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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST, NLN 01-31/5 5pp.

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MEMORANDUM

*Divide file
upstairs*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1973


MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *pwr*
SUBJECT: Nigeria May Be About to Break Relations
with Israel

General Gowon has summoned the Israeli Ambassador in Lagos in for an appointment tomorrow. This is an extraordinary step, since Gowon rarely sees Ambassadors, and the Israelis are convinced this is the occasion for a break in diplomatic relations.

The Israelis (Shalev) are asking you personally to intervene with the Nigerians tonight to try to head this off.

They have heard you have an appointment with Foreign Minister Arikpo tomorrow, but this will probably be too late. Arikpo is tonight in New York with their UN delegation.

The Israelis hope you can convince him that such a step, in the middle of a conflict, by such an important country, is a kind of interference in the Mideast conflict, and would be damaging to free world interests.



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3.3(b)(1)

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

October 10, 1973

TO: AMBASSADOR KEATING, TEL AVIV

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

1. The Israelis have been giving us here lists of equipment which they require on priority basis -- aircraft; ordnance, ammunition, and accessories for aircraft, electronic equipment; and anti-tank weapons and ammunition

2. The President last night approved furnishing all the requested consumables on urgent basis, with exception of laser bombs. As for aircraft, there will be immediate delivery of two F-4s already scheduled for delivery now, plus three additional, for total of five.

3. The President in addition has given formal assurance of replacement of all repeat all aircraft and tank losses. Schedule of delivery is to be worked out here with Defense Department.

4. This Presidential decision was conveyed by me personally to Ambassador Dinitz last night, who has informed Prime Minister. This information is for your eyes only.

5. Warm regards and much admiration for your superb effort and reporting. You seem to invite wars wherever you go but you have done well.

PWRGen S:wgh:10 Oct 73

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 01-31/6 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) tr. AUG 1 2007

By [Signature] NARA, Date 5 Oct 07

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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dinitz file
INFORMATION
October 17, 1973

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Henry,

I met with Dinitz at 12:45 and passed on the message regarding ceasefire linked to Resolution 242. He said he would pass it immediately to the Prime Minister and get back to us as quickly as possible.

Dinitz said that the Prime Minister had asked him to express to the President and to you her appreciation and enthusiasm, and that of Israel, for what the United States is doing. Mrs. Meir says that she is sure the President is mindful of the political and strategic implications of the U.S. action but she is not sure that he fully appreciates how much the U.S. actions have done for the morale of the fighting forces in Israel.

Regarding the military situation, Dinitz said that the force west of the Canal was still operating and that "several scores" of tanks were in the force. He says there is a heavy tank battle on the east bank of the Canal opposite the Israeli strike force on the west bank. The Israelis hope to clear this area near Devesoir and are planning to put a pontoon bridge across the Canal at that point.

The Syrian front is relatively quiet although they anticipate that the Iraqis are preparing to mount an attack.

Dinitz had several questions regarding resupply. He requested to know what the delivery policy on F4's over the next few days would be and also when and how many A4's we were planning to deliver. He reiterated an urgent need for bridging material, especially in light of the battle report which he had just presented. He reminded that they had requested 50 helicopters, but said they would take any number they could get in a hurry. He expressed appreciation for the TOW missiles being provided, but asked if there were any more available anywhere, either off the production line or perhaps going to the FRG (in this case, he said that Golda would ask Willy Brandt to acquiesce in their diversion.) He said that Israel is attempting to destroy Egyptian armored forces and that the **TOW** is urgently needed for that.

Latest cumulative losses: 27 F-4, 48 A-4, 11 Mirage, 6 Super-Mystere, 2 helicopters.

Brent

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 01-31/7 2 pp.

