

HAK had
sure to
[initials]

October 25, 1973
9 a.m.

Mr. Secretary: from Sonnenfeldt

Re your press conference.

I think it would be a mistake to emphasize the element of confrontation with the Soviets, which I gather Sisco would have you do by quoting from the letter to Brezhnev.

The Soviets have the letter, so they need no further signal; they also know of our DEFCON.

The emphasis should be on

-- need to implement cease-fire;

-- desirability of continuing promptly to get UNTSO teams in place and of augmenting them where necessary; (express support for UNEF proposal in SC if that has been decided on);

-- repeat that while we and Soviets have crucial role to play as sponsors of the SC cease-fire resolution and because of our influence in Cairo and Tel Aviv, we do not think it appropriate for our forces to be involved. (hold open possibility of US and Soviet personnel serving temporarily as part of UNTSO;

-- stress that since we do not approve of US and Soviet forces intervening, we certainly do not approve of any unilateral intervention;

-- our alerts are entirely for precautionary purposes;

-- stress that we have been in constant diplomatic touch with Soviets and no useful purpose would be served by talking about it in public; all our actions are designed to make the cease-fire stick, not to seek some sort of confrontation. In fact, cease-fire can only work if we act in harmony, without intervention, rather than at cross-purposes;

-- of course, there must be no effort at unilateral advantage in this complex situation;

19-011
-- stress our information that situation relatively stable on the ground; main thing now is to interpose the UNTSO teams;

-- once this is accomplished we would hope to proceed to other parts of SC 338; this, too, can only be done in calm atmosphere without threats of intervention or pressure.

(Throw in guarded warning to Arabs re oil boycott.)

Rec'd 25 Oct 73
1505 HRS

Hak
SCOWCROFT

October 25, 1973

SECRET

HAK:

The following is a message to you from the Prime Minister through Dinitz:

1) I am sorry to hear that the US does not find it possible to object to the paragraph which calls for a return to the October 22 lines. This more specific demand is more serious than the similar statement in the previous resolution.

2) I appreciate the situation in which the US finds itself in the face of Soviet moves. I do not want the Secretary to think that I belittle the seriousness of the situation.

3) I have taken note of the Secretary's words that he would "do his best to support Israel on the interpretation of the paragraph." The Secretary knows that there is no possibility to fix the location of the previous line; it has never been verified and it has never been demarcated. Therefore, I expect serious discussions will evolve as to the location of the previous lines. I ask the Secretary to be prepared for such discussions and to be helpful to Israel in them.

4) I place great importance on the composition of the international force. It is an obvious point that it must not be composed of nations with no diplomatic relations with Israel. A number of important points will have to be worked out relating to the international force and its terms of reference, including for example authority to dismiss the force. Therefore I ask the Secretary that no finalizing of arrangements be made ~~BEFORE ISRAEL IS GIVEN AMPLE TIME BY THE US TO REVIEW~~ the situation. I ask that Ambassador Scall and Ambassador Tekoah discuss the details in New York, but that finalization be between Ambassador Dinitz and the Secretary so that I may have a direct influence on the final decision.

LSE

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116
BULLETIN

HAK

LL

U.N.-MIDEAST (TOPS 111)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. (AP)-THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED TODAY TO SEND A
U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT SOVIET, AMERICAN OR

OTHER BIG POWER TROOPS.

THE VOTE WAS 14-0, WITH CHINA NOT PARTICIPATING.

WE321PED OCT 25

Revised Security Council Resolution Incorporating
Amendments Accepted by Non-Aligned Cosponsors

October 25, 1973 1:30 p.m.

*Adopted
approx 1530, 10/25*

"The Security Council

"Recalling its resolutions 338 of 21st October 1973
and 339 of 23rd October 1973,

"Noting with regret the reported repeated violations
of the ceasefire in non-compliance with the
resolutions 338 and 339,

"Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's
report that the United Nations observers have not yet
been able to place themselves on both sides of the
ceasefire line,

"(1) Demands that immediate and complete ceasefire
be observed and that the parties return to the
positions occupied by them at ~~5:50~~ GMT on 22nd
October 1973, *1650*

"(2) Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate
step, to increase the number of UN observers on both
sides,

"(3) Decides to set up immediately a United Nations
Emergency Force under its authority, to be composed
of personnel to be drawn from states members of the
UN except the permanent members of the SC, and requests
the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on
the steps taken to this effect,

"(4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Council on an urgent and continuing basis of the
state of implementation of this resolution as well as
resolutions 338 and 339,

"(5) Requests all member states to extend their full
cooperation to the UN in the implementation of this
resolution as well as resolutions 338 and 339."

SECRET

Ambassador Dinitz Situation Report (as dictated by Larry Eagleburger)

1. There were battles throughout the night in the Suez City area. At 5:30 a.m. local time the Egyptians announced their acceptance of the ceasefire; the ceasefire took effect at 7:00 a.m. At that time the Israelis were in complete control of access routes to the Egyptian third army.
2. Dayan met with Silvaso, the UN TSO Chief to agree upon observation posts. Silvaso then left to establish the posts.
3. Shortly thereafter a local battle started along the Canal, with the Egyptians trying to break the siege. One Egyptian force attacked eastward toward Mitla and succeeded in making moderate advances. The Israelis then attacked with artillery to block the advance. The Egyptian force is still some distance from its original attack positions.
4. Around noon local time the Egyptians decided to break out towards the Canal and northward (at the southern end of Bitter Lake). These attacks were combined tank, artillery and Air Force operations by the Egyptians. During the course of the battle the Israelis shot down 15 of the 30 Egyptian aircraft involved. There were no Israeli losses.
5. In sum there has been no fighting on the west side of the Canal; two of the three divisions (Egyptian divisions) on the East Bank are engaged with Israeli forces eastward; the third division is trying to break out westward and northward.
6. Dinitz emphasizes that Israeli instructions are that their forces are to do nothing but block and contain Egyptian forces.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TIME SENT

