 10-17-09

(P. 1 of 1)

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9:50 a.m., April 18, 1969

R just wanted to check ~~when~~ whether HAK had checked the message to the UN. HAK said he personally hadn't see it. Rogers said it was o.k., one of HAK's staff had cleared it.

HAK said the letter was simply a transmitté to the members to make them aware of our protest.

HAK said the President wanted to have this meet ing tomorrow afternnon so would R keep his ~~afae~~ afternoon free. R said he would.

Telecon

Secretary Rogers

12:10 p.m. April 18, 1969

HAK said the President wanted the two of them (K & R) to get together before the meeting tomorrow to discuss this thing.

Rogers agreed and HAK planned on going over to State at 12:45.

*

TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4/18/69 1:25 p.m.

Rogers and HAK agreed to meet after the reception this evening.

Rogers thought the Pres did pretty well (on the press conference). HAK said it wasn't the sharpness he had before. Rogers said on the unilateral thing he went too far. Before he said we were considering it but hadn't made a decision. He said it another way. HAK said in the end he said we won't do it any earlier than these other conditions are met. Rogers said two conditions--when the South Vietnamese would be able to replace our troops. Rogers had planned to take that line in his speech. He doesn't want to be inconsistent with the P. It seems to him that we should portray to the American public (1) we are doing everything we possibly can to resolve this by negotiations. Our posture has been totally reasonable and flexible about how to do it. We want the people in the South to determine their own future. We are flexible and reasonable ~~and want~~. I think the American people tend to think nothing is happening. It seems to me that our main activity is going to be on peace negotiations, but at the same time we are going to plan and have programs set up when the proper time arrives for the South Vietnamese to replace our troops. And I think that's a sensible thing.

HAK: We always had that. I think that would be well within the spirit of what we are saying.

Rogers: I'll try to have something prepared and have you look at it when I come over.

HAK: I will be in my office after the reception.

Rogers; I think the President is getting tired--his voice.

HAK: He has this cold. He is going to Camp David for the weekend. Of course he has been under great strain. It's a pity that he had to have a p.c. before he was ready. He let the p.c. force him into a preliminary statement.

Rogers: It wasn't bad.

HAK: I thought what he said was OK and kept his basic choices open.

Rogers: It was a slower paced one--only 16 questions asked. Rogers then referred to statement by NBC commentatorx --something about troop withdrawals HAK expressed dismay and said so help him, if he finds out who, that man is Out

TELCON

VP Agnew

Mr. Kissinger

4-18-69 3:40 PM

VP said he was appearing on Issues and Answers on Sunday and wondered what kind of responses he should give if Korean question arises. K said he would send him the suggested questions and answers prepared for the President on this. VP said that would help and K said he would get it over this afternoon. VP ~~sa~~ asked if K would be in office tomorrow and K said yes. VP said he would check with him to see how things are and K said, of course, he would have to know before he appears on Issues and Answers.

jm

*

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9:25 a.m., April 19, 1969

HAK said he had talked to the President and the P has decided not to proceed with the strike but to keep the carriers going to the launch point and then turn around. He is not happy about it though.

Rogers said he thought it was a good idea not to. If the occasion does arise later we could make a gesture then and it would look better to the public. He thought the overall results of the press conference was good.

He asked if HAK had a chance to look at his comments yet. HAK said he hadn't received them. R said they would be right over.

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
10:10 a.m., April 19, 1969

HAK said the President wanted to keep the task force moving, not to do anything and then after they have reached the launch point come back. Whatever public statements should keep that impression alive. We want to see what ~~may~~ may elicit from the Russians.

Rogers mentioned his speech again. HAK said he still didn't have it.

Telecon

Ron Pederson

10:15 a.m., April 19, 1969

P mentioned the Secretary's speech. The reason it wasn't over here was that Rogers was going to bring it himself but the meeting was cancelled. They have LDX'd it over. It will include Bunkers comments. If they could have HAK's ideas soon it would be appreciated.

HAK said he was leaving at 2:30 with the President so they would have to send it right over.

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
10:20 a.m., April 19, 1969

Laird wanted to know if the President had been briefed on the SS9 firing the other day. The Soviets fired an SS9 and we think it reached its maximum range.

HAK said he didn't think the President had been briefed and wanted to know if it had been accurate. Laird said it was and it had three warheads. The significant thing here was the ~~bx~~ maximum range did not cover any of our big cities.

HAK thought that was very interesting. If you haven't sent it over, I think it would be very useful. Laird ~~also~~ added that they had also fired an ABM with a loiter capability.

HAK said that Wheeler had told him they had one of this capability but didn't know they had actually tested it. He wanted to know if that was a new thing.