Exempted per sec. 1.4(c)(1) E 012958 Hr. AUG 1 2007

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SECRET

Ambassador Dinitz Situation Report (as dictated by Larry Eagleburger)

1. There were battles throughout the night in the Suez City area. At 5:30 a.m. local time the Egyptians announced their acceptance of the ceasefire; the ceasefire took effect at 7:00 a.m. At that time the Israelis were in complete control of access routes to the Egyptian third army.
2. Dayan met with Silvaso, the UN TSO Chief to agree upon observation posts. Silvaso then left to establish the posts.
3. Shortly thereafter a local battle started along the Canal, with the Egyptians trying to break the siege. One Egyptian force attacked eastward toward Mitla and succeeded in making moderate advances. The Israelis then attacked with artillery to block the advance. The Egyptian force is still some distance from its original attack positions.
4. Around noon local time the Egyptians decided to break out towards the Canal and northward (at the southern end of Bitter Lake). These attacks were combined tank, artillery and Air Force operations by the Egyptians. During the course of the battle the Israelis shot down 15 of the 30 Egyptian aircraft involved. There were no Israeli losses.
5. In sum there has been no fighting on the west side of the Canal; two of the three divisions (Egyptian divisions) on the East Bank are engaged with Israeli forces eastward; the third division is trying to break out westward and northward.
6. Dinitz emphasizes that Israeli instructions are that their forces are to do nothing but block and contain Egyptian forces.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
 Minister Mordechai Shalev of Israel

 Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
 President for National Security Affairs
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 9, 1973
 6:10 - 6:35 p. m.

PLACE: The Map Room
 The White House

Secretary Kissinger: On your special requests, the President has approved the entire list of consumables, that is, ordnance, electronic equipment -- everything on the list except laser bombs. The President has agreed -- and let me repeat this formally -- that all your aircraft and tank losses will be replaced. Of the tanks you will be getting, a substantial number will be M-60's, our newest. As for the planes, for immediate delivery; you will be getting 5 F-4's, 2 plus 3. For the rest, you will work out a schedule.

Ambassador Dinitz: It's a question of days, Dr. Kissinger.

Secretary Kissinger: It will be a matter of days. On the anti-tank ammunition and anti-tank weapons, Schlesinger is all set. You know whom to get in touch with at Defense. If there is any trouble, contact Scowcroft. This is everything else on the list, except the laser bombs and aircraft. On tanks, you will have to work out a schedule.

At the end of the week we can see what is urgent.

Ambassador Dinitz: We will take it all by plane.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 01-31/8 per sec. 17r. AUG 1 2007
By RB NARA, Date 3 Oct. 07

Secretary Kissinger: That's agreed. But you have to paint El Al out. This is for maximum security.

Ambassador Dinitz: Our people who I just spoke to said General Sumner said you wouldn't accept our planes even with El Al painted out.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh baloney. You will see a rapid change.

If the need is acute, you'll see a speedup of tanks.

Dinitz: Can you get some through from Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: There is some possibility. We have some at Leghorn. At the end of the week we can see where we stand. The problem of tanks isn't what you need in this battle, but the situation after this battle. You have assurances that you will have replacements. You have the additional assurance that if it should go very badly and there is an emergency, we will get the tanks in even if we have to do it with American planes.

It is absolutely essential also that Senators and Congressmen don't go around attacking the President. Ribicoff called me to say there is a story going around that I kept you from preempting.

Ambassador Dinitz: That's ridiculous.

Secretary Kissinger: That is the story that is going around. They say I kept you from preempting.

Ambassador Dinitz: I know the source. I'll handle it.

Secretary Kissinger: You don't need to say that something is going on -- we don't need that -- but just keep people from going around attacking us.

Now what is the military situation?

Ambassador Dinitz: The military situation is more encouraging. On the Golan Heights, we have pushed the Syrian forces almost off all the Heights, except at the very edge of the ceasefire line. There are some forces that are not destroyed. Today we destroyed hundreds of Syrian tanks. The missile setup of the Syrians was quiet today, most probably a result of air-strikes yesterday. Also it is possible that they don't want to reveal themselves.

Secretary Kissinger: From the strike on Damascus?

Ambassador Dinitz: That was strategically important because of direct hits on the targets I listed to you. About the other casualties, I don't know.

On the Suez front, we are at five to eight kilometers all along the Canal. Compared to yesterday, this is two to three kilometers nearer.

Today we operated carefully and contact was limited. We took out the tanks but suffered hits.

In the afternoon, 50 Egyptian tanks began to move south to Abu Rudeis. Our Air Force liquidated thirty and the rest were finished off by our armor.

