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001	telecon	Kissinger and Packard (appeal) MR Case NLN 07-13; Doc. ID 2040 Pages: 1 SANITIZED PER 3.3(b)(1); HR-5/11/17.	4/21/1969	B

FILE GROUP TITLE	HAK Telephone Conversation Transcripts	Box 0001
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FOLDER TITLE	[07] April 15-22, 1969
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RESTRICTION CODES

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TELCON
Secy Packard
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 9:45 AM

P said he would not be at 303 Committee meeting today because he has to go to the Hill with Mel. P said on Hexagon/MOL program the consensus is solid that Hexagon should not be cancelled - MOL needs a little more study and unless K is on tight time bomb P would like a couple of more days. K agreed.

K said State is concerned that our planes don't start shooting up ships in our rescue area. P said he and Mel had talked about this and they concur - P will make sure instructions are given to this effect.

K said Mel said his people are running around giving orders and that is not true. K's people are under strict orders ~~not~~ to go thru P's office or Mel's - there is no intention to bypass either of them. P said he did not know about this. P asked if there was anything they should be doing. K said Mel said he is sending over some contingency plans and ~~a~~ K asked if they could be gotten over as quickly as possible - particularly the one for ~~fighter~~ fighter escort for reconnaissance mission.

jm

TELCON
Richard Sneider
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 9:48 AM

K said the North Koreans have asked for an Armistice Commission Meeting on the 18th and S ts to tell State not to go until we have agreed to it. K will turn off the 18th with Defense. K asked S for a paper on the pros and cons on closing down Panmunjom.

jm

TELCON
Captain Wilson (Packard's Office)
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 9:50 AM

K said he was calling about the Armistice Commission meeting on the 18th - he wants to make sure we do not go until there is a consideration of it in the White House. W said there is a message in from Bonesteel asking for Washington guidance before reacting. K said to tell Bonesteel not to react one way or the other. W said he would take care of it.

K asked for a paper on the pros and cons of (a) going to the Armistice Commission meeting and (b) closing down Panmunjom altogether. W said he would do and K asked that it be done ~~fix~~ fairly quickly (thru the Secretary's office, of course).

jm

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TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 10:00 AM

K said he wanted to tell him that specific orders given by the President that these planes cannot fire on anything unless they are attacked. K said it was a very strong point of R's and he told the President immediately.

R said he was going to have Dobrynin in at 12:00. K said President does not want any protest to anyone. R said he was not going to protest - he wanted to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save the men. R said he was coming over soon and would talk to the ~~Presi~~ President. K said he thinks the ~~Presi~~ President is inclined to play this in low key and to say nothing to anyone until we know where we are headed. R repeated that he is going to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save the men. R said he might also tell him we have asked that no ships engaged in rescue mission be fired on. K said he saw no harm in that.

jm

TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 12:40 pm

Rogers asked if HAK had had a chance to talk to the President about Harlan Cleveland and Italy. HAK said he would do it immediately-- he was sure the President would be favorable. At the end of the conversation, HAK said he would let Rogers know about this by tomorrow.

(another subject)

R: I'm upset about a memo he wrote us about what George Meany said, and what Bud Wilkinson said. This business about what I said about the plan-- that we have no magic formula. I couldn't say we didn't have a plan.

K: What you said was right. Where the Vietnamese were off their rocker was to think we had a plan which we were proposing to someone.

R: If there's anyone who should understand that the press doesn't report things accurately, he is the one. In my situation, it's all a matter of record.

R: Bud Wilkinson--I bet he's never read any of these press conferences! I don't mind a memo which indicates a line he wants to follow. And if it appears there's some lack of emphasis...

HAK: This he dictated on his own over the weekend. I got my copy yesterday.

R: I don't mind criticism as long as it's based on fact. If we have Bud Wilkinson and someone in Saigon criticizing us for something we didn't say, and if the President takes it seriously...

HAK: I also made a p. c. statement which in effect said the President knows what he is doing. It didn't mean we are submitting a plan to Hanoi.

R: I wanted to make it clear we had no magic formula; we think things are progressing; that kind of stuff. You can't say "we don't have a plan," or "no comment."

HAK: His basic concern was with the positive parts where he felt what the line should be rather than with the critical part.

R: The only thing I've said that I would have said differently is a question I was asked in the Senate committee about disarmament. They asked about whether ABM would affect adversely the disarmament talks, and I said no, I felt sure if the Soviet Union, for example, said, let us get out of the defensive missile business altogether, we would be pleased about it. I said

obviously they're not going to tear down all their ABM's. But it was interpreted maybe we weren't serious about defense against the Chinese threat. From that standpoint it would have been better the other way.

HAK: I don't think this is a commitment that you will ever be called on to make good.

R: It strengthened our argument if the Soviet Union wanted to make a big play this way we would be in the market for considering it. I'm writing a memo back to him. . . .

HAK: I wouldn't do that. This was done over the weekend at Camp David and I think really his major concern is to put out some guidance so everyone says essentially the same thing.

R: I think that's a wise idea.

HAK: I didn't have the sense of any lingering unhappiness there.

R: Why the hell did he attach a memo from Bud Wilkinson? Have I got to take my foreign policy direction from a football ~~coach~~ coach?

H: I don't even know what he does.

Telecon - 06
April 15, 1:30 p.m.
Secretary Laird

Laird said he had been in the Arms Services Committee all morning. HAK said he had talked to Packard since he tried to reach Laird and it only concerned the matter of making sure our planes in the area had orders not to fire on rescue ships.

