

The original documents are located in Box 57, folder “Protection - Foreign Officials and Dignitaries (4)” of the Philip Buchen Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brent Scowcroft
FROM: Philip W. Buchen *P.W.B.*
SUBJECT: Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

I understand that there is a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, which was established by Executive Order after three Foreign Service Officers were killed in, I believe, Khartoum.

Apparently, the Cabinet Committee itself has not met in at least two years, but has a Working Group which consists mainly of State Department employees.

I would appreciate your personal appraisal of whether a need still exists for this Committee; and particularly whether the Cabinet Committee structure is still necessary.

For your convenience, I attach copies of documents concerning the origin, purposes, and structure of the Committee.

cc: John Marsh
Don Rumsfeld



January 6, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP W. BUCHEN

SUBJECT: Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

I understand that there is a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, which was established by Executive Order after three Foreign Service Officers were killed in, I believe, Khartoum.

Apparently, the Cabinet Committee itself has not met in at least two years, but has a Working Group which consists mainly of State Department employees.

I would appreciate your personal appraisal of whether a need still exists for this Committee; and particularly whether the Cabinet Committee structure is still necessary.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Jack Marsh:

Under present
circumstances, I suggest
we should question
the continuance of
this Committee and its
working group.

Is this proposed
memo to Brent an appropriate
way to do that?



January 6, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP W. BUCHEN

SUBJECT: Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

I understand that there is a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, which was established by Executive Order after three Foreign Service Officers were killed in, I believe, Khartoum.

Apparently, the Cabinet Committee itself has not met in at least two years, but has a Working Group which consists mainly of State Department employees.

I would appreciate your personal appraisal of whether a need still exists for this Committee; and particularly whether the Cabinet Committee structure is still necessary.



AUTHORITY: Memorandum, 9/25/72, from the President to the Secretary of State and
Memorandum, 9/25/72, from the President to the Heads of Depts and Agencies

METHOD: Ex officio

TERM: Pleasure of the President

SALARY: No additional compensation

- PURPOSE:
1. Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities as the collection of intelligence world wide and the physical protection of U. S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the United States.
 2. Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary recommend methods for their effective implementation.
 3. Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur
 4. Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs.
 5. Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.

	Department	Subject
CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM	INDEPENDENT	MEMBERS

MEMBERS:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Transportation
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs
The Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and
such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.

NOTE: The Cabinet Committee will be supported by a Working Group comprised of personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Committee, chaired by the designee of the Secretary of State.

CHAIRMAN: The Secretary of State



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Action to Combat Terrorism

As I stated in the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State, I have today directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, to be chaired by Secretary Rogers. I consider it to be of the utmost importance that we move urgently and efficiently to attack this worldwide problem.

This Committee will consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our Government can take appropriate action in response to terrorist acts swiftly and effectively. In this regard, Secretary Rogers will be in touch with other governments and international organizations.

I expect that you will be fully responsive to the requests of the Secretary of State and assist him in every way in his efforts to coordinate government-wide actions against terrorism.

Richard Nixon



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Action to Combat Terrorism

Your report to me on the measures that are being taken to combat terrorism indicates that we are moving effectively against the problem of thwarting acts of terrorism both here and abroad. The two committees you have set up to cope with this major problem are making commendable progress toward this end.

Because of the great importance and urgency I attach to dealing with the worldwide problem of terrorism, which encompasses diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement functions, I am hereby establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

The Cabinet Committee will be chaired by the Secretary of State and will comprise

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Transportation
The United States Ambassador to
the United Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs
The Acting Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation

and such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.

The Cabinet Committee will be supported by a Working Group comprised of personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Committee, chaired by the designee of the Secretary of State.

The Committee will consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our government can take appropriate action in response to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively. The Secretary of State will be in touch with other governments and international organizations toward this goal.

Federal officers and Federal departments and agencies are to cooperate fully with the Cabinet Committee in carrying out its functions under this directive, and they shall comply with the policies, guidelines, standards, and procedures prescribed by the Cabinet Committee.

More specifically, the Cabinet Committee shall:

- (1) Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities as the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical protection of U.S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the United States.
- (2) Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary recommend methods for their effective implementation.
- (3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur.
- (4) Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs; and
- (5) Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.

Richard Nixon



Wednesday 1/8/75

10:05 Jay had to go to a meeting but left a message -----

They don't know whether Bresney will be coming over to Boston for treatment; if he does -- he's covered by Secret Service -- no problem.

Jay does have the copy of the Ingersoll letter concerning the visit of Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id of Oman -- and advises that Oman is a chief of state so he is automatically covered. It has been cleared with the Secret Service.

(He would be covered whether on personal or official business.)



185.
cc to [unclear]

7500250

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 7, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Phil:

At our invitation, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id of Oman and an official party of about twelve will arrive in Washington January 9 directly from London and will depart January 11, back to London. We do not expect the Sultan (or any members of his party) to travel outside of Washington at any time during the visit.

This is not a state visit. It is a private visit, but, befitting the first visit by Oman's Chief of State, there are several high level calls (on the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense), and several social functions and some sightseeing.

Oman is not involved in the Middle East conflict, other than in pro forma expressions of support for the Arab side. It is a modest oil exporter. The United States enjoys excellent relations with Oman although there is little domestic American interest in Oman or our relations with it. However, the present regime in Oman does have enemies - mostly embodied in the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman" (PFLO), a radical marxist revolutionary organization based in South Yemen, which is carrying on a small-scale guerrilla war of insurgency in Oman's southernmost province of Dhofar. PFLO exists also as a subversive organization in other small Gulf states, and has connections with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). We know of occasional rumors of

The Honorable
Philip W. Buchen,
Counsel to the President,
The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS

W/HM 5/9/00



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

PFLO plots to assassinate the Sultan or otherwise disrupt the regime, but have no knowledge of any plots (1) involving Americans, (2) in the United States, or (3) in connection with the Sultan's visit.

We believe that Secret Service protection is therefore appropriate. I will be greatly appreciative if you would favorably consider Secret Service protection for the Sultan during his visit.

Very best regards.

Sincerely,



Robert S. Ingersoll

Enclosures:

1. The Sultan's Program
2. Biographic Sketch
3. Members of the Sultan's Party



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines
By W/H, NARA, Date 5/9/00

Visit to Washington of Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id of Oman

THURSDAY

9 January

- 1100* - Arrive from London at Andrews AFB in private VC-10. To be met by a State Department delegation headed by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll and a number of Arab Ambassadors. To proceed directly to Blair House.
- 1415 - Call on Qaboos at Blair House by Secretary of State Kissinger
- 1430 - Call by Qaboos on President Ford at White House.
- 2000 - Dinner by Secretary of State at State Dept. in Qaboos' honor. Some 70 guests.

