

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
01	cable	From Helms to HAK	1/10/69	B, A
03	Report	Selection of Professional Personnel in CIA	N/D	B
04	memo	to HAK SANITIZED PER OAC REVIEW 6/13/2008	N/D	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

HAK

BOX NUMBER

2

FOLDER TITLE

(12)

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. B. National security classified information. C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |
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File-Moose

(C4) 1

19 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of General V. Clifton, by Dr. Legere and Dick Moose, July 29, 1968
General Clifton's office, Washington, D. C.

General Clifton had readily agreed to this interview on the basis of a phone call. When we arrived at General Clifton's office we found him very eager to talk. He had set up a tape recorder to preserve our conversation for his own records. He explained that he hopes eventually to write a book. Clifton had apparently heard of our study from Brom Smith.

Transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy

There was very little interchange between the Kennedy and Eisenhower staffs prior to January 20th, 1961. Eisenhower and Kennedy had met, and McGeorge Bundy had talked some with General Goodpaster. However, on the morning of January 20th, the new staff assembled and started "practically from scratch" to sort things out.

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Clifton confirmed that General Goodpaster, at Kennedy's request, had stayed on to effect a smooth team for Bundy and Clifton. Eventually Goodpaster's "secretary of the general staff" type functions went to Bundy. Clifton observed that Goodpaster under Eisenhower had worn more hats than any man either before or after. He handled practically every type of subject. Bundy slowly began to absorb the Goodpaster function taking certain papers and saying "I'll take care of this kind of thing from now on." The intelligence function exercised by Goodpaster went to Clifton, working closely with Bundy.

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Kennedy and Intelligence

For the first ten days of the Kennedy administration, Goodpaster briefed Kennedy, accompanied by Clifton. Differences in style between Eisenhower and Kennedy became immediately apparent in this period. Kennedy preferred to read rather than to listen to oral briefings. Clifton noted in this respect Kennedy's phenomenal reading speed and his unusual powers of retention. Kennedy also wanted more depth of information than Eisenhower had. He wanted the source documents as well as the summary items. When this occurred, Clifton would go back to the agencies for more material. Clifton performed an over-all intelligence liaison function which he exercised until General Taylor came on board in August, 1961. Clifton continued to exercise the

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primary briefing function until Kennedy's assassination. Clifton and Bundy agreed that Clifton would attend the NSC meetings so that he would not duplicate in his intelligence briefing items which the President heard about in council briefings. The intelligence base from which Clifton worked consisted of the CIA summary (CIB), two State Department summaries, a DIA summary, plus individual summaries from the services, a small AEC input, and the Watch Committee report. To supplement this regular flow of summary material, Clifton developed contacts in the individual agencies. These were people who called Clifton when they had something particularly hot or something too sensitive for inclusion in the summaries.

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Clifton noted that it was important to have a single contact point for the intelligence agencies at the White House. This was especially true when President Kennedy, after about six months in office, began to travel a little bit more. Clifton initiated the practice of having the morning CIA summary sent to the President by teletype wherever he was. Eisenhower had not done this. For example, when word of the construction of the Berlin wall was received, Clifton was the only person out of the national security area with the President. He gave the President the word, and the President talked with the Secretary of State within four minutes after Clifton had informed him of the event.

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By February, 1961, President Kennedy felt that he was getting more material from Clifton than he could effectively handle and he asked for the preparation of a special booklet which would summarize the material received each morning. A format was devised by Clifton, Bundy, and Brom Smith consisting of headlines and short blurbs, with a place for Kennedy to indicate if he wanted more information on a particular subject. The latter feature gave rise to the name "Checklist". When he did, Clifton, in coordination with Bundy, would go back to the intelligence agencies for follow-up material, if time was available, or alternatively, Bundy and his staff would respond to the President's request. The Checklist was prepared by CIA between 3 and 4 in the morning in two copies by 7 am. After Kennedy began to use it, he sometimes would call the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense about an item in the Checklist and discover they were unaware of it. As a consequence, the two Secretaries were added to the distribution list as was General Taylor when he joined the White House.

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Whenever possible Clifton would go over the Checklist with Bundy the first thing each morning, and Bundy would give Clifton additional material which he and his staff had either selected or had developed themselves. This latter raises an interesting difference between the Goodpaster and the Bundy operation. Goodpaster never created memoranda or analyses of his own; he had always called upon the agencies to do this. (From our subsequent interview with Art McCafferty we confirmed

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that Clifton, Bundy and Brom Smith worked very closely together on this briefing function and that the potential conflicts and confusion that might have come from their joint handling of this responsibility -- a danger alluded to by General Goodpaster -- was avoided because of the good personal relationships which existed between Clifton and the others.

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The Situation Room

After the Bay of Pigs episode, McGeorge Bundy moved from the EOB to the White House to be closer to the President so that he could be available whenever the President needed him. The President was in the habit of having impromptu meetings. Sometimes Bundy couldn't get from the EOB over to the Oval Office for short meetings on brief notice. Simultaneously there was a growing recognition of the need for a White House facility to keep track of fast-breaking developments. Considerations of space and security led them to choose the West Basement. The Navy built the Situation Room because it had the funds. (Clifton's comments about the creation of the Situation Room corresponds to Art McCafferty's).

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As 1961 wore on, the amount of material handled became so large that Clifton could not handle it by himself. This led to more involvement of Bundy and his staff in the information and intelligence area. Also the potential difficulties with separate lines of communication became more apparent. Clifton stuck very strictly to intelligence business, while Bundy and his staff expanded their activities in the substantive operations area. Bundy had enlarged his staff in order to be able to respond to the President's requests. As noted, Bundy was preparing his own memoranda, but he did this very carefully. When putting together a paper on a subject he very clearly identified his own opinion. He would say, in effect, "Here is the paper you need to make the decision. The Secretary of State sees it in this way, and the Secretary of Defense might say the following: . . ." After a meeting to consider such a paper Bundy would do a directive to the departments and agencies if the President's decision did not exactly fit the alternatives in the departmental papers.

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Clifton said that crisis intelligence came to be handled apart from his regular briefings. It went to the President, and to members of ExCom (not ExCom as such, but to members of the inner circle). Clifton was also cut in on this flow.

In concluding this portion of the interview, Clifton emphasized the importance of having someone to carry forward the intelligence business from one administration to the next and to advise the President on intelligence matters preferably as Goodpaster had done with Kennedy. He also emphasized the importance of having an individual to serve as a corporate memory in the way that Bromley Smith has.