Laird said he had put out the order this morning. He said that ship they were trying to find is at sea but it has Dutch crew. They switched the crews from Korean to Dutch when word got around at the time of the Pueblo thing that we might ~~take~~ take the ship.

HAK said the President wanted to devote the NSC meeting tomorrow to this subject. He will want to have all the military and diplomatic options. Laird said he ought to get himself and Wheeler out of the Committee tomorrow. HAK agreed this should most certainly be done.

Laird said there was a question as to where the orders were coming from. HAK said unless they came directly through Laird, they were not official. WH orders.

Laird mentioned the letter from Bud Wilkinson and was rather shocked at it. He (L) said he had never talked about reductions and had held a pretty hard line saying this wasn't the time to discuss it. HAK said it was necessary to put out a letter to a lot of people to get the point to a few. HAK said anyway, now that we have the President's philosophy on record, we will be able to take action on deviations.

HAK said the briefings should be short and fairly general. A more detailed plan can be put to the President in smaller groups. Laird said he would list the options and not go into detail.

TELCON
Irwin Miller
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 2:15 p. m.

Irwin Miller will be in Washington on Wed., 23 April, and asked if HAK would be able to see him. HAK said certainly they can get together and told him it would be best if Miller's secy would call here on Monday; we would set aside a half hour for that purpose. on Wed. HAK said it would be very good to see Miller again.

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Telecon
McGeorge Bundy
April 14, 1969 1:45 p.m.
15

Re the Harvard situation, Bundy said he had a call from Goodwin. HAK said he hoped Goodwin didn't think he agreed with him because he didn't. Bundy said the problem wasn't going to be solved by Goodwin. Bundy thought they had the best possible mediator in Merrill (sp) but they don't seem to have anybody that enough people can trust.

HAK said he had talked to the President about Bundy's memo. The President is willing to go ahead with the project and secondly that he feels if Bundy would be willing to see it through the next stage this would seem the most efficient way of proceeding and then we can decide later on where to go. Bundy suggested that since Frank Long would be taking over the NSF, he would be a good candidate for the U. S. representative. Bundy said he would do it though. The President also agreed that it would be o.k. to go ahead with the plan to tell the British to go ahead with the first stage planning.

On the Korean situation, Bundy said it was a terribly thing. They (recon.) are essential but terribly overdone. HAK said it was well off the coast. Bundy said these are people who will do what they can do and whether you are technically right doesn't help. HAK said we have asked everyone to keep quiet on this and Bundy said that would last only for awhile. He added that you have to be philosophical about these things.

HAK agreed to see Bundy next week and said he would appoint Osgood to be the staff man for Bundy to work with. (This was actually at Bundy's suggestion and HAK thought it was an excellent idea).

TELCON

The Vice President

Mr. Kissinger

4/15/69 2:15 p. m.

The Vice President called and said he is ready to go out of town; he has a press conference this afternoon and is sure he is going to be asked about the airplane incident, and wants to know what's to be said and what's not. He thought it best to come over to see HAK-- and he did so at about 2:20 p. m.

TELCON
Alex Johnson
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 4:00 PM

K said we are putting this whole business through the NSC tomorrow. President is concerned that once working level at State gets hold of some of these hoptions, there would be leaks. K said he told President he would have a talk with some of the senior people at State to make sure we could handle this ~~xxxx~~ without its leaking. K said he just wanted to appeal to J. J said Win Brown is working on this and he will speak to him - K can assure the President that it will not leak.

jm

TELCON

Ambassador Waller (Australia)

Mr. Kissinger

4-15-69 5:30 PM

W said he had just talked with Mr. Sneider - it is about proposed joint facility at (could not understand what he said). W said full story is reaching newspapers and some of technical journals have published all technical details. Reuters now has garbled version re ground station. W said they now feel they should more or less say what the station is and have made a proposal to Hilbert of Department of Air. K asked if they had to go beyond what we agreed to and W said yes. W said he thinks K will have to take a look at it and Sneider will have whole story. K asked whether W had been informed that the Agriculture Dept. W interrupted to say yes, everything has been taken care of.

jm

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 5:40 p. m.

P: Anything further on the plane?

K: Nothing further yet, no.

P: It should be daylight there pretty soon.

K: We should be getting word within two hours.

P: Probably no survivors.

K: Or picked up -- strong probability no survivors.

We are getting reports on North Korean assets abroad and they're very discouraging. One Korean ship which is sailing with Dutch registry, and Dutch crew and flag--so it's almost impossible to seize that.

P: Check with the Dutch; they ought to want to help us.

It's a question of doing that or something else.

~~xxxx~~ Why not pick up a half-dozen fishing boats?

K: They don't come out in the open seas.

P: No North Korean ships on the high seas at all?

K: The largest ship is the PUEBLO and of course they're keeping that in the port. It hasn't been out at all since they captured it.

P: Well, the more I think about it--there has to be some reaction here. I have a feeling they're testing us.

K: That's clearly true.

P: I'm not among those who think that this matter may not be pretty directly related to the other side.

K: It could be related. Domestically, there will be among the intellectuals considerable heat if we do the other thing. Curiously enough, some of the members of my staff feel we ought to do what you and I were talking about earlier. They feel to let this one go again will be taken very seriously. There was an intelligence report of Nasser's conversation with Hussein to the effect, "After all, it isn't so risky
txx



to defy the United States -- look at North Korea and the PUEBLO. "

P. And look at Peru. No, I think that's right. OK, I certainly lean in that direction.

K: I'm going to have a complete plan for this over to you this evening.

P: I wonder what the situation is on...

K: And we won't present it to the NSC.

