

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	memcon	Hassan, HAK, et al. DECLASSIFIED per Htr 6/18/2012	11/5/73	B
2	memcon	Hassan, HAK, et. al SANITIZED per Htr 6/18/2012 3.3(b)(1)	11/6/73	B
3	memo	Scowcroft to the President DECLASSIFIED per Htr 6/18/2012	11/9/73	B
4	memcon	Faisal, HAK, et. al. DECLASSIFIED per Htr. 6/18/2012	11/8/73	B
5	memcon	HAK, Saqqaf, et al. DECLASSIFIED per Htr 6/18/2012	11/8/73	B
6	memcon	Fahd, HAK, et. al. DECLASSIFIED per Htr. 6/18/2012	11/8/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

HAK

BOX NUMBER

139

FOLDER TITLE

(5)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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HAK TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST

NOVEMBER 5 - 10, 1973

A. TRIP REPORT

B. HAK MEMCONS (DAILY REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT)

- | | |
|---|----------------|
| 1. HAK/Hassan - Rabat | November 5 - 6 |
| 2. HAK/Bourguiba - Tunis | November 6 |
| 3. HAK/Sadat - Cairo | November 7 |
| 4. HAK/Hussein - Amman | November 8 |
| 5. HAK/Faisal, Fahd, Saqqaf -
Riyadh | November 8 |
| 6. HAK/Shah - Tehran | November 9 |
| 7. HAK/Bhutto - Rawalpindi | November 9 |

C. RELATED MEM CONS

- | | |
|---|------------------|
| 1. Sisco/Saunders Briefings in Tel Aviv | November 8 |
| 2. Sisco Briefings - Mideast, Europe | November 10 - 16 |
| 3. Newsom - Addis Ababa | November 8 |

D. PRESS COVERAGE

1. HAK, McCloskey Briefings
2. FBIS - Arab Coverage

SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY. HENRY A. KISSINGER

1120
19 NOV

SECRET/SENSITIVE

7321862

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From Henry A. Kissinger

Subject: Summary Report on Middle
East Trip

Supplementing my reports to you on individual stops during the Middle East portion of my trip, I want to summarize what I see as the principal accomplishments and what lies ahead in our search for Middle East peace.

Ceasefire and POW Exchange

When I left Washington, the immediate need was to stabilize the ceasefire on the Egyptian-Israeli front, a problem which in turn had become linked to an Egyptian-Israeli POW exchange. The groundwork had been laid in my talks in Washington with Foreign Minister Fahmi and Prime Minister Meir, but the positions of the two sides were still far apart.

The initial breakthrough came in Cairo, with the announcement of the resumption in principle of U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic relations and President Sadat's agreement to a six-point proposal that represented about ninety-five percent of what Mrs. Meir had told me Israel wanted. Most importantly for Israel, it finessed the issue of an Israeli return to the military positions they occupied west of the Canal when the October 22 ceasefire went into effect and before they completed their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army and the town of Suez. The agreement simply provides that this thorny question will be discussed between the two sides in the context of discussions on the disengagement and separation of forces, thus providing a means for subsuming it in the broader issues at an early peace conference. Israel also got agreement on a full Egyptian-Israeli POW exchange.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS-1

The main benefit for Sadat was the establishment of UN-supervised arrangements for the non-military resupply of the Third Army and for meeting the essential civilian supply needs of the Suez inhabitants. While Sadat was unwilling to include specific reference to lifting the undeclared Egyptian blockade of the southern entrance to the Red Sea at Bab al-Mandab, he agreed that the blockade would quietly be relaxed.

I sent Joe Sisco from Cairo to Israel the same day to explain the proposal to Mrs. Meir and her colleagues, including Sadat's assurance about relaxing the blockade, and to obtain their approval. Both sides cooperated in expediting Sisco's travel; the Egyptians gave him a special plane to Cyprus, where the Israelis picked him up and flew him to Tel Aviv. In Israel, Sisco concluded a confidential Memorandum of Understanding with the Israelis, designed primarily to meet their concern about participating in the inspection of non-military cargos destined for the Third Army once they had turned over their checkpoint on the Cairo-Suez road to the UN. Having after some difficulty obtained Israeli agreement, Sisco made an unprecedented direct flight from Israel to Saudi Arabia in one of our MAC airlift planes and rejoined me in Riyadh.

Over the next three days, as I went from Saudi Arabia to Tehran, Islamabad, and on to Peking, Israeli and Egyptian military representatives met regularly in the presence of the UN commander at Km. 101 on the Cairo-Suez road to work out the detailed arrangements for supplying the Third Army and Suez town and for beginning the POW exchange. I was in frequent contact with both Foreign Minister Fahmi and Prime Minister Meir as various difficulties came up but held firmly to the position that these had to be ironed out in the direct negotiations between their military representatives in coordination with the UN commander.

The agreement was finally signed on November 11. There followed more differences over its implementation between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and the UN on the other, related largely to Israel's desire to limit the UN presence and to maintain a more visible control and use of the

segment of the Cairo-Suez road in the area they occupy than was acceptable to Egypt. On November 14, however, the Israeli position became markedly more flexible, and on the 15th the turnover of Israeli checkpoints to the UN took place and the POW exchange began.

I find encouraging the progress made over the past two weeks in stabilizing the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire. The fact that Egyptians and Israelis are talking directly and pragmatically with each other at the military level is a hopeful sign psychologically for the forthcoming political negotiations. Furthermore, both sides clearly reflected a willingness to reach accommodations on the ceasefire and POW issues in order to move to the next stage of a peace conference.

While negotiations related to the six-point ceasefire agreement were a principal preoccupation and produced the most concrete results during my Middle East trip, I also concentrated on two other matters.

Arab Oil Pressures

On the question of Arab oil pressures, I made the point in each Middle Eastern capital that the Arabs need our help if they are to get a fair settlement, and that continuation of such pressures will make effective help from us impossible. As I reported to you earlier, King Hussein was in full agreement and said he has been making the same point to other Arab leaders. The key country in this regard is, of course, Saudi Arabia. While Faisal made no commitment to relax the oil restrictions, he clearly feels himself in an agonizing dilemma. I gave him considerable food for thought, and I have reason to believe I made some headway with his key advisors and ministers. Much will depend on whether we can keep up the momentum already established.

Peace Conference

With that in view, I also explored--particularly in Cairo and Amman--the question of how to get a peace conference launched. In Cairo, Foreign Minister Fahmi and I came to a tentative understanding on the following largely procedural points:

1. During the week of November 19, 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union will inform the United Nations Secretary General and others about the modalities of the conference.
2. The United States and the Soviet Union will arrange for a meeting of the Security Council, and the United States will declare that according to its understanding Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria have agreed to attend the first stage of negotiations dealing with disengagement and other related matters for a peace agreement.
3. Furthermore the parties agreed that this conference will be convened under the auspices of the United Nations with the participation of the Secretary General in the opening phase of the negotiations.
4. They furthermore agreed that the conference will be under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union.
5. The conference will be convened on December 8 or 9, 1973 in Geneva. The opening session will be at the Foreign Minister level.
6. The question of the participation of the Palestinians and Lebanon will be discussed during the first stage of the conference.

Assuming I receive Fahmi's confirmation, which I requested from Tokyo, that the foregoing still represents the way Egypt wants to proceed, I shall begin this next week to seek the views of others concerned including the Soviets. The objective is to get the parties engaged in a negotiating process that will relieve pressures both for a new recourse to the Security Council and for a resumption of the fighting. Once a conference is underway, our aim will be to get it to focus on the question of disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces as a first step, and to avoid seeking to come to grips at the outset with the fundamental issues of territory and the Palestinians, which would lead to an immediate deadlock.

Realistically, there can be no progress in any peace conference until after Israel's December 31 elections, but the appearance of negotiations even without the substance will be helpful on the Arab side. Once substantive negotiations begin, moreover, we must expect a series of impasses which will require us to work behind the scenes with Egypt and Israel, and probably with Jordan and Israel as well, to try to overcome them. As we get into the substantive negotiating phase early next year, we can anticipate some difficult times with the Israelis. For this, we will need capital in the bank with them. The fact that we achieved a ceasefire agreement for them with Egypt largely on Israeli terms, that we earlier had achieved Soviet and Egyptian agreement to negotiations which Israel has sought for twenty-five years, and that we are continuing our military and economic support will all help in this respect.

While my efforts to date have focussed largely on the Egyptians, Jordanians, and Israelis, I am seeking to establish an ongoing dialogue as well with the Syrians. They have come a long way but still promise to be the most difficult factor in any negotiation. And, unlike the Egyptian-Israeli front, no agreement has been reached or is in prospect between Syria and Israel to stabilize the ceasefire and exchange POWs.

Finally, we have filled in the Europeans on the results of my Middle East trip and in a general way on our thinking about the future. I intend to keep them reasonably briefed as we go along, in order to minimize to the extent possible their inclination to take unhelpful initiatives which can have a negative impact on our own efforts.

Future Prospects

In assessing future prospects we can, I think, be cautiously optimistic about getting peace negotiations started. Sadat has apparently decided to take a chance on us and to be accommodating with respect to the ceasefire agreement in order to enlist our help once negotiations are underway. The Israelis are reasonably reassured of our basic commitment to their security, but with a bit of underlying nervousness that we may seek to press them to modify their

negotiating positions at the peace conference. The Jordanians are ready for negotiations, although worried that Egyptian and Palestinian interests may be accommodated at their expense. The Palestinians, in fact, are in some confusion, with sentiment growing for them to abandon their opposition to dealing with Israel and join the negotiations in order not to be left with nothing in the end. The Lebanese also want in at an early date.

Finally, the Soviets are playing an ambivalent role. On the one hand they want to work with us in arranging joint U.S.-Soviet auspices, and we are being careful to consult generally with them while pursuing our more substantive efforts bilaterally with the parties. At the same time, they have adopted a harder line than the Egyptians on restoration of the October 22 ceasefire positions and seem to be encouraging the Palestinians to play a more active role, which could greatly complicate the job of getting meaningful negotiations started.

As we move into the complex situation that lies ahead, the next month or so promises to be one of the most important periods in the search for peace in the Middle East since the Six-Day War of 1967.

November 17, 1973

SECRET/SENSITIVE

7322850

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 9, 1973

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, President of Pakistan
Abdul Hafeez Parzada, Minister of Law
Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs and Defense
Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Sidney Sober, US Charge d'Affaires
Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

COPIES TO:

DATE AND PLACE:

Friday, November 9 in the Conference Room
of Prime Minister Bhutto's Residence in
Rawalpindi, Pakistan

SC
EA
NODIS
Files

Bhutto:

We are delighted to have you here. This is a most important visit, and we wish you every success--you personally, your government and your people. We would like to see the US play the primordial part in a settlement in the Middle East.

Kissinger:

We are grateful to you for some of the exchanges we have had during the war. Your links to your friends in the Arab world are extremely helpful. Our strategy is very close to what you put in your letter to the President.

Bhutto:

Would you like to tell us about your trip so far?

Kissinger:

We believe time is ripe for a major effort to achieve peace in the Middle East. The way I have been putting it in my talks in the Middle East is that, while the Soviets can supply weapons, only the US can bring peace. The Soviets are not in a strategic position to provide the outcome that the Arabs want.

XGDS - 1

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Kissinger:

You, Mr. Prime Minister, are not unfamiliar with some of the issues which this situation poses in the United States, although there have been some interesting paradoxes in positions that some of our Senators have taken. One Senator, for instance, who had been extremely critical of the secret bombing in Cambodia, suggested that we give weapons to Israel secretly. Others who, in 1971, had supported the principle that the US should back India because it is the larger power in South Asia immediately during the Middle East war cited the principle that Israel was vastly outnumbered and therefore should be defended.

More seriously, you will recognize, Mr. Prime Minister, that whatever the origins of the war, some of the principles were not so dissimilar from those in South Asia in 1971. Particularly, a victory for Soviet arms would have catastrophic consequences for world peace. This is one of the principal reasons why, after a major Egyptian mistake in not accepting our original proposal for a ceasefire, the US had no choice but to maintain the military balance when the Soviets began a massive airlift of equipment to Egypt and Syria.

Now we are in the situation where President Sadat feels that this war cannot end with just another armistice. We will have inevitable differences with our friends in Israel as we proceed. Let me tell you what it is we are trying to do.

The first phase of our efforts has been to try to help stabilize the ceasefire. We have now achieved agreement between Egypt and Israel on some general principles for establishing the ceasefire in a more stable way. Here is the text of the six points which we worked out. [The Secretary handed the Prime Minister a copy, and the Prime Minister indicated that he had seen it.]

The way we presented the issue was that all of us faced a choice. Either we could spend two months arguing for the October 22 lines and maybe get Israel to withdraw to them,

or we could take a more farsighted view and stabilize the ceasefire now, meeting the necessary humanitarian requirements for the Egyptian Third Army. If the latter course were chosen, then most of our effort could be concentrated on a broader program of disengagement.

I was quite well impressed with President Sadat. He showed wisdom in accepting something that was less than all of what he wanted--or even all of what he was entitled to.

This agreement has been published today and in the next day or two the two sides will begin negotiations to work out the details of implementation. There will be difficulties in this process. Assuming good will, however, we hope it will be possible to proceed.

Once the ceasefire is stabilized, it will then be possible to move on to the next phase--the peace talks. In the first stage of those talks, we envision that the participants would be Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel and that they would discuss a broader program of disengagement of forces. Later, the participation might be expanded to include Lebanon and some Palestinian representatives. Our hope is that the first phase of the talks could begin in the first half of December, but no date has yet been set.

We all must recognize that there are a number of realities in the situation which will have to be overcome. For one thing, Israel has always moved forward, not back. Although Israel probably has no need to stay on the West Bank of the Canal, any withdrawal will be difficult. Moreover, the balance between security and legitimacy will not easily be established.

A second problem is Arab romanticism and impatience. I have personally found it moving and worrying suddenly to be a heroic figure in the Arab world. They assume that my past successes will produce miraculous new successes

in the Middle East. But the problem is that the Arabs look at the last week of other negotiations I have conducted and they want to start with those results in the first week of their negotiations. They forget that each past success took months if not years to achieve.

In other negotiations that we have conducted, the US has controlled some of the assets. That is not the case in this negotiation.

Our Arab counterparts must learn some patience. They must learn to think specifically about how we get from here to there.

Finally, we must consider our domestic situation. It is not possible to say, on the one hand, that the US supports Israel for domestic reasons and then to say, on the other hand, that if we just flicked a finger, Israel would obey. The very factors which produce conditions which provide our influence, also produce the conditions which make it difficult for us to use that influence. The Arabs must give us some time to organize domestic support. Already, the press is accusing us of having somehow harmed Israel in the agreement that was worked out this week. Yet, we have not done anything yet. We must prevent the merging of the complex of domestic issues that are called "Watergate" and the pressures that can be mobilized on behalf of the Zionist community.

One subsidiary problem we face is the Arab oil boycott. This is not so much an economic issue for us. Originally, there was some utility in the boycott because it underlined the goals of the Arab world and the fundamentals of the energy problem. Now, it has assumed negative dimensions. It is not crippling. If it were, a great country like the US could not accept it. But it is extremely annoying. And if it continues, it will be used in our intense domestic debate first by those who seek any weapon to use against the President and then by those who are opposed to an Arab-Israeli settlement and will claim the US should not submit

to Arab blackmail. The only way we can position ourselves toward this problem is to say that an Arab-Israeli settlement is in the national interest and in the interest of world peace. We do not want repeated in the Middle East what was done in the subcontinent. We do not want the Soviets to increase their prominence in the Middle East.

We are prepared to make a move toward peace if the Arabs can show patience and let events mature. But to do this, we need their cooperation. We need to do what must be done as an act of free will. Before we will yield to blackmail, we will join with the Soviets and impose a settlement.

From my last few days in the Middle East, I am happy to report that there is a great deal of good will. What I cannot judge at this early time is the staying power or how the Arabs will handle the pressures on them. Having spent two long evening discussions with Prime Minister Meir, I assure you there will be very tough going on that side. When Mr. Sisco went to Israel the other day, all he did was to take to the Israelis a proposal they wanted, and even that was difficult. It is in Israel's interest to bring about a situation where the Arabs are disillusioned with us. With your knowledge of the US, perhaps you can give the Arabs some insight.

Bhutto: Thank you. Your confidence in making these remarks will be respected.

First, I do not want to tell you what your own interests are. I want you to know that, as Prime Minister of one of the largest Muslim states, I have very good relations with the Arabs, with Turkey, and with Iran. Pakistan is committed to a policy of friendship with those countries--but above all with the US.

In 1956, Pakistani public opinion became, as now, spontaneously worked up. In 1967, the same thing happened. We tried, but it was impossible to keep feelings under control. I came back from the US with every intention of consolidating relations. Then the war broke out and there was great concern

for the Arab countries and for what the US was doing for Israel. Our response was to give assurances that we were being helpful. Several days after the war began, we were being badgered with requests from Syria and Egypt for support. We have pilots in Syria, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf. They wanted to use our pilots but I refused initially. Finally, I said that they could fly if they volunteered, but privately I sent them instructions not to be in a hurry to volunteer, so they gave excuses. Finally, they pressed for arms and pilots, and we did send some pilots. I want to tell you exactly what happened. I do not want to be in a position of not telling you the truth.