WHITE HOUSE LDX NR 393

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'73 OCT 24 PM 4:48

CIA _____ DIA/G _____
STATE X _____ DIA/H _____
NMCC _____ DASA _____
SNMCC _____ NPIC _____
NSA _____

NUMBER OF PAGES 2


DESCRIPTION/COMMENT:
SECRET/EYES ONLY

FROM: **GEN. SCOWCROFT**

TO: **LARRY EAGLEBURGER**

RECEIVED
BY:

DATE/TIME:

1391


October 25, 1973

SECRET

HAK:

The following is a message to you from the Prime Minister through Dinitz:

- 1) I am sorry to hear that the US does not find it possible to object to the paragraph which calls for a return to the October 22 lines. This more specific demand is more serious than the similar statement in the previous resolution.
- 2) I appreciate the situation in which the US finds itself in the face of Soviet moves. I do not want the Secretary to think that I belittle the seriousness of the situation.
- 3) I have taken note of the Secretary's words that he would "do his best to support Israel on the interpretation of the paragraph." The Secretary knows that there is no possibility to fix the location of the previous line; it has never been verified and it has never been demarcated. Therefore, I expect serious discussions will evolve as to the location of the previous lines. I ask the Secretary to be prepared for such discussions and to be helpful to Israel in them.
- 4) I place great importance on the composition of the international force. It is an obvious point that it must not be composed of nations with no diplomatic relations with Israel. A number of important points will have to be worked out relating to the international force and its terms of reference, including for example authority to dismiss the force. Therefore I ask the Secretary that no finalizing of arrangements be made ~~before Israel is given ample time by the US to review~~ the situation. I ask that Ambassador Scall and Ambassador Tekoah discuss the details in New York, but that finalization be between Ambassador Dinitz and the Secretary so that I may have a direct influence on the final decision.

LSE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LDX

SECRET/EYES ONLY

October 24, 1973

Deliver immediately to:

LARRY EAGLEBURGER

Per our phone conversation.


Brent Scowcroft

Attachment

SECRET/EYES ONLY

SECRET

October 24, 1973

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SECRET

General,

Eagleberger reports: (call from Dinitz)

1. Dinitz says that as of 1038 EDT firing has ceased. Israelis hope that Egyptians have decided to abide by cease-fire. It is Dagan's hope that fighting is over.

2. Haig called Dinitz and said Pres. upset, would have to take drastic action disassociating self from Israelis.

D passed on info in paragraph 1.

Haig passed to Pres who is "Thankful and relieved", according to what

Dinitz told. Strong warning reiterated.

JH

TELCON

Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

Wednesday, Oct. 24, 1973

3:40 p. m.

K: We have just been told by the Soviets; I'm not saying this is true; but I want to bring you up to date -- that your forces are still continuing to attack.

D: I have just talked to Israel about 5 mins. ago and they told me all is quiet and we cancelled the blackout in Israel today.

K: I want to inform you of our strategy at the UN. If the meeting is called we will take the following position: 1) We will support the strongest call for an observance of the ceasefire; 2) we will ~~not~~ totally oppose introduction of American and Soviet forces (unless you are for it).

D: No. No. No.

K: 3) We will strongly favor strengthening of UN observers by bringing people in like the Scandinavians and elsewhere. 4) On the question of return to the original line we strongly support the principle but have no thoughts on how to apply it. Scali will be instructed to delay and confuse it. O.K. ?

D: Fine. Do you have any idea if anyone is going to propose a resolution.

K: No. I have no word. I have seen that the Egyptians and Syrians are calling a meeting. I am seeing Dobrynin at 4:00 and another matter and I will tell them not to propose it because we will oppose it. Give us as much assurance as you can that you are not taking any military action.

D: I called 5 minutes ago. I will tell the Prime Minister about the strategy and repeat the concern that the Russians expressed to you.

K: Thank you.

D: Thank you.

END

10/23/73; 11:47 am

Message for General Scowcroft from Minister Shalev:

At 11:00 p. m. on the 24 of October Israel time the Red Cross representative in Tel Aviv transmitted to them an Egyptian request to transfer to the hospital in the city of Suez a supply of blood and that this would be done by an Egyptian representative who would appear at the ceasefire line. Within an hour we gave our agreement and also suggested our assistance in transportation. at 10:30 this morning, Israel time, an Egyptian officer appeared at the ceasefire line with the plasma and I suppose other medicines. We permitted him to go into the city of Suez and deliver the medical supplies and he has already left and gone back from where he came.

This morning on the 25th of October at 4:00 a. m. Israel time we received another request, also from the Red Cross representative in Tel Aviv, who was transmitting a request of the Foreign Minister of Egypt and this time the request was to permit an Egyptian helicopter to fly over our positions bring similar supplies to the 3rd army (plasma and medicines). We were told that this helicopter would only contain one representative and two unarmed pilots. We did not agree to this suggestion and at 10:20 this morning we gave them a negative reply to that. At 11:50 a. m. on October 25 the representative of the Red Cross in Tel Aviv said that in view of the urgent need for plasma in the area of the 3rd army, the plasma will be transmitted there directly by the Red Cross representative in Tel Aviv himself.

referring

The Security Council reassuring to its resolution 338 of October 22
1973

(1) Confirms to its decision about immediate cessation of all fire and all military activity and demands that the forces of the sides should be withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on ceasefire.