So this is encouraging news, and with the new equipment we'll be able to strike.

Secretary Kissinger: OK. You get in touch with our military people. They shouldn't talk all over the Pentagon.

Ambassador Dinitz: We'll deal with General Sumner, not Noyes.

Secretary Kissinger: Scowcroft is here in my office to coordinate.

Ambassador Dinitz: He was very helpful to us last night.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm glad he's helpful to somebody! [Laughter]

Ambassador Dinitz: I shouldn't tell tales out of school but I tell people that you only yell at people you trust.

Secretary Kissinger: Only at people I know can do better work. I never yell at Scowcroft. [Laughter]

OK, can I speak to you alone for five minutes?

[Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Dinitz spoke alone from 6:25 to 6:35 p.m.]

Dinitz file
upstairs

URGENT
ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1973

Shaher called
11:55 pm
B

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*
SUBJECT: Dinitz Wants Your View of Proposed
Senate Resolution on Arms Aid

Ambassador Dinitz called at 7:05 p.m. and read me the text of a proposed Senate resolution on which he has held up until he has checked it with you. It has not yet been submitted and will not be circulated at least until Wednesday morning.

Shaher
~~He~~ will be reachable tonight for your approval or any suggested changes.

The text follows:

"Whereas Egypt and Syria, having spurned the efforts of the United States to bring the parties to the current conflict in the Middle East to the peace table, have instead launched an all-out attack on Israel using large quantities of the most sophisticated weapons of war that the Soviet Union has supplied to them,

"Whereas Israel was aware of the possibility of an all-out attack but held its fire in order to observe the peace,

"And whereas Israel is now valiantly resisting this aggression,

"Therefore be it resolved that it is the sense of the Senate:

"That the United States urgently supply Israel with the military materiel that it requires to defend itself against Arab aggression,

"And that the United States lend its strongest diplomatic support in the UN and elsewhere to efforts to achieve a negotiated and genuine peace among the parties in the conflict."

Handed to HAK by
Dinitz
6:40 pm 10/8/73

BATTLE REPORT AS OF 3 o'clock October 8, Israel time
(9 o'clock in the morning Washington time)

(A) The Syrian Front

1. Hostile Air Action.

(a) The Syrians tried to attack Kuneitra in the course of the night but our planes interfered with their attack. The bombs that they dropped did not strike any target and may possibly have fallen into Syrian areas.

(b) From the early morning until 3 p.m. there were 12 Syrian attempts to attack our forces and other targets in the Golan Heights and one in the north of Israel. In four cases bombs were dropped in our area, with small results. ^{one or} In two cases the attacks were prevented by our planes.

(c) The type of planes which took part in the attacks were primarily Suchoi-7 and Mig17. Special attention should be drawn to an attempt to attack a control position of ours in the north of the country by Suchoi-20 planes. This attack was frustrated and three of the four planes crashed.

(d) In every attack there were eight attacking planes with 8 Mig '21s accompanying them. In ^{some of the} every case, ~~both~~ ^{with some of the} attacking and accompanying planes were shot down.

(e) Since this morning and up until 3 p.m. over 30 Syrian fighter planes have been lost to the Syrians; at least 10 of them on the ground.

(f) In the course of the early afternoon 32 Suchoi-7 planes from Iraq arrived in Syria.

2. Our Air Action.

(a) Our air force did not operate during the night.

(b) Between 6:35 a.m. and 6:45 a.m. three radar stations were attacked.

(c) At 7:20 a.m. we attacked five airfields with good results. Later the Syrians succeeded in renewing attacks from some of these airfields apparently by using the taxiing areas.

(d) Since this morning our air force is operating in assisting our ground forces.

(e) Our losses up to 3 p.m. are two planes downed by missiles and anti-aircraft.

3. Land operations.

(a) During the night the Syrians stabilized their positions in our area. In the morning they started two small attacks.

(b) Our forces went over to a successful counter-attack. As a result of the fighting that has been going on up till now some of the Syrian forces has begun to withdraw. The battle is continuing.

(B) The Egyptian Front

1. Enemy Air Attacks.

(a) In the night 7-8 October there were no attacks by the Egyptian Air Force.