Kissinger: It will be a new day in diplomacy when everyone tells truth.

Bhutto: The Egyptians and Syrians as well as the other Arab countries deeply appreciate what we did.

The Tunku then came to us and proposed an Islamic settlement. He showed me a call for a summit which stated as one objective of the conference strong criticism of the US role. I want to sponsor such a conference, but I told him that the objective would have to be differently stated. So he had the letter changed and on that basis, I agreed. He has talked to King Faisal and to the Shah.

Kissinger: The Shah, after our discussions, concluded that this might not be the most opportune time for such a conference. The reason is that the parties to the conference would just inflame each other. We are in such a delicate phase trying to get the peace conference started. We recognize that it will probably deadlock and that it will have to go into secret channels. This kind of Islamic conference may be better than an Arab summit, but it would be better a couple of months from now.

Bhutto: This is not our initiative. We are not particularly enthusiastic about it.

Kissinger: The Shah favored an Islamic to an Arab summit.

Bhutto: Well, we will not press this now. Going back to the main point, we want a settlement, and we recognize there will have to be give and take to achieve this. We are happy to help promote what you are doing.

Kissinger: The Arabs will not get all they want. We will take the liberty to keep you informed.

Bhutto: President Sadat and the Syrian President may visit here soon. I am trying to help get them closer together.

Kissinger: Tell the Syrian President for me that we are prepared to talk at any level he wishes. We recognize that Syria is an essential component of a peace settlement. I did not go to Syria this time because the opportunity arose too late.

Bhutto: I hope you will be the architect of this peace.

Kissinger: I will make a strong personal effort. We will have to appoint a negotiator to be at the peace conference full time, but I will supervise it personally.

Bhutto: You have overcome the problem of whether there should be withdrawal first or negotiations first?

Kissinger: It always pains Joe Sisco to hear me say this, because he negotiated Resolution 242. But the essence of 242 is that no one can understand what it means.

Bhutto: Will Israel insist on a geographical concept of security? There is no question that the war should have taught them that this is not a workable concept.

Kissinger: Their philosophy has been: Why should we pay? We won the war. The US is not interested in having massive Soviet intervention, and we stopped it. In one sense, Israel has lost because a protracted war will wear Israel down even if it wins every battle. Geographical security is not enough, especially now that there are surface-to-surface missiles in the area. Israel has to understand that frontiers alone do not guarantee security. President Sadat has some ideas on this score, which, while not entirely acceptable to Israel, will provide something to work with.

Bhutto: He is a reasonable man. What about Jerusalem? I assume you have heard a great deal about this from King Faisal.

Kissinger: Faisal discussed his philosophy of history with me and the common interests that exist between Zionism and Communism. He also discussed the nature of the Jewish conspiracy in the world. Finally, he described his concern for Jerusalem.

It seems to me that we have to tackle Jerusalem last. Logically, a solution would be easy because there is no real security threat to anyone from Jerusalem. It would be possible to work out arrangements where the city could be Arab and Jewish alike. Hussein is reasonable. All he wants is a little stake in Jerusalem.

Hussein feels this will be very difficult. When he said all he wanted was access to some of the holy places, Israel would not hear of it. They have their religious parties to be concerned about it. So the best approach seems to be to put this issue at the end of the process.

Bhutto: How does the detente with the USSR hold?

Kissinger: To the Soviets, it is a tactical device. We need it for our domestic situation and for peace in a nuclear age. We were not astonished that the Soviets tried to gain some advantage. We were surprised at the provocation that produced our alert. They demanded that we join them in intervening to consolidate the ceasefire and threatened to intervene alone if we refused. It was a very strong letter and we had no choice. But for our own reasons, we will go back to detente.

Bhutto: We will welcome it if detente works. In September, I had a premonition that the Soviets might try to get away with something. One can make two points: One can argue that detente made it easier to reach a settlement. One can also argue that without detente there could have been a confrontation like that over Cuba.

In our own area, the Soviets are showing interest in Afghan military matters. We have information that a Soviet military team has been on the Afghan-Pakistani border. On the other hand, the Soviets have told us that they are urging restraint in Afghanistan.

Ahmed: Yes, a team of Soviet military experts did inspect the border area and observed a series of night exercises.

Kissinger: We would certainly not look lightly on any outward push from Afghanistan.

At this point the meeting broke and the Prime Minister and the Secretary spent twenty minutes alone together before parting to attend Prime Minister Bhutto's dinner for the Secretary at the Guest House next door to the residence.

H. A.

Harold H. Saunders

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

November 7, 1973

SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Sadat

We have just received a brief report from Secretary Kissinger upon the conclusion of a three-hour session with President Sadat of Egypt. Agreement has been reached on the following proposal, which will be communicated to the Israelis.

1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the ceasefire called for by the UN Security Council.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East Bank.
5. The Israeli check points on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by UN check points. At the Suez end of the road, an Israeli officer can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military nature of the cargo.
6. As soon as the UN check points are established on the Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all POWs, including wounded.

SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

There is also an oral understanding which states that Egypt undertakes to ease the blockade at Bab El-Mandab. Assistant Secretary Sisco is flying to Tel Aviv now to seek the concurrence of the Israeli Government.

An oral message has also been transmitted from you to Prime Minister Meir in advance of Assistant Secretary Sisco's arrival.

Secretary Kissinger has informed me of the agreement he has worked out with President Sadat and which has been sent to you for your consideration. In addition, there is an oral understanding between the United States and Egypt regarding the blockade at Bab El-Mandab which Assistant Secretary Sisco will convey to you. Having read the records of your conversation with Secretary Kissinger, it is my firm conviction that the agreement reached will be satisfactory to you.

Agreement has also been reached in principle on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States, and the following announcement will be made by Ron Ziegler at noon today.

The Governments of the United States and of Egypt have agreed in principle to resume diplomatic relations at an early date. The two Governments have also agreed that in the meantime the respective interests sections of the two countries will be raised immediately to the Ambassadorial level. The Government of Egypt has named Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal. The United States has designated Ambassador Hermann Eilts. They will take up their posts promptly.

Nov. 7, 1973
Revised

1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the ceasefire called for by the UN Security Council.
2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces under the auspices of the United Nations.
3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Suez will be evacuated.
4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East Bank.
5. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez Road will be replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the road, Israeli officers can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military nature of the cargo at the bank of the Canal.
6. As soon as the UN checkpoints are established on the Cairo-Suez Road, there will be an exchange of all POWs, including wounded.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

November 9, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

Secretary Kissinger has sent you the following report of his meeting with King Faisal:

I met with King Faisal for three hours at the Royal Palace in Riyadh, late Thursday evening November 8.

First I gave him word of the agreement we had worked out with the Egyptians and Israelis to stabilize the ceasefire and ensure relief supplies to the Egyptian Third Army. He was pleased at the news. I then outlined again the strategy you intended to pursue in the coming weeks: to prepare the ground carefully in order to move decisively in the near future. Faisal was encouraged by this and assured me several times of his confidence in you and of his friendship for the United States.

In this context I raised the matter of easing the oil boycott. An energy crisis in America, I told him, would make your position very difficult. It would only strengthen the hand of those forces in the U.S. who were resisting a just settlement and who were seeking to undermine Presidential authority generally. I made the point subtly that we could handle an oil shortage economically but that its real significance was political and psychological as I described.

King Faisal assured me that nothing would please him more than to be able to maintain and even increase oil supplies to his American friends. But he emphasized he was under pressure from the radicals. He pointed out that all Arabs were united on the basic issues and he hoped we would move as expeditiously as possible toward a settlement. He did indicate that he would do his best to overcome his dilemma.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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Immediately after our meeting the King sent his two principal advisers one after the other to encourage us in our present course. Prince Fahd, his Second Deputy Prime Minister, came by for a half hour, and Foreign Minister Saqqaf then met with me for an hour. Fahd said he would do his best to get the oil flowing again. The Foreign Minister said that Saudi Arabia was looking for an excuse to get out of its uncomfortable position of confrontation with the United States.

Foreign Minister Saqqaf came by again this morning, November 9, before my departure. He said Saudi Arabia needed some pretext to change its position. He thought the announcement of the opening of the peace negotiations (now planned for November 20) could be the occasion for a formal communication by you to Faisal on the oil boycott. He thought the result might well be favorable.

I invited King Faisal to Washington on your behalf. He said he could not come until after some more progress had been made towards peace.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: King Hassan
Secretary Kissinger
Alec Toumayan (Interpreter)

DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 5, 1973 11:00 p.m. to 12:15 a.m.

PLACE: Office of the King
The King's Private Residence
Rabat, Morocco

HIS MAJESTY: Morocco feels very deeply, and I feel it particularly deeply myself, that your country and President Nixon are showing a mark of consideration towards us in this visit that you are now paying our country. Under the present circumstances this is a gesture that is unforgettable. My small country will do all it can do to facilitate the task of the United States. Consider our support as granted to you.

DR. KISSINGER: I appreciate your courteous words very much. You are aware of the great importance we attach to our relations to Morocco. I want to express in particular our deep appreciation for your assistance in setting up the meeting which General Walters just had and on which he has reported to me fully.

HIS MAJESTY: We have a number of items on the agenda: our bilateral relations; the Middle East; Africa and the Mediterranean. We can talk about them tonight and tomorrow. How do you wish to proceed?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we should cover all of these and you decide the order. Perhaps we could have a preliminary discussion on the Middle East tonight and go on tomorrow. I also want to talk about our bilateral relations, and in particular the plans for Your Majesty's visit to the United States in 1974.

HIS MAJESTY: We shall then talk about the Middle East first.

DR. KISSINGER: I should welcome Your Majesty's impressions.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NEW 09-01/11000 Per Hr. 6/12/2012
By RS WJH NARA, Date 11/16/2016

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HIS MAJESTY. I will be brief because by now the problems have become clear. You will encounter three categories of leaders: those who want peace who have the courage to say so; those who want peace but will wait for others to speak first; and those who do not want peace because peace is their domestic enemy.

DR. KISSINGER: Who falls into each category?

HIS MAJESTY: Those who want peace are first Morocco. Then Tunisia, Egypt, Syria.

DR. KISSINGER: I'm not going to Syria.

HIS MAJESTY: Also Jordan. In the second category are those who want peace but will not say so.

DR. KISSINGER: Who, for example?

HIS MAJESTY: Saudia Arabia. But it will follow. Kuwait. Algeria. But it will follow also. Then there are those for whom peace will be a problem although they understand that peace is needed: Iraq and Israel.

Let's take the last point first. In Morocco we are very tolerant on religious matters. I was brought up that way by my father, Mohamed V. We were not an independent country and the Germans wanted us to treat the Jews in Morocco as they were treated in France, but my father refused. He said the Jews in Morocco were totally Moroccan citizens. This is our tradition. We were nursed by Jewish nurses. Some of our associates are Jews. I am very tolerant myself.

But Israel's problem has become a distinct problem since the emigration from Socialist countries has penetrated so deeply into Israel. You see, when Abba Eban speaks in Arabic over the radio, his Arabic is as good as mine. Moshe Dayan did not lose an eye fighting the Arabs. He lost an eye in the British Army. Tomorrow we can sit down together eating the same food with our fingers, and there will be absolutely no difference between us. We both respect Jerusalem. We respect it because of its Mosques. They respect it because of Solomon's temple. We both respect it because of the Holy Sepulchre of Christ. But Socialist emigrants do not have this respect and

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understanding. Furthermore, they constitute a danger to the United States if 30,000 of them come in to Israel, 10 of them will be eligible for a U.S. visa and will come into your country as spies.

DR. KISSINGER: You feel they are all under Soviet discipline.

HIS MAJESTY: Yes, I do or, if not all of them, at least the cadres.

DR. KISSINGER: We asked ourselves why the Soviets allowed the emigration to go on even during the war.

HIS MAJESTY: They are in conflict with the Palestinians on this point. The Palestinians do not agree with them on allowing this emigration. Israel has been at war since it has existed. It is easy to govern a country at war. It is very difficult to govern a country in peace time because of the restriction in customs and attitudes. In war time you see a Do Not Enter sign and you obey it strictly. In peace time you look at it and disregard it.

DR. KISSINGER: We see it now in Israel after the cease fire. Their domestic problems are coming to the fore.

HIS MAJESTY: In 1965 at the Arab leaders meeting in Casablanca, I told my Arab colleagues, "You can choose between war now or peace now. If you choose peace, then you must take Israel in the Arab league. They will be four million. You will be eighty million." This created a scandal.

DR. KISSINGER: But you were right.

HIS MAJESTY: I was right and I'm still right today.

DR. KISSINGER: I told Abba Eban that I thought Israel would join the United Arab Republic. It has a calling as a Middle East nation, not as an appendage of the United States.

HIS MAJESTY: This is a natural destiny for Israel. But today Israel is more of a U. S. problem than an Arab problem. Why do I say that? The Arabs have just had a test against Israel; the United States will now have a test with Israel.

DR. KISSINGER: I agree with everything you have said so far.

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HIS MAJESTY: We, as a friend of the United States, want to help you win that test.

DR. KISSINGER: At this point we need the support of the Arab leaders who are moderate and who understand the West.

HIS MAJESTY. One must not confess to be moderate rather than to be wise. I consider myself wise but not moderate. When you play cards, there is one card called the Joker and if you have it, you can win the game. I think we have this card in those who met with General Walters. The Palestinian issue has always been an aphrodisiac for the Arabs, for Nasser, for the Syrians, the Iraqis and the Algerians. We have helped the Palestinians as far back as 1965, but no one has known of it. We don't need to have it spread about.

DR. KISSINGER: What is your assessment of General Walters' opening demarche?

HIS MAJESTY: Excellent! He is honest, straightforward, open. Half an hour after their conversation began, and I had left the house, one of my officers, Dlimi, (Col. Dlimi, Intelligence Chief) heard a lot of commotion in the room. He ran back thinking they were fighting, but they were clapping one another on the back and laughing. They acknowledged to me that if they had listened to me in 1969, they would not have wasted a lot of time. Then I met with Nahum Goldmann at length; Goldmann asked me to arrange a face to face meeting with the Palestinians. They let that opportunity slip and lost much time. At this meeting General Walters made them happy. In two hours he created, they told me, a human contact that they had not attained with Le Duc Tho in a year and a half. I told them that that was because Le Duc Tho was yellow and Abraham had created the Arabs, the Christians and the Jews, but not the yellow race.

General Walters will tell you that the Palestinians want more contacts after you come back from Peking.

DR. KISSINGER: We will continue to use General Walters for a while. We have to, so that if it becomes known, we can say that it is an intelligence mission, not a diplomatic mission, and we can say we are using him for information, not for negotiations.

HIS MAJESTY: I repeat that the Palestinian is the Joker in

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the deck of cards. No one will dare do anything against them. General Walters told them the Russians can give you weapons but only the United States can give you land.

DR. KISSINGER: I told him to say that to them.

HIS MAJESTY: They understood that very well. General Walters said there were three conditions. They can have no dreams such as pushing Israel into the sea. They must work things out with King Hussein, and they cannot ask the U.S. to do anything against Hussein. And if there are any acts of violence, the contacts will be broken. They agreed. I talked to the Palestinians again and they are greatly worried that Iraq and Lebanon will now stage actual violence against the Palestinian leaders to further divide the front for the benefit of Habash. Iraq is spending some six million dollars in Beirut. General Walters confirmed that the Russians are spreading news in Lebanon that the U.S. is about to attempt something against the Palestinians. The Palestinians said, "Is the United States involved in these goings on against you in Beirut?" and General Walters said he was giving them his word as a soldier that the U.S. was not involved. He said that he knows you cannot shoot down ideas with bullets.

DR. KISSINGER: We have absolutely nothing to do with this.

HIS MAJESTY: Yesterday I had again information from the two Palestinians that they feared for their safety in Lebanon. In Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon the leftists are spending some six million dollars to wipe them out. If the U.S. can convince Israel that in law as well as in politics a poor arrangement is better than a good trial and a poor peace is better than a good war--if the U.S. can demonstrate to the Palestinians that they can trust the U.S., then no Arab nation will fail to follow. They all speak of Resolution 242 and of the Palestinian rights and there is no third condition anymore. Resolution 242 is well known. The Palestinian rights were not known, and if you take that issue out, peace will then slowly and arduously return to the Middle East. It will be a long process and you and President Nixon will have to be very patient.

DR. KISSINGER: I fully agree with your analysis, Your Majesty. For thirty years Israel asked for direct negotiations, and now that we are offering them, they do not appear to be very interested. Israel faces quite a domestic problem from peace, and it is difficult for Israel to understand that the U.S. wants to

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make peace. Israel is so used to the U.S. being its unconditional ally that the fact that now we want to make peace comes as a psychological shock for them, and this is a most important point.