Laird said he was giving a speech to the Southern Newspaper Editors and wanted to know if it was o.k. to say the following: If the projections continue ~~and~~ the buildup of Russian strategic forces, they will be ahead of us in conventional, strategic offensive and strategic defensive. He wanted to know if that was too scary. HAK didn't think so and thought the President would want that to get out. He suggested Laird send the speech over and he would go over it. Laird said he told Rogers about this and HAK agreed that he should know. HAK said he would pass this information on to the President.

TELCON

Edwin Land

Mr. Kissinger

4/19/69 2:20 p.m.

Land called regarding the Long appointment. He said it would be an opportunity for the President to make a small but important major announcement on the role of science in the US -- a sort of Nixon doctrine on the separation of science and state.

HAK said all he asked Long to do was wait until Congressional hearings were over.

Land said this is bringing politics into that other institution.

HAK said when he has more time he would like to talk to Long about the relationship of scientists to the Administration. Some of them have been extremely reckless in their statements.

HAK said he was going to David this weekend and would raise Land's positive proposal with the P. He also said the next time Long is in town, to call and see if they couldn't get together -- he would like to talk to Long about the relationship of scientists to the Administration.

Telecon

The President

9:15 a.m., April 18, 1969

The President said his concern was that we were going to have a great amount of attention today on this particular thing. He didn't think there was much point in going forward with Option 2. Its too much of a piddily thing to announce it on Monday. To me, its not all that significant. What he had in mind to say was just the facts -- that we have run these flights many times, they have been completely unarmed, they have been well outside the territorial limits, he has ordered a continuation of the flights and will take whatever steps are necessary to see that they are protected.

HAK thought it would most certainly be read as an end to it. The President said suppose it is. HAK said maybe some of the President's supporters would also think this. The reason they are quiet on the Hill is that they don't want to get ahead of the President. The President said if we crack it on Monday he will still get the supporters to come along. HAK agreed.

The P said he would use the phrase "he would use whatever action is determined to be necessary and wondered if HAK had any problems with that. HAK said no but in that case he posed two additional questions. If the question is asked whether this same flight has been flown since the incident the answer would be no since they will not fly another pattern of this kind for another two weeks. On the other hand, we do have another plane standing by. The P said whether we do option 2 or not, we would do that. He would keep these flights on the same pattern. The President said he is not trying to provoke ~~us~~ so no special missions would be set up. If the question is asked whether that means a flight will be in the area, the answer is that it will be in that area whenever it comes up on its regular schedule or we are resuming scheduled reconnaissance. HAK was worried that the headline would be "President orders armed fighter escorts."

The President said don't let the Times editorials bother you. When they push him in one direction, it makes him go all the more in the other. You just don't appease them.

The President said the Czech thing was important. HAK suggested he play that one low key until we see what we are doing to do on the other thing. He added that this is going to make the Soviets look particularly repressive and we would look good because of our restraint.

The President said HAK's plan for today should be to get the plan ready and recheck with Mel and Helms. HAK said he would have a session with Rogers too.

The President said how about spend 15 minutes with the Statutory members of the NSC (specifically Lincoln) just to get their ideas on this thing. He said he favors option 1 because if they took option 2 they would have to take a very tough line in Vietnam and we don't have to with option 1. That would mean the risk of Cambodia

(South?)

HAK said we have had a cable from the North Korean President urging strong action. Our ambassador said we can't.

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-130, document no. 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 01, 2017

TELCON
Secy Packard
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 9:35 AM

50X1, E.O.13526

P said he was calling about the CIA U-2 flight scheduled [redacted] this evening. [redacted] - it will not be protected. P said it would be his advice that we stand it down and wait for a couple of days to see what to do. K asked if anyone -

[redacted] - know that the flight was supposed to go. P said no. K said if we loose ~~any~~ another flight that is not protected we will really be in trouble. P said he thinks it should be stood down. K said he hates to do it but he thinks it is the prudent thing to do.

[redacted] K asked whether P could ~~xxx~~ arrange to have it stood down and P said yes unless K would like to do so. K said no P could call Helms and say they had talked - K will talk to the President.

[redacted]

P said he has the information on MOL - both P and Laird would prefer to let it ride for a while. K said he would like P to send something over that he could study. P said it is their recommendation that MDL be continued as planned but it can be cut back substantially. K asked what P's personal view was. P said it would not be too bad to this - it would delay opportunity to get this sort of capability a year or so, but in view of all budgetary pressures, they could stand it. P said it is very important that they keep the HEXAGON program. P said ~~xxxx~~ he would send a summary over to K; they would prefer not to make a decision until they see how Congress is going to treat them.

