

The original documents are located in Box 2, folder “Agency for International Development - Stan Scott's Activities, 1975-1977 (5)” of the Stanley Scott Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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Feb. 20, 1976

Dear Fellow American:

You are probably aware of the great drought which, from 1972 to 1974, brought near-starvation to millions of people living in the Sahel and other parts of Africa. That extensive loss of life did not occur was due to the magnificent efforts of the African countries themselves and the international donor community, including the United States. The American effort was a fine example of cooperation on the part of government, ~~the~~ ^{imposed} voluntary agencies and many private individuals, probably including some in your own community.

Now that good rains and ~~good~~ ^{imposed} crops in 1974 and 1975 have ended the immediate threat of starvation, the African nations have begun once again the long, arduous task of development. Their objective is to develop their land and water resource potential so as to counteract the effects of future droughts. This very long range program will require a strong effort by Africans, and vision, patience and persistent support from concerned Americans, as well as other donors. The Agency for International Development, - more specifically the African Bureau (~~which I administer~~) - coordinates U.S. government support for this program.

On a recent trip to Africa, I noted with pride how American technology, not only the most modern but also that of an earlier period in our history, was being used to help in developing African lands. Data from American satellites is being used in land resource planning in several areas. In contrast, some of our AID projects are introducing ox-powered cultivation in areas where people have provided the only source of energy for agriculture.



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INSERT

Daniel Parker, Administrator, Agency for International Development, recently reiterated our mission:

"Our vision must be so broad as to never lose sight of the needs of Africa and the Africans. The most important contribution this Agency can make--be it in Africa or elsewhere--is not just the futherance of economic development ^{but} ~~the~~ the development of human resources--the futherance of a climate in which men and women can function with dignity. When one refers to the huge untapped resources of Africa, it is not magnesium or uranium which first comes to mind--it is the untapped human potential." And it is the tapping of this potential wherein we find our mission.

I am sure we agree that the Federal Government does not have a monopoly on the expertise needed to design solutions. I would be pleased if you would view this as a team effort. In addition to your support, we need your ideas on how our own development experience and technology can be used in Africa. I am therefore asking that you relay your ideas to me. By working your ideas into our African programs, I hope these programs can be made not only more successful but also more representative of our own society.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

SSS



I think it is fitting in this bicentennial year that these technologies from different periods of our own history be used to help Africans in their development effort.

Insert (A) →
~~Government programs are only part of American efforts on behalf of African development. In addition to your support, we also need your ideas on how our own development experience and technology can be used in Africa. I am therefore asking you to relay your ideas to me. By working your ideas into our African programs, I hope these programs can be made not only more successful but also more representation^{VE} of our own society.~~

12/30/75


DRAFT - AFR/DP, RHUESMANN:pc



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

*see
inside*

February 23, 1976



Dear Fellow American:

You are probably aware of the great drought which, from 1972 to 1974, brought death to many people and near-starvation to millions of others living in the Sahel and other parts of Africa. That more extensive loss of life did not occur was due to the magnificent efforts of the African countries themselves and the international donor community, including the United States. The American effort was a fine example of cooperation on the part of government, voluntary agencies and many private individuals, probably including some in your own community.

Now that good rains and improved crops in 1974 and 1975 have ended the immediate threat of starvation, the African nations have begun once again the long, arduous task of development. Their objective is to develop their land and water resource potential so as to counteract the effects of future droughts. This very long-range program will require a strong effort by Africans, and vision, patience and persistent support from concerned Americans, as well as other donors. The Agency for International Development -- more specifically the Africa Bureau -- coordinates U. S. Government support for this program.


On a recent trip to Africa, I noted with pride how American technology, not only the most modern but also that of an earlier period in our history, was being used to help in developing African lands. Data from American satellites is being used in land resource planning in several areas, but in some others the state of technology is not even up to the level of that in the United States 200 years ago. Some of our A. I. D. projects, for example, are introducing ox-powered cultivation in areas where people have provided the only source of energy for agriculture.

- 2 -


I am sure we agree that the Federal Government does not have a monopoly on the expertise needed to design solutions. I would be pleased if you would view this as a team effort. In addition to your support, we need your ideas on how our own development experience and technology can be used in Africa. I am therefore asking that you relay your ideas to me. By working your ideas into our African programs, I hope these programs can be made not only more successful but also more representative of our own society.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator for Africa



If more people were aware of the needs, opportunities & challenges - more sharing could be effected.

Can you tell me about opportunities available for my husband? He is a 1st year resident in Surgery here & would like to train elsewhere.


Please respond to:

Dr. & Mrs. Bernard E. Bryant
900 East Blvd. South-Apt. 140K 219E.
Pontiac, Michigan 48053

Thanks.

THE BLACK ECUMENICAL COMMISSION

14 Beacon Street / Room 302 / Boston / Massachusetts / 02108



Mr. Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator for Africa
Department of State - AID
Washington, D.C. 20523



March 3, 1976



Dr. Armistead S. Pride
Emeritus Professor
Lincoln University of Missouri
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101

Dear Dr. Pride:

To receive a letter from a friend is fine, but to get a message from a friend and a former dean is beautiful, especially if that dean is kind enough to read a former student's writing.

Seriously, Dr. Pride, I was delighted to hear from you and to know and to learn that you have almost completed your book on the black press. I anxiously look forward to reading your work.

The work at A.I.D. is challenging and I am delighted to be here. Look forward to hearing from you in the not too distant future.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

SS

Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator for Africa

AA/AFR:SSScott:rsu:3-3-76



LINCOLN UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
JEFFERSON CITY 65101

February 8, 1976

Mr. Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C.



Dear Stanley:


What a splendid piece, "A Long Way to Go!" you wrote for the current Crisis. I've never before guffawed at anything I read in this upstanding journal but you had me splitting my sides on each page. I knew you could write but not with such light, subtle strokes. I don't believe Pat Moynihan could climb that high.

I've wanted for weeks to write you my best wishes and commend you on your good fortune in getting the A.I.D. post. With your desire, discipline and talent you will go far and have a sobering, satisfying career.

I am near the end of the black press book. Am now in the process of retooling, reducing wordage, and polishing. We leave for Israel for a couple of weeks sometime in March.

Best wishes to you and thank you for the materials you mailed before leaving The White House.

Sincerely,


Armistead S. Pride
Emeritus Professor

AS Pride

DEPARTMENT OF JOURNALISM

LINCOLN UNIVERSITY

JEFFERSON CITY, MISSOURI 65101



Mr. Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C.



March 3, 1976



Honorable Franklin W. Williams
President
Phelps Stokes Fund
10 E. 87th Street
New York, New York 10028

Dear Franklin:

I am delighted to have this opportunity to thank you for your hospitality during the reception in New York.

You were kind to afford us the opportunity to renew our acquaintance with so many of our friends in the New York Metropolitan area.

On behalf of my wife and the rest of the little Scotts, I would like to again say thanks to you, Dr. Mabel Smythe and the rest of the Phelps Stokes Fund staff.

I welcome an opportunity to chat with you in the near future to make a determination as to how the Africa Bureau and your organization can best work together.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely,


A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "S/".

Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator for Africa

SSScott:rsW:3/3/76

March 3, 1976

Mr. Abraham S. Venable
Director
Urban Affairs
General Motors Corporation
General Motors Building
Detroit, Michigan 48202



Dear Abe:

I was delighted to have had the brief opportunity to chat with you and your lovely wife during our recent visit to St. Thomas.

I must admit that I was a little surprised when informed by you that our relationship supposedly had gone sour, according to some mysterious third party.

Abe, if you know me at all, you know that I am a candid S.O.B., if I am anything (smile). Well, anyway...all is well that ends well.

We are enjoying our new and challenging responsibilities here at A.I.D. and look forward to seeing you in the not too distant future.

With special best wishes,

Sincerely,

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Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator for Africa

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
GENERAL MOTORS BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48202

ABRAHAM S. VENABLE
DIRECTOR
URBAN AFFAIRS

February 9, 1976



Mr. Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator for Africa
Department of State
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Dear Stan:

My wife and I thoroughly enjoyed the few moments we were able to spend with you in St. Thomas. Your spirits were high and it appears that your new assignment has really brought you back to life (smile).

I must admit that I have been a bit concerned over the fact that you might have misinterpreted my motives during certain past discussions. You have totally clarified any misunderstandings that I might have had and I hope that you feel the same way. Let me assure you that I am 100% in your corner and will do whatever I can to assist you in your new assignment. I'm sure that everyone here at General Motors feels the same way.

If possible, let's get together soon and I hope that you might get to Detroit to meet with some of the GM representatives in our Overseas Division. Will be looking forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Alve", written in dark ink.


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GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION

General Motors Building, Detroit, Michigan 48202



Mr. Stanley S. Scott
Assistant Administrator for Africa
Department of State
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523



AFR/RA, Mr. Dennis Conroy

April 26, 1976

DAA/AFR, Donald S. Brown
~~Donald S. Brown~~



Smallpox Programs

This is just a note of thanks and of sincere congratulations to you and your staff for all the hard work which has gone into preparations for the final smallpox program and which culminated in today's ceremony. I thought the signing ceremony itself went extremely well and I trust will provide positive and useful publicity. But the ceremony was no more than the tip of the iceberg of the hard work which was done by many people on your staff and in the Office of Development Resources in preparing the Project Paper and undertaking all the negotiations needed to bring this matter off.

cc: AA/AFR, SSScott ✓
AFR/DR, Plyman
AFR/DP, RHuesmann

DAA/AFR,DSBrown:rmc

A. S. DOC YOUNG

1717 N. HIGHLAND AVE., SUITE 404
HOLLYWOOD, CA. 90028
(213) 462-1131

July 27, 1976



Mr. Stanley S. Scott
Deputy Director
Agency For International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523

Dear Stan--

Well, as you very well know, we never did get together on the work in Africa. I'm still interested. I finally got some responses out of Mr. Kemper; but, since that time, I've been involved in movie work and other projects. Since that time, also, I've had a "flood" in my apartment (broken pipe) and all the forms, plus other valuable material, were destroyed. If we're still into that project, then I'll need new forms.

Meanwhile--and this is more important at the moment--I'd like to work again in a Republican convention publicity capacity, either as I did in 1972 with you or in another capacity. It is essential that the Republicans provide this kind of service for the Black Press--if they are to get any meaningful coverage of the convention throughout the nation.

As you know, I have the necessary abilities to do this kind of job: I've been covering conventions (national political conventions since 1956). I am a professional journalist. I have the speed (one year, I produced more than 30,000 words on a convention). I am well known all over to editors and publishers. For your information, I am enclosing a Synopsis of Resume which is fairly recent.

This year, if I do this work, I propose that I arrive in the convention city two or three days BEFORE the convention begins. That will facilitate organization. It will mean, also, that I can talk with various people who will be important to the success of this project. My fee for this project is \$1000 plus expenses, including round-trip, first-class air fare, hotel accommodations, and so on. The fee should be paid in advance.

The best way to contact me, surely, will be by letter. I can call you, if you wish. Your attention and courtesy will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. S. Doc Young', written over the word 'Sincerely,'.

1717 N. Highland Ave., Ste. 404

Synopsis of Resume of:

~~1717 N. Highland Ave., Ste. 404~~
Hollywood, California 90028

A.S. DOC YOUNG

TELEPHONE: (213) ~~462 1131~~

462 1131
AD 2 3261

*EMPLOYMENT:

- 1976: Essentially the same as 1975
- 1975 Writing: Daily and weekly newspaper columns; magazine articles; books. Broadcasting: Radio sports programs. Consultant: To a newspaper publisher; to a university provost. Teaching: Journalism class at university level. Publicity: Hollywood motion pictures.
- 1973-74 Executive Editor: Los Angeles Sentinel. Writing: Same as above. Broadcasting: Same as above. Teaching: Same as above. Publicity: Same.
- 1968-73 Daily and weekly newspaper columnist; newspaper and magazine feature writer; author of books. Principal affiliations: The Los Angeles Sentinel, Chicago Daily Defender, Ebony Magazine, Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, Inc., Las Vegas Sun.
- 1967-68 Editor: Los Angeles Sentinel.
- 1965-66 Sports Editor: New York Amsterdam News. Also: Producer of newspaper special editions. Same writing projects as above.
- 1963-66 Executive Editor and Coordinator of Departments: Los Angeles Sentinel.
- 1962 Engaged in authorship of book and same general newspaper, magazine writing program as above.
- 1958-61 Assistant Publisher: Los Angeles Sentinel. Also: Departmental editor, Los Angeles Sentinel.
- 1951-58 With Johnson Publishing Company, Inc. Chicago. Sports Editor: Ebony, Jet and Hue magazines. Managing Editor: Jet, Tan, and Copper magazines. Departmental head, story and feature writer: Jet, Ebony, Hue, Tan, Copper, and Negro Digest magazines.



*I have listed primary positions and/or occupations on this page. Other details of employment, including simultaneous performance in two or more areas, are listed and explained later in this Synopsis of Resume.

Synopsis of Resume -- A.S. Doc Young -- Page 2

EDUCATION: Graduate of Hampton Institute with Bachelor of Science degree. Graduated "with honors." Listed in "Who's Who In American Colleges and Universities."

Original major: Business Administration. Began study of Journalism at Hampton. Additional studies in Chicago and Los Angeles.

PERSONAL: Birth Place: Richmond, Virginia

Birthday: October 29, 1924

Health: Good. Physical checkup - Spring, 1974.

Residence: 1850 North Whitley Avenue,
Hollywood, California 90028

ORGANIZATIONS:

Sigma Delta Chi, The Society of Professional Journalists; Greater Los Angeles Press Club; The Publicists Guild (motion picture industry); National Sportswriters and Sportscasters Association; Baseball Writers Association of America; NAACP, Life member; Los Angeles Urban League.



ADDITIONAL
OCCUPATIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Lecturing to high school and college students.
Organizing community organizations or participating in the formation of such groups.

Functioning in an executive capacity: I have earned or been cast in leadership and executive positions throughout my lifetime. It always has been my desire to learn as much as possible about my work, my profession. In newspapers, for example, I have worked in editorial, advertising, and circulation departments. I have edited in letterpress, offset, and rotogravure.

MOVIES:

In 1957, I pioneered as an Afro-American in the area of Hollywood studio publicity. I have worked on more than 24 movies, domestic and foreign. Among them:

"Uptown Saturday Night" (1973-74), my most recent movie to date.

"Kings Go Forth," starring Frank Sinatra, Natalie Wood, and Tony Curtis, my first.

"The Defiant Ones"

"It's A Mad, Mad, Mad World."

Synopsis of Resume -- A.S. Doc Young -- 3

RADIO, TELEVISION:

20th Century-Fox Television (1969)

Radio commercials, Los Angeles:
Last used radio commercials - 1975.

Own radio program, Los Angeles and Cleveland.

Own television program (UHF), Los Angeles.

Numerous radio-television appearances, Cleveland,
Los Angeles, Chicago, New York City, and elsewhere.

BOOKS:

"Great Negro Baseball Stars," A.S. Barnes & Co. (NYC).
"Negro Firsts In Sports," Johnson Publishing Co., Inc.
"Sonny Liston: The Champ Nobody Wanted," JPC, Inc.
"Black Champions of the Gridiron: Leroy Keyes &
O.J. Simpson," Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
"The Mets From Mobile: Tommie Agee and Cleon Jones,"
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
"The Nat King Cole Story" (softback publication),
Good Publishing Company.
"Black Athletes In The New Golden Age of Sports,"
Johnson Publishing Company, Inc. (to be completed,
summer, 1975); partially serialized in Ebony Magazine).

Also, under contract as of 1975:

"Black Superstars of Sports" (a book of columns)
"Blacks In Hollywood Motion Pictures" (not a title)
"Jimbo"
"HAMP: The Lionel Hampton Story"


SPECIAL EDITIONS:

I have edited, supervised, and produced more than
two dozen special editions of newspapers, the most
notable of which was:

"Black Progress In New York," a 232-page special
edition of the New York Amsterdam News. This was
the largest single edition of a black newspaper
ever published. It grossed upwards of \$150,000.

Also:

A 200-page employment special, Chicago Defender.
A Los Angeles Dodgers special, Los Angeles Sentinel.
30th anniversary special, Los Angeles Sentinel (in
which, for the first time in publishing history,
we carried an advertisement printed on tin foil).



Synopsis of Resume -- A.S. Doc Young -- 4

Special

Editions, 25th anniversary edition, Los Angeles Sentinel.

cont'd: "The Dr. Martin Luther King Memorial Edition,"

Los Angeles Sentinel. The entire edition, April 11, 1968, was devoted to Dr. King. We were the only newspaper in America to do this. A rare development: We ran a full-color photograph of Dr. King. This is rarely done in the Black Press.

Automotive special, New York Amsterdam News.

And others: Most recent: "Black Progress in Los Angeles," Los Angeles Sentinel, 1971.

DAILY NEWSPAPERS:

Chicago's American, special feature writer.

Chicago Daily Defender, sports editor, feature-writer, producer of special editions, sports columnist.

Las Vegas Sun, sports columnist.

Los Angeles Mirror-News, special feature-writer.

FREE-LANCE WRITING:

I have been published in more than 100 newspapers and magazines. My work has been published in foreign countries, and my books are on sale in foreign countries. I have been published in Braille, and my work has been adapted for publication in connection with school laboratory kits. I have contributed, also, to several books, including the "Open Highway Series," published for schools by Scott, Foresman and Company. Among my more notable free-lance work, additionally:

New York Times, features and book reviews on assignment.

TV Guide.

Sport Magazine.

The Sporting News.

Sports Illustrated.

Saturday Evening Post.

The New York Post.

Parent's Digest.

Saga.


Negro Digest.

And others.

PUBLIC RELATIONS,

PUBLICITY PROMOTIONS:

In addition to motion pictures, I have serviced clients in sports, the theatrical world, politics, business (food processing to insurance), industry, and civil rights.



Synopsis of Resume -- A.S. Doc Young -- 5

COVERAGE AND SPECIAL SERVICES:

I have covered numerous major events for newspapers, magazines, radio-television, and book research. Among them:

Democratic National Convention (1956, 1960, 1964, 1968).
Republican National Convention (1968).
Writer, White House Communications Section, during
Republican National Convention, 1972.
Special Assignment Work under direction of Special
Assistant to the U.S. President, 1972-75.
Motion picture world premieres.
World Series.
Morticians' convention.
Super Bowl.
Championship prize fights.
Business and Professional conventions.
Automotive shows.
Championship sports of all kinds (mass-appeal).
Theatrical performances of all kinds.
Celebrity funerals.
Riots.
Festivals.
Academy Awards presentations (movies)



HONORS:

During my professional career, I have been honored by many organizations. Among the honors I treasure most:

Los Angeles Urban League "Ghetto Award."
An NAACP Membership Award.
A 100% Wrong Club of Atlanta Sports Award.
Best columnist, National Newspaper Publishers Association.
President's Anniversary Sports Award, NNPA, 1970.
American Library Association Award for "Negro Firsts
in Sports," named as one of the best reference works
of 1963.
Pepperdine University Award (from Ethnic Studies
Department), 1974.
National Association of Media Women Award,
Los Angeles chapter, 1972.
Special Community Sports Award, Los Angeles, 1972.
National Communicators Award, PUSH Expo, Chicago, 1974.
"Who's Who in America," 1976


SPECIAL TALENTS:

Leadership. Organizer. Self-starter.

REFERENCES:

On request.

FROM: FCA/PAS/PC - Mrs. Bernice C. Renn
 SUBJECT: Chiefs of Mission as of July 2, 1976.




<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE AND CATEGORY*</u>	<u>STATE</u>
AFGHANISTAN, Kabul	Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.	AMB FSO-CM	Calif.
ALGERIA, DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF, Algiers	Richard B. Parker	AMB FSO-1	Kans.
ARGENTINA, Buenos Aires	Robert C. Hill	AMB NC	N.H.
AUSTRALIA, Canberra (Resident Canberra)	James W. Hargrove Also Ambassador to the Republic of Nauru	AMB NC	Texas
AUSTRIA, Vienna	Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr.	AMB NC	D.C.
BAHAMAS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE, Nassau	Seymour Weiss	AMB NC	Md.
BAHRAIN, STATE OF, Manama	Joseph W. Twinam	AMB FSO-2	Tenn.
BANGLADESH, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF, Dacca	Davis Eugene Boster	AMB FSO-1	Ohio
BARBADOS, Bridgetown (Resident Bridgetown)	Theodore R. Britton, Jr. Also Ambassador to the State of Grenada and U.S. Special Representa- tive to the States of Antigua, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis- Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent	AMB NC	N.Y.
BELGIUM, Brussels	Leonard Kimball Firestone	AMB NC	Calif.
BENIN, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF, Cotonou (formerly Republic of Dahomey)		AMB	
BOLIVIA, La Paz	William Perry Stedman, Jr.	AMB FSO-1	Md.
BOTSWANA, REPUBLIC OF, Gaborone (Resident Gaborone)	David B. Bolen Also Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho and to the Kingdom of Swaziland	AMB FSO-1	Colo.
BRAZIL, Brasilia	John Hugh Crimmins	AMB FSO-CM	Md.

*Category Abbreviations:

FSO-CA - Career Ambassador
 FSO-CM - Career Minister
 NC - Non-Career

FSIO-1 - Foreign Service Information
 Officer of Class one
 Ret. FSO - Retired Foreign Service Officer



<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE AND CATEGORY*</u>	<u>STATE</u>
BULGARIA, Sofia	Martin F. Herz	AMB FSO-1	N.Y.
BURMA, SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF, Rangoon	David L. Osborn	AMB FSO-1	Tenn.
BURUNDI, REPUBLIC OF, Bujumbura	David E. Mark	AMB FSO-1	Md.
CAMEROON, UNITED REPUBLIC OF, Yaounde	Herbert J. Spiro	AMB NC	Pa.
CANADA, Ottawa	Thomas O. Enders	AMB FSO-1	Conn.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, Bangui	Anthony C. E. Quainton	AMB FSO-2	Wash.
CHAD, REPUBLIC OF, N'Djamena		AMB	
CHILE, Santiago	David H. Popper	AMB FSO-CM	N.Y.
CHINA, REPUBLIC OF, Taipei	Leonard Unger	AMB FSO-CM	Md.
COLOMBIA, Bogota	Phillip V. Sanchez	AMB NC	Calif.
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE (See ZAIRE)			
COSTA RICA, San Jose	Terence A. Todman	AMB FSO-CM	Virgin Islands
CYPRUS, REPUBLIC OF, Nicosia	William R. Crawford, Jr.	AMB FSO-1	Pa.
CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, Prague	Thomas R. Byrne	AMB FSO-1	Pa.
DAHOMEY, REPUBLIC OF (See BENIN, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF)			
DENMARK, Copenhagen	John Gunther Dean	AMB FSO-1	N.Y.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, Santo Domingo	Robert A. Hurwitch	AMB FSO-1	Ill.
ECUADOR, Quito	Richard J. Bloomfield	AMB FSO-1	Md.
EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF, Cairo	Hermann F. Eilts	AMB FSO-CM	Pa.



<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE AND CATEGORY*</u>	<u>STATE</u>
EL SALVADOR, San Salvador	James F. Campbell	AMB NC	Del.
EQUATORIAL GUINEA, REPUBLIC OF, Malabo	The U.S. suspended diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea on March 14, 1976.		
ETHIOPIA, Addis Ababa	Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.	AMB FSO-CM	Md.
FIJI, DOMINION OF, Suva (Resident Wellington)	Armistead I. Selden, Jr. Also Ambassador to New Zealand, to the Kingdom of Tonga, and to Western Samoa	AMB NC	Ala.
FINLAND, Helsinki	Mark Evans Austad	AMB NC	D.C.
FRANCE, Paris	Kenneth Rush	AMB NC	N.Y.
GABONESE REPUBLIC, Libreville (Resident Libreville)	Andrew L. Steigman Also Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe	AMB FSO-1	Md.
GAMBIA, REPUBLIC OF THE, Banjul (Resident Dakar)	O. Rudolph Aggrey Also Ambassador to the Republic of Senegal	AMB FSIO-1	D.C.
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, Berlin	John Sherman Cooper	AMB NC	Ky.
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, Bonn	Martin J. Hillenbrand	AMB FSO-CM	Ill.
GHANA, REPUBLIC OF, Accra	Shirley Temple Black (Apptd. Chief of Protocol 7/1/76. To depart post 7-16-76)	AMB NC	Calif.
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, UNITED KINGDOM OF, London (See UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND)			
GREECE, Athens	Jack B. Kubisch	AMB FSO-CM	Mich.
GRENADA, STATE OF, 1/St. George's (Resident Bridgetown)	Theodore R. Britton, Jr. Also Ambassador to Barbados and U.S. Special Representative to the States of Antigua, Dominica, St. Christopher- Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent	AMB NC	N.Y.
GUATEMALA, Guatemala		AMB	
GUINEA, REPUBLIC OF, Conakry	William C. Harrop	AMB FSO-1	N.J.
GUYANA, COOPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF, Georgetown	William W. Maguire (Nominated June 23, 1976)	AMB NC	Md.

1/No mission exists at St. George's.



<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE AND CATEGORY*</u>	<u>STATE</u>
HAITI, Port-au-Prince	Heyward Isham	AMB FSO-1	D.C.
HONDURAS, Tegucigalpa		AMB	
HUNGARY, Budapest		AMB	
ICELAND, Reykjavik	James J. Blake	AMB FSO-1	D.C.
INDIA, New Delhi	William B. Saxbe	AMB NC	Ohio
INDONESIA, REPUBLIC OF, Jakarta	David D. Newsom	AMB FSO-CM	Calif.
IRAN, Tehran	Richard Helms	AMB NC	Md.
IRELAND, Dublin	Walter J. P. Curley, Jr.	AMB NC	N.Y.
ISRAEL, Tel Aviv	Malcolm Toon	AMB FSO-CM	Md.
ITALY, Rome	John A. Volpe	AMB NC	Mass.
IVORY COAST, REPUBLIC OF, Abidjan	Robert S. Smith	AMB NC	D.C.
JAMAICA, Kingston	Sumner Gerard	AMB NC	N.J.
JAPAN, Tokyo	James D. Hodgson	AMB NC	Calif.
JORDAN, HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF, Amman	Thomas R. Pickering	AMB FSO-1	N.J.
KENYA, REPUBLIC OF, Nairobi (Resident Nairobi)	Anthony D. Marshall Also Ambassador to the Republic of Seychelles	AMB NC	N.Y.
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF, Seoul	Richard L. Sneider	AMB FSO-CM	N.Y.
KUWAIT, STATE OF, Kuwait	Frank E. Maestrone	AMB FSO-1	Conn.
LAOS, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF, Vientiane		AMB	
LEBANON, REPUBLIC OF, Beirut		AMB	
LESOTHO, KINGDOM OF, Maseru (Resident Gaborone)	David B. Bolen Also Ambassador to the Republic of Botswana and to the Kingdom of Swaziland	AMB FSO-1	Colo.