(b) At 7:05 a.m. 12 Mig 17s covered by Mig 21s attacked our ground forces on the axis Deversoir - Feerdan. Very little success.

(c) At 8:40 a.m. about 45 planes of various types attacked objectives in western Sinai. The main concentration was on the Rafeedim airfield, Hawk bases and a control unit in the Sinai. In the air battles we shot down about 15 planes. Since this attack up until 3 p.m. there were no further Egyptian air attacks.

(d) Egypt has begun to receive reinforcements of fighter planes including 6 mirages from Libya and in the course of the day a squadron of Mig 21s is expected from Algeria.

2. Our Air actions.

(a) Our Air Force continued until aftermidnight in the attacks on the bridges that the Egyptians put up across the Canal.

(b) Since this morning our air force is assisting our ground forces.

(c) Between 9:20 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. our planes attacked radar stations at five different places in Egypt.

(d) At 11:40 a.m. our air force attacked some of the ground-to-air missile batteries in the Port Said area.

(e) Our losses up to 3 p.m. are four planes downed by missiles and anti-aircraft.

3. Land operations.

(a) During the night there was little activity. The Egyptian forces which crossed the Canal organized themselves in defense and continued in the building of bridges and their repair.

(b) The Egyptian force which has come across east of the Canal consists of five infantry divisions and three tank brigades of which two are equipped with T62 tanks.

(c) At dawn a number of frog missiles were fired at the Refeedim airfield. There were no casualties or damage.

(d) From the early hours of the morning our forces are counter-attacking. The Egyptians are trying to stop the counter-attack and among other things are launching local counter-attacks of their own.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1973

Dinitz file

HK

Henry:

Following is miscellaneous intelligence and operational information from Dinitz.

On the northern front:

Israeli operations are designed to destroy as much as possible of the Syrian army. They have no intention of trying to take Damascus. An Iraqi brigade was put out of action today, with 34 tanks destroyed. The Israelis have now occupied an area which completes their control of the Golan Heights and gives them control of the Jordan, Haifa and Damascus Highway.

The Jordanian brigade is not yet engaged. Dinitz says even if it becomes involved, the Israelis will not attack Jordan and the bridges will remain open.

Thirty miles west of the Syrian coast is a Soviet destroyer with heavy SAM armament. The Israelis think it may be going to provide cover for Soviet ships unloading military supplies in Syrian ports.

With regard to the use of the 175 artillery, Dinitz says it is being used only against the Damascus Airport from which Syrian combat aircraft are attacking Israeli forces. They have no intention of using it in any other way or of harming civilians. They periodically must stop shelling the airport to conserve ammunition, and he says each time they do they are hit by Syrian aircraft. *He urgently requests 175 ammo*

The Egyptian attack on the Sinai front yesterday was very welcome to the Israelis, and they are only disappointed it was not repeated again today. Egypt has now transferred its main reserve units to the east bank of the Canal. Activity there today is primarily local engagements.

Dinitz also gave me the Israeli losses in tanks and aircraft.

F-4's

Lost	25
Grounded more than a week	<u>7</u>
Total	32

A-4's

Lost	46
Grounded	<u>19</u>
Total	65

Mirage/Mystere

Lost	13
Grounded	<u>8</u>
Total	21

Tanks

Destroyed	250
Repairable (1 to 2 weeks)	200
Repairable (2 to 6 weeks)	150
Repairable (6 to 12 weeks)	100
Repairable (Over 3 months)	8
Expected additional combat losses	200
Expected additional damaged	<u>200</u>
Total actual and expected tanks out of action	1,180

Dinitz also asked that I call to your attention an article in the New York Times today by Les Gelb, the last paragraph of which states:

"To date, the Israelis have been content to let President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger manage the supply issue and the Russians. Senate sources confirm that the Israelis have not yet tried to bring Congressional pressure to bear on the Administration."


Brent Scowcroft

Handed to HAK by
Dinitz
6:40 pm 10/3/73

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(d) Since this morning our air force is operating in assisting our ground forces.

