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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DAVID R. MACDONALD
Assistant Secretary
Department of the Treasury


SUBJECT:

Secret Service Protection for
Chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization
Executive

Pursuant to our oral discussions with Mr. Paul Rundle, you are requested to provide Secret Service protection for the head of the delegation to the United Nations from the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In the event that Yasir Arafat should arrive during the course of the U.N. debate, Secret Service protection should be shifted to him for the duration of his stay in the United States. Upon his departure, your agents should recommend protecting the ranking member of the PLO delegation for the duration of his visit.


GEORGE P. WILLIAMS
Associate Counsel



cc: H. Stuart Knight
Henry E. Catto, Jr.

bcc: Mr. Buchen ✓

November 5, 1974

Dear Mr. Hoffacker:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of October thirtieth, welcoming me aboard.

It will be my pleasure to work with the Cabinet Committee/Working Group in the months ahead. I would enjoy having lunch with you at your convenience.

Most sincerely yours,

Jay T. French
Assistant Counsel
to the President

Mr. Lewis Hoffacker
Special Assistant to the Secretary
and Coordinator for Combatting
Terrorism
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

JF:em





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 30, 1974

Mr. Jay French
Assistant Counsel to
the President
Room 110
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. French:

I understand that you will be following terrorism in our Cabinet Committee/Working Group. Welcome aboard.

I regret that Skip Williams will be moving on to another assignment. My hope is that we shall be able to continue to work with your office in the same manner as with Skip. I therefore would be pleased to call on you if I can be of further help on the matter of the so-called "package" (protection of foreign officials). Alternatively, may we get together at luncheon?

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Lewis Hoffacker
Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Coordinator
for Combatting Terrorism



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1974


Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, I am directing protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service for the Diplomatic Missions of Mauritania and Somalia located in New York City. Protection for the Somalia Mission may be provided by expanding the present post protecting the adjacent Qatar Mission.

In the case of each such mission, the protection should relate to the office installation of the mission at its upper floor location within the commercial building where it is operating. The protection should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue for the period prior to and through the continuance of the U. N. General Assembly debate on the Palestine question. These directions are, of course, subject to change as the situation may require from time to time.


You are kindly requested to work out the arrangements for this protection in cooperation with the Deputy Attorney General, who has given me his opinion that this direction is in accordance with applicable Federal law.

Sincerely,



Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223



Copies hand delivered to:

Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld
Larry Silberman
Gen. Scowcroft
Ambassador Robert O. Blake
Geoff Shepard
Skip Williams



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1974


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In the case of each such mission, the protection should relate to the office installation of the mission at its upper floor location within the commercial building where it is operating. The protection should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue for the period prior to and through the continuance of the U. N. General Assembly debate on the Palestine question. These directions are, of course, subject to change as the situation may require from time to time.

You are kindly requested to work out the arrangements for this protection in cooperation with the Deputy Attorney General, who has given me his opinion that this direction is in accordance with applicable Federal law.

Sincerely,



Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223



Friday 11/8/74

4:00 Donna had the call from State earlier -- she suggested she get in touch with our office -- but had thought she would be writing a letter.

4:45 I've tried to call Ann Cary back but have not been able to reach her.

I will suggest they write requesting the name of a replacement for Mr. Shepard ----- Mr. Shepard feels that Mr. Buchen should make that decision.



Friday 11/8/74

632-8678

11:00 Ann Cary in State Operations Center said they are updating their list on the Council on Terrorism.

Buchen has basically replaced Tufaro.

They understood Geoff Shepard is leaving and ask who will replace him.



11/8/74 - Edna asked Jay for the incoming on the
Simon package and he said I didn't need it.
He will keep it there.



11/12/74

To: Jay

From: Eva

Mr. Buchen said to get
this to you -- thought
it was all taken care of --
but also wanted you to know
of Cheney's interest.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1974

TO: PHIL BUCHEN

FROM: Dick Cheney

Attached is a memo from you to Don concerning security for Arab and Israeli Diplomats in New York.