HIS MAJESTY: Let us not be hard; in their place I would react in exactly the same manner.

DR. KISSINGER: Even if they believe the insanity of an Arab government, they can see the prospect of Habash ruling in ten or fifteen years. They always look at the worst possible consequence. We cannot leave things to go on as they have been up to 1973. We have need now of some time and confidence on the part of the Arab nations, because if the Arab nations demand too much too soon, they will get nothing. We must have time to organize ourselves and take care of our domestic situation, and I do not mean Watergate. We cannot tackle the Israeli problem without firming up our domestic situation. Right now I have no plan. We need a direction in which to go and a strategy to apply, and then we can set up a plan. We cannot begin by having a plan.

HIS MAJESTY: You want to be a pragmatist?

DR. KISSINGER: I could go to Cairo with a plan, as Secretary Rogers did in 1971, and then the plan would be published and after three months there would be nothing. My tactic is not to lay down a plan but to organize all the points and then after that to move very quickly. I could talk about Resolution 242 or 338--these are all generalities. We can resolve the problem with the cooperation of the Arab countries.

HIS MAJESTY: You can count on two countries, Egypt and Syria. Sadat has proved himself ready to abandon the Russians. I have known him for a long time and I know him well. He is a very serious man and a Moslem. Nasser was an atheist; Sadat is a Moslem. He will do all he can to help you.

Syria has given even more evidence than Egypt because for two years it has withstood pressures from the Soviets to sign a treaty of peace and friendship. My troops and my officers who have been there have seen those pressures to get Syria to sign the same kind of treaty as Iraq and Egypt had signed. But you see Egypt and Syria are capitalist countries, and the intelligentsia is capitalist and cannot be leftist. Your problem

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is not that of Dr. Kissinger versus Sadat, or Dr. Kissinger versus President Assad. Your problem is to make up for lost time, time that the U.S. has lost. They will believe you, and they will ask you for the beginning of some evidence from the U.S. with which they can carry their people.

Egypt has a Communist party, and it has some Maoists. Syria has the extremist Baathists which want to merge with Iraq. They need help. If I were the United States I would try to give them evidence of my good will. I admit that the gap is very wide--it is not an ideological gap; it is a sentimental gap. It is therefore both deep and easy to bridge, just as milk boils quickly and overflows but subsides just as quickly. You have a very small core to the problem.

DR. KISSINGER: We need about one month to organize ourselves in the United States. For instance, everyone knows that a convoy is on its way to the Third Army and that I personally insisted upon this to Israel. All understand that I talked to Israel about the principle of October 22. The morning before I left I received fifteen calls from Congressmen criticizing me.

Your Majesty, we have to choose the battle we want to fight and when we want to fight it. We cannot expend all our armament. The strategy of the Egyptians is to pick a small point and wage an epic struggle, and after three weeks everyone has lost sight of the issue. We cannot have our energies absorbed in trivia. Because while the Arabs are thus in a state of confrontation with us, Israel then makes no concessions at all. We are determined not to permit world policies to be shaped by three million people. We want the security of Israel to be insured. We will press Israel to make major concessions and not stay where they are. I agree with your assessment that the Palestinian is the Joker in the deck and that we must carry on that approach very secretly.

HIS MAJESTY: This was my reason for asking for the Foreign Ministers meeting--so I could tell them, "Let us fight Israel and let us not fight the United States." Israel begins a conflict and then leaves the Arabs in confrontation with the U.S., and if the Arabs do not watch out, Israel will pit the Arabs against the United States.

DR. KISSINGER: That is why I say that an oil embargo is not in the interests of the Arab countries. I believe we must now see this tapering off. If houses are cold in the States this

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winter and people are short of fuel, this will arouse public opinion against the Arabs.

HIS MAJESTY: If there is no fuel in Europe and the Europeans do not have their cars to drive, this will certainly provoke them against the Arabs.

I wish to turn to what I see as a serious domestic problem in the United States. Since 1942 the United States has not demobilized. You went to war in Europe, then in Korea, then in Viet-Nam and you have armed the Middle East. For thirty years the arms industry of the United States has operated at 100 percent of its capacity.

DR. KISSINGER: Let us say about 50 percent.

HIS MAJESTY: Well, 50 to 75 percent. It should be part of your policy, and President Nixon should say this, that you would tell your people, "For thirty years we have armed the world; let us stop being the gendarme wherever a conflict arises." Perhaps I am a poet. I recently reread the history of the United States. It is not your calling to be the world's gendarme. It is your calling as a nation to welcome men of good will and intelligence and honesty, and it would certainly help your way of life.

DR. KISSINGER: This is indeed our historical calling, but we were trapped by the enfeeblement of Europe where in a few years we had to take the place of the UK and France and Germany and later of Japan. The rapid transition from isolation to the first power in the world brought a trauma. I don't think we can ever go back to the innocence that preceded the two world wars. But we can indeed reduce our involvement and be selective in the areas where we want to become involved. If we look at it now, there is no law of nature that says that the political future of South Viet-Nam matters to the United States. But once an American administration had become involved, to lose was different from never having entered. President Nixon is attempting to reduce our involvement and will continue to do so, but we must withdraw very carefully so as not to permit Soviet penetration.

HIS MAJESTY: The Soviets are attempting right now to gain the good will of the Palestinians. Yasir Arafat did not come to the meeting with General Walters because they had just received

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a document from the Soviet Union which tells them that the Soviet Union will impose their presence and be in effect their sponsor at the Peace Conference. The Palestinians told me and General Walters that they can never become a Communist state. Historically the Palestinian people are the keepers of the holy places of Jerusalem. It is inconceivable that they would set up a lay state. They can only set up a Moslem nation, and they will never go over to the Russians. On Jerusalem, they told me this morning that at the very least, they would want to retain the former Arab Jerusalem and would let the Israelis keep the Jewish Jerusalem. This means that the Mosque of el-Aqsa, the Holy Sepulchre, would be under the Palestinians, and the Israelis would have Jewish Jerusalem.

DR. KISSINGER: Jerusalem is the most difficult issue of all. I used to think it would be easy to give up a Mosque, but it is almost impossible for the Israelis to give it up.

HIS MAJESTY: This will create a very serious problem. A number of African countries have already broken with Israel because of Egypt, which is an African nation. If Israel maintains itself in Jerusalem, the entire Moslem world will focus on this and will develop a fixation. The Shah of Iran will say, "I don't know the Arabs and I don't know the Palestinians, but I do know Jerusalem," and this will spread all the way to Nigeria.

This will become a much more serious problem because it is a religious problem, not a political problem. In the Twentieth Century it is a shame to continue to have wars of religion. The Israelis will find this is more serious than fighting inch by inch for a border and they will lose a great deal of support-- not only the Shah of Iran who claims to be a descendant of Darius and therefore an Aryan, but they will also lose the Moslem populations of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, of India, Pakistan and Indonesia, and the so-called Moslems of the Philippines; add the Black Muslims to this, perhaps, and you have total turmoil.

Israel says that it wants secure borders, but does half of Jerusalem constitute a secure border?

DR. KISSINGER: The point is that the religious orthodox Jewish party has the balance in their congress and has an obsession on this point. I used to think the Jerusalem problem was easy; now I'm convinced that Jerusalem is the

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most difficult problem and should not be taken up first.

HIS MAJESTY: Let us look at it from another angle. We will settle the problem with Israel when it has leaders who belong to our generation.

DR. KISSINGER: I fully agree with you.

HIS MAJESTY: I can talk to an Israeli of my age and we understand each other. So the problem is inside Israel. Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan--their generation is the obstacle.

DR. KISSINGER: Once the peace process is in motion I feel that Golda Meir will leave.

HIS MAJESTY: I emphasize the Jerusalem problem because you are going to encounter it everywhere and in particular will you encounter it with great rigidity from King Faisal and subsequently from the Palestinians themselves.

DR. KISSINGER: We have to begin with one big step. The Israelis cannot give up one inch. We have to get a big step to begin.

HIS MAJESTY: We need enough oxygen to sustain us throughout that period and have a period of calm.

DR. KISSINGER: I advocate starting up the negotiation process in December and having the negotiations begin in January.

HIS MAJESTY: The important thing is to put your foot in the stirrup and be up in the saddle. Once you saddle up, your on your way. For years I have had the experience of negotiating with the French and the Spanish, and it was not easy.

DR. KISSINGER: Your country is the first Arab country that I visit. Will Sadat understand the strict need for secrecy and confidence?

HIS MAJESTY. With your pledge to him, he will.

DR. KISSINGER: But can he keep quiet? Because my guarantee is useless if he repeats it. I have consistently said I will not promise what I cannot do. I will therefore promise less than the Russians promise, but we will deliver on what we promise,

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and I have never broken my word. But my promises cannot be broadcast over Cairo Radio.

HIS MAJESTY: I was surprised to see that in his press conference Sadat broke the news about your coming two days in advance of the date, the Thursday, on which it had been agreed to announce your coming. Of course, Sadat is carrying a heavy legacy, Nasser's legacy. But I respect Sadat, and I did not respect Nasser. With King Faisal I don't know how things will go for you. He has changed much in the last two years.

DR. KISSINGER: King Faisal has it in his power to destroy everything, because if he persists in his attitude, we will withdraw our diplomacy. We cannot expose ourselves to blackmail.

HIS MAJESTY: He does not govern alone. He has princes and advisers; there is a Syrian adviser, Dr. Rashin Pharaon, Prince Sultan and Prince Fahd. Perhaps you could have them contacted or reached.

I want to congratulate you on your brilliant strategy in inviting the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister to Washington. For six months, as you know, we have had Moroccan troops in Syria and our influence has been such that Syria is less radical now. We had no diplomatic relations before, it is a difficult, uphill fight for President Assad all the way.

I know that you have studied the Arab world, but you have to live in it to understand that it is even worse than the tropical forest in which you hack a path today and it is covered over the next day so you have to keep it open every day. It is full of contradictions, where you see a capitalist country going Communist and a free country following a path of single party and single trade union regime. All the countries have lied to their people for fifteen years. They said they would throw Israel into the sea, and it is hard for them to say now that they were in error. This can go on for four or five years but not indefinitely. As Lincoln said about fooling all of the people all of the time. So we live in a very special world-- I am an Arab myself, I am of this world, and it is very much like a pilot coming in for a landing and having to execute a totally different approach to the runway. The approach is different as you reach Tunisia. It begins to change.

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DR. KISSINGER: Will you be contacting some of the leaders that I shall meet after I leave you?

HIS MAJESTY: I will do so if you wish.

DR. KISSINGER: If you would, it would be extremely valuable to impress upon them the necessity not to act out of any romanticism but to act in a cool, calm, calculated manner. The Arab leaders believe I can do something. Strangely enough, they believe that because I am a Jew I cannot be accused of anti-Semitism and can settle things where others have not. Perhaps this is true. But they look only at the last week of negotiations and not at the many months that preceded the last week of negotiations. You referred to your own experience of negotiations, Your Majesty, and you know that it is a very difficult, complicated process.

HIS MAJESTY: I cannot reach Sadat over the telephone because the lines are tapped. When will you see him?

DR. KISSINGER: Tomorrow night.

HIS MAJESTY: I can cable my ambassador to Cairo, ask him to seek a meeting with Sadat, and my ambassador will convey the following message to Sadat: "I have met with Dr. Kissinger. It is my impression that he is a charming person but on matters of issue he is very exact and precise; he is not inclined to be a romanticist or a poet. He wants to look at an issue from the angle of success, not failure." I will further say that my impression is that Dr. Kissinger is an honorable man and can be trusted. I believe this, and I will tell Sadat so.

DR. KISSINGER: It is essential at this point to build confidence.

HIS MAJESTY: I will emphasize to Sadat that you have told me of the importance of preserving confidence, and I will tell him that those are the impressions I have formed after meeting you.

DR. KISSINGER: This would help tremendously.

HIS MAJESTY: This message will go out right away and will get to Cairo before you arrive.

You must understand that our people are very sensitive to the lyrical quality of Arab speech. The Germans respond to music,

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the French to perfume and cuisine, the Arabs respond to lyricism. That is why it is said that nothing can excel the Koran, because that is the highest point reached by the language. You can sweep a crowd with a speech. You can sweep it into the Suez Canal, where they will all sink. A great deal of will power is needed to restrain oneself from making speeches. But I know that the hour is late and the jet lag makes itself felt after a long trip. Tomorrow, as I have indicated, we shall meet with some of your associates and some of mine for about fifteen minutes and then we will resume our tete-a-tete.

DR. KISSINGER: Tomorrow we can talk some more about this point and then about our bilateral relations and about Africa.

HIS MAJESTY: I will now walk you back to the villa. It will give me a little exercise.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS King Hassan, II
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

TIME AND DATE 10 50 a. m. to Noon
Tuesday, November 6, 1973

PLACE The Royal Palace
Rabat, Morocco

SUBJECT Second Tete-a-Tete Meeting

King Hassan I would like to read to you the text of a message I will send to President Sadat if you concur

"Following my meeting with Secretary Kissinger, we are happy to give Your Excellency our first impressions, our first personal impressions of the man himself. In light of the importance Secretary Kissinger attaches to our problem, it is my feeling that he is equipped with considerable goodwill and good intentions. We are convinced, Your Excellency, that if he reaches the stage of making a commitment, that he will do all in his power to honor his commitment. It further appears to us that he does not follow classic diplomatic intentions and he prefers to remain far from emotions and imagination, preferring to tackle problems and realities in a cool, calm and objective fashion. We insist upon our chief impression that if he gets into a commitment, he will honor it "

Secretary Kissinger Thank you, Your Majesty, this is extremely useful.

King Hassan This will go out in three or four hours to my Ambassador in Cairo with instructions to deliver immediately to President Sadat. Shall we now talk about the United States and Africa.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

11/09-01/11001 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) Hr. 6/18/2012
By RS/MLH NARA, Date 11/16/2016

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Secretary Kissinger The area I know least is Africa. We have not pursued a very active policy there. It would be helpful if Your Majesty gave me his thoughts. The African States are like no others. Their political structure is less clearly defined. Their foreign policy listens more to emotions. In that part of the world there are more countries whose origin is accidental than anywhere in the world and I am uneasy about the emergence of very small states. You have that kind of problem in your own area with the Spanish Sahara. We have no global policy towards Africa.

King Hassan. I will be brief. When Africa was becoming independent, the U. S. suffered 10 or 12 years ago from the acts of its NATO allies in that U. S. arms were used against liberation movements. The U. S. lodged protests on this with its own allies also. In those days Nassar was very active and the Russians used him to penetrate into Africa and so in 1958-59-60 we faced an Africa in turmoil and an Africa that was calm. The former were more active than the latter more calm African countries. Fortunately, we witnessed a few unfortunate experiments such as Guinea; Algeria, which in four or five years will face a very difficult economic situation. Tanzania; Mali; and Congo Brazzaville becoming Socialists. You must first be rich and then you become poor again.

Secretary Kissinger. When you visit a Socialist country, you find it difficult to understand how anyone could become Socialist. They are dull, boring and poor.

King Hassan But they become cheerful when they leave their countries. At the UN and at the OAU these countries became very militant but now there is a reversal in the trend with Africa becoming more aware of the problems.

In addition, the Chinese play a quiet but powerful role. They are deeply entrenched in Tanzania, Madagascar and also in Mauritania, where they occupy a large number of medical positions and, as you know, since we do not have the confession in our religion, the family doctor becomes the confessor to whom you tell everything

The Russians are trying, through a system of very flexible loans, but we are a mature country with thirteen centuries of independence and not easily deceived by the Russians.

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The U.S. has no global policy in Africa. You have traditional relations with Morocco, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, to a lesser degree with the Sudan and with Tunisia. But no general context. Once the Middle East problem is settled, Africa may, because of its geographical location, deserve a more global policy on the part of the United States. Africa could receive another 200-300 million people.

Secretary Kissinger. How does one conceive a global policy for Africa?

King Hassan: The U.S. could choose five or six countries in Africa which are known for their seriousness and their influence and help those countries which in turn will help the others. The U.S. will not then appear directly involved. Surely it is not in the interest of the United States to have Algeria penetrate into Chad, Niger, etc. It is more traditional for Morocco to do it because if we open a school in Dakar or in Chad, we are not bringing Communism whereas Algeria exports its ideas and Algeria has an underdeveloped form of Communism. The U.S. can pick four or five countries and cover all Africa from there. The Russians have also wanted to have a port on the Atlantic and they hope to do it now with the Algerians.

Secretary Kissinger. Besides Morocco, which countries would you advise us to choose?

King Hassan: Sudan, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, which is a very serious country. It is like having a number of strategic bases.

Secretary Kissinger. What about Zaire?

King Hassan. Yes, Zaire is a very important country. Mobutu is a very good man though very blunt.

Secretary Kissinger. Yes, in his case appearances are not misleading.