- 4 -

STATE	TITLE AND CATEGORY	NAME	POST
D.C.	AMB FSO-1	Harward Isham	SAUDI, Post-ambassador
	AMB		HONDURAS, Tegucigalpa
	AMB		HUNGARY, Budapest
D.C.	AMB FSO-1	James J. Blake	ICELAND, Reykjavik
Ohio	AMB NC	William B. Saxe	INDIA, New Delhi
Calif.	AMB FSO-CM	David D. Newman	INDONESIA, REPUBLIC OF, Jakarta
Ind.	AMB NC	Richard Helms	IRAN, Tehran
N.Y.	AMB NC	Walter J. P. Carley, Jr.	IRELAND, Dublin
Ind.	AMB FSO-CM	Nelson Toon	ISRAEL, Tel Aviv
Mass.	AMB NC	John A. Volpe	ITALY, Rome
D.C.	AMB NC	Robert S. Smith	IVORY COAST, REPUBLIC OF, Abidjan
N.J.	AMB NC	Samuel Gerard	JAMAICA, Kingston
Calif.	AMB NC	James D. Hodgson	JAPAN, Tokyo
N.J.	AMB FSO-1	Thomas R. Pickering	JORDAN, HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF, Amman
N.Y.	AMB NC	Anthony D. Marshall	KENYA, REPUBLIC OF, Nairobi (Also Ambassador to the Republic of Seychelles) (Resident Nairobi)
N.Y.	AMB FSO-CM	Richard L. Snyder	KOREA, REPUBLIC OF, Seoul
Conn.	AMB FSO-1	Frank E. Mason	KUWAIT, STATE OF, Kuwait
	AMB		LAOS, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF, Vientiane
	AMB		LEBANON, REPUBLIC OF, Beirut
Calif.	AMB FSO-1	David B. Bolin	LESOTHO, KINGDOM OF, Maseru (Also Ambassador to the Republic of Swaziland)


MR BILL JACKSON
PUBLISHER
BRIDGEPORT HARAMBEE
C/O NAACP
BRIDGEPORT CT

06607



<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE AND CATEGORY*</u>	<u>STATE</u>
LIBERIA, Monrovia	W. Beverly Carter, Jr.	AMB FSIO-1	Pa.
LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC, Tripoli		AMB	
LUXEMBOURG, Luxembourg	Rosemary L. Ginn	AMB NC	Mo.
MADAGASCAR, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF, Tananarive		AMB	
MALAWI, REPUBLIC OF, Lilongwe	Robert A. Stevenson	AMB FSO-1	N.Y.
MALAYSIA, Kuala Lumpur	Francis T. Underhill, Jr.	AMB FSO-1	N.J.
MALDIVES, REPUBLIC OF, <u>2</u> /Malé (Resident Colombo)	John H. Reed Also Ambassador to the Republic of Sri Lanka	AMB NC	Maine
MALI, REPUBLIC OF, Bamako		AMB	
MALTA, REPUBLIC OF, Valletta	Robert P. Smith	AMB FSO-1	Texas
MAURITANIA, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF, Nouakchott	Holsey G. Handyside	AMB FSO-1	Ohio
MAURITIUS, Port Louis	Robert V. Keeley	AMB FSO-1	Fla.
MEXICO, México	Joseph J. Jova	AMB Ret. FSO	Fla.
MOROCCO, KINGDOM OF, Rabat	Robert Anderson	AMB FSO-1	D.C.
MOZAMBIQUE, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF, Maputo	Willard A. De Pree	AMB FSO-1	Mich.
NAURU, REPUBLIC OF, <u>3</u> /Yaren (Resident Canberra)	James W. Hargrove Also Ambassador to Australia	AMB NC	Texas
NEPAL, KINGDOM OF, Kathmandu	Marquita M. Maytag	AMB NC	Calif.
NETHERLANDS, KINGDOM OF THE, The Hague	Kingdon Gould, Jr.	AMB NC	Md.
NEW ZEALAND, Wellington (Resident Wellington)	Armistead I. Selden, Jr. Also Ambassador to Fiji, to Western Samoa, and to the Kingdom of Tonga	AMB NC	Ala.

2/No mission exists at Malé.
3/No mission exists at Yaren.



<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE AND CATEGORY*</u>	<u>STATE</u>
NICARAGUA, Managua	James D. Theberge	AMB NC	D.C.
NIGER, REPUBLIC OF, Niamey	L. Douglas Heck	AMB FSO-1	D.C.
NIGERIA, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, Lagos	Donald B. Easum	AMB FSO-1	Va.
NORWAY, Oslo	William A. Anders	AMB NC	Va.
OMAN, SULTANATE OF, Muscat	William D. Wolle	AMB FSO-2	Iowa
PAKISTAN, Islamabad	Henry A. Byroade	AMB Ret. FSO Ind.	
PANAMA, Panamá	William J. Jorden	AMB NC	Texas
PAPUA NEW GUINEA, Port Moresby	Mary S. Olmsted	AMB FSO-1	Tenn.
PARAGUAY, Asunción	George W. Landau	AMB FSO-1	Md.
PERU, Lima	Robert W. Dean	AMB FSO-1	Ill.
PHILIPPINES, Manila	William H. Sullivan	AMB FSO-CM	R.I.
POLAND, Warsaw	Richard T. Davies	AMB FSO-CM	Wyo.
PORTUGAL, Lisbon	Frank C. Carlucci	AMB FSO-CM	Pa.
QATAR, STATE OF, Doha	Robert P. Paganelli	AMB FSO-2	N.Y.
ROMANIA, Bucharest	Harry G. Barnes, Jr.	AMB FSO-1	Md.
RWANDA, REPUBLIC OF, Kigali		AMB	
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF, ⁴ /São Tomé (Resident Libreville)	Andrew L. Steigman Also Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic	AMB FSO-1	Md.
SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF, Jidda	William J. Porter	AMB FSO-CM	Mass.
SENEGAL, REPUBLIC OF, Dakar (Resident Dakar)	O. Rudolph Aggrey Also Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia	AMB FSIO-1	D.C.
SEYCHELLES, REPUBLIC OF, Victoria (Resident Nairobi)	Anthony D. Marshall Also Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya	AMB NC	N.Y.
SIERRA LEONE, Freetown	Michael A. Samuels	AMB NC	D.C.

⁴/No mission exists at São Tomé.

<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE AND CATEGORY*</u>	<u>STATE</u>
SINGAPORE, REPUBLIC OF, Singapore	John H. Holdridge	AMB FSO-1	Calif.
SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, Mogadiscio	John L. Loughran	AMB FSO-1	Calif.
SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF, Pretoria ^{5/} Cape Town	William G. Bowdler	AMB FSO-CM	Fla.
SPAIN, Madrid	Wells Stabler	AMB FSO-CM	D.C.
SRI LANKA, REPUBLIC OF, Colombo (Resident Colombo)	John H. Reed Also Ambassador to the Republic of Maldives	AMB NC	Maine
SUDAN, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE, Khartoum	William D. Brewer	AMB FSO-1	Conn.
SURINAM, REPUBLIC OF, Paramaribo	J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.	AMB FSO-1	N.Y.
SWAZILAND, KINGDOM OF, Mbabane (Resident Gaborone)	David B. Bolen Also Ambassador to the Republic of Botswana and to the Kingdom of Lesotho	AMB FSO-1	Colo.
SWEDEN, Stockholm	David S. Smith	AMB NC	D.C.
SWITZERLAND, Bern	Nathaniel Davis	AMB FSO-CM	N.J.
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, Damascus	Richard W. Murphy	AMB FSO-1	Va.
TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF, Dar es Salaam	James W. Spain	AMB FSO-1	Fla.
THAILAND, Bangkok	Charles S. Whitehouse	AMB FSO-CM	Va.
TOGO, REPUBLIC OF, Lomé	Nancy V. Rawls	AMB FSO-1	Ga.
TONGA, KINGDOM OF, ^{6/} Nuku'alofa (Resident Wellington)	Armistead I. Selden, Jr. Also Ambassador to New Zealand, to Fiji, and to Western Samoa	AMB NC	Ala.
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, Port-of-Spain	Albert B. Fay	AMB NC	Texas
TUNISIA, REPUBLIC OF, Tunis	Edward W. Mulcahy	AMB FSO-1	Ariz.
TURKEY, Ankara	William B. Macomber, Jr.	AMB NC	N.Y.

^{5/}during Parliamentary Sessions.
^{6/}No mission exists at Nuku'alofa.

<u>POST</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE AND CATEGORY*</u>	<u>STATE</u>
UGANDA, Kampala	All U.S. Government personnel in Uganda withdrawn. Embassy closed November 10, 1973.		
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, Moscow	Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.	AMB FSO-CM	Calif.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, Abu Dhabi	Michael Sterner	AMB FSO-1	N.Y.
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, London	Anne Legendre Armstrong	AMB NC	Texas
UPPER VOLTA, REPUBLIC OF, Ouagadougou	Pierre R. Graham	AMB FSO-1	Ill.
URUGUAY, Montevideo	Ernest V. Siracusa	AMB Ret. FSO	Calif.
VENEZUELA, Caracas	Viron P. Vaky	AMB FSO-CM	Texas
WESTERN SAMOA, <u>1</u> /Apia (Resident Wellington)	Armistead I. Selden, Jr. Also Ambassador to New Zealand, to Fiji, and to the Kingdom of Tonga	AMB NC	Ala.
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, Sana	Thomas J. Scotes	AMB FSO-2	Md.
YUGOSLAVIA, SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, Belgrade	Laurence H. Silberman	AMB NC	Md.
ZAIRE, REPUBLIC OF, Kinshasa (formerly Democratic Republic of the Congo)	Walter L. Cutler	AMB FSO-1	Maine
ZAMBIA, REPUBLIC OF, Lusaka		AMB	
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE	U. Alexis Johnson	FSO-CA	Calif.
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE	Ellsworth Bunker	NC	Vt.
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE	Robert J. McCloskey Also Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations	FSO-CM	Md.
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE and the Special Repre- sentative of the President of the USA for the Law of the Sea Conference and Chief of Delegation	T. Vincent Learson	NC	N.Y.

1/No mission exists at Apia.

CHIEFS OF PERMANENT U.S. MISSIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
WITH AMBASSADORIAL RANK



USUN (U.S. Mission to the United Nations), New York	William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania (NC)	The Representative of the USA to the United Nations with the rank and status of A.E.&P., and the Representative of the USA in the Security Council
OAS (U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States), Washington, D.C.	William S. Mailliard of California (NC)	The Permanent Representative of the USA to the OAS, with the rank of Ambassador
IAEA (U.S. Mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency), Vienna	Gerald F. Tape of Maryland (NC)	The Representative of the USA with the rank of Ambassador
USNATO (U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Brussels	Robert Strausz-Hupé of Pennsylvania (NC)	The U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of the NATO, with the rank and status of A.E.&P.
USOECD (U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Paris	William C. Turner of Arizona (NC)	The Representative of the USA, with the rank of Ambassador
U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva	<u>8/</u> Francis L. Dale of Ohio (NC) (To depart post 7/30/76)	The Representative of the USA with the rank of Ambassador
USEC (U.S. Mission to the European Communities), Brussels	Deane R. Hinton of Illinois (FSO-CM)	The Representative of the USA, with the rank and status of A.E.&P.

8/On July 1, 1976, President Ford attested the appointment of Henry E. Catto, Jr., of Texas, as the Representative of the USA to the European Office of the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador.

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IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A STAFF REPORT

TO THE


SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



SEPTEMBER 1976



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WASHINGTON : 1976

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
RICHARD MOOSE, *Staff Associate*

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FOREWORD

This report on the political and economic crisis in southern Africa is one of a continuing series of staff reports prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Following Secretary Kissinger's trip to Africa in April, 1976 and his major policy statement in Lusaka, Zambia, the Subcommittee requested that the staff undertake a study of the economic and political conditions in southern Africa to assist it in making informed judgments regarding the possible provision of assistance to countries of the region.


Conflicts between whites and blacks in southern Africa have escalated recently to new levels of violence. Pressures are building toward a destructive race war in southern Africa, with a potential for catastrophe for those who live there. The United States has pledged its efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, but time is fast running out for the implementation of constructive proposals. This report sets out the economic conditions of the countries of southern Africa in some detail, and thus provides the basis for an evaluation of their economic needs and the possible role of U.S. assistance.

This report was written by Frank Ballance, Special Assistant for Economic Affairs for Senator Jacob Javits, and Constance Freeman, of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. Both have lived in Africa for several years and have travelled there extensively. Their report is based primarily on a three week trip in May, 1976 to Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Zaire. In these countries the staff met with U.S. Embassy officials, host government officials, parliamentarians, UN personnel, newspaper editors, and other informed observers. In addition, interviews in the United States and extensive research in the available literature contributed to this report. The report was written during the month of June after their return, and thus does not include certain recent developments, such as the proposals made by the Windhoek Turnhalle constitutional conference.

The Subcommittee hopes that this report will be a useful addition to knowledge of this important part of the world. The views expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Subcommittee members.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY.

(v)



FOREWORD

This report on the political and economic crisis in southern Africa is one of a continuing series of staff reports prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Following Secretary Kissinger's trip to Africa in April, 1976 and his major policy statement in Lusaka, Zambia, the Subcommittee requested that the staff undertake a study of the economic and political conditions in southern Africa to assist it in making informed judgments regarding the possible provision of assistance to countries of the region.

Conflicts between white and black in southern Africa have escalated recently to new levels of violence. Pressures are building toward a fundamental new way in southern Africa, with a potential for civil strife for those who live there. The United States has pledged its efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia and, although not yet in a position to support the implementation of a comprehensive proposal, this report sets out the economic conditions of the countries of southern Africa in some detail and thus provides the basis for an evaluation of their economic needs and the possible role of the assistance.

This report was written by Frank Bellows, Special Assistant for Economic Affairs for Senator James Eastland, and Constantine P. Rousso, Assistant for Economic Affairs for Senator Charles McClellan. Both have lived in the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. Both have lived in Africa for several years and have traveled there extensively. Their report is based primarily on a recent visit to the region in May, 1976 to Zambia, Mozambique, South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. In these countries the staff met with U.S. Embassy officials, host government officials, parliamentarians, U.S. personnel, newspaper editors, and other informed observers. In addition, interviews in the United States and extensive research in the available literature contributed to this report. The report was written during the month of June after their return and thus does not include certain recent developments such as the proposals made by the Windhoek-Tripoli constitutional conference. The Subcommittee hopes that this report will be a useful addition to knowledge of this important part of the world. The views expressed in the report are those of the members and do not necessarily represent the views of the Subcommittee members.

Henry H. H. H. H.



THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

PART I—SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the eyes of Africans and much of the rest of the world the Angolan crisis of late 1975 and early 1976 marked the beginning of the final phase of Africa's transition to black majority rule. Similarly, the awkward results of the U.S. involvement in Angola precipitated a search for a U.S. policy appropriate to the peculiar demands of this stage in Africa-United States relations. Angola lit the fuse for further dramatic confrontations between black and white and East and West in southern Africa. Since that time negotiations over Rhodesia have broken down and guerrilla incursions have intensified. South Africa has experienced bloody race riots reminiscent of the "Sharpeville massacre" of 1960, and substantially more dangerous for the country's future.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's trip to Africa in April, 1976, in the wake of Angola represented the first major shift from the policy established in 1969—the modified option 2 of National Security Study Memorandum 39—which stressed relaxation of pressures on white southern African regimes with a view toward encouraging concessions to the black populations and the presumed rejection of violent actions by the latter. The United States had more actively supported the black governments and movements during the 1960's. Secretary Kissinger's statements in Lusaka pledged U.S. support for majority rule in Rhodesia, and assistance to countries working to bring this about. His subsequent talks with Prime Minister John Vorster of the Republic of South Africa in June indicates that the Secretary believes that South Africa has an important role to play in the resolution of the explosive problems of this region—although itself part of the overall problem.

Since the Angolan misadventure, U.S. Government statements regarding Africa have reflected both a deep concern about possible Russian intervention and domination in the region and a renewed commitment to the peaceful achievement of majority rule. Secretary Kissinger's Lusaka statement synthesized these dual goals by emphasizing Western action to promote moderate black governments in the region as a bulwark against Communist inroads.

The Soviet Union has gained prestige among some African governments because of its support for the winning faction in Angola. Observers often speculate that the U.S.S.R. would further welcome the opportunity to increase its influence in southern Africa by supporting other African liberation groups. The Chinese have recently had closer ties than the Soviets to Tanzania and Zambia, and now to Mozambique, largely as a result of their support for FRELIMO in its struggle against Portuguese rule. However, the Soviet Union probably is the

only member of the Communist world which has the military capacity to lend decisive weight to the struggle of the liberation movements. Prolonged warfare or intervention by outside forces, most notably those of South Africa, to assist Rhodesia could lead to major Soviet arms supplies and possible use of Cuban troops.

U.S. understanding of the forces at work in southern Africa will have a direct bearing on the formulation and implementation of any new U.S. policy in that region. The pace of events since Angola suggests that little time remains for decision-making or the launching of new programs. U.S. economic assistance to the countries of this region would provide a symbol of support for moderate policies. Further, although the economic problems of countries in the area are very serious, even relatively small amounts of U.S. aid could be targeted to deal with particular economic and administrative deficiencies of the recipient countries.

THE RHODESIAN CRISIS

Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the present Southern Rhodesian regime in 1965, international action coordinated through the United Nations has attempted to use economic sanctions to pressure the minority government toward concessions aimed at majority rule. South African support for Rhodesia—as well as violations by numerous other countries—vitiated the effect of sanctions on Rhodesia. The major victim of sanctions has, instead, been Zambia, whose economy was closely linked to its southern neighbors.

The Portuguese revolution in 1974 set in motion a chain of events which resulted in independence for Mozambique and Angola and a major shift in the balance of power in southern Africa. Many Rhodesian blacks have grown increasingly disillusioned with the prospects of obtaining any major share in the government and economy of their country. Numerous attempts at negotiations, both between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia, and between the Rhodesian whites and blacks, have ended in failure—the latest being Joshua Nkomo's widely publicized talks with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith, which collapsed in March of this year. Since then, all sides have been preparing for military action, and armed confrontations are steadily increasing.

The Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) nationalist movement has become increasingly fragmented over the past few years, however. In 1974 the four black Rhodesian political movements were consolidated through outside African pressure under the African National Council (ANC) umbrella. This artificial creation never enjoyed extensive popular support among "liberation" group members. It has now shattered and power seems to be passing to a nebulous leadership group within the military wing of the movement.

There is increasing pessimism in Africa and among African experts about the possibility of peaceful transition to majority rule. The Rhodesian whites remain opposed to all except minimal changes; despite external pressure, they seem to feel that they can hold out indefinitely. Although the Zimbabwe People's Army seems too small and ill-equipped to dislodge the white government at the present time, it has managed to bomb the rail links with South Africa and occa-

sionally to penetrate close to the capital of Salisbury. At a minimum, the guerrillas appear to be gaining sufficient strength to cause further disruption, leading to economic and political erosion within Rhodesia. This is the perhaps inevitable result of the failure of earlier efforts to bring about a peaceful transition. In this context all-out efforts to moderate the conflict are a primary means—and probably a last chance—to avoid possible tragedy both for Rhodesia and its neighbors.

Many African countries have made the achievement of majority rule in Rhodesia a key foreign policy goal. At great cost to itself Zambia closed its border with Rhodesia in 1973, and Mozambique followed suit this year several months after its own independence. Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique have all given sanctuary to Zimbabwe nationalist groups and fighters since UDI, and the armed struggle is currently being waged across the borders of Zambia and Mozambique. The Presidents of the four most involved countries—Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Botswana—serve as a coordinating and consultative group assisting the nationalist factions in their dealings with the outside world. Although bitterly opposed to South Africa's apartheid policies the four "front-line" President were pragmatic enough to recognize South Africa's influence over Smith's government. This group gave its blessing to the efforts of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and Prime Minister Vorster to bring together the contending parties. However, cooperation with South Africa broke down following the collapse of negotiations and South African intervention in Angola.

Some well-informed South Africans appear to recognize that it is no longer in South Africa's self-interest to shore up the white minority government in Rhodesia, because a further radicalization of the Zimbabwe liberation movement threatens to have ramifications in South Africa. Nevertheless, the inconsistency of promoting majority rule for Rhodesia while denying it to South African blacks confronts the South African Government with a dilemma. South Africa's conservative white electorate inhibits development of any policy which would appear to abandon the Rhodesian whites. Thus, while South Africa is unlikely to send its own troops back into Rhodesia, there are limits on how much political or economic pressure it is willing to exert against the Smith regime.

NAMIBIA

South Africa's dilemma is compounded by growing international pressure to withdraw from Southwest Africa (Namibia), a former League of Nations mandated territory, whose current occupation by South Africa has been declared illegal by the International Court of Justice. This pressure and the recent independence of surrounding countries have led the South African Government to accelerate its timetable for self-rule in Namibia and to reconsider the wisdom of directly applying its domestic policy of "separate development" to Namibia.

Constitutional talks based on ethnic group representation are currently underway in Namibia's Capital, Windhoek, with the objective of establishing a federation of semi-autonomous ethnic areas. South

Africa's refusal to accept participation of the black political party recognized by the United Nations and other countries and international groups. SWAPO (South West African People's Organization), as the representative of the Namibian people, casts doubt upon the ultimate acceptability to all concerned parties of any formula agreed to by the Conference. Most observers believe that SWAPO's inclusion may be necessary if the talks are to be successful. Meanwhile, SWAPO incursions over the Namibia borders from Angola are increasing. SWAPO's military efforts, because of its relatively low level of preparedness, and the fact that Namibia's terrain is not very favorable for guerrilla warfare, are substantially less advanced than those of the Rhodesian guerrillas.

HOMELANDS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The South African Government's policy of separate economic and political development for blacks has led to the creation of tribal homelands theoretically destined for political independence. These ten homelands now consist of 113 separate land fragments comprising 13 percent of the South African land area. The largest and least fragmented of these, the Transkei, is scheduled to be granted independence on October 26, 1976. Most African governments regard the homelands as a logical extension of apartheid and have announced their refusal to recognize the independence of the Transkei. The recent and ongoing urban unrest in the Republic of South Africa is making it more difficult for the South African Government to convince other countries that separate development satisfies the aspirations and needs of its non-white population.

U.S. POLICY ACTION

A common reaction in Africa to the Kissinger pronouncements has been the observation that the failure to follow up U.S. policy statements with positive action would generate renewed skepticism among Africans about that policy.

In this connection, the question of whether and how pressure is to be applied against Rhodesia is widely viewed as one of the most immediate tests of U.S. policy. Many Africans regard the repeal of the Byrd amendment, which permits continued U.S. importation of Rhodesian chrome ore and other "strategic" materials, as the most important step which the U.S. could take. In the eyes of much of the world, this legislation makes the United States the only U.N. member in official and open defiance of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia.

South Africa has great scope for applying pressure on Rhodesia, and many people, including supporters of South Africa, argue that it is in South Africa's self-interest to do so. Some observers have suggested that the United States could stress this point in its discussions with South Africa instead of debating the possibility of United States concessions—for example, recognition of the Transkei and increased trade and investment, including the provision of nuclear materials for "peaceful purposes"—in exchange for South African economic pressure against Rhodesia.

The economies, and thus the fortunes, of south-central Africa were tightly interwoven during the colonial period. The Republic of South Africa, as the only industrial economy in the region, exported its goods and trained technicians to the surrounding countries, and absorbed unskilled surplus African labor from the same countries. The mineral wealth of Rhodesia, Zambia, and Zaire made necessary and possible the development of a network of rail lines reaching both the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique were firmly integrated into this system, and their ports served as channels for the exports of the interior.

There are numerous examples of the economic interdependence which Southern Rhodesia and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) developed during the ten years of federation prior to 1964. At the time of Zambia's independence in 1964, its oil supplies came from Rhodesia via a pipeline from Beira, Mozambique, to Umtali, Rhodesia. Its power supplies were generated on the Rhodesian side of the Kariba Dam. The airline and railroad were an integrated system with Southern Rhodesia. Most skilled personnel running Zambia's copper mines were white Rhodesians and South Africans. Since 1964 such links have become increasingly disrupted at great cost to all the countries of south-central Africa. These problems have been exacerbated by the world-wide recession and declining commodity prices.

Zambia, Zaire, and Mozambique need external economic assistance of all kinds, particularly balance of payments support to cover unprecedented deficits, in large part caused by the application of sanctions against Rhodesia. The U.N. estimated that the cost to Zambia of the closing of its border with Rhodesia from 1973 through 1975 is \$330 million. Mozambique just closed its border in March 1976, and the cost of this action in the first year, as estimated by the United Nations, is \$140-165 million. Zaire's economic crisis is primarily the result of a combination of mismanagement and world-wide recession but events in Rhodesia could intensify Zaire's troubles if all transit routes to the south were to be closed.

Other countries in the region not directly affected by sanctions also need external assistance. Botswana's economy would be badly hurt if it applied sanctions by closing the border with Rhodesia, since Rhodesia Railways is its single link with the outside world. Tanzania has played a key role in the struggle for majority rule in southern Africa. While the primary reasons for its current economic problems are a poor resource base and recessionary pressures, it has also borne some of the costs resulting from the redirection of Zambia's transport routes northward.

Secretary Kissinger stated in Lusaka that the U.S. was "ready to help alleviate economic hardships for any countries neighboring Rhodesia which decide to enforce sanctions by closing their frontiers." In particular, \$12.5 million was pledged to Mozambique.

The Congress recently authorized \$75 million for southern Africa in the International Security Assistance Act of 1976. Zambia and Zaire could each receive \$27.5 million in balance of payments support. The remaining \$20 million is undesignated, but it is understood that it would be used to assist other affected countries in the region. Potential uses for the \$20 million include economic support to offset the

impact of the sanctions on the Mozambique and Botswana economies, training programs for refugees from Rhodesia and Namibia, regional transport and communications, general refugee assistance, and advance planning to deal with the economic consequences of the transition to majority rule.

The needs of the southern African region are vastly in excess of the assistance currently under consideration. This assistance would provide, however, a visible demonstration of United States support for those southern African countries whose economies have suffered from their support for majority rule in Rhodesia. Whether such assistance will have more than symbolic value will depend both upon how it is used and whether it is augmented by additional aid in subsequent years. If the situation continues to deteriorate, both the needs of these countries and their requests for foreign assistance will no doubt increase.

There are closely related aspects of the southern African crisis which are not amenable to direct economic assistance. Some observers argue that the United States should apply greater diplomatic and economic pressure on South Africa to withdraw support for the Rhodesian whites and to reform its own system of apartheid. Others argue against increased United States involvement of any kind. Secretary Kissinger's June 1976 talks with Prime Minister Vorster indicate an opening of official communication channels which might eventually also involve South African blacks directly.

In the eyes of black Africans another crucial test of U.S. policy will be whether or not the United States recognizes the independence of the Transkei in October 1976. Recognition could be interpreted as an acceptance of the policy of separate development. In the same vein, most of the world community is unlikely to accord recognition to an independent Namibia unless such independence has been achieved through the full participation of indigenous political groups.

In spite of continuing hopes for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, there is a broad consensus that violent resolution of the conflict is more likely. The longer the struggle drags on, the more important the military leadership elements within the liberation movement are likely to become and the less likely they will be to accept a settlement achieved by the present political leadership. Informed observers believe that as the situation develops, it will be important for the United States to develop widespread contacts with all involved parties and not to align itself with any one black Rhodesian faction or individual. Avoidance of hostility to any one faction may help the United States to prevent an impasse similar to that which characterizes U.S. relations with Angola.