FRIDAY

10 January

- 0930 - Laying of wreath on Tomb of Unknown Soldier, followed by sightseeing tour of Washington.
- 1200 - Call by Qaboos on Secretary of State at State Dept.
- 1315 - Luncheon by Vice President at Anderson House. Some 20 guests.
- 1500 - Call by Qaboos on Secretary of Defense at Pentagon.
- 1800-1930 - Reception by Omani Ambassador in honor of Qaboos at Blair House. Some 100 guests.

SATURDAY

11 January

- 1715 - Departure of Qaboos and party from Blair House.
- 1800 - Departure of Qaboos and party from Andrews AFB in private VC-10 for London.

*Estimated time, will be determined later.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 01566

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Itinerary

DESCRIPTION Itinerary for the Sultan Qaboos bin
Sa'id of Oman's visit to the U.S.

CREATION DATE 01/1975?

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 001900557

COLLECTION TITLE Philip W. Buchen Files

BOX NUMBER 57

FOLDER TITLE Protection - Foreign Officials and
Dignitaries (1)-(6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/1988

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 01567

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Biography(ies)

DESCRIPTION Biography of Qabus ibn Sa'id Al Bu
Sa'id of Oman.

CREATION DATE 09/12/1974

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 001900557

COLLECTION TITLE Philip W. Buchen Files

BOX NUMBER 57

FOLDER TITLE Protection - Foreign Officials and
Dignitaries (1)-(6)

DATE WITHDRAWN 09/07/1988

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST LET

MEMBERS OF HIS MAJESTY'S TRAVELING PARTY

His Majesty Qaboos bin Said
The Sultan of Oman

His Excellency Sayyid Tarik Bin Taimur al-Said
His Majesty's Personal Advisor on Diplomatic
Affairs and Senior Ambassador

His Excellency Qais Abdul-Munim Al-Zawawi
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

His Excellency Ahmed Macki
The Ambassador of Oman to the United States

His Excellency Abdul Hafidh Salim Rajab
Minister of Communications

His Excellency Ghassan Shakir
Foreign Policy Advisor to the Sultan

His Excellency Yahya Omar
Foreign Policy Advisor to the Sultan

Mr. Nureddin Farghal
Chief of Palace Protocol

Colonel J. Harcourt
Security Officer to His Majesty

Plus three to five household servants.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 30, 1975


Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, I am directing that protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service be continued for the following foreign Diplomatic Missions located in New York City:

Jordan
Syria
Palestine Liberation Organization
Lebanon
Israel
League of Arab States

Protection, in the case of each Mission, should relate to the office installation of the Mission at its upper floor location within the commercial building where it is operating. The protection should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue until March 31, 1974, unless further extended.

Sincerely yours,



Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223



November 26, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, and pursuant to my earlier letter to you of November 1, 1974, I am directing that protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service be continued for the following foreign Diplomatic Missions located in New York City:

Palestine Liberation Organization
League of Arab States
Jordan
Lebanon
Saudi Arabian Mission
Saudi Arabian Consulate

Algeria
Syria
Israel
Turkey Mission
Turkey Consulate - *cont*
Cyprus - *drop*

Additionally, protection for the Mission of Brazil shall continue in accordance with my letter to you of November 25, 1974.

In the case of each such Mission, the protection should relate to the office installation of the Mission at its upper floor location within the commercial building where it is operating. The protection should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue until the conclusion of the General Assembly debates about December 17, 1974.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223

bcc: ~~Geoffrey Shepard, Domestic Council~~

Laurence Silberman, Deputy Attorney General

John Thomas, Asst Secy of St for Admin Rm 6316

PWB:JF:em

Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Depty Asst Secy for

International Organization Affairs, Dept of State Rm 6323

General Scowcroft

Donald Rumsfeld

H.S. Knight, Director of Secret Service

1800 G St. NW



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: Jan. 30, 1975

TO: Philip Buchen



FROM: JAY FRENCH

Efforts are underway that will ultimately decide the issue of EPS protection in New York City. Until this resolution is achieved, I recommend that you continue the status quo.



Joint memo from State and
Treasury requesting
60-day extension for EPS
coverage in New York.

(Jay has a copy)





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

JAN 28 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

FROM: John M. Thomas *JM*
Assistant Secretary
for Administration
Department of State

David R. Macdonald *DRM*
Assistant Secretary (Enforcement,
Operations, and Tariff Affairs)
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Continued EPS Presence at Certain
Locations in New York City

The Department of State is requesting continued EPS fixed post coverage at six of the eight locations which were authorized in your letter of December 19, 1974. This request is for a 60 day extension. After discussions between officials of the Department of State and Department of the Treasury (including Secret Service) it has not been possible to reach an agreed position with respect to this request. Basically, the reason for inability to reach agreement is that the Department of State bases its request upon its strongly felt belief that a potential danger exists for damage to premises or injury to personnel at the locations concerned, while the Treasury position is that, regardless of such potential danger, the "temporary" and "emergency" aspects of this protection as required in the EPS authorizing legislation no longer apply to these locations where EPS officers have been stationed for extended periods of time.

For the above reasons we are attaching memoranda which set forth in detail the positions of the Department of State and the Department of Treasury, with the request that the decision be made in your office.

Attachments:

Department of State Position Paper
Department of Treasury Position Paper

1-29-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE REQUEST
FOR EPS COVERAGE IN NEW YORK CITY

The Department of State requests that Executive Protective Service fixed post coverage be continued for 60 days beyond January 30 at six New York City locations: The Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese and Israeli Missions to the United Nations and the Palestine Liberation Organization and League of Arab States Observer Offices. Continued coverage at the Ethiopian and Algerian Missions to the United Nations is not requested at this time although unsettled conditions in Ethiopia could make it necessary to request reinstatement of fixed post coverage at the Ethiopian Mission on short notice.