King Hassan. I worry more over Africa because I see both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic aspects. The future of Europe is not in Europe, it is in Africa. I am afraid that the Europeans have a nostalgia for their former colonies, and how will they come back into Africa? They will come back via Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

4

Secretary Kissinger. The Europeans are never farsighted. They are always very nearsighted. They see only immediate objectives. They have consistently behaved like scavengers picking up bits falling from our table.

King Hassan The Europeans are already well-introduced into Africa because Africa has a shortage of trained personnel and in many independent African countries English and French cadres remain very active. When the Europeans asked us to come into the conference on the Mediterranean, at first I refused. If all the African countries told the United States and the Soviet Union to get out of the Mediterranean, how could we enforce our requests? To speak very frankly, it is not in the interest of Morocco to see the Mediterranean become a bathtub. When Madison Square Garden is full, it matters a great deal who stands at the turnstile. When it is empty, it doesn't matter at all. Tunisia and Algeria went to Helsinki for the Mediterranean neutralization talks but the United States and the Soviet Union turned them down. We have talked to Spain about this, and they agree with us.

Secretary Kissinger: How are your relations with Spain?

King Hassan Very difficult, because it is a very emotional, lover relationship. The Spaniard is very succes d'estime and has enormous pride. They have created a fantastic problem about the Sahara. They must understand that it is an error to create an artificial state.

Secretary Kissinger: I fully agree.

King Hassan I have offered a convention to them on a 50-50 basis for all the resources. I have even offered to give them two bases for 20-25 years so they can protect the Canaries. I have said, let us have a referendum and be done with it. The Sahara will revert to Morocco, we will share the resources on a 50-50 basis, and you will have the bases. But Spain refused.

Secretary Kissinger Why?

King Hassan. Because the Spanish Government is a government of very old men very much set in their ways. Both General Franco and Admiral Carrero Blanco began their military careers in Spanish Sahara.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

Secretary Kissinger Why then make it independent and have it come under the domination of Algeria?

King Hassan It is a psychological problem. Spain after Franco will never be the same. I tell the Spaniards if they give independence to Spanish Sahara, there are 30 thousand inhabitants, all Nomads, who roam about wherever they find a grass to graze. I can not have an artificial state like that in my backyard. And I reacted as you did when the Soviets put missiles in Cuba. This is my Cuba. Have you met the new Spanish Foreign Minister?

Secretary Kissinger Only once.

King Hassan: Lopez Bravo was a much better man.

Secretary Kissinger: Does Your Majesty know that Jobert admires you greatly?

King Hassan: We became good friends. He was born in Meknes and lived here almost 40 years. He is a very straight man.

Secretary Kissinger: He can not do everything he would like to do. He does not have my flexibility. I like Jobert very much. There are so few foreign ministers who are really intelligent.

King Hassan Jobert has always spoken very highly of you. I will tell him that your feelings toward him are the same.

I understand very well that the first priority for the United States is to settle the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger We must settle it but not under Russian pressure. If there is Russian pressure, we will switch back to Israel because we must demonstrate that the Soviet Union can not settle the problem. There is no pressure from the Soviet Union now. For a week we tried not to do anything. If the Soviet Union had stayed out, we would have stayed out. When the Soviet Union began sending arms, then it was no longer an Arab versus Israel conflict. It became a matter of survival of the reasonable Arab countries.

King Hassan: We could not have survived.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

6

Secretary Kissinger: Our airlift to Israel was just as much in the interest of the moderate Arab countries.

King Hassan: Yes, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, trans-Jordania, Morocco, Tunisia all would be pushed out.

Secretary Kissinger: It is also in the interest of President Sadat, because he does not want to become like the President of Czechoslovakia.

King Hassan When Sadat asked for the departure of the Russians, his timing was very poor. Tell him that you regret that he timed it so poorly.

Secretary Kissinger: Can I speak to Sadat frankly or will he repeat everything to the Soviets?

King Hassan: When Secretary Rogers met with Nasser and then with Sadat, the fact that Nasser's offices were stuffed with microphones was discovered by the United States agents sent in advance by Secretary Rogers. Nasser himself did not know it, and he dismissed his Chief of Intelligence. You will have to talk to Sadat in a garden or have a electronic sweep of the premises carried out.

Secretary Kissinger Will he repeat everything to the Soviets?

King Hassan: Not if you ask him not to. I can call my Ambassador and ask him to talk to Sadat before you arrive and stress the importance you attach to confidentiality and the danger of leaks. I can not guarantee that secrecy will be maintained. You can talk to Sadat because he wants to give leadership to the Arab world and he can do it only with peace.

Secretary Kissinger I was impressed with his courage, It took courage to start the war, and he did not lose sight of the political realities. He did not try to make the U.S. the villain. Nasser played the Israeli strategy in making the U.S. into an enemy of the Arabs.

King Hassan The Palestinians have put a problem to me. President Sadat has been extremely correct with them. If the contact is to remain secret, they will not talk. But if Sadat has to learn of it, they want to tell him themselves.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

7

Secretary Kissinger What is your opinion? As for myself, I will not tell Sadat.

King Hassan Then we say nothing. The Palestinians are not in a hurry anyway, but it is in the U.S. interest to make it known that they do not ignore the Palestinians (but not to say how or where because you will encounter demagoguery in the Middle East about the Palestinians and it is best to clear up that burden).

Secretary Kissinger: King Hussein is our friend. We do not want to give the impression that we discard him. Politics is hard, but loyalty is very important.

King Hassan: But the three points that General Walters made to the Palestinians are

- (1) Israel remains Israel.
- (2) Nothing must be done against King Hussein.
- (3) There must be no acts of violence.

The United States has been loyal towards King Hussein, and he can be reassured.

Secretary Kissinger That is true. I will talk to King Hussein in very general terms day after tomorrow and I will communicate with Your Majesty again. You and I can communicate directly through General Walters thus insuring total secrecy of communication.

King Hassan: You could tell Hussein that you guarantee his country, but that it is necessary to have contacts with the Palestinians. I could send a message to him. It would not be good to have that message come to him from King Faisal because they are not on good terms, but with me he is very much at ease. He is my cousin. He knows that I am fond of him. There is full confidence between us.

Secretary Kissinger I will contact you in two weeks and I will tell you whether it is desirable to tell Sadat. My instinct is that it is.

King Hassan If you tell Hussein about the contacts, then after that you must tell Sadat.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

8

Secretary Kissinger I will not tell Hussein on this trip.

King Hassan So we have a total blackout on that.

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Secretary Kissinger I will say that we have been approached and I will ask for his opinion and nothing more. The Palestinians approached us in Beirut but we ignored it.

[REDACTED] Then they called again to ask if there would be a reply.

King Hassan When was that?

Secretary Kissinger: The first message came on October 10, the second on the 21st. Each time it came at the same time as the message sent through you. We preferred to deal with someone we know and trust.

King Hassan. The Palestinian organization is divided into many factions.

Secretary Kissinger. Yes, but we have confidence in you and in your contacts, and if later on you should form any impressions or arrive at any conclusions, we would be grateful if you would share them with us.

King Hassan: The Israelis approached us but we told them that it was too risky and that the timing was wrong. Once the talks began, we said they could contact us then. Their Rome office contacted us.

Secretary Kissinger What do you think of the contact with Syria now and of future contacts?

King Hassan. I told you you did extremely well. I think they must renew diplomatic relations with the United States, and I think I have some influence on them. As you know, my army was the first Arab army into Syria and it has been there for four months now. At any Arab summit meeting Morocco can look anyone straight in the eye and has to make excuses to no one.

Secretary Kissinger: It is in the interest of Syria to come closer to the United States and not adopt a posture of hostilities, because this is playing the Soviet and the Israeli strategy.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

9

King Hassan Syria has a very good reason to renew diplomatic relations with the United States at this time. The ceasefire was brought about by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Syria can not ignore half of the ceasefire arbitrator. My Foreign Minister will go to Syria Damascus, Riyadh and Amman; do you wish me to send a message to Assad?

Secretary Kissinger. You could tell him what you tell Sadat and point out that we would not refuse their approach. I see Riyadh as the creation point. We can do without Middle East oil, which only represents 10% of our imports. We will have to have some rationing. But we will begin a vast national research project on coal liquefaction. The country that put a man on the moon in ten years can turn coal into gas. We have the technological know-how; it is only a problem of engineering. Then in three to five years we will be independent of oil imports. If this looks like the result of Arab blackmail, it will have a very bad influence on American public opinion. King Faisal has made his point, he should now relax for about six months. I can assure Your Majesty that some people in the United States are saying that we should take the oil by military means and can not allow Abu Dhabi to blackmail us. Those are our domestic pressures. The Watergate problems we can handle. But with the very strong pressures from the Jewish Community, which is very powerful in the press, television and banks, if the impression is created that there is a national crisis caused by the Arabs, this will create a very difficult situation.

King Hassan Can you get King Faisal to understand that?

Secretary Kissinger I don't know him. I will speak very frankly with him.

King Hassan Yes, you must. He is an old man and he mixes politics with mysticism even though in our religion it does not mix. You can reach him through the advisor I mentioned last night, Rachaid Frahmoun. I can ask Sadat to reach him and he can also be contacted through Al Adnan who is King Faisal's Chief of Intelligence. At this point Sadat wants very much the friendship of the United States and he will not do anything to alienate you.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

10

Secretary Kissinger: What is the possibility the Russians will not intervene directly?

King Hassan: In Korea, you intervened and the Russians did not. In Vietnam, the same occurred and in Lebanon also.

Secretary Kissinger: Two weeks ago we received a letter from Brezhnev. He wrote demanding the sending of joint Soviet-U.S. expeditionary forces. He said you must adhere to this or else we will act unilaterally and he also demanded an immediate and urgent reply. Well, first of all, we sent no reply and in the second place, we put our troops on alert and then the Security Council approved the sending of forces excluding Soviet and U.S. troops. The Soviets will never run the risk of war in the Middle East. Such a war would be a disaster for the Middle East because the Soviet Union has never left a country where it has sent troops.

King Hassan: King Faisal is the one who stands to lose the most. There is no freedom at all in his country, not even trade unions. When Saudi Arabia blows up, it will be very serious. Right now it is a pressure cooker. My Foreign Minister will leave tomorrow and he will begin where you end. He will start with Iran, then go to King Hussein, King Faisal, Damascus, and Cairo.

Secretary Kissinger: The Shah of Iran admires you greatly. He never fails to state his feelings. He is a remarkable man.

King Hassan: He has a great art and is very sensitive. He has a global vision. I want to go back to what you said about U.S. research on energy. This is bad for Morocco, which is looking for oil.

Secretary Kissinger: It may take ten years. We have coal reserves for 300 years. If we learn to liquify it, we will no longer need to import oil and we also must learn to extract the oil from the oil shale. By 1977 production should begin and should be well along by 1980 if a massive effort is made. The final decision has not yet been made. If we are forced to do it because of what appears to be an Arab campaign, and if at the same time we bear this costly effort and we are asked to help the Arabs, this will create a very ambiguous situation for public opinion.

King Hassan: If King Faisal decides to hold off, Kuwait will follow suit. You probably want to get back to the Villa for a short time before long.

Secretary Kissinger: I had hoped to gain a quick visual impression of Rabat.

King Hassan: I will arrange it immediately.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: King Hassan, II
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Alec Toumayan, Interpreter

TIME AND DATE: After Luncheon Meeting
November 6, 1973

PLACE:

SUBJECT: Brief After Luncheon Meeting

Secretary Kissinger: Whenever I am in China I conduct a review of world affairs with Chou En-lai. Although we differ ideologically, we tend to agree on some things for practical reasons. For instance, on the issue of Chinese subversion into Iran and the Gulf States, I had told him he should send his Foreign Minister to Iran and that he should tone down Chinese subversion in that part of the country. Later on he did that. If you think it would be helpful, I could give him my evaluation of your views.

King Hassan: We had excellent contacts until the Chinese prohibited circumcision on the Moslem children, ordered them to burn Koran and forced them to eat pork publicly. The Chinese are not very wise in Morocco. They move about a great deal and import considerable amounts of subversive literature. Mr. Ceausescu who seems to have developed a great deal of affection for me also advised to balance carefully the Chinese and the Russians.

Secretary Kissinger: I wish to thank you for the extraordinary courtesy you have extended to me.

King Hassan: It is an expression of the esteem which we have for you personally. We feel that you have acquired experience in record time in what is not an easy task. I am convinced that you have begun this effort with the will to succeed and furthermore, you represent a man for whom I have great friendship and esteem.

Secretary Kissinger: I have found my talks with you extremely useful and I am very happy that I began my trip in the Arab countries with a visit to you.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

W.H. Saunders
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPROVED:
S - Mr. Eagleburger

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 5, 1973

TIME: 11:00 P.M.

SUBJECT: Conversation with King Hassan

PLACE: Rabat, Royal Palace

PARTICIPANTS:

US

Secretary Kissinger
Asst. Secretary Newsom
Asst. Secretary Sisco
Mr. Saunders, NSC

MOROCCO

King Hassan
Prime Minister Osman
Foreign Minister Benhima
Ambassador Senoussi
Chief of Royal Protocol General
Moulay Hafid al-Alaoni

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KING HASSAN: We are happy to welcome Secretary and his staff and to continue frequent contact. We know current problems of President Nixon and send our warm regards to him. Our common interests dictate common lines of policy.

You and I have already exchanged views on the Middle East situation. The last war between the Arabs and Israelis was a test for the Arabs. The Arabs consider they have succeeded. Now peace is possible with understanding and a sense of justice. With the interest of the President and the Secretary, this objective can be achieved. No task is too difficult. What is difficult is to find justice among so many tendencies. The situation has changed in the Near East. The Arabs did not previously accept the existence of Israel. Now they have gone beyond. The problem now is to find how Israel can live with the Arabs. The Arabs are strengthened by a unity of religion and a unity of language, but I am worried about the effect of massive immigration into Israel on this balance. With the heavy immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe, Israel will be neither Mediterranean nor American and will be, therefore, less subject to influences by either. The young people of Israel will not know the young people of the Arab world.

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Israel must become integrated into the Arab community. It could become one of the richest regions in the world in agriculture and in industry. The fertile crescent could become a reality. This marriage will not come easily. The Syrians will be particularly nervous.

Finally there is the fundamental aspect of the Palestinians. We noted the special mention of this problem by both President Nixon and Brezhnev. We are certain that they will give reality to their word. It is necessary that a Palestinian entity be planted in a geographic area acceptable to all and with access to Jerusalem.

I appreciated very much the latest message from President Nixon. I understand he wants to give a new look to relations between Morocco and the US. I would like to have a meeting at the end of the year or the beginning of the next with a fixed agenda leading to a determination of our level of relationship. We will not discuss this now since you are preoccupied with other problems. You are most welcome here, and we want you to come back for an official visit of two to three days. We wish you great success in your current mission.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I appreciate the extraordinary welcome here in Rabat. I have always considered Morocco friendly, but what had been a political thought is now a human reality.

Regarding bilateral relations, we are looking forward to your visit in 1974 at a time we can arrange after my return. You and President Nixon will find much to talk about. I will try to give a date within two weeks of my return. President Nixon has great respect for you and admires your courage. We will seek a date in late spring after I have consulted the President's calendar.

It is highly desirable to begin talks on our bilateral relations, and Secretary Newsom is prepared to return at the end of his present trip for a preliminary exchange and a definition of the agenda. My instructions to him are that it is essential that it be known that the US appreciates its friends. We are prepared to cooperate fully where there are common interests and a constructive spirit. We should begin to shape the future jointly.

Our views on the Middle East are very similar. Israel may have won battles, but diplomatically and strategically the situation has changed fundamentally. The Arabs have restored their dignity and are now in a position to make peace. We can look at the future not with slogans but with reality.

Israel must undergo a profound reexamination of its policies. It is no longer possible for them to depend on strength. For thirty years Israel has relied on military prowess and the transition to a different policy will be difficult, especially because it is sudden and unexpected. Israel will come to a realization that the negotiations

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it has sought will give it an opportunity to be a part of a wider community. It is a rare opportunity. It requires patience and perseverance. Every negotiation goes through difficult periods, but success is possible when there is a clear view of the ultimate objective and the confidence of all parties.

I am happy to begin my trip in a friendly country such as Morocco. I believe Your Majesty can play an important psychological role. There is no question about the heroism of the Arab world. Its patience, however, remains to be tested. The Arabs must also understand the delicacy of the problem created by Israel and the US domestic situation. We agree on the general course proposed by Your Majesty leaving aside details. A violent onslaught on this policy is certain to come in the US. It is not for nothing that we became so closely attached to a small nation of three million people, seven thousand miles away. These factors cannot be changed overnight. The existence and security of Israel cannot be negotiated. What can be negotiated is a just and durable peace. A long-term peace can be maintained only if both sides believe it to be just. Our friends can help us to achieve this by pointing out to others that we are sincere and have decided to make a major effort, but that we cannot reach a final destination in one leap. To try in one leap plays into the hands of those that want no peace. Those opposed to peace want confrontation between the US and key Arab countries. Our key mission is to create an atmosphere of confidence.