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Johnson and Intelligence

When he became President, Johnson did away with the regular intelligence briefing of the type Kennedy had received. The material which had previously reached Kennedy in those briefings now went to President Johnson in his night readings. As a result, no one ever knew what he had or had not read. (Comment: "This seemed consistent with what Art McCafferty had told us concerning the period at which Kennedy had turned down the Aide's proposal to run the Situation Room.

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The President's Military Adviser

General Taylor's study of the Bay of Pigs led the President to the conclusion that he needed a military adviser. Clifton suggested the following reasons for this conclusion: (1) following the crisis the President did not have confidence in the JCS - either the Chairman or the Chiefs; (2) The Secretary of Defense had not yet worked out his own arrangement or rapport with the JCS. Clifton noted that this was a violent period in their relations. Dr. Legere interjected the comment that this was the period of the "71 trombones"; (3) Both Kennedy and Bundy understood that the President needed to have the "five men in uniform" on his team. Upon taking office, Kennedy said he wanted to get acquainted with the Chiefs and indicated he wanted the Chairman of the Chiefs to regularly attend the NSC and not be limited to an "advisory" capacity. The President specifically wanted his own separate contact with the Chiefs and had instructed Clifton to work at this liaison activity. Kennedy had told Clifton that he (Kennedy) was not well enough acquainted with the military system and he didn't know the questions to ask the military and the military didn't know what the President should know; (4) if the President had lost confidence in the Chiefs and if they did not communicate well, he needed a means of making up for this, therefore in effect, General Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

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The reaction of the men in uniform to the President after the Bay of Pigs was one of suppressed resentment. After the Bay of Pigs, McNamara was a long time in excusing the Chiefs, whereas President Kennedy had publicly taken the blame.

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New President Needs Military Adviser: President - JCS Relationship

Clifton said this suggested that any new President should have a military representative in order to establish and develop his relations with the JCS and to help him at least through the difficult initial period of his Presidency. Clifton noted that President Johnson had not wanted a military aide between him and the Chiefs. Johnson had wanted to work with his two principal secretaries and with Mac-Bundy. He turned the Departments over to these two men and expected them to run policy. He noted in passing McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy had invented the Tuesday lunch, and that it had not originally included a military man. President Johnson had felt that the Secretary

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of Defense represented the JCS. In time, President Johnson and the Chiefs came to understand each other better and learned how to communicate with one another. By the time of the Johnson administration, of course, Secretary McNamara had asserted his power over the chiefs.

Kennedy and McNamara and the JCS

Kennedy and McNamara had never really agreed over Kennedy's relations with the Chiefs. Kennedy had often sent General Clifton to the heads of the respective services and to the Secretaries of the Services. McNamara resented the President's reaching beyond him directly to the services, but had been unable to do anything about it. For example, President Kennedy once instructed Clifton to seek the views of the Army Chief of Staff and the Director of the Selective Service System, General Hershey, concerning proposed revisions in the draft. He did this although he had already asked McNamara to give him a report on the subject. Clifton was President Kennedy's man with the services. He wanted to know for example "what the Navy really wants," not what McNamara said they needed.

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Clifton's position was ticklish not only with the Secretary of Defense, but also with the military aides at the White House. ← 21
Ultimately, Kennedy designated Clifton as Defense Liaison Officer.

Eisenhower had General Goodpaster but Eisenhower's aides had been junior officers. Eisenhower knew the military system, but Kennedy had a problem in this respect. Clifton had helped him some, serving as more than a mere baggage carrier, but he was not in the position to do the kinds of things that a three or four star general that Taylor was later able to do.

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White House Staff - DOD Relations

The foregoing discussion led us to consideration of the question of why Bundy and his staff had not been involved with the Defense Department, why in fact there had been no Defense representative on his staff. Clifton said that the Kennedy-Bundy group was fascinated with foreign policy but that President Kennedy had not been particularly interested in military matters until after the Cuban crisis. Kennedy had not realized to what extent the activities of the Defense Department influence foreign policy. One of the connections in which this first became evident to the Kennedy people was during the Berlin crisis when they discovered that in order to find out what was going on in Berlin they would have to call a General. Clifton pointed out, nevertheless, that Kennedy was more aware of Defense potential than the other people

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around him. Another reason why the Kennedy people had spent less time on Defense was that they had to spend more time on State because it was not responsive in a disciplined way, as was the Department of Defense under McNamara.

Bundy had dealt directly with McNamara or Gilpatric, rather than dealing with the Defense Department in the same way that he and his staff were dealing with the State Department. In Clifton's opinion Kennedy and Bundy early on decided to be, collectively, Secretary of State. At this point, Clifton digressed briefly and posed the question: "Who does an American ambassador represent -- is he the President's or the State Department's man?" The President may have given him his appointment; however, his next job is more likely to come from the State Department. He is therefore divided in loyalty and if he wants a next appointment, he had to keep his lines straight with the State Department. Clifton noted that as Vietnam developed, our Ambassador to South Vietnam developed a direct link to the President.

Dr. Legere asked Clifton whether he thought President Kennedy had relied to a great extent on General Taylor for the Defense input on foreign policy. Clifton's reply was not altogether clear but he seemed to feel that Taylor's presence had strengthened the military aspect of Bundy's summary presentations.

President Johnson; upon taking office, had begun by shoving the military away from him. He didn't want to meet with the JCS and he didn't want a Defense Liaison Officer. He preferred to deal with McNamara. In this sense, Clifton felt that McNamara had been happier with Johnson than he had been with Kennedy. Toward the last, Johnson had made it clear that any Chief could see him whenever he wanted.

Clifton was present for the presentation of the first Defense budget to President Johnson at the lunch on December 30, 1963. The Chiefs were present at that occasion as they also were the following year. Along with the Chiefs were Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance. It was Clifton's belief that after 1964 the President dealt exclusively with McNamara on the Defense budget.

In summary, General Clifton recommends that a new President needs (1) a military advisor and (2) an intelligence advisor. Clifton intends to pass these ideas to the two nominees.

R. Moose

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry Kissinger

SUBJECT : The Future Role of the White House
Situation Room

1. The Situation Room has become, and should remain, an operating arm of the Presidency. There are functions which must be carried out in and by the White House, and the Situation Room is the logical organization for these assignments. They include:

a. Providing a White House terminal for the "hot lines", Presidential-action State traffic, the LDX network, etc.

