

SECRET

First Israeli  
draft

November 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE UNITED STATES ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN  
THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL  
CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE

1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire in the ground, in the air and on the sea called for by the UN Security Council. The cease-fire includes all military actions on the part of both parties and therefore rules out blockade of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of "the return to 22 October 73 positions", in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces, under the auspices of the U. N.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supply of food, water, and medicine. All wounded civilians in town of Suez will be evacuated. Details to be agreed upon between both sides.

SECRET - XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supply to the East Bank.

Details of the routine to be agreed upon by both sides.

5. Inspection of the non-military supply to the East Bank will be according to the following procedure:

a. The UN inspection will take place at the point on the Cairo-Suez road at which the UN drivers take over the vehicles carrying the non-military supplies. This point will be situated near the cease-fire line on the east side of it. At this point inspection will be carried out by UN officers with Israeli officers observing.

b. At the Bank of the Canal the unloaded supplies will be inspected by Israeli officers with UN officers observing.

6. As soon as the UN check-point is established in accordance with the provisions of para. 5 above there will be an immediate exchange of all POWs (including all those Israelis and Egyptians held since 1969) with first priority for all wounded POWs.

0315000000

7 Nov 73 19 15

9:15 PM local

~~9024~~

T  
..... ZZ RUEHC RUESOR  
DE RUESAD #9024 3111918  
ZNY. SSSSS ZZH  
Z 071912Z NOV 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUESOR/USINT CAIRO FLASH 3666  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0436  
BT

C R E T TEL AVIV 9024

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

I WAS THIRTY MINUTES INTO MEETING WITH PRIMIN  
WHE N I RECEIVED WORD YOU SENDING ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS.  
HAVE SUSPENDED MEETING AND AWAITING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.  
KEATING

BT  
#9024

NNNN



Department of State

AE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM

ACT: AMB  
INFO: VIP 5 CHRN

O 071700Z NOV 73

SECRET/NODIS/HCHEROKEE

FM USINT CAIRO

*Classification*

TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3406

CN: 11431

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4251

BT

SECRET CAIRO 3405

7 NOV 73

NODIS/CHEROKEE

**NODIS**

8:33 PM ++

SECTO 32

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

EO 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PBOR, IS, EG

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

REF: CAIRO 3395 (SECTO 29)

1. PLEASE ADD FOLLOWING SENTENCE TO END OF THE PROPOSED LETTER TO SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH WE SENT TO YOU REFTEL:

2. QTE. I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL COORDINATE WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS AGREEMENT. UNQUOTE.

KISSINGER

BT

#3405

++ ADVANCE ON RECEIPT TO DUTY OFFICER

SECRET/nodis

*Classification*



Department of State

AE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM

ACT: AMB  
INFO: VIP 5 CHRN

SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

Classification

CN: 11432

7 NOV 73

9:18 PM ++

Z 071810Z NOV 73  
FM USINT CAIRO  
TO RUEHC/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3407  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4252  
BT

SECRET CAIRO 3406

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 34

**NODIS**

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY

EO 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG  
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

1. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS THAT THE ONLY MILITARY MOVEMENT REQUIRED UNDER THE AGREEMENT IS AWAY FROM THE CHECKPOINTS. THEY MAY START BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD AND THEREFORE THIS TAKES CARE OF MAJOR GENERAL YARIV'S CONCERN ABOUT CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENTS.

2. IF THE ISRAELIS HAVE TROUBLE WITH THE BLOCKADE AND BELIEVE IT IS A DIFFICULT ISSUE, YOU MAY ASSURE THEM THAT I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A UNILATERAL STATEMENT AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE DOCUMENT WHICH MAKES CLEAR THAT THE CEASEFIRE INCLUDES ALL REPEAT ALL MILITARY ACTIONS ON THE PART OF BOTH PARTIES AND THEREFORE INCLUDES THE BLOCKADE AT THE STRAITS OF BAB EL-MANDEB.

KISSINGER

BT  
#3406

++ copy to D. O. on receipt. . . .

SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

Classification

FORM FS-412(H)  
4-68



Department of State

AE TELAVIV

TELEGRAM

ACT: AMB  
INFO: vip5

CHRN

SECRET//NODIS//CHEROKEE

Classification

Z 071845Z NOV 73  
FM USINT CAIRO  
TO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3408  
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4257  
BT  
SECRET CAIRO 3411

CN: 11439

7 NOV 73  
11:26 PM  
JK

EXDIS

DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS//CHEROKEEECTO 39

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG  
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

1. WE AND THE GOE HAVE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS  
IN THZATEXT OF THE PROPOSAL:

A. IN PARA NUMBERED TWO FOLLOWING QUOTE SEPARATION OF  
FORCES UNQUOTE, ADD QUOTE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN UNQUOTE.

B. IN PARA NUMBERED FIVE T CHANGE QUOTE AN ISRAELI OFFICER  
UNQUOTE TO QUOTE ISRAELI OFFICERS UNQUOTE.

C. IN SECTION FIVE AFTER QUOTE NATURE OF THE CARGO UNQUOTE,  
ADD QUOTE AT THE BANK OF THE CANAL UNQUOTE.

2. YOU SHOULD PRESENT PROPOSAL TO THE ISRAELIS WITH THESE  
MODIFICATIONS.

KISSINGER

BT  
#3411

NNNN

SECRET / NODIS / CHEROKEE

Classification



Department of State

AE TELAVIV

TELEGRAM

ACT: AMB  
INFO: VIP5 CHRN

SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

Classification

Z 071920Z NOV 73 ZFF4  
FM USINT CAIRO  
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3409  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4260  
BT  
SECRET CAIRO 3414

CN: 11437

7 NOV 73

8:11 EM ++

NODIS/CHEROKEE

**NODIS**

SECTO 43

E.O. 11652 -GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, IS, EG  
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

REF: SECTO 34

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY

1. FURTHER TO PARA TWO OF SECTO 34 RE BLOCKADE, FORMIN FAHMI INFORMS US THAT EGYPTIAN POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS: SINCE BLOCKADE WAS NEVER DECLARED, IT CANNOT BE FORMALLY LIFTED, BUT ORDERS FOR ITS RELAXATION HAVE BEEN ISSUED.

2. YOU MAY USE FOREGOING AS ADDITIONAL POINT TO MAKE WITH GOI.

KISSINGER  
BT  
#3414

NNN

++ ADVANCE IMMEDIATELY TO DUTY OFFICER

SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

Classification

FORM FS-412(H)  
4-68



9030

being followed at present in the talks between the Egyptian and Israeli military representative. Dayan said Egyptian general keeps saying talks are under UN auspices.

4. PM Meir was at her best, helping to finesse and overrule <sup>colleagues on</sup> number of issues raised particularly by Allon and Dayan. Best way to summarize meeting is as Pritkin did at end when I asked her what I should report to you. She said to tell you that she would meet with the opposition leaders at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow and with the full Cabinet at 9:00. She hoped there would be no difficulties. If so, she would ~~handle~~ overcome them. She asked me to give you her best and to tell you that this is "fantastic achievement."

5. Would caution that we must wait until we hear from Cabinet meeting about 11:00 a.m. tomorrow before we can say this formally approved.

*JCB*  
KEATING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

OUTGOING



Department of State  
AE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM

ACT: AMB  
INFO: ~~VIP5~~ CHRN

SECRET /nodis/CHEROKEE

Classification

CN: 11442

O 072150Z NOV 73 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO FLASH 5036  
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8290  
BT  
SECRET STATE 219826

8 NOV 73

0042 AM ++

NODIS/CHEROKEE

**NODIS**

TOSEC 186

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SCOWCROFT AND EAGLEBURGER  
INFO FOR SISCO  
LL.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OGEN  
REF: SECTO 41 AND SECTO 32

1. WITH REGARD TO REFTELS, WE SUGGEST THAT, IF TIME PERMITS, WE BE AUTHORIZED TO BRIEF A FEW PEOPLE ON THE HILL, THE PRC, THE UK, THE FRENCH, AND THE GERMANS SHORTLY BEFORE THE GOE IS INFORMED OF ISRAELI AGREEMENT. IF WE WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE EGYPTIANS ARE INFORMED, WE WILL HAVE LOST CONTROL OF THE PROCESS AND LEAKS MAY WELL OCCUR BEFORE WE HAVE COVERED THE APPROPRIATE BASES.

2. RUSH CONCURS.

3. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS. RUSH

BT  
#9826

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SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

Classification



SECRET

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CN: 9031

8 NOV 73

1:45 AM

COMMUNICATE:  
COLLECT  
CHARGE TO

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR IS XF  
Subject: Middle East Negotiations

NODIS

DISTRIBUTION

VIP5

AMB  
DCM  
POL  
CHRN

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN FLASH  
USINT CAIRO

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC  
SECRET TEL AVIV 9031  
TKEM  
~~FROM SISCO~~

~~XXXXX~~ For Flickering and Amb. Brown From Sisco

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ NODIS/CHEROKEE

Neir will

1. PM ~~XXXX~~ expects I ~~XXXX~~ have word of final Cabinet approval of Egyptian-~~xxxxxx~~ Israeli agreement by about 11:00 a.m. Israeli time. Dayan is arranging to helicopter me and party to Allenby Bridge.