While it is recognized in southern Africa that the U.S. is unlikely to provide military assistance, African observers point out that there are other ways in which the United States could demonstrate a positive attitude toward liberation forces. More importantly, the United States could refrain from assisting the Rhodesian white government. It might also provide medical and educational assistance to liberation groups, or even financial assistance to enable them to explain their views abroad.

Secretary Kissinger has agreed to coordinate United States-Rhodesian policy with Presidents Kaunda, Machel, Nyerere and Seretse Khama; many claim that this same policy would be appropriate for other outside powers. A firm U.S. commitment to avoid direct military intervention in the conflict and to coordinate actions closely with the four Presidents would provide a strong moral position from which to influence the approaches and policies of other countries.

Many Africans and concerned observers believe that direct U.S. military involvement in Africa is likely to be counterproductive and that it would lead to the misallocation of resources which could more beneficially be used for development. U.S. arms sales to the area would probably heighten regional tensions without providing real security to the recipient countries. A case which is frequently cited, particularly by economic experts, is that of military sales to countries such as Zaire, which face severe economic crisis and possible massive defaults on existing debts. Even indirect further U.S. military involvement would also make it more difficult for the United States to argue against similar actions by other powers.

Under the leadership of Robert Mugabe, the guerrillas have formed their own army, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZAPU). Who commands this group is, however, unclear. The shifting alignments and conflicts within the Zimbabwean nationalist groups are complex, but an understanding of these is important to an assessment of the future of Rhodesia.

Virtually all informed observers believe that majority rule in Rhodesia is inevitable. The issue is when and how it occurs. Who leads and controls the army and who ultimately concludes the arrangements for transition to majority rule will have a significant impact upon the structure and ideology of the resulting Zimbabwe regime. This in turn will influence events in Namibia and South Africa.

There is a sense that the focus of power within the liberation movements has shifted to the military, and there are indications that the potential military leadership is more radical in its economic and political thinking than any of the old political leaders. There is a consensus that a negotiated settlement by Nkomo, or someone with his background and approach, is likely to result in a society that would be viewed more favorably by the United States and South African governments than a society born out of a protracted and increasingly violent struggle. But there is declining belief in the likelihood of any such settlement.

The four Presidents (Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel and Seretse Khama) now immediately committed to a speedy transition to majority rule, but there is still one that they are also subtly aware that the characteristics of the leadership and its Zimbabwe leadership will affect the ultimate outcome. Kaunda has tended to favor Nkomo and Machel the military. The positions of Nyerere and Seretse Khama are less clear. All four have attempted to moderate leadership struggles in the past and are likely to continue to influence them. The struggle for control of Zimbabwe is in a state of flux. Yet some serious possibilities for compromise may be provided by examining the roots of the struggle, including how and why old leaders are being discredited and who the new ones might be.

PART II—POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

THE RHODESIAN CRISIS

The 1976 breakdown in the Joshua Nkomo-Ian Smith negotiations reduces hopes for a speedy negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. Pressures are increasing within Rhodesia as escalating guerrilla attacks penetrate deeper into the country. At the same time, the African liberation forces themselves are in disarray. The attempt to unify the four key movements under the ANC umbrella appears to have failed and political leaders are spending most of their time trying to supplant each other.

Reportedly disillusioned with attempts to negotiate, and with the ineffectualness of non-violent political efforts, the guerrillas have formed their own "third force" which recognizes the leadership of an eighteen-man command. Who commands this group is, however, unclear. The shifting alignments and multiple conflicts within the Zimbabwe nationalist groups are complex, but an understanding of them is important to an assessment of the future of Rhodesia.

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There is evidence that the focus of power within the liberation movements has shifted to the military. And there are indications that the potential military leadership is more radical in its economic and political thinking than any of the old political leaders. There is a consensus that a negotiated settlement by Nkomo, or someone with his laissez-faire approach, is likely to result in a society that would be viewed more favorably by the United States and South African governments than a society born out of a protracted and increasingly violent struggle. But there is declining belief in the likelihood of any such settlement.

The four Presidents' (Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel and Seretse Khama) most immediate commitment is to a speedy transition to majority rule, but there is evidence that they are also acutely aware that the characteristics of the transition and its Zimbabwe leadership will affect the ultimate outcome. Kaunda has tended to favor Nkomo, and Machel the military. The positions of Nyerere and Seretse Khama are less clear. All four have attempted to moderate leadership struggles in the past and are likely to continue to influence them. The struggle for control of Zimbabwe is in a state of flux. Yet some insights into possible outcomes may be provided by examining the roots of the struggle, including how and why old leaders are being discredited and who the new ones might be.

THE GENESIS

Europeans have been resident in Rhodesia for less than a century. They first arrived in 1890 when the Prime Minister of the Cape, Cecil Rhodes, sent British troops to conquer the indigenous Shona and Matebele tribes. Southern Rhodesia became a crown colony with internal self-rule in 1923, but perhaps half of the present white population (approximately 270,000) arrived after World War II and 10-15 percent after the independence of the former Portuguese colonies.

Southern Rhodesia was linked with Zambia (previously Northern Rhodesia) and Malawi (Nyasaland) in a Central African Federation in 1953. This was strongly opposed by the Africans and subsequently disbanded in 1963 when Zambia and Malawi became independent. At the end of that period Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front defeated its more liberal predecessor and became the Government Party. Smith opposed political concessions to blacks. In 1965 the Rhodesian Front issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain and instituted a rigorous system of racial discrimination.

African resistance to European rule dates back to Rhodesia's initial colonization. Indeed, the Shona group of tribes still blame the Matebele tribe for selling out to the British after the Matebeles themselves had conquered the Shona in the early 1800s. Contemporary organized opposition to white rule in Southern Rhodesia originated in 1957 when the first nationalist political party was formed. Its first task, together with similar parties in neighboring countries, was to oppose the Federation.

THE LEADERSHIP CONFLICT AMONG AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES

The Four Groups

During the 1960s and early 1970s four major political parties or groups developed among Africans in Rhodesia. They all grew out of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) which was founded by Joshua Nkomo in 1961. ZAPU in turn was the successor of a series of movements created by Nkomo and banned by the Rhodesian Government.

The first serious split in 1963 resulted from a leadership conflict between Nkomo and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. Sithole formed a new party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), whose membership was primarily composed of Shona ethnic groups. Contention between the two groups continued and they were both banned and their leadership detained in 1964. ZAPU reorganized underground and continued to build a political and organizational structure within Rhodesia: it also established an external office in Dar es Salaam. The locus of ZANU activity shifted abroad when the detained Central Committee delegated authority to Herbert Chitepo, who had been elected ZANU National Chairman in 1963. ZANU subsequently shifted its base from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka in 1966.

Two new groups entered the scene in 1971. Ongoing leadership conflicts within ZAPU and ZANU resulted in a further breakoff of a group which formed a third party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), under the leadership of James Chikerema

and George Nyandoro. This group never developed a large following.

The fourth group, the African National Council (ANC), did not start out as a political party but rather as a forum to contest the constitutional settlement proposals of 1971. It was generated largely out of the internal ZAPU organization but also had ZANU support. A churchman viewed as a moderate, Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, was chosen to head ANC. He succeeded in defeating the settlement proposals and continued to negotiate with Smith until 1974.

The Evolution of Unity Under the ANC Umbrella

During the autumn of 1974, President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa began to discuss the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian conflict. Although far apart politically, their interests coincided through Vorster's newly launched policy of détente with black Africa and Kaunda's hope that the impending independence of former Portuguese colonies would temper Rhodesian white intransigence. Kaunda and Vorster persuaded Ian Smith's government to release both Sithole and Nkomo from prison so they, together with Muzorewa, could participate in talks with the Presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana about the possibilities of a negotiated settlement.

A precondition for successful negotiations seemed to be unity among the four contending factions. There was, however, initial resistance to moves toward unification. Before his release from prison in 1974, Sithole had been relieved of his position as President of ZANU and replaced by the former Secretary General, Robert G. Mugabe. Sithole was subsequently reinstated but his relationship with Mugabe continued to be uneasy.

Much of the external wing of ZANU, including Chitepo, opposed unification with the other groups. The militants, in particular members of the Karanga tribe, led by Josiah Tongogara, maintained that military efforts were succeeding and negotiations would simply delay progress. In addition, unity might mean sharing leadership with those who had not previously participated in the fight. Sithole received the backing of some of those who favored a political solution (largely Manyikas), but the militants never acceded to the merger.

A final source of contention revolved around FROLIZI. Nkomo tried to convince Chikerema and his group to return to ZAPU since FROLIZI continued to be small and weak. Chikerema refused and demanded instead an equal share in the leadership with the other groups. This continues to be resented by the others.

These difficulties were superficially resolved; an agreement to merge the four groups under the banner of the ANC and interim presidency of Bishop Muzorewa was reached in early December, 1974. The other three leaders (Sithole, Nkomo and Chikerema) were included in an enlarged executive until a Congress could be called to adopt a revised ANC constitution and formally elect the ANC leadership. The aims of the new ANC were: (1) To continue the struggle until liberation had been achieved and (2) to prepare for any constitutional conference which would establish a system allowing the equal political participation of all adults. Smith agreed not to redetain Sithole and Nkomo and the Organization of African Unity recognized the ANC as the sole representative of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

The Disintegration of Unity

A significant number of ZANU members, especially those representing the military, never acknowledged the ANC umbrella. They retained their own ZANU organization and continued the armed struggle, even though the ANC had committed them to a cease-fire. At the same time, this ZANU group experienced a period of internal strife. While unity talks were taking place in late 1974, a group of disaffected, Mozambique-based ZANU soldiers marched on Lusaka where they kidnapped various liberation group leaders and allegedly killed a number of other people. This was ostensibly a protest against conditions in the military camps. It was contended that this so-called Nhari Rebellion was supported and possibly initiated by some of the Lusaka based leadership (largely Manyika). The external leadership council of ZANU (Dare re Chimurenga) severely disciplined the soldiers who participated in the raid and expelled the suspected leaders from the party. Some of those disciplined were subsequently killed or disappeared.

By early 1975, the leadership in both the Dare and the Military High command had become predominantly (approximately 80 percent) Karanga. The Chairman of the Dare, Chitepo, was the only remaining Manyika. He was assassinated on March 18, 1975 just after returning to Lusaka from Malawi, where two of his Karanga colleagues had been arrested.

After the funeral the Zambian Government detained approximately 50 leaders of ZANU including Josiah Tongogara, the Chief of Defense. Other prominent Karanga figures who were detained include: Cletos Chigowe, Chief of Intelligence; Kubirai Kangai, Secretary of Labor; Rugare Gumbo, Secretary of Information; and Henry Hamadziripi, Secretary for Finance. About 1,000 ZANU members were also shipped off to a remote camp, and subsequently sent to Malawi after a series of conflicts with the Zambian police.

A number of interpretations have been given of this chain of events. An international commission set up by the Zambian Government to investigate Chitepo's assassination reported that these events were the result of an attempt by the Karangas, and notably Tongogara, to consolidate their leadership position within the Dare and the Military High Command. The Report notes that those who were expelled from the party after the Nhari Rebellion were from the rival Manyika group. Chitepo, although also a Manyika, had not openly opposed their expulsion. Nevertheless, those Karangas who were attempting to consolidate power may have viewed Chitepo's knowledge about their activities as a threat. Further, according to the Commission, Chitepo's abandonment of his Karanga colleagues in Malawi detention was an additional source of resentment.

ZANU rejects this interpretation, maintaining that Chitepo might have been assassinated by the Manyikas because he failed to oppose the expulsion of his Manyikan friends from the party. ZANU further alleges that since Chitepo continued to oppose ANC unity he was more likely eliminated by a coalition of forces who saw him as a stumbling block to unity (Zambia) and others who wanted to throw the ZANU leadership into disarray (South Africa and Rhodesia).

Although nominally a member of the political leadership of the ANC, Robert Mugabe never fully approved of unification. After Chitepo's death and the redetention of Sithole by Smith in April, 1975, Mugabe called for ZANU to withdraw from the merger and strongly defended the Military Council when its members were arrested in Zambia. He left Rhodesia in the spring of 1975, and returned to Mozambique where he worked with the military. It was Mugabe's assumption that following Sithole's release the latter would raise money and supplies for the troops. When the expected material had not arrived after a year, Mugabe went to Europe, denounced Sithole and the entire ANC, and started his own fund-raising efforts. Mugabe has recently been elected Secretary General of ZANU.

The core leadership of the ANC (Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema and Nkomo) also split apart during 1975. After Sithole had been released from detention to attend the OAU Foreign Minister's Conference in Dar es Salaam and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Jamaica, he and Muzorewa decided they were likely to be detained if they returned to Rhodesia. Nkomo went back alone and started to negotiate with Smith and plan for a Congress to elect permanent leaders. The other three leaders considered the plans for a Congress to be an Nkomo plot to usurp leadership, since they could not go to Rhodesia. Sithole therefore acknowledged the continuation of Muzorewa's ANC presidency and proceeded to organize a Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC) to conduct the armed struggle.

Relations continued to be very tense when the four leaders met again at the abortive Victoria Falls talks in August, 1975. When Sithole announced the formation of the ZLC, with himself as Chairman and Chikerema as Secretary, in September, Nkomo refused to recognize it as a valid institution. He proceeded to hold a National Executive Committee Meeting to plan for a Congress in Rhodesia and Muzorewa expelled him from the ANC. Nevertheless, Nkomo held the Congress and it elected him president of the ANC. The other three leaders did not recognize the Nkomo presidency nor the ZLC so the split was solidified. Nkomo continued to attempt to negotiate with Smith until March, 1976, and the others traveled around the world supposedly building support and collecting supplies for the army.

THE ARMED STRUGGLE

Going back to 1965, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence convinced both ZAPU and ZANU that they would have to fight for majority rule. The external wings of the two parties started training programs for guerrillas and ZANU launched its first offensive in April, 1966, at the so-called battle of Sinoia. Although ZANU forces were completely routed they continued guerrilla incursions until 1970. These military efforts were not very successful, and the acting head of ZANU, Chitepo, called for a retrenchment. Fighting was resumed in 1972 when ZANU began to cooperate with FRELIMO in Mozambique and opened up the northeastern front through Zambia.

Military actions of some ZANU guerrillas continued during the ceasefire declared by the ANC in 1975, although conditions in the guerrilla camps were very arduous. Supplies were not getting through

and much of the military leadership was in jail in Zambia on suspicion of assassinating Chitepo. Sithole and Muzorewa tried to establish control over the rebellious guerrillas after revolts in both the Tanzanian and Zambian camps by establishing the 21-member Liberation Council (ZLC). However, the guerrillas were not effectively consulted about the council. In addition, Noel Mukomo, who was ZANU "Secretary of Defense" before Tongogara and suspected by the Karangas of starting the Nhari rebellion, was appointed to it. Consequently, many guerrillas did not recognize the ZLC and proceeded instead, in late 1975 with encouragement from the four Presidents, to establish their own unified military command.

The great majority of the fighting forces in this new "unified" army, Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), come from the old military wing of ZANU (ZANLA), which was largely Karanga controlled. A joint ZANU/ZAPU command has been set up. It is not clear whether the command consists of nine commanders from ZANU and nine from ZAPU or twelve and six respectively. The leadership of the seven Departments of Command is also shared. If the Director is from one party, the Deputy comes from the other. Despite this formal structure, informed observers question the degree of and commitment to unity. Some of these observers allege that ZANU accepted this structure in the expectation that Tongogara would be released and consequently feels betrayed since he is still being held by Kaunda. The ZAPU forces are quite small and probably make up only 10 per cent of ZIPA. Reportedly some ZAPU members are convinced that ZANU still controls the army and are therefore considering pulling out of ZIPA.

Personality clashes played an important role in previous splits among Zimbabwe liberation groups so the identity of the commanders is not being publicized. It is fairly certain, however, that Rex Nhongo is the head of the nine ZANU commanders and perhaps of the overall Central Command. He was the ZANLA Field Commander at the height of the northeastern front offensive through Zambia. He is also a Karanga and a close associate of Tongogara. The Commission report on Chitepo's death states that he made the bomb which killed Chitepo. And it is thought that Tongogara continues to direct the operations of ZIPA from jail through Nhongo. As the Secretary General of ZANU, Robert Mugabe has also continued to maintain influence within the army although he is a Manyika. It is uncertain whether he is actually one of the commanders.

No one, including the commanders themselves, seems to know exactly how many troops ZIPA has or where they are located. The estimates range from 2,000 to 20,000. There are probably about 1,000-5,000 operating within Rhodesia or just inside the Mozambique border. Guerrilla strikes have occurred in the south on the Beitbridge-Victoria Falls road and on both the Botswana and direct South African railroads. There have also been incidents all up and down the Mozambique border and close to the capital city of Salisbury. ZANU officials claim they have 20,000 troops in training in Mozambique and Tanzania and sent 700-3,000 out to the operational bases in May, 1976. Even the Rhodesian Government asserts that the number of guerrillas has increased from 100 in 1964 to 10,000 in 1976.

The largest concentration of troops is in Mozambique, although training and especially transit camps continue to operate out of Tanzania. There are some ZAPU troops left in Zambia. Kaunda expelled the ZANU cadres, however, after Chitepo's assassination and the subsequent unrest in ZANU camps. The northern front in Zambia was closed during most of 1975, but has recently been reopened. There is also some discussion about opening a new front from Botswana.

A number of outside groups are assisting ZIPA. FRELIMO support on all levels as far as the Mozambique-Rhodesia border has been essential to it, especially in the area of discipline. The Soviets have traditionally assisted ZAPU and are now reported to be channeling supplies through FRELIMO. Some Chinese instructors are said to be in the Mozambique camps but Chinese influence declined after they elected not to play an active role in Angola during late 1975. ZANU has historically obtained training and assistance from China and Tongogara was trained there. The Cubans and some eastern Europeans are also providing technical and training support but there are apparently less than 200 Cubans in Mozambique. There seems to be a widespread feeling that Africans must wage their own revolution and that Cuban support similar to that received by Angola would be undesirable. Finally, Tanzania recently sent 1,500 troops to help Machel keep order, and Nigeria and Zambia have been talking about sending some of their own forces.

INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ANC AND THE ARMY

There has been a great deal of debate about whether ZIPA, which is also called the "third force", continues to acknowledge the political leadership of the ANC or even part of it. Both Sithole and Muzorewa publicly accepted the Chitepo report and blamed tribalism and particularly the Karangas for the unrest within the army. The ZLC was established without consulting the Karangas who appear to be predominant in the army—the ZIPA high command was set up without the backing of the ANC political leadership.

Starting in November, 1975, some members of the army wrote to interested parties such as Tanzania, Mozambique and the OAU Liberation Committee repudiating and denouncing the political leadership for allegedly failing to assist the army and misusing funds raised to support the armed struggle. The precise source of and support for these communications is not clear. Reliable sources believe that the political leadership has spent little time in the camps, either because they have been barred by Machel or felt threatened by members of ZIPA itself.

Parts of the former ZANU forces have never recognized the ANC leadership. The majority of former ZAPU members, however, were loyal to Nkomo and may still be supporting his leadership. If, as is often claimed, the military is now dominant and if the military now has established its own leadership, it seems unlikely that the current political leadership will have an opportunity to play a very significant role, at least until (or if) it once again becomes possible to negotiate.

THE POSITIONS AND REACTIONS OF SURROUNDING STATES

The on-going Rhodesian conflict has had an impact upon both the economies and politics of most of the surrounding states and they in turn have become important players in the efforts to resolve the problem. The most active and affected of these states include Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa.

Zambia

Zambia has used diplomatic/economic and supported military means to resolve the situation in Rhodesia. Best known, perhaps, are its diplomatic and economic efforts to pressure Smith into accommodating some of the demands of the blacks. At great cost to itself, Zambia closed its border with Rhodesia in 1973 to all except Zaire-bound traffic. Subsequently, Kaunda, together with Vorster, was a key force in laying the groundwork for negotiations between the liberation movements and the Rhodesian Government in 1974. Zambia was also the major theatre of military operations of the external wing of ZANU from 1966 until 1975, and the northern front offensive was waged across its borders after 1972. The other groups also had offices in Zambia and carried out some of their limited operations there.

These two approaches began to conflict in 1975 when many of the Zambian-based ZANU members refused to recognize either unity under the ANC umbrella or the negotiations Kaunda had worked so hard to set up. After the Nhari Rebellion and Chitepo assassination Kaunda closed the northern front and rounded up the ZANU guerrillas, subsequently sending them to Mozambique. They have not been allowed to operate out of Zambia since that time. Kaunda also detained much of the ZANU military leadership and closed the ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI offices in Lusaka. The only liberation force which continued to be recognized was the ANC. However, after Muzorewa and Sithole threw Nkomo out of the party in the fall of 1975, Kaunda expelled them from their Statehouse offices to more remote quarters outside Lusaka.

Until the negotiations were terminated in March, 1976, Kaunda seemed to favor Nkomo. Experienced observers believe that this support probably derived not only from Kaunda's commitment to a negotiated settlement but also from his sense of comradeship with Nkomo, since they are both "old-line" moderates. Aaron Milner, an influential and close associate of Kaunda, has also backed Nkomo. Both Milner and most of ZAPU are members of the Ndebele tribe.

Kaunda has been criticized within Zambia for being both too radical and too conservative in his policy on southern Africa. There appear to be a number of people in the middle class who want to reopen the Rhodesian border for economic reasons. It is also rumored that South Africa has provided significant amounts of direct economic assistance to Zambia. Some limited aid was sent to the rural reconstruction camps and the February issue of "African Development" which contained an article about South African assistance to Zambia, was kept off the newsstands in Zambia. It does not appear that significant amounts of aid have been accepted although there are strong indications that the possibility was seriously discussed.

Opposition from those who believe Kaunda to be too conservative, i.e., the left, has not been particularly effective. This point of view was centered in the University where there were some student demonstrations relating primarily to support for the MPLA in Angola. Kaunda closed the University in February, 1976, and detained a number of lecturers and students who were suspected of attempting to radicalize the other students. The causes for this action appear to relate to both internal University politics and external political issues. The foreign lecturers were deported and the University has reopened.

After the negotiations broke down in March, Kaunda again pledged himself to support the armed struggle; the northern front was reopened in June, 1976. He is still keeping the ZANU/Karanga military leaders in detention. It would be difficult to release them since the Chitepo Report, which Zambia commissioned, specifically identified them as Chitepo's assassins. It is believed that Kaunda may also consider them too radical an element to have at large. Experienced observers have speculated that their continued detention might cause dissension between Zambia and the Third Force or with Machel and Nyerere, who evidently favor newer and more radical leadership.

Mozambique

During its struggle for independence from Portugal, FRELIMO cooperated with and assisted the Zimbabwe liberation forces and particularly ZANU. Since independence the Mozambique Government has continued to play a key role in the growing conflict, including the closure of its border with Rhodesia in March, 1976.

It appears that Machel was never as optimistic about the possibilities of a successful outcome to Rhodesian negotiations as was Kaunda, but he did agree to go along with the others. During the past year the guerrillas have concentrated even more in Mozambique and have continued to obtain FRELIMO assistance. Some observers assert that Machel currently favors the Third Force and military leaders over the political leadership. If true, this position would be consistent with Machel's leftist leanings and his own rise to leadership through the military. Machel and Tongogara were fellow students at military staff college in China.

Machel probably exerts a good deal of influence over the eighteen-man command of ZIPA. He has tried to keep the army isolated from the old party leadership which might promote dissension among them. Muzorewa and Sithole visited the camps in July of 1975 but they have not been there since. Reportedly Machel has restricted Muzorewa and Sithole to Maputo when they are in Mozambique. In early June, Muzorewa stated that he had been "let down" by Machel. Machel in turn announced that the front-line nations and the OAU would now support the Third Force directly because there was so much disunity among the political leadership. In response to Muzorewa's charges that he had been "let down" Machel asserted that no leader "worth his salt" needed permission to visit his own people.

Mozambique is becoming an increasingly important base of guerrilla operations. Nevertheless, Mozambique regards hot pursuit actions across its borders by the Rhodesian security forces as incursions upon its sovereignty. Smith has stated that direct FRELIMO troop involve-

ment in the conflict would elicit a Rhodesian declaration of war against Mozambique. Reportedly, Rhodesia has already bombed guerilla bases in Mozambique and Rhodesian troops have clashed directly with the Mozambique army.

Tanzania

Although Tanzania does not border on Rhodesia, President Nyerere has been one of the strongest proponents of the struggle against the Smith regime. The first external offices of the Zimbabwe liberation groups were established in Dar es Salaam and military training and transit camps have existed in southern Tanzania since UDI in 1965. Tanzania has also strongly enforced sanctions against Rhodesia. For example, travellers with Rhodesian stamps in their passports are allowed to enter Tanzania only under exceptional circumstances.

There is some evidence that Nyerere, like Machel, was skeptical about the possibility of real progress through negotiations and about South Africa's "détente" policy; nevertheless, he agreed to go along with negotiation attempts. He, like Kaunda, closed the offices of ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI and agreed to recognize only the ANC in the spring of 1975. Nyerere now appears to favor the Third Force but his views of the more radical Karanga leadership are not clear. Some observers contend that both he and Machel would prefer the leadership of Tongogara to that of Nkomo.

South Africa

South Africa has supported the Rhodesian Government both economically and politically for a variety of obvious reasons. On the other hand, the coup in Portugal and resultant independence for Angola and Mozambique caused Vorster to intensify his policy of "détente" with black Africa. The Rhodesian conflict is a major stumbling block for this policy. The South African Government has begun to pressure the whites in Rhodesia to become more accommodating to black demands. Hence, Vorster cooperated with Kaunda in initiating the series of talks in 1974 which paved the way for an attempt at negotiated settlement.

There seems to be general agreement among the informed public in South Africa that the Rhodesian whites have neglected numerous opportunities to ameliorate the situation in the past and that they should have started sharing power several years ago. Many South Africans view the appointment of four African chiefs to the Rhodesian cabinet as an important step, but one which came too late. They now believe that the blacks in Rhodesia will only settle for undiluted majority rule, and those who hold this view feel that South African intervention in Rhodesia would be unwise. Interestingly enough, this position has been taken by a number of representatives of the Afrikaaner press.

The South African Government is thought by experienced observers to be reluctantly prepared to accept a black government in Rhodesia, although it would vastly prefer a gradual transition by means of a qualified franchise over a period of years. The latter course is considered preferable because blacks are not thought to be prepared to run the country. A more rapid transition would probably be more acceptable to South Africa if the new government was led by a moderate like

Nkomo who is viewed as more reliable than the other leaders. The South African Government fears a black left-wing government because it might attempt to spread its ideology and commitment to majority rule to South African blacks. In contrast a peaceful transition to a moderate black government might assist South Africa in solving its own problems because it could alleviate some white fears and encourage black moderation.

South Africa withdrew its troops from Rhodesia eighteen months ago. Experienced observers believe that it is unlikely, after the recent Angolan experience, that they will be sent back unless Cuban and/or Russian troops actively join the guerrillas. It is considered possible, however, that the more conservative elements in South Africa could compel the government to become involved if there were massive guerilla incursions into Rhodesia or numerous white deaths.