50X1, E.O.13526

jm

*

TELCON
Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 9:45 AM

S said he was calling about Harold Brown and making him scientific assistant for SALT Delegation. S asked whether there is any possible objection. K said he heard ~~Flannigan~~ Flannigan mention something that sounded unfriendly. K asked if S was talking to anyone about starting talks. S said no, he is just talking about who should be on delegation - something will have to be started on ~~xxx~~ place, people and time. K asked if he was talking to the Russians. S said no, he will not do that until it is clear that everyone wants him to. K asked S to send him over a paper on Brown which he will give to the President with his own endorsement.

S asked whether K had seen the paper about Merz (?) ^{NRV}. K asked whether S had any ideas on how to stop it - how would S make sure the other side is not going ahead. S said by mutual looking at tests. K asked whether S was confident that it ~~xxxxxx~~ requires testing. S said yes - he thinks we should look at this problem. K said he would see if he could pull some of it into the NSC for a formal look throughout government. S said he has passed the paper he sent to K to Wheeler and Packard. S agreed that it should go into the NSC.

jm

TELCON

Bryce Harlow

Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 9:55 AM

H said the President is having Senators Mansfield, Aiken and Fulbright in tonight for an informal session. Since most of discussion is apt to be foreign affairs H thinks K should be present. H will propose to the President and let K know. It is to be at 6:00 in the Library.

jm

*

TELCON
Gov Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 10:00 AM

R asked if everything was progressing - K said we are not going to do it.

R said the Secret Service feels the ~~mission~~ situation is manageable. R said when he was down here he talked with Dick Helms briefly - as far as security is concerned they will be the ones to protect him. K said he does not think the Secret Service knows what they are talking about in foreign countries except for physical protection. R said he wondered if there should not be a brief meeting in K's office with Helms, Jim Cannon and also Bob Lilly - just to compare record in forton of Dick. K said he had had a special report made by the Agency and in their judgment there was a possibility that an attempt would be made. They think riots are less like than assassination attack. K said he had mentioned this to the President becuse he did not want to put R into position of passing on his own security.

K said he would set up meeting for Jim if R wanted him to. K said he has two worries - one is physical attempt and the second is if there is an incident. If so, others will probably feel they have to prove their manhood. K said he would check with Helms again today to see what he thinks. R said check out idea of going by chopper - that minimizes situation.

jm

*

Telecon.
10:25, ^{Am.} April 21, 1969
Joe Sisco

Sisco said he had talked to Hal on the Middle East paper they sent to HAK. HAK said he hadn't seen it yet.

Sisco wanted to know if they had to take this paper to the Review Group. He said they could move faster on it and it wouldn't be necessary to introduce people who are extraneous to it. Sisco said he would like also to skip the NSC if this was possible and go straight to the President.

HAK the Review Group and NSC does two things. (1) makes decisions, (2) educates the people. Sisco agreed that this would definitely educate the people. Sisco said, justified on the ground of education, he would agree with that.

HAK said he would read it, take it directly to the President and then probably go to the NSC anyway for education's sake without telling them of a previous decision. Sisco said this was a major decision.

HAK said he thought Sisco's talks were going well with Dobrynin. Sisco said he was applying Harriman's principles. You keep telling the Russians what you want them to do on what point but you don't tell them how. Dobrynin said that he(Sisco) had made his point ad nauseum. HAK said he was very shrewd.

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
10:55, April 21, 1969
AM.

Laird wanted to know if Helms had called HAK about the U-2. HAK said no but Packard did. Laird's view was that we should stand it down and HAK agreed at least until the President has a chance to hear about it.

Laird said he had already done this and added that we couldn't protect the U-2 flights. HAK said we can't afford to lose another unprotected plane.

Laird said he wanted to lean over backward so we wouldn't have another knocked down. He added that a fighter escort doesn't mean a thing against reconnaissance unless you have ground control radar. We have ships and plans with radar equipment but some of these are coming from Vietnam. He thought they would have to fly fewer recons in Vietnam but he said he would send over a paper explaining this whole thing to HAK. Laird said he has asked for the minimum amount of reconnaissance needed. He said you have to do this in order to give this kind of protection. HAK wanted to know what it would do to Vietnam.

Laird said every flight in Vietnam is protected by ground and air control. The safest way to do it in Korea is to do it like they are ~~now~~ doing it in Vietnam. Laird said he would arrange it so there would be no noticeable degradation of any recons in Vietnam until the President or HAK orders it. They are trying to make it with none at all.

Laird will get the paper over to HAK for his review.

*

Telecon
Joseph Alsop
11:00 a.m. , April 21, 1969

Alsop thought the Korean thing was handled very well in the President's press conference. HAK said, you don't think we should have done more. Alsop said no, but he thought the President would have to go outside the press conference on the ABM thing.