The threat of injury to members of UN Missions and damage to their offices and property is imminent and serious. The increased tempo of Jewish Defense League activity in recent days is directly related to PLO efforts to obtain international recognition (attack on Indian UN Mission) and to opposition to Soviet emigration policy (shooting into the Ukrainian UN Mission). It can quickly escalate further as a result of the volatile Middle East situation where continuing incursions into Israel and Lebanon have resulted in deaths and injuries. The two recent attacks on Israeli airliners at Orly Airport are another example of incidents which can be reflected in counter action in New York (demonstration against Aeroflot).

While the Middle East is the principal source of possible security problems for UN Missions in New York, events in both Ethiopia and Cyprus are also explosive issues. The continuing clash between Ethiopian government and Eritrean insurgents has been reflected in large potentially dangerous demonstrations by the Ethiopian and Eritrean communities in New York. Similarly, continued communal strife on Cyprus and the coming debate in the Congress on U. S. aid to Turkey agitate the Greek-American community in New York.

We consider that these possibilities for injury and damage to personal of UN Missions and their offices require that we maintain a continuing high state of alert. It is the Department's position that this minimum EPS coverage described in paragraph one is essential to supplement the New York City police in areas where they cannot or will not operate in providing protection. The Federal Government has a clear obligation under international law, made explicit in the US-UN Headquarters agreement to insure the security of missions attached to the United Nations. There is no present alternative resource to EPS personnel to which we can look for this protection.



MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

SUBJECT: United States Treasury Department Position on
Continuation of Executive Protective Service
(EPS) in New York City

The current directive assigning EPS officers to New York City UN Missions expires on January 30, 1975. The EPS has been stationed in New York City since September 30, 1973, and we have, over the last sixteen months, worked with the State Department in an attempt to provide for the protective needs of foreign UN Missions. In light of current circumstances, Treasury's position is that all EPS officers should be removed from New York City on January 30, 1975.

BACKGROUND

Public Law 91-217 which established the EPS authorized the President to assign officers to areas of the country other than the District of Columbia on a case-by-case basis. During hearings on this legislation, committee representatives of both the House and Senate indicated opposition to the expansion of the EPS into areas of traditionally local responsibility. The Senate report states in part "it is believed that this authority (the President's) should be used only in exceptional cases and then on a temporary basis until the local police force can provide the level of protection deemed essential."

The House report is most explicit, stating in part..."the committee here stated primarily that this authority (the President's) extends only to situations of extraordinary gravity where the local police force is totally incapable of providing the level of protection deemed essential to the International integrity of the United States.....the authority is not and may not be construed to be a substitute for the responsibility of local forces to provide protection for Consulates, the United Nations, and similar foreign delegations within the United States. The increased protection to be provided by the EPS is designed primarily as a preventive



measure within the Washington Metropolitan area. It is not intended that this new Service assume the responsibility of other police departments to provide protection to persons and property within their respective jurisdictions."

The long term use or permanent assignment of EPS to United Nations Missions in New York City is contrary to the strongly expressed Congressional intent to limit the EPS to metropolitan areas of the District of Columbia, except "on a temporary basis...in...situations of extraordinary gravity."

In assessing the New York United Nations situation there are two distinct types of threats which should be considered. One is the common criminal, protester, or aberrant individual, who through gaining access to the premises of a Foreign Diplomatic Mission can present an embarrassment or a nuisance. The other and more ominous threat is that presented by a confirmed terrorist or an organized group dedicated to violence and equipped with deadly weapons. Even in the optimum conditions of Washington, D.C. the EPS officer on fixed post duty has his greatest deterrent effect upon the common criminal, demonstrator, or deranged person. For the determined terrorist or organized group he serves no security purpose. Indeed a door guard by himself is simply a lightning rod or fixed target which identifies the location of a Foreign Mission.

PRESENT SITUATION

There continues to be general unrest in foreign countries but we have no specific threat information against UN Missions in New York. The UN General Assembly is not in session and visits of high level foreign officials that attract attention have been few.

It is Treasury's opinion that the EPS should be utilized outside the Washington area only on a temporary basis, for a limited period of time, by Presidential directive, and in



exceptional cases. The normal day-to-day operation of the United Nations, in our opinion, is not considered to be an unusual circumstance or exceptional case.

RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons outlined above, the Treasury Department recommends that the EPS be removed completely from New York City on January 30, 1975.

*Protection
EPS*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JEANNE W. DAVIS

FROM:

PHILIP W. BUCHEN

P.W.B.

At your request, I have reviewed the attached memoranda concerning protection of foreign officials and installations. Set forth below are my comments.

1. I agree with the several conclusions noted on page 3 of the Granger Memorandum in which the ad hoc working group expressed its agreement.

The transfer of EPS from Treasury to State would involve a significant change of purpose and policy as well as the creation of a new Federal police force, and I concur with Justice and Treasury in opposing this action.


I favor the use of a federal subsidy for New York City to be used exclusively for protection of United Nations activities. However, I am not certain that the best and most appropriate source of these funds is LEAA.

2. The positions which are discussed above are applicable to the first and second recommendations made by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll at page 4 of the Granger Memorandum. With regard to the third recommendation, I believe that an indefinite extension of EPS in New York until final resolution of this matter would unduly restrict the President's statutory discretion to direct (or withdraw) EPS protection for diplomatic missions in locations in the United States other than in Washington, D. C., 3 U.S.C.A. § 202. This recommendation should be deleted.



3. It would be preferable to me if you would delete the indication that the White House Counsel concurs in the recommendations of the Granger Memorandum (page 6) and the Kissinger Memorandum to the President (page 6).
4. Rather than comment on the options listed in the Granger Memorandum, I offer the following recommendations in summary of my position:
 - no presidential action at this time
 - initiation of a small OMB study of State's Diplomatic Security Force
 - informal exploration with New York City officials of the possibility of subsidizing that City's protection of U.N. activities. It would hinder such negotiations if the President had been asked for and given his approval for exploratory talks on this point.
 - a reasonable increase of EPS and State Security personnel to meet the greater demands which they are experiencing
 - no firm commitment to keep EPS in New York until final resolution of the subsidy issue since such a commitment is unnecessarily binding

In the event Secretary Kissinger decides to forward a Memorandum to the President, I would like the opportunity to expand further upon the Counsel's position.



THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

February 4, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PHILIP BUCHEN

FROM:

JAY FRENCH 

Over the last few months, I have informally kept in touch with Treasury, State, OMB and Domestic Council about the status of the Ingersoll Proposal (also known as the Hoffacker Proposal), which deals with the protection of foreign officials and installations. Even though some matters remain unresolved, the N.S.C. staff is preparing to forward these proposals to Secretary Kissinger. You have been asked for your comments about (1) a proposed memorandum from C. Granger (Director of N.S.C. Planning Staff) to Secretary Kissinger and (2) an optional memorandum from Secretary Kissinger to the President.