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b. Providing a channel for the routine dissemination of finished intelligence to the President and his immediate personal staff.

c. Providing an around-the-clock alerting center for the White House.

2. These functions are essential; there may be others which can usefully be performed. On the other hand, President Johnson, Mr. Rostow, and the Vietnam war have in combination caused the Situation Room to acquire certain other functions which can be better performed elsewhere. The White House is receiving, on a routine basis, a considerable flow of raw intelligence reporting--CIA TDCS's, NSA reports and translations,

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Defense Attache reports, routine State traffic. (There is also a massive flow of military operational traffic related to the war.) These materials cannot be properly used without selection and interpretation by trained analysts in a variety of specialties. In fact, this task is the primary mission of the intelligence community in Washington. At the least, the present practice confuses management lines; worse, it is dangerous and, ultimately, expensive.

3. If the Situation Room is to serve only the President and his immediate senior advisers, this flow of raw intelligence should probably be stopped. The President should receive only finished intelligence, and CIA can undertake to supply his intelligence needs, through the Situation Room, at any time in any form. The problem of raw material in the White House becomes much more complicated, however, if the Situation Room is also to serve the "NSC Staff", or whatever apparatus replaces it. Normally such a staff will include men of considerable substantive background, men who would expect and probably need to read selected raw traffic for background. Thus, definitive arrangements on this aspect of the Situation Room cannot be made until we are advised by you as to your staff requirements.

4. The fact of the Situation Room as an ongoing institution becomes a factor in the pattern of White House organization. It provides a source of national security materials for the President. For these to reach him, however, they must be channeled through one of his senior staff. I assume this officer will either be you or someone designated by you.

5. On this assumption, the Situation Room will be under your control, but you will need someone to run it for you. There are considerable advantages, both to you and to us, in having this someone be a CIA professional. The job requires

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deep experience at information-handling in support of policy, objectivity in regard to policy issues, and sensitivity both to security and to the idiosyncracies of senior government officials. The CIA senior duty officer system turns out individuals at the GS-14/15 level with precisely these qualities. With such a man in charge, I could assure you of a professional operation, directed at the President's interests (and your own), and fully independent of the Departments.

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6. In any case, I can assure you the present CIA staffing of the Situation Room is worth the it costs us. From the White House view, we are the only source of properly trained watch personnel. From our own view, our people profit from the added experience and the broadened variety of assignments the arrangement provides.



Richard Helms
Director

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CAPTAIN ROBERT O. WELANDER, USN

PRESENT DUTY: Military Fellowship Program of the Council on Foreign Relations

EDUCATION: U. S. Naval Academy, 1945, BS Degree (Naval Science) *(Graduated 22 out of 1046)*
Air War College, 1962
George Washington University, 1962, MA Degree (Foreign Affairs)

SUBSPECIALTY: International Affairs (9902P)
Defense Intelligence (9501P)

YEAR GROUP: 1945 AGE: 44 HOME STATE: New York

RELIGION: Protestant FAMILY STATUS: Married to the former Patricia Ann Benson of San Diego, California. They have two children; a son age 17 and a daughter age 12.

LANGUAGE: French PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Height: 72½"
Weight: 184 lbs.

HOBBIES: None DECORATIONS: Republic of Viet Nam Navy Gallantry Medal with Gold Anchor (Foreign Award)
Bronze Star
Navy Commendation Medal
Meritorious Unit Commendation (USS FOX (DLG-33))

PREVIOUS DUTIES:

Gunnery Officer, USS PURVIS (DD-709)	7/45 - 3/46
Communications Officer, USS CECIL (DD-835)	3/46 - 6/48
Student, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida	6/48 - 6/49
Student, Naval Air Auxiliary Station, Corpus Christi, Texas	6/49 - 10/49
Gunnery Officer, USS LSMR 401	10/49 - 6/51
Post Graduate Student, Naval Intelligence School, Washington, D. C.	7/51 - 6/52
Assistant Naval Attache, Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand	6/52 - 7/54
Communications Officer, USS BALTIMORE (CS-69)	10/54 - 5/56
Personal Aide and Administrative Assistant to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)	5/56 - 12/57
Aide and Flag Lieutenant, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	1/58 - 8/59
Executive Officer, USS EPPERSON (DD-719)	9/59 - 6/61
Student, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama	6/61 - 8/62

PREVIOUS DUTIES (Cont'd)

*This is a particularly significant assignment
which I would like to describe in detail.*

Assistant for Special Projects, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (90) ←	6/62 - 6/64
Commanding Officer, USS SEMMES (DDG-18)	6/64 - 12/65
Commanding Officer, USS FOX (DLG-33)	1/66 - 5/68
Temporary Assignment as Member of Politico-Military Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	7/68 - 9/68
Navy Member, Military Fellowship Program of the Council on Foreign Relations	9/68 - present

FITNESS REPORT EXCERPTS ON CAPTAIN ROBERT O. WELANDER, USN, 448060/1100

Rear Admiral Ralph W. COUSINS, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE/
Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN

"Although the period covered by this report is a relatively short one, it should be noted that the employment of Captain WELANDER's command, USS FOX (DLG-33) was particularly arduous and demanding from every standpoint. During this time, with the FOX performing both as PIRAZ (CTU 77.0.2) and North SAR ship in the Tonkin Gulf, Captain WELANDER's performance of duty was outstanding in every respect. From my personal observation I can attest that Captain WELANDER maintained his ship in superb material condition and trained his crew to a high peak of readiness, achieving the very finest performance through the use of the highly technical electronic equipment with which his ship was specially equipped.

The FOX made several significant recommendations for improvement in PIRAZ procedures. Captain WELANDER also helped develop the Strike Support Ship concept and FOX was acting in that capacity when our fighters were close-controlled to intercept and destroy two MIG aircraft, a first in TF-77 history. Also, Captain WELANDER performed most effectively as SAR commander, handling fast-moving and dangerous situations in a top-notch manner.

As a result of FOX's fine performance in the northern reaches of the Tonkin Gulf I have recommended the ship for the Navy Unit Commendation.

In my opinion Captain WELANDER would make a fine flag officer and I earnestly recommend his consideration therefor."