Alsop was going to do a story on the troop withdrawals and thought that since all the phoney stories were confusing in the papers lately, he wanted to see if he could shed any light on it. He wanted to know if the story in Newsweek that Abrams was ordered to stop the heat was true. HAK said it was totally untrue. He wanted clarification -- if we find we have some ~~superfluous~~ superfluous power in August we would pull them out. HAK said he didn't want to set any dates and furthermore, no decision has been made to pull out any troops. He added that until there is some functions that can be taken over by the SVN we cannot do it. 200,000 is absurd.

Alsop said he thought the whole thing had reached the absurd stage. It is vitally important to keep the pressure on. HAK said he thought the President was quite clear about his intentions at the press conference. Alsop said what worried him was combat troops. No matter ~~how much~~ how much the SVN improve, you know power of pressure is always increasing by the Americans. He judged that in talking with Mel that that was also Mel's view. He wanted to know if HAK agreed with this. HAK reiterated his previous statement on the present views.

Alsop said this Cambodian thing is also important. HAK said they wouldn't resume negotiations with us if they thought negotiations with NV were preordained (question posed by Alsop). Alsop wanted to know how much chance was there of it leading to resumed relations. HAK said we would just have to wait. Alsop wanted to know what we were doing. HAK said we were just not doing much. He said he didn't want to mislead him. The last thing we want to do is explain to the Senate Sub-Committee that we don't plan to do something that we say we might plan to do. Also said he got the impression that HAK ~~did~~ would rather not have the subject mentioned, but added that he thought it was too important a subject not to be mentioned. He wanted to know where we stand and what we would gain by bombing those stations. HAK said he could only tell him that we are going to do nothing and that it wasn't in any immediate scenario. Alsop wanted to know how long it would take to complete the Sihanouk negotiations - HAK said about a month



- 2 -

Alsop
April 21.

Alsop said that Sihanouk has changed his basic posture.

Alsop and HAK discussed the possibility of getting together Monday, April 28 for an early dinner. HAK accepted tentatively. They would get back with each other before then. No mention as to who would call who.

TELCON

Marshall Schulman - Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 12:15 PM

S said he was calling about two things. The ~~first~~ first: he had dinner with Millionschikov last night and his visit with K had a good effect. On basis of M's talk with K, he advised S that ~~on~~ their academy group should not try to move now. S said M seemed to have confidence that Administration was serious about it.

S said he was leaving Wednesday for England for an ISS Council meeting and Ditchley for European Study Group. K said he would like to see S on his return. S asked if there was anything K wanted to sharpen him up on. K mentioned the SALT talks on which we are proceeding - K said this is not single concern of the Administration but it is one and we are serious about it. K mentioned NATO - it is time now for them to tell us.

Also discussed ABM and Harvard.

S asked whether Frank Long could be taken ~~a~~ care of and whether there was any chance of reversing this. K said he had talked to Ed Land about this last week.

S said he would be back next Tuesday and will call K - K said he wants to see him.

jm

TELCON

James Killian

Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 2:45 PM

K HAK said he did not realize K had called on Friday. K said he was hopeful of making some kind of input on celebrated case of Frank Long. ~~KQ~~ HAK asked what could be done now. K said some kind of ~~xx~~ reassurance should be given that the National Science Foundation will be continued as objective agency, insulated as much as possible from political considerations. K said he would hope very much that the President will find some occasion to ~~fix~~ give some reassurance of this kind. K was sorry Lee DuBridge had been overridden. K said the Administration got off to such a wonderful start and it was too bad this had to happen. HAK said he has been ~~wracking his~~ wracking his brain to figure out what ~~was~~ could be done. HAK said it is one of those things where you had to be in Washington to see how things occur. Concern was the problem of putting up before the Senate at a time when there was so much pressure anyway - turned into supporting a particular program. K said that is not understood. HK said he knows it is not and he is not one hundred percent sure he understands it correctly. K said there is some concern among the scientists that this could destroy DuBridge. ~~Kx~~ HAK said he has not been in on this one, but he had a good talk with DuBridge last week and that would be most ~~injust~~ unjust. HAK said this is out of his domain but he does see the President a lot and has occasions to say something.

jm

TELCON

The President

Mr. Kissinger

4/21/69 2:55 p.m.

The Pres. asked if HAK had those two names on a piece of paper so he could dictate to Rogers. HAK said he had one, and would check out the other one and have it first thing in the morning. Pres. asked did HAK think one is enough? HAK said on one he was not clear. So Pres asked him on which one he was unambiguously clear. HAK said the man's name is Richard Holbrook, a Foreign Service man, very able. 25 or 26, and he has a great missionary spirit. Pres said that's all we need. One's enough.

President said "you didn't have to come up with anything today apparently?" HAK said he was told that the Pres would call him when he was ready to see him. Pres noted they got a little tied up because of the tax bill. He said "let's see what develops here -- it won't be until after 5:00.