There are essentially four items under consideration:

- (a) Expansion of EPS for better protection of installations.
- (b) Expansion of State Department's Security for protection of foreign officials other than chiefs of state and heads of government.
- (c) Financial assistance for New York City in exchange for protection of U.N. Missions.
- (d) Transfer of the greater part of EPS to State Department to create a Diplomatic Security Force.

The Treasury Department approves of all items except the transfer of EPS to State.

The Justice Department similarly does not approve transfer of EPS to State. Also, Justice opposes the use of LEAA funds for financial assistance to New York. However, Justice does not object to the concept of subsidizing New York.

1. Procedurely, I believe your comments are properly requested only if Secretary Kissinger decides to forward the memorandum to the President.
2. However, if you would like to briefly reply, I have attached several pertinent comments.

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS

January 31, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROY L. ASH
 PHILIP W. BUCHEN
 KENNETH R. COLE, JR.

FROM: JEANNE W. DAVIS *JWD*

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations

The NSC Staff has prepared a set of recommendations on the protection of foreign officials and installations for possible submission to the President. They have been informally coordinated with Mr. Bill Fee (OMB), Mr. Jay French (Office of the White House Counsel), and Mr. Lynn May (Domestic Council Staff).

We would now appreciate receiving formal agency concurrence and/or comments on these recommendations contained in the attached memoranda.

Because of current high-level interest in this subject, we would appreciate receiving your reply no later than COB, February 4, 1975.

*The Ingersoll Memo is illegitimate - Ad Hoc Comm. formed had a deadline
 W H C. doesn't concur*

*Treas. Hoffa's Chairman
 Dep. Sec of State
 AG
 NSC Staff*

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDSACTION

January 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: CLINTON E. GRANGER *Director of NSC planning staff*

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations

The Deputy Secretary of State has forwarded to the President a report on the protection of foreign officials and installations prepared under the auspices of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (Tab C). In his memorandum of transmittal, Mr. Ingersoll has made a series of recommendations for the President's consideration on this subject (Tab B).

BACKGROUND

In July, 1974, the President directed that a comprehensive study be prepared under the general guidance of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT) to define the goals of a program to protect foreign officials and installations in the United States (Tab D). The study was to be conducted by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and State and the NSC Staff, and chaired by the Chairman of the Working Group of the CCCT. Its report was to be submitted to the Chairman of the Cabinet Committee for the Committee's review and forwarding to the President.

The report and memorandum to the President from Mr. Ingersoll, signed as Acting Secretary, were received by the NSC Staff in mid-October. Subsequently, the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice, as well as OMB and the White House Office of Congressional Relations, were requested by the NSC Staff to provide additional comments and analysis on the ad hoc working group report and Deputy Secretary Ingersoll's recommendations prior to forwarding to the President (Tab E). The Department of the Treasury's response requested that action be suspended pending the conclusion of discussions between that department and the Departments of State and Justice aimed at arriving at a consensus on outstanding issues dividing them at the time of the preparation of the report of the ad hoc working group. These discussions, monitored by the NSC Staff, did enlarge the areas of consensus between these departments, but disagreement on certain issues remain upon which the parties are unable to agree.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

DAD, 4/6/88

THE PROBLEM

By tradition and international law, the host country is responsible for the protection of foreign officials and installations. In the United States, local and state law enforcement agencies exercise the bulk of this responsibility, particularly outside the Washington, D. C. area. The situation in New York City is illustrative. Both the consular and UN mission personnel and facilities in that city are primarily protected by its police department. The federal contribution is limited to FBI and Justice assistance in the areas of intelligence, investigation, and prosecution and a small contingent of the Executive Protective Service (EPS), currently numbering about 20 officers, which is temporarily assigned to that city to provide fixed post protection of certain (particularly Arab) diplomatic installations. Consequently, while foreign governments look to the U.S. Government for the protection of their personnel and facilities, the primary responsibility -- and financial burden -- actually falls on local and state authorities.

While local authorities have generally done an extremely good job, the federal government is dependent on their cooperation in insuring that this responsibility is satisfactorily met. This can result in genuine differences of view as to the deployment of assets and the character of the protection provided. In New York City, for example, the police department will not station officers inside buildings containing diplomatic installations, providing instead only street-level protection, despite requests by the federal government. Currently the federal government has only limited assets to deploy in the event local authorities are not responsive to federal requirements. Gaps in coverage may increase in the future as budgetary considerations lead to reductions of police and other services.

The division of responsibilities for the protection of foreign officials and installations within the Executive Branch also poses obvious difficulties. The bulk of federal assets are controlled by the Treasury Department. This includes the EPS, which protects foreign installations in Washington and in such other cities as the President directs, and the Secret Service, which provides protection to visiting chiefs of state, heads of government, and such other foreign visitors as the President directs. The State Department's Office of Security has a limited capability to protect visiting foreign officials. The Department of Justice and FBI contribute in the areas of intelligence, investigation and prosecution.

The two principal questions which must be addressed are:

- Should the federal contribution to the protection of foreign officials and installations be increased, and, if so, how and by what amount, and;

- What organization and management of federal assets should be directed; should the resources be centralized under the control of a single organization.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP REPORT

The ad hoc working group agreed on the following points:

- The principal responsibility for the protection of foreign officials and installations should remain with state and local authorities;
- The contribution of the federal government to the protection of foreign officials and installations should be selectively increased in the following areas:

Protection of Installations: The EPS should be expanded so that it can provide increased protection to diplomatic installations in Washington and other cities, as required. Limitations on EPS manpower make it difficult to provide satisfactory protection to diplomatic installations in Washington and also deploy guards to other cities on a temporary basis. Legislation under consideration by the Congress would substantially increase EPS manpower.

Protection of Foreign Visitors: The State Department's Office of Security should be expanded so that it can assume primary responsibility for the protection of foreign visitors below chief of state and head of government. This would reduce the burden on the Secret Service which has frequently been called upon to protect such officials because of the limitations in State's assets.

Financial Assistance to New York: Ways should be explored to provide financial assistance to New York City because of the unique burden imposed by the large number of United Nations installations located in that city.