I assume all of this has now been resolved. If it has not, please contact me immediately.

Attachment



(2)
See
11/1/74

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

talk to Phil

JS 12C.
see reel
del. - ambrose

November 1, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DON RUMSFELD

FROM:

PHIL BUCHEN *Phil*

SUBJECT:

Security for Arab and Israeli
Diplomats and Installations in
New York During Upcoming
U. N. Debates on Palestine

The following persons met in General Scowcroft's office at 10:00 AM on November 1 for just over an hour:

1. General Scowcroft
2. Phil Buchen
3. Geoff Shepard
4. Frank Niland (Justice)
5. Ambassador Blake (State)
6. Paul Rundle (Secret Service)
7. Jay French
8. Skip Williams

The meeting was precipitated by a document^{ed} request from U. S. U. N. received by me today for immediate expansion of EPS personnel in New York to protect the respective offices of nine additional Arab missions to the U. N., the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) Office and the League of Arab States. Secret Service protection for the head of the PLO delegation has been requested by State and was also discussed.

The following points were covered:

1. EPS is legally entitled to protect the 9 Arab missions upon direction from the President; and the Secret Service is legally



entitled to protect the head of the PLO delegation upon the direction of the President. Everybody present concluded that the situation warranted this kind of protection except that EPS is concerned about its own manpower problems.

2. The logical place for EPS to get additional manpower is to use personnel now assigned to protection of the New EOB (22) which could be protected instead by GSA, and Geoff Shepard agreed to investigate the feasibility of this change.

3. An opinion should be sought from the Department of Justice as to the legality of providing EPS protection to offices of PLO and of the League of Arab States. Justice should be asked also to provide the language for a direction to be issued in behalf of the President by the Counsel's office.

4. The security forces of the State Department are willing to protect the members of the PLO delegation other than the head delegate. However, to provide the needed manpower, State would like to have Secret Service relieve State of its current protection for Makarios, the former head of the Cyprus government, and Skip Williams will investigate the feasibility of such a shift.

5. Larry Silberman will be asked to initiate coordinated planning among the various security forces and law enforcement agencies as may be needed during the period of the U.N. Assembly's debate on the Palestine issue, including the FBI and the military.

Subsequently, I talked with Ed Schmults of Treasury and met with Larry Silberman on the implementation of the foregoing. By a later telephone call from Silberman, I received the opinion that the attached form of direction to the Secretary of the Treasury is legal and appropriate.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 1, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, I am directing protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Services and the United States Secret Service for the following foreign diplomatic missions located in New York City:

Libya
Sudan
Morocco
Qatar
Mahrain
United Arab Emirates
Oman
Democratic Yemen
Yemen Arab Republic
Palestine Liberation Organization
League of Arab States


In the case of each such mission, the protection should relate to the office installation of the mission at its upper floor location within the commercial building where it is operating. The protection should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the mission and should continue for the period prior to and through the continuance of the U. N. General Assembly debate on the Palestine question. These directions are, of course, subject to change as the situation may require from time to time.

You are kindly requested to work out the arrangements for this protection in cooperation with the Deputy Attorney General, who has given me his opinion that this direction is in accordance with applicable Federal law.

Sincerely yours,

Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.



November 12, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

DAVID R. MACDONALD
Assistant Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT:

Secret Service Protection for
Syria - Abdul-Halim Khaddam, and
Saudia Arabia - Omar Saqqaf

You are requested to provide Secret Service protection for the above-mentioned Foreign Ministers during the period when they are in the United States attending the United Nations debate on Palestine.

JAY T. FRENCH
Assistant Counsel

cc: H. Stuart Knight
Henry E. Catto, Jr.

JTF:em



Tuesday 11/12/74

6:00 Jay brought over the attached memorandum, which he doesn't recommend you sign -- probably should be kept in the file for information but not sent to Scowcroft -- just to keep you informed of what's going on.

