

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	report MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST Exempted	Medical Profile - Col. Qadhafi 2pp. NLN 01-31/1 per Htr. 22 Dec. 06 Sec 3.3(b)(1) EO 12958	n.d. [6/73]	B
2	memo MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST Exempted	Colby to HAK 8 pp. NLN 01-31/2 per sec. 1.4 (c)(d) EO 12958 Htr. AUG 1 2007	10/26/73	B
3	memo MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST Exempted	Colby to HAK 1p. NLN 01-31/3 per sec. 1.4 (c)(d) EO 12958 Htr. AUG 1 2007	10/25/73	B
4	memo MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST SANITIZED	Eagleburger to Scowcroft 4 pp. NLN 01-31/4 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) EO 12958 Htr. AUG 1 2007	10/15/73	B
5	memo MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST Exempted	Colby to HAK 5pp. NLN 01-31/5 per sec. 1.4 (c)(d) EO 12958 Htr. AUG 1 2007	10/13/73	B
6	memo MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST SANITIZED	HAK to Keating 1pp. NLN 01-31/6 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) EO 12958 Htr. AUG 1 2007	10/10/73	B
7	memo MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST Exempted	For the Record 2pp. NLN 01-31/7 per sec. 1.4 (c)(d) EO 12958 Htr. AUG 1 2007	10/10/73	B
8	memcon MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST	HAK, Dinitz, et. al. NLN 01-31/8	10/9/73	B

DECLASSIFIED per Htr. 8/1/07
BOX NUMBER 136 [p. 1 of 2]

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files HAK Office Files Country Files ME

FOLDER TITLE

① DINITZ, June 4 - October 31, 1973

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. B. National security classified information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |
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9	letter w/attach.	Shalev to Scowcroft DECLASSIFIED Per Ltr ²⁵ 3 Nov 2008 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-110/1 8pp	10/6/73	B
10	memo w/attach.	Rodman to HAK DECLASSIFIED Per Ltr ²⁵ 3 Nov 2008 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-110/2 4pp	10/3/73	B
11	memo	Rodman to HAK	10/3/73	B
12	memo	Rodman to HAK	6/4/73	B
13	report	Biography SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 4/10/2008	n.d.	B

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HAK

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(1)

DINITZ, June 4 - October 31, 1973

[2]

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

10 October 1973

My dear Mr. President:

I have been instructed by the Prime Minister of Israel to transmit to you the following message:


"Dear Mr. President,

Early this morning I was told of the vital decision you made to assure us the immediate flow of U.S. materiel. Your decision will have a great beneficial influence on our fighting capability. I knew that in this hour of dire need to Israel I could turn to you and count on your deep sympathy and understanding.

We are fighting against very heavy odds, but we are fully confident that we shall come out victorious. When we do we will have you in mind.

Golda Meir"

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Simcha Dinitz".
Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador

D

Oct. 22, 1973

It is understood that the phrase "under appropriate auspices" in point 3 of the Security Council Resolution shall mean that the negotiations between the parties concerned will take place with the active participation of the United States and the Soviet Union at the beginning and thereafter in the course of negotiations when key issues of a settlement are dealt with. Throughout the entire process of negotiation the United States and the Soviet Union will in any case maintain the closest contact with each other and the negotiating parties.

A.G. HK

D
Oct. 22, 1973

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A.G. HK

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST

NLN 01-31/1

2pp-

Exempted

per sec. 1.4 (c)(d) EO 12958 Hr. 8/1/07

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER | ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.



Dear Dr. Kissinger:

*with
the Compliments of the
Embassy of Israel
at Washington*

Received with thanks.

Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador

RETURN THIS RECEIPT IMMEDIATELY TO

Henry A. Kissinger
The White House

REGISTRY NO.