P: Rogers is going to be before the press tomorrow--editors -- at noon. Don't put this before the NSC.

K: We will present to the NSC what happened and a whole list of actions on what could be taken, but with no emphasis on any one, and no details.

K: I talked to Rogers about Cleveland and he would prefer him as Ambassador to Italy.

P; That wouldn't bother me.

TELCON
Ambassador Ortona
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 5:50 PM

K said he was stuck here for a while on this airplane that has been brought down - O asked where. K said Korea. K said if he is not there by 8:30 this evening to go ahead with dinner and he will come whenever he can. If K cannot come, he will call at a reasonable hour. O said they never go to the table until 8:45 and that can be delayed. K said he hopes to be able to make it by then.

jm

TELCON
Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 6:25 PM

K said S was trying to see him yesterday. S said he was trying to show him draft paper but wanted Packard to see it to make sure he had no trouble with ~~arithmetic~~ arithmetic and he has not gotten it back from Packard yet. S said if K has a few minutes tomorrow he would like to come over and ~~be~~ show it to him. K said he would see how the aircraft business is going. K is becoming anti-Korean as it is ruining his schedule. K said there is less you can do against a little country than a big one. S said he was glad he does not have to make decision - K said he was going to pass it to the SecState.

jm

Telecon

The President

April 14, 1969 6:30 p.m.

The President wanted to know what the situation on the Dutch ship and crew was. HAK said they still haven't located it yet. It has been reported to be in the high seas. The P said he would assume HAK has checked with the lawyers but not the State lawyers. The P said his view would be to pick up the ship. As soon as it has been paid for, is that impossible? HAK said the first reports were that it was. After their discussions, he told them that another look had to be taken. The President said it was impossible to pick up the Pueblo too but they did. We should pick up the crew and take them back to Holland. When they give us the Pueblo, we'll give them their ship. He asked what kind of ship it was. HAK said it was one of their largest fishing ships. The President said O.K., "I think we should just pick the darn thing up." We should check with the Dutch to see where it is and all the circumstances. He said he would be willing to take heavy criticism for this.

HAK said he had already put this on a high priority basis. The President said to find a way that international law can be breached. The U.S. became a great nation by breaking international law. The President said we certainly have concluded that we won't just ~~sit~~ sit here and do nothing. HAK agreed. The President said even if the peaceniks on HAK's staff didn't agree. HAK said he didn't have any peaceniks on his staff. The President said he was just kidding. HAK said the State Department had a paper on diplomatic actions. The President said the ~~the~~ price is too high to pay not to do anything. He said you recall Nasser's statement and said "I just think we have to do something here. If we don't face up to the Dutch, we have to face the Navy action." HAK said the Navy was coming in with a plan and that we would suffer little or no losses. They would come in low. The President said (someone) is trying to pursue the line that recon plans are fair game. This was not a regular recon plan, was it? HAK said it definitely was not. This plane has been doing the same thing for 15 years without protest. It had been a deliberate plan to get it ~~and they xxxxx~~. They were moving two mig 21s which would not signal anything in particular to us about their intentions. The President wanted to know what Defense has said. HAK said they have just put out the facts. That the closest point was 15 miles and that it was attacked 100 miles out. The President said Rogers would have to say something tomorrow to the editors he is meeting with and that he probably wouldn't be able to attend the NSC meeting. HAK said the President wouldn't be making any decision on this tomorrow anyway. The President said, "no, no, I won't even discuss it, just listen."

The President said that ship must not get to North Korea. We'll just tell the Dutch we'll buy the darn ship. HAK said he would run it through again.

The President wanted to know if HAK had any lawyers on ~~his~~ his staff. HAK said no and that he would have to work through State. The President wanted to know if Justice would do anything. HAK said yes, I'll try them. The President said, I just happened to have Mitchell here in my office. "I'll let you talk to him".

Mitchell wanted to know what the problem was. HAK said he didn't have the full facts. There is this ship (North Korean) sailing under Dutch crew. The N. K. sent the ship to the Netherlands and when we made some point about picking it up because of the Pueblo, they changed their crew. The President wants to know if its illegal to pick up the ship. Mitchell asked if we knew the contractual arrangements between the Dutch and North Korea. HAK said we have very sketchy facts. Mitchell said we should contact the proper Embassy in Holland; they must have the information on the legal arrangements. HAK said he would get all the facts together. The reports have been very bad. Mitchell said do we know where the ship is. HAK said it is reported to be on the high seas but that hasn't been confirmed as yet.

The President came back on and said we will do all we can do here but he has determined in his ownmind that we are going to do something "even if I have to ~~override~~ ^{override} everybody in the State Department. "

HAK said when we move the carrier to another position, we should make it public. If we try to keep it a secret, they will think we are serious, otherwise it might come off as a bluff.

The President wanted to know if HAK had anything good to tell him. HAK said ~~not~~ no. The President said he thought HAK's conversation with Dobrynin was good. HAK said he was concerned; that we should look dangerous. The President said how about doing the lunch plan and getting caught. They took the ship so we get Cambodia. HAK said the lunch plan would be used only if they turned us down on the other. The President said he wanted every plane into South Korea. HAK said they were all ready to go but that we should go careful on this. The President agreed. The President said it should be easy to pick up that ship. Just go out and get it. HAK said Defense and CIA were working on the location.

The President called back to say that HAK should call Loyds of London; they should know where the ship is. If not, call that man in the Hauge and tell him we have this problem and want to know where the ship is. HAK said he would follow through.

