

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister
Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense
Aharon Yariv, Prime Minister's Office

Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA
Harold H. Saunders, National Security Council
Senior Staff
Kenneth B. Keating, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Nicholas A. Veliotos, Deputy Chief of Mission,
American Embassy, Tel Aviv (joined after break)

DATE & TIME: Wednesday, November 7, 1973, 7:30 p.m. -
Midnight

PLACE: Prime Minister's Guest House
Herzliyya, near Tel Aviv

Sisco: Well, Madame Prime Minister, I am here to tell you the story.

Allon: In Israel we talk about the oral Torah. You are here to give us the oral Torah.

Sisco: Since our talks in Washington last week, Madame Prime Minister, I have tried to do my homework. You are an old school teacher. Let us see whether we have earned a gold star.

First, let me set aside quickly the announcement that has just been made that the U.S. and Egypt have decided in principle to resume diplomatic relations. This means that we will upgrade our Interests Sections so that they will be headed by men at the ambassadorial level.

Prime Minister: These men have not been appointed ambassadors yet?

Sisco: They have the rank of ambassador but will serve as heads of the Interests Sections until full diplomatic relations are formally resumed. Our man in Cairo will be Hermann Eilts. I want to tell you

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

that he has a well-balanced view on this problem. That is why the Secretary picked him. The Egyptian in Washington will be Ashraf Ghorbal, who was in Washington for five years and is now a counselor to President Sadat.

Most of the meeting with Sadat concentrated on the proposal which you have before you [copy attached]. A little time was spent on the resumption of relations and on ideas for a peace conference.

We put to President Sadat your Saturday night proposal. The Egyptians agree on all points in every important respect. There is one point which has taken a somewhat different form, and I will come to that in a moment.

The proposal calls for each side to observe the ceasefire. You will note that it avoids mention of any specific UN resolution. We did that in order not to be so explicit about the issue of the October 22 lines.

The second point, as you suggested, leaves the question of return to the October 22 lines to the time when you discuss disengagement.

You will note that the word "immediately" is used. The Egyptians have in mind that the first item on the agenda of the peace conference will be disengagement. You can slow down that process between now and the peace conference. We talked in terms of a conference to begin the first week in December.

Prime Minister: Then what does "immediate" refer to?

Sisco: It refers to the whole paragraph.

The proposal would establish UN checkpoints upon the Cairo/Suez road. The Egyptians were particularly interested in the checkpoints at Kilometers 102 and 109.

Prime Minister: The road remains status quo?

Sisco: Your checkpoints are replaced by UN checkpoints. At the offloading point you would participate in the inspection.

Allon: The whole road, then, remains part of the territory we occupied?

Sisco: We did not go into detail on that. We assume that you would be off the road. But this agreement does not get into the question of where the lines are.

Prime Minister: Remember our discussion Saturday night. I said that nothing must change on the road. But I did say that as far as the first checkpoint is concerned, I was prepared to suggest to the Government that the UN would make the inspection and that we would be there. At the unloading point, we would make the inspection and they would be there. There is no question of handing over the checkpoints completely because that would amount to handing over the road.

Allon: This will need further clarification.

Sisco: [At this point, Ambassador Keating arrived.] Ken, I had just begun to explain this proposal which we are putting forward based on our Saturday evening conversation. In our judgment, it meets all essential Israeli points. In essence, return to the October 22 lines is left to the time when the parties talk about disengagement. The principle of non-military supply is established, and UN checkpoints are set up. Then there will be an exchange of prisoners.

I was just about to make the point that the blockade is not in the formal proposal but is the subject of an oral understanding. Egypt has undertaken to ease the blockade at Bab-el-Mandab. This means that ships will be permitted to go through the strait, but Egypt expresses the hope of moderation on the number of ships. Sadat feels he cannot take domestically and in the Arab world making concessions on both the October 22 lines and the blockade. Therefore, he would hope for no publicity on the easing of the blockade.

We believe this formula meets your essential requirements. Also, the Egyptians are ready to lift the blockade in the context of an agreement on disengagement. Both the issue of the October 22 lines and the formal lifting of the blockade will be considered in the context of the discussion of disengagement.

We attach great importance to the question of guaranteeing that non-military cargoes get through to the Egyptian Third Army. We have given our assurance to Egypt on this point. Bearing in mind

the possible terrible alternatives that we discussed Saturday night, we like you want to avoid giving the Soviets the opportunity to act by themselves or in concert with others. I have been asked by the Secretary to stress the importance we attach to this and to tell you of the assurance we have given to the Egyptians that non-military cargoes would not be impeded.

Frankly, as we told you in Washington, the Egyptians are still fearful that once the prisoners of war are returned--since there is no return to October 22 lines--you can shut off the food at will. They are very concerned about this, and this is one of the reasons why our assurances were given.

The Egyptians want to talk about disengagement at the first stage of the peace conference.

If your government agrees to this proposal, we are prepared to oppose Security Council resolutions on return to the October 22 lines.

From a procedural viewpoint, if this proposal is agreeable to you, your military representatives would meet with Egyptian representatives Friday along with a UN officer to put this agreement into effect. The US would send a letter to the UN Secretary General informing him of our understanding that the governments of Israel and Egypt had agreed to this proposal. We would ask him to assure that a UN representative would meet with the Egyptian and Israeli representatives and receive the confirmation that both sides had agreed. This agreement would be ratified by the Security Council.