2. Since there are four of us (Sisco, Saunders and ~~XXXX~~ Amb. Brown should arrange for two SY) plus baggage, believe ~~two cars~~ ~~XXXXXX~~

3. To be on safe side suggest cars be at bridge from 11:00 a.m. on.

4. I then can rejoin Secretary's party ~~XXXXXX~~ in time for 1355 departure ~~XXXXXX~~ recall, he leaves ~~XXXX~~ 1355.

*Keating*  
KEATING

DRAFTED BY:	JSisco	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
CLEARANCES:	<del>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</del>	11/8/73	269	Mr. Sisco

SECRET  
Classification

FORM 73-413 (H)  
4-68

Tel Aviv

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Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING



SECRET  
Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CN: 9032

8 NOV 73

2:05 AM

From: E.O.11652

Amembassy TEL AVIV  
GDS

TAGS:

PFOR, IS, EG

Subject:

Middle East Situation - Press Handling

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

USINT CAIRO FLASH

INFO:

SecState WASHDC FLASH

AMB

~~EXDIS~~ SECRET TEL AVIV 9032

DCM

EXDIS

POL

DAO

ECO

VIPS

CTN

PM Meir was anxious to put a positive cast on my meeting with her and her Cabinet colleagues. I agreed that PM's office could put out short statement that meeting was held "in a good and constructive spirit." Embassy has been swamped with inquiries. We are making no statement and responding individually to these inquiries that we have nothing to add to the PM's office statement.

KEATING

EXDIS

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

DRAFTED BY:

USIS:LLeffkow:cs1

DRAFTING DATE

11/7/73

TEL. EXT.

270

APPROVED BY:

Asst. Secy: JSisco

CLEARANCES:

Classified by L. Lefkow  
Subject to GDS of E.O.11652.  
Downgraded at 2-yr intervals  
and declassified Dec. 31, 1983.

SECRET  
Classification

FORM 4-68 PS-413(M)

Tel Aviv

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SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CN: 9040  
NOV 8, 1973  
1259

COLLECT  
CHARGE TO

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG  
SUBJ: Middle East Situation

DISTRIBUTION

AMB

CHR  
K

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN FLASH

INFO: SEC STATE WASHDC FLASH

SECRET TEL AVIV 9040

EXDIS

DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. PM has asked me to see her again regarding ~~some~~ some points in the agreement which came up in Cabinet meeting. I will, ~~therefore~~ <sup>therefore</sup>, not be able to join you in Amman but I am making arrangements to fly directly to Riad to meet you there.
2. I will report to you promptly following my meeting with PM.

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
KEATING

EXDIS

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

DRAFTED BY: Asst. Secy. JJSisco/kl	DRAFTING DATE 11-8-73	TEL. EXT. 270	APPROVED BY: DCM:NAVefotes
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CLEARANCES:

Classification

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FORM 75-413(H)

Tel Aviv

Tel Aviv

8 Nov 73 10 28

N.: 3-078KGA981  
...ZZ RUESAD  
DE RUE SKG 5960 3 121025  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 081020Z NOV 73  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO RUE SAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 5623  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9969  
BT  
S E C R E T AMMAN 5960

11476

EXDIS

SECTO 56

FOR SISCO FROM THE SECRETARY  
DEPT FOR S/S ONLY

11652: XGDS  
IS: PFOR, EG, IS  
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN ASSURANCES ON BLOCKADE

FAHMI REPEATED TO SECRETARY AGAIN THIS MORNING  
REASSURANCE THAT THE BLOCKADE WOULD NOT BE  
ENFORCED. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD ASSURE THAT THERE ARE  
NO REPEAT NO ANNOUNCEMENTS OR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THIS  
WOULD PUT EGYPTIANS IN AN UNTENABLE POSITION.

ISSINGER

BT  
5960

NNNN

Department of State

CN 9045

TELEGRAM

8 nov 73

252 pm

F.O. 11652:  
TAGS: ~~XXXX~~ PFOR, US, IS  
SUBJECT: Meeting with PriMin Meir

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: USDEL RIYAD FLASH  
Secstate WASHDC FLASH

AMB

~~SECRET~~  
VIF-5  
CHR  
D

SECRET TEL AVIV 9045

HANDLE AS NODIS CHFROKFI

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. In final wrap up meeting, most of ~~which~~ which devoted to Israeli interpretation of Egyptian-Israeli agreement, PM conveyed her and Cabinet approval of document without any word changes. In order get her to accept, I agreed to informal US-Israeli memorandum of understanding regarding certain points.
2. Near end of meeting much to surprise of everyone PM proposed that basic document be changed to reflect nuances of private informal US-Israeli understanding which I had previously worked out with Gen Yariv. We dug in our heels and I refused any change in document, and she finally came around on basis of a suggestion that she would wish to put her gloss and/ interpretation

APPROVED BY: JJSISCO:DP	DRAFTING DATE: 11/8/73	TEL EXL: 269	APPROVED BY: JJSISCO
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Classified by Asst. Secty Sisco. Subject to GDS of FO 11652. Automatically Downgraded Two Year Intervals, Declassified Dec. 31, 1981

Tel Aviv

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document when she speaks before Knesset.

3. We talked about timing and scenario and I said that we would get a precise message to her on this from you now that Israeli government approval had been given. She suggested that 8:30 p. m. local Friday would suit her very well since she would <sup>want to</sup> speak to Knesset at that time. She seemed flexible on timing but expressed above preference. ~~My arrival in Riyadh is not a factor~~ If you have worked out a definite timing schedule, I would suggest you not wait <sup>my arrival in</sup> ~~for my arrival in~~ Riyadh but send your views promptly to PM.

4. I would also suggest an immediate brief, oral message from you to PM saying that I have reported to you and that you appreciate the constructive spirit in which the Israeli government has approached this matter.

5. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Saunders and I will be taking a C-141 to Riyadh as soon as we have filed a full report of the meeting to you. I am glad the Israeli approval has come in time for you to use it to the maximum in Riyadh.

*Ken*  
KEATING  
~~XXXXXX~~

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Tel Aviv

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 2290Q  
RECD: NOV 8, 1973  
1520Z

Z 081414FZ NNNOV 73 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0455  
RUESYA/USDEL RIYAD FLASH 006  
RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH 627  
BT

SECRET TEL AVIV 9056

NODIS/CHEROKEE

EXDIS

HANDLE AS NODIS CHEROKEE

SECRETARY FROM SISCO

E. O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PFOR, US, IS  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

REF: TEL AVIV 9045

FOLLOWING IS FINAL AGRCD TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING:  
BEGIN TEXT: 8 NOV 73. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT  
AND ISRAEL CONCERNING THE CEASEFIRE.

1. EGYPT AND ISRAEL AGREE TO OBSERVE SCRUPULOUSLY THE CEASE-  
FIRE ON THE GROUND, IN THE AIR AND ON THE SEA, CALLED FOR BY THE  
UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE CEASEFIRE INCLUDES ALL MILITARY ACTIONS  
ON THE PART OF BOTH PARTIES AND THEREFORE RULES OAH BLOCKADE OF  
THE STRAITS OF BAB-EL-MANDEB.

2. BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THEM WILL BEGIN  
IMMEDIATELY TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF "THE RETURN TO 22 OCT  
1973 POSITIONS," IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AGREEMENT ON THE  
DISENGAGEMENT AND SEPARATION OF FORCES, UNDER THE AUSPICES  
OF THE U.N.

BH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2-TEL AVIV 9056, NOV 8

3. THE TOWN OF SUEZ WILL RECEIVE DAILY SUPPLY OF FOOD, WATER AND MEDICINE. ALL WOUNDED CIVILIANS IN TOWN OF SUEZ WILL BE EVACUATED. DETAILS TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN BOTH SIDES.
4. THERE SHALL BE NO IMPEDIMENT TO THE MOVEMENT OF NON-MILITARY SUPPLY TO THE EAST BANK. DETAILS OF THE ROUTINE TO BE AGREED UPON BY BOTH SIDES.
5. INSPECTION OF THE NON-MILITARY SUPPLY TO THE EAST BANK WILL BE ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:
  - A. THE WESTERN CHECKPOINT ON THE CAIRO-SUEZ ROAD WILL BE MANNED BY UN PERSONNEL. THE VEHICLES CARRYING NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES AND DRIVEN BY UN DRIVERS WILL BE INSPECTED BY UN OFFICERS WITH ISRAELI OFFICERS OBSERVING.
  - AT THE BANK OF THE CANAL THE UNLOADED SUPPLIES WILL BE INSPECTED BY ISRAELI OFFICERS WITH UN OFFICERS OBSERVING.
6. AS SOON AS THE UN CHECKPOINT IS ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PARA 5 ABOVE, THERE WILL BE AN IMMEDIATE EXCHANGE OF ALL POWS (INCLUDING ALL THOSE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS HELD SINCE 1969), WITH FIRST PRIORITY FOR ALL WOUNDED POWS. END TEXT  
BT  
#9056

SECRET

*Agreed final  
version*

8 November 1973

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT  
OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND  
ISRAEL CONCERNING THE CEASE-FIRE -----

1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire on the ground, in the air and on the sea, called for by the UN Security Council. The cease-fire includes all military actions on the part of both parties and therefore rules out blockade of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of "the return to 22 October 1973 positions", in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces, under the auspices of the U.N.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supply of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in town of Suez will be evacuated. Details to be agreed upon between both sides.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supply to the East Bank. Details of the routine to be agreed upon by both sides.
5. Inspection of the non-military supply to the East Bank will be according to the following procedure :

**SECRET - XGDS (3)**  
**CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER**

a. The Western check-point on the Cairo-Suez road will be manned by UN personnel. The vehicles carrying non-military supplies and driven by UN drivers will be inspected by UN officers with Israeli officers observing.

b. At the Bank of the Canal the unloaded supplies will be inspected by Israeli officers with UN officers observing.

6. As soon as the UN check-point is established in accordance with the provisions of para.5 above there will <sup>be</sup> an immediate exchange of all POWs (including all those Israelis and Egyptians held since 1969), with first priority for all wounded POWs.