Rear Admiral W. V. COMBS, USN, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group SEVENTH
Fleet

"Although I have not been able to personally observe Captain WELANDER frequently, I have been in a good position to witness and evaluate the outstanding performance of his ship in her outstanding performance in one of the most demanding assignments in the Tonkin Gulf, that of PIRAZ ship. In brief, as PIRAZ ship it was FOX's responsibility to keep tract of all friendly air traffic in the Tonkin Gulf--numbering frequently in the hundreds at any instance. To successfully command such a sophisticated and complex ship as FOX is a challenge in itself--to do so with distinction, as Captain WELANDER has done, in the high tempo and demanding operational environment of the Tonkin Gulf today, is the mark of an outstanding naval officer. In addition to PIRAZ Captain WELANDER has commanded FOX equally well in assignment on Northern SAR station. He also is imaginative and productive in the development of new operational concepts which will concurrently more fully utilize the great capabilities of his ship and the installed NTDS system

Rear Admiral W. V. COMBS, USN, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group SEVENTH Fleet (Cont'd)

and extended range radar. Several such concepts are in the middle stages of implementation in SEVENTH Fleet with a resultant substantial improvement in efficiency and effectiveness of the attack career strike force operations being carried out in the air over the Tonkin Gulf and North Vietnam. Captain WELANDER has demonstrated his outstanding abilities. It is now the Navy's opportunity to benefit further by his assignment to future demanding positions of increasing responsibilities. He is strongly recommended for early selection to flag rank."

Rear Admiral George R. MUSE, USN, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla ELEVEN

"Captain WELANDER is without a doubt one of the finest and most competent young Captains in the fleet today. His performance of duty as Commanding Officer, USS FOX has been outstanding in every respect. He is dedicated and highly motivated. Precept and example are the means by which he very effectively leads his personnel. This officer is highly respected by seniors as well as juniors. He is by nature aggressive, without offending, and in his approach to all problem areas, has the capability of knowing the details without getting lost in the details, resulting in satisfactory solutions to even the most complex of problems. Captain WELANDER is acutely aware of the needs of his ship and his personnel, both officer and enlisted, who so proudly man her. He leaves no stone unturned in attending to these needs.

During the period of this report, USS FOX has been exposed to a particularly strenuous schedule which had to be condensed and tight-fitting to meet an unexpected earlier-than-anticipated WestPac deployment. It has taken Captain Welander's dynamic leadership to persevere successfully over all obstacles under difficult and demanding conditions. He has personally and very effectively directed the planning efforts of the ship in preparing for Ship Qualification Acceptance Trials (SQUAT), Final Acceptance Trials (FAT), Post Shakedown Availability (PSA), Shakedown Training and Fleet exercises. In addition, FOX was exposed to many inspections in preparation for deployment on 7 June 1967. Among these inspections was a Nuclear Weapons Acceptance Inspection, which had to be split up in two sections since the JCS safety rules for ASROC in the DLG 26-Class were not available. FOX prevailed beautifully in all the above and enjoys a fine reputation. Since Captain Welander personally directs the efforts of his ship, it is largely because of his close interest and attention to detail that FOX has enjoyed so many successes at this point in her short history. FOX has recently headed West for her first deployment. It is with the knowledge of Captain Welander's strong and effective leadership that his Flotilla Commander expects to hear even greater successes in the future for this fine ship. He is complemented by a charming and attractive wife, and together they form a highly effective husband-wife team. Captain Welander is an officer with marked potential for higher and broader responsibilities and is one who should be among those considered for early selection to Flag Rank."

Captain William M. MONTGOMERY, USN, Commander Destroyer Division SIX TWO

"CDR WELANDER has continued to perform in the same highly professional and totally competent manner demonstrated during the previous reporting period. His exceptional capabilities have again been demonstrated both in his personal achievements and those of his ship.

SEMMES participated in the highly successful project F/R-69 for which performance she was commended with the participating Task Group. In May and early June, during the DOM REP Contingency OPS, CDR WELANDER and SEMMES, by magnificent seamanship and superb shiphandling under adverse conditions, saved the derelict merchant ship SS SAN CARLOS from imminent beaching. CDR WELANDER was awarded the Navy Commendation Medal for this accomplishment.

In July 1965 SEMMES was declared the winner of her second consecutive DESRON SIX Battle Efficiency pennant as well as Engineering and Weapons Departmental awards (both second's) for excellence during the FY 1965 competitive year. This performance is in great measure due to CDR WELANDER's inspired personal leadership, as well as to his outstanding professional ability.

The level of CDR WELANDER's performance is amply documented by the enclosures hereto (not included with excerpts). The depth of his leadership is further indicated by the wonderful esprit which permeates SEMMES and is reflected in a first cruise reenlistment rate above the force "target", and a 66 percent success rate (including three E-8's) on the last enlisted advancement exams.

In his collateral duty as Chairman of the DESRON SIX Operations Board of Analysis, he has ably directed the efforts of the Squadron Operations Officers in analyzing mutual problems and recommending solutions for the Squadron Commander's action, lending his drive and initiative to spark their effort and his experience and sound judgment as a stabilizing influence.

CDR WELANDER is a truly outstanding Naval Officer with immense potential for further advancement. He was selected for promotion to Captain by the last board to meet. He should soon be a prime candidate for flag rank."

Rear Admiral H. A. RENKEN, USN, ACNO (General Planning and Programming)

"Commander Welander is one of the most able officers of his rank in the Navy. His understanding of Navy problems and his grasp of the proper manner of solving them are extraordinary. He is very convincing in his oral and written explanations and recommendations. He is a hard and willing worker whose results are invariably outstanding. A great deal of his time has been spent in responding directly to tasks laid upon this office by CNO; the satisfaction of CNO with his abilities and performance is reflected in the commendatory memorandum appended. He is particularly qualified in matters relating to program matters before Congress and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has a brilliant mind which he uses to the best interests of the Navy. His discretion and loyalty are equalled only by his determination to perform consistently and well. His appearance and personal life are above reproach. Commander Welander is destined for positions of great importance and responsibility in his future career."

CAPTAIN REMBRANDT CECIL ROBINSON, USN

PRESENT DUTY: Commander Destroyer Squadron THIRTY-ONE

EDUCATION: George Washington University, Bachelor of Arts Degree
Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia

SUBSPECIALTY: Politico-Military Strategic Planning (9900S)

YEAR GROUP: 1944 HOME OF RECORD: Clearfield, Pennsylvania

AGE: 44

FAMILY STATUS: Married the former
Joan Dufton of Clearfield, Pennsyl-
vania. They have two sons ages 20
and 17.

RELIGION: PROTESTANT

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:

Height: 5' 10"
Weight: 180 lbs.