Reaching agreement on this proposal proved a difficult task. We think we are bringing you what you asked for Saturday evening. Madame Prime Minister, your persuasive powers are well known. So are the Secretary's. He used them all today. We think this moment is to be seized quickly so that we can bring about the ceasefire you and we want. We hope for your prompt approval.

Most of the time with Sadat was spent on this issue. There was a little bit spent on the resumption of relations and on the peace conference. They indicated a desire to meet in the first week of December. Geneva is agreeable to them. They backed away from the idea of New York. This seems to be one minor indication that they are serious.

Allon: They wanted Geneva because the UN is there?

Prime Minister: No, just the UN agencies are there.

Sisco: The composition of the conference would include Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Lebanon has indicated some interest in participating. Whether that is necessary at the outset is a question that can be left to the Lebanese.

Prime Minister: Do the Syrians want to participate?

Sisco: We didn't get into that. What we are talking about here are Sadat's ideas.

Prime Minister: Are the Soviets acquainted with this proposal?

Sisco: They will be informed at some point soon in Washington. I don't recall the exact timing.

Prime Minister: Secretary Kissinger in Washington placed great stress on his desire to persuade President Sadat to use his influence on the question of oil.

Sisco: We are confident he will use his influence. Frankly, our first interest is in gaining acceptance of this proposal and in seizing the opportunity to stabilize the ceasefire. But we would also like to use the agreement when we arrive in Riyadh tomorrow afternoon. We would hope to use this agreement--plus the fact that King Hussein and King Hassan are being helpful--to erode the oil boycott. I may be over-optimistic, but I have the feeling that the Arabs may be slowly coming to the view that blackmail is not the way to deal with the US.

This is just my personal view, but Sadat seems interested in disengaging from too close a relationship with the USSR. He insisted that we come directly to Cairo to know Egyptian positions and not go through Moscow.

Just to give you one small vignette of Egyptian thinking on this point, one of the Egyptians was talking today about the possibility of the US joining the talks between the Egyptian and Israeli military representatives. But he thought a moment and decided that if the US were there, it would raise the Soviet question. And he didn't want that.

Allon: Did they tell you how many Soviets are there now? Is the number increasing?

Sisco: The Soviets sent those 70 observers without telling the Egyptians. We now have an agreement to provide 36 US and 36 Soviet observers. The Egyptians are going to send the other 34 home.

Prime Minister: Let me ask you this. Tomorrow at the Cabinet meeting I will have to understand clearly what the understanding on the blockade means. What does it mean that the Egyptians hope that only a limited number of ships will pass?

Sisco: I don't believe the word "limited" was used. I said that the Egyptians hoped you would be moderate in the number sent through the strait.

Prime Minister: We don't send boats just to make Sadat unhappy. There are quite a few that will have to come through. This has to be very clear. Another thing: If the formal raising of the blockade will depend on the first phase of discussions in December, what will happen if they break down? Does that mean another blockade? We are at the mercy of Sadat. What am I going to say when someone gets up in the Knesset and asks what I have done about the blockade?

Allon: Word will get out that the ships are getting through.

Sisco: It will become known.

Prime Minister: Then we will be accused of a breach of confidence. A more serious question is that all we have is an oral promise from the Egyptians to you. We know this is how things go. We run to you and tell you our complaint and Sadat will tell you his story. I can't imagine that we can accept this. So much depends on the freedom of shipments there. We and Iran have put enormous amounts of money into the flow of oil. And yet we are leaving this dependent on Sadat. He will stop the flow; he will find some excuse.

Sisco: There is no limit that he has placed on the number of ships. He simply expressed the hope that you will be moderate in the number you send. Some of the points that might be made publicly in dealing with this issue are that the question of October 22 lines and the formal lifting of the blockade will be left to later discussion. Second, we attach importance to the assurance Sadat has given us, and I am sure

you do also. Finally, the realities on the ground are such that if the blockade is reactivated, you will have a great deal of leverage since you have not been forced back to October 22 lines. The other side is keenly aware of this.

[At this point, a message from the Secretary of State was delivered to Mr. Sisco saying that new messages were coming and that he should avoid making any approach until they had been received. The meeting broke for about an hour and a half while the messages were awaited and while dinner was served. When the meeting resumed, Mr. Sisco informed the Prime Minister of the following two messages from the Secretary in Cairo:

SECTO 34

"1. You should make clear to the Israelis that the only military movement required under the agreement is away from the checkpoints. They may stay both sides of the road and therefore this takes care of Major General Yariv's concern about cross-country movements.

"2. If the Israelis have trouble with the blockade and believe it is a difficult issue, you may assure them that I have no objection to a unilateral statement at the time of the signing of the document which makes clear that the ceasefire includes all repeat all military actions on the part of both parties and therefore includes the blockade at the straits of Bab El-Mandeb."

SECTO 43

' 1. Further to Para 2 of SECTO 34 re blockade, ForMin Fahmi informs us that Egyptian position is as follows: Since blockade was never declared, it cannot be formally lifted, but orders for its relaxation have been issued.

"2. You may use foregoing as additional point to make with GOI."