(2) Suggest to the Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately take steps for immediate dispatch of the UN observers to supervise the observation of ceasefire between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose first of all the personnel of the United Nations which is at present at Cairo.

"withdraw to the line that they occupied" -- delete

With respect to the observers, our position is that the same principle should apply as to the force, but we are willing to entertain a request from the Secretary General for a small number, provided the distinction between the observers and the force is strictly maintained.

From the Prime Minister

The situation in the front is such that the Egyptians in fact have not observed the ceasefire in the very beginning, except for a very very short time. They have resumed firing - first with artillery and then throughout the night it was fighting. This morning, Israel time, they were even trying to capture places that did not capture before. The ceasefire which we (they) accepted and honestly observed must be mutual - reciprocal. She wants personally to tell Dr. Kissinger subsequent to their conversations they had that the Egyptians who initiated an open fire are responsible for all the fighting. She is going to the Parliament today and she will explain Israel's good faith in accepting the ceasefire and their intention to observe it but she will also say that as long as they are shooting at us they will shoot at them.

Your Military Attache in Israel is constantly being brought up to date on every single incident. Until now there are 17 violations by Egyptians.

She asked me to deliver this message personally to the Secretary. She wants Dr. Kissinger to believe her it was the result of the Egyptian initiative and none on their part.

"The Security Council:

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy.
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease fire the implementation of SC Resolution 242 in all of its parts.
3. Decides that immediately and concurrently with the cease fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. "

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
 General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs
 Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

DATE: Sunday, October 21, 1973

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office
 The White House

General Scowcroft began the meeting by reading the agreed text of a resolution which the U. S. and the Soviet Union had jointly agreed to submit to the Security Council that evening. General Scowcroft pointed out that the resolution:

- Leaves all Israeli forces in -place.
- Contains no reference to withdrawal, only a general reference to Resolution 242.
- Calls for direct negotiations between parties with joint U. S. / Soviet auspices to facilitate.
- Includes a joint U. S. /Soviet commitment to use maximum influence to bring about an exchange of prisoners.

General Scowcroft indicated that a call for a Security Council meeting would be initiated at 6:00 p. m. that evening. The only response made by the Ambassador was that the timetable was very tight.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET / SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY

TO HAK _____

October 21, 1973

TO: LARRY EAGLEBURGER

FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

Dinitz just called with a message for you from the Prime Minister. She asks that you come by Israel on your way home from Moscow, independent of any position they may take on the SC Resolution. That is, they would not delay taking a position on the resolution pending completion of your trip. I told Dinitz I would pass the message to you immediately. He requests our urgent reply.

Warm regards.

SECRET / SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY

SECRET

October 21, 1973

TOHAK _____ FLASH

TO: LARRY EAGLEBURGER FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

Dinitz just called to inform me that the Israeli^{have} decided to accept the resolution. The Prime Minister is writing to the President to ask clarification on a number of points related to the resolution, but Dinitz has stated clearly that ~~the~~ Israeli acceptance is not contingent on the answers to the questions ~~she posed~~. I will pass the Prime Minister's letter as soon as it arrives.

Warm regards.

SECRET EYES ONLY

TOHAK

October 21, 1973

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Deliver in a sealed envelope to Lawrence Eagleburger

Reference HAKTO 08 Dinitz was informed within five minutes of receipt of cable from you. The fact is that the press report came out in early afternoon and your report of meeting did not arrive until 10:00 p. m. None of your messages are held, regardless of the hour at which they are received.

Reference your cable to Ziegler, I had told Jerry Warren, who confirmed it with Haig, that he could say the President was in continuing contact with you and also with Brezhnev. The specifics were inserted at the last minute and I was not aware of that. You should know that there was no way repeat no way to have avoided a press statement yesterday.

Warm regards.

10/21/73

"The Security Council:

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy.
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease fire the implementation of SC Resolution 242 in all of its parts.
3. Decides that immediately and concurrently with the cease fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. "

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FOR: SCOWCROFT / EYES ONLY

FROM: EAGLEBURGER

FYI AND RECORDS.

[Handwritten signature] for LSE



SECRET

COPY 15 OF 15 COPIES

Department of State

TELEGRAM

Z 242030Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 266
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8575

CONTROL: 7 0 0 9Q
RECD: 24 OCT'73 5:51PM

HRK
SECRET
24

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR

REF: DAO MSG 1950 241620Z OCT 73

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. I CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER MEIR AT 1730 LOCAL TODAY AT THEIR REQUEST. ALSO PRESENT WERE GEN ZEIRA, CHIEF OF IDF INTELLIGENCE, MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRECTOR PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AND DC.
2. MRS. MEIR INITIATED CONVERSATION BY STATING SHE HAD ASKED ME TO COME TO RECEIVE PERSONAL BRIEFING FROM GEN ZEIRA AS CONCERNS SITUATION IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ FRONT AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH HER BECAUSE "SOME OF YOUR PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON SEEM TO BE WORRIED; THEY ARE NOT SURE WE ARE DOING THE RIGHT THING" ON THE SUEZ FRONT. GEN ZEIRA THEN GAVE ME BRIEFING ALONG LINES REPORTED REFTEL DURING WHICH HE AND MRS. MEIR PARTICULARLY CITED INTERCEPT MESSAGE BETWEEN MINISTER OF WAR IN CAIRO AND COMMANDER OF THIRD ARMY AS EVIDENCE CAIRO ORDERED INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ FRONT.
3. MRS. MEIR EMPHASIZED ISRAEL HAD NO SECRETS FROM U.S., INTELLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE, AND SHE HAD GIVEN ORDERS THAT WE BE GIVEN ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF GOI WHICH BORE ON MILITARY SITUATION. IN THIS SPIRIT, SHE INVITED MY DATT WITH OTHER DAO PERSONNEL TO GO TO THE SINAI AND SEE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. SHE REITERATED THAT ISRAEL HAD NOTHING TO HIDE. I EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT DATT GOING TO AREA AT THIS TIME, ALTHOUGH I APPRECIATED SPIRIT BEHIND OFFER. SHE REPLIED THIS WAS OUR DECISION, BUT SHE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE GOI HAD NOTHING TO HIDE.
4. TO SUPPORT HER CASE THAT ISRAEL DID NOT TAKE INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH, MRS. MEIR NOTED THAT SYRIAN FRONT IS TOTALLY QUIET, ADDING THIS PROVES "WHEN THEY DON'T