DECORATIONS AND AWARDS:

Distinguished Service Medal
Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V"
Joint Service Commendation Medal
American Campaign Medal
European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign
Medal
Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal
World War II Victory Medal
Navy Occupation Service Medal with "Europe"
and "Asia" Clasps
China Service Medal
National Defense Service Medal
Korean Service Medal
United Nations Service Medal
Korean Presidential Unit Citation
Vietnam Service Medal with Silver Star
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with
Device (1960-)

NOTES OF DISTINCTION:

Received Distinguished Service Medal in 1968 for exceptional service
on the Staff of Commander in Chief Pacific.
Received CNO Leadership Award in 1960 for his performance in command
of USS BERRY (DE-1035).
Early selected for promotion to both Commander and Captain.

PREVIOUS DUTIES:

First Lieutenant, LST-485	10/44 - 8/46
Navigation Officer, LST-1032	9/46 - 12/46
Gunnery Officer, LST-601	12/46 - 9/47
Executive Officer, LST-912	9/47 - 7/48
Student, Naval School General Line, Newport, R.I.	7/48 - 5/49
Engineering Officer, USS ENGLISH (DD-696)	6/49 - 3/52
Head, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Program, Bureau of Naval Personnel	4/52 - 9/54
Executive Officer, USS WALKER (DDE-517)	10/54 - 8/56

PREVIOUS DUTIES (CONT'D):

Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia	8/56 - 1/57
Assistant Head, Command Policy Section, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	2/57 - 6/59
Commanding Officer, USS BERRY (DE-1035)	8/59 - 11/60
Commanding Officer, USS BRADFORD (DD-545)	12/60 - 1/62
Objective Plans Officer, Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	2/62 - 8/64
Commander in Chief Pacific	
Assistant Head, Southeast Asia Plans and Policy Section	9/64 - 6/65
Executive Assistant and Aide	7/65 - 9/68
Commander Destroyer Squadron THIRTY-ONE	9/68 - Present

EXCERPTS FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF CAPTAIN REMBRANDT C. ROBINSON, USN

1. Excerpts from Performance Records (Fitness Reports) submitted on Captain ROBINSON while serving as Executive Assistant and Aide to Admiral U. S. G. SHARP, USN, Commander in Chief Pacific from July 1965 to September 1968. For his exceptional performance during this period he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. (Copy of CINCPAC's recommendation for Distinguished Service Medal and Citation attached.)

"In summary, this energetic, forceful, brilliant and dedicated officer is the best captain with whom I have ever had the pleasure of serving. He gives every indication of being one of the great naval leaders."

"Captain Robinson has continued his superb performance as my closest personal adviser. He is intimately involved in all matters which reach the CINC level from my staff and from other echelons. Officers of all ranks and all Services constantly seek his advice and counsel. Despite his own heavy workload, he never seems too busy to help them. The smooth and efficient functioning of my very large staff and indeed the outstanding team work in the Pacific Command as a whole is due in no small measure to Captain Robinson's tireless, close attention to the countless matters which the Commander in Chief must deal with. His understanding and judgment is the type you expect of an officer who wears four stars. The wartime direction of the Pacific Command has required constant seven-day week attention. In three years as my Executive Assistant, Captain Robinson has been on a seven-day week with practically no time off. The durability of his enthusiastic, completely competent and spectacular performance under these conditions has been amazing. It would be virtually impossible to duplicate the rich professional background and experience he has gained during the past three years. He has accompanied me to almost every major strategy conference. He has been in attendance when I have held sensitive policy discussions with my component commanders and with General Westmoreland and General Bonesteel. He participated in three presidential meetings in the Pacific, and has read and absorbed almost every command level message and directive concerning the war in Southeast Asia. I can think of no comparable exposure of an officer in the fields of strategic and operational planning. During over 600,000 miles that we have traveled together Captain Robinson has become known by all of our American Ambassadors in the Far East as well as the military leaders of our Asian Allies. He is admired throughout the Pacific."

"Knowing his exceptional talents, I made a great effort to have him assigned as my Executive Assistant. When he took over this assignment, my workload decreased 25 percent. His great intelligence, astute judgment and ability to express himself with clarity both orally and in writing make him invaluable to me."

2. Excerpts from performance records while serving in the Strategic Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations from February 1962 to August 1964:

"I have watched this young officer for many years engaged both in operational commands at sea and in demanding planning jobs ashore and am continuously impressed with this officer's brilliant, outstanding performance, regardless of the job assigned. His exemplary performance of duty has been and continues to be characterized by a wide professional background and experience, sound judgment, and brilliant intellect coupled with intense initiative, unlimited energy and extraordinary discernment." Signed by RADM W.F.A. WENDT, USN

"He has the **qualifications** of intelligence and wisdom and the qualities of initiative, industriousness and attention to detail required of the senior ranks in the Navy. He has the rare capability of doing a truly superlative job regardless of the task assigned, the shortness of the deadline, or the stress imposed. He shows unusual acuity to separate the important aspects from the unimportant." Signed by RADM W.F.A. WENDT, USN

(Excerpt from letter to then VADM U.S.G. SHARP from Dr. Thomas C. Schelling of Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, regarding the performance of then Commander ROBINSON as a member of an Interdepartmental Long Range Study Group)... "I am sure I need not explain to you what a superbly helpful and reliable colleague he can be. I am also sure that his record is replete with evidence of his fitness. But I would like the privilege of contributing to that record.

Commander Robinson joined the project expressing his readiness to serve in whatever capacity I might choose to make use of him. I ended up choosing to make use of him in many more ways than I expected at the outset. He was a full-fledged and responsible member of the group. He was also, frequently, a source of advice and information to me on how to get things done, and done properly, in an environment that I was not entirely used to. He also perceived early that I needed more reliable administrative support than I had, and he personally took it on himself to remedy that deficiency, did so in a tasteful manner, and proceeded to teach me what a comfort it can be to have an absolutely reliable executive officer.

In a group like mine, spending an intensive ten weeks together, personal qualities can make a lot of difference. I know that everybody in the group liked and appreciated Commander Robinson, and I am sure I am not the only one in the group who looks forward to continuing a personal friendship with Commander Robinson."

If I am ever asked to take on another project like that one, I can think of only one condition that I would insist on--that I be permitted to ask the Navy for Commander Robinson again."...

