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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JIM CANNON *JC*
SUBJECT: Memorandum from Secretary Coleman
Re: Busing

Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Coleman commenting on the Attorney General's proposed legislation to limit the remedial authority of Federal courts in school desegregation cases. In it, the Secretary expresses his strong opposition to the legislation, which he views as a retreat from existing constitutional doctrine in the school desegregation area, and urges that it not be submitted to the Congress.

Secretary Coleman has also requested that a copy of this memorandum to you be circulated among other Members of the Cabinet.

However, the nature of his memorandum is such that I do not feel I should circulate it without your authority.

_____ Circulate to Attorney General
Levi and Secretary Mathews

_____ Do not circulate



THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

June 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


FROM: William T. Coleman, Jr.

SUBJECT: Attorney General's Desegregation Bill

There is no level at which this bill can be condoned. Its submission has the potential for great mischief, in that it will raise false hopes in, and stiffen the resolve of, those who would violently or otherwise resist judicial desegregation orders. It also seeks to establish special rules for Blacks who especially need constitutional rights and this is particularly offensive because the Department of Justice is the leading contender for another rule of law when Blacks are not involved. In addition, I do not feel that what the bill seeks on a policy level to do is consistent with what I believe is the position of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Finally, on a technical level, the bill, with all due respect, is confusing and clumsily drafted. If enacted, it will impose on litigators and trial judges unworkable standards and burdens of proof. It is unconstitutional in at least four respects.

I shall concentrate, however, on four major respects in which the bill seeks to roll back existing constitutional doctrine and on the fact that it will make one rule for Blacks and another for all other litigants.


1. The bill would limit judicial relief to those "particular schools" whose racial composition has been affected by intentional discrimination, and within those schools, to the correction of only that amount of racial imbalance that can be shown to have resulted from such discrimination (p. 8). There are two problems with



this. The first, as anyone with an ounce of trial experience will recognize, is that it will pose impossible burdens on lawyers (for both sides) and courts alike. The apparent attempt to place the burden of going forward on the causal issue on the school board (p. 9) will not simplify matters -- the standard is unworkable in any event -- and in addition is entirely negated by the subsequent declaration that no presumption of causation is to be drawn from a combined showing of racial imbalance and intentional discrimination (pp. 9-10): if those two together don't make a case, obviously nothing can.

The second problem, of course, is that the bill in this respect importantly cuts back on constitutional holdings of the Supreme Court. The Court has indicated repeatedly that where a school district is shown to have engaged in intentional segregation, the constitutional mandate will not be satisfied until there is "a unitary system": for years the remedial focus has been on the system, not on the individual school, let alone on the mere correction within the individual school of that incremental amount of imbalance that can be shown to have resulted from unconstitutional motives. The point, as you know, was made entirely clear in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), where the Court indicated that a showing of intentional segregation in one section of Denver supported a city-wide remedy. The Court had two strings to its bow in Keyes: first, the limited showing was enough to justify classifying the entire district as a dual, segregated one which had to be made unitary, and second, "common sense dictates the conclusion" that officials who intentionally segregate in one part of a school district are similarly motivated as regards their actions in other parts, even though the plaintiffs are not able directly to prove it elsewhere. This bill would deny that obvious common sense.

The bill does nod to the demands of reality and the Constitution when it relieves the focus on particular schools where such focus proves "not feasible" (p. 8). But this is only a nod, clearly insufficient in both respects. In the first place, there doubtless will be occasions on which judges will refuse to make a finding of infeasibility. Some judges are not too bright; others are less than wholly sensitive to racial segregation claims; and still others, quite understandably,



will assume that the Attorney General and the Congress did not intend (no matter what common sense might suggest) the proviso to be universally applicable and will therefore seek at least some occasions on which to refrain from invoking it. But even assuming the proviso is widely or even universally invoked the findings that school-by-school causal breakdowns are "not feasible" become the order of the day, the practical and constitutional problems are not solved; such a finding serves only to remove the "particular school" limitation on relief. It does not purport to alter the more general limitation;^{1/} to the effect that correction must be made only to the extent that "the overall pattern of student concentration" throughout the district has been affected by intentional segregation (p. 8), and the incredible proof problems that more general limitation will entail. Nor, obviously -- because of the retention of the general limitation -- will this proviso, even assuming intelligent application, even begin to satisfy the demands of Keyes.