He then read the draft letter that we would propose sending to the UN Secretary General advising him of the Egyptian and Israeli agreement to the proposal. On the basis of a telephone paraphrase of another message, he advised the Prime Minister that we wished to change the word "officer" to the plural in paragraph 5 of the proposal. The exchange then resumed with the mood visibly relaxed and attention turned to clarifying various points.]

Prime Minister: What exactly happens on the road? We are in charge of the road. At the point where the Egyptians cross to our part of the road and change drivers to UN drivers, that is now our checkpoint. At this point the UN inspects with our people there. Then they go on to the Canal and unload. The inspection there is done by the Israelis with the UN looking on.

Sisco: Wait a minute, I don't know whether we are talking about the same thing. I don't want to go into detail about this. Point 4 in the proposal says that there shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East Bank.

Allon: That should say "to the Third Army."

Prime Minister: That needs to be certain.

Dayan: I can understand why you don't want to get into details. I can see you only want to deal with matters of principle. But we must be clear. I would just like you to be aware of some of the complications involved. For instance, there is one isolated Egyptian position at the head of Little Bitter Lake. It has received no supplies for the last two weeks. We expect them to give in. It is part of the Third Army. They have even asked us to evacuate some of their people. We refused to let food in.

Sisco: Sadat is sensitive about mentioning the Third Army. The original language in this paragraph was "the Third Army."

Dayan: I am not trying to negotiate with you. I just want you to understand some of the complications.

The second point is that there will be daily supplies going into Suez City. But the Third Army is on the East Bank. We do not want the two to be linked. We control the connection only by fire. So if we open fire to avoid Egyptians establishing a connection, you will understand.

Prime Minister: We have to reach some conclusion on the blockade. We could make this declaration that is proposed when we sign the agreement. What happens when Sadat says no, or do you have an understanding with him?

Dayan: One cannot say that a ceasefire is in force if a blockade is still maintained.

Sisco: This message indicates that the Egyptians have already given the order to relax the blockade. They are serious. I think you have to wait to see how it works.

Prime Minister: Moshe [Dayan] is making the Egyptian point.

Dayan: A ceasefire cannot include a blockade.

Allon: Verbally this is all right. But you should know that although emotionally the prisoners come first, politically and strategically, the blockade comes first.

Sisco: What do you mean "politically and strategically?"

Prime Minister: This is not different from Sharm El-Sheikh in 1967, only worse. It is smothering us.

Sisco: Everything that you wanted in substance, you have.

Allon: If they turn back a ship, it is war.

Sisco: We ought to make that clear to them. If they reimpose the blockade you are saying that you will have a free hand.

Dayan: I have two technical points and one major one.

First, we need maps agreeing on where each party is. Yet I fear Egyptians will not feel like putting anything on paper. The Syrians have done so.

Prime Minister: A map without political implications.

Sisco: Do you really want to get into the process of delineation? This raises the question of the October 22 lines.

Dayan: Unless it is clear, some Egyptian will come swimming over, we will fire and there will be no more ceasefire.

Sisco: Can't you make this orally when your representatives meet?

Dayan: Yes, that is what I am saying. Our aim is to prevent the Egyptians from the Third Army from continuing to try to establish themselves on the West Bank in hopes of being in place when the UN shows up. If they do keep up, we shoot and there are problems for the ceasefire.

Sisco: It seems to me the formula is good enough the way it is. The only military movement required of Israel is to move away from the checkpoints. I can see you are talking about how to avoid bumping into each other, but I would be very cautious about drawing lines. All I am saying is to be careful.

Dayan: The UN is already putting current positions on maps.

Another technical issue is an agreement on supply to the Third Army. There is no number of trucks yet agreed. Something must be agreed. For example, we have already agreed to let 7 trucks a day go to Suez City.

The big point I would like to make is that we should not transfer the issue of disengagement to the peace conference. We should see two phases in the present negotiations: agreement about the ceasefire and resupply; and then from that basis, negotiations about disengagement only with Egypt. It would be wrong to postpone the talks on disengagement to the peace conference.

Sisco: But we hope that the question of the October 22 positions will become academic. The Secretary has put it well to you: if we are able to discuss the next move, the question of October 22 lines will become meaningless. If not, there is a serious risk of another war.

Prime Minister: Why not let Yariv talk about disengagement?

Dayan: I am not for leaving this to the peace conference.

Sisco: All we are doing is to suggest that maybe you would want to slow the process down. It is complicated. I do not have hard views on the issue. The other side seems to prefer to discuss it at the outset of negotiations at the conference.

I will say that you and they have one thing in common: you both want to talk about the subject of disengagement. Let us leave it at that.

Dayan: Let us let Yariv go on with this subject.

Allon: I support Dayan's position but add this argument: If disengagement becomes the first phase of the peace talks, the presence of the Soviets and Syrians could kill the negotiations. We have hope that some agreement might be achieved there.

Sisco: Don't take this too literally.

Prime Minister: The Generals can go on talking about this.

Allon: Some members of the Cabinet who are not as in love with the Soviets as you might raise a question about involving the Soviets in the issue of disengagement.

Prime Minister: The Americans are not in love with the Soviets. They are pursuing a philosophy of detente. But they are not in love.

Allon: Why can't we insist that diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR be restored in principle before the Soviets play a role in peace talks? Otherwise an enemy will be presiding over the talks.

Sisco: If the day comes when relations are restored, it would be a good thing. We have told the Soviets this.