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 8:15 PM

President asked if K ^{was} were still in the Sit Room - K said no, meeting had just broken up. They will reassemble in another hour or so. President asked K to come to Lincoln Room and he would have something there for him to eat.

jm

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Telecon
April 15, 1969 9:30 p. m.
Prof. Doty

HAK opened the conversation by saying that Doty was probably calling to tell him to take strong measures against North Korea.

Doty said (the Russian) was in Cambridge. He was originally scheduled to go to Mexico but that was cancelled but he decided to come to Boston anyway. MIT had asked him to do a small seminar. He would be in Washington this weekend and would very much like to see HAK. HAK said he would love to see him and they agreed that HAK could probably do it Saturday morning. The dinner was almost over and he had hoped to talk to HAK before to get an idea of what to ask him. HAK wanted to know what they did discuss. The Russian said when the agreement comes he hopes it can be very simple and more matters of principle. Doty said his (HAK) idea about an annual review or exchange once a year seemed to go over very well. It should be made understandable and executable. Doty said he would get more out of him before he left for Washington and keep HAK posted.

(They went on to discuss the Harvard situation)

Doty asked about the Frank situation. HAK said he was having ~~dinner~~ lunch with Lee tomorrow. He didn't want to discuss it on the phone.

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 10:00 PM

President said another option had occurred to him with greater symbolic meaning - a Navy blockade of the one port of significance. K said he was sure it could be done. President referred to Cuban blockade and said question is how long can it be maintained. K said that is the problem. President said he was thinking of the impact. President said people say it does not mean anything, but it means a lot to a lot of people. President said it is good when there is something specific that you want to get done - there is nothing they can do to get the blockade lifted. K said except to pay damages. President said that is what he meant - we want that and the return of the Pueblo. President said it would not take a lot to blockade that place. K said on the other hand there is not much going in or out either so it may be an empty gesture. President said they have to live so there is something going in and out. President referred to three Polish ships which have to come in - they could be kept out. K said they could unload elsewhere and ship down by ~~mail~~ ^{boat}. K said he would have it looked into. President said he wants to get something that has symbolism - that is what we are talking about. President said it could be signal of what we are going to do down below. President said we could keep it for a few months and then lift it but not say anything. K said if they wanted to play it nastily, we could get hit with it every day - harrasing us, etc. K said he would look at it and give the President pros and cons tomorrow.

K said he has some more information on ship - it is in the area of Capetown and supposed to reach Hong Kong on April 23 and go on to Korea. Told President about payment breakdown - 20% down payment had been made by Koreans and they owe 80%; loan has been guaranteed by Dutch government. President asked about title. K said we do not think it has passed, it is still a Dutch ship. K said we would have to compensate the Dutch Government 5 1/2 million dollars. President said that is awful small compared to risks taken in other areas. President said there is a lot of symbolism in that.

K said we have assigned State to come up with legal opinion supporting President if he decides to seize ship. President said throw the blockade one at them too. K said o.k. - all of this will be discussed at 3:00 meeting tomorrow. K said the Cuban blockade worked because they thought we were heading for an invasion. President said he knows it is not on all fours at all.



President said he was just looking over military plans. They want to hit two other air fields because they are not so close to the Soviet border. President said there is something to be said about fields not so close to Soviet border. K said he told them to make a plan and give the President all reasons why they are opposed to it and then President can choose - K said we will throw blockade into it too. President said he thought blockade was better than mining.

President said he would like to make meeting in the morning relatively brief. K agreed.

jm

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger to

Dr. Kramer

11:00 p. m. , 4/15/69

K -- Asked Kramer how much he would press for strong action in the current situation.

Kramer -- Recommends immediate reaction in the strongest possible fashion in order that it would avoid that this would be repeated. Believe that any indication of our not immediately reacting strongly will only lead to further action on the other side.

K -- My worry is the domestic situation.

Kr -- The nation will essentially follow strong leadership ~~XXXXXX~~ regardless of what certain people or certain groups will do. Sixty-five per cent will follow the President of the United States if he goes before the people and says, 'this is the situation -- I had to act.' Thirty-five per cent will be against the President. I don't think we can take it because otherwise we will be involved in the Mid-East, in Korea, in South Vietnam, in Berlin and in Latin America by more or less coordinated action against us. I feel we should react immediately and strongly. Have you talked to General Woodward?

K -- I know what to do. My problem is, is it psychologically wise?

Kr -- You will find the NY Times and the Washington Post against you, but not the nation. Talk, for example, to Meany. People like that have untold members, who will endorse strong action. There will not be a reaction in this country that will be averse to the President except for that small percentage which would be averse anyway. I would not be afraid of that, and I don't say it because of my well-known prejudices, but based on an objective analysis of the situation. Even if you read today's NY Times, the nation will follow a strong leadership. The President doesn't have anything to fear. He will only find the same critics who would criticize him anyway. I recommend you talk with M/Gen Woodward who for years has negotiated with the North Koreans. He is a cynic, but unbelievably brilliant. He is very unpleasant but very bright and realistic. In this country, nobody will be able to do any harm to the Commander-in-Chief. I, for instance, have been of the opinion that if, in Vietnam, you should be relatively statesmanlike, we would have a crisis in Korea. It is one of the crises I have predicted -- next the Middle East. These are interconnected. North Korea might hit, but they

can't continue it. Talk with General Yarborough. I'm sure you will get the same answer as from me. I assure you of one thing. If ever we seem willing to give in one area, we will immediately be in greater difficulties than ever in all others.

K -- However, there is a domestic problem here which I think Haig has explained to you.