If peace is to come, and if the US is to play a crucial role, it is more likely to come through policies followed by Your Majesty than by pressures and blackmail. We are engaged in this effort not because of pressure, but because of our conviction that unless there is peace the situation will lead to the domination of the area by outside powers with other interests. If the US is to be treated as an enemy, we cannot play a role with good will and a determination to succeed. We have endeavored to tell the truth, to speak frankly and to keep our promises.

KING HASSAN: Here is one problem which is posed in a brutal and realistic form. This is the question of defending the rights of five million Arabs who have no land. The US has ignored the Palestinian problem for twenty-five years. If the US would make contact with the Palestinians, it would advance the peace. The occupied countries say, "free our territories first, then help the Palestinians." The non-occupied countries say the reverse.

The problem is more simple and can be negotiated.

You spoke of internal US difficulties. We consider the internal difficulties of the US to be artificial. Watergate is too small a matter to be true. I think Watergate is a vast conspiracy against the equilibrium of the US and the role of the US. I would suggest your security services investigate the Senate and others because this is a plot against the US not against the administration.

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The Arab press has not given much importance to these scandals, and this is a good thing. I might also say privately that I am glad Nixon fired Cox because the head of state must control what he does.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree that these internal difficulties produced by Watergate have been given a prominence out of proportion to the causes. It is true in our country that for a decade and a half there has been an attack on our institutions. That we can contain.

There are other internal difficulties produced by a highly organized minority over a span of thirty years. That internal difficulty will become very relevant as we proceed to a solution of the Middle East problem. One mistake in the Arab world is to believe that the US needs only to give an order and problems can be solved. We are going to have difficulties in getting even to the point of making a recommendation. It is a difficulty we can solve, but for which we must have time. Watergate is a temporary thing, but it could merge with these deeper problems, and that could be dangerous.

With respect to the Palestinians, we have learned more from Your Majesty than from any other source. Never before have I heard the matter presented by a leader whom we consider wise and friendly.

We can form conclusions about the retention of Arab territory, and we can affirm in principle the rights of the Palestinians. But if these rights are defined too extremely, the consequences would be to push Israel into the sea. You cannot introduce five million Palestinians into Israel without that result.

KING HASSAN: I did not intend that they should be all settled in Israel. This is a question one must pass to the Palestinians and ask them what they propose. If they say a small part of two or three different countries, this might be a solution.

The King and Secretary adjourned for a private meeting.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE November 6, 1973

TIME: 6:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Conversation
with President BourguibaPLACE: Carthage Palace
Tunis, Tunisia

PARTICIPANTS:

US

Secretary Kissinger
Asst. Secretary Newsom
Asst. Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Seelye
Ambassador McCloskey
Interpreter Alex Toumayan

TUNISIA

President Bourguiba
Prime Minister Nouira
Foreign Minister Mohamed Masmoudi
Director of Cabinet Ali Hedda
SecState for Foreign Affairs
Abdelaziz Hamzaoui
Tunisian Ambassador to Washington
Salheddime El Goulli

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I look forward to your visit to the United States next year.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I am very grateful to President Nixon for the gift he sent me, the moonrock with Tunisian flag, that Ambassador Seelye just brought me. Since we have little time we will begin right away. I hope your tour of Arab capitals will be fruitful and that you will succeed in your historical mission and your attempt to find a solution to bring peace back to the region. I don't know if you have a plan. I had proposed a plan to the Israelis; it was simple and correct and involved a great sacrifice on the part of the Palestinians in returning to the line of 1947. Any other solution will not be a solution but will keep wars going. The Palestinians had accepted the '47 line, which takes away 54 per cent of Palestine. 242 and its implementation after '67 will have no result since it came about as the result of a war between states and makes no reference to the Palestinians. More and more people come to realize the importance of the Palestinians. Even today the nine European countries said that the crux of the problem is Palestine. Having helped Israel, the United States can pressure it. The war has

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revealed that the Arab soldier, if properly armed, knows how to fight and die.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is not surprising if you look at the history of the Arabs.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: After '67 no one took them seriously. They had fled without shoes. But you must tell President Nixon that after this war the Soviet influence has grown. They are more and more in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Egypt, Aden and Southern Yemen, and they are also in Iraq and Syria and in India. I am sure that little by little Southeast Asia will fall prey to yellow communism, as in Cambodia, or Russian communism, as in Vietnam. We know that behind the iron curtain they hold their own people very tightly, as witnessed by the Sakharov protest, and we see it clearly here when cooperation agents from the iron curtain countries wanted to remain here after their assignments.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Many countries have had that experience.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The United States and the United States Government being young and enthusiastic trust their partners, but the Russians are consistently moving forward.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can assure you that we have no illusions about Soviet policy.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: In the recent Pakistani war when Nixon sent the Seventh Fleet on a maneuver similar to the Kennedy missile crisis when Khrushchev pulled back, this time Brezhnev did not move. The Soviets hold sway over India and Bangladesh, which owes its life to the Soviets and now Afghanistan sides with the Russians too. We feel the danger very acutely, having chosen democracy. I made my own choice back in 1940 through my friends. US Consul Doolittle gave me a visa to come to the United States in 1946. It is thanks to him that I am alive.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We know that you are a long-time friend of the United States.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: When I decorated the officers of the Sixth Fleet, I told them you do not defend only Southern Europe, you must also defend North Africa. In World War II, I sent a letter to the people of Tunisia from jail on August 8, 1942 in which I said that the Germans would surely lose the war. This came as a shock to the Tunisian people who suffered from repression. I was freed from jail by the Germans. For three months I was Mussolini's guest in Rome. He wanted my support. I said there was only one condition, to recognize the independence of Tunisia. But that's not what they were fighting for. So we waited for the Allies. Mr. Doolittle came back and told General Juin that he knew Bourguiba and that Bourguiba had been with the

Allies since 1940. So you see it all goes way back. I think also of the role played by Bob Murphy and the Bizerte Resolution which passed 66 to zero because no one wanted to vote for France.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I remember it very well. I have followed with great interest and admiration your entire career and your more recent declarations on this immediate problem of the Middle East. You showed great courage in speaking of negotiations at a time when it was not fashionable.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I was almost torn apart. Dean Rusk called me and said that my action called for great courage and not only physical courage. Now they are all saying if we only had listened to Bourguiba.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The mistake that you never made and that the Arab world made after '67 was to think that it could gain through hostility toward the United States.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: That was a very poor idea. Since 1946, when I worked with the joint US-UK commission, I travelled throughout Palestine and I said that there was no solution except dezionization of the Jews. We have nothing against the Jews. We respect all religions. The Koran respects all religions. We are all monotheists.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In this phase, the United States is prepared to make a joint contribution towards peace in the Middle East and if you analyze the situation you will conclude that only the United States can do this. Others can give weapons, but only the United States can give territory. It is important that the Arab countries show an understanding of our problems as we show now an understanding of their problems. It is not accidental that for 30 years the United States has supported a small country seven thousand miles away with a small population surrounded by hostile populations.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: It is this attitude of hostility which is a major error committed by the Arabs.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Those factors which produced the United States' engagement must be taken into account as we attempt now to conduct a more balanced policy. Nothing would please more those who are opposed to peace than to create opposition between the Arabs and the United States. Friendship between the Arabs and the United States is a natural thing. In this new phase we need a reasonable amount of time to organize ourselves. The Europeans can make all the declarations they want, it is pure rhetoric. The United States alone can produce results. I have nothing against their declarations, but what we need now is progress.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Europeans see their oil supply cut down and prices going up.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is not greatest form of heroism that history has witnessed, but is a fact. One word about oil because it is double-edged weapon. If at a time when we are making a major effort to bring peace and we are determined to do this and we face a serious domestic struggle, if at this same time we are confronted with rationing and shortages which can be blamed on the Arabs, it will strengthen our opponents, it will not fortify our positions. We will start an emergency program to substitute coal for oil through the technology of liquefaction and this costly program can be blamed by some upon the Arabs. The Arab countries must attenuate their pressures upon us and give us time to develop our policy.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I know that Arab oil only accounts for 6 per cent of US consumption.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: 12 per cent and you see it is large enough to be noticeable and annoying, but not large enough to be decisive. Besides we do not need the pressures of oil because we are determined to strive toward a just and durable peace.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: They use whatever weapons they have. They would use Phantoms or Migs, but it will have no effect, it may even have reverse impact.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The danger lies precisely there. We are acting now not because of oil but because of the reason President Nixon gave. A continuation of the conflict will mean that powers external to the area will become dominant, and this is not in the interest of the world and certainly not in the interest of the people of the Middle East.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Soviet Union has already assumed a position of dominance. Now with Sadat they will have a base in Alexandria.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If they have assumed a position of dominance, then we have no incentive to act.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: You see you miscalculated in your efforts for detente. You did not take the Middle East into account and as a result those people who for six years had had neither peace or war decided to strike.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We did not forget because of detente: an excess of emotionalism is not one of our characteristics.

SECRET/NODIS

Being occupied in Vietnam we did not want to handle two crises simultaneously. We knew that the Middle East could not be settled without a major crisis. I told many Arab Foreign Ministers with whom I talked before the war that we intended to take a determined action after the Israeli elections sometime in November. So it had been our intention all along to act at about this time, but the recent war has given even more impetus to our intention.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Palestinians will never agree to lose part of their territory by force. This is against international law, it is against honor. Before the war you thought the Arabs could not fight.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I never believed this myself. I am a historian. I know the history of the Arabs. The Koran was spread by armies not by missionaries. For centuries the Arab armies inspired fear.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: They felt they had a divine mission. The US knows of the preparations that are made, but they didn't feel the Arabs would do so well.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We felt we had more time. We did not think the crisis would come so fast. It came two weeks after I became Secretary.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: Egypt has made a number of friendly gestures to the United States but to no avail. It has awarded the pipeline to US firms.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think economic considerations are that important, policies and general philosophy are more important. During this last war Sadat behaved very wisely, not like Nasser who focussed hatred upon the United States. Sadat kept communications open and showed great wisdom.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: He got nothing in return for his gestures.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When he dismissed the Soviet advisers the intention was good, but the timing was unfortunate because it happened during an American electoral campaign and you cannot do anything in the United States at that time because of the Jewish electorate. As to how long it will take, the problem is to find the right moment. If we move too quickly we will obtain nothing. If we move too slowly there will be another explosion. We must find a reasonable time, and I do not believe it will take too long, but we want to move decisively. We think it's a matter of a few weeks.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I wish you success, but I see no solution as long as the Arab countries see part of their territory occupied by the Israelis. This will be a stumbling block with a "no peace - no war" situation. There will only be peace if Israel shows less greed and accepts what the UN offered it. Each country must defend its territories. The Palestinians were robbed of their lands. They agreed with the UN Resolution under which they lose 54 per cent of their lands. If Israel does not yield, it will behave as Hitler did in grabbing the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia under the pretext of securing German borders. That is not a way out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I told your Foreign Minister that in the next few weeks the negotiations can start and that process will help to define the borders.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The war is not over. Even today each side accuses the other of violating the cease-fire line which is a very vague line.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: But with your satellites you and the Russians know where the line is.

FONMIN MASMOUDI: The Egyptians know where it is and the Israelis know where it is and so do you and the Soviets. But the Egyptians and the Israelis don't want to say where the cease fire line is.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the cease fire line, I know that a number of people would like to debate that question because it has no final consequence. We can discuss the line of October 22nd for six months, and it will only bring a delay for the start of the real peace negotiations. I spent two evenings with Prime Minister Golda Meir and we spent 90 per cent of our time on the question of the cease fire line and where it was. If the Israelis are still on the line of October 22 in a year then we have failed. If they are not, then it does not matter where the line is.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: When I come to the United States, hopefully in May, I will see the President, and I will be ready to give a press conference.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are sorry to lose Ambassador El Goulli who has done a fine job in Washington.

PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I want to reiterate the importance of the Palestinians. They come to see me, and I talk with them. They are not an enemy, they are an unhappy people who have been wronged.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can be sure we will do our best to make peace. Our public opinion will be very important and we must have it with us. It will take us time to prepare that opinion.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1973

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*

Secretary Kissinger has sent you the following report of his meeting with King Hussein:

I had an extremely cordial and relaxed two and a half hour meeting with King Hussein in Amman today. He sends you his warmest regards which I reciprocated on your behalf.

The King explained in some detail the difficult choice he faced in the recent war and spoke with some satisfaction of the way he had avoided the twin dangers of full involvement, on the one hand, and isolation through total non-participation, on the other. He reflected a basic confidence in his position and in the correctness of his policies. At the same time he reiterated many of his old underlying concerns: apprehension about the Soviet position in Iraq, worry that other Arabs will make separate settlements with Israel which leave him out, and suspicion that some Arab leaders may be working for a separate Palestinian state at his expense. He said Sadat had told him even the U.S. and Soviets favored this -- an idea of which I immediately disabused him.

The King introduced an interesting new concept with regard to the Palestinian question; instead of an immediate return of the West Bank to Jordan following Israeli withdrawal, an international presence would be introduced in Gaza and the West Bank. A plebiscite would then be held offering the Palestinians there the choice between independence, federation with Jordan in a united Arab kingdom, or reintegration into the Hashemite Kingdom. I told him that we had always envisaged the Palestinians remaining a part of Jordan but said that his concept was an interesting one which could be kept in mind as the negotiations proceed.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

NW09-01/11002 Per Hx. 6/18/2012

By RS/MLH NARA, Date 11/16/2016~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (9)

CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

I briefed the King fully regarding the proposal I negotiated with Sadat on the ceasefire and prisoner of war question (Israeli acceptance had not yet been received at the time I left Amman). I also gave him in some detail our ideas for getting a peace conference started under US-Soviet auspices in early December. I assured him that we were not being taken in by the Soviets and had no secret understandings with them. Rather, we felt that the joint auspices idea offers the least difficult and most manageable approach among the available alternatives.

In response to my point that the Arabs could not expect help from us in bringing about a settlement while we were subjected to pressure on the oil issue, the King said he fully agreed with me and had said so to other Arab leaders.

Towards the end of our meeting, the King brought up his need for additional military assistance. I was frank about the Congressional limitations on our ability to be helpful but assured him we would do our best. I was able to convey to him our decision on rapid resupply of his tank losses in the war, which was helpful, but it is clear that he has in mind a more ambitious program and more sophisticated equipment than we have provided Jordan so far. This will be discussed with his military people next month, and I said I would tell the Defense Department to be sympathetic.

After the meeting the King hosted a small informal reception laced with humor, anecdotes and further examples of our common strategic approach to the Middle East. I reassured him once again that we would always check with him if and when we talked to the Palestinians. I noted that Jerusalem would probably prove to be the most difficult issue, the Israelis showing no sign of give. The Jordanians underlined again the importance of this question; we both agreed that the city could ideally serve as a bridge between Israelis and Arabs. The King stated that he had good relations with such common friends as Iran and Turkey who share our overall approach to the region.

Once again it was clear from this visit that the King highly values his relationship with you. He wants to cooperate closely with us to reinforce our common interests in the area and wants to be sure his policies and actions meet with your approval. I assured him they did.

The King capped our extremely warm reception by flying me to the airport in his helicopter, and providing us with a fighter escort.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 8, 1973

SUBJECT: Meeting between Secretary Kissinger and King Hussein

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Brown, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan
Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs

King Hussein of Jordan
Crown Prince Hassan
Prime Minister Zaid Rifai

King opened the conversation with a comment about the announcement of the resumption in principle, at an early date, of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had always taken the view that we were prepared to renew relations when Egypt was. We saw no need to make concessions, and we did not do so. President Sadat has understood that a hostile attitude toward the U.S. will not achieve the results he seeks. If he is hostile, he can get arms from the Soviets, but it won't satisfy his aspirations. The Egyptians are beginning to understand this as Your Majesty always has.

I believe we have reached a solution of the ceasefire issue, assuming we get Israeli agreement. (The Secretary then handed the King a copy of the six-point agreement negotiated in Cairo, emphasizing that he was doing so on a confidential basis.) This agreement deals only with the ceasefire. It means an end to the debate about where the October 22 lines are.

KING HUSSEIN: Does it establish the lines?

NEA·ALAtherton, Jr./h1k/11/19/73

(Drafting Office and Officer)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It does not call for a return to the October 22 lines. What it does is to remove Israel from the checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road and provide that the UN will move in. There will be unlimited non-military supplies to the Third Army. There will be Israelis at the one checkpoint at the Suez end of the road, together with the UN, to supervise the off-loading. There will be an exchange of POWs, and harassment of shipping in the Red Sea will be relaxed. I think the ceasefire problem will be resolved.

KING HUSSEIN: This is gratifying. The situation was becoming dangerous.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We thought it futile to debate where the October 22 lines are. If there is a peace settlement soon, this will be irrelevant.

KING HUSSEIN: How was the visit of Golda Meir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Your Majesty has had experience in dealing with her. Flexibility is not her outstanding attitude. Making peace will be a big adjustment for Israel.