Prime Minister: It is a good thing to have in mind.

Allon: Wouldn't it be wiser to negotiate with each Arab country separately? By getting them all together we just compound the problems.

Sisco: We are talking about a broad strategy which would allow separate negotiations. We envision the initial meeting with Waldheim and all the parties there. But our notion is that informally the talks would begin to break down into separate areas. We intend to play an active role, and we do not want the Soviets, for instance, to play a role in relation to Jordan. Neither does Hussein. Our formula gives you the flexibility you want.

Allon: It is important to separate Syria and Egypt.

Sisco: The Egyptians are not anxious to have the Syrians there either.

Allon: You referred to the first week in December. But we will be on the verge of an election then. The opposition would say we don't dare negotiate before we have a mandate. Also, I think the prospect of negotiation is an asset, but if we start too early and get stuck too early, we are in trouble. This is another argument for giving more to Yariv's talks. I don't think negotiations should begin before mid-January.

Prime Minister: I don't usually care what the opposition says if I am not convinced they are right. But in this instance, they have a case. They will ask how we know we are going to win the election.

Allon: Some of the coalition parties may oppose negotiations.

Prime Minister: Our religious party will say, What about Judea and Samaria? We will be in trouble. Our difficulty is that they are right.

Sisco: I have two observations. I can appreciate this problem. We had this in mind and early December does represent a stretching out. We felt this was the best we could do. But we have to keep in mind that even if discussions start in early December they could be handled so that nothing much happens during those first weeks. I will report to the Secretary but we could not say January.

Prime Minister: I would like on this point to simply have an understanding between the US and Israel. I just want the Secretary to understand our predicament. I do not want to make too much of this issue because I do not want to raise a question in Egyptian minds about our ability to follow through on the present agreement to stabilize the ceasefire.

Sisco: We will be helpful. Sadat is a very keen political leader. He understands these things.

Prime Minister: The big question is what can we do about the prisoners in Syria.

Sisco: We transmitted Yariv's message.

Prime Minister: There is a terrible horror story from Geneva today.

Sisco: When this agreement is announced, if you agree to it, this could put pressure on the Syrians. Then we could follow up on Friday with the Soviets if we don't hear from them. I do not think either of us should play this too eagerly.

Dayan: The Syrians have 15,000 peasants who left their villages. We must deal with both of these issues together.

Prime Minister: That must press on them. This may be a political or economic problem which they are anxious to solve. You might speak to the Soviets.

Sisco: I feel this agreement will help. If we have not heard from the Syrians in a few days, we will follow up with the Soviets.

All on: What shall we do about the Cabinet?

Prime Minister: It will meet tomorrow at 10:00 a.m.

Sisco: May I make an out-of-place suggestion? Could it meet at 8:00 a.m.? I had hoped for agreement tonight but I can understand the need for a Cabinet meeting.

Prime Minister: I promised the opposition leaders I would meet with them before the Cabinet meeting. I will call them in at 8:00 a.m., and we can have the Cabinet meet at 9:00 a.m.

Sisco: When do you think I would hear the results?

Prime Minister: 11:00 - 12:00 noon.

Sisco: I am trying to catch up with the Secretary's party in Amman.

Prime Minister: We will call you around 10:30 a.m. and let you know how things are going. Yariv will arrange for a helicopter to the Allenby Bridge.

We have one other issue that concerns only one person. When we put together the list of prisoners we will have to add 10. Nine of

them are from the war of attrition. Then there is one--Barukh Mizrachi-- who was arrested a year ago in Yemen for intelligence activities. We have to get him out.

Dayan: There is one other technical point. Perhaps you could urge the Egyptians to start preparing their lists and machinery for the prisoners exchange, especially the wounded. The POW exchanges should take place as soon as possible and preliminary work should be done.

Sisco: I will request the Secretary to pass this to the Egyptians.

Allon: How will the UN ratification of this agreement happen?

Sisco: I will suggest to the Secretary that the Secretary-General consult informally with the Security Council members and simply report a consensus. That would avoid debate.

Allon: Can we also expect close cooperation between Jerusalem and Washington on the terms of a permanent solution?

Sisco: Of course!

Allon: Just to review on the checkpoints. There is one check post at the entry point into Israeli-administered territory. The UN inspects, and we are there. We control the road. The second inspection point is when the unloading takes place.

Prime Minister: When the trucks come to the check post between Egyptian and Israeli-administered areas, the drivers change.

Sisco: The only two points mentioned to us were those at Kilometers 102 and 109.

Yariv: Those would be inside our territory.

Dayan: It doesn't matter whether they are inside our territory or not. Where the checkpoints are doesn't effect where the line is.

Sisco: My only caution is don't raise any questions needlessly.

Prime Minister: The one thing that must happen for Sadat's good is that the first checkpoint that the Egyptians come to is a UN checkpoint. And we will be there.

Dayan: Wherever the checkpoint is doesn't change the line.

Prime Minister: We must be clear. Instead of making this a UN road, we will make the first checkpoint under the UN. The UN will make the first inspection.

Allon: The Egyptians will reject our role in that inspection.

Prime Minister: What is inspection? If there is a tank or artillery piece then we have a basis for objecting. But we are not going to go through each truck. When the trucks are unloaded, however, that is where we want to inspect.

Sisco: How many posts are there?

Yariv: The only one is at the ceasefire line.