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VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DELIVER TO PETER RODMAN IN SEALED ENVELOPE

October 5, 1973

TO: Secretary Kissinger

FROM: Brent Scowcroft

Minister Shalev called on me at 5:30 p. m. and passed
the following informal communication from the Prime Minister:

QUOTE-----UNQUOTE
(See attached)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

1. INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN ACCUMULATING OBLIGES US TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN SYRIA AND EGYPT, THE BATTLE DEPLOYMENT AND STATE OF ALERT OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE INCREASED MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS AT THEIR FRONT LINES WITH US, MAY BE MOTIVATED BY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING TWO POSSIBILITIES:
 - A. A BONA FIDE ASSESSMENT BY BOTH OR ONE OF THESE COUNTRIES, FOR WHATEVER REASON, THAT ISRAEL INTENDS TO CARRY OUT AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST THEM OR AGAINST ONE OF THEM;
 - B. THE INTENTION ON THEIR PART - OR ON THE PART OF ONE OF THEM - TO INITIATE AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST ISRAEL.

2. IN CASE, HOWEVER, THIS DEVELOPMENT STEMS FROM THEIR APPREHENSIONS ABOUT AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION FROM THE SIDE OF ISRAEL, SUCH APPREHENSIONS ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. WE WISH TO ASSURE YOU PERSONALLY THAT ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION WHATEVER TO INITIATE OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST SYRIA OR EGYPT. WE ARE, ON THE CONTRARY, MOST EAGER TO CONTRIBUTETOWARDS AN EASING OF THE MILITARY TENSION IN THE AREA. ON THESE GROUNDS WE WISH, THROUGH YOUR GOOD OFFICE, TO INFORM THE ARABS AND THE SOVIETS OF OUR ATTITUDE, WITH THE VIEW OF ALLAYING THEIR SUSPICIONS AND THE AIM OF RESTORING CALM TO THE AREA.

3. SHOULD SYRIA OR EGYPT INTEND TO LAUNCH OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEM IN ADVANCE THAT ISRAEL WILL REACT MILITARILY, WITH FIRMNESS AND IN GREAT STRENGTH. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO BRING THIS TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ARABS AND SOVIETS THROUGH THE CHANNELS AT YOUR DISPOSAL.

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TOP SECRET/NODIS

Priorities for shipment as relayed by Senator Jackson
(Extent to which this comes from Israelis, I don't
know)

1. Fifty (50) F-4s (out of a presumed approved total of 80) required within the next 48 to 72 hours. (When I inquired as to modalities, it was clear that Jackson's people had not thought this through, beyond suggesting that Europe would presumably be the principal source.)
2. Fifty (50) Sky Hawks to be shipped ASAP.
3. Three hundred (300) M-60s--there are Israeli vessels in Baltimore and Boston which can accept some portion (perhaps all ?) of these M-60s. Again, Europe as an alternative quick source was cited.
4. Thirty (30) CH-53-C helicopters--to be transported by air.
5. Twenty (20) Cobras--to be transported by air.
6. Ten (10) C-130s--to be transported by air.

TOP SECRET/NODIS

ARAB ARMIES

Handed to Gen S by
Mun. Shalev, 5³⁰ pm,
10/5/73

1. IN THE LAST TEN DAYS THE EGYPTIAN ARMY HAS REINFORCED ITS DEPLOYMENT IN THE CANAL ZONE. WITHIN A RANGE OF UP TO 30 KM WEST OF THE CANAL THERE ARE NOW ABOUT 195 ARTILLERY BATTERIES (INCL. 120 MM MORTARS) COMPRISING SOME 1100 BARRELS, AS COMPARED WITH THE USUAL DEPLOYMENT OF 140 BATTERIES (ABOUT 800 BARRELS). IN ADDITION, PART OF THE TANKS OF THE INFANTRY DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN ADVANCED TO THE VICINITY OF THE CANAL. CONCENTRATIONS OF DUG-OUTS FOR VEHICLES AND WATER CROSSING EQUIPMENT IN THIS AREA HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY OCCUPIED. AT LEAST IN FIVE CONCENTRATIONS WE HAVE LOCATED, WHAT WITH HIGH PROBABILITY SEEMS TO BE G.S.P. SELF PROPELLED FERRIES. ALL ARMS OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY ARE IN A STATE OF HIGH ALERT. THE INTER SERVICE EXERCISE IS APPARENTLY CONTINUING. ACTIVITY OBSERVED NEAR THE CANAL IS ROUTINE.