KING HUSSEIN: I agree, but it is a last chance. The Israelis must put themselves in the position of viewing matters from the point of view of others.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The history of Israel is a history of struggle. They are not used to peace.

How shall we proceed?

(The King indicated he had no preference.) I would welcome Your Majesty's views.

KING HUSSEIN: (Reading from a prepared brief) Ever since the 1967 war Jordan has done all it could to achieve a just and lasting peace. I warned that unless Israel's position changed a resumption of the war was inevitable. I expected this last war and passed on to you information we had about Egyptian and Syrian plans. I did not know the date, but I knew the situation was explosive. I hoped that there would be efforts to prevent it and expected Israel to make some adjustments in its position. Before this last war Sadat told me his purpose was not to destroy Israel.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I may interrupt Your Majesty, how long before the war did he tell you this?

KING HUSSEIN: I was told personally when I was last in Egypt that something must be done. The situation was changing on the ground and in the world. Sadat did not tell me when he would go to war, but I had the impression following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between ourselves and Egypt and the institution of political coordination among us that any military moves would be coordinated. It did not work that way, but I had heard from Sadat of his need to improve his negotiating position.

This tragic deterioration of the situation should not have been allowed to happen. It put Jordan in a difficult position. I did not wish to participate in the war but could not remain entirely out. Jordan is the Arab country most involved in terms of both land and population. Participation in the war could have led to the destruction of Jordan and the creation of a vacuum which radical elements would have filled. Non-participation could have led to the total isolation of Jordan and to our becoming the scapegoat. Despite our participation some are still trying to make us the scapegoat. I have heard this from some on my recent visit to Arab countries -- for example from Sadat, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. They said that things would have ^{been} different if Jordan had permitted the Fedayeen to operate from its territory and put pressure on Israel.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No such comment was made to me by Sadat.

KING HUSSEIN: If we had done this, we would have had to concentrate on our very survival. Instead, we chose a formula which avoided both dangers and enabled us to be a counter-balance to the Israelis in Syria.

I am pleased with the ceasefire and accepted it before the Syrians did. When Syria accepted, I considered pulling our troops out of Syria but feared an Iraqi move to take over. The Iraqis have now withdrawn and Jordanian troops are back to the third line. I have told the Syrians I need to withdraw my forces as soon as possible and am waiting to hear from them.

We are now in the post-war period and there is need for a solution to the problems of the Egyptian Third Army, the POW issue, and the problem of Israeli occupation of additional Syrian territory. Obviously we are now facing the battle of peace. I want to

agree with the United States on where we go and how.

Our situation is different from that of Syria and Egypt, which are not connected with the Palestinian problem and which already had international boundaries before the 1967 war. Jordan's 1967 border was the armistice demarcation line. The West Bank is both Jordanian territory and part of Palestine. The population is Jordanian and Palestinian. The rights of the Palestinians have to do not with the West Bank and Jordan but with Israel. The question is who represents the Palestinians. Our position is that the West Bank is Jordanian-Palestinian territory occupied by Israel. It is Jordan's duty to recover that territory with minor changes on a reciprocal basis. In addition, we cannot give up responsibility for the Moslem and Christian parts of Jerusalem which should, however, remain a unified city.

We are ready for a settlement based on Resolution 242. Negotiations should be between one Arab side and the Israeli side. I do not mind if others reach agreement first, provided the settlement is implemented as a package.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I want to be sure I understood. Is Your Majesty saying that any implementation must await a settlement by all parties?

KING HUSSEIN: This is my preference. Progress in one area should not impede progress in others. The Syrians feel the same.

On the question of having a Palestinian delegation at the negotiations, I do not oppose this but they cannot claim to represent all Palestinians. I would not object provided they represent those Palestinians outside the West Bank. Some Arab countries are trying to use the Palestine Liberation Organization to establish an independent Palestine consisting of the West Bank and Gaza. I do not accept this. Once the West Bank is returned, I will give it self-determination provided Israel withdraws to an international presence.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Could Your Majesty explain?

KING HUSSEIN: I want to give the Palestinians the right for the second time to say what they want.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You do not seek withdrawal to Your Majesty's control?

KING HUSSEIN: Not immediately. I would give the population a choice under the supervision of an international presence between a separate Palestinian state, federation in a united Arab kingdom, or again becoming part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom will respect any choice the population makes in a free popular expression of its wishes. It is difficult now to see how a free choice can be made. There are many tendencies and influences from the Palestine Liberation Organization and other Arab states. Jordan has a responsibility to seek to recover its territory; if it is not returned directly to Jordan, then to some international body. We need to find the way to lasting peace.

If the Soviet Union gets the Palestine Liberation Organization to challenge Jordan's claim to the West Bank, this means Jordan would no longer be a party to the conflict. This would be dangerous, since a separate peace under such circumstances would create a new radical entity and violate Resolution 242.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a constructive idea (i.e., a West Bank plebiscite under an international presence). I want to tell you in confidence that I have discussed with Sadat and with the Soviets the question of auspices for the negotiations. We think U.S.-Soviet auspices would be best. If we invited the British and French, we must invite China which would then fight with the Soviets, and the British and French would fight with us. We have no special love for the Soviets but think the Israelis are more likely to accept them than others. Any other auspices would be more complex. The UN Secretary General could participate or at least preside. In the first stage, we foresee the participation of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel to discuss the disengagement of forces. I told Sadat that the participation of others, meaning Lebanon and Palestine, should be discussed during the first stage. We did this to protect Your Majesty. President Sadat has agreed to this procedure. This makes Your Majesty a charter member, and the question does not arise whether Jordan is a party. Also, we need not face the question of who represents the West Bank; only Jordan represents them. The Palestinians could be introduced at a later stage. I advise Your Majesty not to get into this question now.

KING HUSSEIN: The other Arabs want the Palestinians included.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is true, but they know they need us. With regard to the ultimate disposition of the West Bank, I have not formed an opinion, but I hold the firm view that friends of the United States should not be penalized. We have acted, as in the Indian-Pakistani War, to make clear that our friends will not be forsaken.

If the disposition of the West Bank becomes an issue, I find your three-option, international-presence proposal interesting. But this is not the U.S. position, which remains what it has been in the past. However, we should keep Your Majesty's idea in the back of our minds for the negotiations. I have not yet discussed the question of the peace conference with Israel. We think, however, that it should start in Geneva around December 7, 8 or 9.

Incidentally, if there are many more pictures of me with my arms around Arabs, I will be in difficulty. After this trip, I won't be able to go to New York.

In my view, this may be the last chance for peace; it is certainly the best chance. But there are several factors to be taken into account: (1) Israel cannot make a rational decision until after its elections; (2) there is the problem of the basic Israeli position; (3) there is the domestic situation in the U.S. and some related difficulties of the President; (4) there is the Arab mentality which has a kind of romanticism about it. This is attractive, but it leads to impatience. An idea one day becomes a proposal the next day and a plan the next. I have been appealing to all to keep in mind that in every negotiation I have conducted I have recognized the need for careful preparation. If we push too fast, we can destroy the opportunity. We recognize the need to make progress. From the Arabs we need patience and a sense of responsibility, though I do not need to say this to Your Majesty. We need trust between the Arabs and ourselves.

I told Sadat there is no way the Arabs can achieve what they want through hostility toward the U.S. If the Arabs want to work with us, we are prepared. One problem here is the oil pressure. I must tell you that under no circumstances will we accept pressure from the Europeans. They can freeze to death and we will not yield. Furthermore, we cannot accept the idea that we can be blackmailed into doing our duty. We want peace

because the situation in its absence is too dangerous and the area will be radicalized. But as for the oil pressure, we get only 12 percent of our oil from the Middle East; the embargo is a nuisance, but we can manage. But if we have six months of oil shortages, we cannot also be asked to make a major diplomatic effort and to take on the Jewish community. If the oil pressures continue, nothing I have said will hold. We are not asking for a formal end to the embargo, but we need to have it relaxed. We need to be given time to conduct our diplomacy.

KING HUSSEIN: On the question of the Palestinians, we are almost certain of what the results of a plebiscite will be, given the close feelings between Palestinians and Jordanians. We feel that any solution must deal with all territory recovered, not only the West Bank but Gaza as well. It must all be under one umbrella. Giving the West Bank and Gaza a choice about their future will satisfy Jordan.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will keep your idea in mind. We have not discussed a Palestinian solution with the Israelis, and it affects their interests. We have no objection to self-determination but will want to discuss the question with Israel. We have always felt that the best thing for Israel is to keep the West Bank under Jordanian rule.

KING HUSSEIN: We are thinking in terms of the future. My concept of giving the Palestinians a choice is offered as an idea.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just thinking out loud I doubt that Israel wants the Palestinians to participate, but at the same time your offer would ease Palestinian pressures.

ZAID RIFAI: Do you think what His Majesty has been saying would come in the second stage?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. The first stage discussions will deal with military disengagement.

ZAID RIFAI: Would the second stage also include withdrawal?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There would be some in the first stage and some in the second, but the question of participation of others, by which we mean Lebanon and Palestine, would only be discussed in the first stage.

I assume that you feel that Iraq should not participate. We are openminded.

KING HUSSEIN: You should not be.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was joking.

From the American and Israeli viewpoint the best solution would be a Jordanian West Bank. This would make it easier to carry out demilitarization and other measures. But most of the problems for Your Majesty do not come from the U.S. and Israel but from the other Arabs.

ZAID RIFAI: Have you discussed settlement terms with the Soviets?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. Of course the Soviets will seek to give the impression that we are partners. The Soviets talk much about detente, but for us this is a practical, not an emotional question, produced in part by our domestic situation and by nuclear realities. We think it will be easier to work with the Soviets than not to do so, but we have made no agreements with them except on the question of auspices. We are prepared to hold discussions bilaterally with the Arabs. The U.S. has no interest in the spread of Soviet influence. I do not need to make this clear in Amman, but I have said this to Sadat. For a week after the ceasefire Sadat sent his messages to us through the Soviets. We have told him to send them directly to us.

KING HUSSEIN: Sadat has said there is a U.S.-Soviet agreement about a Palestinian state.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is not true.

The Soviets have made all kinds of offers: a joint U.N. emergency force, a joint expeditionary force, joint representatives in Cairo for the ceasefire. But it would be stupid for

us to cooperate in these ways and thus let the Soviets in. We intend to work directly with all concerned.

ZAID RIFAI: We are puzzled by something Ambassador Salah in Washington reported that Mr. Sisco said to him. Salah says that Sisco asked whom Jordan preferred to have represent it the U.S. or the Soviet Union. (The Secretary asked Atherton if he knew about this. Atherton said he was present at the conversation referred to, and Salah's report was not exactly what Sisco had said. Sisco had said that he assumed Jordan would prefer to have the U.S., rather than the Soviet Union, act as its lawyer.)

ZAID RIFAI: The Soviets would be a nuisance. We want the U.S. to speak for us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree the Soviets will be a nuisance, but joint auspices with them are necessary.

KING HUSSEIN. Did Sadat speak for the Syrians when you were in Cairo?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We prefer to speak to them directly.

ZAID RIFAI: The Syrians told us that they would have welcomed a visit by you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then we made a misjudgment. Please tell the Syrians we want to be in touch with them. I will be pleased to see them when I go to NATO. Tell them to send any high-level representative and I will be pleased to meet him. I have already seen Ismail (Syria's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs). The Syrians must understand that the U.S. has no animosity toward them.

KING HUSSEIN: Jordan's interests are parallel with those of the United States. How do you see Jordan's position in the area as a whole? Can we rely on the help of the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our interest in the Gulf has, if anything, increased. Within the limitations of Congressional restraints we will be delighted to help.

KING HUSSEIN: On the oil question, I have told the other Arabs that their pressures are a mistake.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They will backfire. Groups in the United States who are opposed to the Arabs will say that the Arabs are all with the Soviets and they (the Arabs) are responsible for the oil shortage. Many of the Jewish press people traveling with me have been hostile to our agreement in principle to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt. The agreement on the ceasefire and the POWs is favorable to Israel, but the press people have assumed the worst.

ZAID RIFAI: Has Sadat accepted your line of reasoning?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but he says that many of the rulers of oil-producing states are uncontrollable.

ZAID RIFAI: Sadat is pressing them to use the oil lever. When you deal with Sadat it is difficult to get an agreement that sticks.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He can't get away with it, if he wants support from us.

KING HUSSEIN: You will have a problem when you go to Saudi Arabia.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know whether our personalities will harmonize.

KING HUSSEIN: You will hear a lecture on Zionism and Communism. The younger ones in Saudi Arabia, for example Prince Fahd, will be good ones to see.

CROWN PRINCE HASSAN: I want to say something on the question of the Palestinians. Jordan has been the only one to put forward a plan. Most of the Palestinians are in Jordan. We need to find a way that U.S. help can be channeled to help the Palestinians, but this is a case where the more that is done and the less that is said is the better. It is important to avoid international consortia and public visibility.

KING HUSSEIN: This is a continuation of what the U.S. is doing. After the Soviet threat in the area, the next threat is from Iraq.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought I had heard that the Iraqis were returning to Syria.

KING HUSSEIN: This is not clear. But there is a solid Soviet presence in Iraq which can create difficulties in the Gulf and even on the energy question.

I have another problem to raise on the economic side. The war has affected us adversely. We need to continue to play an effective role. To do this, we need to take a new look at our military planning. We were not aware until this war of how far behind we were in sophisticated equipment. With regard to our previous planning on deliveries and types of equipment and in the light of your airlift to Israel, Jordan has a problem.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are prepared to replace your losses immediately through delivery of the M-60 tanks and of M-48A3 tanks -- with 32 or 38 of them, I am not sure which. Beyond that we are sympathetic to discussing any additional requirements in addition to our previous planning. But we have an almost uncontrollable Congressional problem resulting in a sharp reduction of funds.

ZAID RIFAI: We need a planeload of TOWs to show our army that you are taking care of us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am told we have pretty well run out of them, but I will look into this -- at least with regard to sending a token supply.

KING HUSSEIN: We will need to review all of our military planning in the next talks between our military people.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will instruct the Defense Department to be forthcoming.

ZAID RIFAI: Their approach must be different this time. - In the past we have spent three days discussing the delivery of some items three years in the future.

KING HUSSEIN: Jordan will be helpful to you with respect to studying Soviet weapons; a new kind of surface-to-air missile -- I think it is a SAM-2D -- landed in our territory from Syria during the war, and we are cooperating with your team which is

studying it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is your impression of the Syrian army?

KING HUSSEIN: They have high morale. Their losses in armor were heavy, but these are being replaced. They have a new class of pilots graduating. They did much better in the field this time than last. Their planning is not as effective as it could be. They have lots of Soviet experts with them with whom our boys had a chance to discuss military tactics.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Your Majesty, do you have any information about the presence of Soviet combat forces in Syria?

KING HUSSEIN: We have nothing recently.

(At this point the King and the Secretary continued the discussion in private.)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: King Faysal ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud
Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, Second
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Interior
'Umar al-Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs
Dr. Rashad Pharaon, Royal Adviser
Shaikh Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Saudi Arabia
Ambassador to the United States

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Ambassador James Akins
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Isa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U. S. Embassy,
Beirut (interpreter)

TIME AND DATE: Thursday, November 8, 1973
8:45 - 10:25 p.m.

PLACE: The Royal Palace
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

[At the opening of the meeting, the members of the party were introduced to the King. There was a brief photo opportunity. After the photographers were dismissed, servants entered and served cups of coffee spiced with cardamom.]

Faysal: I hope you have had no difficulties on this trip.

Kissinger: No, Your Majesty, I've had a very good trip and a trip I hope can contribute to peace in the Middle East.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NL009-01/11003 Per Hr. 6/18/2012
By RS/MAH NARA, Date 11/16/2016

~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Faysal: This is our hope also, that it will lead to peace.

Kissinger: I have had the benefit of some of your reflections on peace in the Middle East, Your Majesty. I wonder if there are some additional comments you would care to make that I could transmit to President Nixon.

Faysal: Of course our deepest hope is that peace and stability will reign in the Middle East, and Your Excellency is aware of my views in the past: in essence, that there will be no stability and peace unless Israel withdraws from the occupied territories and the Palestinians go back to their own homes. And that is why we sincerely hope that it will come about as expeditiously as possible, and that the Arabs will be permitted to return to friendship with their American friends. And we also hope that this in itself -- the restoration of peace and stability, and of friendship -- will automatically lead to a shrinking of Communist influence in the area.

Kissinger: Would Your Majesty like me to describe first what we did on this trip, and then describe where we proceed?

Faysal: As Your Excellency would like.

Kissinger: I remember vividly, Your Majesty, your visit to the United States, when you pointed out to our President some of the dangers you saw in the situation. And many of the predictions of His Majesty have come true.

I thought it would be useful if I explained to His Majesty what our thinking is, so that even if he disagrees with us in some details he can understand us and perhaps contradict us where we are wrong.

Faysal: Please.