3. Excerpts from performance records while in command of USS BRADFORD (DD-545) from December 1960 to January 1962 and USS CHARLES BERRY (DE-1035) from August 1959 to November 1960. He was selected for the CNO Leadership Award for his performance as Commanding Officer, USS BERRY (DE-1035):

As Commanding Officer USS BRADFORD (DD-545) ... "In reporting upon CDR ROBINSON's personal characteristics and performance of duty, one is moved to the use of superlatives. He is unquestionably one of the most outstanding officers presently in command of a ship of this Force. His daily performance of duty is characterized by tremendous and tireless energy and drive skillfully directed to the achievement and maintenance by his command of the highest degree of readiness, utility, morale and well-being. His ship is smart, taut, spotlessly clean throughout and literally ready for inspection at any hour of the day. Discipline, highest morale and pride in the ship are manifest from stem to stern. CDR ROBINSON is an exceptionally broad-gauge, brilliantly capable and thoroughly dedicated naval officer, perceptive, resourceful and decisive. I consider it to be in the best interest of the naval service that CDR ROBINSON receive an accelerated promotion." Signed by Captain John M. ALFORD, USN

... "Inasmuch as CDR ROBINSON has command of one of the Pacific Fleets most obsolescent destroyers and is being evaluated in comparison with commanders of our newest missile frigates there is no factor of lucky assignment operating in his case. CDR ROBINSON has tremendous energy, excellent judgement, exceptional ability, confidence in his own ability, and an appropriate degree of humility. His ideas are excellent and he possesses the ability and the push to make them work. His officers and men have never worked harder or been happier as evidenced by their high morale, enthusiasm and confidence. CDR ROBINSON has had a profound effect for the good on every activity in the BRADFORD from general mess and wardroom to material and operational readiness. He is an articulate speaker and fine writer. He and his family would represent the Navy and the United States with distinction in any position. A truly outstanding officer who should be seriously considered and is strongly recommended for deep selection." Signed by Captain B. A. SMITH, USN

As Commanding Officer USS CHARLES BERRY (DE-1035) ... "The superlative performance during the Philippine "goodwill cruise" and in the "People-to-People" program have contributed in bringing considerable credit and respect to the U.S. Navy and improving U.S. Relations in these areas. ROBINSON is a dynamic personality; extremely conscientious, industrious and enthusiastic. He runs a very smart ship; the cleanest ship this officer has ever seen. ROBINSON's dynamic personality is reflected throughout the crew." ... Signed by Captain J. P. RIZZA, USN

... "LCDR Robinson is not only an outstanding officer, but the best in grade I have ever been associated with. His performance and that of his ship during deployment to the SEVENTH Fleet was spectacular and led me to recommend him for the CNO Leadership Award which was given him." ... Signed by Rear Admiral J. W. LEVERTON, Jr., USN

Excerpts from CNO Leadership Award: ... "It gives me great pleasure to inform you that you are the officer selected to receive the Chief of Naval Operations Leadership Award for 1960 from among the many outstanding officers in the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

I have noted the outstanding performance of your command in practically every area in which it can be judged. This, of course, is truly the reflection of the leadership qualities of the Commanding Officer. General Order No. 21 states that leadership is the sum of those qualities of intellect, of human understanding and of moral character that enable a man to inspire and

manage a group of people successfully. It is significant that you were able to achieve the results you did through the elements and aspects of leadership contained in this General Order. I am confident that the results of your inspirational leadership will be reflected in the character of your people and will extend far beyond your present and forthcoming assignments."... Signed by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN



COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96610

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Ser 2300

11 JUN 1968

From: Commander in Chief Pacific
To: Secretary of the Navy (Navy Department Board of
Decorations and Medals)
Via: Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: Distinguished Service Medal; recommendation for
Ref: (a) SECNAVINST P1650.1C
Encl: (1) Proposed Citation

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), it is recommended that Captain Rembrandt C. Robinson, USN, 410647/1100, be awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for exceptionally meritorious service and distinguished performance of duty during three wartime years from July 1965 to July 1968 in an assignment of great trust and responsibility.

2. Captain Robinson assumed duties as Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief at a time when U. S. forces were first being committed to combat in South Vietnam, when a logistics base in Southeast Asia was practically non-existent, and when our air campaign against North Vietnam was in its initial stage. Throughout the subsequent force buildup and ensuing conduct of combat operations he served as my principal assistant, closest personal adviser and as a key member of the staff. His assistance, recommendations and contributions in the field of basic policy formulation and strategic direction of forces have been incisive, professional and in a measure of value far beyond his grade or seniority.

3. Throughout his tenure he demonstrated the finest sense of loyalty to me as the Commander in Chief as well as to the many elements of the Pacific Command with which he was in daily contact. His skillful assessment of problem areas, his forcefulness, and his perceptive vision served as cohesive and motivating forces to the 650 officers on the CINCPAC staff, many of whom sought his advice and counsel on a

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continuing basis. His retentive memory and broad professional background were of incalculable assistance in providing continuity, direction of effort, and imaginative new approaches to staff actions. In the process he instilled in the members of the staff a dedication and creativity reflecting much of his own vitality and superior performance.

4. His exceptional knowledge and fine judgment are recognized by senior military officers in all Services, as is the imaginative manner in which he exercised the wide latitude I accorded him. A unique combination of tact and executive ability enabled him to execute his duties in a forceful and confident manner. His interest, diligence, attention to detail, and sheer ability made him invaluable as my closest personal adviser in the development of plans and policy for the execution of the war in Southeast Asia, and in the achievement of teamwork and balanced readiness throughout the Pacific Command. He was my personal troubleshooter, expediter and contact with the staff, initiating many measures to improve a smooth and efficient operation. His imprint will remain throughout the CINCPAC staff for many years.

5. With a broad background in the principles, doctrines and procedures of joint operations, Captain Robinson made one of his most enduring contributions in the field of command relations. Since 1964 he has personally drafted and in many cases expedited and guided the preparation of all CINCPAC policies on command arrangements, interpreting each specific situation within the framework of the National Security Act, the Functions Paper, and pertinent directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander in Chief Pacific. When combat operations commenced in Southeast Asia he was of great assistance in the initial drafting and development of my position that all allied forces should remain under national command - a policy that has been endorsed repeatedly at the highest levels of government during the past four years. The allied and joint U. S. relationships which govern combat operations in Southeast Asia are based on the principles of command set forth by CINCPAC, and are a testimony to the persistent and thorough manner in which Captain Robinson has reviewed and helped formulate dozens of operation plans. On one occasion he worked in closed session with the American Ambassador, drafting key sections of the terms of reference for the U. S. commander in Thailand. The final product was approved by me, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the Secretary of Defense without change.