Sisco: Then there is one post there and one at the offloading point?

Allon: There is one final problem. The UN Secretary General is asking us a lot of questions about the role of the UNEF.

Dayan: If we agree about disengagement then there will need to be an emergency force between.

Prime Minister: Then the UNEF should take a long vacation.

Allon: It is just a point to keep in mind.

Sisco: I found no great desire on Sadat's part for an active role by the Secretary General. He has shifted the talks from New York to Geneva and he laughed about the SYG saying that he supposed that he would have to be there.

Prime Minister: Did you find Sadat different from a couple of years ago?

Sisco: He has aged. He seems a little more subdued. Two and a half years ago there seemed to be a wild streak in him, and I do not see that now. He is serious. He doesn't want to rely on the Soviets.

Sirri, one of the Egyptians you met with, General Yariv, described what a moving human experience it was for him to shake Israeli hands and to meet Israelis. He said that if Egyptians and Israelis could talk they could sort this problem out.

As far as I am aware, Sadat never raised the question of direct negotiations. He spoke of the peace conference with everybody present.

Sisco: What shall I report to the Secretary, Madame Prime Minister?

Prime Minister: You can tell him that we will meet with the Cabinet tomorrow morning. I hope we will have no difficulty. If so, we will try to overcome it. Give him my best and tell him this is a fantastic achievement.

Sisco: You will remember that he told you he would try.

Prime Minister: But he made my life miserable by telling me that he did not see a ghost of a chance.

Yariv: I won a lunch from the Prime Minister. I said I thought it had a reasonable chance.


Prime Minister: Yariv was the only one.

[At this point, Yariv received a copy of the press report from Cairo announcing Mr. Sisco's trip to Israel. It was agreed that the only comment would be that the talks had been useful. Just as the meeting was breaking up Mr. Sisco received a message suggesting a final modification in the language of the proposal. The principal one was the suggestion that the words "under the auspices of the UN" be added to paragraph 2. Also it was suggested at the end of paragraph 5 that the words "at the bank of the Canal" should be added. There was no disagreement about this, but the Prime Minister urged that the idea of UN auspices be dropped. She felt that throwing the issue into the UN would create a "terrible mess."]

[At this point, Dayan intervened to explain that the Egyptians were probably simply trying to describe the same procedures that govern the present talks among the Generals. They describe these talks as under the auspices of the UN even though the UN fellow is far away.]

Sisco: I will communicate this to Cairo as your understanding of the meaning of "UN auspices." If I hear differently I will let you know.

[At this point, the meeting ended with warm handshakes all around.]





SECRET
Classification

Department of State

CN: 9034

TELEGRAM

8 NOV 73

INDICATE:
COLLECTY
CHARGE TO

From: Amembassy TEL AVIV
E.O.11652 XGDS
TAGS PFOR, IS, EG
Subject: Middle East Situation

3:30 AM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: USINT CAIRO FLASH

VIP5
AMB
CHRN
(D)

INFO: SecState WASHDC FLASH
SECRET TEL AVIV 9034
NODIS/CHEROKEE

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

1. Meeting with PM Meir took place at Guest House where you visited on your stop in Israel. Allon, Dayan and Yariv also present on Israeli side. Keating and Saunders joined me on US side. Meeting took place in two parts, divided by break I asked for while we waited for arrival of your three flash messages. Actual meeting time was about three hours.

2. I had just completed my point by point discussion of provisions in proposed agreement when word of your messages arrived. During that part of discussion, two main issues immediately aroused Israeli concern:

(a) First, PM was concerned that turning inspection over to UN on road amounted to turning road entirely over to UN. I simply agreed to come back and clarify this point at completion of general run-through of proposal.

DRAFTED BY: HSaunders/JSisco/csl	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT	APPROVED BY:
-------------------------------------	---------------	----------	--------------

CLEARANCES:

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

SECRET
Classification

FORM FS-413(H)
4-68

9034

(b) Point that really concerned PM was question of oral understanding on blockade. After explaining Egyptian willingness to ease blockade meant letting ships go through, I added that Egyptian hope was that Israel will use moderation in allowing ships to transit. ~~as to number~~

~~She~~ She ~~is~~ asked: What does "in moderation" mean? Can Sadat determine that Israel has exceeded some undefined limit on the number of ships and renege on understanding? If he does, there will be no record at UN or elsewhere; Israel can complain to US but US may not be in position to help. How can Govt reply when Knesset members ask what we did about blockade? What if news of oral understanding with US on easing blockade becomes public, will Israel be accused of violating a confidence and will that be used as excuse for reimposing blockade? Later Allon added that prisoners are number one issue emotionally but blockade is number one issue politically and strategically. PM said it raised same issues as Sharm-el-Sheikh in 1967, only worse.

3. ~~KE~~ Leaving question of road until later, I responded on blockade as follows: I suggested PM could say that questions of Oct 22 lines and formal lifting of blockade would be taken up at later stage between the two parties--i.e. in context of discussion on disengagement. I also stressed that realities on the ground on West Bank would give Israel leverage if easing of blockade not effective since proposed agreement did not force Israel back to Oct 22 lines. Egypt

Tel Aviv
OUTGOING
Tel Aviv
OUTGOING

keenly aware of these realities and Israel's continuing capacity under this agreement to turn a tap on or off with respect to supplies for Third Army. Finally, I said we attached importance to Sadat's assurance to us and I hoped Israel would give similar weight to this assurance.