Says these are not the real matters we ought to raise with Scowcroft; it is the larger problem of decision making.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 12, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : General Scowcroft

FROM: Philip W. Buchen

SUBJECT: Personal security of certain delegates
to the United Nations' debates on Palestine

On November 1, 1974, you and I met with representatives of the Secret Service (USSS), Department of State, and Department of Justice to discuss the personal security of certain representatives to the United Nations during the debate on Palestine. Additionally, we discussed Executive Protective Service coverage of certain installations, which is not a subject of this memorandum. As a result of that meeting, it was agreed that the USSS would protect Yasser Arafat or the ranking member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation. The Department of State, using its own security forces (DOS SY), agreed to protect all others in the delegation as a group.

Subsequent to this meeting it was learned that as many as fifteen foreign ministers might also attend the UN debate. In order to head off numerous requests that USSS protect all these diplomats, I asked you to see if a screening process could be established at the Department. Although I do not know what process was eventually created at the Department, I learned subsequently that USSS would be asked to protect the foreign ministers of Syria, Saudia Arabia, and Egypt while DOS SY would protect all others. This arrangement was agreeable to all parties. On November 11, 1974, it became apparent that neither Arafat nor Kaddumi would arrive with the PLO delegation, and the Department informally requested USSS to cover the third-ranking head of the delegation because he was technically the ranking leader. USSS resisted this request which later became ^{more} ~~more~~ when Assistant Secretary Buffum at the Department of State informed my office that the DOS SY would provide this protection. Again, this solution was agreeable to all parties.



Today I learned that DOS SY is not providing protection to the PLO delegation as originally understood, but that this assignment was turned over to the New York City Police Department (Police). Because the Police were given this assignment, they in turn refused to provide the USSS with certain support forces which they had earlier agreed to do. Therefore, USSS had to move additional agents to New York to perform these functions. Also today, the Department raised the question of which Agency, if any, would protect Kaddumi when USSS protection is shifted to Arafat. The Police have indicated that they do not have the manpower to protect him and DOS SY indicates the same. There is no resolution to this question at this time. However, I would not recommend two USSS details. It would be ideal if DOS SY could supply one or two agents to protect Kaddumi during this overlapping period.



November 5, 1974

*Example
U S S S
Protection*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DAVID R. MACDONALD
Assistant Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT:

Secret Service Protection for
Chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization
Executive

Pursuant to our oral discussions with Mr. Paul Rundle, you are requested to provide Secret Service protection for the head of the delegation to the United Nations from the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In the event that Yasir Arafat should arrive during the course of the U.N. debate, Secret Service protection should be shifted to him for the duration of his stay in the United States. Upon his departure, your agents should recommend protecting the ranking member of the PLO delegation for the duration of his visit.

GEORGE P. WILLIAMS
Associate Counsel

cc: H. Stuart Knight
Henry E. Catto, Jr.

bcc: Mr. Buchen

*1800 G LK AW
Chief of Protocol
Dept State*



Mr. Buchen

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1974


MEMORANDUM FOR:

DAVID R. MACDONALD
Assistant Secretary
Department of the Treasury

SUBJECT:

Secret Service Protection for
Yasser Arafat or ranking head of the
Palestine Liberation Organization
delegation

I would like to clarify the responsibility of the Secret Service concerning protection of the above referenced persons. Pursuant to a memorandum dated November 5, 1974, from George Williams to you, protection was designated for Yasser Arafat and the ranking head of the delegation in the absence of Arafat. It is believed that the ranking head of the delegation is Farouk Al-Kaddumi. Should neither Arafat nor Kaddumi be in the United States, it will not be the function of the Secret Service to protect the next ranking leader of the delegation.


Jay T. French
Assistant Counsel



cc: H. Stuart Knight
Henry E. Catto, Jr.

11/15/74

4:10 Ambassador Hoffacker called to discuss
the Working group arrangement for the Cabinet
Committee to Combat Terrorism -- sending a copy
of the members of that group.