Department of State  
AE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM

ACT: AMB  
INFO: ~~DECOGNXXIXM~~ CHRN (D)

SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

Z 071630Z NOV 73  
FM USINT CAIRO  
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3405  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4247  
BT  
SECRET CAIRO 3399

Classification

CN: 11428

7 NOV 73

7:39 PM ++

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO ~~2~~✓41

**NODIS**

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

EO 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PBOR IS EG  
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE WE PROPOSE SENDING TO SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSAL WORKED OUT WITH SADAT. YOU SHOULD INFORM PRIME MINISTER MEIR.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL:

I HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT SADAT ON THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO HAS JUST ADVISED ME FROM ISRAEL OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT: "(TEXT OF PROPOSAL)".

TO ASSIST THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS IN RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREGOING, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR EARLY NOTIFICATION TO THEM OF THE UN OFFICIAL WHOM YOU WILL DESIGNATE TO WORK WITH THEM. SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END TEXT.

3. PLEASE FLASH US WHEN ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE HAS BEEN OBTAINED.

KISSINGER

BT  
#339

SECRET /NODIS / CHEROKEE

Classification



SECRET XEROX

Classification

# Department of State

CN 9046

8 nov 73

## TELEGRAM

303 pm

INDICATE:  
 CT  
 TO

EO11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, US, IS, XF  
SUBJECT: Press Handling:

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Secstate WASHDC FLASH

AMB  
DCM  
POL  
EC  
DAO  
VIP-5  
CHR  
USIS  
LAB

CONFIDENTIAL TEL AVIV 9046

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. At end of meeting PM asked whether I could make very brief statement to press expressing optimism. We agreed on the following which I conveyed to the press after I left the meeting: we have had a useful and constructive meeting with the Prime Minister and her colleagues. I am flying to Riyadh to report to the Secretary of State I am optimistic.
2. I took no questions.

*KBN*  
KEATING

DRAFTED BY: AsstSecy:JSisco:ag	DRAFTING DATE 11/8 73	TEL. EXT. 269	APPROVED BY: <i>KBN</i> AMB:KBKeating
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CLEARANCES:  
  
Classified by Joseph Sisco  
Subject to GDS of EO 11652,  
Declassified 12/31 79.

CONFIDENTIAL  
Classification

FORM PS-413 (1)  
4-68

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

## PROPOSAL

1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the ceasefire called for by the UN Security Council.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East Bank.
5. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez Road will be replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, an Israeli officer can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military nature of the cargo.
6. As soon as the UN checkpoints are established on the Cairo-Suez Road, there will be an exchange of all POWs, including wounded.



SECRET

W H



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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4 5 5 8Q  
RECD: 15 NOV, 11PM

*Scowcroft*  
*LL*

*Sander*  
*Samphlett*

O R 152336Z NOV 73  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5613  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0195  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1665  
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0085  
BT

SECRET LONDON 13420

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PFOR, XF, FR  
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S MIDDLE EAST/EUROPE  
TRIP - BRIEFING OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT  
- NOVEMBER 14

1. I WOULD DESCRIBE MY MEETING (AMBASSADOR IRWIN PRESENT) WITH JOBERT AND PRIOR SESSION WITH DE COURCEL AND COLLEAGUES AS A POLITE STAND-OFF. THEY LISTENED ATTENTIVELY, SPOKE A FEW WORDS OF PRAISE, SOMEWHAT GRUDINGLY I THOUGHT, FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SIX-POINT AGREEMENT, STRESSED THE "AMBIGUITIES" IN THE AGREEMENT GIVING ME THE IMPRESSION THEY DID NOT EXPECT MIL REPS DISCUSSIONS TO SUCCEED. THEY SEEMED TOO PRIDEFUL TO SAY THEY WANT IN AS CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS, BUT EXPRESSED THIS GINGERLY SAYING SC HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE; EUROPE MUST HAVE A ROLE AS A GUARANTOR AND CARETAKER OF AREA IN POST-SETTLEMENT PERIOD. THEY DO NOT FEEL THEY CAN STAND ON SIDELINES. THEY EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED. ALL OF THIS WAS DONE COURTEOUSLY, WITH GALLIC UNDERPLAY AND IRONY. FINALLY, I DID NOT MAKE POINTS YOU SUGGESTED RE ARAB OIL PRESSURES.

2. AFTER OUR EXTENDED CONVERSATIONS WITH DE COURCEL, I GAVE JOBERT AN ABBREVIATED VERSION OF OUR REPORT. I SAID WE THOUGHT OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS WAS BETTER NOW THAN ANY TIME SINCE 1967 BECAUSE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS IN AREA HAD FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED. OCTOBER WAR HAD BOLSTERED ARAB SELF-CONFIDENCE AND AT SAME TIME

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HAD BEEN SOBERING EXPERIENCE FOR ISRAEL. WHAT CONCLUSIONS ISRAEL WOULD DRAW FROM THIS EXPERIENCE REMAINED TO BE SEEN. WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN CEASEFIRE AND SIX-POINT AGREEMENT WAS FIRST STEP, BUT ONE COULD NOT BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ON THIS BASIS ALONE. WE RECOGNIZED DIFFICULTY OF PROBLEMS AHEAD. I SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT THE VARIOUS PARTIES HAD CHANGED THEIR BASIC POSITIONS ON AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, AND PAINFUL COMPROMISES WILL BE REQUIRED. EGYPT WAS STILL TALKING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL TO THE PRE-JUNE 1967 LINES; KING HUSSEIN WAS, AS BEFORE, INTERESTED IN A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE; SYRIANS APPEAR SOMEWHAT LESS RIGID IN AFTERMATH OF WAR BUT THERE WAS STILL NO SIGN THAT THEY COULD CONTEMPLATE COMPROMISE ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION IN GOLAN. IF THERE WAS DEVELOPMENT WHICH TENDED TO MAKE US HOPEFUL, IT WAS FACT THAT FOR FIRST TIME PARTIES HAD AGREED TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS, AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 338.

3. JOBERT BROKE IN AT THIS POINT AND ASKED WHETHER I THOUGHT U.S. HAD SUFFICIENT MEANS OF PRESSURE TO BRING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. I SAID THAT WHATEVER ARABS THOUGHT OF U.S. IN PAST, WE HAD COME AWAY FROM RECENT TRIP WITH CLEAR IMPRESSION OF RENEWED CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. RESUMPTION IN PRINCIPLE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN CAIRO WAS REFLECTION OF BOTH CAIRO'S AND U.S. BELIEF THAT WE NEEDED HIGH-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS AS WE ENTERED NEW STAGE BUT ALSO DECISION BY EGYPTIANS THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE U.S. OPPORTUNITY TO BRING OFF PEACE SETTLEMENT. MOREOVER, ALTERNATIVE FOR THEM WAS NOT ATTRACTIVE. WE ACCEPTED OPPORTUNITY WHICH PRESENT SITUATION AFFORDS AND REALIZE THAT IN DOING SO WE WERE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE RESULTS, BUT THIS WOULD ALSO DEPEND ON PARTIES THEMSELVES.

4. JOBERT ASKED HOW WE INTENDED TO TACKLE THIS FORMIDABLE TASK. I SAID OUR APPROACH WOULD BE TO TRY TO REACH (ONCE PEACE CONFERENCE COULD BE CONVENED WHICH WE HOPED WOULD BE IN DECEMBER) AREAS OF ACCOMMODATION ON ISSUES INVOLVED IN PEACE SETTLEMENT THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE PARTIES. THIS WAS

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TELEGRAM

- 3 - LONDON 13420, 15 NOV '73

FUNDAMENTALLY THE WAY WE HAD GONE ABOUT THE SIX-POINT AGREEMENT, AND IT SEEMED TO HAVE WORKED. WE WOULD NOT GO INTO FORTHCOMING PEACE CONFERENCE WITH U.S. PEACE PLAN. IN EARLIER MEETING, DE COURCEL SAID FRENCH HAD ALWAYS BEEN SKEPTICAL, THOUGH NOT NEGATIVE, ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF PARTIES TALKING TOGETHER, GOF FEELS CONFERENCE WILL NEED HELP OF U.S., SOVIETS, AND OF OTHERS WHO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH PARTIES. ALSO, FINAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD HAVE GUARANTEES NOT ONLY FROM U.S. AND USSR, BUT FROM OTHERS, SUCH AS FRANCE, WHICH HAS ITS OWN INTERESTS IN ME, INCLUDING OIL. BECAUSE OF ITS INTERESTS, FRANCE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SETTLEMENT AND TO GUARANTEES. FRANCE CANNOT REMAIN IDLE AS IT MAY, IN FACT, BE MORE VITALLY INTERESTED IN OUTCOME THAN IS U.S.

5. I SAID WE HAD NOT GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT YET TO GUARANTEES, BUT THERE WERE NUMBER OF THEORETICAL OPTIONS. ON ONE LEVEL, ONE COULD LOOK AT GUARANTEES FROM POINT OF VIEW OF PARTIES WHO WOULD BE EXCHANGING OBLIGATIONS DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER IN A PEACE AGREEMENT. THIS IS A PRIMARY GUARANTEE. MOREOVER, WHILE ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS OPPOSED A UN FORCE, UNEF IS NOW ON THE GROUND. HOW UNEF WORKS OUT WILL HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON WHAT KIND OF ROLE UN FORCE CAN PLAY, IF ANY, IN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. ON ANOTHER LEVEL, THERE IS QUESTION OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT GIVE GUARANTEES. I SAID THERE WERE NO AGREEMENTS BETWEEN USG AND ANYONE ELSE AS TO POSSIBLE ROLE IN THIS RESPECT. FINALLY, GUARANTEES COULD BE SEEN ON LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH AS UNSC, WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE THEM. SUCH GUARANTEES NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED EXCLUSIVE, BUT RATHER AS MUTUALLY REINFORCING. IN ANY EVENT, WE WILL BE STUDYING QUESTION OF GUARANTEES IN DEPTH, WE ARE NOT AT STAGE OF PRACTICAL REALITY ON THIS ASPECT. WE HAVE DRAWN NO CONCLUSIONS.