4. Following receipt your messages, mood of conversation changed. I had previously made point but ~~stressed~~ ^{stressed} again to ~~PM~~ ^{pursuant to your message} that only ~~Israeli~~ ^{Israeli} military movement required under agreement is away from the checkpoints. Then your message that Israel could make unilateral statement that ceasefire included ^{end of} all military actions and therefore includes blockade was very well received. This capped off by helpful ~~in~~ ^{from} Fahmi message that orders for blockade's relaxation already issued and that since blockade never formally declared, it cannot be formally lifted. Also informed her of proposed letter to SYG as means of explaining procedures anticipated. PM and colleagues relaxed considerably and turned attention to sharpening their understanding of exactly what agreement would mean for them.

5. First issue was road. PM finally summed up as follows: important point is that when Egyptian trucks reach Israeli administered area, first checkpoint should be UN checkpoint with Israelis observing but not participating in inspection. Second checkpoint would be at the point of unloading and there Israel would participate in the inspection.

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

6. Dayan pointed out on several occasions that question complicated by a number of technical details which would have to be worked out on the ground. For instance, he noted that one small segment of Third Army isolated at head of Little Bitter Lake who so far excluded from resupply. He also felt their need to map present positions of parties. He said he not introducing these as subject of negotiation with us but simply to illustrate that Generals would have serious issues to discuss and to be sure US understands these complications. I agreed these issues would have to be discussed on the ground and cautioned strongly against getting too precise about mapping present positions since that would reopen issue of Oct 22 lines. Dayan understood and PM agreed very strongly with my statement re dangers inherent in trying to delineate lines.

7. PM turned to declaration on blockade. Dayan said it logical to take position suggested that ceasefire naturally covers all military actions including blockade. ~~PM readily agreed. He also added~~ ~~it would be inconsistent to say that ceasefire in force and yet maintain blockade.~~ I called attention to fact that Fahmi said order to relax blockade already issued and stated my view that Egyptians serious about easing blockade by letting ships through. PM indicated satisfaction with idea of unilateral statement. Allon cautioned that if Egyptians turn back a ship, that would amount to breach of ceasefire and war.

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

9034

8. Dayan then ~~raised~~ ^{raised} major point on negotiating strategy. He suggested that issue of disengagement be dealt with in talks between the Egyptian and Israeli generals and not be deferred until peace conference. He felt it easier to deal with this as Israeli/Egyptian issue than to get Syrians and others involved. I stressed our hope to make discussion of October 22 lines academic and our desire to give Israel an opportunity to have some time before facing this issue. I emphasized importance of fact that both sides prepared to discuss disengagement. PM and Allon both supported idea of letting Yariv discuss disengagement with Egyptian general. Allon added argument that if disengagement became first phase of peace talks, presence of Soviets and Syrians on this issue could kill negotiations at outset. Also pointed out that some members of Cabinet would object to Soviet involvement in this issue. I simply noted their view, agreeing we did not have to settle it tonight. I leave it to you as to whether Egyptians should be made aware that Israeli military representative apt to raise disengagement matter at some early meeting.

9. On subject of peace talks, Allon felt it would be wiser for Israel to negotiate with each Arab country separately. Trying to negotiate with all at once would just compound difficulties. I outlined our notion of plenary opening session of peace conference to be

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

Tel Aviv

followed by real negotiations that likely to break down quickly into smaller groups and issues. We do not, for instance, want Soviets involved in any serious way in Jordanian negotiations. I said I thought such formula would provide flexibility Allon asking. PM Meir again strongly agreed.

10. Allon stated and PM seconded view that peace conference in early December too early in view of Israeli elections on December 31. PM said she could understand opposition argument in that government should not negotiate until its mandate confirmed. I said we had stretched timing as far as we could with Israeli problem in mind but did not want to propose January. Felt early December was best we could do. PM accepted this point but said she would merely like understanding with U.S. about Israeli predicament. On other hand, she did not want to make too much of this argument ~~for~~ for fear of raising question in Egyptian minds about durability of present argument on stabilizing cease-fire. I said I would report this to you and felt myself that Sadat is a keen enough politician to understand problem. I concluded saying we would try to be helpful in the few weeks before the Israeli election, bearing their concerns in mind.

11. PM then turned to prisoners in Syria. I urged that neither we nor Israel appear over-eager on this issue and suggested that we wait for announcement of present

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

Tel Aviv

agreement to have its effect on Syria. PM Meir suggested we follow up with Soviets, and I agreed we would in a few days if we have not heard from the Syrians by then. Dayan noted that Syrians have 15,000 peasants whom they want to return to occupied villages, saying that could be a counter-pressure on prisoner issue. I said I felt Israeli offer to Syrians on civilians and POW's was constructive.

12. PM originally had in mind calling Cabinet at 10:00 a.m.. I asked if she could make it earlier, stressing importance of maintaining momentum and concluding agreement before we meet with Saudis. She agreed. PM will call in opposition leaders at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow and the full Cabinet at 9:00 a.m. Said she would try to give me final answer by 10:30-11:00.