Pres asked "anything on your mind? nothing new?" HAK replied we are holding fleet there for 72 hours, as you ordered. And State is drafting a message back. Pres said, just say it's no threat to them. HAK said he would suggest, the reason the fleet is there is because of the two things the Pres said in p.c., protecting our planes, etc. We can say it is no threat to the Soviet Union.

Pres: I think this is no threat. I'd then couple that with "this is no threat to you, but in view of your communication with North Korea, you should restrain them on something like this."

HAK said Bryce Harlow called him about tonight. Pres said he thinks it would be a good idea -- 6:00 o'clock. Just sit and talk with Mansfield and Fulbright..

*

TELCON
Senator Javits
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 3:05 PM

J asked whether K was acutely and dynamically aware that he is Chairman of Political Committee of North Atlantic Assembly - it is parliamentary organization of NATO. J said they meet twice a year and J says it is a great platform for Europe. J said he would like to consult with someone as to what the basic problems are and what might be done about them. Asked for K's advice as to people he should talk with. K suggested Hillenbrand at State and Hal Sonnenfeldt on his staff. J said he had heard of a fellow at State by name of Abraham Katz. K said he did not know him. J said there is also a Middle East angle because Turkey and Greece are members. J said he has special relationship with Demirel.

J asked if K remembered his mentioning Whitney and that committee. K said it is pretty full. J said he is still interested and J would like to have it considered. K said there is no vacancy. J said well if there are 10 members they could make it 11. K asked why he did not write the President a letter. J said no, he would commit it to K momentarily.

K asked whether J would let him know at some point what he wanted him to do on the 19th - J said he would.

jm

TELCON
Secy Hickel
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 3:10 PM

H said he talked to President last Thursday about Micronesia. K said Pres told him about it. H said about 4 or 5 people in his Department would like to discuss this with K and wondered if K could do it tomorrow or Wednesday. K said Wednesday would be better and he would have his office call this afternoon and make a few suggestions re time. K said he would like to bring one of his staff people. H asked where meeting should be and K said if H was planning to attend he would come over there. H said he was and would set it up in the conference room.

jm

(Meeting set for 11:00 AM, Wednesday, April 23 - Sneider advised to accompany)

TELCON
Robert Mayo
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 3:15 PM

M said K had mentioned to him the other day that there was a good possibility of turning upside down what the President decided on those two projects. K said his reading (his alone) was that President will probably decide to go ahead with HEXAGON and turn the other way on MOL - at least for strong ~~stretch~~ stretch-out. K said he was getting paper in next day or so from Defense which he would show to M. K said he is more apt to cancel MOL than Hexagon, which he assumes M will not object to. M said no, particularly if MOL is cancelled - if stretched out, it does not save a great deal. M said he understands that Mel would be unhappy if either of them are cancelled and K agreed.

jm

TELCON

Mr. Moynihan

Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 4:00 PM

M asked whether K remembered exchange he had with Calaghan at British home office. K said yes - he saw the note to the President. M said he had picked for topic the most neutral one - evaluation of social programs. A year ago, M arranged for conference to be held at American Academy of Arts and Sciences two weeks from now. Discussion will be race and poverty and a series of papers will be given. The Academy is willing to put up money to bring one or two Englishmen over here for conference and M asked how to proceed. K said he could go thru State but they will make a huge operation ~~xx~~ out of it, or he could do it thru back channel with British Embassy, keeping State informed. K said that is the way he would do it. M said he would call the Cultural Attache and tell State as a matter of courtesy.

jm

TELCON

ElliotRichardson - Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 approx 6:30 PM

K said he understood R was going to see his friend with whom he ~~w~~ did so well on Czech matter. R said posture we will take is firm one but not too reassuring. R said he will read talking paper to him and tell him he can have a copy if he wants. R said he was instructed to see him. K asked R to give him a call after the meeting.

K said he was having some East Asia experts here for lunch on Thursday and asked R if he would like to join them. R said he would like to very much. K said lunch would probably be in the Situation Room and K said he would call about the time.

jm

(R's office advised lunch is at 1:00)

TELCON

Elliot Richardson

Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 8:00 PM

R said Dobrynin read his statement which was identical, except for variance in translation, that had been presented to Beam. R said he then read our statement. R said he prefaced reading of it by picking up phrase from their statement, saying we hoped we could continue to find ways of improving relations between US and USSR. R ~~said~~ said concluding note was to effect that with 20 US ships in the Sea of Japan approaching closely to the Soviet border, naturally the Soviets had some concern with this. R said he took it to be semi-apologetic. R said he then thanked him for explanatory statement

R asked if K had gotten anything more for him on Billington. K said no he would call Mosely in the morning.

jm

*

Telecon
Fritz Kraemer
8:50 a.m., April 22, 1969

It seems that David Nevin from Life called Kraemer and wanted an interview to discuss HAK. Kraemer didn't want to grant the interview without first getting HAK's permission.