On the other hand, it is considered highly unlikely that South Africa will close its border with Rhodesia. This would be unacceptable to those who believe strongly that South Africa should be supporting its Rhodesian "kith and kin." Pressure from the right has traditionally had more impact upon the Vorster government than pressure from the moderates or the left. Furthermore, most South Africans do not believe in the use of sanctions because that policy could too easily be turned against them.

Nevertheless, most observers believe that if South Africa has to choose between its own needs for transport facilities and those of Rhodesia, it will fulfill its own needs first. Informed opinion allows for the possibility of subtle pressure on Rhodesia but believes that it would have to be a carefully orchestrated policy in order to avoid enraging the right wing.

On balance, South Africa will probably continue to put pressure on Smith to accommodate and to promote negotiations with the hope that a moderate government will be the result.

PRESENT SITUATION AND PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE

The final breakdown of negotiations between Smith and Nkomo in March, 1976, left little basis upon which to resume them. Both parties rejected the British proposal for a two-year transition to majority rule; Nkomo because it was too long and Smith because it was too rapid. Some observers contend that the year-long negotiations were a charade to demonstrate to the world that negotiations were impossible. The four Presidents have now agreed that armed struggle is the only available tactic for the immediate future.

Even as both sides build up their forces, the leadership situation among liberation groups remains confused. Nkomo claims that he has significant support within Rhodesia. He probably continues to control the ANC/ZAPU party structure but most of his popular support is limited to the Bulawayo region and the predominantly Ndebele areas. However, the Shona group of tribes compose 4.5 million of the 6 million blacks in Rhodesia and they have traditionally resented the Ndebele.

The politically aware among them have tended to back ZANU. Muzorewa seems to retain the more generalized support of the less

politically aware which he acquired while organizing against the Constitutional proposals in the early 1970s. It is difficult to determine if this support has been alienated by his recent more radical stances and statements. Chikerema never had and still does not appear to have the support of more than a small splinter group. Finally, Sithole continues to try to reassert control over the old ZANU cadres but with diminishing success.

The consensus seems to be that the old leadership is losing its grip and no real solution will be possible without the concurrence of the Third Force or military. The relevant question then becomes—who leads the Third Force? Tongogara from prison? Mugabe, who is Secretary General of ZANU? Rex Nhongo in his own right and not as a front man for Tongogara? Soviet-trained Albert Mangena, who was recently identified by Newsweek as a key leadership figure? A figure as yet unnamed or unknown? Or is the leadership genuinely wielded by a group? At this juncture even the best informed observers simply do not know.

ZIPA is building up its forces and guerrilla activity. The strategy is said to be to train and to raid until the fall rainy season when ZIPA can launch a major offensive. Meanwhile, the tension is building within Rhodesia despite government claims that morale among both civilians and soldiers is high.

The recent guerrilla attacks on Beitbridge and the railways shocked the Rhodesian whites, since these areas were previously considered safe from guerrilla incursions. The Rhodesian Government subsequently called up the reserves, withdrew military exemptions, and increased taxes in order to double its annual defense budget to \$180 million. All of these measures have had a negative impact upon the economy.

All able bodied persons are now being called upon to contribute to the struggle. It has become necessary to protect the entire 800-mile long border and to provide heavy security guards for all trains and road traffic leaving Rhodesia. The protected village policy (similar to Vietnamese protected hamlets) along the borders is being more rigidly enforced. During May, 19 individuals apparently were shot on sight by security forces because they were found outside village boundaries recruiting mercenaries from other countries. Reportedly they recently recruited some 30 Americans and British in Iran. The mercenaries' passports and airfare are said to have been withheld until they finished training or their tour of duty. May, 1976 was supposedly the most violent month in the history of the conflict. Death estimates for both sides range between 104 and 141 in contrast to 26 in January. One source indicated that the kill ratio, once 12 to 1 in the Rhodesian Government's favor is now running at only 3 to 1.

These events have apparently led to some reevaluation of the situation among Rhodesians. The government continues to maintain that both whites and blacks are committed to the struggle on the economic and military fronts and will not give in to the "communist" guerrillas. But some white Rhodesians are apparently debating abolishing voter qualifications in order to stimulate new discussions with black nationalists and Smith has recently declared his willingness to contemplate bringing more blacks into the government. Former Prime Min-

ister Garfield Todd has recently been released from house arrest in what some observers consider an effort to placate white liberal opinion.

The leader of the opposition white Rhodesia Party, Timothy Gibbs, has called for the elimination of racial discrimination, a return to the common voting roll for whites and blacks and a qualified franchise. Another group, the National Pledge, has raised \$150,000 for a campaign to end racial discrimination.

Nevertheless, the "laager" or siege mentality reportedly remains strong, especially among those who have lived in Rhodesia for many years. The white emigration rate is about 1,000 per month but the inflow of Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique has largely compensated for the loss. The core population is likely to stick out the fight, if only because they cannot get their assets out or maintain the same standard of living elsewhere. It is particularly debatable, however, how long the new arrivals will want to remain.

Although the future outlook is too murky to predict, three possible scenarios in particular seem plausible. An increase of Rhodesian "hot pursuit" missions into Mozambique might evoke a stronger reaction from that country with or without outside assistance. The OAU has recently asked Mozambique for reports about Rhodesian border violations. Mozambique would probably first seek help from OAU countries, several of whom are considering the provision of assistance. Few parties favor a request for Cuban or Russian intervention at this stage although this is sometimes mentioned as a last resort. Even without outside help, an aggressive response from Mozambique might elicit the Rhodesian declaration of war against Mozambique that Smith has threatened.

A second possibility is an ongoing build-up of troops on both sides with an increase in guerrilla attacks and Rhodesian responses. This might continue until the fall rainy season when the physical conditions for guerrilla incursions will improve. At that point the liberation groups might plan to launch a major offensive, possibly with the support of troops from other African countries. Whether or not the Rhodesian security forces will be capable of effectively repelling them may depend as much upon the state of the economy as on the state of the army. If conditions become too difficult the South Africans might come to their aid, whereupon the black nationalists would probably also ask for additional outside assistance.

The third possibility is the resumption of negotiations. The black groups have stated that they will only negotiate if there is a prior agreement to a fairly rapid transition to majority rule. The white Rhodesians are unlikely to agree unless forced by economic pressure from further border closures, a large outflow of whites leading to significant economic decline, or some other measure which would convince the whites they were going to lose. A simple change in government leaders is unlikely to have this effect, since Smith would most likely be replaced by a more conservative figure.

In general, the consensus of informed opinion is that the longer it takes to resolve the Rhodesian conflict, the more violent will be the solution and the more radical the ensuing government. The Third Force seems to be assuming the authority once held by ANC political leadership. Many of the Karanga leaders of the old ZANU military

are still in Zambian prisons. If they are released, they may well become the new ZIPA leaders. They are unlikely to defer to the old political leaders when it becomes time to negotiate, because they have pledged themselves to change not only the skin color of the ruling group but the socio-economic system as well.

NAMIBIA (SOUTHWEST AFRICA)

At the conclusion of the Angolan civil war in early 1976 there was widespread speculation that military activity, possibly with Cuban involvement, would spill over into a concerted military effort to establish majority rule in Namibia. Instead, the primary focus for both attention and action became Rhodesia. Nevertheless, tensions are building in Namibia and even the South Africans have recognized that they must establish a shorter timetable for self rule. Pre-constitutional (Turnhalle) talks are underway but the participants do not include the major black political party, SWAPO, and the terms of reference of these talks are not acceptable to them. Experienced observers believe that if a peaceful settlement is not reached in Namibia by the time the Rhodesian conflict is concluded, the force of the armed struggle will be directed to that arena.

As a former German colony, Southwest Africa became a South African protectorate under the League of Nations after World War I. Shortly after the United Nations was created, it voted to rescind South Africa's authority over its former protectorate, and has since passed numerous resolutions calling upon South Africa to withdraw from the territory and return it to the United Nations for a transition to independence. The most recent of these, Security Council Resolution 385 adopted this year, includes a provision to explore the use of more forceful measures if South Africa has not withdrawn its troops by August 31, 1976. The United Nations has established a Commission on Namibia (the United Nations' name for Southwest Africa), which is headed by Sean MacBride, and will soon open a Namibia Institute in Lusaka to train future government leaders.

South Africa has never recognized U.N. authority over Namibia, and views itself as an administering not an occupational force, present in the territory at the invitation of the people. Most nations do not accept this position since the people's will is expressed by a minority white government.

Namibia is a large barren country located in the southwestern part of Africa, believed to have large natural resources including diamonds and uranium. The total population numbers less than 900,000, only 100,000 of whom are white. The white population is estimated to consist of 25,000 whites of German descent, 25,000 Afrikaners who immigrated from South Africa and 50,000 South African Civil Servants. Forty-six percent (400,000) of the population come from the Ovambo group located in the north and nine other black African and "coloured" groups make up the remainder. Racial discrimination and apartheid measures in Namibia are similar to those existing in South Africa. The local legislative assembly and the territory's representatives to the South African Parliament are white.

SWAPO

The Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) has been recognized by both the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the legitimate representative of the majority of the Namibian people. The OAU Liberation Committee has put SWAPO in its "first category" for maximum assistance and it is the only liberation movement to which the British provide direct assistance.

The South African Government long ago outlawed SWAPO. A number of its leaders are imprisoned on Robbins Island, and periodic round-ups, detainments and even torture of suspected SWAPO members apparently occur. Efforts to wipe out underground SWAPO bases were increased last year when South African troop strength geared up for the Angolan incursion.

The external branch of SWAPO has made Zambia its primary base for a number of years but Zambia seemingly is fearful it will have the same kind of problems with SWAPO that it recently experienced with ZANU. It consequently maintains rather tight control over the estimated 10,000 SWAPO members within its territory. The U.N. Namibia Commission and Institute for Namibia are located in Lusaka and a farm and school were established in the same area to accommodate the augmented flow of refugees during the mid-1970's. The farm has recently been closed and the school moved to Kayomo where "outsiders" are no longer welcome.

Most recently the Zambians have arrested and kept in "protective detention" approximately 20 SWAPO members, including Andras Shipanga, who is well known in diplomatic circles in Lusaka. The Zambians denied this detention for two weeks after it occurred. Some observers have claimed that there was an internal threat against the top SWAPO leadership, most notably against the President, Sam Nujoma, who is usually identified as a moderate and part of the "old boys" school. Some claim that a nascent revolt was developing among a group of young Turks who resented the old guard's lack of results during their many years outside Namibia. The old guard was also accused of misusing funds and material. Another interpretation is that Shipanga in particular was challenging Nujoma from the right through his western contacts. A third possibility is that Shipanga's group was interfering with Nujoma's attempts to negotiate with South Africa about possible SWAPO participation in the Turnhalle talks.

Either at the request of Nujoma or on its own initiative, the Zambian Government decided to arrest a small group and allow the majority of the leadership to continue organizing. There are also indications of splits between the internal and external wings of SWAPO.

SWAPO's present ideology is moderate relative to that of other liberation groups; its leadership has been largely western educated. Symbolically the party advocates free enterprise except for natural resources which it believes should be jointly owned by the private and public sectors. The current splits within SWAPO may reflect challenges to this position; a long struggle might result in a more radical ideology.

Until recently most guerrilla operations against Namibia were conducted over the Zambian border via the Caprivi strip. A major offensive was planned for 1975 but was subsequently shelved so as not to interfere with the Rhodesian negotiations. At that time it was estimated that SWAPO had about 1,000 trained troops divided into three groups. Those in Zambia were Russian trained, those in Tanzania had Chinese instructors, and a third group was operating in northern Namibia, where they facilitated the large refugee migration of 1974. More recently SWAPO's base of operations has shifted to the Angola border where it has a new source of Soviet supplies and MPLA support. There has been an increase in guerrilla attacks this year from Angola. Twenty South African soldiers were killed between January and April and several whites have recently been attacked near Windhoek.

WINDHOEK TURNHALLE TALKS

A major component of South Africa's policy of détente has been an attempt to find an acceptable solution to the Namibia problem. Since the South African presence is considered illegal by most international forums, outside intervention is possible and has been discussed by a number of groups. Most recently the Commonwealth Ministers in Jamaica denounced South Africa's role in Namibia and called for an accommodation with SWAPO. During the fall of 1974, the Southwest African Nationalist Party (white) first considered the possibility of conducting constitutional talks based on the premise that the people of Southwest Africa, not South Africa or the United Nations, should decide the future of this territory. Talks were subsequently convened in the fall of 1975. Although formally all options were considered open, the underlying intention was to work out a constitution and governmental structure consisting of a loose confederation of semi-autonomous ethnic areas similar to South Africa's homelands policy. In other words it was an attempt to get other ethnic groups to accommodate the ruling whites. The convention has no legal mandate to make its decisions binding.

Participation in the talks is based upon ethnic group representation. Eleven population groups originally sent 156 delegates. There was no limit on the number representing each group since decisions were to be reached by consensus. Part of the purpose of the exercise was to circumvent SWAPO, so no political party representation was allowed. Even the white opposition party could not send representatives since the territorial government's Executive Committee designated its National Party members as delegates. This has caused some contention, especially among the Germans a number of whom do not feel adequately represented and would prefer to negotiate with the blacks on their own. Black delegates represent tribal groupings and some claim that South Africa influenced the selection of conservative and often illiterate tribal chiefs.

The South Africans maintain that SWAPO is not eligible to participate in the talks because it is an illegal political party, not the representative of an ethnic group. SWAPO in turn refuses to take part in any talks organized along ethnic lines. It considers itself a political party which represents all the people of Namibia. It has further re-

fused to recognize any talks instigated by the occupying force because legally only the U.N. Namibia Commission has the authority to conduct negotiations leading to independence.

Although the SWAPO refuses to consider negotiating with South Africa along what it views as master-servant lines, it has set down a number of conditions under which it will talk. These include: (1) South African recognition of the independence and right to self-determination of the people of Namibia, (2) elimination of the idea of partitioning Namibia, (3) recognition of SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people, (4) release of all Namibian political prisoners, and (5) free repatriation of all Namibian exiles without fear of detention. South Africa has rejected these conditions but it is supposedly debating its categorical rejection of all SWAPO participation. Ideally it would like to split SWAPO and convince part of the group to participate in the talks on an ethnic representational basis.

Even though black delegate selection was supposedly carefully orchestrated by South Africa, some of the resolutions which have come out of the conference are in line with SWAPO goals. They included calls for the establishment of a multi-racial government by June 30, 1976, an end to ethnic politics, one man—one vote, the elimination of all racial segregation laws, and a three-fold increase in the minimum wage (to \$120 a month).

Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the leader of the Herero tribal delegation, presented a blueprint constitution which provides for a unitary state instead of a loose confederation of ethnic groups. Election to the legislature would be based on universal franchise and the two chambers would be divided on north-south lines with the intention of moving toward political rather than ethnic group representation. The current Southwest African legislature is thought to be unlikely to agree to such proposals. It is significant, however, that the whites are even willing to discuss these key issues with blacks.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

Namibia is an Achilles heel for South Africa; there is a growing belief within South Africa that it must eventually be turned over to the Namibians. Some South Africans believe that what happens in Namibia today may be a projection of what will occur in South Africa tomorrow and the accomplishment of peaceful change in Namibia could provide a challenge to South African whites to go through the same process. Indeed, the Namibian talks are sometimes viewed as a possible trial run for South Africa. If they are to play that role the talks must be successful, yet without the participation of SWAPO any system emerging from them is unlikely to be accepted by the Ovambo people who constitute the largest part of the population. As the primary black political party in Namibia, SWAPO has fairly widespread influence; while South Africans publicly reject SWAPO's power, their on-going attempts to get SWAPO to join the talks indicate a private recognition of SWAPO influence.

Although the Turnhalle talks were originally planned to take three years it is currently projected that they will reach a solution or break down at the end of one year in the autumn of 1976. On August 31, 1976,

the United Nations Security Council plans again to consider the Namibia question. South Africa is categorically opposed to a United Nations supervised or controlled election. SWAPO, on the other hand, claims it will recognize a plebiscite only if South Africa withdraws from Namibia. SWAPO further asserts that it will continue guerrilla operations should there be any new government which it views as a black puppet of South Africa, installed by elections which have not been controlled by the United Nations. In this case, informed observers believe that SWAPO would be likely to call for outside support as the MPLA did in Angola.

Meanwhile South Africa continues to organize for both an eventual augmented conflict or a transition to self-rule. Vorster has invited outside representatives, including the OAU, to go into Southwest Africa and meet with the "true leaders" (not SWAPO) of the people. There have been some recent breakdowns in petty apartheid as racial designation signs are taken down, a few hotels become multiracial, and the pass laws are revised.

Ethnic homelands are being established in Southwest as they are in South Africa proper. Local rule has been granted to the eastern Caprivi Strip and to the Republic of Basters, which is made up of 20,000 coloureds of mixed Dutch-African descent. At the same time, a one-kilometer wide no-man's-land has been established along the thousand-mile-long Angolan border to try to control SWAPO raids.

Informed observers believe that the immediate situation in Namibia is not as explosive as that in Rhodesia, and that the chances of a peaceful solution are better than in Rhodesia. But the time span in which this must be accomplished, if widespread violence is to be avoided, has been significantly shortened by other events in the region. The results of the Turnhalle talks, the United Nations deliberations and the internal dissensions within SWAPO will all help to determine the eventual outcome.

SOUTH AFRICA

The Republic of South Africa presents a much more complicated situation than Rhodesia. One person in five is white, compared to one in 23 in Rhodesia. Sixty percent of the white population is an Afrikaans-speaking, Dutch-descended group which settled Cape Province in South Africa at roughly the time the English colonists settled America. These people feel themselves to be African, and are recognized as such by many black African leaders.

The recent serious outbreak of rioting by urban Africans in Johannesburg and Pretoria demonstrates the enormous tensions in the social structure in South Africa, and how closely related the events in Rhodesia and Southwest Africa are to those in South Africa itself. The foreign policy thrust of the Vorster government has been to pursue a détente policy with moderate black African states to the North, while continuing to force the pace of separate development within South Africa. In essence, South Africa has been prepared to deal with black Africans outside South Africa in a manner quite unthinkable internally. This policy has suffered a number of severe blows: the collapse of the Smith-black nationalist talks at Victoria Falls in August, 1975, which were engineered by Vorster and Kaunda; the inter-

vention of South Africa in the Angolan civil war, which had the effect of confirming majority black African support for the MPLA; and now the recent urban rioting by blacks, an indication that the blacks do not accept Vorster's claim that separate development is a satisfactory solution to South Africa's racial problems.

Because South Africa is recognized as a key element in the solution of southern African problems, events in South Africa will have an important bearing on Rhodesia and Southwest Africa. The disturbances in the various African townships have directly challenged the South African Government at home for the first time in many years, and external pressure on South Africa may also increase sharply. A decline in foreign investment, such as occurred after the Sharpeville massacre, could have a most damaging effect on the South African economy—especially in conjunction with the drop in world gold prices.

Since the Nationalist Party, the party of the Afrikaners, came to power in 1948, the government has pursued a policy of racial separation and discrimination known as apartheid. Only whites have political power. The entire edifice of laws and regulations preserve white supremacy through job reservation for whites, residential and educational segregation, inferior black education, and a pass-law system that permits Africans to live in urban areas only if they work for whites. Political organization by blacks has been ruthlessly suppressed; even black trade unions are not permitted.

The Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and South Africa's growing isolation from the rest of the world forced the government to hasten its steps to implement separate development as a means of justifying its policies to the rest of the world and removing blacks not needed as laborers from white South Africa. The government determined to create Bantu homelands (Bantustans) to serve as the designated areas of the various African tribes of South Africa. Ten Bantustans have been established, varying in size and administrative development from the Transkei, the largest, least scattered, and prepared to become independent on October 26, 1976—to South Ndebele, a tiny fragment of land with no administrative organization. A map of the Bantustans in the Appendix makes clear the fragmented character of these units.

The Bantustans together comprise only 13 percent of the total land area of South Africa; the remaining 87 percent is to remain under white control. At present there are 113 separate fragments of land, to be consolidated at some future time to thirty-six. At that time KwaZulu, the homeland for the four million Zulus, will consist of ten separate fragments. Two separate states of five fragments will contain the 3,950,000 Xhosa speakers. Six fragments make up the Bantustan of Bophuthatswana for the 1,720,000 Tswanas. South Africa plans to give these ten Bantustans complete independence, although only the Transkei has been given a definite timetable for this transition.

The Bantustan policy is the intellectual creation of the Nationalist Party, on the theory that South Africa is a multinational country, not a multi-racial one. There has never been any referendum to determine whether Africans or even whites want Bantustans. Sharing political power with Africans is an anathema to Afrikaners. In their view,

separate development permits blacks to have their own political system apart from the whites, whose power over the remaining part of South Africa will be left unchallenged. In reality the Afrikaners see quite clearly that with their total population numbering just a bit over 2 million they cannot share political power with 20 million non-whites without quickly losing their hold on the government. Thus the Bantustan policy enables the Afrikaners to fragment the non-white groups and push them out into homelands where they cannot challenge white power. The anticipated end result is a residual South Africa in which the whites are in the majority.

Experienced observers in South Africa readily point out a number of what they consider to be fatal flaws in the policy of separate development. Even the enlightened (*verligte*) segment of Afrikaner intellectuals themselves admit some of these flaws and profess concern over whether the pace of change has overtaken separate development. However, officials of the South African Government show no sign of rethinking separate development, but instead are pushing ahead with its implementation.

The homelands policy has no provision for the 2.3 million coloured people of mixed race who live primarily in Cape Province, and the 700,000 Asians, who live largely in Natal. Both groups are highly urbanized, yet they have neither rights in the white towns nor hope of a traditional homeland. A commission of inquiry into the conditions of the coloured people, under the chairmanship of an Afrikaner woman sociologist, has just recommended widespread changes for the coloured population, but some of the most significant of these proposals were rejected by the Vorster government.

Second, and most serious, it is noted that the homelands policy does not deal with the situation of urban Africans—who live outside the homelands and comprise between one-half and two-thirds of the total population. These people will continue to have no rights or power in white South Africa. In theory urban Africans should belong to the homeland of their language group, even if they were not born in the homeland and have no ties there. Urban Africans now have no "right" to be in urban areas unless employed, and are sent back to their tribal areas if they lose their jobs. Under the homelands policy their situation would worsen because they would ultimately lose their South African citizenship, and become foreign migrant laborers in their own country. Thus it is not surprising that there is widespread hostility to the homelands policy among urban blacks.

The extent to which the government is prepared to force the Bantustan policy on an unwilling population is demonstrated by a recent government move that threatens serious friction between South Africa and the Transkei, which is on the verge of independence. The South African Government has announced that the 1.3 million Xhosa who live outside the Transkei will be considered Transkei citizens on October 26, the date of Transkei's independence. Chief Matanzima, Transkei's Prime Minister, has rejected this declaration and has stated that the Xhosa in South Africa are the responsibility of the South African Government.

The South African Government has gone further by announcing that black businessmen and professionals will be required to take home-

land citizenship as a condition for renewal of trading or professional licenses. Black leaders have reacted bitterly to this policy. The *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg's leading newspaper, labelled it "political black-mail" and wrote: "It is coercion of the most blatant kind, and is dangerous." In addition, the limited home ownership (really long-term leasehold) available for Africans in Soweto will be available only to those who have taken homeland citizenship.

The limbo in which urban Africans exist in South Africa is not recognized in the policy of separate development. This group is relatively more educated, more prosperous, and more aware of the outside world. The politically conscious among them argue that Vorster's *détente* policy is meaningless unless he comes to terms with blacks in South Africa. Many of them now feel that events in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia prove that their time has come and they are prepared to hold firm for one man, one vote, in South Africa instead of being bought off by political rights in independent Bantustans. Events in Soweto show that these feelings are at a flash point.

The third major flaw which observers point out with regard to the Bantustan policy concerns the fragmented and economically weak character of these entities. Former Prime Minister Verwoerd was opposed even to foreign investment or white settlement in the homelands, but this view was ultimately rejected as unrealistic.

Nevertheless, the Bantustans remain economic backwaters, and serve chiefly as pools of unskilled labor for white South Africa. Agriculture is the main economic activity of the homelands, with virtually no industry and very little mining. The most valuable mineral areas and much of the best farmlands have carefully been left in white South Africa. The Transkei must import as much corn as it produces. If this is indicative of other Bantustans, none is likely to be self-sufficient in food. Furthermore the Bantustans are virtually totally dependent on South Africa for transportation, electrical power, communications, health facilities and trained manpower. Since they comprise only 13 percent of South Africa's total land area, it is difficult to believe that the Bantustans can ever be more than economically helpless, mini-states completely dependent on the good will of the South African Government.

The independence of the Transkei on October 26 will present the rest of the world with the necessity of deciding whether to recognize its sovereign status. The overwhelming majority of African states have already announced their intention to refuse to recognize Transkei's independence. Africans regard it as a stepchild of apartheid and as a reactionary attempt to retribalize Africa.

The United States has stated that it intends to be guided by African countries on the issue of recognition. Since only a handful of African states at most are likely to recognize the Transkei, it seems unlikely that the United States will do so. Many urban black South Africans would regard it as a betrayal of their interests by the United States and in direct contradiction to the policies enunciated in Kissinger's Lusaka speech.

The possibilities for peaceful change are rapidly fading in South Africa, as they are in Rhodesia. The anger and frustration of urban Africans have exploded in the worst urban violence since the Na-

tionalists came to power. Many of the young Africans believe that violence is the only answer to their condition. The question now is whether the violence in Soweto will lead to a strengthening of the right wing of the Nationalist Party, or to a greater push for reform by other whites. The limited reforms of the recent past such as a partial lifting of segregation in sports, international hotels, and parks are apparently not enough to satisfy many blacks. The real issue is whether the whites will move toward meaningful sharing of economic and political power with the blacks. Available evidence leads one to conclude that whites are not prepared to make such concessions.

The outcome of the Rhodesian situation and the progress toward self-government in Namibia are vitally important for South Africa. The emergence of moderate governments in both countries could provide South Africa with border security and the maintenance of economic ties. Moreover, it could set the tone for similar developments in South Africa. If South African whites see that black governments in Rhodesia and Namibia continue to accept and protect whites it will help to allay fears about changes in South Africa.

The pressure for change on South Africa can only grow stronger and the timetable for meaningful action foreshortened. It is discouraging to find that South Africans are still obsessed with cosmetic changes instead of facing up to the fundamental change necessary to deal with non-white concerns.

PART III—THE ECONOMIES OF AFFECTED COUNTRIES

THE DISRUPTION OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRANSPORT NETWORK

A major legacy of colonial rule in south-central Africa is the close linkage between the economies of countries in this area. South Africa is the major economic power in the region, and has served as a powerful magnet, drawing African labor from countries to the north. Rhodesia, Zambia, and Malawi were joined together in the Central African Federation, a white-dominated union that lasted for ten years until 1963. The economies of the Portuguese colonies were closely tied to South Africa. Mozambique in particular served as the major channel for trade from Rhodesia, and the port of Laurencio Marques also served South Africa. The British-built and owned Benguela Railroad ran from the port of Lobito in Angola through Zaire to Zambia and provided a significant outlet for their copper exports. The mineral wealth of the heart of central Africa: Zambia, Zaire, and Rhodesia has made possible the development of a relatively sophisticated rail transport system.