2. THE STATE OF ALERT AND THE MOVE INTO EMERGENCY DISPOSITIONS IN THE SYRIAN ARMY CONTINUES IN THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENCE (BETWEEN THE CEASE FIRE LINE AND 25 KM EAST OF IT) 106 ARTILLERY BATTERIES (16-20 BATTERIES MORE THAN IN PAST EMERGENCY DISPOSITIONS) AND ABOUT 750 TANKS ARE DEPLOYED. AT THIS STAGE THE DEPLOYMENT IN THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE IS NOT CLEAR TO US, BUT WE ASSESS THAT IT HAS BEEN OCCUPIED BY PART OF ARMOUR UNITS.

THE SYRIANS HAVE ADVANCED SUKHOI FIGHTER BOMBERS TO RELATIVELY CLOSE AIRFIELDS IN WHICH THEY WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY STATIONED. THIS IS TRUE AT LEAST FOR DMEIR AIRFIELD. THE OBSERVED ACTIVITY ALONG THE CEASE FIRE LINE IS ROUTINE.

Western Union

International Telex

Western Union International, Inc.

SOVIET ACTIVITY

3. DURING THE NIGHT OF 4-5 OCT, 11 SOVIET PASSENGER PLANES LANDED IN DAMASCUS AND CAIRO AIRPORTS. SOME HAVE ALREADY TAKEN OFF IN THE DIRECTION OF USSR.

4. BETWEEN 2350 HRS ON OCTOBER 4 AND 0330 HRS ON OCTOBER 5, FIVE IL-18 AEROFLOT PASSENGER PLANES, SENT BY THE SOVIET UNION, LANDED AT DAMASCUS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. TWO OF THEM ARE KNOWN TO HAVE LEFT FROM BUDAPEST. ALL FIVE PLANES TOOK OFF FROM DAMASCUS LATER ON OCTOBER 5 AND FLEW NORTH. THE PLANES' TAIL NUMBERS WERE 75454, 75465, 75516, 75602, 75676.

5. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED RUSSIAN FAMILIES (WOMEN AND CHILDREN) WERE SEEN COLLECTING AT DAMASCUS AIRPORT - APPARENTLY FOR EVACUATION FROM SYRIA.

6. ON OCTOBER 5 BETWEEN 0020 HRS. AND 0430 HRS SIX AEROFLOT PASSENGER PLANES SENT BY THE SOVIET UNION LANDED AT CAIRO AIRPORT. OF THESE, FOUR WERE IL-18'S AND TWO IS-62'S. FOUR OF THE SIX PLANES TOOK OFF A FEW HOURS LATER (BEGINNING AT 0770 HRS.) FLYING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET UNION. TAIL - NUMBERS OF THE IL-18'S WERE. 74262, 75784, 74261, 75894. THE IL-62 TAIL- NUMBERS WERE 866 98, 866 99.

7. FIVE SOVIET NAVY VESSELS WERE DUE TO SAIL THIS MORNING FROM THEIR ANCHORAGE IN ALEXANDRIA. THEY WERE A KOTLIN CLASS DESTROYER, A RIGA CLASS FRIGATE, ANOTHER SHIP, A SALVAGE RESCUE VESSEL AND A TUG.

THIS LEAVES IN ALEXANDRIA ONE F- CLASS SUBMARINE (APPARENTLY IN DRY DOCK) AND SIX AUXILIARY CRAFT, I.E. ALL COMBAT. SHIPS WERE DUE TO LEAVE THE PORT. AS REGARDS PORT- SAID, THE INTELLIGENCE MONITORING SHIP KRIM, LEFT YESTERDAY (OCT 4 TH) AND A POLNOCHNY CLASS LANDING SHIP, THIS MORNING (OCT 5TH). REMAINING IN THE PORT ARE A FRIGATE AND A POLNOCHNY CLASS LANDING SHIP. THE MINESWEEPER/LAYER AT MAERSA MATRUH IS ALSO EXPECTED TO LEAVE.