6. DE COURCEL SAID USG HAS APPEARED TO WISH TO SOLVE ME PROBLEM OUTSIDE THE UN OR WITH ONLY UN RUBBER STAMP. GOF THINKS EXCLUSIVE AUSPICES OF U.S. AND USSR WOULD BE TOO PRECARIOUS. FRANCE ALSO BELIEVES FUTURE UN FORCE NEEDS THE KIND OF GUARANTEE WHICH ONLY GREAT POWER PARTICIPATION CAN PROVIDE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ME PROBLEM NOT BE SOLVED OUTSIDE UN; SC PERMANENT MEMBERS HAVE SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY.

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TELEGRAM

- 4 - LONDON 13420, 15 NOV '73

7. DE COURCEL ASKED MY VIEWS ABOUT ROLE OF SOVIETS AND EUROPEANS. I SAID CONFERENCE MODALITIES HAD ONLY BEEN DISCUSSED IN PRELIMINARY FASHION. WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE LARGELY DETERMINED BY PARTIES' OWN FEELINGS AS TO WHAT THEY CONSIDERED MOST CONGENIAL FORUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAELIS HAVE CONSIDERED SC AND UN GENERALLY AS PARTISAN. USG FEELS CONFERENCE MODALITIES MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. SO FAR, EGYPT, JORDAN AND ISRAEL HAVE ACCEPTED U.S. AND SOVIET OFFERS OF GOOD OFFICES. WE UNDERSTOOD VIEW THAT EUROPE HAS ROLE TO PLAY, AND WE HOPE IT CAN PLAY A SUPPORTIVE ROLE. HE FELT IT SHOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTED THAT PEACE TALKS MUST BE ORGANIZED SO AS TO PRODUCE PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE RESULTS, AND IT IS THESE RESULTS WHICH WILL BE TO THE ULTIMATE BENEFIT OF ALL, INCLUDING EUROPEANS.

8. JOBERT ASKED WHAT WE THOUGHT THE EFFECTS OF THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL WOULD BE. I SAID THAT IT WAS OUR FEELING THAT WE COULDN'T AFFORD TO WAIT UNTIL ELECTIONS TO GET PEACE CONFERENCE UNDERWAY. WE RECOGNIZED -- AND I SAID THAT I THOUGHT ARABS UNDERSTAND THIS -- THAT THE PRESENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WITHOUT NEW MANDATE WOULD BE UNABLE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH REALLY SERIOUS ISSUES INVOLVED IN PEACE SETTLEMENT UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS. I SAID BOTH SIDES SEEM TO WANT TO TAKE UP DISENGAGEMENT AND SEPARATION OF FORCES IN FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IN PEACE CONFERENCE.

9. DE COURCEL EARLIER HAD COMMENTED THAT DATE OF EARLY DECEMBER FOR CONVENING OF PEACE CONFERENCE SEEMED OPTIMISTIC IN VIEW OF HARD LINE PREMIER MEIR REPORTEDLY TAKING. HE FELT THERE WERE MANY AMBIGUITIES IN SIX-POINT PROGRAM. HE ASKED HOW WE SAW NEXT STEP AND WHETHER DISENGAGEMENT LIKELY BE IN PLACE OR WITH EXCHANGE OF AREAS. HE WONDERED IF THERE WERE MOMENTUM ENOUGH TO OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY AMBIGUITIES. SISCO SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT FORM DISENGAGEMENT MIGHT TAKE. THAT WOULD INITIALLY BE SUBJECT OF TALKS AT MILITARY LEVEL BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT GET FAR IN THIS FORMAT, THEREFORE PROBABLY WOULD CONSTITUTE OPENING

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TELEGRAM

- 5 - LONDON 13420, 15 NOV '73

PHASE AT PEACE TALKS.

10. JOBERT ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT ON BLOCKADE OF BAB EL MANDEB. BECAUSE OF SENSITIVITY THIS POINT, I GAVE HIM GUARDED REPLY SAYING WE THOUGHT EGYPTIANS WERE FULLY AWARE OF IMPORTANCE THAT ISRAELIS ATTACH TO PROPOSITION THAT CEASEFIRE HAD TO BE EFFECTIVE ON SEA AS WELL AS LAND. JOBERT SMILED AND SAID, "I UNDERSTAND."

11. JOBERT ASKED WHETHER WE HAD REALLY COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING WITH SOVIETS ON APPROACH TO PEACE SETTLEMENT. I SAID ANSWER IS NO. IN MOSCOW U.S. AND SOVIETS HAD CONCENTRATED ALMOST ENTIRELY ON PRODUCING RESOLUTION 338. THERE HAD BEEN SOME GENERAL REFERENCES -- BUT VERY LITTLE -- TO ROLE OF GUARANTEES.

12. JOBERT ASKED ABOUT OUR IMPRESSION OF KING FAISAL'S PRESENT ATTITUDE ON OIL. THIS GAVE ME OPPORTUNITY TO GET IN LINE YOU SUGGESTED. I SAID WE BELIEVE HIM TO BE MAN OF GREAT INTEGRITY; HOWEVER, HE WAS ANGUISHED, TORN BETWEEN CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES. WE HAD MADE CLEAR IN VARIOUS QUARTERS DURING OUR TRIP THAT U.S. WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THAT ARABS HOPED FOR ON PEACE SETTLEMENT UNDER SHADOW OF THREAT TO US AND OUR FRIENDS. USG CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT ALL OF US AVOID GIVING IN TO THESE PRESSURES. WE BELIEVE THAT IF NONE OF US GIVES IN TO THREATS, THERE ARE GOOD PROSPECTS. IN OUR VIEW NUMBER OF ARAB LEADERS UNDERSTAND THIS BASIC POINT. DE COURCEL INTERJECTED WE KNOW HASSAN UNDERSTANDS THIS. I SAID OTHERS DO AS WELL. IT WAS OUR JUDGMENT THAT IF SOME FURTHER PROGRESS COULD BE MADE THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE FAISAL IN TIME WOULD FIND WAY TO EASE OIL EMBARGO. WHEN DE COURCEL ASKED IF ARABS COULD NOT PUT MORE AND MORE PRESSURE THROUGH OIL EMBARGO, I SAID OF COURSE BUT RISK THEY RUN IS THAT NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED IN SUCH ATMOSPHERE LIKELY TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND IT NOT FEASIBLE FOR US TO PLAY EFFECTIVE ROLE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. US INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE-MAKING PROCESS IS ESSENTIAL AND BEST CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IS IF WE ALL STAND TOGETHER. FINALLY, I MADE POINT TACTFULLY THAT US COULD ONE WAY OR ANOTHER MANAGE UNDER EMBARGO.

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13. I ENDED BY REITERATING OVER WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH GOF AND NATO ALLIES ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.

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*Scowcroft*

R 160012Z NOV 73 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 5616  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0198  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1668

CONTROL: 4 5 9 1 Q  
RECD: 15 NOVEMBER 73 -  
8 56 PM

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LONDON 13421

NODIS/CHEROKEE

*Sand*  
*Somffelt*

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PFOR, XF, UK  
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S MIDDLE EAST/  
EUROPEAN VISIT - BRIEFING AT BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE  
NOVEMBER 15. PART 1.

1. IN LONDON TODAY WE HAD FAR AND AWAY MOST INFORMATIVE AND USEFUL EXCHANGE OF OUR TRIP. THAT IS NOT TO SAY WE AND BRITISH AGREED ON ALL POINTS, BUT DIFFERENCES WERE FRANKLY LAID ON TABLE IN MANNER THAT I BELIEVE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OUR PURPOSES. BRITISH MADE STRONG CASE FOR URGENCY IN SETTING DATE FOR PEACE CONFERENCE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON TWO GROUNDS: (A) ARAB SUMMIT WHICH NOW SCHEDULED NOVEMBER 26 DURING WHICH BRITISH FEAR (AND I WOULD AGREE) THERE IS RISK ARABS WILL TAKE POSITIONS WHICH MAY MAKE CONVENING OF PEACE CONFERENCE MORE DIFFICULT; AND (B) SYRIANS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF DRIFTING AWAY FROM SOLIDARITY WITH SADAT IN TERMS OF LATTER'S COMMITMENT TO ENTER CONFERENCE. BRITISH HAD SEVERAL INTERESTING THINGS TO REPORT, SO I FELT IT WORTH GIVING YOU FAIRLY FULL ACCOUNT.