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SECRET

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SECRET

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- TEL AVIV 8575, 24 OCT'73

SHOOT, WE DON'T SHOOT." (DEPPRIMIN ALLON MADE SAME POINT IN CONVERSATION JUST PREVIOUS TO MY DISCUSSION WITH MRS. MEIR-SEE SEPTEL).

5. I ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER WHAT MAD HER THINK THE USG DOUBTED ISRAEL'S CONTENTION THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE INITIATED THE WIDESPREAD CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ZUEZ SECTOR? SHE REPLIED THAT HER FEAR WAS THAT "SADAT AND HIS FRIENDS" AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO THE SOVIETS) WERE UNDOUBTEDELY TRYING TO CONVINCED US THAT IT WAS ISRAEL RATHER THAN EGYPT THAT WAS AT FAULT. SHE THEN EXPLAINED THAT SHE HAD SPENT LONG HOURS YESTERDAY BEFORE KNESSET DEFENDING THE CEASE FIRE. THE OPPOSITION IS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION, ASSERTING THIS WAS A MAJOR MISTAKE WHICH WILL COST ISRAELI LIVES. ONE OF THE MAJOR ARGUMENTS SHE HAS BEEN USING IN DEFENSE OF GOVERNMENT'S DECISION IS THAT CEASEFIRE WOULD SAVE LIVES. SHE DOESN'T CARE ABOUT VIEWS OF OPPOSITION, BUT SHE HAS TO CARE ABOUT LIVES OF HER SOLDIERS. SHE POINTED OUT SHE ASSUMED THE US REALIZED THE ISRAELI SOLDIERS HAD TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, AND WHEN 30 EGYPTIAN PLANES ATTACK, ISRAEL CANNOT BE BLAMED FOR SHOOTING DOWN 14 IN SUBSEQUENT AIR BATTLES. MRS. MEIR THEN CONFIRMED THAT SHOOTING IN SOUTH ENDED ABOUT 1700 HOURS AND EMPHATICALLY STATED ISRAEL DID NOT RPT NOT WANT IT TO START AGAIN.

6. MRS. MEIR THEN COMMENTED ON GREAT APPRECIATION OF ISRAELI PEOPLE TO THE US AND TO THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY, NOTING "ONLY WE REALLY RECOGNIZE HOW MUCH PRESIDENT NIXON HAS DONE FOR US."

7. MRS. MEIR THEN ASKED ME TO MAKE CERTAIN THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL VALUED THE AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP ABOVE ALL THINGS AND COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT IMPERIL OUR SUPPORT BY TAKING INITIATIVE TO VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE. "PLEASE TELL THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY WE WOULD NOT DO THIS TO THEM." SHE EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL HAD ONLY TWO REAL PRIORITIES AS A NATION: ONE, SURVIVAL AND SECURITY AND, TWO, THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US IN GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY IN PARTICULAR.

8. I TOLD MRS. MEIR THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND SHE AND ISRAEL WERE TELLING US THE TRUTH AND I HAD COMMUNICATED THIS TO WASHINGTON. I ASSURED HER THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY COMMUNICATE HER VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.

SECRET

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SECRET

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-3- TEL AVIV 8575, 24 OCT'73

9. COMMENT. I HAVE TRIED TO SUMMARIZE A VERY LONG CONVERSATION IN WHICH MRS. MEIR REPEATED HER CENTRAL THEME - CONCERN OVER THE INTEGRITY OF THE CREDIBILITY LINK BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.S. - OVER AND OVER AGAIN. I DO NOT BELIEVE ISRAEL WOULD THREATEN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH US FOR A FEW MORE MILES OF DESERT. WHILE WE HAVE NOT BEEN WILLING TO ALWAYS CREDIT 100 PERCENT WHAT THE GOI HAS TOLD US ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE I AM CONVINCED THEY ARE TELLING THE TRUTH. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO REASSURE MRS. MEIR THAT THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY DO NOT QUESTION HER VERACITY AND FRIENDSHIP FOR THE U.S. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A BRIEF, QUICK MESSAGE OF THIS NATURE WILL GO A LONG WAY TO SUSTAIN HER IN A MOST DIFFICULT PERIOD. YOU MAY WISH OF COURSE EVEN WISH TO CONTACT HER DIRECT.

KEATING

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Passed to Anselm Dinitz
by Gen. Semenov
1515, 2105

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

Since the attack on your forces on October 6, we have worked tirelessly for an end to the fighting and bloodshed on terms that would enable you and your neighbors to make a new beginning towards peace.

Today, we have concluded discussions with the Soviet Union, the results of which I want to communicate to you urgently for the concurrence and support of your Government.