HAK thought that Nevin had done the most perceptive article on Rockefeller and thought that Kraemer should see him.

Kraemer wanted to discuss Rogers' statement but HAK said he just couldn't discuss it now. He would send Haig over. Kraemer said he had put Nevin off until Thursday and hopes to be able to see Haig before then.

Kraemer said he would stand by HAK and wanted to know, as everyone did, if HAK ~~new~~ knew what was going on. HAK said he certainly did but he couldn't afford to be defended. Kraemer understood.

Kraemer wanted ~~still~~ to see HAK. HAK said he might go into Walter Reed next Saturday and if he did, Kraemer could come there to visit him. In any event, HAK said he would try to see Kraemer next week some time.

TELCON

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 9:30 AM

K said he had a problem on which he wanted B's advice - concerns the Long matter which has been dumped into K's lap. K said he did not know anything about it until it blew up. K said now, quite frankly, how can the damage be minimized. President feels badly about it - he had not focused on what NSF is, etc. B asked if there is any chance of just turning it around - saying staff was wrong, etc. B asked what Lee thinks. K said Lee is just frantic and between the two of them his nervousness contributed to this - he did not take it to high enough level and did not handle Long in such a way that it could be turned around. K said he had talked to Killian and his view is that it is too late to turn ~~ix~~ it around. B said he knows Frank very well and could find out about that. K said he is not sure there is readiness for that. It may be that someone will be appointed and along with that the strongest possible ~~xxx~~ statement would be made re independent role of the Foundation and independent role of science. K said he does not completely exclude the turn-around. B asked how high up short of the President is the staff judgment that would have ~~be~~ to be overruled. K said there are two difficulties - one is newspapers and second is the level in the White House is at the same level as K. K said on Congressional side and old adviser side, this presents some personal problems. B said then the next best thing would be to get word out quietly that you want someone just as good as Long. B said he does not think science community is vindictive. K said he was sure we could get some recognition for Frank - he is sure Pres would make ~~xxxx~~ clear that this is no reflection on him. B said that was not the perfect solution, however. B said it boils down to fact that Pres has now focused on what NSF is and with what he knows now, if DuBridge/ had been more sensitive, this never would have happened. At some point someone will have to have the authority to leak this. B said if K allows him to, he would like to talk to his friend Stratton. K said fine and B said he would call back later today. K said Killian thought if we did not reverse the thing we should go for Peori(?). B said there is no doubt that he has standing. K said if it should be that B's best judgment that the only way to rectify this is to go back to Frank, he will not hesitate to put that up. B said it is certainly not the only way but it is magnanimous. K said one thing that was said was that scientific community will not give Frank credit - he was just beaten down. B said he would take a reading on that and be back in touch.

jm

TELCON

James Killian
Mr. Kissinger
4-22-69 9:45 AM

HAK said he was calling because he could not get to the President until later in the day. HAK said he has checked around and has every reason to believe that what he told K yesterday will have considerable support. HAK said it is only to avoid another confusion that he wants to get President's final approval. HAK said what he told K about President's attitude and desire to rectify matter will not be changed by a conversation - HAK just wants to run name by him. K asked whether HAK had seen story in the Times today on this - it is critical statement pointing out bad effects on Foundation's prestige. K said before any action is taken Philip Handler, Chairman of that Board, should be consulted. Handler is also President-elect of National Academy of Sciences. K said any kind of selection of individual should have Handler's knowledge and support. HK agreed. HAK said speaking strictly for himself (not for President) what would be the impact on the scientific community if President reversed himself. K ~~was~~ said wonderful. HAK asked whether they would say we had beaten him down and now we will beat him down on everything else. K said he did not think so. K said he thought it would have profoundly beneficial effect. HK asked better than ~~Peori~~ Peori one - K said yes. HAK said he would put these choices before the President and thanked K for ~~was~~ his willingness to help and for talking with him.

jm

TELCON

Bob Haldeman

Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 ~~10:00 AM~~ 9:55 AM

K said he had called H last night and operator could not reach him.

K said he talked to Killian and asked what could be done to rectify Long situation. K said Killian did not say we have to appoint Long and mentioned Peori. H said we can't get him. K said Killian claims that is because way DuBridge put it to him - Killian thought he could sell it to him. K said he then called Paul Doty and he was affirmative - suggested President might meet with Counsel of National Academy of Sciences for half hour in his office this would help. H said he is planning to go there to the meeting. K asked whether it was already agreed to an on program. H said yes. K said he might get booed - H agreed.