Kissinger: Between 1967 and 1973, Your Majesty, the United States did not succeed in doing something decisive about the problems in the Middle East. My predecessor, Secretary Rogers, and Secretary Sisco made an effort for some two years, but it did not have the full organized power of the United States behind it -- which was not their fault. The difficulty for us, Your Majesty, has been that until this year, most of our domestic attention was focused on the war in Viet-Nam, and we did not find it easy to take on the domestic upheaval that it would represent domestically. After the end of the war in Viet-Nam, Your Majesty, the President directed me to turn my attention to the Middle East -- and I must say,

Your Majesty, that he did this before the way, at the end of August and in early September.

When I met Your Majesty's Foreign Minister in New York, at the end of September, I pointed out to him that we would make a major effort at the end of November, and we discussed how the U. S. could cooperate with the Arab world. Then the war broke out, and accelerated all developments.

Now the war presented us, Your Majesty, with a particular problem. I know some of our actions embarrassed some of our old friends. While we may not gain your approval, perhaps I can explain to you why we acted as we did.

From the first day we say that the war proved the indispensable necessity of finding peace. And President Sadat will confirm to you, Your Majesty, that we exchanged correspondence with him every day, even in the most bitter days, when we were doing things that were most painful for Egypt. And we always told President Sadat what I'm saying to Your Majesty -- that when the war is over, the U. S. will use its influence for peace, no matter what we do during the war.

Our motivation during the war, Your Majesty, was to prevent the increase of Communist influence. And when the Soviet Union poured arms into the area, then we believed we had to react to that. I know Your Majesty doesn't agree with this, but I thought Your Majesty would want to understand our motivations during the two weeks of war.

But now the war is over. We were instrumental in bringing about a cease-fire, even though the Israelis wanted to continue fighting. We have been instrumental -- in fact, we have been decisive -- in bringing about the resupply of the Third Egyptian Army. And when I met with President Sadat yesterday, he and I agreed on a settlement to the ceasefire problem, which now has been accepted -- under great pressure -- by Israel. This makes it possible to open peace negotiations.

Incidentally, if Your Majesty wishes, we can leave a text of the agreement with your Foreign Minister. It will be announced tomorrow evening.

Faysal: [nods] I am grateful to Your Excellency for these elaborations and explanations, and I would like to mention the fact -- that you know -- that in the past I repeatedly explained to President Nixon and Secretary Rogers the pressing need for the U. S. to bring pressure on Israel to withdraw from

the occupied territories -- worrying about the inevitable explosion I foresaw.

Kissinger: His Majesty turned out to be correct.

Faysal: Because the Communists, as you know, would like the situation to remain as it is, because it is fertile ground to penetrate further. We know the U. S. , throughout its history, has always stood up against the aggressor. Your Excellency recalls vividly in the last war when the Nazis cast avaricious eyes and moved against Poland and Czechoslovakia, the U. S. without hesitation moved against them, with the British and French. In 1956, the U. S. did not hesitate to line up against the British and French allied with Israel which committed aggression.

If the United States after the 1967 war had immediately taken steps not only to stop Israeli advances but to move back to the lines of June 4, 1967, we wouldn't have seen these recent developments.

As I have explained, Your Excellency, and as I have made it clear to President Nixon, my thoughts are that unless the Israelis withdraw from the occupied territories and permit the refugees to return to their homes, there will be no peace. Once this happens, there will be peace.

I am speaking frankly, of course, as a friend. Actually it saddens me, it is painful to me to have to take steps which not only cause an imbalance in our relationship, but harm our friendship.

But as you recall, I read in 1967, events opened up more avenues for the Communists to advance. And what did they do? They ran around stirring up trouble, spreading the idea that Saudi Arabia is in cahoots with Israel. Because the Communists know that we are their biggest obstacle in the Communists' path in this area, that's precisely why they are ceaselessly stirring up trouble to remove us.

Kissinger: I agree with Your Majesty on the Communist political and security purposes.

Faysal: But unfortunately Israel seems to be preparing the ground for the success of these designs. That is why I say, and I would like to repeat, that Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories and permit the return of those who have fled. Without these two practical steps, there will be no guarantee of peace in the area.

Sagqaf: I want to point out that some have the impression that His Majesty doesn't care any more about the issue of Jerusalem. This is, of course, not true.

Faysal: It is unfortunate that among those of the Jewish faith there are those who embraced Zionism, and this will be to the detriment of the Jewish people. Before the advent of Israel, of the Jewish state, there was nothing to harm the good relations between them. The Arabs had no reason to resist them. There were many Jews living in Arab countries, we called them Arab Jews. When the Jews were persecuted in Spain, for example, the Arabs protected them. In Spain, the Romans also drove the Jews from these areas, but the Arabs welcomed them.

These are problems created by Israel, aided and abetted by the intrigues and designs of Israel.

At the Yalta Conference, President Franklin Roosevelt's meeting with Stalin, the President and Churchill wanted to do something for the Jews, and it was Stalin who said: "No, we must have a state for them." And the Soviet Ambassador at the UN accused the U.S. of placing obstacles to the creation of the Jewish State.

After 1947, in the ensuing negotiations, Count Bernadotte sent a representative urging that the territory be rescinded. It was the Soviet Union then that opposed the ceasefire.

So this points out the Communists' designs. Doubtless, Your Excellency is aware of all these points. What is needed now, at the risk of repeating myself, is Israeli withdrawal as soon as possible from the occupied territories, and allowing the Palestinians to go home. If these two things can be done, it can happen that peace and stability can be restored.

The U.S. always stands up against the aggressor, and many regard Israel as the aggressor. From 1958 to 1967, there was never any act of aggression against Israeli territory, in spite of the fact that after 1949 Israel was offered a certain defined territory, as you know.

I present this argument for a major effort. I therefore urge my American friends that they should not abet this tendency in Israel. We actually think the U.S. has the most of its friends in the Arab world. And we sincerely hope once the U.S. gives up its out-and-out support for Israel..... which is not even in your country's interest.

As a friend of the U. S. , I hold close to my heart U. S. interests, almost as close to my heart as my own country's interest.

But unfortunately, and Your Excellency will realize it immediately, it is inconsistent with your interests. We always want to establish this, and it is painful also to hear that there are in America elements -- and outside the Jews -- who support Israeli superiority. There is no reason to continue this. We feel it is incumbent on the U. S. to realize this.

It is not a question of racism but a question of loving one's patrie. We deal, even in the Arab world, with people on the same level, whether Jews or not. There must be established in Palestine, by agreement, a mixed Jewish-Moslem state. No one refers to the U. S. as a "Christian state." They will open it up to all in a democratic process.

How is it conceivable to witness the driving away of an indigenous people from their homes and territory, and at the same time bring in people who don't really belong there [but bring them in only] because of their religion? Now the greatest part of the immigration is from the Soviet Union. They seem to want to establish a Communist base right in the middle of this region. As you know, the Communists are against the beliefs of any kind. All faiths believe in a deity, but the Communists don't.

Kissinger: Your Majesty, the problem the U. S. now faces is how we can go from the present situation -- what we recognize is intolerable to the Arabs -- to a genuine peace.

Faysal: Start by having Israel withdraw.

Kissinger: I agree, Israel has to make withdrawals. But it is a problem for the U. S. how to bring this about. If you permit me, Your Majesty, I'd like to put before you our thoughts on this.

Faysal: I must draw your attention to my deepest thought, that Israel would withdraw the moment Israel saw that you would no longer protect it, cuddle it.

Kissinger: I have examined His Majesty's thinking on this subject, and I must say it has considerable merit.

The problem is that the Communists can give arms to the Arabs but only the U. S. can bring peace for the Arabs. His Majesty pointed out that the

U. S. can influence Israel to choose a course of peace. I believe His Majesty is right.

The United States can do it, but it is a very difficult enterprise for the United States. Because the conditions that produce the American relationship to Israel have a very profound significance within the United States in certain domestic groups. The reason why in the past many initiatives have not succeeded is because they were treated as foreign policy problems and insufficient attention was devoted to handling the domestic situation.

I'm speaking very candidly to His Majesty.

Faysal: I appreciate your frankness and I reciprocate when I say it is incumbent on the citizens of a country to be loyal to that country.

Kissinger: That may be true, but it is a fact that many people in key places in our Government, including many in Congress, identify U. S. interests with Israel's interests.

Faysal: I repeat, we can't see it. What interests does the United States have? On the contrary, as far as we can see, Israel is a liability to the Americans, costing you much.

Kissinger: Regardless of the pressures, the important thing is that the President has now decided to make a major effort to bring about a settlement. Contrary to 1967, the President is prepared to fight the battles that are necessary to bring this result. I told your Foreign Minister this, and in honor of His Majesty I confirm it to you today.

Faysal: We are very hopeful that our way of thinking ... that you will see your way to go along with these suggestions.

Kissinger: We want to move in that direction. But I would like His Majesty to understand certain problems on our side. We have in recent weeks given considerable proof that we're moving in the direction that His Majesty indicated: We saved the Egyptian Third Army. And we have brought about an agreement that will now be signed tomorrow or the day after on stabilizing the ceasefire. And we have agreed with President Sadat on the opening of a peace conference and on the direction we will move in a peace conference. And we are going to establish friendly relations with every Arab country that is prepared to do it. And His Majesty will remember that I specifically mentioned Syria at the dinner table.

Faysal: Incidentally, before I mention Syria, I should say that I asked a Syrian friend whether Syria would have anything against a visit by you to Syria. He said instantly, "On the contrary; we would welcome it."

Kissinger: That was a misunderstanding. The principle of a visit to Syria is accepted, and we will maintain contacts.

Faysal: This was Syria's reply to my message to our Ambassador in Syria, and we got an answer back from their Foreign Minister.

Kissinger: We will keep this very much in mind, and I want to make clear we do not intend to exclude Syria from contact at a very high level on an equal basis.

Faysal: This is absolutely right, because Syria cannot be ostracized.

Kissinger: I assure Your Majesty that we will deal with Syria with great seriousness, and any advice His Majesty has on this will be greatly appreciated.

Faysal: We confirm that the Syrians are anxious to meet with you and receive you at the highest level.

Kissinger: We will reestablish contact with them immediately on my return to the U.S. On this trip my schedule was absolutely fixed but, I repeat, we will establish contact at the highest level. When I come to Europe in December, perhaps I can use the occasion to meet with the President of Syria.

Faysal: Yes.

Kissinger: Let me point out some of our problems. We will move in the direction I indicated but we must be given the opportunity to organize our domestic situation or our effort will fail. We must prevent the combination of the attacks already being made on the President from other reasons with the attacks from certain religious groups from becoming overwhelming. Therefore, we will begin to organize our support in Congress and in the newspapers and elsewhere. This will take us some weeks.

Faysal: We wish you every success in this regard, and we hope you will move as expeditiously as possible.

Kissinger: I have been told that His Majesty is a man of his word and that he respects people who act the same way.

Faysal: Of course, I appreciate that, but I also would appreciate -- and I would shout it from the rooftops if I could -- that Americans will become aware of their interest.

Kissinger: His Majesty will see in the next months that we will make a major effort to make progress.

Faysal: A few months will be a bit much for the impatient, but let's hope it can be weeks. To get rid of Communism once and for all.

Kissinger: Let me touch on a subject about which I know nothing and our Ambassador knows a great deal. This is the question of the embargo on oil by certain Arab states. We understand the emotions that produced this, and we are not debating those.

Faysal: This is precisely what makes me red hot with anxiety to expedite this as fast as possible, so we can go not only to rescinding the ban but to increase our production.

It has been almost calamitous to my nerves to have to take this action with my American friends. My colleagues can confirm that yesterday I nearly was incapacitated because of my nerves, but I controlled myself and was able to receive you. Yesterday I received the credentials of your Ambassador, and -- parenthetically, these two things are not related -- I nearly had a nervous breakdown. My doctor told me to rest. Thanks be to God, I recovered and was able to receive you.

Therefore, I repeat, I am most anxious that this happen most expeditiously, so that we can not only go back to the status quo but increase our production.

Kissinger: But I want to put before His Majesty the following proposition: The decision has had enormous effect -- not economic, because we can handle it economically, but psychologically, coming as it did from an old friend of the United States.

Faysal: That is precisely why I have suffered even more than you.

Kissinger: And we take it very seriously. But now we face a new situation. The strategy of those who oppose peace has been to portray the Arab world as basically hostile to the United States and therefore to mobilize public support for opposition to the peace effort. Over the next period, Your Majesty, we are prepared to move in the direction of peace, on a course we already discussed with President Sadat. It will be very difficult if now in America we face a situation where we have to ration gas and in winter have to limit the heating of our housing. In this situation, two things will happen: First, President Nixon's authority will be further weakened, because he will be blamed whatever the reason. And as his authority is weakened, his ability to act decisively in other fields is weakened. Second, certain forces will be able to use this to generate hostility to the Arab world in general. And since these forces have a great deal of influence on the press and TV anyway, it makes it enormously difficult. And this is why I wanted to put, for the consideration of Your Majesty, [the idea] not of reversing the principle, but of limiting its application. If what I say is not realized, His Majesty will be forced [to reimpose it]. But what I am suggesting is the possibility of limiting this difficulty, to ease the task of those moving towards peace.

I've discussed this problem frankly with President Sadat, and he has said he would not oppose such a decision.

Faysal: Of course it would be a great pleasure to us to be in a position to rescind it immediately. But you understand the difficulty we are in, and the embarrassment to us. This decision has been in our mind for a long time. But in order to come to a happy medium and achieve what you are asking, it would be for the United States to announce immediately that Israel must withdraw from the territories and allow the return of the Palestinians and -- and this is a new thing -- that if Israel does not do so, you will no longer support it.

Kissinger: May I say something, not with the idealism of His Majesty, but in its practical aspects? If we make a dramatic announcement, we will create a domestic upheaval. We have to move step-by-step toward a goal.

If I can say something here in strict confidence -- that will not be repeated -- that in the next few days we are planning to end the airlift that was started during the war.

Faysal: That is something that should be.

Kissinger: But we can do certain things, but if we announce total programs it will be very dangerous for us.

Faysal: That is exactly why you are on the right path, and I am urging only speed.

Kissinger: That is the situation, Your Majesty, and we will move with the speed that the situation permits. But if I can urge His Majesty to consider -- not for a decision here but he will want to reflect on it -- but to resort not to pressure now but to a way to make our task easier. And if we don't produce results, His Majesty is free to return to the previous policy.

Our Ambassador, who is an expert on the oil problem, will be able to confirm to His Majesty that in the next period, when diplomacy will be most active, the oil restrictions will be annoying but not decisive. But they can be used by our opponents to mobilize public opinion with the view that we are yielding to Arab blackmail -- which we can already see in the newspapers in Israel and certain U. S. papers. And it is important to what we should see as a common objective.

Faysal: This is our own predicament -- the other side of the coin -- that the Communists are accusing some Arab elements of going along with U. S. pressure.

Kissinger: One reason we are having the Soviet Union in the peace conference is not because they can bring peace but to make it harder for them to do mischief during the conference.

Faysal: Yes, but I'd also like to forewarn you that they cannot be trusted.

Kissinger: Your Majesty, I can assure you that we have no illusions about the Soviet Union. I don't have to remind you that the Soviet Union is our enemy.

Faysal: In essence, I repeat, if we aim at the right path by getting Israel to withdraw and permit the people to return, then the Soviet Union will have no leg to stand on.

Kissinger: That is why we want to mobilize support. Your Ambassador can confirm that it is essential not to further weaken the authority of the President. The President will have to spend all his time explaining why he

didn't foresee the energy crisis, why there has to be rationing, etc. It will strengthen our opponents who do not want peace and weaken your friends who do want peace. And if it doesn't come about, unintentionally, you can return to your previous policy. That is understood.

Faysal: I offer a ready answer with which to hit those who want to accuse you of succumbing to Arab blackmail -- it is to say that the only reason the Arabs are doing this is our support for the enemy of the Arabs.

Kissinger: Your Majesty, it won't work this way. Our best propaganda in the United States is to say that we are on a responsible course, not because we are anti-Israel or pro-Arab but because we are interested in peace in the Middle East and the national interests of the United States. That's the only argument they will understand. If we debate the merits of the Arab-Israeli dispute, there will be more people defending the Israeli side than the Arab side, even if His Majesty is right. That is why we want to raise the level of argument to the level of the American national interest, and that cannot be debated.

Faysal: Of course I appreciate your valid explanations. But at the same time I wish Your Excellency to appreciate the position of Saudi Arabia, which was a decision not of ours alone but as part of a joint decision. We are part of the Arab family. What I need is the wherewithal to go to my colleagues and urge this. Therefore, first I need speed, and second to announce it [your position] publicly.

Kissinger: We will do this at various stages of the negotiation. But if we do it before the negotiations, it will defeat itself. If we do it before the negotiations, we will be less effective in the negotiations.

I have in the past not made promises to Arab leaders because I was not sure I could deliver anything. Since September I have spoken with many Arab leaders and I don't want to promise more than I can deliver.