13. PM said she wanted us to know that Israel will have to add to its list of prisoners ten more. Nine of them from the War of Attrition. Tenth is Barukh Mizrahi, who arrested for intelligence activities in Yemen and transferred to Egypt. In this general connection, Dayan noted that, while arranging checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road would take only a few minutes, the exchange of prisoners would take some time and he asked us to suggest to Egyptians that they begin preparing lists and machinery so that exchange can get started at earliest possible

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

time, especially for wounded. Suggest you make this point in your final meeting with Egyptians.

14. In response to question on how I envisioned UN ratification of this agreement, I said I would recommend to you a procedure which did not involve formal debate and voting. The SYG would consult members of Security Council informally and report consensus.

15. At several points in conversation, PM showed considerable interest in Sadat personality. Said on at least two occasions she would like to meet him. I stressed ~~XXXXX~~ Sadat's desire to work through us rather than through USSR. PM seemed genuinely pleased over announcement of resumption of relations in principle.

16. I described the format regarding the UN conference, i.e. Geneva, US-USSR auspices, Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian and Israeli composition with Lebanon to decide for itself whether to participate. PM voiced no ~~difficult~~ difficulty with any of the above, just nodded approvingly.

17. As meeting about to conclude, I asked what I should report to you. PM asked me to tell you that the Cabinet would be meeting in the morning. She hoped there would be no difficulties but if there were, she would overcome them. She asked me to give you her best and to tell you ~~XXXXX~~ that this is a "fantastic achievement."

SECRET

Classification

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

Tel Aviv

9034

18. Just as meeting breaking, final suggestions on changes brought in. When PM heard suggestion of adding "under auspices of UN" at end of paragraph 2, she felt Israel should not accept that. She began to lambast UN involvement in familiar fashion. At this critical point, Dayan intervened, explaining that Egyptians describe present auspices for talks between Egyptians and Israeli generals as being under UN auspices even though UN representative not present. Dayan felt Egyptians simply seeking way to indicate that similar procedures would continue to be followed. We agreed that this change would be ~~ikmz~~ incorporated, the Israeli understanding of this change being it refers to auspices similar to those under which present talks between generals taking place. I said I would let them know in the morning if I got any information that would be contrary to this information.

19. Meeting ended at midnight with very warm feelings all around.

[Signature]
KEATING


Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

Tel Aviv

OUTGOING

OUTGOING



Department of State

AE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM

ACT AMB
INFO CHR (DUMMY)

SECRET//NODIS

CN 11422

Classification

7 Nov 73

5:57 pm


Z 071415Z NOV 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHCR/AMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3404
INFO RUEHCR/AMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 2749
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4243
BT
SECRET CAIRO 3395

NODIS

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 29
FOR AMBASSADOR KEATING FROM SISCO

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PBR, IS, JO
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS



1. I AM FLYING IN TO ISRAEL IN ABOUT THREE HOURS. AN EGYPTIAN PLANE IS TAKING ME TO CYPRUS AND AN ISRAELI PLANE IS PICKING ME UP IN CYPRUS TO TAKE ME TO ISRAEL.
2. I WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED TO BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADAT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO MEET ME AT THE AIRPORT SO THAT I CAN FILL YOU IN BEFORE YOU AND I AND HAL SAUNDERS MEET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.
3. PLEASE TELL THE PRIME MINISTER THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH HER AS SOON AS I ARRIVE AND WOULD LIKE TO COME TO HER OFFICE FROM THE AIRPORT.
4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION MY ARRIVAL WILL BE PRECEDED BY A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSAL.
5. I WILL BE SEEKING AN ANSWER TO THE PROPOSAL FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THIS EVENING.
6. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, MY TENTATIVE PLANS ARE TO STAY OVERNIGHT AND HAVE THE ISRAELIS DRIVE ME TO THE ALLENBY BRIDGE WHERE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO HAVE THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT DRIVE ME TO AMMAN TO REJOIN THE SECRETARY'S PARTNER.
7. FOR AMMAN: THIS IS STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION AND YOU SHOULD DO ABSOLUTELY NOTHING AT THIS TIME: ALL OF THE ABOVE MUST BE STRICTLY HELD.

KISSINGER

BT
#3395

SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

Classification



Department of State
AE TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM

ACT: POL-3
INFO: AMB DCM VIP5 ECO DAO CHRN USIS

CONFIDENTIAL

CN: 11430

Classification

Z 071829Z NOV 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8286
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 219569

7 NOV 73

6:32 PM ++

E.O. GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, J.)

FOR SISCO FROM PICKERING

TWO FLASH MESSAGES, ONE FROM SECRETARY, OTHER CONTAINING
SLIGHT WORDING MODIFICATIONS, BEING SENT TO YOU. DO NOT
MAKE ANY APPROACH UNTIL YOU RECEIVE MESSAGES. KISSINGER
BT
#9569

++ advance on receipt to duty officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM 4-68 FS-412(M)

SECRET/NODIS

E.O.11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, EG
SUBJ: Middle East Situation

ACTION: USDEL RIAD

FLASH

INFO: SECSTATE WASHDC

FLASH

SECRET TEL AVIV

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

*for incorporation in
informal understanding,
but not as changes
in basic document.*

*(d) point from which Israelis would observe
checkpoint would be worked out on
ground.*