2. SINCE SIR ALEC IS ILL, WE SAW LORD BALNIEL, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, PRECEDED BY MEETING WITH FCO MIDDLE EAST PROFESSIONALS HEADED BY ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY PARSONS. PARSONS SAID HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED FAIRLY FULL REPORT FROM BRITISH NATO REP AND OTHER POSTS ON MY BASIC REPORT, SO HE THOUGHT WE COULD SKIP THAT AND PROCEED DIRECTLY TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS WHICH BRITISH WANTED TO POSE. FIRST WAS QUESTION OF LINK BETWEEN TALKS ENVISAGED UNDER PARAGRAPH 2 OF SIX-POINT AGREEMENT AND PEACE CONFERENCE. I SAID THERE WAS NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THERE WAS SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AT THIS TIME ON WHAT DISENGAGEMENT WOULD MEAN; THERE WAS HOWEVER DESIRE IN BOTH CAIRO AND

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

2 LONDON 13421

JERUSALEM TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER PROMPTLY. ISRAELIS HAD ASKED WHY MILITARY REPS COULD NOT TALK ABOUT DISENGAGEMENT AND WE HAD SAID, NONE OF COURSE. IF THEY COULD REACH FURTHER AGREEMENT THIS WOULD BE ALL TO GOOD. BUT PRIVATELY WE ASSUMED AT THAT TIME THAT MILITARY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT, AND THIS THEREFORE WAS LIKELY TO BE FIRST ITEM ON AGENDA OF PEACE CONFERENCE.

3. PARSONS ASKED ABOUT BLOCKADE AT BAB AL-MANDEB. I SAID IT WAS TRUE BLOCKADE WAS NOT MENTIONED IN AGREEMENT; NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS KEEN AWARENESS IN CAIRO OF GREAT IMPORTANCE ISRAEL ATTACHED TO LIFTING OF BLOCKADE, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO SEE HOW THINGS WORKED OUT IN PRACTICE.

4. PARSONS ASKED WHETHER WE SAW PROSPECT OF SIMILAR AGREEMENT ON POW'S WITH SYRIA. I SAID WE HOPED, NOW THAT EGYPT-ISRAEL POW EXCHANGES HAD APPARENTLY BEGUN, THAT THIS WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE SYRIAN SIDE. I REVIEWED WITH HIM RECENT EXCHANGE OF PROPOSALS BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAELIS.

5. I SAID THAT, MORE BROADLY, WHILE IT IS CLEAR CAIRO WANTS US ENGAGED, IT WAS NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHAT SYRIAN POSITION WAS. SYRIANS HAD SAID IN TALK IN WASHINGTON THAT THEY WANTED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US. THIS WOULD BE DONE. I SAID WE HAD OFFERED SYRIANS PROSPECT OF A VISIT BY ME TO DAMASCUS DURING THIS TRIP, BUT THEY HAD POLITELY DECLINED INDICATING THIS WAS NOT THE MOMENT. I INDICATED THAT SOME FUTURE CONTACTS MIGHT PROVE POSSIBLE.

6. PARSONS SAID ALL OF THIS WAS MOST ENCOURAGING. THERE WERE SEVERAL POINTS ON WHICH BRITISH WERE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR: HMG WANTED FULL SETTLEMENT; THEY FELT IT WAS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO KEEP UP MOMENTUM; SOONER NEGOTIATIONS COULD START THE BETTER. UNDERSCORING HIS WORDS, PARSONS SAID HMG WOULD DO NOTHING, HE REPEATED NOTHING, TO IMPEDE START OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHATEVER MANNER PARTIES COULD AGREE TO. HMG DID NOT CARE ABOUT AUSPICES; RESULTS WERE WHAT COUNTED. AS TACTICAL MATTER, HOWEVER, BRITISH WERE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT

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IT MIGHT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES TO TRY TO KEEP UN OUT OF PROCEEDINGS ALTOGETHER. PRESSURE WOULD GROW FOR INVOLVEMENT FROM LARGE NON-ALIGNED BODY IN UN AND THIS WOULD BE FED BY RADICAL ARABS. BRITISH THOUGHT SOLUTION MIGHT LIE IN USING WALDHEIM AS KIND OF LAY FIGURE WHO WOULD IN FACT NOT PLAY MUCH OF A ROLE AS NEGOTIATOR. IF HE WERE AROUND IN THIS COSMETIC FORM, IT MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT.

7. I SAID I GENERALLY THOUGHT POINT HAD MERIT AND WOULD REPORT HIS VIEWS. ARRANGING FOR SOME MANNER OF COSMETIC UN PRESENCE SEEMED SENSIBLE.

8. PARSONS SAID HE WISHED TO PASS ON TO US SOME RECENT GLEANINGS, MEAGRE AS THEY WERE, OF SYRIAN ATTITUDE. THEY WERE BEGINNING TO SAY "ALL SC MEMBERS HAVE TO BE PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE." PARSONS SAID THIS IDEA WOULD BE DISASTER IF IT GAINED CURRENCY AMONG ARABS. HE THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO CONCENTRATE ON DRIVING SYRIANS OFF THIS POSITION. ALSO, HE SAID, ARAB SUMMIT WAS NOW DUE TO CONVENE NOVEMBER 26. HE HAD FOREBODINGS ABOUT ITS LIKELY EFFECT ON CONFERENCE IF DATE AND MODALITIES HAD NOT BEEN WORKED OUT BY THEN. AT WORST, ARABS GATHERED TOGETHER COULD WRECK THINGS TOTALLY BY ISSUING L973 EQUIVALENT OF "THREE NO'S" OF L967 KHARTOUM CONFERENCE. EVEN AT BEST, SUMMIT WAS LIKELY TO HAVE EFFECT OF MAKING ARAB POSITIONS ON QUESTION OF AUSPICES AND PARTICIPATION MORE RIGID. PARSONS HAD SAID HMG HAD BEEN DOING ITS BEST TO ARGUE AGAINST SUMMIT WITH ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

9. PARSONS SAID HE THOUGHT SYRIANS PROBABLY WANTED SETTLEMENT BUT THEY FEARED THEY WOULD BE SOLD DOWN THE RIVER BY SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL PEACE SETTLEMENT. THIS MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO HAVE SECURITY COUNCIL AUSPICES. PARSONS DETECTED SIGN OF NEW RAPPROACHMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA,

BECAUSE JORDAN ALSO HAD MISGIVINGS ABOUT POSSIBLE SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT. PARSONS THOUGHT SYRIANS WERE GETTING INTO INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE STATE, AND INCREASINGLY PUSHING NEGATIVE POSITIONS. IF SYRIA WERE REALLY STICKY ABOUT GOING INTO CONFERENCE IT MIGHT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SADAT TO GO IN. I SAID I WAS NOT SO SURE ON THIS POINT, BUT IT WAS WORTH

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-4- LONDON 13421

THINKING ABOUT. PARSONS SAID WE SHOULD WATCH OUT FOR SYRIANS. HISTORY SHOWED THAT FOR THE LAST FIFTY YEARS SYRIA HAD AN ALMOST SPOTLESS RECORD AS SPOILER IN AREA.

10. I SAID THESE COMMENTS WERE MOST INTERESTING SINCE OUR INFORMATION ABOUT SYRIA WAS VERY MEAGER. IF WE SUCCEEDED IN GETTING EVERYONE TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE, LIKELY PROCEDURE WOULD BE TO BREAK UP AT FAIRLY EARLY STAGE INTO SUBGROUPS, EACH OF WHICH WOULD DISCUSS ONE OF ASPECTS OF PEACE SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD POSE DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR STAGE MANAGERS OF CONFERENCE. ISRAEL WANTED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN SETTLEMENT, YET IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP OTHERS IN PLAY IN SOME MANNER. I GAVE PARSONS RUNDOWN ON LEBANESE ATTITUDE AND THEN WE GOT INTO DISCUSSION ABOUT PALESTINIAN ASPECT. QUESTION OF WHO REPRESENTED

PALESTINIANS AT CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED FAIRLY SOON AND UNFORTUNATELY ONE COULD NOT BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT EASY SOLUTION. PARSONS AGREED. I SAID WE HAD IMPRESSION THAT LEBANESE WANTED US TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM FOR THEM. I SAID I FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ARABS THEMSELVES SET TOGETHER TO TRY TO WORK OUT A COMMON POSITION ON PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION QUESTION.

11. PARSONS WONDERED IF ARABS WERE DOING ANYTHING TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE ESSENTIAL FOR ANY COALESCENCE OF PALESTINIAN OPINION ABOUT REPRESENTATION AT CONFERENCE. I SAID I DOUBTED THAT SUCH RECONCILIATION WAS POSSIBLE, AND I WAS NOT AT ALL SURE WE SHOULD TRY TO PROMOTE IT. KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ANY SUCH PRESSURES.

12. PARSONS THEN SET FORTH BRITISH POSITION ON PALESTINIANS. HMG VIEWED PALESTINIANS AS FALLING INTO THREE CATEGORIES: 1) REFUGEES OF ORIGINAL '48 STRUGGLE, DISPOSITION OF WHOM SHOULD FALL WITHIN PURVIEW OF UN RESOLUTION 194 OF 1948 (BUT PARSONS INDICATED THAT PRACTICAL COMPROMISE WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED BETWEEN THIS RESOLUTION AND REQUIREMENTS OF PRESENT REALITY); 2) PALESTINIANS LIVING IN GAZA, WHICH BRITISH SAY OUGHT TO

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TELEGRAM

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-5- LONDON 13421

REVERT TO ARAB CONTROL IN PEACE SETTLEMENT BUT DETAILS OF  
PRECISE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE LEFT FOR  
NEGOTIATION; AND 3) JORDINIAN WEST BANK RESIDENTS WHOM  
BRITISH REGARDED TO BE UNDER JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY  
(PARSONS COMMENTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT UK WAS ONE OF  
TWO STATES THAT CONSIDER WEST BANK DE JURE PART OF  
JORDAN); AND THEREFORE PALESTINE PROBLEM WITH WEST  
BANK SHOULD BE SETTLED BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND HIS  
SUBJECTS.

L3 PARSONS SAID THESE WERE BRITISH IDEAS BUT HMG ASN'T  
GOING TO RAM THEM DOWN ANYBODY'S THROATS.