PAGE 3

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8. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ALERT MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY EGYPT AND SYRIA ARE IN PART CONNECTED WITH MANOEUVRES (AS REGARDS EGYPT) AND IN PART DUE TO FEARS OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS BY ISRAEL.

WE CONSIDER THE OPENING OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL BY THE TWO ARMIES AS OF LOW PROBABILITY. THE POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF SOVIETS BY CIVILIAN PLANE AND THE EXPECTED DEPARTURE OF THE MAJORITY OF SOVIET SHIPS IN ALEXANDRIA AND PORT SAID MAY BE A CONSEQUENCE OF A CRISIS IN XX ZT RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA OF THE RESULT OF A SOVIET ASSESSMENT THAT HOSTILITIES MAY BREAK OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

=====

Peter *File*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1973

Henry:

Dinitz called to inform and ask our views on an Israeli proposal to sell to India 400 gun barrels for 105 mm guns. The Indians intend to mount them in their British-made tanks.

The gun barrels are of Israeli manufacture but, as a courtesy, Israelis wanted to give us the opportunity to express our views before proceeding with the transaction.

No objection ✓

Prefer that the sale not be made _____

Other _____


Brent

Maximum
Israeli position
(Dinitz comments
June 15)

General Working Principles

1. There should be agreements between the parties based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace. Completion of the agreements should at some stage involve direct negotiations among the parties. An interim settlement is not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could by agreement include demilitarized zones and effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.
6. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the peace treaties must be based.
7. There must be a just settlement of the refugee problem. In reaching an agreement containing the provisions laying down the obligations accepted by the parties towards a settlement of the refugee problem, neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.

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General Working Principles

1. The agreement should be comprehensive, covering all parties and issues. This does not preclude that the implementation occurs in stages or that some issues are resolved on a priority basis.
2. The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied in 1967.
3. Any border rectifications, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh, and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and the establishment of peace.
6. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal should be assured. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.
7. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement must be based.
8. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis and in accordance with the appropriate UN decisions.
(Reserved by the US side)

The US position is that completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories.

B



C

Given to

Idan

June 18

General Working Principles

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They should be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace. The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on specific issues are not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement include demilitarized and other security zones; establishment of an international force including participation of the signatory nations; stationing of such a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the peace treaties must be based.
6. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis which provides for registering and implementing the choices of the refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for compensation.
8. A material breach of the agreement by one of the parties shall entitle the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its performance in whole or in part until the breach is rectified.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION (Outside System)

SECRET/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

June 21, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Principles of an Arab-Israeli Settlement--
Israeli Comments of June 19

Attached are:

--At Tab A as a working base a draft of the principles which simply records Dinitz' suggestions of June 19.

--At Tab B is a minimum revision of the May 1972 US-USSR draft taking Dinitz' June 19 comments into account. Actually, all but one of his suggestions are incorporated. I have included the paragraph on freedom of navigation through international waterways that he suggested dropping. It does not seem inconsistent with special arrangements at Sharm al-Shaikh which in any case are allowed for in an earlier paragraph. And we do not want to lock ourselves into exclusive Israeli control at Sharm al-Shaikh.

--At Tab C again for comparison is what the optimum might look like from our viewpoint. This would differ from the Israeli position on one other point in addition to that mentioned in the paragraph above. This additional point deals with a refugee settlement. Since our position does not entirely coincide with Israel's, it seems to me there should be one place where US views are recorded. I have changed the word "choice" to "interests," however, to move somewhat toward the Israeli concerns.

XGDS-3
DECLAS-Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

SECRET (XGDS)

June 21, 1973

General Working Principles

As Revised by Dinitz's Suggestions to Rodman June 19

(Underlined words are Israeli additions; lined-through words are Israeli deletions.)