632-9892

see
terrorism
file



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1974

FOR: Philip W. Buchen
FROM: Jay T. French
SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Visitors to, and Diplomatic
Installations in, the United States, Part I

Introduction


The President may direct the Secret Service to protect "distinguished foreign visitors" to the United States and the Executive Protective Service to protect "foreign diplomatic missions" located in the United States other than in the District of Columbia. The Department of State has frequently sought this exercise of the President's discretion. The Treasury Department, to which these two security services report, has usually resisted such requests. The White House Counsel's office has been repeatedly called upon to review these requests and resolve differences of opinion between the Departments. As a result, in some instances proper security is not being provided when it is necessary and on other occasions security is being provided when little or none is required.

The solution to these difficulties should require two decisions: one immediate and the other long range. The purpose of Part I of this paper is to suggest a simple temporary course of action until a permanent resolution is achieved. The long-range resolution is discussed in Part II.

Background

Legal

The United States Secret Service (USSS) is authorized to protect certain persons including visiting heads of foreign state



or government under Title 18 USC § 3056. Further, at the direction of the President, the USSS shall also protect "other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States." The Executive Protective Service (EPS) by Title 3 USC § 202, is authorized to protect the Executive Mansion, Presidential offices and foreign diplomatic missions located in the City of Washington. Further, the EPS shall also protect "foreign diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United States....as the President, on a case by case basis, may direct."

Definition of Problem in Two Parts

A. The difficulty, in deciding whether to exercise such discretion, is the basic conflict of interests between the Department of State (which recommends protection) and the Treasury Department (which provides protection). State clearly makes recommendations for security when it is politically important to do so, regardless of the real danger to the person or installation. There is ample justification for such recommendations. Our diplomats and installations abroad need protection and reciprocity is a way to ensure that it will be provided. On the other hand, Treasury properly challenges use of USSS and EPS personnel for "cosmetic" details.

The problem crystalizes when the resolution of these conflicting interests requires the exercise of a statutory discretion which itself fails to define when such an exercise is justified.

Part A of the problem is defined, therefore, as the lack of a standard upon which the President may base his decision to exercise discretion in this matter.

B. Another difficulty is the organizational process by which the Department of State arrives at a decision to seek the exercise of the President's discretion. In the past, desk officers at State have routinely recommended protection for visitors or installations of the country for which they are responsible. These requests went directly to the Office of the Chief of Protocol, who referred them to the White House Counsel. There was no thorough review of such requests or coordination



between the Department of State Security Office (SY) and the USSS. Often it fell to the White House Counsel to discover if intelligence sources believed that a real threat existed and further, when USSS, EPS, or SY had the available manpower to handle the detail.

Thus, Part B of the problem is defined as the lack of review and coordination which a request receives at the Department of State, before it is transmitted to the White House.

Temporary Solution

The solution to Part B is relatively simple and requires only that the Department of State establish a single procedure for handling all requests. Logically, the process should utilize existing organization routes. For example, a request initiated at a particular desk should go to the Assistant Secretary for that geographic region. After review and screening, it should go to the Deputy Secretary and ultimately to the Secretary of State. At some appropriate point along this route, it seems advisable to consult SY and USSS for intelligence information and manpower availability. Ultimately, the Secretary (or Acting Secretary) should forward the request to Counsel to the President for coordination of the Presidential decision.

There is one pitfall in the above. If the various Department of State officials delegate their responsibilities to the next inferior level, then the procedure will in time become the source of similar difficulties which we now face. It is important to ensure that persons at the highest levels in the Department are responsible for recommendations to the President.

Part A of the problem is obviously more difficult because the magnitude of the problem is beyond a temporary solution. Effective implementation of the solution to Part B will obviate most of the present difficulties in any event.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 15, 1974

FOR: Philip W. Buchen

FROM: Jay T. French

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Visitors to, and Diplomatic
Installations in, the United States, Part II

Introduction and Background

The Secretary of State directed the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to prepare a proposal for the permanent solution to the problems discussed in Part I. The Working Group was apparently unable to agree on a proposal and therefore, an informal subcommittee was created to prepare the paper. The proposal of this subcommittee is now in the Domestic Council for transmittal to the President. As a practical matter, it is important to note that the subcommittee had no official standing and that its proposal was never approved by the Working Group or by the Cabinet Committee.