Secretary Kissinger whom I sent to Moscow in response to an urgent Soviet request, has reached agreement with Mr. Brezhnev on a resolution which we and the Soviets would plan to introduce this evening in the Security Council. This resolution has only three operative paragraphs and nothing else which: (A) calls for an immediate ceasefire in place, the ceasefire to come into effect no later than 12 hours after (B) the Security Council decision has been taken; / a second paragraph makes a general call upon the parties to implement Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts after the ceasefire; and (C) it is linked to a third paragraph which calls for negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. In addition, the Soviets have agreed to join us in strongly urging an immediate exchange of prisoners of war.

Madame Prime Minister, we believe that this is a major achievement for you and for us and supportive of the brave fighting of your forces. It would leave your forces right where they are: There is absolutely no mention whatsoever of the word "withdrawal" in the resolution; third, for the first time, we have achieved the agreement of the Soviet Union to a resolution that calls for direct negotiation without conditions or qualifications between the parties under appropriate auspices. At the same time we and the Soviets have agreed privately to make our joint auspices available to you and to the Arabs to facilitate this process, if this is agreeable to the parties.

I wish there had been time for fuller consultations but with the bloodshed continuing, with Israel in such a favorable position on the ground, with the risks increasing by the hour as substantial supplies are being poured in by both major powers, we felt it was imperative that an understanding be reached promptly.

We are planning to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a meeting of the Security Council at 9:00 p.m. this evening. The Soviet Union will join us in this request as well as in the submission of the resolution.

Finally, Madame Prime Minister, I want to say a word about the Arab reaction. We do not know whether this proposal will be accepted by the other side because among other things it is a far distance indeed from the five-point Sadat program announced the other day.

I hope, therefore, that you and your colleagues will reply promptly to this message and that we have your full support in this matter.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

*Hand Delivered to
Amb. Dinitz
11:00 am, 10/22/73*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 21, 1973

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Since the attack on your forces on October 6, we have worked tirelessly for an end to the fighting and bloodshed on terms that would enable you and your neighbors to make a new beginning towards peace.

Today, we have concluded discussions with the Soviet Union, the results of which I want to communicate to you urgently for the concurrence and support of your Government.

Secretary Kissinger whom I sent to Moscow in response to an urgent Soviet request, has reached agreement with Mr. Brezhnev on a resolution which we and the Soviets would plan to introduce this evening in the Security Council. This resolution has only three operative paragraphs and nothing else which: (a) calls for an immediate ceasefire in place, the ceasefire to come into effect no later than 12 hours after the Security Council decision has been taken; (b) a second paragraph makes a general call upon the parties to implement Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts after the ceasefire; and (c) it is linked to a third paragraph which calls for negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. In addition, the Soviets have agreed to join us in strongly urging an immediate exchange of prisoners of war.

Madame Prime Minister, we believe that this is a major achievement for you and for us and supportive of the brave fighting of your forces. It would leave your forces

right where they are: There is absolutely no mention whatsoever of the word "withdrawal" in the resolution; third, for the first time, we have achieved the agreement of the Soviet Union to a resolution that calls for direct negotiation without conditions or qualifications between the parties under appropriate auspices. At the same time we and the Soviets have agreed privately to make our joint auspices available to you and to the Arabs to facilitate this process, if this is agreeable to the parties.

I wish there had been time for fuller consultations but with the bloodshed continuing, with Israel in such a favorable position on the ground, with the risks increasing by the hour as substantial supplies are being poured in by both major powers, we felt it was imperative that an understanding be reached promptly.


We are planning to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a meeting of the Security Council at 9:00 p.m. this evening. The Soviet Union will join us in this request as well as in the submission of the resolution.

Finally, Madame Prime Minister, I want to say a word about the Arab reaction. We do not know whether this proposal will be accepted by the other side because among other things it is a far distance indeed from the five-point Sadat program announced the other day.

I hope, therefore, that you and your colleagues will reply promptly to this message and that we have your full support in this matter.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Richard Nixon".

Her Excellency
Golda Meir
Prime Minister of Israel

Given to HAK
by Dinitz
Oct. 19, 1973

Main points of Heikal article in AL-AHRAM, October 19, 1973.

At this moment it is difficult to envisage an early end of the fierce battles now raging on the Syrian Heights and in the sands of Sinai.

Even if the fighting will cease before we have reached our objective - and I don't think it will - I have to state now in advance that from here on Israel will not wait for long before once again opening fire and renewing the conflict. Although there are some who think that Israel will agree to a cease-fire with the Egyptian forces remaining in the positions that they have reached east of the Canal, it must be borne in mind that an Israel agreement to such a cease-fire should not be mistaken for acceptance by Israel of the existing situation but rather as a way of gaining time.

I will not discuss here the ultimate aim of the Arab/Israel conflict but it is important to pay attention to the question of what is the aim of our war against our enemy and of the enemy's war against

us. The aim in the present stage is not an area in the Golan or the entire Golan, a part of Sinai or all of it. Nor is the question that of the connection with Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza or the rights of the Palestinian people. The aim is, in short, the Israel Defense doctrine, the urge to prove that this doctrine is wrong. The raising of doubts about the Israel Defense doctrine will not in the present stage restrict the dimensions of the Israel/Arab war and will not go far in the forthcoming stages. The question is not that of the liberation of the Arab territories conquered after June '67 but rather more and more that of the future of Israel even if ~~this~~ does not seem feasible at the present moemnt. If the Arabs will succeed in liberating the territories which were conquered on June 5 '67 by war what would prevent them from conquering in the next stage Palestine itself by the force of arms. The main problem is that of the balance of force and it is there that the danger for Israel lies.