The working group disagreed on the following points:

- The State Department supports centralizing federal responsibility and assets for protection of foreign officials and installations in a single organization and is prepared to assume responsibility for its development and control. This new Diplomatic Security Force (DSF) would consist of the expanded EPS (not including that element committed to the protection of the White House compound) and its own expanded Office of Security. Treasury and Justice oppose this concept.

- The Department of Justice opposes the utilization of Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds as a vehicle for assisting financially the City of New York. Treasury and State support its use for this purpose.

MR. INGERSOLL'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Deputy Secretary has submitted three recommendations for the consideration of the President.

1. That the Department of State be given primary authority for controlling the federal contribution to the protection of foreign officials and installations in the US. This would be accomplished through formation of a Diplomatic Security Force incorporating appropriate EPS assets.
2. That Justice and LEAA be directed to use LEAA funds to provide financial assistance to New York City, particularly through the formation within the New York City police department of a Mission Guard Force (MGF), a special element committed to the protection of UN facilities.
3. That the current deployment of a small EPS contingent in New York City be continued until other arrangements are concluded.

Mr. Ingersoll has established a Standing Group, composed of representatives of State, Justice, and Treasury and other appropriate agencies, to assist in the implementation of any decisions made in this regard.

DISCUSSION

Expansion of Federal Assets: Assumption by the federal government of primary responsibility for the protection of foreign officials and installations is precluded at this time by constitutional, congressional, and budgetary considerations. A good case can be made, however, that the federal government should be in a better position to deploy federal assets in cases of extraordinary security threats -- such as the visit of Mr. Arafat to the UN -- or when important diplomatic considerations are involved -- as when the Ukrainian mission was fired upon. Failure to respond in the latter type of cases could seriously affect foreign relations or the reciprocal protection foreign governments give to U.S. citizens and property. Appropriate increases in the manpower of both EPS and State's Office of Security would provide this capability at relatively little cost. EPS would then be in a better position to temporarily deploy guards to cities outside Washington -- say to the Soviet consular building in San Francisco -- if security or diplomatic considerations warrant. In addition, State's Office of Security could provide protection to a larger number of visiting foreign officials who, particularly for diplomatic reasons, should be afforded some degree of protection.

Financial Aid to New York City: The New York City government and congressional delegation have long been requesting that the federal government provide some degree of financial relief. The President has responded to these requests, indicating his concern and interest in finding a satisfactory solution. In my judgment, there is good case for seriously considering some form of financial assistance to New York City.

The manner in which the federal government approaches this question is important because of the likelihood that other cities would demand financial assistance were it to be extended to New York City. Financial assistance tied to the unique UN protection responsibilities of New York City would be the best way not to set a precedent applicable to all other US cities with diplomatic facilities.

So far, New York City has not been approached as to what form and amount of financial assistance would be mutually acceptable. Consequently, if it is determined that this question should be seriously explored, representatives of the government should be instructed to explore with New York City officials various mutually acceptable alternatives -- including both short-term and long-term subsidy arrangements -- for submission to the President for decision. Prior to conducting these discussions, those representatives should submit proposed guidelines for these talks for prior approval.

Control of Federal Assets

The dispute between State and Treasury (supported by Justice) over the control of federal protective assets (particularly deployment of EPS guards) is rooted in an essential difference in perspective. State is particularly sensitive to the diplomatic and reciprocity considerations involved in the deployment of federal assets and is more inclined to provide a diplomatic facility a visible federal guard for these reasons even if a specific security threat has not been identified. Treasury, on the other hand, believes that maintaining the professionalism and morale of the EPS demands that the decision to deploy guards should be based primarily on security considerations.

There are two ways to reconcile these divergent points of view. One is to leave the final decision to an independent party. Currently, the President has assigned this role to the Office of the White House Counsel. That office reviews all requests for deployment of EPS outside Washington and for Secret Service protection of foreign officials. Another would be to assign full responsibility to one of the parties. This would imply a decision to consolidate assets into one organization (such as the Diplomatic Security Force).

Centralization of responsibility and assets in a Diplomatic Security Force is an attractive concept in many ways. It does pose, however, a variety of

difficulties. The formation of such a "federal police force" could encounter Congressional opposition. The management and budget considerations are not yet fully explored. Consequently, this option -- while worth consideration by the President -- should undergo more detailed examination prior to his final review. In the meantime State and Treasury should be encouraged to continue their search for temporary mechanisms for resolving most issues in this area with minimal recourse to the White House.

X
The Office of the White House Counsel, Domestic Counsel Staff, and Office of Management and Budget concur in the following recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Option I

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A recommending:

-- That the Deputy Secretary of State should be instructed to have the Standing Group initiate discussions with New York City on mutually satisfactory options for providing federal assistance relating to the city's protection of UN facilities and personnel. Among the options explored should be both possible short-term and long-term subsidy arrangements. The Standing Group should submit a list of satisfactory options for review by the President no later than April 1, 1975. If this recommendation is approved, the Mayor of New York City and selected members of the New York congressional delegation will be informally notified of this initiative.

-- That the Office of Management and Budget be instructed to undertake a thorough analysis of the Diplomatic Security Force concept. It should report its finding by April 1, 1975. Pending a decision, State and Treasury should be encouraged to seek ways to resolve differences on the deployment of EPS and Secret Service with a minimum of recourse to the White House. The President should also direct the continued deployment of EPS in New York City pending a decision on the DSF concept, subject to the review of the Office of the White House Counsel.

-- That the Office of Management and Budget be instructed to support State and Treasury requests for appropriate additional manpower in order to increase federal capabilities to protect foreign installations and visitors.

Approve _____

Approve as amended _____


Option II

That you sign the memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of State at Tab AA without bringing this matter to the President's attention at this time. This

option would have the advantage of postponing direct Presidential involvement in the questions of the centralization of authority over federal protective assets, subsidy arrangements with New York City, and expansion of federal assets until more detailed proposals are ready for his consideration.

Approve _____

Approve as amended _____



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDSACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations

The Deputy Secretary of State has forwarded for your review a report on the protection of foreign officials and installations prepared under the auspices of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT) (Tab C). In his memorandum of transmittal, Mr. Ingersoll has made a series of recommendations for your consideration on this subject (Tab B).