1. Day began when Yariv arrived at Embassy with text of "memorandum of understanding between Israeli Govt and USG on the agreement between the Govts of Egypt and Israel concerning the ceasefire." This was presented to us by Yariv as Israeli interpretation of each of the articles in the basic proposal. All were ^{generally} acceptable to us, although ^{it} ~~it~~

del require ~~some~~ ^{however} work to arrive at ~~some~~ ^{statement} ~~of general~~ ^{principles} that would govern UN manning at inspection points

on the road. *I also made clear that in discussions between military reps that while Israelis might try out ^{plans} ~~various~~ ^{various} ~~plans~~ ^{plans} related to ~~arr~~ ^{arr} manning at*

2. ~~Inspection~~ ^{Inspection} ~~points~~ ^{points} ~~on road.~~ ^{on road.} *This pattern of informal means of understanding*
"Inspection of the non-military supply to the East Bank ~~will~~ ^{will}

will be according to the following procedure:

- a. The Western checkpoint on the Cairo-Suez road will be manned by UN personnel. The vehicles carrying non-military supplies and driven by UN drivers will be inspected by UN officers with Israeli officers observing.

*some of these points, that this was not necessarily
other mid interpretation since we did not & could not get*

into such specific detail at Secret level. I expected
you that an mid up talk would not create difficulties
which could raise questions of good intentions.

b. At the Bank of the Canal the unloaded supplies will be inspected by Israeli officers with UN officers observing."

3. During this discussion, Yariv in touch with PM who asked that we come to her office to go over final understanding and to discuss how exactly proposal would be implemented.

4. Meeting with PM began with Allon, Yariv, Dayan, one of Dayan's aides and Mordechai Gazit of PM's office present. Ambassador Keating and Saunders accompanied me.

5. Meeting with PM began with above formulation reviewed and agreed. In this discussion, I made three points *which Sadat he recorded as our view.*

(a) Exact location of inspection checkpoints would be left to be worked out on the ground; *Sadat had mentioned 102° & 109°.*

(b) Question of whether a third checkpoint apart from ones at Western end of road and at unloading point necessary would be left to parties;

(c) We could not object if Israelis insisted on trying to negotiate presence of Israeli liaison officer with each convoy along road, but if Egyptians resisted this ~~proposal~~ *refinement,* ~~we would understand their position.~~ *we could*

6. PM then went over what she would ~~say~~ say on blockade. Her final formulation developed along following lines:

Israel had agreed to scrupulous observance of ceasefire, which of course includes all actions in the air, on the ground

speculate how they would feel on the matter as we were not assuming

portion of support for Israeli view.

and on the sea. She noted that she could not guarantee that newsmen would not get wind of private understanding on this subject. Also, newsmen would begin to see boats arriving in Eilat. I urged her to tell us when first boats would be coming through so that we could pass word to Eghptians and hopefully minimize incidents or misunderstandings.

7. PM asked exactly what Israelis needed to do and what U.S. would do regarding announcement of agreement. She would like to go on

the air at 8:30 p.m. Friday Israeli time. I told her I would cable you and that a message would be sent to her ~~previous plan of action after I had talked to you in Riyadh.~~ *re tuning*

8. ~~At this point,~~ ^M ^{then} meeting seemed about to end with total agreement and PM said that agreement would create a new mood ~~for~~ if prisoners were promptly exchanged and if ~~a~~ boats began coming through Straits.

9. At this point, however, she ^{apparently} realized that the paper that would be published tomorrow would be basic document presented to her last night and not informal US-Israeli memo of understanding discussed this morning. She professed to believe that basic agreement would be changed to reflect wording of memo of understanding. She said that

the Cabinet had approved memo of understanding ~~and not basic agreement.~~

then she raised another point.

Main sticking point was ^{word} "replaced" in ^{statement} that UN would

replace Israeli checkpoints on road. For almost 30 minutes, she maintained that she would have to call another Cabinet meeting and

urged us to go back to Sadat changing wording of that point to say that checkpoint would be manned by UN personnel. I stated firmly that we

could not accept ~~any~~ changes ~~without delay and risk of upsetting whole~~

at least a 4-8 hour delay and reopening entire P.S.T. arrangement.

I argued strongly that she not reopen the negotiations.

10. Break in impasse came with suggestion that she employ tactic similar to one you suggested on blockade, and she finally agreed that

in speech to Knesset she would state as a fact her understanding of what

was objectionable, she said

he opponents would make much of it. Taking over 4 from the Israelis.

be necessary regarding

~~the~~ steps would be taken on the ground to effect change on the road. ~~Asked not~~ All on was useful at this point, saying that she could tell Knesset that question of special corridor not at issue and that there would be no change in fact of control over the road.

since dualis not a as a regard to more to position.

11. PM acquiesced with understanding that she could state her interpretation of principle elements of agreement as contained in US-Israeli memo of understanding but without referring to that memo. Points would be made as hers alone.

12. *Full list of informal memo of understanding being*

~~In discussion of what should be said to press on our meeting, I suggested that I state simply that we had had useful talks and that I was on my way to Riyadh to report to the Secretary. PM asked whether I could say that I was optimistic. At her request, I agreed to do this. Brief three-sentence statement to reporters along these lines made as we left PM's office.~~

sent report.

13. ~~Thus we have final Israeli agreement to basic proposal which you sent with us to Israel.~~

to be too specific, pointing out that if they want to get some of their messages at military representative talks, public specificity will only make it more difficult for the other side.