K said he then talked to McGeorge Bundy who said he would like to talk with his friend Stratton and he will call K back. H asked K what his conclusion is at this point - K said he wanted to wait until Bundy calls back. K said he leans toward reappointing Long - at least he does not reject it as totally as he did yesterday. H said their mistake was in appointing DuBridge. K asked if this could wait until this afternoon and H said he guessed so but DuB is rushing around lobbying. H ~~sa~~ suggested K call ~~Dubridge~~ DuB and ~~have~~ tell him not to do anything for 24 hours - K said he would.

jm

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger

Paul Costello

4-22-69 10:00 AM

C said the VP is speaking tonight in New York before large group - Klein feels there is a noticeable void in his speech because there is no mention of Korea. K said he was not sure Korea should be mentioned and asked if speech was on foreign policy. K asked that text be sent to him - his own instinct is that the subject of Korea should not be mentioned unless he mentions other foreign policy matters. C said he was not sure he could get text of speech as he thinks it is in New York. Klein asked C to get a page from K that could be inserted covering the President's position on Korea.

K said he would think about it and call C back.

jm

TELCON
Dr. DuBridge
Mr. Kissinger
4-22-69 10:10 AM

DuB asked if Flannigan had been in touch with K ~~about~~ about getting together. K said he has had a number of call sfrom scientific community and President asked hi m to get consensus based on calls today. President wants to do nothing today - he will put it all together and act on tomorrow morning. K said he thought they should all do nothing until tomorrow~~am~~ morning. DuB said he thought they should all meet. K said President does not want a lot of calls made around the country which would indicate enormous confusion and ~~xxxxxx~~ nervousness. DuB said he certainly agrees with that - this must be kept between them until decision is made. DuB said he thought they should meet and compare notes on this and what it will mean to the Administration. DuB said if we can get together today and give him something tomorrow that would be helpful.

jm

TELCON

Bob Haldeman

Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 10:12 AM

K told H about his conversation with DuBridge. K said he wants to meet today with H, K and Flannigan, but K suggests it be set for tomorrow morning - by then, K will have the temperature. H said o.k.

TELCON

Congressman Frank Bow

Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 11:50 AM

B said he thought he had answer to matter about which he was calling - had to do with briefing up there re two radar positions on that plane and President said three. B said he was concerned about possibility of credibility gap on the thing. B talked to Laird this morning and he straightened it out for him. B thanked K for returning his call.

jm

*

TELCON
Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
4-22-69 11:55 AM

K said he went to Pres on S's behalf and Pres says he has already approved the thing - K just wanted S to know that he has his interest at heart.

S said he was talking to Flemming about another matter this morning and he said on General Advisory Committee there was some question because President saw a number of good friends on the list. S said he told him he had talked to K and Rogers a month ago and K said the President had said to go ahead with a clean sweep. K said that is what he said. K said he thinks he meant there were some good friends on the new list. S said Flemming led him to believe there was a question about accepting some of the resignations. S said he has already notified each one. S went over list of names (McCloy, Blough, John Cowles, Al Gruenther, Kistiakowsky, Meaney, McGee, Neuberger, ~~Phleg~~ Phleger, Troy Post, Roby, Wright and York) K said he would take care of this and take the ~~lx~~ blame on it. S said he is retaining York, Phleger, Gruenther and Kistiakowsky as consultants and he has written them to this effect. S said this is just as consultant and not Presidential appointment - can't break off with all people who disagree with ABM. K said as far as York is concerned, President feels he went too far. K said the people S mentioned are the ones whose ~~xxx~~ resignations he would have accepted with pleasure. K said he was only telling him what the thinking is here. K said since these are not Presidential appointments, there is no need for S to clear them here. K said if it surfaces he will point out that S informed him - no reason for S to take any action until it surfaces.

jm

TELCON

Mr. Haldeman

Mr. Kissinger

4/22/69 12:40 p. m.

Haldeman said the President wondered if HAK had anything to report on the Long status. HAK said he had talked to Killian since talking to Haldeman. Killian was taking another reading. HAK said he put it straight up to Killian who, after all, was Eisenhower's advisor. Haldeman said the President had an interesting thought: What about Killian? HAK said he didn't know if Killian would take it. HAK had said there is probably no chance of a reversal, but if there were one, would this be taken to mean yielding to pressure or a sign of magnanimity? Killian said he wanted to think about it, but he was waiting to hear from Piori. HAK is waiting to hear from Killian, Stratton and Bundy. HAK said we know we can get out of it by the Piori route. Killian wouldn't take this lightly.