His singularly successful efforts to indoctrinate officers of all Services in the principles of unified command and the inherent Service responsibilities within this body of doctrinal policy have been of great assistance. Combat operations in Southeast Asia have provided a real test of the Unified Command Plan and the over-all concept of joint and combined planning and operations. When a future analysis is made of our wartime command structure I feel that it will validate these principles of command as exercised by the responsible commanders. In large measure it will also reflect Captain Robinson's persistent efforts as my personal representative to ensure the proper interaction of these command arrangements during an unprecedented period in our military history.

6. It would be possible to document countless areas in which Captain Robinson's recommendations contributed directly and materially to the effective conduct of combat operations by U. S. forces in the Pacific. This was nowhere more evident than during my inspections to all parts of the command. Captain Robinson accompanied me on fifty-two trips, covering over 600,000 miles. He was in attendance at almost every major strategy conference in the Pacific, including three Presidential meetings. Many of the position papers which I took on trips were a product of Captain Robinson's perceptive ability to forecast problem areas. He took detailed notes at every stop and during all briefings. His comprehensive trip reports provided the basis of my debriefings for the four-star component commanders, and for follow-on staff actions. During these trips he became known to all of our American Ambassadors in the Far East as well as the military leaders of our Asian allies. He is admired throughout the Pacific.

7. I am aware that the Distinguished Service Medal normally is awarded to individuals at the peak of their careers, and that its presentation to officers in the grade of captain is reserved for instances of unusually distinguished service. I have given long thought to this action in this light, and consider Captain Robinson's performance to be unsurpassed. He brought to his duties a degree of determination, wisdom and consummate professional skill which contributed directly to the efforts of U. S. and allied forces in Southeast Asia and to the over-all Pacific Command. By his resourcefulness and devotion to duty throughout an extended and singularly demanding tour in which he worked without leave and

virtually without respite for over three years in a position of great trust and responsibility, he rendered invaluable service to his country and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service. His enduring contributions to the Pacific Command were of a nature normally expected and received from flag officers only. I know of no one more deserving of this award.

8. The facts as contained in the proposed citation are personally known to me.

9. Captain Robinson has been awarded the Bronze Star Medal with Combat V for service during the Korean War.

10. The estimated date of his detachment from present assignment is 1 August 1968.


U. S. G. SHARP


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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting
the DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL to

CAPTAIN REMBRANDT C. ROBINSON 416647/1100
UNITED STATES NAVY

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of the United States in a position of great responsibility as Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief Pacific, from July 1965 to July 1968. Exercising outstanding professional ability, perception, and creativity, Captain Robinson was responsible for providing personal assistance and advice to the Commander in Chief Pacific in matters ranging from current combat operations to the long-range aspects of national and international strategy and policy. During his tenure, more than 500,000 United States troops were deployed to Southeast Asia and a logistic base superior to any in history was built to support these forces; other free-world troops were deployed and their capabilities integrated with those of the United States and Government of South Vietnam; and U. S. Navy and Air Force forces increased significantly in both strength and firepower. By his interest, diligent attention to detail, and sheer ability, Captain Robinson filled a significant role in the development of plans and policy for the execution of the conflict in Southeast Asia and in the achievement of teamwork and balanced readiness throughout the Pacific Command. He was singularly successful in his efforts to ensure the uniform application of the principles of unified command and joint doctrine on all plans and operations during an unprecedented period in our military history. As a close personal adviser and principal staff assistant to the Commander in Chief Pacific, Captain Robinson provided continuity, direction of effort, and imagination to the total scope of staff planning. His professional knowledge, sound judgment, organizational ability, and loyal devotion to duty were of inestimable value to the nation, and reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Naval Service.

PERSONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
MEDALS & AWARDS BRANCH

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For the President;
JUL 08 1968
PAUL R. IGNATIUS
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Navy

Ref: SecNav Ltr of 27 June 68 (bd ser 5936) Finish File Pers-G25

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PREVIOUS DUTIES: (Con't)

Platoon Leader, Troop F, 8th Cavalry, Far East Command	8/48 - 8/48
Platoon Leader, Headquarters Troop, 1st Cavalry, Far East Command	8/48 - 12/48
Athletics and Recreation Officer, Service Troop, 8th Cavalry, Far East Command	12/48 - 4/49
Athletics and Recreation Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 8th Cavalry, Far East Command	4/49 - 4/49
Administrative Assistant, Office of the Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Far East Command	6/49 - 9/50
Aide-de-Camp, Headquarters, X Corps, Far East Command	9/50 - 6/51
Aide-de-Camp, Headquarters, Far East Command	6/51 - 8/51
Company Commander, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, 131st Tank Battalion, Ft Knox, Kentucky	8/51 - 11/51
Company Commander, Company B, 131st Tank Battalion, Ft Knox, Kentucky	11/51 - 6/52
Training Inspector, G3 Section, Ft Knox, Kentucky	6/52 - 9/52
Student Officer, The Armor School, Ft Knox, Kentucky	9/52 - 6/53
Tactics Instructor, Combined Arms Detachment, 1802d Special Regiment, West Point, New York	6/53 - 9/53
Tactical Officer, U.S. Corps of Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York	9/53 - 6/55
Company Officer, Midshipman Company, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland	6/55 - 8/56
Battalion S-3, Headquarters and Service Company, 899th Tank Battalion, US Army Europe	8/56 - 12/57
Logistics Staff Officer, Installations Branch, G-4 Division, Headquarters, US Army Europe	12/57 - 6/59
Student Officer, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island	8/59 - 6/60
Member, Staff and Faculty, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island	6/60 - 8/60
Student Officer, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.	9/60 - 2/62

PREVIOUS DUTIES: (Con't)

Staff Officer, Intelligence and Policy Planning Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Washington, D. C.	2/62 - 7/63
Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D. C.	7/63 - 2/64
Military Assistant, Office of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Cuban Affairs), Washington, D. C.	2/64 - 5/65
Military Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.	5/65 - 6/65
Student Officer, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania	8/65 - 6/66
G-3, 1st Infantry Division, Viet Nam	7/66 - 10/66
Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, Viet Nam	10/66 - 4/67
Brigade Commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Viet Nam	4/67 - 5/67
Commanding Officer, 3d Regiment, US Corps of Cadets, US Military Academy, West Point, New York	7/67 - 6/68
Deputy Commandant, US Corps of Cadets, US Military Academy, West Point, New York	6/68 - Present

EXTRACTS FROM EFFICIENCY REPORTS ON COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., USA, 050790

Position: Commander of 3d Regiment,
U. S. Military Academy

Date: June 1968

Evaluator: Colonel A. J. Hughes,
Deputy Commandant,
West Point

"An affable, well mannered officer... Polished and erudite, he is an outstanding organizer; is adept at handling a great amount of detail smoothly... is a perspicacious and analytical thinker who works hard, plans ahead, and gets results... He is long on good sound common sense. Possesses an outstanding knowledge of military and world affairs and he speaks and writes well... an extremely capable Colonel who is definitely General officer material for he has the qualifications, the drive, and the ability. He will stand out at or near the top of the list in any competition... of resolute character and high morals and he is a fine husband and father. Recommended for key positions, staff or command, at the very highest echelons in the Army and the Defense Establishment..."