Prior to Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, virtually all of Zambia's copper exports and a good deal of Zaire's copper were exported via Rhodesian railways to Mozambique ports. Zambia's imports came over the same routes. U.N. sanctions following UDI sharply cut Rhodesia's oil supply, but it was replaced by South Africa and Mozambique so the economy continued to function. Rhodesia subsequently shut off its oil supply to Zambia, forcing Zambia to turn north to Tanzania for oil. Thus began a major effort by Zambia to reorient its transport routes northward through Tanzania. Initially, an unpaved road (the Great North Road), carried Zambia's copper exports 1,000 miles to the port of Dar es Salaam and brought in the oil needed to run her economy. This proved disastrous during the rainy season, and Zambia urgently required all-weather transportation routes for both exports and imports.

After the World Bank rejected Zambia's and Tanzania's request for a loan to construct a railway line from Zambia to Dar es Salaam, the Chinese provided an interest-free loan of \$100 million for this purpose and built the railroad in record time. This line has just been completed but will not be fully operational until the rail bed has settled. Zambia and Tanzania also built an oil pipeline to the Copper Belt, and the U.S. provided assistance to pave the Great North Road.

The Rhodesian border closure in January, 1973, further disrupted Zambia's links with the outside world, and shut Zambia completely off from its export routes through Rhodesia and Mozambique. The Zambian-Rhodesian border has remained closed since that time, except for transit traffic to Zaire.

The final blow to Zambia's transportation routes was the Angolan civil war in 1975, which shut the Benguela Railroad. This railroad

carried about 50 percent of Zambia's export trade at the time. The line is still not open: several bridges remain down in Angola, trapping Zambian imports and rolling stock in the Lobito port area. These successive disruptions forced the diversion of Zambian cargo to Dar es Salaam and Mombasa, causing serious congestion and the hold-up of 70,000 tons of Zambian copper for several months. A 40 percent force majeure cut was imposed on copper exports.

Mozambique's decision to close its border with Rhodesia in March, 1976 was the final element of disruption in the once close transportation links in southern Africa. Mozambique's enforcement of sanctions leaves Rhodesia with access to the sea only through South Africa. Rhodesia has two railway lines running to South Africa; the old line runs through Botswana, and a new line through Beitbridge links Rhodesia directly to South Africa.

Botswana has thus far hesitated to sever its economic links with Rhodesia, and the U.N. has exempted Botswana from the application of sanctions against Rhodesia. However, the President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, has recently said that Botswana could comply with U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia if it were assured of technical and financial aid to keep its own trade routes operating. The railway running through Botswana is owned and administered by Rhodesia. Botswana has no rolling stock, locomotives, repair yards, or technical staff of its own. A Canadian survey has recently estimated that Botswana would need 130 technicians, 50 train crews, 300 wagons, and 10 diesel engines—at a cost of roughly \$88 million—to continue the rail operations if sanctions were imposed. South African cooperation would also be necessary because Botswana's 500,000 tons of vital imports and its 300,000 tons of beef, copper, and nickel exports must pass through South Africa.

Rhodesia, a landlocked country, is vulnerable to pressure from the surrounding countries, especially Mozambique and South Africa. Although Rhodesia officially estimated that only 30 percent of its traffic to the sea was affected by the Mozambique border closure, reporters estimate that the percentage is much closer to 60. In 1973 Mozambique ports handled 2.8 million tons of Rhodesian exports and imports. By 1975 this figure had dropped to 2.1 million tons, still leaving a significant tonnage to be diverted through South Africa's overburdened ports and railways. Rhodesia also lost 2,300 railway wagons, which were confiscated by Mozambique when sanctions were applied. This amounts to one-sixth of the Rhodesia Railway total rolling stock, which would cost about \$50 million to replace. Rhodesia's shortage of foreign exchange makes it virtually impossible to do so. In addition, Rhodesian imports will cost more and exports will be less competitive because export routes through South Africa are much longer than those through Mozambique.

Rhodesia has survived for more than ten years in the face of U.N. sanctions. During nine of those years, from 1965 to 1974, it averaged a real growth rate of 7 percent. A sharp reversal was set in motion by worldwide recession, oil price increases, and falling commodity prices. Industrial output fell 1.4 percent in 1975, and imports have been drastically reduced.

While Rhodesia can probably continue to survive economically for some time, the application of sanctions by Mozambique makes its position much more difficult. Rhodesia is now totally dependent on South Africa and its good will for the use of railroads and ports. Both are congested and South Africa may well find an additional two million tons of imports and exports burdensome. South Africa could well give first preference to her own commodities.

Rhodesia also faces a severe economic drain because of the increase in guerrilla activity. This has led to an increase in the defense budget and the call-up of virtually all able-bodied men to serve in the Rhodesian Army. This latter has had a significant disruptive effect on business within Rhodesia.

THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS OF RHODESIA'S NEIGHBORS: ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE, TANZANIA, AND ZAIRE

ZAMBIA

Until the closure of Mozambique's border in early March, Zambia was the African country that bore the heaviest brunt of sanctions against Rhodesia. Zambia's transport difficulties have been a major drain on the economy. With the closure of its transport routes through Rhodesia and Angola, Zambia's external links are through Tanzania and to a lesser degree through Malawi and Mozambique. Close to 87 percent of Zambia's copper exports travel out by rail or road through East Africa.

The remaining 13 percent goes through Malawi. The Chinese-built Tanzania-Zambia Railroad has been completed but is not yet fully bedded in. The maximum the line can handle at present is one train a day of about 20 wagons carrying 800 tons. This amounts to roughly 15,000 tons a month.

The paved road between the Zambian Copper-Belt and Tanzania, built with U.S. aid, permits road transport of copper exports, although it is an expensive alternative to the railway. Recently a fleet of 52 heavy trucks has begun operating on this route.

The heavily congested and inefficient port of Dar es Salaam is a major bottleneck, and roughly 7,000 tons of Zambian copper is estimated to be backlogged there. In addition, about another 7,000 tons of Zambian copper remains in the Angolan port of Loboito. The export route through Malawi requires transshipment to Malawi Railways. A direct road link between Zambia and Mozambique should be paved soon, since financing has been obtained. Even with these alternative routes, Zambia's transportation system is inadequate for its needs.

The reasons for Zambia's economic crisis are fairly apparent. Zambia is a one-commodity economy. Copper provides over 90 percent of its foreign exchange and in normal times, 50 percent of its government revenue. Copper will provide no revenues for the government in 1976. In a one year period, copper prices have fallen by two-thirds, from \$1.50/lb. in 1974, to \$0.55/lb. in 1975. Foreign exchange earnings from copper fell from \$1,320 million in 1974, to \$729 million in 1975. The closure of the Benguela Railroad led to a 6 percent decline in the volume of exports for Zambia in 1975. The real gross domestic product

during 1975 declined by 3 percent to \$1,389 million. If the deteriorating terms of trade are included, the effective decline is estimated at 24.6 percent.

Zambia experienced its first trade deficit since independence during 1975 when the official balance of payments short fall was estimated at \$388 million. However, the real balance of payments deficit for 1975 amounted to about \$640 million because Zambia accumulated \$250 million arrearages in the payment of imports. These are computed as capital inflows.

The Zambian Government introduced a restrictive budget in January, 1976, which contained a wide range of new measures including increases in personal taxes, customs and excise taxes, sales and gasoline taxes. Also a compulsory saving scheme was announced. The budget contained a 36 percent cutback in capital expenditure and an attempt to reduce current expenditure by over \$86 million.

The mining companies are also faced with serious cash-flow problems because of their difficulties in getting imports and exporting copper. In 1975, the two major mining companies were forced to borrow about \$250 million in the Euro-dollar market in order to maintain normal operations. The Minister of Finance estimates that their borrowing requirements for 1976 will range from \$380 million to \$570 million, depending largely on the extent of the transport problems. The improvement in the price of copper to about \$0.72/lb. has now made it possible for the mining industry to operate at above the break-even point. It is unlikely in the near term, however, to generate the foreign exchange earnings necessary to ease the balance of payments situation.

The increased costs of imports also have had a serious impact on the balance of payments. For example, the bill for imported petroleum is likely to rise from \$89 million in 1975 to about \$125 million in 1976.

The Ministry of Finance estimates that it will need \$156 million to cover a major part of its unpaid 1975 import bills. Even after various measures have been adopted to tighten control over the balance of payments, the deficit for 1976 will be about \$319 million. Further, this is probably an optimistic prediction since it is based on the assumption that Zambia will be able to reduce its imports from a level of \$950 million in 1975 to \$700 million in 1976.

Zambia has drawn about 76 million SDRs (roughly \$87.4) from the IMF from the three categories of standby facility, compensatory financing facility, and oil facility. One tranche is only worth about \$14 million to Zambia. Zambia has requested IMF balance of payments support to cover its projected external financing needs in 1976. Discussions with the IMF are now in progress but full assistance would probably amount to only \$90 million. Even this amount may be contingent upon Zambia's devaluation of its currency.

The World Bank is considering a program loan of about \$25 million and the EEC has agreed to make available to Zambia loans and grants totalling \$81 million over a period of four years. Bilateral assistance from Western European governments may reach another \$40 million. After taking all these forms of assistance into account Zambia will still require close to \$400 million from other sources during 1976.

Sir Robert Jackson, Coordinator of the United Nations assistance to Zambia, has estimated that the costs to Zambia of closing the border with Rhodesia will total \$330 million at the end of 1975. Zambia has so far received only \$63 million in aid from a small number of United Nations member countries.

Agriculture has also not fared well since independence in 1964. Production of tobacco, once a significant export crop, has declined in absolute terms. About \$70 million is spent yearly on imported food. Only about 90,000 head of cattle are produced annually, and in one recent three-month period in 1975, the nation had to fly in 60,000 tons of beef from Botswana. These imports have now ceased but Zambia is not yet self-sufficient. The government is attempting to establish state cattle ranches, but so far these have not been very successful. The staple food is corn; Zambia now seems to be attaining self-sufficiency in this area at least. Marketed production of milk has actually fallen, and imports of milk were necessary in 1975. Zambia requires imports of both butter and cheese. A major source of difficulty for the agricultural sector in Zambia has been the very large gap between urban and rural wages. Copper miners were well organized and paid, and their high salaries have tended to push up salaries throughout the urban economy in Zambia. There has consequently been a major rush to the cities, and Zambia is today probably the most urbanized country in Black Africa. Previously government subsidies have held down the prices of staple agricultural products, but the recent necessity for government belt-tightening has meant the end of these subsidies. In February, the price of corn meal jumped 110 percent as a result of the removal of government subsidies. The inability of the government to develop agriculture has been one of Zambia's most serious failures.

One effort to solve the rural-urban gap was a World Bank proposal of intensive development zones that could become growth poles in the rural areas. These were designed to provide a package of services to the farmers. The cost of this program to the Zambian Government and the tight budget situation has caused its adoption to be postponed.

In short, Zambia has many of the typical problems of a single-commodity developing country. A high copper price led both the Zambians and the outside world into thinking that Zambia had a higher level of prosperity than actually existed. The Zambians had elaborate plans for the development of their economy, on which they spent a great deal of money, often without satisfactory results. Frequent changes of government personnel and lack of trained manpower have hampered Zambia's ability to implement its plans. Zambia has been unable to overcome the gross imbalance between the urban areas, especially the prosperous mining sector along the railroad line, and the rural communities which are much poorer. There has been little progress in moving their economy away from dependence on one commodity. In fact, Zambia's relative prosperity from copper has probably prevented them from taking the necessary steps to diversify their economy or develop agriculture as Malawi has done.

Zambia was simply unprepared for the very large drop in copper prices, and was without a cushion and had to restrict its development plans. Its hopes for bringing its rural and urban sectors into greater harmony have receded further into the future. Zambians are partially responsible for this impasse but clearly the fault is not exclusively theirs. Foreign assistance would be important to Zambia to compensate in some small way for the disruption of development plans caused by the Rhodesian crisis, and the continuing need for trained manpower and sound economic advice. Zambia's mineral wealth ought to provide the basis for long-term prosperity, with aid providing a bridge over the present difficult period.

Aid for Zambia

Zambian officials projected a series of short-term needs totalling slightly over \$60 million. These include fertilizer requirements for 1976 and early 1977 of \$25 million, mining and earthmoving equipment of \$2.5 million, fisheries refrigeration equipment of \$5 million, water supply equipment of \$13.5 million, and spare parts and unspecified services of \$10 million.

Zambian officials thought that three commodities could be financed under Public Law 480: wheat, edible oils, and stock feeds. They provided figures for total annual consumption, without specifying how much they hoped to receive from Public Law 480. Neither the Zambian officials nor U.S. Embassy officials had detailed knowledge of the operations of Public Law 480. AID sent an expert to clarify the situation in May. Other possible U.S. programs in which the Zambians expressed interest were an AID Housing Guaranty program (\$15 million) and Ex-Im credits.

Zambian officials also discussed a number of long-term requirements. These include \$20 million for a hydro-electric scheme for rural electrification and rural power transmission, and a dairy development scheme for which the Dutch Government is conducting a feasibility study. Both these projects would need a great deal of forward planning before U.S. aid could be committed.

The United States has not previously had a bilateral aid program in Zambia. The establishment of a formal AID mission will probably not be necessary if U.S. aid is limited to short-term BOP assistance and P.L. 480. Although Zambia's most urgent short-term need is for BOP assistance, there are genuine limits on the amount of overall assistance that can be used wisely. Zambia still lacks adequate trained manpower, and this shows up in poor planning and implementation.

The Zambians are extremely sensitive to outside criticism and what they regard as interference in the management of their country. In these circumstances informed observers believe that it would be best for U.S. assistance to begin cautiously so that expectations will not be so great that neither side can meet them. If an aid relationship begins to develop, there are narrowly focused programs in food production, health, and manpower training that can make substantial contributions in areas of Zambian weakness without costing enormous sums of money. Zambia's political philosophy of humanism provides the right environment for the implementation of "New Directions" AID programs, if basic structural and managerial problems are recognized and treated seriously.

MOZAMBIQUE

The Cost of Applying Sanctions Against Rhodesia

The People's Republic of Mozambique became independent on June 25, 1975, after a 10-year struggle was waged by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), whose leader is the current President, Samora Machel.

Mozambique was a Portuguese colony for 500 years, but there was little development of the interior until the last 50 years. Mozambique, like Zambia, has a dual economy: a large subsistence agricultural economy, which is extremely poor, and a relatively sophisticated modern sector, developed mainly to service the transport needs of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Zambia.

Mozambique was a highly dependent colonial economy. It was an important source of imports into Portugal. Plantations were required to sell all or part of their output to Portugal at prices determined there. It was a major market for Portuguese exports. A highly protective tariff and foreign exchange system provided preferential entry for Portuguese exports at prices which would have been impossible under a free market system. These colonial arrangements help to account for a degree of dependence on Rhodesian rail traffic which proximity alone would not necessarily have produced.

The U.N. economic team that visited Mozambique in April, 1976, to determine the impact on the Mozambique economy of applying sanctions against Rhodesia stressed the patterns of colonial dependence.

"The developmental objectives prior to independence had important implications for the structure of the economy of Mozambique. The bulk of the investment was in ports and railways designed to facilitate the transit trade and provide the means to carry on the trade with Portugal. The financial system was integrated into foreign monetary systems, especially the escudo, and rand areas. A high proportion of capital formation was directed toward creating larger, more modern urban centers at the ports, and to developing a high level of services in these centers. A high level of activity was involved in servicing international trade—banking, insurance, forwarding, clearing. Essential services, such as health, education, and recreational facilities, were concentrated in the urban centers and were designed to cater to the demands of expatriates, settlers, and tourists. The road system that evolved was designed to serve the urban centers and to stimulate tourism.

Very few investments were directed toward expanding agricultural production in the subsistence sector, or to introducing cash crops into this sector. Most of the investments in agriculture were directed toward large production units in the hands of settlers or to plantations of such crops as sugar, rice, and cotton to provide staples for export to Portugal.

This kind of economic and social structure was very vulnerable to external influences. There was a very small internal economic system as only a small part of consumption was produced within Mozambique. Very little in the way of social

services was provided to the population at large. The major external linkages were either with Portugal or with the more developed sectors of neighboring countries. The structure of the economy made exploitation easier through under invoicing and transfer pricing, and made it extremely easy to frustrate foreign exchange controls. Heavy demands were made on professional skilled and semi-skilled personnel which the local educational system was not designed to produce. This meant that most of the modern sector within Mozambique depended on expatriates. There was a degree of vulnerability arising from the expectations by expatriates and settlers that Mozambique would continue to remain an overseas province of Portugal. When it became clear that independence was likely, and towards the end, imminent, the exodus of professionals, skilled and semi-skilled personnel was therefore greater than would have been the case if the transition to independence had been contemplated. It is in this context that one must examine the effect on the Mozambique economy of applying sanctions to Rhodesia, and closing its border to Rhodesian traffic."

The report of the U.N. economic mission provides the only detailed account of the losses that Mozambique has experienced as a result of applying sanctions. The mission estimated that the direct cost to Mozambique of applying sanctions will be between \$139 and \$165 million for the first year, and between \$108 and \$134 million the following year. For years thereafter, the costs are likely to be in the region of \$106 to \$132 million annually.

Prior to 1965, roughly two-thirds of the tonnage handled in the port of Beira and about one-fifth of the tonnage handled in the port of Maputo consisted of traffic to and from Rhodesia, including transit traffic through Rhodesia. In recent years this proportion has dropped to about one-half for Beira and one-seventh for Maputo. However, much of the traffic from Rhodesia was bulk traffic for which revenue charges and port charges were higher. It is estimated that about half the revenue for Mozambique ports and railroads was derived from Rhodesian traffic, although it accounted for less than one-fourth of the total tonnage.

The Mozambique Railway system in the North and the South was joined only through Rhodesia. Therefore the closing of the border with Rhodesia has also cut the traffic links between the southern and northern systems.

The U.N. report estimated that the reduction in foreign exchange earnings from the railway and ports of Mozambique as a result of the application of sanctions would be between \$57 and \$74 million. An additional \$5 to \$10 million is lost from the services that were provided for the transit trade such as clearing, forwarding, bonding and insurance.

Tourism accounts for a second category of revenue which has recently been lost. More than 50,000 tourists have annually visited Mozambique from Rhodesia. It is estimated that the yearly revenue loss

from the decrease in tourist trade will be between \$4.5 million and \$5.5 million. Losses from airport taxes, landing fees, and other airline operations by Rhodesian aircraft in Mozambique add up to another million dollars.

Remittances from Mozambique migrant workers in Rhodesia have also ceased. Mozambique, in common with a number of other black African countries neighboring South Africa and Rhodesia, traditionally provided a large pool of unskilled and cheap manpower. Remittances by Mozambique workers in South Africa are still an important source of foreign exchange for the Mozambique Government, as were the remittances to the roughly 80,000 Mozambique workers in Rhodesia. Many of these people are working in the mines although some are in industry and agriculture. The U.N. report calculated the foreign exchange earnings from workers employed in Rhodesia amounted to \$22-25 million a year.

Finally, there are certain costs associated with exports to Rhodesia and imports from Rhodesia that will no longer be available. Exports to Rhodesia in 1975 were approximately \$5 million and the imports from Rhodesia amounted to about \$20 million. Certain products previously exported to Rhodesia—such as copper concentrates, asbestos, and bauxite will be difficult to transport and sell in other markets, and other products which have been traditionally supplied by Rhodesia such as corn, iron, tobacco, gypsum, fertilizer, paper and chemicals—will be more expensive from other sources. The total cost of these changes is likely to amount to some \$10 million.

In aggregate terms the ongoing annual cost of applying sanctions against Rhodesia will be in the region of \$108 to \$134 million.

	Millions
Losses on transport and services.....	\$63-\$85
Losses on tourism.....	4.5-5.5
Losses on remittances.....	22- 25
Increase in the trade deficit.....	16

A second category of costs attributable to the application of sanctions relates to additional projects that Mozambique needs for services that were previously supplied from Rhodesia. A major example of such a project is the telecommunication link within Mozambique and with the outside world. Previously many telecommunications connections were routed through Salisbury and the troposphere station which provides the telecommunications link between Maputo and most of the rest of the country is situated right on the Rhodesian border. Therefore an alternative system will have to be provided if Mozambique is to be protected from Rhodesian border incursions against the station. In the same way, Salisbury airport is no longer available as an alternative to Beira; an alternative airport will have to be provided if international flights are to be continued to Beira.

It will also be necessary to construct an alternate transport link between the northern and southern railway systems, probably a road link with freight terminals at each end. Finally, it is necessary to devote some resources to establishing reception centers for Mozambiquean workers from Rhodesia returning to be resettled. It is estimated that almost \$3 million will be required for food for these reception centers. The total cost of these additional projects is estimated by the U.N. at \$31 million.

Other costs relate the need for additional supplies in Mozambique, since previously Rhodesia provided emergency requirements, such as spare parts, food, medicines and small items of machinery and equipment. Additional food production as a cost of \$6 million will be needed to replace emergency supplies from Rhodesia.

The U.N. mission also calculated the indirect cost of applying sanctions. More than 10,000 people, 5,000 of whom were railway employees, will lose their jobs as a result of sanctions unless new developments are undertaken. The cost of supplying employment for this redundant labor force has been included in the U.N. estimates of emergency financial assistance. However, there will be additional capital costs for providing alternate employment in various development projects. There are costs and resulting delays in planning associated with an already overburdened administration. As the U.N. mission points out, the sooner major development activities are undertaken, the shorter will be the period for which emergency financial assistance will be necessary.

Mozambique Economy

Mozambique's economy has experienced substantial disruption since independence in 1975. The U.N. mission estimated that the gross domestic product is between \$180 and \$200 per person. At the same time it is also estimated that annual income in the rural areas in 1972 was about \$50 per capita. Agricultural production fell some 50 percent in the commercial sector between 1974 and 1975. Activity in the transport sector fell about 30 percent between the same years, and in the manufacturing sector by about the same amount. Construction activity dropped off by at least half. Thus it is estimated that there is a decline in GNP of roughly 30 percent in 1975, after a fall of similar magnitude in 1974.

Relatively little of this fall affected the rural subsistence sector. It is the urban, primarily expatriate group which has been severely affected, many of whose members have left the country since the middle of 1974.

The U.N. mission estimated that the trade deficit for 1976 will be roughly \$275 million, which does not include the import component of emergency and developmental projects necessary to overcome the effects of applying sanctions. Mozambique has benefited from a system of forced savings by Mozambiquean workers in the South African mines, which was introduced by the Portuguese several decades ago. After the first three months of the worker's contract, 60 percent of his wages are withheld, and an equivalent amount of gold at the official price of \$42 per oz. is transferred by the South African Government to Mozambique's account. The Mozambique Government reimburses the worker in escudos at the official exchange rate upon his return to Mozambique. However, the value of this gold to Mozambique as a foreign exchange asset valued at the world market price of gold is more than three times the official rate at which the gold was received. This may have added some \$80 to \$90 million to Mozambique's foreign exchange reserves during 1975. Remittances from miners have decreased since independence, and this trend will continue as Mozambique no longer issues passports for work in South Africa.

Even if this arrangement were to continue as it is now, the deficit would still be between \$175 and \$200 million. The U.N. mission con-

cluded that the balance of payments deficit in 1977 will be roughly the same as 1976. Mozambique will therefore require a substantial amount of financial assistance to meet its balance of payments deficit of the next two years. Some of this deficit could be met by the import of essential materials covered by grants. General balance of payments support is clearly required. The U.N. has compiled a list of specific commodities needed. Aid could be provided to fund specific import requirements to ensure that there are no transfers to the Zimbabwe Liberation Army.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has had an office in Maputo since January, 1975. UNDP started emergency programs in four priority fields: health, agriculture, housing, and water supply.

According to experts one of the most serious problems of the Mozambique Government is the shortage of trained manpower. This prevents detailed project planning and results in a long lead time in the development and approval of projects.

Experienced observers state that other difficulties in dealing with the Mozambique Government included the centralization and slowness of decisionmaking, the lack of experience in dealing with international aid, the lack of organization which extends even to the most simple administrative tasks, and reluctance to accept foreign advisors. Mozambique needs some 650 technicians urgently. Observers hope that as the government gains confidence it will become more receptive to foreign advisors and more sure of its own decisions.

Mozambique has not yet joined the World Bank and the IMF, but there are indications that it intends to do so. However, it has not yet made a formal application.

The FRELIMO Government is much more ideologically oriented than most in Africa. It is Marxist in orientation, and the controlled press has an anti-Western bias. Political ideology sets the framework in which economic decisions are taken. It is likely that political decisions on nationalization were made by FRELIMO before independence and implemented afterwards.

While reports of economic disruption are widespread, there is no evidence of corruption in government at this point. As an example, food distribution last year during the floods was handled quite well, and with no evident signs of corruption. On the other hand, there continue to be food shortages with long queues in Maputo.

Government nationalization has extended to private property, but businesses as such have not been actually nationalized. Legal and medical services on the other hand have also been nationalized. There is a drastic shortage of doctors.

The banking sector has not been nationalized, but two large banks in which the Portuguese Government has interests prior to independence were taken over by the Mozambique Government. Some private banks are still operating. However, the nationalization of property has caused the mortgage investments of the bank to lose their value, and therefore the banks themselves are in a nonviable position.

South Africa continues to play a significant role in the Mozambique economy, especially in the ports and railways. South African Airways, a government owned corporation, has offered to provide daily air

service between Johannesburg and Maputo so that technicians and officials from South Africa can commute to Maputo. The South African Government is urging business cooperation so that the Mozambique economy can be kept going.

Maputo is still an important port for South Africa, but some businesses are reportedly reluctant to use the port because of the unreliability of the labor force and costly delays. Firms find it more difficult to get insurance coverage and fewer Western ships are calling. Both Mozambique and South Africa are pragmatic enough to recognize that they need each other despite the gulf between their political philosophies.

There are some hopeful signs in Mozambique's relations with the United States. Chrome destined for the United States in Beira at the time sanctions were applied was ultimately released for the United States. President Machel also has seemed somewhat interested in the possibility of foreign investment in Mozambique, although his government has yet to decide what its policy will be with respect to foreign investment.

At this point sources indicate that foreign investment has not been ruled out completely. One U.S. missionary, The Reverend Armand Doll, is still being held by Mozambique. The United States maintains a low profile embassy with a small and energetic staff.

Aid for Mozambique

A number of countries have provided or have promised to provide aid to Mozambique since independence. A short account of this assistance may be useful. China reached an agreement with Mozambique in July, 1975, to provide an interest-free loan equivalent to \$56 million, to be repaid over 20 years starting in 1990. East Germany has agreed to provide technical personnel and training in sectors such as agriculture, health, transport, industry, and education. The Netherlands signed an agreement in October, 1975, for a grant of \$10 million. In October, 1975, a general agreement of cooperation between Mozambique and Portugal was signed. This agreement provided for the employment of Portuguese technicians and public servants, but many of these civil servants have terminated their contracts a year early. There has been a substantial deterioration in relations between the two governments since February, 1976.