Kr -- Referenced the NYTimes article again -- concerning various members of Congress -- everybody is willing to give President Nixon some time to think it over. Even the most hostile members of Congress. The nation would definitely go along. If you do not react immediately, then these probing actions from the other side will finally lead to something that goes beyond probing action -- then you are in a real crisis. I will be here at Ft. Benning for the next two or three days -- please feel free to call me.

AS

TELCON

Gov Rockefeller

Mr. Kissinger

4-16-69 12:42 PM

Discussed President's OAS speech - R said he thought it went off very well. He stayed and had coffee with Ambassadors and then lunch with Galo Plaza who thinks things are going very well. R said he was pleased and grateful to K.

K said President feels strongly that R's mission will be something that can put his Latin American policy on a new basis. R said he was sure it will contribute to good will. R plans to say he is going to listen and to report to the President - he will not get into policy. R said if his mission results in suggestions that will be useful, fine - then the President can announce policy.

R said he is pleased with way it is ~~is~~ shaping up. K said re Guatemala he has special intelligence estimate that there is some chance that Castro groups there will make an effort to do something. K has mentioned this to President because he did not think R should be put in position of being concerned about his ~~own~~ own safety. President does not think R should run any risks at all. K said it could be dropped and we could find something else - we will do whatever R wants. K said if R does not go to Guatemala ~~it~~ it will be because of Presidential orders. R said he thought Secret Service and CIA should appraise situation down there. R brought up possibility of helicopter and K said we could probably get one from Canal Zone. R said he could fly to some spot, meet and make it a short visit. K agreed that it should be short and that R should not stay overnight by any means. R said if this cannot be done, the alternative would be to meet with the five Central American countries together because they are in the common market. K said that is what he thought too. R said he would like to go through with Guatemala if possible - if Guatemala is skipped then another country should be too. K agreed. K said excuse should be that R is cutting down trip. R said no - it would be that he wanted to meet with five together. K said he has talked to the head of ~~the~~ the Secret Service and they are giving it high priority.

R said he had a couple of questions: Asked about substituting Sam Gould for Jim Hester. K said he would run by the President. R said this fellow ~~KN~~ Knight is a possibility (from Miami), but he would like to get more people from West Coast. R mentioned Buff Chandler (the mother). K said the Chandlers are good friends of President and he could clear that one. R was apparently reading something and said he noticed that George Woods is against

Mrs. Chandler - she is a wonderful woman but no one else can get a word in when she's ~~around~~ around. R said he thinks she's great. R said on the business side, there is Arthur Watson of IBM and Beverly Murphy, President of Cambell Soup (Wood recommending latter). R said maybe K could check those names out. K said he would let him know by tomorrow evening. R then mentioned Dr. Emile Merk(?) who is at U of California at Davis - President of the Agricultural College.

R said re ABM Commission, he does not see how he could take on anything else. K said he was not ~~h~~ aware of this - had he been called? R said yes, he was asked to chair a committee and he just cannot - he is in an awful bind. K said BeLieu must have called him and he would talk to BeLieu. K said if someone could talk to Goodell it might help - R said he would be glad to do so. R said Ted Braum has made a suggestion about forming a women's committee - they could talk about defending their homes, etc. K said that was a very good idea. K asked R if he thought we should fight for this - R said yes. K said Percy is giving us a hard time. R said he would talk to him, but K said it would not do any good.

R said he was coming down for FIAB. K said he looked forward to seeing him

jm

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TELCON
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69 1:30 PM

K said he wanted to get Y's judgment on Korea and UN. Y said simplest way is sending letter from President to Security Council explaining what has happened, giving our point of view, etc. K asked if ~~someone~~ someone would then call a SC meeting. Y said no it would be circulated ~~then~~ published. Y said more formal procedure would be to ask for urgent meeting of SC and present case. Y said we would, of course, know from the beginning there would be no substantive action - all we would get would be a forum to present our case. K said President's ~~concer~~ concern is that he does not want the Soviets to go on record against us, if he can ~~xxxx~~ avoid it - he is eager to keep four-power talks going if possible. Y said if we go into SC and make our speech, the Soviets will ~~xxx~~ feel obliged to make ~~speech~~ speech for other side. Y said also that he is not sure we could get nine votes and Soviets would veto. Y said this would mean a confrontation between us at a time when we have these other things cooking. K asked if there is some way Y could get his views to the President. Y said he would send a telegram right away.

K said the President is pleased with the way Y has been handling the four-power talks. K said at early opportunity he is going to try to get Y in to see President for first-hand appreciation of what he has been doing. Y said he would be in town on Wednesday of next week. K said he would try to get an appointment for Wednesday ~~xxx~~ afternoon or Thursday morning.

jm

TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 2:10 p. m.

Laird said they have picked up two pieces of fuselage which had bullet and shrapnel holes in it, and that really confirms it was a shoot-down. They also picked up a flare. But no survivors. HAK noted "so it wasn't a missile."

When HAK asked if Laird should put out that info, Laird said no, not until it is confirmed by another source. He wants to wait and make sure the report is verified. HAK agreed, and wondered if we shouldn't ask the Russians to return to us the pieces of airplane they've got -- wouldn't that be a good ploy? Laird said yes, he would check into that.

Laird asked, "What do you think about this afternoon?" HAK said he was musing about it, that the President and he talked for a bit after the meeting. HAK asked, "What do you really think?"

Laird: Well, if there was some way we could hit one of their aircraft or ships, I would do it in a minute. I think the next thing we can do is to go out... that second airfield. I am going to think about this until 3:00. But I have got concerns over what this might mean from the standpoint of our force commitments in that area, and we must bear in mind that we can't put ourselves in a position where we are forced to pull back, as far as Vietnam is concerned. But I'm also concerned about how this might be interpreted by the people in Paris, particularly the North Vietnamese.