Faysal: We sincerely hope you'll achieve this goal and we wish you success.

Kissinger: I know His Majesty wouldn't wish to make a decision on this subject while I'm here. I would just wish that after I've been here, His Majesty might bear in mind this -- that pressure could make the task difficult, or impossible. And I hope His Majesty might consider that the efforts we have done already -- bringing about a ceasefire, bringing about

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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the relief of the Third Army, bringing about stabilization of the ceasefire, and ending the airlift next week -- would be evidence of the direction in which we are moving.

Faysal: We pray to Almighty God that He will continue to grant you success in all these noble efforts. I spoke very frankly to Your Excellency because I respect your proven ability and wisdom.

Kissinger: I appreciate His Majesty putting his problems before us. Our Ambassador can pursue this subject at a later period.

Faysal: We will of course welcome discussions with His Excellency the Ambassador always.

I repeat our supplication to God and our prayers that all these problems will be removed as expeditiously as possible.

Kissinger: I give His Majesty the assurance that we will make a major effort, with all the dedication of which we are capable, for our friends in the Arab world.

Faysal: And I wish you the greatest success.

Kissinger: I don't want to tire His Majesty, but of course I am at His Majesty's disposal. Should we continue?

Faysal: I appreciate your consideration.

[The meeting then ended at 10:25 p.m.]

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: 'Umar al-Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs

Dr Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
James Akins, U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Isa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U. S. Embassy
Beirut (interpreter)

TIME AND DATE: Thursday, November 8, 1973
11:03 - 11:57 p. m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Suite
Guest House
Riyadh

Saqqaf: I don't think we have much more to say after the long discussion you had with His Majesty. You both were difficult, as far as I can see. But this was among friends. You will see results.

Kissinger: I didn't think there could be an answer.

Saqqaf: Secondly, there are some Americans who seem to think he is not really interested in Palestine but only in Communism and radicalism.

Kissinger: Who is so stupid?

Akins: Jackson said that.

Saqqaf: He makes so many bad statements. He said "They can drink their oil or swim in it. We don't need it." This doesn't help

Kissinger: He's running for President.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
OLW09-01/11004 Per Hr. 6/18/2012
By RS/WMP NARA, Date 11/16/2016

Saqqaf: What you said today is true -- that the so-called oil pressure will help your opponents. But what the King said....

Kissinger: Is also true.

Saqqaf: The King has never wanted to hurt the U. S. But he kept saying this for years. He said it a long time ago.

Isa: He said it to President Kennedy in 1962.

Saqqaf: He said we should let Palestinians return, and end it.

Akins: Eban told Congressmen Steele and Ryan that the boycott meant nothing, that we didn't need the oil, and that three weeks after the boycott, Saudi Arabia would be reduced to poverty.

Kissinger: That's not true.

Saqqaf: You said to me the second time I met you in State Department, "What do the Arabs want?" I said, "We're not that powerful. We can't destroy Israel. All we want to do is shake public opinion." It's in your records.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Saqqaf: What the Soviet Union gives them is only drops-- some weapons -- then they leave.

The Arabs achieved something very great. The complex of always being defeated is gone

Kissinger: That's good.

Akins: That's very good.

Saqqaf: What Russia sent wasn't the way it was done by the U. S. They sent it by slow ships, and only small things came in planes. To punish Syria and Egypt. To show their dependence.

Kissinger: Quite frankly, Mr. Foreign Minister, you and I knew the Israelis were winning [when the ceasefire was declared].

Saqqaf: Of course. And Aly Sabry would have come in.

Kissinger: Yes. We stopped Israel from destroying the Third Army.

Saqqaf: You helped that.

Kissinger: But if Arab radicals win with Soviet arms, you yourself would be threatened.

Saqqaf: But on this issue we are united.

Kissinger: Of course.

Saqqaf: If they win, what happens before is forgotten. I saw the people in the street; they were angry at the ceasefire. Every country's people was pushing its government to keep fighting. So we are paying for it, not Syria. When a Phantom destroys a refinery in Syria, it's we who pay for it, and Russia who gets the hard currency.

Let me tell you what Boumedienne told me. Don't write this down. Boumedienne saw Brezhnev in Moscow. Brezhnev said to him frankly, "We don't want long-term peace or long-term war. We want things to erupt, and then calm down. Now we want a ceasefire." That's what he said. So Boumedienne said: "Why tell me? I'm not fighting." Brezhnev said, "Tell Sadat." "Why should I?" said Boumedienne, "it's not my business."

You know Brezhnev is a very nervous type. He was getting up all the time, and scratching his arm. Then at one point, Boumedienne said, "We've got some money for you." Immediately Brezhnev perked up: "We want some arms," Boumedienne said. Brezhnev immediately had the money in a Soviet bank.

They want us to go this way.

Kissinger: Will you?

Saqqaf: No. There will be no Russian arms in Saudi Arabia. That's why the King was very ill yesterday. He has influenza. It's painful to him not to defend his country. But when he defends the U.S., he feels like someone standing alone. Nobody's with you. If I look with a microscope, only Rhodesia is with you. All of Africa has cut diplomatic relations. I don't know what problems you have, but we have a problem. Kenya, Ethiopia, who all had good relations with Israel, cut relations without even approaching them first. If these countries do this, how can we refuse? We were called to a meeting in Baghdad; we had to accept the decision. And once we

give our word we have to keep it.

Iraq refuses to attend the meeting. Do you know why? Because they had to accept in advance the decision to cut relations with the U.S. and nationalize companies.

What can we do? We, also, live in a crazy area.

Kissinger: We both have dilemmas.

Saqqaf: The difficult time will come not now, but later.

Kissinger: Three months from now.

Saqqaf: When we get to problems like Jersalem, moving across the Suez.

Kissinger: That's right

Saqqaf: I understand this is the only way you can do it.

Some of them think it's all solved. I saw Sadat yesterday. He said, "It's all settled. We have diplomatic relations; the Israelis will withdraw "

Kissinger: Really?

Saqqaf: They really think that.

Kissinger: We have to have patience. The Israelis still have to understand what happened to them. They need a few weeks.

Saqqaf: And they have an election. And both sides need to learn that the other doesn't want to kill them. Now it's a vicious circle.

So we want your help. We want something we can feel.

Kissinger: If you look at what we've done in the last few weeks, it's quite a lot. And it's preparation for something more.

Saqqaf: All those who have met you have felt you're sincere. And you don't say that what you can't do you can do. We heard this when you met King Hassan and when you met President Sadat. We heard this from Morocco, from Egypt.

Kissinger: That's interesting.

Saqqaf: We heard this from Benhima. But they were all more optimistic than they should be. They told me it was encouraging, I said, "Let's wait."

Sadat said the same thing: You were a wise man, very calm, very patient to hear, never annoyed, that you never stop anyone from talking, that you talk at the beginning about what you can do and what you can't do. But still they are Arab, thinking more than they should.

Kissinger: And Arabs are romantic anyway

Saqqaf: Yes.

Isa: If you will permit me, this brings to mind a line of Arab poetry. A poet once said about the triangle of love, about what he was suffering: "We fell in love with Leila" -- the lover of that poet -- which is the USA. "But she was in love with someone else" -- Israel. "And yet there is a third party in love with us but we don't want her" -- the USSR.

Saqqaf: There are many sayings like this in Arabic about our relations with the U. S.

As the King said, we're friends and remain friends.

There was an Iraqi broadcast after the last OAPEC meeting. "Who can say Saudi Arabia will stop the oil? There must be something to stop oil to the West; there must be a conspiracy."

Akins: Because Saudi Arabia is a tool of the U. S.; therefore the oil boycott must be a plot to hurt Iraq.

Kissinger: Amazing

Sagqaf: [takes out paper] These are my talking points. I think we've covered everything in our talks:

- What Saudi Arabia wants.
- Why the U. S. helps Israel so much.
- What conditions make Israel so arrogant, so difficult.
- Why America is always silent for 25 years.

It is up to the U. S. to try to straighten out what has gone askew. When you went all-out to help the Zoinists, what did you get in return?

The Arabs are one hundred percent united on this issue, and Faisal is way out in front on this. The policy of Saudi Arabia in twenty-five years has not changed. His Majesty has constantly drawn the attention of the U. S. to this. I personally never met an American in this country without spelling it out. We urge you not to consider that our fear of Communism is a weakness on our part. Sure, we are against the Communists, but we are also against the Zionist occupation, and the occupation of the holy places.

We want to dispel the myth that there is no connection between oil and the problem in the Middle East. Some have come and reiterated this myth with some audacity. We won't be subjected to threats. We are familiar with what happened in 1962, when the U. S. was urging everybody to recognize Yemen. And we were almost alone. The Ambassador here was Hart; he subsequently realized he was wrong.

I wanted to reiterate to you and assure you that there is no desire to destroy Israel. In our country we have people who are from central Africa; the Middle East is really a kaleidoscopic region. We're not against Judaism as a religion. No Muslim can be. I could not be a good Muslim if I maligned Judaism. This isn't my personal opinion; it's in the Koran. Arab history books are replete with references to Jewish writers and scholars. We don't want the Nazi complex of hatred of the Jews to be imposed on us. Jewish poets in Arabic are taught in our schools.

Akins: There is an Arabic saying "As faithful as Samuel."

Saqqaf: Permit me to say this. We've been so rich with promises, our political wealth is a stack of IOU's. This doesn't refer to you. You told me it before the war started; I told it to my King, and the Arabs know it. But it is an Arab saying: "I am rich, but my wealth is promises."

We hear threats in the U. S. about grain cereals. We know it's not U. S. policy.

Kissinger: We should not have a confrontation.

Saqqaf: We are against it. We are your friends. Help us.

Kissinger: We say the same thing to you. And on oil, if we don't keep our promise, we will still need the oil next year.

Saqqaf: We were watching you two from the side; we thought he [the King] lost.

Kissinger: With all due respect, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I don't believe!

Saqqaf: Another point: Detente between the great powers should not be permitted to work to the detriment of the Third World.

Kissinger: Of course. Let me assure you the Soviet Union will try to give the impression that we and they have prearranged it all. It is not true. It's a game they play.

Saqqaf: We say that to the Arabs.

I want to repeat that it's important to have contact with Syria.

Kissinger: We didn't want to be refused. But now that we understand the situation, we will reestablish contact.

Saqqaf: That's good. I will tell them. I'm going around to different capitals. They are important to Arabdom. You should see the destruction wrought there; it will cost us millions and millions of dollars.

Akins: And the Russians couldn't possibly have produced the ceasefire, or relief of the Third Army.

Saqqaf: We're aware of that. Since Sadat became President, six months afterwards, we've been in contact. He's a wise man. He knows what he can do and cannot do.

Kissinger: He impressed me.

Saqqaf: He knows the limits. He's not ambitious. If Nasser was alive, he'd be shouting

Kissinger: And he'd fail.

Saqqaf: Of course. The man was never normal -- he'd read a book and change his style of government completely. A semi-educated officer can't run a state

I don't want to keep you.

Our contact, between us. . . .

Kissinger: Let's maintain the channel. May I write you for your opinion?

Saqqaf: Of course.

Kissinger: If you see something I should know, or some thing I should not have done, please -- seriously -- tell me.

Saqqaf: I've done this on Syria.

Kissinger: That was the first time I understood their position.

Saqqaf: Do you have a copy of the agreement?

Kissinger: Yes. [Tab A]

Saqqaf: Theirs is longer.

Kissinger: This is the six points on the ceasefire. Then there are seven points on negotiation.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-9-

Saqqaf: Yes.

The Arabs have confidence in you and therefore they have confidence that everything will come out right.

Kissinger: That may be too much. But it shows their good intentions.

Saqqaf: They said there would be negotiations in December.

Kissinger: Yes. December 8 And they wanted the Foreign Ministers They wanted my personal presence.

Saqqaf: It's some visible movement. It's important.

No country in the Middle East can afford like Egypt to lose six million pounds every three years.

Kissinger: These six points will be announced tomorrow. The seven points will be announced about November 20

[The meeting ended with warm handshakes. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister walked downstairs together, their arms around each other.]

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, Second Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
James Akins, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Isa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U. S. Embassy Beirut
(Interpreter)

TIME AND DATE: Thursday, November 8, 1973
10:35 - 11:00 p. m.

PLACE: Secretary Kissinger's Suite
Guest House
Riyadh

Fahd: I don't want to overburden Your Excellency by taking up more of your time, but I want to express appreciation for your visit.

Kissinger: I want to thank you, Your Highness. I was looking forward to welcoming you to the U. S.

Fahd: I'm very pleased, and still look towards it.

I would like to take this opportunity to express the hope that the friendship between the U. S. and Saudi Arabia which was strong in the past will remain strong.

Kissinger: This is our hope.

Fahd: And these things that have come between us I would like to consider as things that are transitory and not permanent in nature.

And of course I appreciate listening to your explaining so brilliantly to His Majesty the King the difficulties for the U. S. and the particular difficulties that would not be understood by those who do not know the U. S.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
DLW09-01/1005 Per Hx. 6/18/2012
By TS/WAH NARA, Date 11/16/2016

And I would assure Your Excellency that I for one will be instrumental among those who will help you on the path you have marked out.

Kissinger: If this cannot be done, my path will be immeasurably more difficult. Because when the whole atmosphere in the U.S. becomes focused on what will appear as a domestic problem, it will be impossible to mobilize ourselves for a difficult foreign struggle.

Fahd: That's actually what I am saying -- that while we feel at ease hearing you outline the steps you have embarked upon, I feel inevitably the results will be good. And we appreciate the fact that things cannot be done overnight and have to be done step-by-step, but expeditiously.

Kissinger: I appreciate your understanding.

Fahd: I'm known for looking at things from a practical point of view, not in the clouds.

Kissinger: That is the only way to get things solved.

Fahd: And now we are beginning to feel in the air, after a long time, the thread of a solution that would be acceptable to the Arabs and Israel.

Kissinger: I have the same sense. A year ago I thought the time was not right; now I feel the time is right.

Fahd: Of course I appreciate that difficulties will be felt by people in Japan and the United States and Europe. But every cloud has a silver lining -- the thread has now appeared.

Akins: I want to emphasize one point that the Secretary said to His Majesty -- that the present effort did not begin when the war started, but before the war started, and certainly before this boycott. I was with the Secretary in New York and he said specifically that we would make a major effort.

Kissinger: Thank you.

Fahd: I heard that declaration myself and was very impressed.

The first step, as the Secretary said, was easing of relocation of the Third Army.

Kissinger: Right. And it was very difficult.

Fahd: It was very difficult. Because these are exactly the kind of steps that themselves could be used for telling our friends: Look at what the U.S. has done, and the U.S. is willing to do more.

Kissinger: Yes.

Fahd: And we hope that at the peace conference that you mentioned will be the first of next month, a further tangible step will come that will help further.

Kissinger: Inevitably. I'm looking at it from the diplomatic point of view. But please tell His Majesty that if we are to move effectively at the conference, it will help if some easing had already taken place. Otherwise it will get confused in our domestic problem.

Fahd: I appreciate that. I will personally do what I can to bring this about.

Kissinger: It will help tremendously in our common effort.

Fahd: I appreciate that very much.

This is something touching on the situation in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq and southern Arabia. We have evidence that keeps coming to us -- certifiable -- that there seems to be a pincer movement around Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The Chinese from the south, the Soviet Union from Iraq. That is why we anticipate that once this immediate problem is solved, the Communists will contrive something to happen in Saudi Arabia.

Kissinger: That is why it is essential that between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia there be no misunderstanding. You are the principal target. If you isolate yourselves you are losing one of your best supporters. I told His Majesty at dinner that we are prepared to be helpful with respect to the threat from the south. And of course we can cooperate with regard to the threat from the north. Perhaps when Your Highness comes to the United States we can consult further on this.

Fahd: In fact we are in dire need to organize our armed forces -- the army, navy, air force -- not with any aggressive intent but to defend ourselves.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Fahd: I had intended to talk with President Nixon about our Navy, which is a special problem.

Akins: They have a money problem.

Kissinger: A money problem!

Akins: We told them first that the program would cost \$200 million. Then we said, "Sorry, there's been a miscalculation. It will cost \$650 million." Then we said later, "No, it will be \$900 million." They think we're not serious.

Kissinger: I don't have the facts. But we take this very seriously. We intend to strengthen your forces. In fact, we will send our Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements here, who is a great lover of Saudi Arabia. When do you intend to visit the U. S. ?

Fahd: When you get a chance to relax. I want to give you a chance to relax first.

Kissinger: That may not be so soon!

Fahd: Seriously, when you sense and I feel that things are moving in the right direction again.

Kissinger: Some time in the next month, then.

Fahd: I don't want to burden you. I will do my utmost to remove the obstacles to strengthened relations.

Kissinger: I'll do my utmost to work in the direction and spirit that I have described.

[With warm handshakes, the meeting ended. Secretary Kissinger accompanied the Prince downstairs to the door, where the Foreign Minister was waiting.]