Sweden has committed \$12.5 million for fiscal year 1976. For fiscal year 1977, the Swedish Government has committed \$18.5 million. Denmark has provided grant assistance for 1975-77, totalling \$4.8 million. The Danes have also provided an interest-free loan of \$5.3 million for the purchase of Danish equipment and services during 1975-77. Norway has committed \$4 million for grant assistance in 1975-76. Finland has committed approximately \$1 million for 1976. The Soviet Union has signed an agreement of cooperation, but the details have not been published. Arab oil-producing countries have provided \$1 million in emergency funds, and general agreements on cooperation with Zambia and Tanzania have been signed.

Assistance specifically related to the application of sanctions against Rhodesia has come from the United Kingdom, which has pledged about \$12 million in soft loans and has pledged an additional \$24 mil-

lion, the details of which are to be worked out shortly. The Secretary General of the Commonwealth has visited Mozambique and possibilities of a Joint Commonwealth contribution and technical assistance are under study. The European Community has sent a mission to Maputo but the outcome has not yet been announced.

Secretary Kissinger in his Lusaka speech mentioned a U.S. contribution of \$12.5 million in assistance to Mozambique. This figure was originally based on an initial estimate of \$57 million by the Mozambique Government as the cost of applying sanctions. Of this amount \$12.5 million would have been about one-fourth. The \$12.5 million could come from the \$30 million allocated to former Portuguese colonies which was authorized and appropriated by Congress this year.

Secretary Kissinger addressed the issue of refugees in the area. It is estimated that there are approximately 17,000 refugees from Rhodesia in camps in Mozambique. The U.N. resettlement scheme for these refugees budgeted \$7.2 million. The initial subscription to this fund was \$5 million, of which the United States provided \$1 million. An additional \$2 million is needed for this effort.

A portion of U.S. assistance might be considered in the form of food: milk, corn, or wheat. The Mozambique Government had not indicated in May how the aid could best be channeled. Considering that the UNDP is operational in Mozambique and has facilities for monitoring the program, some experts believe that it would be sensible to channel aid through a U.N. special account to be monitored by UNDP. Because of the lack of administrative experience by the Mozambique Government, it would seem advisable that any aid be supplied in a form least subject to bureaucratic tangles. A more conventional aid agreement is not very feasible at this time because of the still cautious relations between the United States and Mozambique, the difficulty of administering an aid program in Mozambique, and the lack of trained personnel in Mozambique to deal with a bilateral aid program.

Like Zambia, Mozambique's absorptive capacity is sharply limited, and carefully tailored, specific programs that do not require significant local administrative inputs can provide considerable impact at low cost. Any substantial aid program is not thought likely until the course of Mozambique-United States relations is clearer and the major existing irritant to relations, the imprisonment of the Reverend Doll, is dealt with.

TANZANIA

Tanzania is not contiguous to the states directly involved in the southern African conflict, and has been relatively little affected by sanctions against Rhodesia. The major indirect effects have resulted from its role as a conduit for Zambian imports and exports.

Aid to Tanzania has thus far been justified on the basis that Tanzania ranks as one of the 25 least developed countries and meets quite easily the criteria of "New Directions"—for its own political and social philosophy. More recently this aid has an additional function: to complement the political relationship developed as a result of Secretary Kissinger's visit. The United States has agreed to work with and through the four African Presidents involved in southern Africa.

Nevertheless there are signs of uncertainty in the future of our aid program in Tanzania.

Political differences between the United States and Tanzania came to a head over Tanzania's role and vote in the U.N. on the resolution declaring Zionism to be a form of racism. Shortly thereafter the State Department set up an Office of Multilateral Affairs, whose function was to make visible our displeasure with countries such as Tanzania who voted against us. One method was to suspend or cut down on aid to those countries, the so-called Zap List. Thus in the case of Tanzania, the Public Law 480 Title I request was left pending from last August until a few weeks ago, when a Title I agreement for 40,000 tons of maize was signed. Also State has placed a ceiling on grant aid to Tanzania of \$4,450,000 for agricultural programs.

It is understood that it took the Secretary's visit to Tanzania to change U.S. policy. At the same time, another set of events have overtaken the "Zap List" as a threat to U.S. aid to Tanzania. The most serious of these problems are outstanding expropriation cases and payment to Nello Teer, the AID contractor on the road to Zambia.

Tanzania and Nello Teer went to arbitration about cost overruns and agreed on a settlement of \$4 million. Tanzania admits her liability but lacks sufficient foreign exchange to pay Nello Teer. AID was prepared to offer Tanzania a loan of \$4 million so that Tanzania could settle with Nello Teer, but questions have been raised in Congress about the terms of the loan. Under Section 620(c) failure to pay for goods and services could hold up new loans for Tanzania.¹

Perhaps even more serious in the long run are several outstanding expropriations cases which amount to a few hundred thousand dollars. Tanzania has promised compensation; but its offer in one case, a coffee farm, has been rejected as too low. The Tanzanian Government could probably settle the U.S. expropriation cases without great strain, but observers indicate that it is worried about the precedent that would be set for the larger expropriations to British owned property. Tanzanian officials seem to be aware of the potential seriousness of this problem. A number of U.S. Government officials favor taking a tough line with Tanzania, and are looking for other issues to hold up U.S. aid.

The lack of clear standards for "adequate and effective" compensation permits considerable scope for leniency or toughness depending on subjective evaluations of the country in question. It would be useful to study the question of expropriation and determine what standards are being or should be applied. Such a study might develop workable standards to ensure the proper application of the expropriation barrier to foreign assistance.

The largest capital expenditure related to the southern African situation has been the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. Another area of capital expenditure has been the Dar es Salaam harbor, long congested and a major bottleneck for imports and exports. This situation is somewhat improved now, but has been a nagging problem for the last ten years.

In the last few years and largely to deal with the drought, AID has increased assistance to Tanzania until it has now grown to be one of

¹ The issue with Nello Teer has been settled since this report was written.

the larger U.S. programs in Africa. However, the U.S. program is still smaller than those of several other donors, including those of the World Bank and the Scandinavian countries.

U.S. assistance to Tanzania is concentrated in food production, health and population planning. The Great North Road has been paved with U.S. assistance. There are one or two Americans on contract to AID assisting in the ports. Otherwise, U.S. assistance is not linked to the southern African situation. Nor do the Tanzanians want it linked. Aid is treated as a separate subject to be handled quite apart from southern African issues. None of the money in the Security Supporting Assistance authorization for southern Africa is projected for Tanzania, although it is possible that some portion could be used for transport problems connected with Zambia, Mozambique, or Zaire, refugees from southern Africa, or training or health programs among refugees in Tanzania.

Tanzania's Economy

The Tanzanian economy has suffered a number of setbacks in recent years. Drought in 1973-74 required substantial food imports. Tanzania has been hit hard by falling prices for the commodities it exports, such as cotton and sisal, while world inflation and sharp oil price hikes have increased the cost of imports. The necessity to import food has a devastating impact on the balance of payments. Tanzania imported over 900,000 tons of grain valued at \$240 million between January, 1974, and September, 1975. This virtually depleted Tanzania's foreign exchange reserves, leaving it with an average of three weeks import payments in 1975. A large portion of these imports were commercial grain purchases from the United States.

To meet this economic deterioration Tanzania has severely restricted imports—a fact which is clearly reflected in the paucity of goods in Dar es Salaam shops—and has tightened foreign exchange controls. Its reliance on foreign assistance to finance its capital budget is steadily increasing. In 1975, Tanzania was forced to postpone its third Five Year Plan because of the large resource gap. The Plan is now supposed to be initiated in July, 1976. The Tanzanian Government projects that half the resources needed for fulfillment of the Plan will have to come from foreign sources. It is questionable whether Tanzania can generate the other half from domestic resources.

Tanzania has its own version of African socialism, guided by the philosophy of President Nyerere. The core of its development strategy is the idea of Ujamaa villages, a system of rural socialism based on cooperative sharing of communal property with a basic level of inputs and services provided by the government. Originally the government stated that settlement in Ujamaa villages was purely voluntary. Recent government dissatisfaction with the slow pace of settlement has led to forced removal of peasants to the villages. Some observers have felt that the Ujamaa settlement program has had an adverse impact on food production. This is difficult to verify, but it is clear that the government can no longer afford to spend as much on social services for Ujamaa villages as it has in the recent past. The government clearly recognizes the need to increase food production and is initiating programs accordingly.

Zaire has been less directly affected by the Rhodesian conflict in either economic or political terms than the other countries considered in this report. It is, however, facing an economic crisis of major proportions which has been exacerbated by the Angolan civil war and could be made even worse if events in the south cut off all rail traffic and imports from that region.

Zaire's large land mass of 235 million hectares is rather sparsely populated by 19 million people, 2.25 million of whom live in Kinshasa. Roughly half of this land is arable but only one percent is actually cultivated. If the agricultural resources of just the eastern region were adequately exploited, Zaire could become a net exporter of food. It is currently forced to import simply to stave off hunger. The vast mineral wealth found in the Shaba (formerly Katanga) and Kivu regions is legendary. Zaire probably has the world's richest copper deposits. They currently account for 80 percent of export earnings and 45-50 percent of government revenue. Other important minerals include cobalt, zinc, diamonds, tin, gold and manganese. Despite these important resources the per capita income is only \$100 a year.

Recognizing the severity of the economic crisis, Zaire was finally compelled by the state of its economy and the pressures of outside creditors to submit itself to an IMF stabilization program this year. The package included significant cutbacks in imports and government expenditures and a devaluation of the currency. As expected, this has resulted in steep domestic price increases.

The IMF projected that the stabilization measures would decrease the balance of payments deficit from \$600 million to \$100 million. This estimate was based on 1976 copper sales of 500,000 metric tons at an average price of \$0.66 a pound and a maintenance of imports at the 1975 level of approximately one billion dollars. The IMF plan also included a debt rescheduling of \$200 million.

U.S. officials believe that the deficit will be at least \$250-300 million more than anticipated by the IMF. Copper production is likely to be only about 460,000 metric tons and of that only 410,000 will actually be sold. Further, an estimated average price of \$0.66 per pound is considered too high as the price was only \$0.56 until May. It would have to stay at the current \$0.72 for the rest of the year to average \$0.66. Roughly every 10,000 metric ton miscalculation results in a revenue loss of \$14.5 million and every penny difference in the average price makes a \$10 million difference in foreign exchange and \$5 million in government revenue. Thus the deficit in expected copper revenue if only 410,000 metric tons are sold at 0.63 cents a pound would be \$158 million. In addition to a minimum import level of one billion dollars is considered too low. Minimum requirements without even affecting any of the root problems in transport or agriculture would amount to at least \$118 million. Thus U.S. officials assert that the deficit will be \$276 million more than the IMF projected or about \$375 million total.

The debt rescheduling anticipated by the IMF has not yet taken place, although discussions are under way. In exchange for the rescheduling Zaire has agreed to put 10 percent of its export receipts or about \$120 million in a trust fund to pay 1975 arrearages and the

interest on the 1976 debt. None of this had been deposited by June 1976. In order to reach this figure by the end of the year approximately \$17 million per month would have to be put aside. It seems unlikely that Zaire will be able to do this. Current monthly receipts from copper are only about \$31.5 million. This is less than supply times price because costs are deducted and the actual payments are based on an estimate process which relates to a four-month rolling line of credit. This inflow is barely adequate to cover the costs of essential mine, fuel and bread imports. There is nothing left to contribute to the trust fund. If Zaire's creditors are unwilling to reschedule the debt since Zaire has not lived up to its agreement, an additional \$200 million will be added to the deficit for a total of \$575 million.

Potential assistance available to cover this deficit amounts to only about \$300 million. The IMF has made \$160 million available but only \$54 million has not been drawn or already committed. Other donors, including the United States (\$45 million in 1976 and 1977 combined), are discussing contributing about \$150 million. Even if all of these funds become available and the debt is rescheduled, U.S. officials estimate that over \$50 million will remain uncovered. If the debt is not rescheduled the deficit will be about \$250 million. In short, by September or October, Zaire will have drawn all of its IMF assistance and unless someone intervenes will be forced to default on its debts. These debts are held largely with Western donors and defaults would undermine the confidence which the IMF stabilization program was designed to engender. If Zaire consequently becomes incapable of importing, the mines and transport system will probably shut down, widespread hunger could result, and economic and political chaos seem likely.

Causes for the Crisis

Zaire's crisis has resulted from a combination of external balance of trade factors, the impact of the Angolan civil war, and most basically the existence of ongoing and all-pervasive economic mismanagement.

The most immediate causes are external, more specifically a precipitous decline in copper prices just when import costs, especially for fuel, were rising. Copper prices hit a high of over \$1.50 a pound in 1974 and then fell in one year to \$0.54 a pound. Although they are back to \$0.72 a pound this month it is highly unlikely they will climb back up to the 1974 level in the near future. Increased import costs have had not only a direct impact on the terms of trade but also caused a decline in copper production since imports essential to the operation of mines are lacking. Some observers maintain that the most serious copper problem in Zaire is not price but production levels.

On a more basic level the primary reason why Zaire was hurt so badly by these external factors is gross economic mismanagement. Zaire has not only failed to diversify its economy since independence, it has concentrated even more on a single commodity—copper. In 1959 copper accounted for 40 percent of exports and agricultural production for 50 percent. By 1976 over 70 percent of exports were copper and other minerals made up an additional 20-25 percent. There has been an absolute decline in food production and imports are now

necessary to avert hunger. This has been further compounded by increased urbanization—the population of Kinshasa increased from 450,000 in 1959 to 2.25 million in 1976—and disruptions in the marketing system.

Mismanagement is also partially responsible for the large debt accumulation, much of it for low priority, prestige projects. Zaire has had no economic plan and inherited very limited trained manpower at independence. There is no real expert economic management at the top.

Zaire's wealth has attracted a stream of foreign investors promoting a variety of projects. Many of these projects were accepted, especially if there was no immediate domestic disbursement obligation. Most of this investment comes from the foreign private sector but much of it has government guarantees. Little attempt was made to determine if these projects could eventually pay for themselves. This situation was subsequently compounded by the accumulation of short-term high interest roll-over debt to cover payment on past loans.

A final and all pervasive problem of mismanagement is widespread corruption which is even acknowledged by the government. This is found on all levels and severely disrupts the rational allocation of resources, and discourages assistance agencies and well-wishers of all kinds.

The civil war in Angola occurred just as these other economic pressures were coming to a head. The most serious result of the war for Zaire was the closure of the Benguela Railroad. This had been the major transport route for most of the copper exports from the Shaba region. In addition quite a bit of Zairean rolling stock was destroyed. At best the railroad could not be repaired until the end of the rainy season in the fall of 1976. The continuation of guerrilla attacks on the railroad make even this timetable very optimistic.

The war also resulted in a direct outflow of resources. Zaire probably provided the FNLA with several million dollars worth of supplies since they were afraid an MPLA government might cut off their only domestic outlet to the sea through Matadi. Direct military expenditures also increased because it was considered necessary to build up forces on the border.

Finally, refugee flows of over a million persons put an additional burden on the economy.

The Rhodesian conflict could further complicate this picture if it results in the termination of rail shipments from southern Africa to Zaire. The Shaba copper producing region gets a major portion of its imports from the south over the rail line which passes through Rhodesia. The only other options for both imports and exports are the complicated rail-ship transshipment routes to Matadi (2,600 kilometers) or to Dar es Salaam via the inland lakes.


Zaire is making some efforts to grapple with its own problems. The crisis did force Mobutu to submit to an IMF stabilization program but it must be noted that Zaire took the "IMF cure" once before in the mid-1960's and its impact wore off in several years. One can only hope that the second dosage will have more permanent effects. Mobutu does seem more committed now to diversifying the economy and con-

centrating on agriculture and transport although a significant increase in copper prices might dilute this commitment. Efforts are being made to stem the flow to Kinshasa by declaring that all unemployed urban immigrants will have to find a job in fifteen days or be sent back to the land and new drives against corruption are being discussed.

While it is clear that the root cause for most of Zaire's problems are internal and its own responsibility, it is probably shortsighted to conclude that the country should now simply be allowed to suffer the consequences. If Zaire is forced to default on its debts and can no longer import, political and economic chaos in the urban and mining areas is likely to result. This would have little immediate impact on the majority living in the subsistence agricultural sector but would spread there as well if the disruption reached civil war proportions. Significant levels of unrest in Zaire might further be extended to neighboring countries, invite attacks from abroad, or encourage existent secessionist tendencies in Shaba and Cabinda. Assistance from outside sources which would help Zaire to overcome the most immediate deficit problems could be vital in averting the current threat of chaos but no amount of money will solve Zaire's long-range problems unless management practices are radically improved and the economy diversified.

ANC—African National Council
FROLIZI—Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
Namibia—Southwest Africa
OAU—Organization of African Unity
SWAPO—South West African People's Organization
UDI—Unilateral Declaration of Independence
ZANLA—Zimbabwe Liberation Council
ZANU—Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU—Zimbabwe African People's Union
Zimbabwe—Rhodesia
ZIPA—Zimbabwe People's Army
ZLC—Zimbabwe Liberation Council

Map of Southern Africa showing transport routes and mineral resources



Planned South African homelands



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Stanley Southall Scott

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COUNTY OF
RESIDENCE

COMPLETE ONLY IF WIFE/HUSBAND OR CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS ARE
TO BE INCLUDED IN PASSPORT AND SUBMIT GROUP PHOTOGRAPH

(WIFE'S) (HUSBAND'S) FULL LEGAL NAME

DATE OF BIRTH (Mo., Day, Year)

PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State or Province, Country)

CHILD(REN) NAME(S) IN FULL

PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State or
Country)

DATE OF BIRTH
(Month, Day, Year)

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPLICANT FOR HIMSELF AND PERSONS INCLUDED

HAVE YOU OR ANYONE INCLUDED IN THIS APPLICATION BEEN ISSUED OR INCLUDED IN A U.S. PASSPORT?
☒ YES ☐ NO (IF YES, GIVE DATE OF MOST RECENT PASSPORT ISSUED AND NAME IN WHICH ISSUED)

12/1/75 Stanley Southall Scott

IF NOT SUBMITTED WITH THIS APPLICATION:

Where issued: Washington, D.C. (Dip. # X091920)

Disposition: Currently in my possession

IN THE EVENT OF ACCIDENT OR DEATH NOTIFY (Do not show name of a person who will accompany you when traveling)

Name in full: Mrs. Bettye L. Scott

Relationship: Wife


Street address, City, State: 454 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024

Phone No. 484-3781

SEE REQUIREMENTS FOR PHOTOGRAPHS
ON ATTACHED INFORMATION SHEET.
PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH DO NOT MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OR ARE NOT A LIKENESS
WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED.

CLERK OR AGENT WILL STAPLE PHOTO
HERE. DO NOT IMPRESS SEAL ON EITHER
PHOTOGRAPH.

FEE EXEC. TWX POST.



TO BE COMPLETED BY ALL APPLICANTS			
FATHER'S NAME Lewis Agustus Scott		FATHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH Edwards, Mississippi	FATHER'S DATE OF BIRTH ? ☒ U.S. CITIZEN ☐ NOT U.S. CITIZEN
MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME Clinora Hamer		MOTHER'S PLACE OF BIRTH Bolivar, Tennessee	MOTHER'S DATE OF BIRTH ? ☒ U.S. CITIZEN ☐ NOT U.S. CITIZEN
☐ I WAS NEVER MARRIED ☒ I WAS LAST MARRIED ON 12/23/62		TO (Full legal name - complete whether widowed or divorced) Bettye Ann Lovejoy WHO WAS BORN ON (Date) 2/21/36	
BORN AT (City, State, Country) Cuthbert, Georgia		☒ WHO IS A U.S. CITIZEN ☐ WHO IS NOT A U.S. CITIZEN	☒ MARRIAGE NOT TERMINATED ☐ MARRIAGE TERMINATED BY ☐ Death ☐ Divorce on (Date)
E WOMEN MUST COMPLETE FOLLOWING IF CHILDREN OF A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE ARE INCLUDED OR IF PREVIOUSLY MARRIED BEFORE MARCH 3, 1931			
I WAS PREVIOUSLY MARRIED ON		TO (Full legal name)	
ON (Date of birth)		WHO WAS BORN AT (City, State, Country)	
☐ FORMER HUSBAND WAS U.S. CITIZEN ☐ FORMER HUSBAND WAS NOT U.S. CITIZEN		PREVIOUS MARRIAGE TERMINATED BY ☐ DEATH ☐ DIVORCE ON (Date)	
F COMPLETE IF APPLICANT OR ANY PERSON INCLUDED WAS NOT BORN IN THE UNITED STATES			
ENTERED THE U.S. (Month) (Year) ☐ APPLICANT ☐ WIFE ☐ HUSBAND ☐ CHILD		IF FATHER NATURALIZED: DATE CERTIFICATE NO. BEFORE (Name of Court) PLACE (City, State)	
RESIDED CONTINUOUSLY IN THE U.S. From (Year) To (Year) ☐ APPLICANT ☐ WIFE ☐ HUSBAND ☐ CHILD		IF MOTHER NATURALIZED: DATE CERTIFICATE NO. BEFORE (Name of Court) PLACE (City, State)	
		IF KNOWN, FATHER'S RESIDENCE IN U.S. From (Year) To (Year)	
		IF KNOWN, MOTHER'S RESIDENCE IN U.S. From (Year) To (Year)	
G PROPOSED TRAVEL PLANS - TO BE COMPLETED BY ALL APPLICANTS			
PURPOSE OF TRIP OFFICIAL U.S. GOV'T BUSINESS PROPOSED LENGTH OF STAY		MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION Ship ☐ Air ☒ Other ☐ Departure ☐ Return ☐	
NO. OF PREVIOUS TRIPS ABROAD WITHIN LAST 12 MONTHS		COUNTRIES TO BE VISITED South Africa	
		DO YOU EXPECT TO TAKE ANOTHER TRIP ABROAD? ☒ Yes ☐ No IF SO, WITHIN ☒ Year ☐ 2 Years ☐ 5 Years	
I have not (and no other person included in this application has), since acquiring United States citizenship, been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state; taken an oath or made an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state; accepted or performed the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; made a formal renunciation of nationality either in the United States or before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; ever sought or claimed the benefits of the nationality of any foreign state; or been convicted by a court or court martial of competent jurisdiction of committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, or conspiring to overthrow, put down or to destroy by force, the Government of the United States. (If any of the above-mentioned acts or conditions have been performed by or apply to the applicant, or to any other person to be included in the passport, the portion which applies should be struck out, and a supplementary explanatory statement under oath (or affirmation) by the person to whom the portion is applicable should be attached and made a part of this application.) WARNING: False statements made knowingly and willfully in passport applications or in affidavits or other supporting documents submitted therewith are punishable by fine and/or imprisonment under the provisions of 18 USC 1001 and/or 18 USC 1542. Alteration or mutilation of a passport issued pursuant to this application is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment under the provisions of 18 USC 1543. The use of a passport in violation of the restrictions contained therein or of the passport regulations is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment under 18 USC 1544. All statements and documents submitted are subject to verification. I solemnly swear (or affirm) that the statements made on all the pages of this application are true and that the photograph attached is a likeness of me and of those persons to be included in the passport.			
(To be signed at same time by wife/husband to be included in passport)		(To be signed by Applicant in presence of person administering oath)	
Subscribed and sworn to (affirmed) before me this _____ day of _____, 19 _____			
(SEAL)		(Signature of person authorized to accept passport applications)	
Clerk of the _____, Postal Clerk or Passport Agent at _____			
IDENTIFYING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED (Proper evidence to identify the applicant and husband/wife to be included in the passport must be submitted)			

Mr. Stanley S. Scott

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR

PERSONAL

December 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATORS

FROM : AA/SER, Charles A. Mann *CAM*

SUBJECT: Letters of Resignation


It is customary for all Presidential appointees to submit their resignations when a new President takes office.

Your letter to President Carter should be dated January 21, 1977, the resignation to be effective at his pleasure. Your letter should be submitted to me, for on forwarding, not later than close of business January 15, 1977. A sample letter is attached for your information and guidance.

If any of you plans to resign effective as of a date prior to January 21, 1977, you should be submitting a letter to President Ford giving the effective date of your resignation. This can be done up to January 20, 1976, with a copy to me.

Attachment

Sample ltr to President-elect Carter



Sample letter to President-elect Carter

January 21, 1977

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with established procedures, I hereby submit
my resignation as Assistant Administrator for _____
_____, Agency for International Development,
to be effective at your pleasure.

Respectfully,



Copies given to
North & Cylke



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

OFFICE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONAL ACTIVITIES COORDINATION

(OSARAC)

Botswana

Lesotho

Malawi

Swaziland

Zambia

P.O. BOX 750, MBABANE, SWAZILAND

TEL. 2072/2073/2074

December 20, 1976

Mr. Stanley S. Scott, Jr.
Assistant Administrator/AFR
Agency for International Development
6936 New State
Washington, D.C. 20523



Dear Mr. Scott:

In over 16 years with AID in the field I have invited hundreds of senior AID officials from Washington to my home for anything from cocktail parties and dinners to a one-week stay, and you and Mr. Cylke are the first that have ever sent a thank you letter.

To say I am impressed is putting it mildly. You might say I was even shocked, but I and my wife deeply appreciate the fact that both you and Mr. Cylke took the time to remember such a little courtesy.

One of my big gripes against AID/W personnel has been the fact that people who have lived in my home, had dinner and received many courtesies, including meetings at airports, taxi service, shopping service, etc. etc. while on visitation trip overseas hardly even have the courtesy to speak in the halls of Washington and, at the most, would offer to buy you a cup of coffee in the cafeteria. That you and Mr. Cylke are different is certainly an asset to the African Bureau. While I may differ with Mr. Cylke's concept of what is needed in rural development, I was very impressed with his sharp mind and ability to grasp overall concepts such as the importance of infrastructure and the absolute necessity of working with the small farmer. How difficult it is for most AID officials to realize that all of the planning, budgeting, programming, etc. is a complete waste of time until you get face to face with the small farmer and motivate him to grow the crops utilizing technology that will increase his production and income.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I sent to Lee Metcalf. I do not know what your plans are and it was completely unsolicited but I think it is only fair that a man with your interest and potential in resolving some of the basic problems in the Africa Bureau be brought to the attention of some of the senior members on the Hill.


Mr. Stanley S. Scott, Jr.

2.

December 20, 1976


Again, thank you for your courtesy and please convey my thanks to Mr. Cylke for his.

Sincerely yours,



Ralph W. Clark,
Acting Agriculture Development Officer

Enclosure: Copy of Letter
to The Hon. Lee Metcalf



U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

OFFICE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA REGIONAL ACTIVITIES COORDINATION

(OSARAC)

Botswana

Lesotho

Malawi

Swaziland

Zambia

P.O. BOX 750, MBABANE, SWAZILAND

TEL. 2072/2073/2074

December 20, 1976

The Honorable Lee Metcalf
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.



Dear Lee:

First I wish to thank you and Mike for your kind letter of July 1975. Your kindness in offering to act on my behalf at that time was deeply appreciated. I won't go into details of my assignment to Africa, with which I was happy, because even after your long years in the legislative side of the Government I am sure you would not believe that an agency as important as ours could be so completely fouled up. If it did not have such an adverse effect on our personnel, it would be hilarious.