HAK: Yes, you stated the case exactly -- that's exactly the problem.

Laird: And this problem concerns me. I'm not worried about the public opinion. We'll have a bad reaction here either way. What we're trying to do is get the war in Vietnam over with.

HAK: 'Either these guys are getting irrational and we better settle it; or now they're in the same mess as their predecessor and we don't have to settle it.'

.....
Laird: The statement has to be very strong/and get some of their planes out their on the reconnaissance, and if we had a chance to knock a few planes down it would be terrific. I don't think we'll get that chance.

HAK: You stated the issue exactly.

Laird and HAK said they would see each other at 3:00.

(Another subject)

Laird said he got HAK's letter about Haig and agrees with HAK 100%.
HAK said anything he or Wheeler could do would be appreciated.

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Telecon
The President
2:35 p.m. April 16, 1969

HAK said he wanted the President to know that our destroyers had picked up some of the debris and it had bullet holes and shrapnel in it. Now we have incontrovertible evidence that it was shot down. HAK said we might ask the Soviets to return the debris of the wreckage they picked up also. The President said he wondered whether it was worth it or not and added that we might request it in a low key but wasn't sure. HAK said we could hold off on this and if no other action is contemplated this might be one avenue.

The President mentioned that his 3:00 meeting would be delayed to 3:15.

TELCON

Joseph Alsop

Mr. Kissinger

4/16/69 6:15 p. m.

HAK referred to a comment Alsop made to Rogers at lunch, which Rogers repeated to the President, and the President wants to know what Alsop really thinks. Alsop at first didn't recall what he had said to Rogers, and HAK reminded him that he said "whatever we did would have public support." Alsop said, with respect to North Korea, Yes, I think that's correct.

HAK said the President wants to know what Alsop thinks we should do. Alsop's first answer was: I don't know. Then he went on to say he thinks you have to start by asking the motive of this behavior. He is inclined to believe that from the beginning the policy of North Korea is primarily to take pressure off the North Vietnamese. HAK said, "so they would like us to divert ourselves up there--so that would be a sign of weakness." Alsop said the situation that would confront them in North Korea if the North Vietnamese have to cease and desist. China is in chaos. The old Wave of the Future has come to a dead halt. And in both countries you have the contrast of economic disaster and tyranny in the North; and economic progress and a better life in the South. Alsop thinks this is what bugs them.

HAK said his advice, then, is ignore them essentially and concentrate on Vietnam.

Alsop said VNam certainly is most important at the moment. Any serious diversion from VNam is a mistake. Win in Vietnam and you win the ball game.

HAK said he followed that reasoning, and they had thought that's one of the things Alsop might have had in mind, but we just wanted to be sure.

Alsop said whatever we do he'll support us. Alsop also suggested that Dean Acheson is the man to get an opinion from--"he is a wiser man than I am by far. I rather think one war at a time, is what he would say."

HAK: Well, I don't think one's tendency to take on another war is overwhelming at this moment. You don't find people trying to break down the President's door in order to urge him into another war. Alsop said that he can well believe. Alsop extended every kind of good luck to the President. HAK thanked him saying he appreciated this, and he would be seeing the President in a little while.

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TELCON
Max Frankel
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69 6:25 PM

F said aside from the two obvious - UN and MAC - he could not think of any options - is he overlooking anything? K said no, we have not made any alarming statements. F said quite to the contrary. K said our present view is we do not see any sense in a lot of diplomacy if we do not know what we want to accomplish. There has been a lot of protesting in the past. What we have been trying to do is find out where things stand and try to get as good an assessment as to what happened as possible. K said we knew yesterday what had happened but to know in exact detail took a little more time. K said we will be talking to people diplomatically fairly soon. F asked if we were under much pressure. Referred to clips of President on campaign trail - restore respect for America, etc. K was unaware of clips. K said he thinks the President feels on this he has to do what is right. K said we have been looking at it carefully. We go over these reports and look at situation but we are not going to have a huge trauma in any sense. K said we are talking for background. F said absolutely. K said unless you know what you are trying to do and what you are trying to achieve - we have had meetings; we did talk to Dobrynin about it yesterday. F said they have been helpful. K said they have been helpful in rescue operation and that is all we have talked about. There is not much we can ask them to do at this moment - there is also not much we can ask the Russians to ask them to do. K said he did not know whether this conversation was very helpful but would give F something of our mood. K said our mood is that we do not like to say things we do not do and do not like to imply things just to prove our manhood. F said conversation was very helpful. K said we of course talked to our Korean people to get their judgment and we have been collecting judgments on motives, etc. We will make a decision on a specific course of action. F referred to concern about lingering possibility of President hemmed in by his own rhetoric.

K said he could not say what final conclusions will be reached - no decision now and no crisis atmosphere here. F said there certainly is not. K said we meet and discuss and we had an NSC meeting. K said he worked last night trying to lay out all options and that is where we are right now. F said K might not think he has said much, but he has said enough and F appreciates it. K said quite frankly yesterday was spent ~~determining~~ determining whether there were any survivors.

jm

TELCON

David ~~Roxco~~ Rockefeller

Mr. Kissinger

4-16-69 6:40 PM

R said he was seeing King Hussein and wondered if there was anything special he should be aware of. K said no, we had good sessions with him here. Basic problem is what we need from Arabs is maximum commitment to state of peace. The more commitment they can make the more we can press the Israelis to be reasonable. K said he thinks Hussein is willing to go as ~~xx xx~~ far as Nasser. K said we are not inclined here to bring pressure on Hussein to go in a way that would jeopardize his position.