2. The bill would limit busing orders to three years, extendable under certain circumstances to five (pp. 11-12). No point to this, other than political expediency, is even hinted at: it is plainly arbitrary and will often fail to satisfy the constitutional requirement of a move to a unitary system. The Attorney General appears to regard busing as a criminal sentence rather than a remedy, with a single generation of students (of all races) being sacrificed as penance for the earlier misdeeds of the school board. The punishment having been thus served, things can revert to the status quo.

3. The bill would limit judicial relief to that racial segregation which is inflicted by school

1/In fact, the bill becomes entirely unintelligible at this point. Within a district, it makes no sense to speak of imbalance except insofar as the racial percentages in one school vary from those in another. The more sensible course would have been to relieve the general limitation -- to correction of only that incremental amount of imbalance that can be shown to have resulted from intentional segregation -- when it became infeasible. The Attorney General must have realized, however, that in the hands of an intelligent judge that would gut the bill entirely, and therefore settled on an unintelligible compromise.



officials (thereby excluding, for example, a case in which there has been intentional segregation by housing officials applying a law which requires racial housing segregation, which in turn has resulted in imbalanced schools.) This result is not apparent on a first reading of the bill,^{2/} but it is clear nonetheless, for two independent reasons. The first is that racial intent on the part of officials other than school officials must be proved "on the basis of evidence other than the effects of /Their/ acts or knowledge of such effects alone . . ." (p. 6). Presumably, as regards nonschool officials (why the difference?) a virtual confession of racial intent (not just knowledge) is needed. Surely the Attorney General is aware of what that means: even Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), perhaps the clearest case of nonexplicit but intentional racial separation in history, involved only an (unavoidable) inference from effect. Second, "unlawful discrimination" is defined as action which is "intended to discriminate against students on the basis of their race . . ." (p. 5, emphasis added). Obviously, an intent on the part of nonschool officials to discriminate against minority students will not be demonstrable.^{3/} What will be demonstrable, at most, is an intention to discriminate against minority persons generally: the effect specifically on students will be derivative.

4. The Department of Justice has been the most successful exponent of the theory in the Courts that

^{2/} Apparently officials other than school officials are subject to section 6 but not to section 5 (see p. 6). What that means is not clear, since the difference between sections 5 and 6 never entirely clarifies. But it doesn't matter, since, for the reasons discussed in the text, the acts of officials other than school officials are practically exempt from the entire bill in any event.

^{3/} There is an added problem here. Taken seriously, the definition resurrects Plessy v. Ferguson: one apparently has to show not simply an intention to segregate on the basis of race but rather an intention comparatively to disadvantage minority students.

once it is proven that a corporation has violated the antitrust laws the remedy can involve parts of the business which were acquired in legal ways which did not violate the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 391 U.S. 244 (1968); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88 (1950); and United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724 (1944). The same rule applies in reapportionment cases and in unfair labor practices cases. In fact, the novel concept advanced in the bill would apply only to racial segregation cases. This is not only offensive to those who believe in the Constitution but itself is unconstitutional.

In at least four respects, therefore, the bill would roll back the existing demands of the Constitution. The Attorney General's theory, apparently, is that Congress can control the jurisdiction of federal courts and thereby deprive them of constitutional remedies they have been invoking (see p. 3). But it is one thing to deprive a court of jurisdiction over a class of cases entirely, and quite another to prescribe to it what it can and cannot decide and order in a case over which jurisdiction is otherwise preserved. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872); H. Hart & H. Wechsler, Federal Courts 316 (2d ed. 1973). In particular, Congress' control over the jurisdiction of federal courts cannot constitutionally be invoked intentionally to deprive litigants of rights to which the courts have found them to be constitutionally entitled. See, e.g., Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1307-08 (1970); P. Brest, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking, chap. 15 (1975). And even assuming it could get away with it, this Administration dedicated to restoring confidence in government, simply should not be attempting by statute to deny recognized constitutional rights.

Finally, the bill, if enacted, would destroy one of the high moments of U.S. history, namely how through the law the white majority recognized the legitimate demands of a discrete minority and under the leadership of courageous federal district judges brought about the changes which have helped this country to be no longer divided on racial grounds.