If all this goes on, what will happen to the immigration to Israel, the call for which was based not only on religious legend but also on the

opportunities offered by Israel and the security that it offers. The philosophy of Israel Defense and its expressions in fact are therefore the contents and the framework of the armed conflict and 10 kms north or south, 20 kms. east or west, are not really relevant.

delivered to SCOWER OF T By
SA LEV AT 2.45 PM
10/20/73
Summary "A"

The situation on October 20 at 1600 Moscow time

EGYPTIAN FRONT

1. THE FORWARD THRUST OF OUR FORCES CONTINUES. WE ARE ENGAGED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF LARGE PARTS OF THE LOGISTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE TWO EGYPTIAN ARMIES HOLDING THE CANAL LINE, AS WELL AS OF THE MISSILE SITES SYSTEM PROTECTING THESE ARMIES FROM AIR ATTACK. ABOUT 20 MISSILE BATTERIES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED IN THE LAST 48 HOURS WITH ROUGHLY ONE HALF (IN THE BRIDGEHEAD AREA) AS A RESULT OF THE ARMoured THRUST, THE OTHER HALF (BETWEEN PORT SAID AND ISMAILYA) AS A RESULT OF OUR AIR FORCE'S ACTION. ONE OF OUR COLUMNS' FORWARD UNITS HAS AT ONE POINT CUT THE NORTHERN SUEZ-CAIRO HIGHWAY.

RUNNING PARALLEL TO AND NORTH OF THE RAILWAY LINE, TO THE WEST, OUR PENETRATION IS OF ABOUT THIRTY KMS. TO THE NORTH, WE ARE MOPPING UP THE AREA IMMEDIATELY TO THE WEST OF CANAL AND SOUTH OF THE ISMAILIYA AGRICULTURAL CANAL. THE CORRIDOR LEADING TO OUR BRIDGEHEAD IS BEING WIDENED AND CONSOLIDATED, WITH THREE BRIDGES IN OPERATION. ON THE EASTERN BANK

OF THE SUEZ CANAL, WE ARE EXERTING SOME PRESSURE ALL ALONG THE EGYPTIAN POSITIONS BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE BREACH.

2. EGYPTIAN FORCES ARE BEING DEPLOYED IN THE REGIONS OF JEBEL AWEYBID, JEBEL UM KATIB, ABU SUWEIR IN AN EFFORT TO CONTAIN THE ADVANCE ISRAELI THRUST. THE BRUNT OF THIS IMPROVISED DEFENSE IS CARRIED BY UNITS FROM THE 4th ARMoured DIVISION WHICH FORMED THE RESERVE OF THE THIRD ARMY, HOLDING THE CANAL LINE BETWEEN THE SMALL BITTER LAKE AND SUEZ. UNITS FROM THE THIRD MECHANIZED DIVISION PROTECTING THE CAIRO AREA HAVE BEEN MOVED FORWARD AND ARE BLOCKING THE ISMAILYA-CAIRO HIGHWAY. THE SECOND ARMY, HOLDING THE CANAL LINE ON THE EAST BANK NORTH OF OUR CORRIDOR IS DEPLOYING UNITS ALONG THE ISMAILYA AGRICULTURAL CANAL AND IS MAKING UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO ATTACK OUR CORRIDOR FROM THE NORTH.

3. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE OF THE SIZE OF THE EGYPTIAN FORCE WITHDRAWN FROM THE EAST BANK OF THE CANAL AND ENGAGED IN THE DELAYING ACTION ON THE WEST BANK. HOWEVER, A ROUGH ESTIMATE WOULD HAVE IT THAT 20 PERCENT OF THE FORCE ORIGINALLY ON THE EASTERN BANK ON OCTOBER 15TH HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN.

4. WE ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN TANKS AS FOLLOWS :

SECOND ARMY SECTOR : 250 EAST OF THE CANAL, 70 WEST OF THE CANAL. THIRD ARMY SECTOR : 200 EAST OF THE CANAL, 150 WEST OF THE CANAL. UNITS ON THE WESTERN FRINGES OF THE BATTLE ZONE (REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE CAIRO AREA) 180 TANKS.

5. SUMMARIZING THE PRESENT SITUATION, WE HAVE COMPLETELY SEIZED THE INITIATIVE, CAUSING CONFUSION AND DISLOCATION TO THE ENEMY. A WEDGE HAS BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE EGYPTIAN FRONT AND THE TWO ARMIES ARE PRACTICALLY SEPARATED FROM EACH OTHER. A THREAT OF ENCIRCLEMENT IS DEVELOPING IN THE REAR OF THE THIRD ARMY.

THE PROGRESSIVE DESTRUCTION OF MISSILE SITES PROVIDES OUR AIR FORCE WITH INCREASING FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE BATTLE AREA. THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE IS MEANWHILE CARRYING OUT LARGE-SCALE FIGHTER ATTACKS ON OUR BRIDGEHEAD, EXPOSING ITSELF DANGEROUSLY TO ISRAELI ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE (44 PLANES LOST IN THE LAST 48 HOURS).