Because the Agency does need highly competent people at its head, I have decided to bring to your attention, for whatever it is worth, the knowledge that one of our higher-ups in the Agency in Washington, Mr. Stanley S. Scott, the Assistant Administrator for Africa, strikes me as being one of the best administrators I have met in our Agency over the past nine years. When he was given the job he inherited an administrative mess. Several of my old friends in Washington report that he is doing an excellent job in creating a decent administrative organization. Because he is a Republican appointee, I am afraid that Mr. Carter may accept his resignation. I sincerely hope for the good of the Agency that such is not the case.

I myself was very happy over the election, and especially pleased that John Melcher will be your new colleague in the Senate. Several of my Republican friends in Billings are very high on John and I am sure both of you can expect a long-term tenure in the U.S. Senate. I will retire on May 2, 1977, and plan to reside permanently in the Flathead Lake area and, although I am not known in the area, I plan to take an active part in politics.

I will be in touch with your and John's office in Montana to see what I can do to help in future elections. Even though my wife is a staunch Republican, she agrees with me that the future of Montana and our country can only be

The Honorable Lee Metcalf

2.

December 20, 1976

assured by keeping men like yourself back in Washington
battling this crazy bureaucracy and the eastern coast
philosophy.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph W. Clark

Acting Agriculture Development Officer

P.S. Give my regards to Dorothy Tenembaum (if she has not
retired) and others on your staff who have been so consider-
ate in the past.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500



Dear Mr. President:

As I prepare to leave the Federal Government to take on another challenging job in the private sector, I want you to know that I will always value your friendship and effective leadership in one of the most turbulent periods of our nation's history. To you and Mrs. Ford, our nation is eternally indebted.

It has been a delightful, hectic, frustrating, enjoyable and personally satisfying six years here at the nation's nerve center. I have never regretted my decision to come to Washington. These are demanding and exciting times for all of us, and I would certainly encourage others to join the ranks of those thousands of unsung government employees who daily perform with enthusiasm and dedication to duty. Those of us who have had the opportunity to climb the proverbial mountain know that there is no real alternative to meaningful involvement.

Along with you and other Americans of good will, I hope and pray that God will provide the light for the President-elect to come up with effective solutions to the nation's remaining social, economic, and political ills. I know that you will continue to speak out on those problems which most demand America's attention.


And to you and Mrs. Ford--who captured our nation with her courage and dedication to American values--I wish you long life, good health and God's speed.



- 2 -


Mr. President, thanks for the opportunity to serve in your Administration. I hereby submit my resignation as Assistant Administrator for Africa, Agency for International Development, to be effective January 20.

Respectfully,



Stanley S. Scott

Assistant Administrator for Africa
Agency for International Development



January 6, 1977

Mr. Kenneth E. Scott
1441 Lebanon Road, Apt. L 120
Nashville, Tennessee

Dear Ken,

I am returning the promisory note forwarded to me by Mr. M. G. Ferguson of the Citizens Savings Bank and Trust Company, with the understanding that we/I are responsible for seeing that it is paid.

Ken, I would very much appreciate it if you would check with Mr. Ferguson to determine as to whether we might stretch this \$1300 note out for payment within a year as opposed to the 60 day duration. It will be virtually impossible for me to handle that over a 60 day period. Anything that you can work out in this matter will be appreciated.

At some point in the distant future, I think it would be a good idea to determine your expenses for your senior year and try to work out with me and your mother some way in which to meet the expenses that you face. Expect to hear from you when you get the opportunity.

Love,



Funds Raised; IFAD Gears to Go

Parker Signs Agreement; U.S. Pledges \$200 Million

After two years of international negotiations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has reached its goal of \$1 billion in pledges and the Articles of Agreement were opened for signature. Within the next six months the Agreement will be signed and ratified by the participating countries which should permit IFAD to become operational this year.

IFAD brings to fruition an initiative proposed at the 1974 World Food Conference to accelerate the flow of external resources to developing countries for improving food production and nutrition.

The Articles of Agreement were signed for the United States by AID Administrator Parker December 22 at the United Nations. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim attended the ceremony in the Security Council chambers. Mr. Parker was accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations William W. Scranton.

"With the Articles of Agreement now open for signature," the AID Administrator said, "it is our hope

that ratification by member governments will quickly follow so that IFAD may become fully engaged in its vital role of improving the global food situation which is essential for the economic and social well-being of the world's poor people."


A major feature of the fund is that it will bring together member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) in a major multilateral assistance program.

The United States provided leadership to the over-all funding effort when Secretary of State Kissinger announced in September 1975 at the UN Seventh Special Session that President Ford would seek authorization for a U.S. contribution of \$200 million provided other donors added their support for a combined goal of at least \$1 billion.

Pledges from all sources now in fact exceed the target and amount to \$1.022 billion with \$567 million from the OECD — including the U.S. contribution; \$435.5 million from the OPEC countries, and \$19 million in local and convertible currencies from the developing country members who will be the recipients of the Fund.

U.S. participation in IFAD has been characterized by a high degree of cooperation and coordination between the executive and legislative branches. The Congress has appropriated \$200 million to fulfill the U.S. pledge, and upon the review of the Articles of Agreement by the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. will proceed with the

(Continued on page 6)



United Nations photo

Administrator Parker signs the IFAD Articles of Agreement for the United States at the United Nations. At left is UN Secretary-General Kurt Wald-

heim. Also observing are Philippe Gblain, Chief of the Treaty Section of the United Nations, and U.S. Ambassador William W. Scranton, right.

Lesson in Flexitime

AID's Flexitime Study Group, chaired by William W. Gullett, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Program and Management Services, will conduct a series of meetings for AID supervisors beginning January 19. The meetings will inform the attendees of the possible use of flexible working hours by employees in AID/Washington.

The Study Group also plans to discuss flexitime with the employees' exclusive representatives. Thereafter, questionnaires will be distributed to AID/Washington employees. The Group will present a report, including discussions with the American Federation of Government Employees and American Foreign Service Association, to the Deputy Administrator.

Agency for International Development
Washington, D. C.

FRONT LINES

"... the 'front lines' of the long twilight struggle for freedom..." John F. Kennedy

Vol. 15, No. 5

January 13, 1977

Colombia Receives 2 Loans

The last of a series of AID credits to Colombia — two loans totaling \$4 million in an overall package of \$53 million — has been concluded by the Agency.

A \$2 million loan to the National Apprentice Service (SENA) designed to benefit the rural poor was signed by President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen. The second loan for \$2 million will assist the Accion Cultural Popular (ACPO) to undertake programs to educate and train farmers.

The AID Mission in Colombia is now completing a wide range of assistance projects to various entities, both governmental and private. The primary emphasis of the total program is to assist rural poor in the most underdeveloped areas of the country.

Last year President Lopez and President Gerald Ford agreed on the gradual turnover of Colombian development to completely Colombian supported programs.

The National Apprentice Service will use most of its \$2 million loan to purchase equipment and obtain some technical assistance for rural mobile training units. The organization has made the commitment to reach more than 150,000 rural poor in 1977 and 1978. This represents a 50 percent increase over programs that were carried out in 1974 and 1975.

Short-term courses in agriculture, rural industry, farm management, rural cooperatives, etc., will be offered by SENA throughout the country.

SENA is a semi-autonomous governmental entity, which is funded by a national payroll tax. It is responsible for training Colombian workers in both the modern industrial and traditional sectors. Last year SENA graduated over 350,000 Colombians in a wide variety of occupations and skills. About one-third of these

(Continued on page 3)

HELPING DEAF COLLEAGUES

They're Showing Signs of Understanding

By Julie Cheu Riegg

Eighteen employees in AID's Office of Financial Management are "signing" away their lunch hours, thanks to Lenora Watlington, accounting technician in the Office's Regional Services Division.

Ms. Watlington is teaching them sign language. The objective is to promote better communication with three deaf employees in the Office.

"I first became interested in sign language when I was assigned as the immediate supervisor to Laurie Warren, a deaf Project Stride employee who now is with the Data Control Division. She showed me how to 'sign' by teaching me to fingerspell."

Sign language, also known as Ameslan, is used in place of the spoken word through the movement of hands and arms. Fingerspelling, the simplest form of Ameslan, uses hand positions and configurations for the 26 letters of the alphabet.

"When Laurie taught me to fingerspell, I became increasingly interested in learning how to better communicate with the deaf," she says. "At Laurie's urging I enrolled in a night course at her alma mater, Gallaudet College in

Washington, D.C. It is the only liberal arts college for the deaf in the world."

The institution was established in 1864 when President Lincoln signed into law legislation authorizing the college to confer liberal arts degrees. It then was known as the Columbia Institution for the Deaf and Dumb and Blind. In 1894 the school was renamed Gallaudet College in honor of the founder of the first permanent public school for the deaf in the United States. Today, more than 1,000 students live and study on the 92-acre campus. In addition to its undergraduate programs the college has a graduate school that is open to both hearing and deaf students. All classes are conducted simultaneously in Ameslan and the spoken word by deaf instructors.

(Continued on page 3)



Photo by Clyde McNair

LENORA WATLINGTON

New Era Seen in Third World Relations

Williams Presents DAC View In Report

Cooperation between industrial nations and the rapidly advancing countries of the Third World is entering a new phase of constructive realism, according to Maurice J. Williams, Chairman of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee.

In his report, "Development Co-operation—1976 Review", published last month, Mr. Williams said: "The period 1974-1976 will be viewed in retrospect as one of transition to a 'New Realism' in world affairs, a turning point in the evolution of a broader community of national states working together for a new global order . . .

Not Completed

"This does not mean that the process of important changes has been completed, far from it. Reform of the old international order is under way. While much has been accomplished, more remains to be done. In particular, workable agreement has not been reached on a strategy for longer-term international development cooperation, one which takes the unique situations of developing countries more fully into account. That remains a key objective . . ."

The DAC Chairman, former AID Deputy Administrator and veteran of U.S. foreign assistance programs, added: "Despite appearances to the contrary, the conference dialogues of 1975-1976, between the Third World and OECD countries at numerous United Nations meetings and at the Conference on International Economic Co-operation in Paris, are reaching a consensus on the important problems and on the examination of alternative solutions. Some of the most urgent tasks leading to resolution of these problems are in hand, others can best be resolved over a period of time."

More Than a Review

The annual report goes beyond reviewing the development assistance efforts and programs of DAC member-countries to focus on current critical issues in the field of development cooperation.

Following are some of the main points made in the Chairman's introductory chapter:

- Progress towards greater stability and reduced vulnerabilities in the international system requires that states evolve joint understanding on important economic objectives and policies. This cannot be achieved by some once-and-for-all "global bargain", a "misguided notion (which) has encouraged ideological posturing—by representatives of both industrial and developing countries . . ."

What is required is "a sustained effort of cooperation in adjustment of national economic policies to assure non-inflationary economic growth, particularly among the industrial countries, and to remove those constraints which prejudice the growth of developing countries."

- One of the significant developments of the period since 1973 was the balance-of-payments "development security financing" which cushioned the economies of many developing countries from



MAURICE J. WILLIAMS

through their inability to finance trade deficits. The report comments: "The sharp increase in the economic disparity among developing countries after 1973, and the bleak prospect for lower-income countries for the rest of the decade, require special efforts which have yet to be undertaken."

DAC members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and the European Economic Community. As a group they improved their aid performance over the past two years, raising net disbursements from \$9.4 billion in 1973 to \$13.6 billion in 1975—an increase of more than 40 percent.

Increase Shown

As a share of GNP, this represented an increase from 0.30 percent in 1973 to 0.36 percent in 1975. But, because of inflation, the real value of DAC aid increased by only 7 percent in 1975.

Mr. Williams said, "This reversal of the downward trend of DAC aid is significant if it heralds a growing understanding of the importance of development assistance for poorer developing countries, and a greater responsiveness to that need. We believe that it does."

He noted, however, that "the improved aid performance of DAC members has been disproportion-

Net Flow of Resources Received By Developing Countries

	\$ billion		
	1973	1974	1975
I. Bilateral flows (total, net)	\$23.5	\$29.1	\$39.1
— DAC countries	21.7	25.0	33.8
of which: ODA	7.1	8.3	9.8
other official flows + private	14.6	16.7	24.0
— OPEC countries	0.6	2.9	4.4
— Centrally Planned Economies	1.2	1.2	0.9
II. Flows from multilateral institutions, net ¹	3.3	4.6	5.8
III. Estimated Euro-currency, borrowing, net	8.5	8.0	9.5
IV. Total I to III	35.3	41.7	54.4
IMF Oil Facility	—	1.1	2.4
GRAND TOTAL	\$35.3	\$42.8	\$56.8

¹ DAC Members provided \$3.8 billion to multilateral agencies as ODA in 1975

ately borne by nine countries who, with 20 percent of the combined GNP of the DAC group, provide about 40 per cent of total DAC aid."

He remarked: "The aid performance of the United States, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Germany—relative to the strong positions of their economies—has been disappointing . . . The United States, in particular, is doing less than it should in concessionary capital for developing countries. In recent years, the U.S. level of economic assistance has been significantly

below the average of other DAC countries."

The DAC Chairman concluded: "Without steady growth of the world's economic product and broadening trade opportunities, the pressure of population in developing countries will almost certainly intensify the need for steadily larger financial transfers among states and prove destructive to the prospects for a stable world order. Trade expansion, in particular, will be more efficient in contributing to economic self-reliance of most developing countries."

Comparative Aid-Giving Performance

Countries (ranked in order of per capita GNP, 1975)	1975					1974				
	GNP per capita		Total official and private net flows		Net official Development Assistance		Total official and private net flows		Net official Development Assistance	
	\$	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank	% of GNP	Rank
Switzerland	\$8,746	1	0.76	11	0.18	14-15	0.74	9	0.15	16
Sweden	8,439	2	1.09	7	0.82	1	1.15	5	0.72	1
United States	7,098	3	1.15	6	0.26	12	0.73	10	0.24	13
Norway	6,951	4	0.98	9	0.66	3	0.81	8	0.57	4
Denmark	6,937	5	0.75	12	0.58	7-8	0.68	12	0.55	5-6
Germany	6,831	6	1.17	4	0.40	10	0.83	7	0.37	10
Canada	6,664	7	1.34	3	0.58	7-8	1.16	4	0.50	8
Belgium	6,516	8	1.36	2	0.59	6	1.12	6	0.51	7
France	6,418	9	1.16	5	0.62	4	1.22	3	0.59	3
Australia	6,142	10	0.71	13	0.61	5	0.69	11	0.55	5-6
Netherlands	5,890	11	1.56	1	0.75	2	1.31	1	0.63	2
Finland	5,508	12	0.34	17	0.18	14-15	0.27	17	0.17	15
Austria	4,999	13	0.45	16	0.17	16	0.61	14	0.18	14
Japan	4,357	14	0.59	14-15	0.24	13	0.65	13	0.25	12
United Kingdom	4,110	15	1.01	8	0.37	11	1.23	2	0.38	9
New Zealand	4,044	16	(0.59)	14-15	0.52	9	0.40	15	0.31	11
Italy	3,106	17	0.95	10	0.11	17	0.28	16	0.14	17
DAC average	\$5,858		(1.05)		0.36		0.81		0.33	



One of the scenes from "Bangladesh—a Beginning or an End?", the AID film that continues to win awards.

Bangladesh Movie Honored; AIDSAT Films Win Awards

"Bangladesh—A Beginning or an End?", a 15-minute color film produced by the Office of Public Affairs, won two more prizes last month. The film won the San Francisco Film Festival's Special Jury Award and a Golden Eagle Award at the annual Council on International Nontheatrical Events (CINE) Awards Program and Exhibition in Washington, D.C.

"Bangladesh" was one of 258 winners selected by the CINE, which received nearly 800 applications from all parts of the United States. The film now is eligible to compete in international film festivals and exhibitions all over the world.

Producer of the film is Jerry Rosenthal and director/cameraman,

Carl Purcell. William Gage of Com-Corps in Washington, D.C. wrote the script and edited the film.

The Bangladesh film, along with "Survival in the Sahel", "Pakistan—Land of Promise" and "Guatemala: In the Face of Disaster" are being distributed publicly.

Two films the Agency's Inter-agency Development Coordination Office produced for the AIDSAT (AID Space Age Technologies) demonstration recently held in 27 developing countries won awards at the New York and Virgin Islands Film Festivals. "If One Today, Two Tomorrow", won gold and bronze medals in the Social Welfare category and "Images of Life" took gold and bronze medals in the Science and Technology category.



Photo by Clyde McNair

Lenora Watlington, left, draws the rapt attention of her students in the sign language class she conducts semi-weekly for employees in the Office of Financial Management. From her left: Mable Braxton, Joan Pinkney, Shirley Carter, Wilmoth Myers, Douglas Dill, Allen

Lester, Jean Jordan, Trenita Davis, William Schrider, Joan Mashburn, Alisare Greenwood and Geneva Chandler. Not pictured are Lana Barrett, Carole Vereka, Jean Best, John Yang, Susan Hudec and Elaine Lewis.

'SIGNING IN'

Staffers Learn Colleagues' Silent Language

(Continued from page 1)

Ms. Watlington began her evening classes in June 1974 at the cost of \$40 per course. She attends one class per semester, twice a week, two hours a night.

"I started out with Ameslan I which focuses on the condensed form of sign language," she says.

In that class students are taught to abbreviate common phrases. For instance, the sentence, "How are you?" becomes "How you?" And the sentence, "Are you finished eating?" is abbreviated to "Finished eat?"

Later courses took Ms. Watlington to more intermediate Ameslan where she was taught idioms and idiomatic expressions. For example, the "four-plus-four" sign means "what for or why?" The "money zero" hand movement signifies "I have no money."

After four courses, Ms. Watlington, who joined AID in 1967, felt qualified to teach basic Ameslan to her colleagues. She says:

"Last summer I proposed the idea to Joseph A. Giza III, the assistant executive officer. He in turn, circulated a memorandum to FM employees that a sign language class would be available for those who wanted to learn how to better communicate with the deaf. Classes began in November with 20 employees meeting during the 12:30 to 1:30 p.m. lunch break. The class later dropped to 18 when some stu-

dents didn't have time to attend the semi-weekly sessions."

"When I first taught Lenora fingerspelling," Ms. Warren reports, "I never thought it would lead to a sign language class in AID."

John Daigle, another deaf employee who works in the Central Accounting Division, substituted for Ms. Watlington one day and rates the students as "pretty good."

More Awareness

One of the students, Allen D. Lester from the Management Operations Office, acknowledges that "the class in sign language is a new and exciting experience in learning. It has made me aware of the obstacles deaf people must overcome in order to become productive members of society. This, in turn, has made me more productive."

"I now find myself talking and signing with co-workers with whom I previously had little contact," Ms. Warren says. "We deaf employees undoubtedly have benefitted from the class."

Douglas M. Dill from the Loan Division, notes that the Agency has hired several hearing handicapped persons over the years. "I felt," he says, "that it would be in the best interest of AID and myself to learn to communicate with them. When the course was offered, I took advantage of the opportunity to learn this communications skill."

Ms. Watlington uses the same text book from which her professors taught her.

"I admit that it is not an easy course to take. It takes a lot of memorizing. But my students tell me they look forward to coming to class every week. They discovered they have hands! And, they seem to enjoy practicing with each other."

Joan L. Mashburn from the Central Accounting Division admits "the course is difficult. It is comparable to learning a new foreign language."

The hard work, however, is not without its rewards.

According to Jean Jordan, Regional Services Division, learning to communicate with the deaf is an enlightening experience. "I have profitted very much from what I have learned."

Geneva Chandler from Data Management agrees. She says that sign language has opened a "new world of language" for her. She thinks that the interest the class has generated shows "people with hearing problems that they too have a special contribution to society."

William F. Schrider, Central Accounting Division, adds that the "deaf employees have been made to feel more a part of the organization since the classes began."

Laurie Dowling, a deaf employee in the Loan Management Division,

admits that the class has brought a closer contact with her colleagues.

"I never have felt better and more comfortable with my co-workers since I joined AID in 1972," she says.

"I get such a good feeling knowing that I am helping others to communicate with the deaf," Ms. Watlington says. "Now we don't have to write notes or mouth words to make ourselves understood as was occasionally necessary before."

Classes Continue

The lunch hour classes will continue until March. Ms. Watlington says she may begin another Ameslan I course when the current session ends. However, it is contingent on the number of students who wish to take a more advanced course from her next spring.

"I hope many of them do continue because it takes years to become good at signing. I can communicate fluently now but not rapidly. I know that what I've done here has helped me and others. The more people I get to learn from me, the better off the three deaf employees are going to be."

Lana Barrett, Regional Service Division, sums up what many of her classmates have expressed. "The number of students who attend these sign language classes at noontime lets the hearing impaired know we care."

Morris Dominican Director

Patrick F. Morris, a veteran foreign assistance officer, was sworn in January 5 as Mission Director to the Dominican Republic. Since 1975 he has been Associate Assistant Administrator of the Office of Development Program in the Latin America Bureau.

Mr. Morris began his government career with the U.S. Department of Agriculture in Mexico in 1949. He joined the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in Lima, Peru, in 1951. He was assigned to Ecuador as program officer to the Foreign Operations Administration/International Cooperation Administration, predecessors of AID, in 1953. From 1955 to 1958 he served with ICA in Washington, then went to Bolivia as program officer (1958 to 1960) and as Deputy Mission Director (1960 to 1961) and to Venezuela as AID Representative (1961 to 1966). He served in Washington as Director of AID's Office of Bolivian/Chilean Affairs (1966 to 1968) and in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination as Director of the Office of International Assistance Coordination (1970 to 1971).

In 1971 he was named Development Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris, France. From 1973 to 1975 he served as Deputy Director of Panamanian Affairs in AID's Latin America Bureau.

Mr. Morris received a B. S. degree from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., in 1948; a B. A. degree from San Marcos University in Lima, Peru, in 1951, and an M. A. degree from the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Md., in 1969. He served overseas with the U. S. Army from 1943 to 1945.

Born May 9, 1925, in Anaconda, Mont., Mr. Morris is married to the former Yolanda Falconi and they have four children.



PATRICK F. MORRIS

New Booklet Out Soon

"AID's Challenge in an Interdependent World", a pamphlet describing the objectives and programs of U.S. foreign assistance, will be available shortly. The pamphlet is 36 pages, plus cover, and is illustrated with photographs and charts. Produced by the Office of Public Affairs, the pamphlet is designed to respond to requests for basic, non-technical information about foreign aid.

Colombia's ACPO Trains Campesino Leaders

(Continued from page 1)

graduates were trained under the rural mobile program.

The equipment to be purchased includes jeeps and launches so that instructors and supervisors can reach isolated areas in Colombia where many of the rural poor reside. U.S. technological advances in small farm equipment will be utilized by purchasing appropriate demonstration agricultural equipment and supplies.

Monsignor Jose Joaquin Salcedo, the executive director of ACPO, began the organization's program 29 years ago in a small Colom-

bian village in the Andean mountains, with a modest social assistance project to help the poor farmer and his family improve both their standard of living and well-being. By the use of ham radio and volunteer teachers, literacy campaigns were started and self-improvement programs initiated. Through the years ACPO has grown to be a leader in this type of endeavor in Latin America.

ACPO now has an intensive training program in its two training centers for campesino leaders, who come from throughout

the nation. Over 600 leaders and volunteers are trained annually to assist fellow campesinos in self-improvement and community development. ACPO has a network of radio stations which provides literacy education, primary level correspondence education, agricultural courses and general interest programs.

The organization publishes the only truly rural newspaper in Colombia, El Campesino. Two million copies of the newspaper will reach the isolated farmer this year. In addition 246,000 low-cost paperback books (10 cents U.S.)

are sold and distributed nationwide at a minimal cost to the consumer.

In order to finance its many social programs ACPO has depended on business enterprises that it has developed within its organization. Currently about 65 percent of the necessary revenues come from this source. The \$2 million loan to ACPO, the majority of which is for printing equipment, will be used to develop two new lines of sales.

Both loans will be repaid in dollars. They are for 40 years, with a grace period of 10 years.

Service Awards Presented

Four Washington Bureaus and three AID Missions recently presented Length of Service Awards to their respective employees. The 40 employees were recognized for their Federal service which totalled 780 years.



Thomas Blacka, Director of the Office of Financial Management, presented certificates and pins to, left to right: George Stewart, 10 years; Doris Brooks, 20 years; Dorothy Shirley, 25 years; Alan Gordan, 10 years; William Telfair, 30 years; Claud Alsop, 35 years; Clarence Combs, 25 years; Ruth Allen, 25 years; Joseph Dajani, 10 years; Mr. Blacka, and Anne Terry, 20 years.




Donald A. George
SER, 30



John E. Everhart
SER, 25




James F. Russell
SER, 35



J. Strassberger
SER, 10




Assistant Administrator for Africa Stanley S. Scott presented length of service awards to, left to right: Thomas O'Keefe, 10 years; Theodore Brown, 10 years; Paul Struharik, 10 years; Justina Millan, 25 years; Mr. Scott; Rose Wilson, 20 years; Dwight Wilson, 10 years, and Graham Thompson, 10 years. Not present were Barbara Williams, 25 years, and Emmalita Jefferson, 10 years.



Bobby Allen
Afghanistan, 10



Raymond Hooker
Afghanistan, 10



Selig Taubenblatt
NE, 25




Joseph Novak
Niger, 30



Assistant Administrator for Latin America Eugene N. S. Girard II presented awards to, left to right, front: Felipa C. Coleman, 20; Margaret L. Kranz, 25, and Peter J. Romano, 25. Rear: Henry H. Bassford, 10; John A. Sanbrailo, 10; Mr. Girard; ViRuth Chandler, 10, and Robert C. Simpson, 10. Not present were Mary K. Brent, 10, and Antonio M. Velasquez, 10.



Five Bureau for Program and Management Services employees received certificates and pins for their Federal service. Left to right: Robert J. Cook, 35 years; Gertrude Schwartz, 20 years; Bill White, 25 years; Robert Gibson, 25 years, and Louis Richardson, 35 years.



Three Swaziland Mission personnel received their awards from Regional Development Officer John H. Kean. Left to right: George T. Eaton, Assistant RDO; Ralph W. Clark, 20; Mr. Kean; Jack B. Warner, 10; Thomas G. McDonough, 20.

AID Helps Farmers Fight Pest Threats

Seek to Cut Crop Losses

By Gale D. Wallace

Farmers in developing countries are receiving assistance from AID to control plant pests and diseases which threaten their efforts to increase world food production. Food losses in the developing world as a result of pest activity is estimated from 20 to more than 80 percent, depending upon the country, the crop and the season.

AID has established workshops and seminars to teach developing countries how to reduce losses in food crops through more effective and safer use of pesticides and other chemicals to control pests and diseases. The Agency is scheduling three such workshops for 1977—in Alexandria, Egypt, in March, in Bangkok, Thailand, in April, and in Bogota, Colombia, in October.

The developing world, whose current population totals about 2.5 billion persons, faces the possibility of having to feed five billion persons by the year 2000. In contrast, the industrialized areas of the world now supporting 1.1 billion persons will only have to support 1.4 to 1.7 billion persons, according to current estimates. This 24-year period is regarded as critical since it represents the lead time available to stabilize world population growth and to increase food production to meet these needs.