TELCON

Bob Haldeman

Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 ~~11:50 AM~~ 3:05 PM

H asked whether President had talked further to K about Long thing and if so, where was it left. K said he told him he would have info by noon tomorrow. H asked whether there is a meeting tomorrow with DuBridge and K said he would like to wait to see what reading he gets.*

H asked whether President had approved K's plan about Laos. K said he was mumbling about it but he does not know.

jm

(*prior to this telephone conversation, Flannigan's office called to say a meeting on this subject was set for ~~4x~~ 10:00 AM tomorrow - don't know whether it is on or off now as result of this conversation)

TELCON

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 4:20 PM

B said he had relatively little to report. He talked to Stratton who tried to reach Long but he is unavailable until later. Stratton ~~was~~ was going to talk to him on purely personal basis.

B said both he and Stratton have high opinion of Pe~~ri~~ori but Stratton has impression he has turned it down. K said Killian thinks if he is approached right, he would reconsider. B said if this happens Stratton felt it would be quite important for someone (should be President perhaps) to speak to Tom Watson. B said he thinks Peori would be regarded as brave recovery - he has respect of first-class people in scientific community. B said he, of course, does not know who other possible candidates might be.

K said B was going to give him sense of what reaction would be if President reversed it. B said it would be very easy to get responsible men of science to applaud that - to say two big men had met over errors of lesser men. B said what puzzled both him and Stratton was if DuBridge's role was so imperceptive and unhelpful, could Frank work in a role in which he would have to have ~~normal~~ normally close relationship with President's Science Adviser. B said he was hoping to learn more on that from Long but could not reach him. B said Jay is more uncertain ~~that~~ and more edgy than he is as to whether science would come around - it was only his obligations here that prevented Stratton from writing a strong letter to DuBridge.

B said President would ~~soon~~ come out smelling like a rose but question is whether he wants to overrule his staff. K said he thinks he owes him that option and would like to put it before him as one of the choices. B said he could assure President that both he and Jay would get on phone and try to make their prediction come true in terms of scientific reaction.

jm

*

Telecon
Glen Seaborg
4:40 p.m. , April 22, 1969

Seaborg wanted to know whether Commissioner Tape and John Foster of DOD could come over to discuss the policy question of high-yield tests. It is rather ~~x~~ intricate and thought HAK should have the problem relayed to him before making a definite request to the President.

HAK agreed.

Seaborg said he would have his secretary call Joan McC to work out this four-sided meeting.

(HAK said he would prefer it to wait at least until Thursday which didn't present any problem to Seaborg)

Telecon

Herb Klein

7:25 p.m., April 22, 1969

Klein was in New York with the Vice President and wanted clearance on statement regarding Korean situation that the VP was going to make.

HAK thought that the less we mentioned Korea, the better. Klein thought it would be good if the VP mentioned at least something. Klein was going to jot down a sentence or two and call HAK back.

Klein wanted to mention that this was an act by an immature nation but HAK objected to immature -- word was struck. Finally ended up with statement that mentioned that flights were being continued with protection.

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger to Gen Wheeler

9:00 p. m. , 4/22/69

K -- Wanted to check on the press guidance for the upcoming exercise.

W -- The same guidance as before on how to handle this was put in the message; i. e. , "we don't know anything about this."

K -- asked if W was back-channelling the message.

W -- It's already gone. When I left, I released the message which I had already prepared (in fact, I had prepared 2 messages -- one saying 'yes, ' and one saying 'no. ')

K -- You will let us know when the thing is on?

W -- Yes, it will be Wednesday afternoon.

lds

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger to Bryce Harlow

9:05 p. m. , 4/22/69

K -- At President's request, was checking on sending to the Senate the Long appointment.

H -- Had talked with Dirksen -- told him the problem the President has. He said he understood the President's problem with the academic and scientific communities, but this man should not be appointed. The President should go ahead and send it up to the ~~XXXX~~ Senate; Dirksen will put a "hold" order on it, and he will take the fire.

K -- Is that wise?

H -- It's all right, if we have to do it to placate the community.

K -- The reason the President feels this way now is because of the soundings K has taken. The President doesn't want to sit down with a bunch of scientists again.

H -- This is subjective.

K -- Would the Pres. lose prestige in the Senate if he sends it up?

H -- Ev fully understood it. The press would make a good deal over a turn-around. Feel it's a one-day wonder. Don't think it amounts to much one way or another.

K -- Suppose Dirksen doesn't put a hold order on it -- would it go through?

H -- It ~~would~~ probably would go through. Think now, in light of what has happened, that it would make Dr. Long a useful political instrument to the President's opponents on the ABM.

K -- How would they use it?

H -- He would be called to testify and would appear on TV programs. In any case, Lee DuBridge is almost at the breaking point with this thing. I don't think it is worth it not to go ahead with it.

K -- I think so too. I have promises from 5-6 senior people they would give statements. You will go along if I do it?

H -- Yes, I am with it.

lds