The definition of the problem may be divided into two parts, as stated earlier. Part A is the lack of a standard by which the President is provided a basis for exercising his discretion. Part B is the lack of review and coordination of requests prior to transmittal to the White House.

Part A

The lack of a standard at the Presidential level is because the White House has never adopted the standard of either State or Treasury over the other. It is unwise, however, to make such a choice since both Departments are essentially correct.



There are three possible permanent solutions:

1. Remove the statutory language which gives the President the discretion to direct such protection.
2. Place the protective forces within the same Department that initiates requests for protection.
3. A combination of existing proposals.

Part B

The lack of review and coordination which is given to a request that the President exercise his discretion is an organizational problem. There is but one solution and it must be the implementation of a definite, thorough and structured review process involving the highest levels of the Department of State which is the agency requesting the exercise of the President's discretion.

Discussion of Solutions to Part A

The first possible solution is to simply remove the language contained in Title 18 USC § 3056 and Title 3 USC § 202 which give the President the discretion to provide protection to certain foreign visitors and installations.

The effect of this action would be to leave each Department and its respective security agencies with its own existing statutory authority without the option of seeking the President's action.

I recommend against this solution simply because all parties agree that there are circumstances when protection is required, although not authorized by statute. For example, the party leaders of communist nations are not heads of state or government who automatically receive USSS protection. However, everyone agrees that such protection is essential and it can only be provided by the exercise of the President's discretion.



The second solution is basically the approach adopted by the Hoffacker proposal. It would create a Mission Guard Force at the Department of State by merging most of EPS and SY into a new State security agency. It would provide installation security in Washington, New York and other cities, and personal security for foreign visitors who are not automatically covered by USSS's statutory authority.

The attractiveness of this solution is obvious since only in rare cases would the President be asked to exercise his discretion. State would be able to provide protection and gain a certain assurance of reciprocity for our diplomats. The pitfalls are the amount of reorganization that would be required to create this new force and the creation of another national police force. Specifically, EPS would be split into two elements. Those guarding the Executive Mansion would be retained by Treasury and all others would be transferred to State. State's SY would be dissolved and merged into the new Mission Guard Force and additional personnel would be hired. The Treasury Department resists this proposal.

I recommend against this solution because it effectively destroys EPS, which was recently created, builds a new national police force under the Department of State, which is unnecessary, and the same goals can be achieved by simpler solutions.

The third solution is a combination of many proposals and begins with the premise that both State and Treasury are justified in their approaches. Set forth below are the security matters that are the subject of everyone's concern.

Persons

Heads of State/Government
Distinguished Foreign Visitors who are
high security risks
Other Distinguished Foreign Visitors

Installations

Foreign Embassies in Washington, D. C.
Diplomatic Missions in other United States cities
United Nations Missions in New York City

The USSS protected about 140 foreign visitors last year divided equally (70/70) between heads of state, who must be protected, and distinguished visitors, who were covered at the direction of the President. The number has increased steadily in addition to other protective duties without an increase in personnel. Morale among agents is a problem since they travel about an average of 38% of the time.

I recommend that USSS continue to protect heads of state and those few visitors who fall into the special categories; communist party leaders and high security risks (i.e., Yasir Arafat). All other personal protection should be the responsibility of the Department of State's SY. To handle protection of these persons, a minimum increase in SY personnel will be required. The number is minimal because security is often "cosmetic" and thus large numbers of agents are not required for each detail. It is apparent that many SY personnel are untrained in personal protection and a liaison program should be established with USSS to correct this.

I recommend that the legislation now pending before the Congress for 350 additional EPS personnel be strongly urged. This would double the Service's size. In addition to covering Washington's foreign embassies, a few officers should be detailed to provide protection for certain diplomatic missions in other United States cities. The Russian Consulate in San Francisco and other consulates in New York City and Chicago are examples that need protection from time to time. The method by which security is provided should be left to the discretion of the Service in conjunction with local law enforcement agencies.