31-AA

CLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION
(Serial No., File No., Subject)

Note to Amb. Dinitz with cy ~~box~~
of paper

DATE

Oct. 31, 1973

INCLOSURES

1

ADDRESSEE

His Excellency
Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador of Israel
Israeli Embassy

Receipt for communication(s) described above is hereby acknowledged by:

ADDRESSEE'S SIGNATURE

DATE RECEIVED

TO BE RETURNED TO THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT

CLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be de

16-70499b-1

GPO

**THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE NW.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500**

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

CLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be de

*Delivered to Amb. Dinitz
7:05 pm, Oct 31, 1973*

October 31, 1973

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

**Attached is a copy of a paper which
Minister Fahmi presented during his
meeting with the President this afternoon.**

Sincerely,

**Brent Scowcroft
Major General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs**

Attachment

**His Excellency
Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador of Israel
1621 - 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.**

October 31, 1973

I. The most immediate steps which would be conducive to strengthening the ceasefire phase and the conduct of peace negotiations consist of:

1. Observation of the ceasefire.
2. Stationing of UN forces in necessary and appropriate points.
3. Return of Israeli forces to the positions of October 22.

The aforementioned steps were specifically ordered by the Security Council and need not be the subject of any delay or contact between the parties.

II. When Israeli forces return to the October 22, 1973, position, an exchange of all prisoners of war will take place.

III. Israeli forces are then to withdraw to a line inside Sinai to be agreed upon by the military. This line should lie as a matter of principle to the east of the passes.

IV. In order that the disengagement be effective, a zone as wide as possible should separate the forces of the two sides. UN forces will be stationed in such a zone, which to the west will have Egyptian forces in their present position.

V. As soon as all Israeli forces proceed eastward to the disengagement zone, the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea will be effected. [In other words, the blockade of Bab al-Mandab will be lifted.]

VI. When Israeli forces reach the disengagement zone and UN forces are stationed therein, the operation of clearing the Suez Canal would begin.

VII. The disengagement stage is to be followed by another single stage, namely, the withdrawal to the international frontier. The time limit for such withdrawal is to be set up.

VIII. When UN forces reach the international frontier, the state of belligerency terminates.

IX. In the course of preparation of the disengagement phase concerning Egypt and Israel, a parallel phase is to be set up for Syria.

X. At the same time as the disengagement zone is set up separating forces east of the passes, a peace conference under UN auspices is convened with participation of all parties, including the Palestinians. The big powers should participate in the peace conference as well.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LDX

October 30, 1973

FOR: LARRY EAGLEBURGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

For your information.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation between Ambassador Dinitz and General Scowcroft on Tuesday, October 30, 1973 at 12:45 p. m.

Ambassador Dinitz reported that as a special gesture to the President the Prime Minister wishes to inform Dr. Kissinger of the following:

The one-time convoy to the Third Army was of 100 trucks (which in itself was a considerable concession). Yesterday the Egyptians attempted to add additional trucks to the convoy. We said no. However, in line with the request of the President, the Prime Minister has now agreed to permit an additional twenty to thirty trucks containing general supplies plus ten to twelve additional trucks with medical supplies over and above the 100 originally agreed-to. The Israeli checkpoints have already been notified to clear the trucks.

The Prime Minister also wanted Dr. Kissinger to know that she was not only authorizing the additional trucks but that they were also helping the Egyptians transfer the cargo over the Canal by furnishing additional barges and permitting additional people to work on the loading and unloading. (This they have done on their own initiative -- there had been no complaints from the Egyptians.)

The Prime Minister requests urgently of the President that during his meeting with Minister Fahmi, he press on him the importance of a general exchange of prisoners at the earliest possible moment.

THE WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

WHITE HOUSE LDX NR 453

'73 OCT 30 PM 1:47

CIA _____ DIA/G _____
STATE X _____ DIA/H _____
NMCC _____ DASA _____
ANMCC _____ NPIC _____
NSA _____

JP

NUMBER OF PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION/COMMENT:

FROM: GEN. SCOWCROFT LIMITED

TO: LARRY EAGLEBURGER

OFFICIAL
USE

RECEIVED
BY:

DATE/TIME:

30 OCT 1973
2 09
STATE

Egypt

Delivered to Amb. Dinitz
7:05 p.m., Oct 31, 1973

October 31, 1973

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Attached is a copy of a paper which
Minister Fahmi presented during his
meeting with the President this afternoon.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft
Major General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

His Excellency
Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador of Israel
1621 - 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

October 31, 1973

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X. At the same time as the disengagement zone is set up separating forces east of the passes, a peace conference under UN auspices is convened with participation of all parties, including the Palestinians. The big powers should participate in the peace conference as well.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.