6. OUR MAJOR OBJECTIVE REMAINS THE INFLICTION OF MAIMING LOSSES ON THE EGYPTIAN FORCES IN ORDER TO DESTROY THEIR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES. WHETHER OR

NOT WE SHALL INDEED ACHIEVE THE ULTIMATE AIM, NAMELY THE COLLAPSE OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY, WE HAVE ALREADY ACQUIRED SOME NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE THANKS TO OUR ACHIEVEMENTS SO FAR. WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ACQUISITION OF SOME MORE LEVERAGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF FURTHER INITIATIVES. AT THE SAME TIME ALL OUR ACTIONS HAVE TO BE GUIDED BY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A RAPIDLY APPROACHING CEASEFIRE/ STANDSTILL. WHEN THE CEASEFIRE COMES INTO FORCE IT SHOULD FIND US HOLDING A LINE THAT MAKES SENSE FROM A POLITICO-MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. THE FURTHER DRIVE THAT WE STILL HAVE TO DEVELOP WILL BE MADE POSSIBLE BY THE MAGNIFICENT FIGHTING SPIRIT OF OUR FORCES. HOWEVER, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THEY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN HEAVY COMBAT ALMOST INCESSANTLY SINCE OCTOBER 6TH.

THE SYRIAN FRONT

1. ESSENTIALLY THIS HAS BEEN A STATIC FRONT THROUGHOUT THIS WEEK. HOWEVER, THE BULGE HAS CONTINUED TO BE THE FOCAL POINT OF DAILY ATTACKS BY THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES REINFORCING THE SYRIAN ARMY. WE HAVE INFLICTED SERIOUS DAMAGE ON THESE VARIOUS

CONTINGENTS (ABOUT 100 IRAQI, 20 JORDANIAN AND 60 SYRIAN TANKS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED IN THE LAST WEEK).

THERE HAS BEEN A SMALL FORWARD MOVEMENT BY OUR FORCES IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE THE LINE IN THE UM BATNA AREA (IN THE SOUTH-WEST CORNER OF THE BULGE).

2. SOVIET SHIPMENTS AMOUNTING TO 400 TANKS HAVE REACHED SYRIA AND THE TANKS ARE AT PRESENT BEING DISTRIBUTED TO THE UNITS, INCLUDING FRONTLINE UNITS. RUSH COURSES FOR ARMOUR PERSONNEL ARE BEING HELD.

3. WE MAY OR MAY NOT DEVELOP SOME FURTHER INITIATIVES ON THIS FRONT BEFORE THERE IS A CEASEFIRE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 24, 1973

HAK:

In addition to the bit of information on Cairo radio and POWs that I passed in to you during your meeting with Dobrynin, Dinitz had the following other points to make:

1) He has passed your message to the Prime Minister. Her answer to you is that she reassures you that peace prevails and that therefore Russian suspicions are unfounded.

2) The Israelis will have between 2 and 3 thousand POWs including senior officers and pilots. Israeli prisoners in enemy hands number about 80; some 290 Israelis are MIA (some obviously may be prisoners). The Israelis are willing to exchange all the POWs they hold for all Israeli POWs held by the Arabs.

LSE

**SCOWCROFT
ONLY**

SANITIZED COPY

TRANSMITTED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

'73 OCT 15 PM 1:08

ES. Hoy
OCT 15 PM 12 57

LDX MESSAGE NO. 314, CLASSIFICATION SECRET/SENSITIVE NO. PAGES 3

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. SECRET/SENSITIVE

FROM: EAGLEBURGER, 5, 20968, 7234-A
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

LDX TO: W. H., DELIVER TO: GEN. SCOWCROFT, EXTENSION: 2255, ROOM NUMBER: SITROOM

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR SCOWCROFT

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: AT
Executive Secretariat Officer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 01-31/4 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) Hr. AUG 1 2007
By B NARA, Date 3 Oct. 07

[p 1 of 4]

SANITIZED COPY

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: L. S. EAGLEBURGER

MEY FOR LSE

[NLD 01-31/4:2]

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 15, 1975

HAK:

Dinitz just called. He says that the head of Jordanian intelligence has just sent the following message to the head of Israeli intelligence:

"I have shown the content of your message last night to the King, and it is with deep regret that after studying your map coordinates we have to advise you to consider our expeditionary force of the 4th armored brigade as hostile as of yesterday morning.

"The King and his headquarters have been under pressure directly from his opposite number to the north to either withdraw the 4th brigade or have it carry out its military duties at what was then the 8th day of the war. The 4th brigade is within the danger zone you indicated, and was not, to date, in action. It inevitably will be. The King, with heavy heart, has asked me to advise your military to consider it as hostile since yesterday. As for the probable reference to its position, it has been given so many contradictory orders that it is nearly impossible to predict where it will be at any given moment.

"Best wishes."

Dinitz tells me that this same message will be passed [REDACTED]

The Israeli understanding is that the Jordanian brigade will be working in coordination with the Iraqi force. That is, it is becoming a part of the Iraqi movement in the area.

Under these circumstances, according to Dinitz, "the least harm would be done if in addition to this force, no additional force was sent into action in this region or any other region of the front.

SANITIZED

3.3 (b) (1)

[NLD 01-31/4:3]

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

with Jordan, and trust that the existing force there will receive instructions not to engage heavily in battle. This is said with the hope that the engagement should it occur will be limited."

Dinitz went on to say, however, that naturally the Israelis will be forced to fight when they are attacked. He then asked whether we would do everything within our power to impress upon the Jordanians the objectives stated above.

LSE

*Brent - since is done a telegram
As Brown. W*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

[NW 01-31/4:4]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Rodman Chan
Divide file upstairs
ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

October 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: PETER RODMAN
SUBJECT: Arikpo and Israel

When you see Arikpo, there is still time, if you wish, to make an effort to head off a Nigerian break in diplomatic relations with Israel.

Shalev made an urgent appeal to us the other day, thinking the break was then imminent (Tab A). A few days later you concluded it was then OBE. But as of this morning the break has not yet been made. The Nigerians are obviously under pressure but they are also obviously resisting the pressure too.