The United Nations Missions in New York City should be covered exclusively by the New York City Police Department. Federal legislators from New York State have long sought a subsidy for the local police. I urge that sufficient funds be annually contributed to the United Nations budget and then passed through to the City of New York. The Department of State would continue to receive requests for coverage from U.S.U.N. although they would be sent to the New York police for action. By contributing the funds to the United Nations,



we avoid requests that similar funds be supplied to other United States city police forces with numerous foreign missions to protect. It would be an important point in contributing such funds to ensure that the New York police would agree to protect mission offices within buildings. They have never agreed to do so before.

Discussion of Solutions to Part B

As stated above, there is but one solution to Part B. The decision to request the President to exercise his discretion to provide protection for a particular individual or installation must come from the office of the Secretary of State to the office of the White House Counsel. Both Cabinet officers should staff the request to persons under them but not the responsibility.

If Part A is handled as suggested in solution number 3 above, few requests would ever be processed.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 16, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: PHILIP W. BUCHEN
FROM: JAY T. FRENCH

CASE STUDY

Security Arrangements During United Nations
Debate on Palestine, November 13, 1974


Introduction

During the United Nations debate on Palestine, considerable security was required to protect official visitors and foreign installations in New York City. Four security agencies were available for duty: New York City Police Department (NYPD), United States Secret Service (USSS), Executive Protective Service (EPS), and Department of State Security (SY). In order for the USSS and EPS to protect certain persons and offices it became necessary for the President to exercise his statutory discretion in such matters. The difficulties underlying this Presidential action have been broadly discussed in two earlier memoranda. The purpose of this paper is to report on four occurrences which point out the need for an examination of the manner in which the President is requested to use his discretion to direct such protection.

First Example

Facts

On November 1, a meeting was held at the White House to coordinate all security measures. The Department of State, White House Counsel, National Security Council, USSS, Department of Justice and the Domestic Council attended. At this meeting it was agreed the President should direct the USSS to protect Yasir Arafat.



Further, since Arafat might be in the United States for only part of the debate, it was agreed that USSS would also protect the "head of the PLO delegation in Arafat's absence." The Department of State agreed to give group security to the remaining members of the PLO delegation.

Shortly before the arrival of the delegation on November 12, it was learned that neither Arafat nor Kaddumi (the second ranking leader) were on board the plane. The Department of State asked the USSS to protect the third ranking leader as "head of the delegation." USSS resisted and contacted the White House Counsel for clarification. There was legitimate confusion over the meaning of the words directing coverage of the "head of the delegation in Arafat's absence." Specifically the question was how far down the chain of rank was coverage meant to go?

The matter resolved itself because the USSS had sent its agents to the airport in the event coverage was finally directed. They filled in with the NYPD and adequate security was arranged.


Problem Area

The concern is that for a period of several hours, the White House counsel was in the inappropriate position of trying to determine the adequacy of protection for the PLO delegation. The agencies and departments were each telling the counsel's office that someone else should cover this individual because it required greater or lesser coverage. Advice even came directly from an ambassador at U.S.U.N. as to which agency should handle the matter. This points up the need for coordination among departments and security agencies to determine exactly what degree of protection is required in each instance. The White House counsel is not qualified to decide this question.

Second Example

Fact

On November 14, the Israeli Defense Ministry in New York reported several telephone threats to blow up its office. NYPD responded to the threats by stationing an officer in front of the office within the commercial building, although, notice was given to U.S. U.N. that



he would be withdrawn the next day. U.S.U.N. requested the assignment of an EPS officer to this fixed post. White House counsel was informed of the matter by an information copy of U.S.U.N.'s request to the Secretary of State. Counsel contacted the appropriate officer at the Department of State, even before he had received the request, and asked for an immediate review of this request before it was forwarded to the White House. EPS was alerted to the request. Shortly thereafter, a protocol officer contacted the White House counsel forwarding the request. The officer had no knowledge that any review had been conducted, that any intelligence agency had been consulted, or that any protective service had been contacted to determine which agency might be in the best position to respond. Counsel requested such information and in a few moments a security officer from SY telephoned with the same request and very sketchy justification for seeking the President's discretion in this matter. As a final note, an ambassador from U.S.U.N. telephoned counsel urging immediate action by the President. Action was taken and the appropriate direction sent to the Treasury Department.