Received 5:15 p.m. 29 Oct 73
CDX'd to Saylebrun for Secy, 6:30 p.m.
שגרירות ישראל
ושיננטון

PERSONAL
& CONFIDENTIAL

29 October 1973

The Honorable
Major General Brent Scowcroft
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear General Scowcroft:

At the suggestion of the Secretary of State,
I am submitting to you herewith the following
suggested draft for the announcement of the Prime
Minister's visit:

"The Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda
Meir, is to come to Washington for a
working visit. Mrs. Meir will meet the
President of the United States, Mr. Richard
Nixon, on Thursday, November 1, 1973. The
Prime Minister will also confer with U.S.
Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger."

This statement will be released in Washington
and Jerusalem at an agreed time.

Sincerely,


Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

LDX'd to Engelbarger
5:52 pm, 29 Oct 73

October 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Minister Shalev gave me a report on the second meeting between the Israeli and Egyptian Generals (12 Noon Cairo time).

The Egyptians raised the matter of Israeli withdrawal to the 22 October lines; the establishment of regular resupply convoys to the Third Army; and the acceleration of the unloading of the first convoy.

The Israelis, in turn, raised the following:

- (1) The question of regular resupply convoys and the lines of 22 October would have to be dealt with at a political level;
- (2) They agreed that five amphibious vehicles and 50 workers should be used to trans-ship the supplies across the Canal;
- (3) An acceleration of the exchange of the wounded and of lists of POW's;
- (4) Immediate visits by the ICRC to the wounded and the POW's;
- (5) Develop a time-table for the exchange of the POW's.

The Egyptians handed over a list of 45 wounded prisoners and 6 dead and promised by tonight's meeting a positive reply on: (1) the readiness to return the wounded prisoners; (2) arrangements with the ICRC to visit the wounded with medical supplies; (3) the evacuation of seriously wounded prisoners, both in the Third Army and in Israeli hospitals. The Egyptians also promised a list of all POW's within three days, but stated they were not yet in a position to discuss a time-table for POW exchanges.

The atmosphere of the meeting was fairly good. The Egyptian General said he understood the delay in the convoy unloading and that they had no real complaints about it. There were no threats by the Egyptian side of renewed force. They did complain about the shooting down of helicopters which may have been evacuating the wounded.

Brent Scowcroft

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

Dinitz File

*Handcarried to Embassy
by Lit Rm @ 2³⁰ pm -*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR
AMBASSADOR DINITZ

Attached is a communication to the Secretary
from Mr. Ismail.

BS
BRENT SCOWCROFT

I wish to inform you of the following developments:


1. Although the supply column has been in principle allowed to continue towards its destination, it was delayed by the Israelis who created technical difficulties and finally shot at the column.
2. The meeting arranged for 2400 hours October 27, 1973 was finally held, however, the Israelis insisted that they were not authorized to discuss the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions concerning the restoration of the line of 22 October 1973. They introduced new elements regarding the exchange of POW's and the question of the maritime lines of communication in the Red Sea. However, I must admit that the meeting was dignified. A date for a new meeting was not fixed, though we are agreeable to meet again as soon as possible.
3. President Sadat has decided to send immediately to Washington Minister Ismail Fahmi accompanied by Ambassador al Iryan to meet you and acquaint you with the events of the last few days as well as to present to you in preparation for your forthcoming visit to Egypt, the Egyptian concept for the establishment of durable and just peace.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Henry -

I agree with Hal's
arguments.

Brent



The Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, is to come to Washington for a working visit. Mrs. Meir will meet the President of the United States, Mr. Richard Nixon, on Thursday, November 1, 1973. The Prime Minister will also confer with U. S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

In addition, the President will be seeing the Acting Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Ismail Fahmi, on Wednesday at 10:00 Am and he will also be seeing Ambassador Dobrynin today at 6:00 p. m.