R said one of his colleagues has been talking to Saunders on K's staff about an idea he has re Saudi Arabia and Libya. Both countries have recently discovered wells and underground rivers. If those areas could be developed and a certain number of refugees taken, this would help Israeli problem. R said there was some indication that if Saudi Arabia and Libya were willing to take the refugees, some negotiation might be possible with respect to Jerusalem. R asked whether K had any objections to his mentioning this to the King. K said he would take it easy on Jerusalem - that is most complicated issue. R said what amazed him was that there was any favorable response from Israel that there was room for negotiation. R said he would just say he had a friend who had mentioned this to him.

R asked whether there was any chance of K's going to the next meeting of their group in Paris. R asked whether K was going to Bilderberg. K said he has not decided yet, but it is on his calendar and barring any crises, he is hoping to go. R said K might consider staying over and attending meeting in Paris the following Tuesday. K said he would try.

(FYI - Bilderberg is week end of May 8)

jm

TELCON
Prince Bernard
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 6:45 p. m.

Prince B asked if HAK were coming to the Bilderberg meeting. HAK replied that he would love to come, but it depended on his workload here, and on whether or not there is a crisis going on at that moment. HAK went on to say that he requested an appointment for the Prince, and he would call the Prince about it in the morning.

The Prince asked if HAK were free for lunch tomorrow (Thursday) or on Saturday, and HAK said perhaps on Saturday. The Prince mentioned that if he were to see the P it would be on an informal basis, and HAK said that is clearly understood. HAK said there was absolutely no problem about the appointment, but the Pres' schedule has been thrown off by the fact of his press conference on Friday for which he needs time to prepare, and also by this Korean incident of the plane shoot-down.

Prince said if HAK can't make lunch, could he let him know in the morning when he could come in to see HAK for a moment?

HAK clarified that lunch would be with him alone, not with the President, and the Prince understood that, and what he had in mind was lunch at the Embassy.

Prince said he was leaving at 10:30 but would be back at 12. And he admonished HAK not to overwork himself--he knows how quickly it can happen. . .

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TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69 7:05 PM

K said he had personal view (not Presidential) about Panmunjom business. K said he thinks we should not show a nd say nothing - no explanations, no complaints. R said that is what they are going to do - he has already told his people. R said they will have a letter that could be sent to U Thant or SC getting on record - very low key.

R asked if K had seen statement by FM of Japan about retaliation. K said no.

TELCON
Elliot Richardson
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 8:10 p. m.

Richardson decided he would go later on tonight to Airlie, getting there around 9:30. He was disappointed not to get the straight dope on our foreign policy, because he could afford a little guidance. HAK said that what Richardson would say, HAK would probably agree with.

Richardson is appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow afternoon for a briefing on the shoot-down. He feels it is probably better that he do it before the President talks than afterwards. HAK said the President doesn't want to imply that there will be a clear-cut decision; he doesn't want to have the impression that we're building up for a climactic decision one way or the other. Richardson said he can duck that. What concerns him most is that they will undoubtedly focus on the process by which decisions like this are made, who is consulted, etc. (referring to the 303 business); did the President know, and, if not, who in the White House, etc. ? HAK said he would tell them the truth. He would say there is a monthly review.

Richardson said that's what he'd like to do. HAK said it's the only thing to do. They can't expect the President to know every individual mission. But he thinks it's essential that we say that this has had full political clearance, so it doesn't look as if the military are running loose. Richardson said he agrees 100%. Richardson asked if HAK reports to the President on 303 decisions. HAK said the Pres gets a minute of every meeting, which he approves. On top of that, HAK gives him every disagreed item and every item that might embarrass him, even if it is agreed.

Richardson ask what would you want me to say about his participation, knowledge or approval. HAK would say the WH chairs this committee. HAK will check it with the President in the morning to be absolutely sure. He wouldn't give the name of the committee--but it doesn't make any difference. Richardson said he thinks it would be a good idea if HAK would check it. He doesn't think there's anything to be apologetic about.

HAK said he thinks it's a very conscientious system, and he certainly looks at every one of these things, and he thinks Richardson probably does before he goes to these meetings. Richardson has been to one, but Alex, of course, is there. HAK said the book they get goes thru another committee--the Joint Reconnaissance-or-something-committee.



Richardson said he kept waiting for General Steakely to tell them this morning what the value of this intelligence was, but he decided not to raise the question. HAK thinks this is a question we ought to ask when this is over. It won't help us now.

Richard had a conversation with someone from which he got the impression that in the conduct of this study there's a lot of US investment in hardware and US personnel abroad which isn't subject to anyone's review in terms of justification. HAK said the problem is once a thing like this is approved it goes on forever. He spoke of putting a terminal date on every operation -- this would force an automatic review every six months. Richardson said that doesn't go far enough. He referred to 24,000 US personnel in West Germany, in this business, and over 12,000 in Okinawa. HAK said of course that sort of thing is not reviewed.

HAK asked if they were luncheing tomorrow, or was R preparing for the meeting. R said he was counting on lunch.

HAK asked R to give the group at Airlie his apologies -- (he has to work on the press conference). R said he would apologize to the group for having to take a watered-down and second-hand version. HAK said "and then you will deny it if they put our stories of White House dominance over State." Richardson said of course. In this connection, he was interviewed by Peter Lisagor, and he told Peter how well the system is working, and how smooth our cooperation is, and how firm our mutual understanding. He said Lisagor seemed to believe it.

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TELCON

The President
Mr. Kissinger
4/17/69 8:45 p. m.