Evaluator: Brigadier General Bernard W. Rodgers
Commandant of Cadets, West Point

"I have served with Colonel Haig in previous assignments, to include combat as well as staff assignments at the highest level. In all types of assignments, Colonel Haig performs in a manner which is truly outstanding and better than any other officer I have known."

Position: Battalion Commander,
1st Infantry Division, Vietnam

Date: March 1967

Evaluator: Colonel William B. Caldwell III,
Brigade Commander

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is the most outstanding Infantry Battalion Commander I have seen in combat in Vietnam. He is articulate, intelligent, courageous, and is possessed of high personal and professional standards dedicated to the accomplishment of his mission... For his actions against two Viet Cong Regiments during Operation Junction City, 31 March thru April 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Haig was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross... Because of his outstanding performance of duty, he was selected on the field of battle to be a Brigade Commander when the former Brigade Commander was wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Haig is General officer material and should be given positions of great responsibility."

Evaluator: Major General J. H. Hay
Commanding General

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is without doubt one of the finest combat leaders the United States Army has produced during this war. He possesses all the qualities that such a leader should have; namely, great professional knowledge, initiative, perseverance, aggressiveness, and the ability to elicit from subordinates maximum effort in their performance of duty... He is erudite, articulate, imaginative, and refuses to accept any form of mediocrity. Lieutenant Colonel Haig has the capability and potential to rise to positions of great authority and responsibility in the military establishment..."

Position: Battalion Commander
1st Infantry Division, Viet Name

Date: February 1967

Evaluator: Colonel Sidney B. Berry Jr.,
Brigade Commander

"Colonel Haig possesses to an unusual degree the intellectual, personal, and professional qualities which make him equally effective as a high level staff officer or as a battlefield commander... He is capable of serving in positions of highest responsibility and is a potential three or four-star general."

Evaluator: Major General W. E. DePuy
Commanding General

"He has already demonstrated beyond any doubt that he is a masterful tactician, a cool and courageous combat leader, and I now regard him as the best battalion commander in the division... I expect lieutenant colonel Haig to rise high in the ranks of general officers. I strongly recommend that he be considered for selection to brigadier just as soon as possible and well ahead of his contemporaries."

Position: G-3, 1st Infantry Division, Vietnam

Date: November 1966

Evaluator: Major General W. E. DePuy,
Commanding General

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is one of those officers who should one day wear four stars. As the G-3 of this division, he was the primary moving force in planning and in operations. He is brilliant, extremely courageous, a 24 hour-a-day worker and a man of complete integrity and high moral character... Colonel Haig has all the tickets to go all the way and the Army should be very careful to manage his future assignments and to accelerate his promotion so that the Army and our country can enjoy the benefits of what this officer has to offer."

School: US Army War College
(student)

Date: June 1966

Evaluator: Major General Eugene A. Salet,
Commandant

"A highly intelligent, well-informed officer who freely, cheerfully and enthusiastically participated in all curricular and noncurricular activities of this installation. Quiet in manner, he displays an excellent sense of humor and a very pleasant personality... In all respects he exhibited superior leadership qualities. He demonstrated complete objectivity when considering matters of national significance, and is considered fully qualified for assignment to joint, combined, unified, allied, or OSD staffs... His poise, persuasiveness, and professional maturity mark him clearly as one of the outstanding members of his class. During the academic year, he and his family have made an outstanding contribution to this military community. He assisted in the Boy Scout Program and the Catholic Youth Program. He organized and conducted a Horse Show; and he actively participated in adult athletic programs. His wife served as a Gray Lady and was active in many programs sponsored by the Officers' Wives Club... He is general officer material."

Position: The Military Assistant to The Special Assistant Date: April 1965
to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

Evaluator: Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,
The Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is the most outstanding officer of his rank I have ever worked with. In a post which I consider one of the most difficult and demanding in the Department of Defense, he has worked day and night, under extreme pressure with total dedication, in duties which cover the full spectrum of the Department of Defense... His duties as military point of contact between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the President required him to deal with a large number of important Government figures. This he did with great tact and competence. I have counted on him to handle White House correspondence of personal interest to the President, to pass on most of the cases himself, and to select those few which needed my personal attention. He was personally selected by the Secretary of Defense to develop and prepare briefings which the Secretary gave to the highest officials of the Executive and Legislative branches of the government. The President personally commented on the excellent work on important matters performed with the White House staff... Lieutenant Colonel Haig is the most outstanding Lieutenant Colonel of any service whom I have ever known."

Evaluator: The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance,
Deputy Secretary of Defense

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig has performed his important mission in a manner that could be expected of very few officers. He is one of the most outstanding military men with whom it has ever been my privilege to be associated. The depth of his professional background in political and military affairs, the total nature of his integrity and dedication and the sensitivity of his judgement have made him an invaluable assistant. He is a tremendous asset to the Army and to the country."

Position: Staff Officer, Politico-Military
Branch, International Policy
Division; Office, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Military Operations

Date: August 1963

Evaluator: Major General C. E. Hutchen, Jr.
Director of Strategic Plans and
Studies

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is outstanding. He has poise, an incisive intellect, a fine sense of humor, and a remarkable ability to look ahead. He is polished, sociable and obviously physically fit... he demonstrated an unusual grasp of both international affairs and staff procedures... Demonstrated mature judgement and finesse. A man of high standards, he took a great interest in his family and his community. A pillar of strength in plans - a topnotch team player, an accomplished planner -- this officer should be specially marked for positions of great responsibility..."