William T. Coleman, Jr.



cc: Quern
Parsons
Cavanaugh



THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20410

June 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO: James M. Cannon
SUBJECT: Attorney General's Draft Bill

I have sent the attached, which is in bare outline form, to no one, but I would like to discuss with the Attorney General, William Coleman and Paul O'Neill.


Carla A. Hills

Attachment



Reference is made to the Attorney General's Draft Bill sent to me by memorandum dated June 19, 1976.

I do not here address the Constitutional questions, which the Attorney General has analyzed and determined his analysis to be constitutionally valid on grounds which he describes as "respectable", although not without opposition. I am here concerned that the Draft Bill has racial implications that can be avoided.

Bad

Instead of declaring this a Bill primarily to establish limitations on the remedies that can be ordered in suits to desegregate our schools, I suggest that the Administration declare that it seeks to eliminate the condition of educationally disadvantaged schools.

Such condition may arise from

- (1) natural forces which are lawful, or
- (2) unconstitutional action.

This Administration can declare that it desires to help remedy that condition regardless of the cause. ^{1/}

1/ The present Bill seems to imply that where the condition occurs from natural and therefore lawful causes, there is no remedy to the social ill.

What is problem trying to correct.

*appears to
inferior schools.
No school
should be an
inferior school*

*2225
Kudlin*

The remedy proposed in either case is local conciliation through Commission encouragement, and the Commission should have funds at its disposal.^{2/}

In addition where there is a showing of unconstitutional violation, as specified in the Bill, the court can fashion a remedy which includes bussing, but must reassess the condition after three years and again in five years and can extend the remedy in extraordinary circumstance.

The emphasis should be on an effort to rid the country of the unwanted condition, to wit, educationally disadvantaged school systems.

- a) System of ~~other~~ state
b) Keep decision - part = all tainted
c) opta
3 + 2 = continuing

^{2/} E.g., The Emergency School Assistance Act which provides school boards with financial assistance while they are undergoing voluntary or court ordered desegregation.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1976

TO: Dick Cheney
~~Jim~~ Cannon
Jim Cavanaugh
Dick Parsons
David Lissy

FROM: Robert Goldwin *RG*

This letter from Diane Ravitch, received today, contains a suggestion that should be considered for inclusion in the busing statement.

She recommends that it is time for a major government-sponsored study of (1) the educational effects of ordered desegregation on the children and (2) educational programs that are most effective with minority and poor students.



June 15, 1976

Mr. Robert Goldwin
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bob,

I hope that last Saturday's meeting proved useful to the President and his advisers on the subject of school integration. I believe that there is specific action that the federal government can take to help clarify the issue. In addition to whatever legislative steps seem appropriate, I would urge the President to commission a "Coleman II" report. Coleman I, which studied equality of educational opportunity, found that resources were almost equal but that educational outcomes for blacks and whites were very unequal. The question that arose from Coleman I was how to improve the educational results for black children so that the average black child would not end the 12th grade three years behind his white counterpart. Coleman I implied that black pupils in predominantly white schools did better academically, but failed to note that these black pupils were already living in integrated neighborhoods and were probably from at least lower-middle-class families; a less celebrated finding in Coleman I was that blacks in all-black schools actually scored higher on many tests than blacks in schools that were half-black-half-white and blacks in schools that were integrated but predominantly black. We do not at present have any theories to explain the latter finding.

If there were a Coleman II, it should examine two questions: first, what has been the educational impact of busing (or coerced desegregation); and second, what educational methods or programs are known to produce better educational results for either/or minority children and poor children. I have seen isolated evaluations of the effect of coerced desegregation; the Office of Education commissioned one in Waco, Texas, for instance, that was released last year but never received any attention. I suggest that you get a copy of it, as it seems to be a balanced study; perhaps O.E. has commissioned similar studies in other cities.

We all believe in the same ends: an integrated society and equality of education. The means, however, should not be considered moral or immoral. If busing does not provide higher quality education with better results, if it leads to a substantial white exodus, if it does not enhance race relations, then it should be discarded for means that do work. Busing is an instrument, nothing more; it should be judged by its effectiveness. I hope that the President would see the wisdom of amassing the data that would establish its educational effects in an authoritative fashion.

Yours truly,

Diane Ravitch



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: RON NESSEN

FROM: MARGITA WHITE

SUBJECT: Briefing on Busing

Attached at Tab A is a suggested invitation list for 34 columnists to be invited to a briefing on busing.