THE PROBLEM

By tradition and international law, the host country is responsible for the protection of foreign officials and installations. In the United States, local and state law enforcement agencies exercise the bulk of this responsibility, particularly outside the Washington, D. C. area. While local authorities have on balance done an extremely good job, the federal government is dependent on their cooperation in insuring that this responsibility is satisfactorily performed. This can on occasion result in genuine differences of view as to the deployment of assets and the character of the protection provided. Currently the federal government has only limited assets to deploy in the event local authorities are not responsive to federal requirements. Gaps in local coverage may increase in the future as budgetary considerations lead to reductions of police and other services.

The division of responsibilities for the protection of foreign officials and installations within the Executive Branch also poses difficulties. The bulk of federal assets are controlled by the Treasury Department. This includes the Executive Protective Service (EPS), which protects foreign installations in Washington and in such other cities as the President directs, and the Secret Service, which provides protection to visiting chiefs of state, heads of government, and such other foreign visitors as the President directs. The State Department's

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Office of Security has a limited capability to protect visiting foreign officials. Genuine disagreements between these departments over the deployment of federal assets currently must be resolved in the White House.

The two principal questions which should be addressed are:

- Should the federal contribution to the protection of foreign officials and installations be increased, and, if so, how and by what amount, and;
- What organization and management of federal assets should be directed; should the resources be centralized under the control of a single organization.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT

The report, prepared by an ad hoc working group consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice, makes the following points:

- The principal responsibility for the protection of foreign officials and installations should remain with state and local authorities;
- The contribution of the federal government to the protection of foreign officials and installations should be selectively increased in the following areas:

Protection of Installations: The EPS should be expanded so that it can provide increased protection to diplomatic installations in Washington and other cities, as required. Current limitations on EPS manpower make it difficult to provide satisfactory protection to diplomatic installations in Washington and also deploy guards to other cities on a temporary basis.

Protection of Foreign Visitors: The State Department's Office of Security should be expanded so that it can assume primary responsibility for the protection of foreign visitors below chief of state and head of government. This would reduce the burden on the Secret Service which has frequently been called upon to protect such officials because of the limitations in State's assets.

Financial Assistance to New York: Ways should be explored to provide financial assistance to New York City because of the unique burden imposed by the large number of United Nations installations located in that city.

- The State Department supports centralizing federal responsibility and assets for protection of foreign officials and installations in a single organization and is prepared to assume responsibility for its development and control. This new Diplomatic Security Force (DSF) would consist of the expanded EPS (not including that element committed to the protection of the White House compound) and its own expanded Office of Security. Treasury and Justice oppose this concept.
- The Department of Justice opposes the utilization of Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) funds as a vehicle for assisting financially the City of New York. Treasury and State support its use for this purpose.

MR. INGERSOLL'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Deputy Secretary has submitted three recommendations for your consideration

1. That the Department of State be delegated primary responsibility for controlling the federal contribution to the protection of foreign officials and installations in the U. S. This would be accomplished through formation within that department of the Diplomatic Security Force.

2. That Justice and LEAA be directed to use LEAA funds to provide financial assistance to New York City, particularly through the formation within the New York City police department of a Mission Guard Force (MGF), a special element committed to the protection of UN facilities.

3. That the current deployment of a small EPS contingent in New York City be continued until the MGF or other arrangement is concluded.

DISCUSSION

Expansion of Federal Assets: Assumption by the Federal government of primary responsibility for the protection of foreign officials and installations would appear to be precluded at this time by constitutional, congressional, and budgetary considerations. A good case can be made, however, that the federal government should be in a better

position to deploy federal assets in cases of extraordinary security threats or when important diplomatic considerations are involved. Failure to respond in the latter type cases could seriously affect foreign relations or the reciprocal protection foreign governments give to U. S. citizens and property. Appropriate increases in the manpower of both EPS and State's Office of Security would provide this capability at relatively little cost. EPS would then be in a better position to temporarily deploy guards to cities outside Washington if security or diplomatic considerations warrant. In addition, State's Office of Security could provide protection to a larger number of visiting foreign officials who, particularly for diplomatic reasons, should be afforded some degree of protection.

Financial Aid to New York City: The New York City government and congressional delegation have long been requesting that the federal government provide some degree of financial relief. You have previously responded to these requests, indicating your concern and interest in finding a satisfactory solution. In my judgment, there is a good case for seriously considering some form of financial assistance to New York City.

The manner in which the federal government approaches this question is important because of the likelihood that other cities would demand financial assistance were it to be extended to New York City. Financial assistance tied in some way to the unique UN protection responsibilities of New York City would be the best way not to set a precedent applicable to all other U. S. cities with diplomatic facilities.

So far, New York City has not been approached as to what form and amount of financial assistance would be mutually acceptable. Consequently, if you determine that this question should be seriously explored, representatives of the government should be instructed to explore with New York City officials various mutually acceptable alternatives for submission to you for decision. Prior to conducting these discussions, those representatives should submit proposed guidelines for these talks for prior approval by the White House.

Control of Federal Assets: The disagreement between State and Treasury (supported by Justice) over the control of federal protective assets (particularly deployment of EPS guards) is rooted in an essential difference in perspective. State is particularly sensitive to the diplomatic and reciprocity considerations involved in the deployment of federal assets and is more inclined to provide

a diplomatic facility a visible federal guard for these reasons even if a specific security threat has not been identified. Treasury, on the other hand, believes that maintaining the professionalism and morale of the EPS demands that the decision to deploy guards should be based primarily on security considerations.

There are two ways to reconcile these divergent points of view. One is to leave the final decision to an independent party. Currently, you have assigned this role to the Office of the White House Counsel. That office reviews all requests for deployment of EPS outside Washington and for Secret Service protection of foreign officials. Another would be to assign full responsibility to one of the parties. This would imply a decision to consolidate assets into one organization such as the Diplomatic Security Force.

Centralization of responsibility and assets in a Diplomatic Security Force is an attractive concept in many ways. It does pose, however, a variety of difficulties. The formation of such a federal police force would likely encounter congressional opposition. Nor are the management and budget considerations fully understood. Consequently, this option -- while worth consideration -- should undergo more detailed examination prior to your final review. In the meantime, State and Treasury should be encouraged to continue their search for temporary mechanisms for resolving most issues in this area with minimal recourse to the White House.