California Contract

Before the workshop/seminar program began in 1973, AID contracted with the University of California to undertake surveys to identify and evaluate pests and diseases having the most serious impact on food production and to make recommendations on how best to devise control programs.

The surveys undertaken by the University of California, working with other land grant colleges, found that pest management in developing countries today is often done in total isolation of other problems and of its effect on the total environment. Adoption of improved pest management methods not only will increase food production in developing countries but also will result in greater safety for humans and an improved general environment.

The survey teams, consisting of an entomologist, plant pathologist, nematologist and a weed scientist, visited seven countries in East Asia, four in the Near East and Asia, five in the Near East and Mediterranean areas, eight in Africa, six in Central America and five in South America. They learned that misuse of pesticides is common. Pesticides often are used on the wrong crops for the wrong pest or in the wrong



The correct use of pesticides is part of the curriculum in the workshops being sponsored by AID. Increases in food production may

depend, among other things, on the control of pests. Incorrect use can be dangerous to farmers and to their crops.

amounts. Annually, hundreds of human poisonings occur in many of these countries among workers directly involved with pesticide application, from reuse of pesticide containers in the home or from high levels of toxic residues on food crops.

Education to Dangers

The workshop/seminar program is designed to educate the people, train those who work with pesticides and alert officials of developing countries to both the dangers and the economic losses that occur from improper pesticide practices.

Recent awareness in the developing countries of environmental problems associated with their development has increased their interest in integrated management and training workshops. Requests for assistance in pest management are being received by AID. For example, 20 laboratories in developing capacity now are upgrading their capacity to undertake quality control programs for pesticide analysis, and participants from these institutions have been trained at the University of Miami. During the past two years AID Missions in Egypt, Bangladesh, Colombia and the Philippines have responded to requests for short-term assistance in pest and pesticide management.

AID in recent years has been

responding to requests from developing countries for help to increase food and agriculture production. In all countries where Agency programs are under way there is today at least one agricultural program. In addition to technology, AID helps the host country obtain the necessary tools, including improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides and chemicals for crop protection. AID also provides, in consultation with the World Health Organization, pesticides for use in public health programs such as malaria control, and African sleeping sickness and river blindness.

Many crop improvement practices have been introduced. The rapidity with which these practices have been adopted and the increased production which has resulted have been both surprising and gratifying to the host countries. They also have found that the changed agroecosystem resulting from the introduction of new practices has resulted in shifts and sometimes intensification of pest and disease problems. This requires the training and retraining of crop protection and pest management specialists in the developing countries.

In anticipation of requests for assistance in training and retraining from many of the key areas of the developing world, the AID

sponsored workshop/seminar program will run through December 1979 at an estimated cost of \$1.3 million.

Other Universities

Besides the University of California and the University of Miami, other institutions working with AID include North Carolina State University and Oregon State University as well as the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

AID's assistance in providing pesticides to developing country programs is now governed by the August 1975 Policy Determination on environmental aspects of development assistance, as implemented by Interim Pesticide Procedures promulgated January 7, 1976, and Environmental Procedures regulations of June 30, 1976. AID policy is to ensure that the environmental consequences of proposed AID-financed assistance are identified and considered by AID in collaboration with the host country prior to a final decision to proceed and that appropriate environmental safeguards are adopted. Generally, pesticides not sanctioned for use in the United States by the Environmental Protection Agency will not be furnished by AID. There are some exceptions. For example, pesticides intended to alleviate conditions not occurring in the United States may not be sanctioned for these uses in the United States but may be quite safe elsewhere. AID has declined in the past to finance certain pesticides which are registered by the EPA for use in the United States when AID has determined that foreign distribution or use lacks adequate safeguards.

Started in 1973

The workshops/seminars will deal with controls of such pests as insects, nematodes, weeds, birds and other vertebrates; infectious diseases including viruses, mycoplasma, bacteria and fungi, and noninfectious diseases including those resulting from toxic mineral excesses or deficiencies, chemical pollution, adverse environment and land abuses. These are the major

sources of productivity losses in agriculture.

The program first began in El Salvador in December 1973. Training was given in the safe handling and use of pesticides and integrated pest control. Since then El Salvador has requested follow-up training in gas chromatography for pesticide residue analysis and other systems to solve problems which have arisen in Central America from improper use of pesticides.

Similar workshops were held in Jakarta, Indonesia, for 400 participants in 1974 and another six months later for representatives of more than 50 agencies of the Philippines Government which are concerned with pesticides.

Program Cancelled

A workshop/seminar had just begun in Guatemala City last February when the devastating earthquake which damaged much of that country forced the cancellation of the meeting.

AID also is cooperating in an international effort to provide pest management technology. AID representatives will participate in UN Development Program seminars to be held in Santiago, Chile, in January and February, in Lima, Peru, in June, and in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in September and October. Another UNDP seminar is planned for Dakar, Senegal, starting in February 1978.

Food Institute Chief Named to TA Post

Nicolaas G. M. Luykx II, Director of the Food Institute at the East-West Center in Honolulu since 1970, has been named Director of Development Administration in the Technical Assistance Bureau.

Mr. Luykx also has served as a part-time professor in the College of Tropical Agriculture at the University of Hawaii since 1970.

From 1966 to 1970 he was associate professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Michigan State University.

He was senior advisor to the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from 1966 to 1968.

He was associated with Cornell University from 1956 to 1966 in various capacities, first as a graduate assistant in research and teaching, then as an extension specialist and later as assistant professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics.

Mr. Luykx received a B.S. degree in biology from Cornell University in 1953. Also from Cornell, he re-

ceived an M.S. degree in agricultural economics and international economics in 1958, and a Ph.D. degree in public administration and finance in 1962.

He has written many articles on international economics, including "A Public Policy Profile on Bengal Rural Development", "Rural Government in the Strategy of Agricultural Development" and "Expenditure Controls in Thailand".

Mr. Luykx was born in Tenafly, N.J., October 16, 1931. He is married and has two children.

Improve Your Form SF 171

"Tips on How to Improve Your SF171" will be presented at an hour-long workshop at 12:15 p.m., Thursday, January 27, in New State, Room 5951, by Joan Clark, AID's Federal Women's Program Coordinator. Each employee is responsible for updating her or his own SF171 (Personal Qualifications Statement) and for having an updated form in his or her personnel file. Call Ms. Clark at 632-9160 if you have any questions about the workshop.



Deputy Mission Director to the Philippines Charles C. Christian recently presented Bicentennial Medal Awards to three executives of Philippine voluntary agencies for their "outstanding voluntary work, deep compassion and concern for the dignity of the Filipino people". Left to right: Albert Fraleigh,

Food for Peace officer in the Mission; Mr. Christian; Rev. Jesus B. Fernandez, Executive/Project Director of EPHPHETA; Mrs. Loreto Paras-Sulit, former Secretary-General of the Philippine National Red Cross, and Sylvia Montes, President, Philippines Association of Social Workers.

Air Pioneer Kerwood Dies

Charles W. Kerwood, retired training officer, died December 15 at Sibley Memorial Hospital in Washington, D.C., after a long illness. He was 79 years old.

A retired Air Force colonel and an aviation pioneer who participated in four wars, Colonel Kerwood began his foreign aid career in 1949. He joined the Economic Cooperation Administration, an AID predecessor, in June of that year. He continued to work for ECA and its successor agencies until 1965 when he retired from Federal service.

Colonel Kerwood was a member of the Lafayette Escadrille in World War I. During the 1920s he represented the United States in aviation matters in Russia and the Balkans. He also was a colonel in the Greek Royal Air Force in the Greek-Turkish war and organized a U.S. volunteer squadron for the French-Riff campaign in North Africa.

Colonel Kerwood was a member of the Air Force Association and was inducted last June into the Aviation Pioneers Hall of Fame.

He is survived by his wife, Catherine, of 4000 Tunlaw Road NW, Washington, D.C. 20007, and a son, Wayne S. of West Milford, N.J.

Leukemia Fatal To Walter Pierce

Walter E. Pierce Jr., former Department of Agricultural employee on loan to AID in South Vietnam, died November 14 of leukemia in Edison, Ga. He was 61.

Mr. Pierce served in the Vietnam Mission from 1967 to 1975. While assigned there he played a key role in promoting log production and wood product exports. He also was instrumental in developing plywood furniture and other wood industries for South Vietnam.

He is survived by his wife, Anne; two sons, and three grandchildren.

Directives, Notices Cite Agency Activity

The list of AID directives and significant notices recently issued includes:

Handbook 2—Program Planning and Budgeting—Supplement A 11, Special P.L. 480 Programming Guidance (TM 2:9)—Supplement A 11a incorporates into Handbook 2 AIDTO CIRC A-313 dated 6/3/76, subject, "P.L. 480 Title I as a Development Resource—General Guidance and Instructions for Preparing FY 1978 Title I Proposals." Supplement A 11b incorporates AIDTO CIRC A-467 dated 8/24/76, subject, "P.L. 480 Title I as a Development Resource—Implementation of the ('Loan Forgiveness') Currency Use Offset Provision of § 106 of PL 480 as amended."

Handbook 3—Project Assistance—Appendix 8C, Development Loan Committee: Interagency Coordination (TM 3:10)—This new appendix incorporates into Handbook 3 guidance formerly contained in M.O. 1054.1—Dollar Loans, Cooley Loans and Investment Guaranties: Interagency Coordination.

Handbook 5—Delegations of Authority

- **Delegation of Authority 95—To the Assistant Administrator for Population and Humanitarian Assistance (TM 5:8)**—Deletes paragraph 1.b. which pertained to foreign disaster assistance activities. A new Delegation of Authority 116—To the Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, covers those activities.

- **Delegation of Authority 99—To the Assistant Administrator for Program and Management Services, et al., Covering Contracting and Related Functions (TM 5:9)**—Amended by Delegation of Authority 116 to transfer certain authorities from the Assistant Administrator for Population and Humanitarian Assistance to the Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Also revised under TM 5:11 to increase the amount in paragraph 1A(i)e from \$25,000 to \$250,000.

- **New Delegation of Authority 116—To the Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (TM 5:10)**—Delegates to the Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, all of the authorities and functions specified in any AID regulations (published or unpublished), directives or communications of any nature relating to the furnishing of international disaster assistance in accordance with Chapter 9 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

- **Redelegation of Authority 99:1—To the Director, Office of Contract Management (TM 5:12)**—Increases the amount in paragraph i.e. from \$25,000 to \$50,000.

- **New Redelegation of Authority 99:2—To the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Program Support, Bureau for Program and Management Services, Regarding Contracting Authority (TM 5:13)**—Redelegates to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Program Support, SER, the authority to sign or approve certain U.S. Government contracts, country contracts for technical assistance, grants, Project Implementation Orders/technical services (PIO/T), various agreements and other authorities for which said Assistant Administrator has responsibility.

Handbook 10—Participant Training

- **Chapter 25, Allowances (TM 10:37)**—(a) Revises the monthly allowance rates for academic and nonacademic participants and (b) amends the transit period for non-academic participants in regular and special programs.
- **Chapter 29, Professional Society Membership—Attachment A, Form AID 1380-12 (TM 10:38)**—Transmits a copy of revised form AID 1380-12, Recommendation of Participant to American Professional Society.

Handbook 14—AID Procurement Regulations

- **Chapter 7, Title 41 of the Code of Federal Regulations (41 CFR 7), Federal Register edition of the AID Procurement Regulations (AIDPR), revised as of July 1, 1976 (TM 14:9)**—Supersedes the July 1, 1975, edition.
- **AIDPR Notice 77-1 (TM 14:10)**—Adds a new Part 7-50, Extraordinary Contractual Actions to Protect Foreign Policy Interests of the United States, to the AID Procurement Regulations (41 CFR 7).

Handbook 17—AID Organization—Chapter 9, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (TM 17:83)—Reflects the establishment of a new Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance.

Handbook 18—Information Services

- **Part I, Directives and Publications (TM 18-1:13)**—The more substantive changes are: (1) Chapter 2 includes, in 2C, guidance on the maintenance of handbooks by User Offices and Attachments 2C and 2D are added to provide examples of the Transmittal Memorandum and Checklist formats; (2) Attachment 2B shows the

Expect IFAD Start Before End of '77

(Continued from page 1)

official ratification.

"The U.S. contribution is in addition to the assistance provided through our existing bilateral and multilateral foreign aid program," Mr. Parker said, "and as such reflects a major budgetary decision to increase the United States commitment to alleviating problems of hunger and malnutrition."

Dr. John A. Hannah, Executive Director of the World Food Council and former AID Administrator, organized and coordinated the international pledging effort leading to the establishment of the fund. Since the beginning of negotiations in May 1975, Philip Birnbaum, AID's Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, has served as the chief U.S. negotiator for IFAD and was elected Vice-Chairman of the IFAD Preparatory Commission which is developing the new organization's policy guidelines and operating procedures.

The preamble to the Agreement recognized that "the continuing food problem of the world is afflicting a large segment of the people of the developing countries and is jeopardizing the most fundamental principles and values associated with the right to life and human dignity."

The objective of the fund, as stated in article two of the Agreement, "shall be to mobilize additional resources to be made avail-

able on concessional terms for agricultural development in developing member states." In fulfilling that objective, article two states, "the fund shall provide financing primarily for projects and programs specifically designed to introduce, expand or improve food production systems and strengthen related policies and institutions within the framework of national priorities and strategies."

AID Sends Relief to Cyprus

The United States through AID has contributed \$17.5 million to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to support continuing refugee relief and rehabilitation programs in Cyprus.

An agreement covering the contribution was signed December 30 in Geneva with the UNHCR. The contribution was voted by Congress in the Fiscal Year 1977 appropriation for the Security Supporting Assistance program. Since the political and economic disruptions in Cyprus in mid-1974, the United States has provided \$72.5 million for activities supported by the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Force in Cyprus.

current practice followed in publishing changes to the FPR's and AIDPR's (Handbook 14), and (3) pages 4 to 5 and 4 to 6 clarify the procedural difference between requesting complete handbooks and requisitioning copies of handbook changes.

- **Pages D-1 and D-2 of Attachment D, and pages K-5, K-6, and K-17 of Attachment K, of Appendix D, Codes and Numbering Systems (TM 18:13)**—Reflects recent organizational and FY changes.

Handbook 22—Travel and Transportation

- **Exhibit 6B, Maximum Rates of Per Diem Allowances for Travel in Foreign Areas (TM 22:33)**—Shows maximum per diem rates for travel in certain foreign areas.

- **Pages 9A1-23—9A1-26 of Appendix 9A1, H-100—Travel, Transportation and Storage of Effects (TM 22:34)**—Lubumbashi, Zaire, is reinstated to the list of posts that require boxing of motor vehicles (section H-167.2).

Handbook 25—Employment and Promotion—Pages 6-3 and 6-4 of Chapter 6, Foreign Service Assignments and Tours of Duty (TM 35:23)—Changes the approving authority in 6D4b for extending tours of duty in AID/W beyond 4 years from the Assistant Administrator for Program and Management Services to the Deputy Administrator or his designee; (2) adds 6D4c to provide approving authority for extensions of tour of duty in AID/W beyond eight years by the Administrator.

Handbook 27—Attendance and Leave—Appendix A, Attendance and Leave (TM 27:8)—Clarifies section 463 regarding maternity leave and deletes section 464.4, Points of Departure and Destination, because part of the text has been incorporated in section 464, Granting Transit Time, and the remainder is no longer applicable.

Handbook 30—Separation and Disciplinary Actions—Pages 3A-52 and 3A-53 of Appendix 3A, Retirement (TM 30:8)—Tripoli, Libya, was designated as an unhealthful post effective June 1, 1976, and Santa Cruz, Bolivia, was designated as an unhealthful post effective July 1976 (Exhibit 673.4-3, pp. 7 and 8).

Significant Notices

- **Increase in District of Columbia Withholding Tax—AID/W Notice (9/1/76)**—The District of Columbia City Council has amended Section 12.8(b)-c of the D.C. Income Tax Regulations to change the fixed percentages to be applied to the amount of Federal Income Tax withheld for determining the amount of D.C. withholding tax effective July 1, 1976.

- **Bureau for Latin America—Reorganization—AID General Notice (9/3/76)**—Announces a reorganization in the geographic area offices of the Bureau for Latin America.

- **New and Revised Forms—August 1976—AID General Notice (9/3/76)**—Lists new revised AID forms which became available in August 1976.

- **Clearance Procedures for the Coordination of AID-Sponsored International Travel—AID General Notice (9/8/76)**—Announces clearance procedures, designed to eliminate any confusion and misunderstandings in authorizing AID-sponsored international travel. These procedures will be incorporated into Handbook 22.

- **Health Insurance Coverage After Retirement—AID General Notice (9/13/76)**—Announces a change in the requirements for retiree to continue health benefits into retirement under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. This notice will be incorporated into Handbook 29.

- **AID Contract with National Archives and Records Service (NARS) for Comprehensive Records Management Study—AID General Notice (9/17/76)**—Announces that AID has contracted with NARS to conduct a detailed study of all aspects of records management, stressing the possible need for an automated record storage and retrieval system and requirements for advanced word processing equipment. The notice explains the reasons for this study.

- **Responsibility of Foreign Service Employees—AID/W Notice (9/20/76)**—Reminds Foreign Service employees stationed in AID/W they should obtain a medical examination in the Department of State Medical Division (M/MED) every two years to keep medical records current for transfer to overseas assignment; refer to Handbook 29, Appendix 1F, 3 FAM 684.7-3c.

Additional copies of the above may be obtained from the AID/Washington Distribution Branch, SER/MO/PAV/D.

HONOR ROLL

Two Win Superior Awards For Outstanding Service



FRANCES WHITE

Frances M. White

Frances M. White, most recently secretary and executive assistant to Deputy Administrator John E. Murphy received a Superior Honor Award just prior to her departure on November 23 from AID to return to her home in Midwest City, Okla. She was recognized for her "outstanding and dedicated service in support of the work of the Deputy Administrator and professional excellence as executive assistant and senior secretary."

Ms. White specifically was cited for her work in "maintaining a strong and effective liaison with senior Agency and other government officials, the White House staff, members of the Congress and their staffs, foreign dignitaries and private businessmen . . ."

Despite long hours and heavy job demands, Ms. White "worked with outstanding dedication and competence." She played a key role in identifying matters or problems requiring the attention of the Deputy Administrator. According to her nomination for the Superior Honor Award, she "exercises mature judgment in establishing priorities based on her personal knowledge of the demands on the Deputy Administrator's time and urgency of his needs. . . She calmly and efficiently handles the endless flow of papers and telephone calls, and is extremely adept and accurate in her analysis of documents . . ."

Karol Flakowicz

Karol Flakowicz, supervisory personnel specialist in the Personnel and Manpower Office, received a Superior Honor Award on the eve of his retirement from Federal service last month. He was cited for his "11 years of outstanding contribution to the Agency's workforce planning and reporting systems."



KAROL FLAKOWICZ

Mr. Flakowicz joined AID in 1965 after 20 years of service with other government agencies. He served in AID as Chief of the Personnel Statistical and Manpower Analysis Branch. There, he directed the development of systems for

workforce planning, preparation, correlation and presentation of personnel reports and data. Under his leadership an annual comprehensive report on the AID workforce was developed and now is issued annually.

According to the nomination, Mr. Flakowicz's contributions to the Congressional Presentation and to Congressional testimony for AID officials has "combined imagination and precision . . . He has provided thorough, comprehensive and thoughtful information involving the creative use of data to support Agency points of view."

Mr. Flakowicz also was cited for his leadership role in the revisions and refinements to the Agency's Personnel Data Systems (RAMPS).

Joseph Hutchinson

Joseph W. Hutchinson, supply clerk in the Distribution Branch of the Bureau for Program and Management Services, recently received a Special Achievement Award, which included a \$250 check.




Photo by Clyde McNair

Joseph W. Hutchinson, who received a cash award for special achievement in his job in the Agency's Distribution Branch, speeds AID literature on its way.

Mr. Hutchinson was recognized for his "highly efficient and outstanding performance" during 30 years of service in the Agency. He specifically was cited for updating AID's mailing list system by converting 65 percent of the list to an IBM system.

The new system promotes a more efficient procedure to make corrections, additions and deletions. According to the nomination, Mr. Hutchinson has been able to keep the mailings updated and saved AID an estimated \$700 a year in materials and manpower.

The nomination states that Mr.

Hutchinson's "initiative, awareness and knowledge of his duties and total concept of the distribution process and his performance in executing his duties in a highly efficient manner serves as an inspiration to his co-workers."

Charles J. Dove

Charles J. Dove, technical information specialist in the Technical Assistance Bureau, recently received the Meritorious Honor Award from Assistant Administrator Curtis Farrar. He was cited for his part in a team effort that has provided "AID missions and the worldwide development community ready access to publications produced under AID centrally-funded Research and Development Studies."

Dr. Dove was credited for instigating a research and development system that provides quarterly publication of AID research and development abstracts; a computerized address list for prompt mailings to 7,000 key addresses in developing nations; a system for producing microfiche masters of all publications listed in the abstract journal; a reproduction center to produce microfiche or hard copies on demand, and a drawing fund to facilitate prompt response to AID mission and developing country requests.

Afghan Awards



The Afghanistan Mission recently held its sixth Annual Award Ceremony to recognize more than 150 AID participants who have returned to Afghanistan after one or two years' training in the United States under the joint U.S.-Afghan participant training program. Certificates of Achievement were presented to the returnees who completed their AID-sponsored training between April 1975 and October 1976. U.S. Amba-

sador to Afghanistan Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., center, congratulates Asefa Amenzada, who studied to become an auxiliary nurse midwife. At left is Ali Ahmad Khuram, Minister of Planning. Seated is recently retired Mission Director Vincent W. Brown and at rear are Saif Rahman and Fouzia Popal, training assistants in the Mission. At right is Abdul Skakoor Farhadi, who received an M.S. degree in architecture.

FRONT LINES, an internal publication of the Agency for International Development, is published every other Thursday by the Publications Division, Office of Public Affairs. Its aim is to familiarize AID employees in Washington and overseas with policy, program, procedural and personnel information.

Employees are encouraged to contribute stories and ideas. Copy and photographs should be submitted at least one week in advance of publication to Front Lines, Room 4898, AID, State Department, Washington, D.C. 20523. Phone: (202) 632-7978.

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Jerry E. Rosenthal, Division Chief Alexanderina Shuler, Editor
Julie Cheu Riegg, Assistant Editor

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
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By Kay Chernush

At a time of widespread unemployment, layoffs and job uncertainty, Gary Reusche's main goal—to work himself out of a job—may strike many Americans as somewhat peculiar.

Mr. Reusche doesn't have a secret source of income and at 25 he isn't quite ready to retire, either. In fact, he and his wife, Carolyn, have a new family member to provide for—a daughter born last summer.

On closer examination, though, Mr. Reusche's plan is not as strange as it might first appear. On contract with AID and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, the young agronomist is working on a corn improvement project in Haiti, training local agricultural technicians of that Caribbean country in corn breeding, seed multiplication and extension work.

"My job will be a success when the *agronomes* are trained and they continue to have the financial backing to carry on the research and extension work we've started," he said, referring to his Haitian counterparts in Creole, the language he uses in his daily work. "It's my goal to make them self-sustaining, to see this thing go on without me."

The corn improvement project holds considerable promise for the island nation, which is faced with the problem of how to make less and less land produce more and better food to feed its expanding population. Today, most of Haiti's five million people eke out a meager existence from the soil, and good land is scarce. Years of deforestation and soil erosion have left the country with a dwindling amount of arable land. Per capita income in rural areas is estimated to be about \$70 a year, making Haiti the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Reusche's job is to oversee a 7.5-acre demonstration farm near Les Cayes, in the country's southern peninsula. There he screens both local and foreign varieties of corn and test-plants the ones that look promising in terms of yields and nutritive value. Working closely with the Mexican-based International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, he has been experimenting recently with high-lysine corn, which has considerably better protein characteristics than normal corn.

"Normal corn tends to be deficient in lysine and protein in general," Mr. Reusche explained. "But there are indications that high-lysine corn has approximately the same protein value as



Agronomist Gary Reusche and Haitian agricultural technicians set up a model corn silo, which Mr. Reusche hopes will catch on with Haitian farmers. The silos are inexpensive and easy to fabricate.

'WORKING HIMSELF OUT OF A JOB'

Seeking a Better Ear of Corn To Ease Haiti's Hunger Pains



Photos by Kay Chernush

Gary Reusche examines the results of a recent "variety trial." Each type of corn is carefully tagged and its char-

acteristics noted and analyzed. The most promising are then cross-bred to produce a better crop.

skimmed milk. Experiments show that children with protein deficiency who have been put on this type corn lose the signs of malnutrition."

Such a crop would be a tremendous boon to Haiti, whose people on average have one of the lowest protein and caloric intakes in the world, according to UN statistics. But there still are many problems connected with growing high-lysine corn. Mr. Reusche is quick to point out that he found a "much greater percentage" of rotten ears in the lysine material and that the yields are generally less than with normal varieties.

"It's still quite experimental. Although it's got great potential for the future, it really doesn't have much practical importance for Haitians just yet," he observed.

Mr. Reusche's enthusiasm for his work has led him to expand the scope of the original AID contract, which basically called on him only to look for different seed varieties that might show potential for good production in Haiti. However, he soon discovered that very little had been done locally in the area of corn research on which he could build, so he also began a program of basic research and breeding.

What corn breeding involves, he explained, is "choosing a variety that looks as if it has potential, hand-pollinating it, crossing it, developing it to bring out the better characteristics until you get a seed that's considerably better than what's available." He is particularly optimistic about improving a local variety called "Jeremie 3-mo," which has excellent growth characteristics but yields small ears and not enough of them. By crossing it with "foreign material" and selecting only the plants that show vigorous growth, he believes he can achieve a better quality ear and higher yielding plant.

"I think it can outyield the hybrid that's available for this area under lower levels of fertilization. 'It's all basic research, nothing real new about it. I'm following procedures that have been

used for 50 years in the United States," Mr. Reusche remarked.

Such efforts are relatively new, however, in Haiti and he has gone to great trouble to have a Haitian agronomist and agricultural technicians assigned to the project so that he is not working in a vacuum. He wants the Haitians to be able to take over the work when his contract expires in a few years.

The Reusches moved to Haiti from their McLean, Va., home in September 1975, after he was tapped for the job by Virginia Polytechnic Institute, from which he received both B.S. and M.S. degrees. Although his master's thesis and most of his research involved soils, he had a strong background in crop breeding and a long-standing interest in international agriculture.

Most days find him out at the farm by early morning, meeting with his Haitian counterpart, Robert Etienne, supervising the field hands and doing various phases of field work. This might include planting, taking data on the corn at different stages of its growth, fixing tools, building an inexpensive silo—"the normal things that go on around a farm during the growing season of corn," he said. He modestly did not mention that here they go on in Creole, a language he learned on the job and now speaks fluently.

By one or two o'clock in the afternoon, when the heat steams up from carefully tended furrows, Mr. Reusche heads for the cool confines of the office in his rented house in Les Cayes. There he catches up with all the paper work and data analysis involved in the project.

"Those are the more glorious days," he said, shaking his head at the thought of all the things that can and do go wrong. But already farmers are stopping by the farm and commenting on how nice the corn looks. He's counting on their interest and need as well as his counterparts' resourcefulness to make the corn improvement project a success.