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They should be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace. The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on specific issues are not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement between the parties include demilitarized and other security zones; establishment of an international force including participation of the signatory nations; stationing of such a force at strategic points. ~~and the most effective~~ International guarantees could include with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the peace treaties must be based.
6. ~~Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel. - This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.~~
7. ~~The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis - which provides for registering and implementing the choices of the refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for compensation. There~~ must be a just settlement of the refugee problem.
8. ~~A material breach of the agreement by one of the parties shall entitle the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its performance in whole or in part until the breach is rectified.~~

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SECRET (XGDS)

June 21, 1973

General Working Principles
Minimum Revision of May 1972 US-USSR Draft
Taking Into Account Israeli Comments of June 19, 1973

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5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the peace treaties must be based.
6. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
7. There must be a just settlement of the refugee problem.

SECRET (XGDS)

SECRET (XGDS)

June 21, 1973

General Working Principles
Optimum Revision of May 1972 US-USSR Draft
Taking Account of Israeli Thoughts of June 19, 1973

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. The agreements should be based on Resolution 242 and should establish a final peace which will provide the basis for development of normal relations. The obligations of each side in a state of peace should be specified in the agreements. Those agreements should be arrived at through a process of negotiation between the signatories. Negotiation should begin without preconditions on the basis that no outcome is precluded. Separate arrangements on specific issues are not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized boundaries and for assuring the security of Israel and its neighbors.
3. Any border changes which may take place should result from voluntary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement between the parties include demilitarized and other security zones, international forces with participation of the signatories, special arrangements at strategic points, and the most effective international guarantees which could include the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The agreements should signify recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area, including Israel.
6. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel and should be effected by the agreements. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal. [Note: This is included despite the Israeli suggestion to delete it because we do not want to lock ourselves forever into Israel's keeping Sharm al-Shaikh, which in any case is covered in paragraph 4.]
7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis which provides for registering and implementing the interests of the

SECRET (XGDS)

refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for compensation. The interests of the Arab people of Palestine in political self-expression will be taken into account in the negotiation of the agreements. [Note: This is included despite Israeli objections with "choices" changed to "interests". It reflects the most reasonable way of solving the refugee problem-- getting Israel's agreement on how many it would take, finding out what individual refugees want to do and letting Israel screen those who want to settle in Israel.]

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BIOGRAPHY - Simcha Dinitz

Israel

Mr. Dinitz' career has been notable in three respects in particular: the breadth of his American experience, his long and close association with Mrs. Meir and the rapidity of his rise in the Israeli diplomatic service.

Dinitz was born in Tel Aviv in 1929, received his primary and secondary schooling there, and after a brief stint with the Israeli Defense Forces came to the United States in 1950. He attended the University of Cincinnati briefly and then entered Georgetown University, where he obtained his degrees as Bachelor of Sciences (1954) and Master of Sciences cum laude (1957). While in college he worked at the Israeli Embassy in Washington as night watchman and messenger. On graduation he entered the Israeli diplomatic service as Information Officer at the Embassy. In 1968-69 he returned to Washington, serving as Minister of Information. His only other foreign diplomatic posting has been in Rome as Minister, 1966-68, though he has attended various UN General Assembly sessions. Dinitz' wife, Vivian, is American by birth and two of their three children were born in the United States.

Dinitz' association with Mrs. Meir began during his first assignment to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem. Working first in the Ministry's Information Department, and later as the Director of the office of the Ministry's Director General (No. 2), Dinitz became in 1963 Chef de Cabinet and Political Secretary to then Foreign Minister Meir, serving until Mrs. Meir's resignation in 1966. He returned to Prime Minister Meir's staff in mid-1969, again as her Political Secretary. In 1972, Mrs. Meir named him Director General of the Prime Minister's office as well. By virtue of these positions and Mrs. Meir's implicit confidence in him, he is reckoned to be one of the most influential officials in the Israeli bureaucracy.

Dinitz has risen fast. At 43, after only 15 years in the diplomatic service, he is his country's nominee for its most important diplomatic post. Although widely respected for his

State Dept. review completed

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intelligence and ability, his ascent, not surprisingly, has aroused adverse reactions in some quarters. It seems clear that Foreign Minister Eban acceded to the appointment most reluctantly. Dinitz, however, would come as Mrs. Meir's tried and trusted colleague of many years; this is sufficient recommendation in itself for most Israelis.

Dinitz's personal manner is easy and relaxed, though one senses an underlying purposefulness and intensity. His English is excellent.

A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

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Page Denied