END PART ONE

NOTE: NOT SENT TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO AND SEOUL BY OC/T PER  
S/S-O. SENT WHITE HOUSE FOR THE SECRETARY ABOARD  
AIRCRAFT.

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*J. Henderson*  
*Secretary*  
*Rodman*  
*McFarlane*  
**TELEGRAM**



Department of State

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CONTROL: 3 1 5 6 Q

Received: Nov., 10, 1973 846 PM

O 110018Z NOV 73 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5149  
RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 002  
BT  
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 12979

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US, MX  
SUBJECT: SISCO BRIEFING OF LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. SUMMARY: I BRIEFED LEBANESE FONMIN AND KEY MINISTRY OFFICIALS EVENING NOVEMBER 10 ON PROGRESS TO DATE AND LIKELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. AFTER BRIEFING WE DINED WITH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. THEY HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CAIRO WHERE THEY FOUND EGYPTIANS HAVE "REGAINED CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES" AND WILLING MAKE CLEAR TO ALL CRITICS, THAT THEY BELIEVE THIS WILL PRODUCE LONG-AWAITED RESULTS. LEBANESE REASSURED BY CLARIFICATION OF HOW WE SEE PEACE TALKS DEVELOPING. THEY WISH PARTICIPATE BUT NOT IN DISCUSSING DISENGAGEMENT. PRIMARY OBJECTIVES ARE DEFINITIVE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR PRESENT BORDERS WITH ISRAEL AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. I URGED THAT THEY SEEK UNIFIED ARAB POSITION ON LATTER POINT AND THAT THEY CONSULT, CLOSELY WITH ARAB LEADERS SUCH AS KING HUSSEIN. LEBANESE SEEMED VERY PLEASED WITH OUR REASSURANCES, AND I TOLD THEM WE WISHED INTENSIFY CONSULTATIONS AS WE MOVE INTO NEXT PHASE OF SEARCH FOR JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT. THEY WOULD WELCOME A VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER.  
END SUMMARY.

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NODIS-SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2- BEIRUT 12979 Section 1 Of 2 November 10, 1973

2. IN TWO-HOUR MEETING AT LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY NOVEMBER 10, I BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFA AND HIS TOP ASSISTANTS ON PROGRESS TO DATE. FONMIN AND PRIME MINISTER (WHO JOINED US LATER FOR DINNER) HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CAIRO WHERE THEY SAW SADAT AND OTHER EGYPTIAN LEADERS. THEY DESCRIBED EGYPTIANS AS HAVEING "REGAINED CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES' EFFORTS TO TRULY SEEK JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST." FONMIN ALSO EXPRESSED HIS AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION FOR YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD, AS WELL AS THOSE OF USG GENERALLY.

3. I GAVE THEM A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF HOW WE SEE IMPROVED CHANCES FOR PEACE IN AREA, PARTICULARLY GREATER REALISM ON BOTH SIDES, AND OUR DETERMINATION CONTINUE USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO HELP CONTINUE FORWARD MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, ROAD AHEAD IS DIFFICULT AND USG WILL NEED ALL SUPPORT IT CAN GET FROM PUBLIC OPINION IN OUR COUNTRY IF IT IS TO BE ABLE USE ITS INFLUENCE AS IT MIGHT WISH. IN THIS CONNECTION, ARAB OIL EMBARGO IS DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD. IT TENDS TO TURN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST ARABS AND MAKE IT SEEM THAT USG BEING BLACKMAILED INTO DOING SOMETHING WHICH IS ACTUALLY IN ITS OVERALL INTEREST. IN ORDER HELP EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH PUBLIC OPINION, ARAB COUNTRIES LIKE LEBANON WHO UNDERSTAND PROBLEM OF PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD USE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE WITH OIL-PRODUCING ARAB STATES TO EASE EMBARGO. FONMIN NOTED THAT LEBANON NOT AN OIL PRODUCER AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT GET OTHER ARABS GIVE UP USE THIS WEAPON.

3. IN DESCRIBING LIKELY FUTURE PROGRESS, I WAS ABLE CLARIFY LEBANESE CONFUSION OVER NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT RETURN TO OCTOBER 22 LINES AS PART OF SIX-POINT AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSION OF DISENGAGEMENT WHICH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE UP FIRST WEEKS OF PEACE TALKS. LEBANESE HAD ASSUMED DISENGAGEMENT TALKS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL LIKELY BE CONCLUDED BY TIME PEACE

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-3- BEIRUT 12979 Section 1 Of 2 November 10, 1973

TALKS BEGIN NEXT MONTH AND THAT TALKS WOULD THEREFORE ENTER IMMEDIATELY INTO OTHER ISSUES. UPON HEARING HOW MANY PROBLEMS WILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED ON DISENGAGEMENT AND THAT WE AND EGYPTIANS SEE DISENGAGEMENT AS COVERING MORE THAN MERE OCTOBER 22 LINES, FONMIN SAID THAT LEBANESE HAD NO DESIRE PARTICIPATE IN THAT PHASE OF PEACE TALKS. THEY DO WISH TO PARTICIPATE AT APPROPRIATE EARLY STAGE IN ORDER OBTAIN DEFINITIVE INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR BOUNDARIES WITH ISRAEL AS SET FORTH IN 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ON THIS POINT, THEY ATTACHE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR REPEATED SUPPORT FOR THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND OUR LONG-STANDING SUPPORT OF PRESENT BOUNDARIES, WITH WHICH ISRAEL IS ALSO IN AGREEMENT.

4. I SAID THAT FROM OUR TALKS WITH EGYPTIANS WE HAD REACHED TENTATIVE JUDGMENT THAT NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WOULD BE TAKEN UP WITH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS ON IMPLEMENTING SIX POINTS, INCLUDING EXCHANGE OF POWS, COMPLETING UN FORCE, WORKING OUT CONFERENCE DETAILS. I POINTED OUT THAT WHILE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS MIGHT TOUCH UPON QUESTION OF DISENGAGEMENT, REALISTICALLY THIS LIKELY TO BE PRIME FOCUS OF OPENING PHASES OF CONFERENCE. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT QUESTION OF LEBANESE PARTICIPATION AND THAT OF PALESTINIANS WOULD BE MATTER FOR CONSULTATION IN FIRST PART OF CONFERENCE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT CAIRO HAD TOLD LEBANESE THAT CONFERENCE PLANNED FOR FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER.

NOTE: PASSED BY OC/T

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 3 1 5 9 Q

Received: Nov., 10, 1973 908PM

O 110018Z NOV 73 ZFF-4  
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5150  
 RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 003  
 BT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 12979

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

5. FONMIN SAID THAT UNLESS QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY THERE COULD NEVER BE ANY REAL OR LASTING PEACE IN AREA. LEBANON WOULD HAVE LIKED TO ABSORB SOME OF 250,000 PALESTINIANS LIVING THERE BUT UNABLE TO DO SO FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REASONS. ANY SETTLEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR COMPENSATION FOR REFUGEES THAT WOULD BE USED SO AS TO INDUCE THEM TO RETURN TO TERRITORY OR COUNTRY SET ASIDE FOR THEM. THERE MUST BE SUCH A TERRITORY OR COUNTRY IF SETTLEMENT IS TO WORK. IN 1971, USG PROMISED CONSULT GOL ON QUESTION SOLUTION FOR PALESTINIANS. FONMIN SAID HE ASSUMED THIS STILL TRUE. I SAID IT CERTAINLY WAS, WE ARE CONSULTING ON THIS RIGHT NOW, AND WE WILL VERY MUCH APPRECIATE FRANK AND CONCRETE LEBANESE VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION. WE BELIEVE APPROPRIATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD HAVE TALKS ON THIS MATTER AND TRY TO REACH AGREED POSITION. IT IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO TALK TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS, PARTICULARLY HUSSEIN, SO AS TO REACH SENSIBLE POSITION AND NOT ALLOW SOVIETS OR OTHERS SPLIT ARABS AT CONFERENCE ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTER. FONMIN SAID THAT LEBANESE WOULD CONSULT WITH OTHER ARABS AND WITH PALESTINIANS. HE NOTED THAT PLO ALREADY REPRESENTS PALESTINIANS IN ARAB LEAGUE. HE URGED THAT USG CONTINUE USE ITS INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN HELPING BRIDGE POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN ARAB STATES FRIENDLY TO US.