These three meetings are all part of the President's effort to bring a lasting peace in the Middle East.

PERSONAL/EYES ONLY

URGENT ATTENTION

October 26, 1973
9:45 a.m.

Mr. Secretary:

From Sonnenfeldt *HS*

Re Soviet truce observers.

I would really urge you in strongest terms to make a try at getting the Soviets excluded from both the UNTSO and UNEF contingents (I am not sure how the two differ; presumably they don't, for now, but the latter may later be transformed into some kind of peacekeeping operation.)

First, the presence of Soviet personnel will mean constant bickering within UNTSO about who started one or another violation;

Second, it will mean that the inevitable disputes about what the October 22 cease-fire really were will be compounded by partisan Soviet interpretations;

Third, there is real danger that if the Soviets show up near the Israeli lines there will be incidents.

None of this is offset by inclusion of US observers.

On top of that, we have spilled blood with the UK and French by excluding Permanent members from the UNEF. As long as the distinction between UNTSO and UNEF is unclear, the already growing tension with the British and French (even if it is largely due to their own stupidity and myopia) is going to become worse if it now turns out that great power personnel is included after all.

Our proposal night before last was made in different circumstances, as was your press conference comment; we intended them as face-savers for Brezhnev.

Consequently, I believe it is very much in our interest to go to both the Egyptians and the Soviets -- who, incidentally put their people in unilaterally even though the President's letter had specifically said there should first be consultations on modalities between US and Soviet representatives -- and tell them that in the new circumstances we should both stay out of the truce supervision and observation business.

This is important for another reason: for once Waldheim was willing to take action on his own to keep the Soviets out; he will never do it again if we now turn his flank.

Finally, we have not thought through the whole US/Soviet guarantee business and what precise roles we play. It is clear from the pre-history that the Soviets want these "guarantees" applied in the first instance to force Israeli withdrawal. Before we concede the principal of US/Soviet involvement in UNTSO or UNEF, we should get our own thinking clear.

Any demarche to the Soviets and Egyptians on this could leave open whether or not Soviets stay somewhere behind the Egyptian lines, though it would be best to get them out altogether.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 01-31/2 8 pp.

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Delivered to Scamroft
by Minister Shalib
at 1600, 25 OCT 1973

IMMEDIATE SITUATION

1. ON SYRIAN FRONT

SITUATION IS STABLE AND WE HAVE IMPROVED SITUATION
BY TAKING COMMANDING POSITIONS ON MT. HERMON.
WE ARE HOLDING THIS FRONT WITH MINIMUM NECESSARY.

2. ON EGYPTIAN FRONT

(A) WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SURROUNDING 3RD ARMY FORCES
ON THE EAST BANK (OVER 2 INFANTRY DIVISIONS WITH

0
ELEMENTS EQUIVALENT TO ANOTHER DIVISION. ALTOGETHER
ABOUT 200 TANKS).

WE HAVE ALSO CAUSED HEAVY LOSSES TO ARMORED DIVISION
AND MECHANIZED DIVISION OF 3RD ARMY AND ADDITIONAL
ARMoured AND MECHANIZED BRIGADES BETWEEN CANAL AND
CAIRO, AS WELL AS TO LOGISTICAL ECHELONS. BY CONTINUED
ACTION OF ARMOR, ARTILLERY AND AIR WE SUCCEEDED IN
DESTROYING ALL SAM BATTERIES IN THE BRIDGEHEAD AREA
AND OUR AIR FORCE HAD A FREE HAND IN HITTING 3RD ARMY.
THIS ADVNTAGE IS TEMPORARY AS EGYPTIANS ARE TRYING
TO SET UP MEW SAM BATTERIES.

(B) THE 2ND ARMY HAS SUFFERED LOSSES BUT STILL MAINTAINS A STABLE FRONT MAINLY ON THE EAST BANK OF CANAL, FROM ISMAILIA TO PORT FUAD.

THIS INCLUDES : 3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND ARMoured AND INFANTRY BRIGADES EQUIVALENT TO ANOTHER DIVISION.

ALTOGETHER ABOUT 230 TANKS.