RECOMMENDATION

1. An interagency group, under the leadership of the Department of State, should be instructed to initiate discussions with New York City on mutually satisfactory options for providing federal assistance relating to that city's protection of UN facilities and personnel. Among the options explored should be both possible short-term and long-term subsidy arrangements. The interagency group should submit by February 15, 1975, a proposed set of instructions for White House review prior to undertaking these discussions. A list of satisfactory options for your review should be submitted no later than April 1, 1975. If this recommendation is approved, the Mayor of New York City and selected members of the New York congressional delegation will be informally notified of this initiative.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. The Office of Management and Budget should undertake a thorough analysis of the Diplomatic Security Force concept. It should report its findings by April 1, 1975. Pending a decision, the

current EPS deployment to New York City should continue, subject to the review of the Office of the White House Counsel, and State and Treasury should be encouraged to seek ways to resolve differences on the deployment of EPS and Secret Service with a minimum of recourse to the White House.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. The Office of Management and Budget should be instructed to support State and Treasury requests for appropriate additional manpower in order to increase federal capabilities to protect foreign installations and visitors.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

4. That you authorize me to sign the memorandum at Tab I to the Deputy Secretary of State which contains the above points.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

The Office of the White House Counsel, Domestic Council Staff, and the Office of Management and Budget concur in the above recommendations.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL - GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Officials and
Installations


The President has reviewed the report on the protection of foreign officials and installations prepared under the auspices of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and the recommendations contained in your memorandum of October 6, 1974.

The President has concluded that centralization of Executive Branch responsibility and assets for the protection of foreign officials and installations could offer several advantages over current arrangements. Before making a final decision on this recommendation, however, the President directs that a comprehensive and detailed study of the budgetary and management implications of this concept be prepared by the Office of Management and Budget. The Department of State should submit a detailed proposal for implementation of this concept to OMB for analysis. The OMB report should be submitted for the President's consideration no later than April 1, 1975. Pending his decision on this concept, the President directs that the current Executive Protective Service deployment in New York City be retained, subject to review by the Office of the White House Counsel, and that you continue efforts to secure the fullest degree of cooperation between the principal departments concerned with this problem.

The President supports a limited expansion of the Executive Protection Service and the Office of Security of the State Department in order to provide the Executive Branch with a greater capability for supplementing on a temporary basis the protection of foreign installations in Washington, New York, and other cities (as required) and to increase the protection of foreign officials visiting this country below the level of chief of state or head of government, which will continue to be the

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Officials and
Installations

The President has reviewed the report on the protection of foreign officials and installations prepared under the auspices of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and the recommendations contained in your memorandum of October 6, 1974.

The President has concluded that centralization of Executive Branch responsibility and assets for the protection of foreign officials and installations could offer several advantages over current arrangements. Before making a final decision on this recommendation, however, the President directs that a comprehensive and detailed study of the budgetary and management implications of this concept be prepared by the Office of Management and Budget. The Department of State should submit a detailed proposal for implementation of this concept to OMB for analysis. The OMB report should be submitted for the President's consideration no later than April 1, 1975. Pending his decision on this concept, the President directs that the current Executive Protective Service deployment in New York City be retained, subject to review by the Office of the White House Counsel, and that you continue efforts to secure the fullest degree of cooperation between the principal departments concerned with this problem.

The President supports a limited expansion of the Executive Protection Service and the Office of Security of the State Department in order to provide the Executive Branch with a greater capability for supplementing on a temporary basis the protection of foreign installations in Washington, New York, and other cities (as required) and to increase the protection of foreign officials visiting this country below the level of chief of state or head of government, which will continue to be the

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responsibility of the Secret Service. Specific recommendations related to the above should be transmitted to the Office of Management and Budget for consideration by the President for inclusion in the FY-76 budget.

The President agrees that the possibility of the extension of federal financial assistance to New York City, tied to its unique responsibility for the protection of UN installations, should be explored. The President directs that representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury and Justice, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Domestic Council Staff, under the leadership of the Department of State, initiate discussions with appropriate New York City authorities. Among the alternative explored with New York City should be both possible short-term and long-term subsidy arrangements. A set of options as to both the types and levels of possible financial aid should be presented for the President's consideration no later than April 1, 1975. Prior to initiating these discussions, a proposed set of instructions to guide the Executive Branch's representatives should be submitted for White House approval.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Executive Director, Domestic Council
The Office of the White House Counsel



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Officials and
Installations


The report on the protection of foreign officials and installations prepared under the auspices of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and the recommendations contained in your memorandum of October 6, 1974, have been reviewed.

The centralization of Executive Branch responsibility and assets for the protection of foreign officials and installations could offer several advantages over current arrangements. Before placing this proposal before the President, however, a comprehensive and detailed study of the budgetary and management implications of this concept should be prepared by the Office of Management and Budget. The Department of State should submit a detailed proposal for implementation of this concept to OMB for analysis. The OMB report should be submitted for the President's consideration no later than April 1, 1975. Pending a decision on this concept, the current Executive Protective Service deployment in New York City should be retained, subject to review by the Office of the White House Counsel, and you should continue efforts to secure the fullest degree of cooperation between the principal departments concerned with this problem.

A limited expansion of the Executive Protective Service and the Office of Security of the State Department would provide the Executive Branch with a greater capability for supplementing on a temporary basis the protection of foreign installations in Washington, New York, and other cities (as required) and to increase the protection of foreign officials visiting this country below the level of chief of state or head of government, which will continue to be the responsibility of the Secret Service. Specific recommendations related to the above should be transmitted to the Office of Management and Budget for consideration by the President for inclusion in the FY 76 budget.

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The possibility of the extension of federal financial assistance to New York City, tied to its unique responsibility for the protection of UN installations, should be explored. Representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury and Justice, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Domestic Council Staff, under the leadership of the Department of State, should initiate discussions with appropriate New York City authorities. Among the alternatives explored should be both possible short-term and long-term subsidy arrangements. A set of options as to both the types and levels of possible financial aid should be presented for the President's consideration no later than April 1, 1975. Prior to initiating these discussions, a proposed set of instructions to guide the Executive Branch's representatives should be submitted for White House approval.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Executive Director, Domestic Council
The Office of the White House Counsel



*Protection
Foreign*

March 4, 1975

*Shaw
Jay*

Dear Mr. Solars:

Thank you for your February 27 letter to the President expressing your opposition to a policy which would exclude Jewish officers from assignments abroad at the request of the host government, and of your intention to introduce legislation which would make it a Federal offense for commercial firms to acquiesce to such demands from foreign governments.