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**TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

O 122315Z NOV 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 12  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8685  
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 6150  
BT

CONTROL: 3 4 5 9 Q  
RECD: 12 NOVEMBER 73 -  
9 16 PM

**SECRET** BONN 16393

*Scowcroft  
McFarlane*

NODIS/CHEROKEE

TO THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IT  
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S MIDDLE EAST/EUROPE TRIP -  
BRIEFING OF THE ITALIANS

1. MY FIRST STOP IN ITALY HAS GONE WELL. I HAD TWO SESSIONS WITH ITALIANS, ONE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING AND LONG SESSION OVER DINNER WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY HIERARCHY HEADED BY SECRETARY GENERAL GAJA AND HEAD OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENT DUCCI LAST NIGHT. IN ADDITION, I HAD VERY CORDIAL AND USEFUL MEETING AT VATICAN WITH ARCHBISHOP CASAROLI, WHO IS, AS YOU KNOW, VATICAN'S DE FACTO FOREIGN MINISTER.
2. AT EACH OF THESE MEETINGS, I SET FORTH OUR POSITION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. I AM REPORTING IT IN DETAIL SINCE IT WILL BE REPEATED AT EVERY STOP WITH ONLY NECESSARY LOCAL VARIATION, AND IF YOU HAVE ANY OBSERVATIONS I WOULD APPRECIATE IT. I SAID I HAD COME AT YOUR EXPRESSED WISH TO CONVEY TO OUR NATO ALLIES OUR IMPRESSIONS OF HOW EVENTS HAD UNFOLDED IN RECENT WEEKS AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THEM AS WE NOW MOVE FROM SITUATION IN WHICH FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF PEACE SETTLEMENT WOULD BE ADDRESSED. I SAID I WAS HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO MAKE ITALY MY FIRST STOP WHICH WAS IN ITSELF TESTIMONY OF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO US-ITALIAN COLLABORATION ON THIS SUBJECT.
3. I SAID AS RESULT OF LATEST WAR OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS IN MIDDLE EAST APPEAR TO US TO BE MORE FAVORABLE FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE 1967. NEITHER SIDE HAD ACHIEVED DECISIVE VICTORY; NOR HAD EITHER SUFFERED DECISIVE DEFEAT. FOR ISRAEL BUBBLE OF INVINCIBLE MILITARY POWER HAD BEEN BURST; AT SAME TIME THE ARABS NO LONGER HAD TO FACE PROSPECT OF

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VENUE. IN INITIAL PHASE, WE THOUGH CONFERENCE WOULD BE COMPOSED OF PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS WITH QUESTION OF LEBANESE PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION FROM PALESTINIANS TO BE TAKEN UP AT AN APPROPRIATE EARLY STAGE. UNSYG WOULD OPEN CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT ENVISAGE UN PLAYING REAL SUBSTANTIVE ROLE. CONFERENCE WOULD BE UNDER US-USSR AUSPICES. FIRST ORDER TO BUSINESS LIKELY TO BE QUESTION OF DISENGAGEMENT AND SEPRATION OF FORCE. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT MILITARY REPS IN THEIR DISCUSSION ON GROUND IN NEXT FEW WEEKS COULD MAKE PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE, BUT PROBABILITY WAS THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED IN FIRST INSTANCE BY PEACE CONFERENCE.

I THEN CAME TO MY MAIN THEME. I SAID WE FRANKLY COULD NOT ENVISAGE SOLUTION THAT WOULD NOT REQUIRE US BRINGING ITS INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON ISRAEL. THIS WOULD INEVITABLY CREATE STRAINS IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS. WE WOULD NEED TIME TO MANAGE THIS IN MANNER THAT WAS LEAST DISRUPTIVE; WE WOULD ALSO NEED MAXIMUM SUPPORT FROM CONGRESS AND PUBLIC FOR OUR OBJECTIVES. WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET THIS SUPPORT UNDER THREAT OF BLACKMAIL IN FORM OF EMBARGO ON OIL SHIPMENTS TO US. I HEN TOLD THEM VERY GENERALLY ABOUT YOUR TALKS IN RIYADH WITH KING FAISAL. I SAID THAT SADAT, KING HUSSEIN AND HASSAN SEEMED UNDERSTANDING OF THE COGENCY OF OUR ARGUMENT AND WE HOPED THEY MIGHT USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH FAISAL. FAISAL WAS GENUINELY ANGUISHED MAN. WE COULD NOT REPORT ANY CHANGE IN HIS POSITION, BUT HE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE WVEIGHING OUR ARGUMENTS VERY CAREFULLY IN DAYS AHEAD, AND WE INTEND TO FOLLOW UP OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM.

9. I SAID THIS WAS WHERE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN HELP CAME IN. THEY COULD STRESS TO ARABS IMPORTANCE OF THIS CONSIDERATION. WITH THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE, THEY COULD POINT OUT VITAL NECESSITY OF STRENGHTENING HAND OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH IF PEACE SETTLEMT ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS WAS TO BE THUGHT ABOUT.

BOTH ITALIANS AND VATICAN QUESTIONED ME ABOUT EUROPEAN ROLE IN PEACE CONFERENCE. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS IN PARTICULAR PRESSED ME HARD ABOUT THIS LAST NIGHT.





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-5- BONN 16393

KEPT INFORMED ON STEP-BY-STEP BASIS. WE WOULD DO OUR BEST IN THE FUTURE TO FULFILL THIS REQUIREMENT THROUGH INTENSIVE AND CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS.

12. MEETING WITH MORO WENT VERY WELL. HE CONFINED HIS REMARKS ALMOST ENTIRELY TO ASKING SERIES OF INTELLIGENT QUESTIONS ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR MAKING PROGRESS AND WHAT EUROPEAN ROLE MIGHT BE. AT END HE SAID ITALY WOULD TRY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE, AND I BELIEVE HE PERSONALLY MEANS THIS. HE RESPONDED WELL TO OUR ASSURANCES THAT WE WANTED INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM IN FUTURE.

13. AT HOLY SEE, CASAROLI GREETED ME PARTICULARLY WARMLY AND SAID IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE POPE WAS EXPECTING VISIT FROM POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER THAT DAY THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO SEE ME. AS EXPECTED, CASAROLI WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN OUR IDEAS ON JERUSALEM, WHICH WE DISCUSSED FOR SOME TIME, AND HE ALSO FOCUSED ON PALESTINIAN ANGLE. HE SAID VATICAN HAD RECENTLY REFRAINED FROM ANY PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION OF ITS POSITION ABOUT INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM. THIS WAS NOT BECAUSE VATICAN HAD ABANDONED THIS POLICY BUT RATHER BECAUSE IT DID NOT WISH TO PRECLUDE OTHER VARIATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE AGREED TO AMONG THE PARTIES, PROVIDED BASIC PRINCIPLE IS OBSERVED THAT FOREIGN COMMUNITIES AND RELIGIOUS INTERESTS WOULD "FEEL AT HOME IN JERUSALEM, AND NOT MERELY AT ISRAEL'S PREASURE." HE ALSO MENTIONED DESIRABILITY OF SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FOR WHATEVER STATUS OF JERUSALEM EMERGED.

14. ON JERUSALEM I TOLD CARASOLL THAT BOTH SIDES WERE BASICALLY AGREED THAT SUBJECT WAS SO COMPLEX IT SHOULD BE LEFT AS LAST ITEM ON AGENDA. WE THOUGHT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT IN TIME, BUT THIS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO WAIT FOR PROGRESS TO BE MADE ON OTHER MORE TRACTABLE ISSUES. WE DID NOT AT THIS MOMENT HAVE ANY READY-MADE SOLUTION. AS ABSTRACT EXERCISE, WE COULD DRAW PLAN THAT WOULD LOOK GOOD ON PAPER, BUT I SAID IMPORTANT THING WAS TO APPROACH THIS AS WELL AS OTHER PROBLEMS PRAGMATICALLY. CASAROLI NODDED VIGOROUSLY IN AGREEMENT.



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-6- BONN 16393

15. ON QUESTION OF PALESTINIANS, I TOLD CASAROLI WE COULD NOT CONCEIVE OF ANY SOLUTION IN MIDDLE EAST THAT WOULD BE EITHER JUST OR DURABLE THAT DID NOT MEET LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF PALESTINIANS. BUT ISSUE WAS EXCEEDINGLY COMPLEX. FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS FOR ARABS AND I TOLD BOTH ITALIANS AND VATICAN I HAD MADE THIS POINT DURING VISIT TO LEBANON, WAS FOR ARABS TO ADOPT COMMON POSITION IN THEIR APPROACH TOWARD PALESTINE PROBLEM. US HAD HARD ENOUGH TASK WITHOUT TRYING TO GET INTO MIDDLE OF INTER-ARAB DISPUTES OVER PALESTINE PROBLEM. SOVIETS ALSO, I SAID, WOULD TEND TO EXPLOIT ISSUE UNLESS ARABS GET THEIR DUCKS IN ROW. HERE AGAIN, I SAID BOTH AT ST. PETER'S AND IN ROME, THAT EUROPEANS COULD PLAY USEFUL DIPLOMATIC ROLE IN QUIETLY TRYING TO URGE ARABS TO MORE VIABLE POSITIONS ON THESE VARIOUS ISSUES.

16. IN SUM, WE HAVE MADE GOOD START ON OUR EUROPEAN EXERCISE. BOTH ITALIANS AND VATICAN WANT TO BE HELPFUL. WE MUST RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, STRONG CONCERN ABOUT EXCLUSION OF EUROPEANS FROM PEACE CONFERENCE ROLE AND SOME QUALMS, BECAUSE OF PRACTICE IN PAST, THAT US WILL NOT LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISES TO CONSULT WITH THEM FULLY AND ON TIMELY BASIS. WE ARE OBVIOUSLY GOING TO HEAR MORE OF THESE THEMES IN THE OTHER CAPITALS.

17. I STRESSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF ABOVE AND UNDERSCORED THERE SHOULD BE NO BACKGROUNDING OF PRESS ON THIS MATTER IN ANY WAY.

18. COMMENT: I RECEIVED YOUR TELEGRAM AND I WILL AVOID US-EUROPEAN DIFFERENCES ON NATO AND OTHER EUROPEAN ISSUES AS YOU INDICATE. I WILL ALSO GO LIGHT ON PEACE CONFERENCE IN NATO. YOU NOTE THAT I WAS FAIRLY SPECIFIC IN MY BILATERAL HERE -- THE REASON IS THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE TOLD A PRETTY FULLY STORY TO THE LEVANESE AND PERHAPS OTHERS, AND I FIND ITALIANS KNEW THE SPECIFICS EVEN BEFORE OUR FORMAL MEETING OPENED LAST NIGHT.