Therefore you may wish to make this point to Dr. Arikpo:

- The independent stand of major countries like Nigeria is what gives these countries special weight in the non-aligned world. At a delicate moment like the present, it is especially important that a major country like Nigeria not do something which inadvertently upsets the situation.
- In the aftermath of this crisis, the US will move vigorously to promote a settlement. Nigeria, which has friendly relations with both sides, will be in a key position to help this effort. Your courageous stand of independence will be vindicated.
- We have heard reports that you are under pressure to break relations with Israel. We think Nigeria will gain more by maintaining its current position.

At Tab B is a briefing paper which Shalev gave us on Gowon a few weeks ago.

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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 11, 1973

OBE

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*
SUBJECT: Nigeria May Be About to Break Relations
with Israel

General Gowon has summoned the Israeli Ambassador in Lagos in for an appointment tomorrow. This is an extraordinary step, since Gowon rarely sees Ambassadors, and the Israelis are convinced this is the occasion for a break in diplomatic relations.

The Israelis (Shalev) are asking you personally to intervene with the Nigerians tonight to try to head this off.

They have heard you have an appointment with Foreign Minister Arikpo tomorrow, but this will probably be too late. Arikpo is tonight in New York with their UN delegation.

The Israelis hope you can convince him that such a step, in the middle of a conflict, by such an important country, is a kind of interference in the Mideast conflict, and would be damaging to free world interests. *They hope you can do this without revealing the source!*

From Shalev
10/3/73

GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON
NIGERIAN HEAD OF STATE

As the most populous black African country, the relative political stability it has achieved since the Civil War ended, and with its natural resources (oil), Nigeria plays a key role in African affairs. Gowon is the current chairman of the Organization of African Unity.

Gowon (who is a Christian) has been under strong pressure by some sectors of the Moslem community in his country, and by the North African Arab countries, to break relations with Israel. At least in formal statements he has accepted the Arab interpretation of Resolution 242 (although there is some doubt whether this reflects his personal views).

On the other hand, Israel maintains relatively strong economic ties with Nigeria and large parts of the non-Moslem population are sympathetic to Israel.

If Nigeria should succumb to Arab pressure and break relations with Israel, the result would be not only detrimental to Israel. Such a development would greatly reinforce the destructive trend in African affairs, and would weaken the moderate countries' ability to pursue their policy of constructive development and of opposition to the radical and pro-Communist forces.

Gowon, as the leader of Nigeria, would also be the natural leader of a moderate Africa, which would devote its resources and capabilities to its own progress, rather than engage in sterile political propaganda.

GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON,
page 2.

It should be impressed upon him that an anti-Israel policy, i.e., giving in to Libya, Algeria, etc., would be a grievous blow to Nigeria's standing and its potential leadership of Black Africa.

P.M.

18 Oct. 73

Following are preliminary remarks which I was instructed by the Prime Minister to bring to your personal attention as her first reflections on the conversation I had with General Scowcroft and the subsequent telephone conversation I had with you :

The Prime Minister appreciates your remark that we can be sure that the United States will not accept any proposal which refers to the '67 lines. But she has to call your attention that any mention of 242 in connection with the cease-fire can be interpreted by the Egyptians and the Arabs as a reference to the '67 lines.

The battle is not over yet and the Soviets are already trying to dictate to Israel political moves designed not only to save their client States but also to reward them. We will not be a party to such a move. This was a terrible war. Our casualties in dead, if we calculate them in terms of the population of the United States, are in the magnitude of the losses that the United States suffered in Korea or Viet Nam wars that lasted, of course, a much

longer time. It was a very cruel war and it is not over yet. The Prime Minister is sure that K. will understand and believe her when she says to him again what she told him on several occasions in the past, that during a serious peace negotiation she will have no hesitation to bring before the Government, the Knesset and the people, any difficult decision that will be necessary. But as long as there is not even a serious proposal on a cease-fire, and as long as we are far from peace negotiations - she does not see any justification for the mention of 242.

It is important to remember that the decision on the cease-fire in '67 did not mention the Armistice Agreements of 1949. Just as the cease-fire resolution of '67 did not mention or refer to previous documents or resolutions but stood on its own, so also now a resolution on cease-fire in '73 (after an additional war initiated by the Arabs and backed by the Soviets) must stand on its own feet.

Moreover, Resolution 242 refers explicitly to the conflict of '67 and now we are discussing cease-fire resulting from the war of '73.

We never believed that Resolution 242 is a panacea.

We agreed to accept it in specific circumstances prevailing at the time, circumstances which do not exist any more.

For further clarification : We do not object that a resolution on cease-fire there will also include a call for negotiation for peace. But we object to the mention of a specific resolution which refers to circumstances which do not exist any more.

She will not go into detail on the pitfalls and difficulties of Resolution 242, difficulties which are not confined only to the question of withdrawal and borders.

The Prime Minister is anxious that K. understands that she says these things before a final position of Israel has been formulated. She is sharing her thoughts with him. She will have to consult with the Government. (There is a specific Government decision that the Cabinet must be convened and consulted before a policy on the cease-fire is fixed). Since we do not have yet any specific draft of a Soviet proposal, the discussions in Jerusalem at

this stage must of necessity, be of a general nature and deal with matters of principle only. But the Prime Minister found it necessary to bring to his attention that the very possibility of a mention of 242 lights up a red light for us.

The Prime Minister has instructed me to tell you that she has invited the Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban, to return promptly to Jerusalem in order to take part in these discussions and in the discussions on the situation in the front.

From the point of view of the time-table, we see no reason for undue haste. So far there are only feelers from the Soviet side. As far as the situation in the front is concerned, we have no reason for any speed-up of the diplomatic moves.