I would like to assure you that I will call your letter to the attention of the President and the appropriate members of the staff at the earliest opportunity.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Vernon C. Loon
Deputy Assistant
to the President

The Honorable Stephen J. Solars
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

bcc: w/incoming to General Scowcroft for appropriate handling.
~~bcc: w/incoming to Philip Buchen - for your information.~~

VCL:EF:VO:vo



STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
13TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
POST OFFICE AND
CIVIL SERVICE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
MICHAEL LEWANDOWSKI
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
18 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2361

Handwritten: Jewish Affairs

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

February 27, 1975

2-28
DISTRICT OFFICES:
KENNETH LOWENSTEIN
DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE
1628 KINGS HIGHWAY
BROOKLYN, N.Y. 11223
(212) 965-5100

117 BRIGHTON BEACH AVENUE
BROOKLYN, N.Y. 11235
(212) 963-5103

1301 47TH STREET
BROOKLYN, N.Y. 11219
(212) 963-5166

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to register -- in the strongest possible terms -- my deep dismay over confirmed reports that the Army Corps of Engineers has complied with King Faisal's demands that Jewish officers not be assigned to U.S. projects in Saudi Arabia. In view of the fact that this constitutes a blatant violation of the basic rights and liberties guaranteed to all Americans by our Constitution, I urge you to take prompt and affirmative action to reverse this policy forthwith.

I will soon be in touch with the Attorney General, urging that he also investigate this entire situation with a view toward ascertaining the extent to which other Federal agencies and private corporations are also acquiescing in such discriminatory demands. It should be made crystal clear to both government and business officials that such distasteful acts of discrimination against Jewish citizens and concerns will not be condoned. At the same time, I believe that criminal prosecutions should be sought against those who have violated our most cherished Constitutional safeguards in this regard.


Unfortunately, many of our present statutes contain loopholes which do permit discriminatory commercial dealings. Accordingly, I will soon be introducing legislation which will make it a Federal offense to propose a business offer which is contingent upon the disclosure of information regarding the race, religion, sex or national origin of another party; to engage in a commercial venture which would require discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin; or to join in a commercial arrangement in which a foreign government or concern could infringe on the rights of other individuals on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin.



Gerald Ford
Page 2
February 27, 1975

In the absence of this urgently-needed legislation, however, I am hopeful that you and your administration will move with all dispatch under existing laws to effectively end these arrogant anti-semitic actions on the part of our own governmental agencies.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Stephen J. Solarz".

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
Member of Congress

SJS:kam



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1975

*Protection
Foreign*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, I am directing protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service for the Ethiopian Mission to the United Nations by expanding the present post protecting the nearby Jordanian Mission.

Protection for the Ethiopian Mission should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue until April 5, 1975.

Sincerely,

Philip W. Buchen
Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223



March 6, 1975

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, I am directing protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service for the Ethiopian Mission to the United Nations by expanding the present post protecting the nearby Jordanian Mission.

Protection for the Ethiopian Mission should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue until April 3, 1975.

Sincerely,

Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223

bcc: Hon. John M. Thomas
Ambassador Robert O. Blake
Mr. H. S. Knight
General Brent Scowcroft
The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
The Honorable Laurence H. Silberman
The Honorable Robert Ingersol



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 6, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PHILIP W. BUCHEN

FROM:

JAY FRENCH 

Both State and Treasury have requested the continuation of Executive Protective Service protection for the Ethiopian Mission to the United Nations. Accordingly, I recommend that you sign the enclosed letter to Secretary Simon.

cy for
Jay

MAR 5 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

FROM: John M. Thomas 151
Assistant Secretary
for Administration
Department of State

David R. Macdonald /s/David R. Macdonald
Assistant Secretary (Enforcement,
Operations, and Tariff Affairs)
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Continued EPS Coverage at the
Ethiopia Mission to the UN

In your memorandum of February 6, 1975, to the Secretary you authorized the continued coverage by the Executive Protective Service at the Ethiopian Mission in New York until March 6, 1975.

In view of the current unrest involving the hostilities in Ethiopia and the attending potential for violence and disruption by the Ethiopian Community in New York, we respectfully ask for continuation of the existing coverage at the Ethiopian Mission in New York for an additional period of thirty days.



March 27, 1975

*Jay has
responded
to this.
It can be
filed
T.*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jay French

FROM:

Bill Casselman

Barbara White, one of our ambassadors to the United Nations, spoke to me recently about the problem of authorizing Secret Service coverage of visiting dignitaries. Apparently, our U. N. Mission has been experiencing some time lag between the time in which the dignitary arrives in the United States and the actual initiation of Secret Service protection. While Barbara believes that this is not a problem with respect to situations where we are given sufficient lead time, she thought it important that we develop some supplemental procedures to permit the Secret Service to transfer agents from its New York Field Office to the U. N. without clearance from the White House in "emergency" cases.

bcc: Phil Buchen

WEC:bw



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1975

*Protection —
for foreign
officials*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, I am directing that protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service be continued until May 31, 1975 for the following Foreign Missions to the United Nations, located in New York City.


Israel	Jordan
Lebanon	Palestine Liberation Organization
Syria	League of Arab States

Sincerely,

Philip W. Buchen

Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D.C. 20223





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

FROM: John M. Thomas
Assistant Secretary
for Administration
Department of State
John M. Thomas
David R. Macdonald *DM*
Assistant Secretary (Enforcement,
Operations, and Tariff Affairs)
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Request for Continued EPS
Coverage at UN Missions

Executive Protective Service fixed post coverage is now scheduled to conclude on March 31 at the following diplomatic facilities in New York: Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese and Israeli UN Missions and Palestine Liberation Organization and Arab League Observer Offices.

The Department of State requests a two month extension of EPS coverage at these six locations until May 31. This would maintain protection at levels considered minimum in view of the continuing volatile Middle East situation and the important, sensitive negotiations now in progress. We believe the possibility of violent acts in New York against one or more of protected missions remains real. The recent threat by Zoucheir Mohsen, head of Military Section of the PLO in Damascus on March 12, "to strike at any Israeli strategic target wherever we can reach it, in Israel or in Japan or in the United States"; expected intensified JDL activity and its Committee Against Israel Retreat (C.A.I.R.) and a relatively new active organization, Save our Israel (SOIL) whose members during a recent demonstration poured a liquid over their hands in a symbolic gesture to demonstrate the blood stained hands of arabs, are examples.



The inconclusive result of Secretary Kissinger's most recent trip to the Middle East bespeaks the deep-seated tensions in that area which could foreshadow a growing incidence of disruption and violent activity against diplomats and missions in New York.