This list is culled from our current list of 48 columnists (Tab B).

I've talked to Jim Cavanaugh and we agree the briefers should be the Attorney General and Secretary Mathews.

Although the legislation is scheduled to be announced on Wednesday at 11:00 a.m., I gather this is not final. I've asked the PIOs for Levi and Mathews to check their respective calendars for 4:00 p.m. Tuesday and 9:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday so that we can pick one of these times for the briefing. The most convenient time may be 9:30 a.m. Wednesday morning because Mathews will be meeting with the President from 8:00 to 9:30 (I have not been able to confirm whether Levi also will be in that meeting).

I recommend the briefing be held in the Roosevelt Room. Unfortunately, the Roosevelt Room is booked for the remainder of the week, including all three time slots. The Wednesday 9:30 time would require the Jerry Jones meeting to be held elsewhere.

I also recommend that consideration be given to having the President drop by at the beginning of the briefing to make a few comments before turning the program over to Mathews and Levi.

Finally, I will be working with the PIOs for Justice and HEW to schedule some out-of-town editorial board briefings for Mathews and Levi.

cc: Jim Cavanaugh ✓



POSSIBLE INVITEES - BRIEFING ON BUSING

Holmes Alexander - McNaught
Robert S. Allen - Field
Don Bacon - Newhouse
Charles Bartlett - Field
David Broder - Washington Post
Marquis Childs - United Features
Al Cromley - Daily Oklahoman
Ray Cromley - NEA
Roscoe Drummond - L. A. Times
Alan Emory - NANA
Rowland Evans - Field
Ernest B. Ferguson - Baltimore Sun
Clayton Fritchey - L. A. Times
Meg Greenfield - Post-Newsweek
James J. Kilpatrick - Washington Star-News
Joseph Kraft - Field
Saul Kohler - Newhouse
Peter Lisagor - Chicago Sun-Times
Martin Nolan - United Features
Robert Novak - Field
John Osborne - New Republic
Eugene Risher - Cox
Carl T. Rowan - Washington Post
Godfrey Sperling - Christian Science Monitor
Hugh Sidey - Time
TRB (Richard Strout) - The New Republic
Jerry terHorst - Detroit News
Nick Thimmesch - L. A. Times
Frank van der Linden - United Features
George Will - Washington Post/Newsweek
James Weighart - New York Daily News
Tom Wicker - New York Times

Philip Geyelin - Editor of Editorial Page, Washington Post
Edwin Yoder, Editorial Page Director, Washington Star-News



WASHINGTON AREA NEWSPAPER COLUMNISTS

Holmes Alexander - McNaught
Robert S. Allen - Field
Joseph Alsop - L. A. Times
Don Bacon - Newhouse
Charles Bartlett - Field
Thomas Braden - Los Angeles Times
David Broder - Washington Post
Art Buchwald
Patrick Buchanan - New York Times
Marquis Childs - United Features
Al Cromley - Daily Oklahoman
Ray Cromley - NEA
Ralph de Toledano - Copley
Roscoe Drummon - Los Angeles Times
George Embrey - Columbus Dispatch
Alan Emory - NANA
Rowland Evans - Field
Ernest B. Ferguson - Baltimore Sun
Clayton Fritchey - L. A. Times
Meg Greenfield - Post-Newsweek
James J. Kilpatrick - Washington Star-News
Louis Kohlmeier - Chicago Tribune
Joseph Kraft - Field
Saul Kohler - Newhouse
Peter Lisagor - Chicago Sun-Times
Sarah McClendon - United Features
Marianne Means - King Features
Martin Nolan - United Features
Robert Novak - Field
Crosby Noyes - Washington Star-News
John Osborne - New Republic
Eugene Risher - Cox Newspapers
Carl T. Rowan - Washington Post
Hobart Rowan - Washington Post
Godfrey Sperling - Christian Science Monitor
William Safire - New York Times
Joseph Slevin - Knight
Hugh Sidey - Time
TRB, The New Republic (Richard Strout)
Jerry terHorst - Detroit News
Nick Thimmesch - L. A. Times
Frank van der Linden - United Features
George Will - Washington Post
Garry Wills - Washington Star-News
James Weighart - New York Daily News
Richard Wilson - Register and Tribune
Tom Wicker - New York Times