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WHITE HOUSE  
Department of State

WH. E.O. General Security (6)

TELEGRAM

'73 NOV 13 PM 8:06

SECRET

SCOWCROFT  
MCFARLANE  
REDMAN

CONTROL: 3812Q  
RECD: NOV 13, 1973  
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Z 132020Z NOV 73  
FM USLO PEKING  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1027  
BT  
SECRET PEKING 1436

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 163

E.O. 11652:  
TAGS:  
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS

FOR OPERATIONS CENTER: PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
FROM SECRETARY TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO BY FASTEST  
AVAILABLE MEANS.

1. QUOTE. I HAVE READ YOUR LONG BRIEFING TO THE ITALIANS.  
I THINK YOU SHOULD TONE DOWN ANY DESCRIPTION OF OUR  
INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL BECAUSE THIS SUBJECT  
WILL ONLY LEAK AND CAUSE TROUBLE. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT  
YOU DO NOT ASK THE EUROPEANS TO HELP US BECAUSE THEIR  
INTERESTS ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO OURS. I DO NOT  
WANT YOU TO REHEARSE TO THEM THE AGREEMENT I MADE WITH  
FAISAL. PLEASE CONFINE YOURSELF TO A MATTER OF FACT  
DESCRIPTION OF WHERE WE ARE HEADING EVEN IF IT APPEARS  
UNIMAGINATIVE. UNQUOTE.

KISSINGER

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#1436

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WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
Department of State  
'73 NOV 13 PM 8:06

W.H. (8)  
Gen. Scowcroft (Dwd)  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ SCOWCROFT  
MCFARLANE  
RODMAN

CONTROL: 3703Q  
RECD: NOV 13, 1973  
1712Z

O 131532Z NOV 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 0014  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8692  
BT  
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 16428

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, XF  
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S MIDDLE EAST/EUROPE  
TRIP-BRIEFING OF THE GERMANS

1. WE HAD EXTENDED, FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS WITH GERMAN STATE SECRETARY FRANK AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS THIS EVENING AT SCHLOSS GYMNICH GUEST HOUSE OUTSIDE BONN (FRANK SAID THIS SPLENDID PLACE STILL OWNED BY METTERNICH FAMILY AND HE SORRY YOU COULD NOT BE HERE). AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND ALSO PRESENT.
2. I PRESENTED OUR VIEWS IN MUCH THE SAME VEIN AS DURING OUR CONVERSATIONS IN ROME. FRANK ON WHOLE TOOK MATURE, CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, ALTHOUGH SHOWING SOME TOUCHINESS ABOUT MANNER OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH FRG DURING MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. FRANK ALSO RAISED QUESTION OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE CONFERENCE, BUT AT END SAID RESULTS WERE WHAT MATTERED TO FRG, AND PRECISE MEANS BY WHICH THEY ACHIEVED OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE.
3. FRANK DESCRIBED CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAD LED EUROPEANS TO JOIN IN EC-9 NOVEMBER 6 DECLARATION. HE SAID THERE WERE BOUND TO BE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPEANS IN APPROACH TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. EUROPEANS SAW MIDDLE EAST MAINLY AS REGIONAL PROBLEM, WHICH WAS DICTATED BY GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND FACT THAT EUROPE WAS FAR MORE DEPENDENT ON ARAB OIL THAN U.S. GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF U.S., ON OTHER HAND, INEVITABLY

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-2-BONN 16428, SECTION 1 OF 2, NOV 13

GAVE U.S. SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE. HOWEVER, IN FRANK'S VIEW THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT EUROPEAN AND U.S. ROLES IN SEARCH OF PEACE IN ME COULD NOT BE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING.

4. FRANK EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR DIFFICULTIES IN CONSULTING DURING RAPIDLY DEVELOPING CRISES. AT SAME TIME, HE WAS IMPLICITLY CRITICAL OF U.S. PROPOSAL IN NATO FOR COMBATING SOVIET ACTIONS. NOTING THAT U.S. HAD SUGGESTED TO ALLIES SUCH MEASURES AS HALTING CSCE, RETHINKING MBFR AND STOPPING CREDITS TO USSR AND EE'S, FRANK SAID IN FRG VIEW SUCH MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED VERY CAREFULLY. FRG DID, HOWEVER, AGREE ON BASIC POINT ABOUT INDIVISIBILITY OF DETENTE; THE FUTURE OF DETENTE IN EUROPE COUHTBWUUDGPPGLY BE DETACHED FROM SOVIET POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR ELSEWHERE.

5. I SAID THERE WAS NO SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO QUESTION OF CONSULTATIONS. IN CRISIS SITUATION IT WAS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO CONSULT AS RAPIDLY AND FULLY AS ONE WOULD WISH. I OUTLINED FOR HIM, AS EXAMPLE, RAPIDITY WITH WHICH MENACING SOVIET NOTE HAD COME UPON US AFTER CEASEFIRE AND URGENCY WITH WHICH WE FELT WE HAD TO TAKE ACTION. BUT I SAID U.S. FULLY RECOGNIZED NEED FOR FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO ALLIES AS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS UNFOLDED, AND WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. HE INDICATED HE APPRECIATED AND UNDERSTOOD THIS.

6. FRANK'S ATTITUDE WAS ENTIRELY HELPFUL ON SUBJECT OF OIL. GERMANY SUBSCRIBED 100 PERCENT TO U.S. POSITION, WHICH I HAD OUTLINED, THAT U.S. ABILITY TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE FOR SEARCH FOR PEACE WOULD BE SEVERELY HAMPERED BY CONTINUATION OF OIL EMBARGO. HE SAID GERMANY FEELS EXACTLY THE SAME WAY ABOUT BLACK-MAIL. WHEN EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR HAD RECENTLY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION TO HIM OVER EUROPEAN NINE-POWER DECLARATION, FRANK SAID HE THANKED HIM BUT QUICKLY ADDED THAT THIS MANIFESTATION OF EUROPEAN SUPPORT WOULD ABORT IF PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE TURNED AGAINST THE ARABS BECAUSE OF OIL SHORTAGES. THEY OBVIOUSLY HOPE FAISAL WILL MAKE A TURN ABOUT, BUT HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC.

7. ON QUESTION OF EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN AUSPICES OF PEACE CONFERENCE, FRANK SAID HE PERSONALLY TOOK

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CONTROL: 3718Q  
RECD: NOV 13, 1973  
1836Z

O 131532Z NOV 73  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 0015.  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8693  
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SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 16428

NODIS/CHEROKEE

RELAXED VIEW, BUT HE COULD UNDERSTAND IT THAT FRANCE AND UK MIGHT BE UPSET. HE WONDERED IF WE HAD ANY CONVINCING ARGUMENTS AGAINST THEIR PARTICIPATION. HE DID NOT THINK THAT IN EFFECT JUST SAYING ISRAEL DIDN'T WANT THEM WAS SUFFICIENT. I SAID I HOPED THIS WOULD NOT BECOME MATTER OF NATIONAL AMOUR PROPRE. REALITY WAS THAT ISRAEL, EGYPT AND OTHER ARABS READY FOR US-USSR AUSPICES. I WAS NOT MAKING VALUE JUDGMENT, BUT ONE PARTY CLEARLY FELT UK, FRANCE HAD BEEN PARTISAN; SC MORE SO, AND UN GENERALLY EVEN MORE SO. I SAID WE WOULD GIVE THIS MATTER FURTHER THOUGHT; QUESTIONS OF AUSPICES WERE IMPORTANT BUT NONE OF US WOULD WISH TO AGREE TO PARTICIPATION THAT MIGHT PLACE IN JEOPARDY ACTUAL HOLDING OF CONFERENCE. AGAIN FRANK SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.

8. FRANK ASKED HOW WE ENVISAGED SOVIET ROLE AT CONFERENCE. I SAID THIS WAS HARD TO PREDICT. IT WAS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD MOVE BEYOND NON-CONFRONTATION TO WILLINGNESS TO PLAY ACTIVE, FULLY COOPERATIVE ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT PEACE SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD BE PUT TO TEST AT PEACE CONFERENCE. OBVIOUSLY WE WOULD BE HAVING CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS BUT WE WOULD HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THAZ NEITHER ISRAEL NOR JORDAN, NOR EVEN EGYPTIANS, WERE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT ANY PRIMARY SOVIET ROLE. WE WERE AS YET UNSURE ABOUT SYRIA'S ATTITUDE. FIRST THREE WERE ALL LOOKING PRIMARILY TO U.S. TO PLAY LEADING ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT SETTLEMENT. FRANK COMMENTED THAT FROM SITUATION AS WE DESCRIBED IT U.S. LIKELY TO BE PRINCIPAL ARBITER WITH SOVIETS PLAYING MUCH MORE LIMITED ROLE. AS FOR EUROPEANS, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT EUROPE COULD NOT PLAY USEFUL DIRECT ROLE IN NEGOTIATING SCENARIO GIVEN OVERRIDING RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPER-POWERS BUT HE DID THINK THAT IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS

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Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

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EUROPE'S ABILITY TO ADOPT COMMON, LIMITED POSITIONS  
COULD BE USEFUL ADJUNCT TO OUR EFFORTS. I WHOLE-  
HEARTEDLY AGREED, AND AGAIN STRESSED OUR DESIRE TO  
CONSULT FULLY WITH GERMANS AS WELL AS TO HAVE ANY OF  
THEIR IDEAS ON ELEMENTS OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. I  
STRESSED ALSO EUROPE'S ROLE COULD BE SUPPORTIVE IN  
QUIET OF DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, RATHER THAN BY PUBLIC  
DECLARATIONS. FACT THAT PARTIES WOULD BE AROUND  
CONFERENCE TABLE MEANT A CHANGED SITUATION, AND I  
HOPED FELT NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS  
WAS THING OF PAST.

9. AGAIN I STRESSED CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR DISCUSSION.  
HILLENBRAND  
BT  
#6428

**SECRET**

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