(C) WE HAVE CONCENTRATED THE GREATER PART OF OUR FORCES IN THE BRIDGEHEAD WEST OF THE CANAL AND LEFT ENOUGH FORCES ON EAST BANK TO CONTAIN EGYPTIANS.

(D) WE SEE A GOOD CHANCE FOR DESTROYING 3RD ARMY FORCES ON EAST BANK OF CANAL (ANNIHILATING AND CAPTURING) BY CONTINUED ACTION OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES, WHILST PRESSING AND HITTING 2ND ARMY AND 3RD ARMY FORCES BETWEEN CANAL AND CAIRO TO PREVENT INTERFERENCE AND CAUSE LOSSES. IN CASE WE INITIATE THE OPERATION IT WILL NECESSITATE 3-4 DAYS. IN CASE OUR OPERATION STARTS AFTER REPULSING THE EGYPTIAN OFFENSIVE, THE DURATION DEPENDS ON THE DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNED WITH THE EGYPTIAN OFFENSIVE.

3. IN ADDITION TO RUSSIAN POSSIBILITIES MENTIONED BY YOU WE ALSO SEE :

(A) 150-200 FIGHTER PLANES THAT CAN REACH EGYPT WITHIN 3-4 DAYS.

(B) TWO ARMoured/MECHANIZED DIVISIONS WITHIN 6-7 DAYS AFTER LOADING ON SHIPS (3 DAYS TRAVEL PLUS 3 DAYS DISEMBARKING).

SITUATION IN NEAR FUTURE (2-3 WEEKS)

4. DESPITE HEAVY LOSSES, EGYPTIAN AND ESPECIALLY SYRIAN FORCES ARE IN PROCESS OF REINFORCEMENT AND REHABILITATION BASED MAINLY ON ENORMOUS SOVIET AID BUT ALSO ON AID FROM ARAB COUNTRIES.
5. EGYPT HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM SOVIETS : 150 TANKS WITH 250 MORE EXPECTED, UNSPECIFIED, BUT LARGE NUMBER OF SAMS (INCLUDING SAM-6) AND PLANES. IT RECEIVED FROM ARAB COUNTRIES APPROXIMATELY : 100 FIGHTER PLANES, 12 HELICOPTERS, CROTAL SAM BATTERY, SELF-PROPELLED A.A.A. BATTERIES AND ABOUT 230 TANKS.
6. SYRIA HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM SOVIETS : 500 TANKS, UNSPECIFIED, BUT LARGE NUMBER OF SAM (INCLUDING SAM-6) AND APPROXIMATELY 50 PLANES AND 100 MORE EXPECTED. IT RECEIVED FROM ARAB COUNTRIES TANK UNITS WITH ABOUT 570 TANKS.
7. IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED WE HAVE TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE ARAB MILITARY INITIATIVES WITH OR WITHOUT SOVIET DIRECT INTERVENTION. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN POSITION OF STRENGTH AND ALSO ENABLE TO TAKE POSSIBLE INITIATIVES FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL PURPOSES IT IS IMPERATIVE TO ACCELERATE DELIVERY OF MATERIEL AS PER REQUEST TO MAXIMUM POSSIBLE.
8. AS AIR FORCE IS A DECISIVE FACTOR IN CAMPAIGN IT IS OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE TO EQUIP US WITHOUT SLIGHTEST DELAY WITH ADDITIONAL PLANES AND ESPECIALLY WITH EFFECTIVE ^{AND MASSIVE} MEANS AGAINST SAM-6 AND OTHER SAMS. THIS INCLUDES MEANS FOR DESTROYING SAM BATTERIES, FOR SELF-PROTECTION OF PLANES AND MASSIVE ECM AND ECCM MEANS.
9. IT IS ALSO ESSENTIAL THAT PLANES DELIVERED TO US BE OF THE MODERN WERSION, I.E. PHANTOMS FROM BLOCK B AND ABOVE AND SKYHAWKS TYPE F NOT RPT NOT TYPE E . ARMED HUEY COBRA HELICOPTERS (AT LEAST 25) ARE URGENTLY NEEDED .===

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by Minister Shaliev
at 1600, 25 OCT 1973

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