The President felt the stuff in the briefing book on the Korean thing was not adequate for the press conference. First question asked will be: What are the facts? What are you going to do about it? How many Americans are stationed in South Korea? The fact the number of missions the first three months was 90. The material doesn't show something that needs to be in there--something with regard to the number of Americans that have been lost already. HAK said we are getting that right now.

P: There are 50,000 Americans there. The North Koreans threatened them, etc. As a matter of fact, over the past two years _____ men have been killed. I have the responsibility for the safety of these men. They (the flights) have been made and they will continue.....that's the kind of thing. Then you go on to the other question: What are you going to do now? I'd like a view of what we're planning to do. For example, there's no question and answer here: What are you going to do diplomatically? What are your diplomatic options? UN. Panmunjom. Have you protested.

H: I'll have it over within an hour.

P: I think that's right. Just sit down and figure out questions... I need to know about the Panmunjom thing. Has it been put out to the press?

H: It was supposed to be put out by State simultaneously.

P: There's too much of a buildup for this press conference. That would be a dead giveaway we will do something. Better to fuzz it up a little. We are checking with the UN. Leave that little crumb bun for them.

H: You ordered your Ambassador to file a protest with the President of the Security Council.

P: The Ambassador of the UN--I have asked him also to explore any other ways the UN could help. How are you going to react? What are you going to do? I'm not going to announce that decision. What's your suggestion as to how that has to be handled?

H: You could say we will announce measures ~~that you will be~~ as they are being taken for the time being. We have taken the following steps, and not indicate that there will be others.

P; Plan it in your own mind. Sort of talking points rather than questions and answers. In answer to the first question, I might talk 3 or 4 minutes .

H: On the Panmunjom meeting, it's supposed to begin at 9 o'clock our time. We won't be signing our protest until 11 tonight. It won't be released until 11.

P: We have filed a protest. I have instructed our Ambassador to the UN to file this protest with the President of the Security Council. I'll be able to do the toe-dancing. Talking points in the light of what we are preparing to do. Get talking points to lay the foundation for later action. If you say too little they're going to know damn well you're going to do something. On the other hand, fuzz it up. Let them think we are just going to explore the possibilities.

P: Suppose they ask are our aircraft carriers being sent up there?

H: I think you could say certain precautionary alert measures have been taken.

P: I think we should say that such measures will continue. How about saying such measures will continue in this area and such measures will be protected. There will be reaction in event there is any attack on them. Give the warning thing. Use Game Plan II. That will be a good cover.

H: If you take Option 2, you can wind it down at that point. You can leave it right there. You don't have to make another announcement.

P: That's not our intention, you understand. It's a way to keep Option 1 more of a shocker.

H: I've talked to John and Bob about it. John wants to think about it overnight. Bob leans toward option 1.

P: Have you talked to Rockefeller yet?

H: No. I will do it first thing. I will do a draft speech for Monday, too.

TELCON

Secy Rogers

Mr. Kissinger

4-17-69 9:05 AM

K said President just wanted to make sure that none of them speculate how far plane was from shore. R said K did not have to caution him. K said he knew that but President asked him to call all Departments and make sure. R said he had some reservations about issuing Mel's proposed statement - not much has been said about it. R said Richardson is testifying today before SFRC. K said he was not too crazy about it (statement) yesterday when it first came up. R said it was o.k. if a question came up, but did not think much of putting out as a special statement. R said it is in the paper this morning because it was in the Defense paper. K said he thought that was enough. R said ~~xx~~ he and Elliot talked last night about what he might say and they tentatively agreed he should just say what the procedure is; interdepartmental group at under secretary level, etc.

K said the ~~President~~ President asked him to put together some sort of contingency plans for the various things to be done in connection with yesterday afternoon's discussion. K asked whether R could give him the name of someone at State (perhaps Alex Johnson) to deal with. R said he would let K know.

jm

Telecon
The President
9:25 , April 17, 1969

P - In terms of the reaction - speaking of public handling, do you think some kind of diplomatic protest should be made?

K - I am exploring now what would happen if we were to go to the UN. We won't get a favorable vote. I'm doing this on a very low key. We can go to the Security Council on Saturday. We really would have done everything possible at that point.

P - The unsophisticated citizen might feel, why don't we make them pay for the plane, thinking back to the Pueblo. We should at least make a gesture. We are not going to get our selves into a long debate over this.

K - I wouldn't go to the UN unless we are going to do the other thing.

P - Oh, we'll do the other thing. but suppose the UN says they are going to investigate?

K - I have a call in to Joe Sisco who handled these matters before. This is not in full authority, but if we don't press too hard, they might be glad to wind the whole thing up.

P - Is there some other way.

K - We can launch a formal protest and demand compensation.

P - I have a feeling thats better. The UN is not going to do anything about this. We can do something so that they will turn it down fast.

P - Thats why the Panmunjom thing might be a good idea. H - I don't think we should show up there.

(something missing here)

K - I told Rod, subject to my checking with you, that he could indicate a bit more concern so that everyone does not think the crisis is over.

P - Tell them I met with you and members of NSC staff until after midnight last night - I think it would be a good thing to do.



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K - We do not want this thing to cool before we act but we have to have some thin thread of trying.

P - o.k. The UN thing worries me - they will take a week to debate.

K - I am going to check on what happend when we had the Pueblo. I'll check other diplomatic possibilities.

President and K discussed idea of formal protest - decided should not be done with Soviets. K said it would be sign of distain if we did thru Poles, for example. K said protest thru Hungary or some minor country would get us on record. P said what about Romania.