Problem Area

Sometime after the earlier-mentioned November 1 meeting, the Department of State was urged to set up a review process to screen all requests for protection. Counsel was informed by several different persons that such a process had been placed in operation involving various protective forces, intelligence agencies, and State and Treasury officials. Apparently this procedure was not followed in the instant case.

It was learned that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State who had been notified of the request by White House counsel merely referred it to his aide. The aide in turn passed it to the security office who in turn gave it to the office of the Chief of Protocol. The protocol officer then called counsel not realizing that counsel had started the process as described above. No review ever occurred. It is imperative that requests be thoroughly reviewed before the President is asked to exercise this discretion.



Third Example

Fact

On November 5, the Department of State requested the USSS to provide three details to protect the President of Lebanon, his wife, and the Foreign Minister during their visit to the United States. The President of Lebanon was automatically protected as a head of state. His wife and the Foreign Minister would have been protected as long as they were with the President.

Problem Area

When the USSS protects a person, protection is around the clock and thorough. It is inappropriate to request three full details when SY could provide an escort officer in the event the wife or Foreign Minister left the President's party for any appreciable length of time. It became necessary, therefore, to ask the Department of State to withdraw its request for these two extra details. The request should have been screened beforehand. Again, counsel was never informed of any reason why such protection was warranted.


Fourth Example

Fact

On October 31, White House counsel was asked, by the Chief of Protocol, to provide USSS protection for Mrs. Marcos of the Philippines. On examination by counsel, it appeared that the only justification for protection was an attempt on her life several years ago in the Philippines and the fact that she had been given USSS protection on prior visits. Her annual visits are not official but are for the purpose of visiting a daughter in school in the United States, and friends, as well as shopping. The request was denied.

Problem Area

The problem was that counsel had to interview a USSS official and a Department of State official to determine the above facts. This case is an excellent example of "cosmetic" security. It is a waste of time for a full USSS detail.



Second, it is noteworthy that someone at the Department of State who disliked this decision contacted a National Security Council official at the White House in an attempt to overturn the decision. This is apparently a frequent avenue of appeal used by Department of State officials when they disapprove of counsel's decision. If the White House counsel's office is to continue to handle these requests, this avenue should be closed.



November 19, 1974

EPS
Protection
Foreign

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Scowcroft
FROM: Philip W. Buchen
SUBJECT: Requests for Protection of Foreign
Visitors and Diplomatic Installations
in the United States

Recently we discussed revising the procedure by which the Department of State reviews, coordinates, and forwards to my office the requests for Executive Protective Service and Secret Service protection of foreign visitors and installations in the United States. I understand that such a new procedure has been established.

It would further assist me in reviewing these requests to receive a written statement explaining the need for protection in each instance. The statement might briefly mention the recommendations of each department and agency involved in the review procedure. Finally, I would appreciate it if this written request were sent directly to me or Mr. Phillip Areeda by the responsible State Department official.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1974


Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, I am directing protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service for the Israeli Ministry of Defense located in New York City.

In the case of this Diplomatic Mission, the protection should relate to the office installation of the Mission at its upper floor location within the commercial building where it is operating. The protection should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue for the period prior to and through the continuance of the United Nations General Assembly debate on the Palestine question. The directions are, of course, subject to change as the situation may require from time to time.

You are kindly requested to work out the arrangements for this protection in cooperation with the Deputy Attorney General.

Sincerely,



Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William E. Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1974

FOR: General Scowcroft
FROM: Philip W. Buchen *P.W.B.*
SUBJECT: Request for Protection of Foreign
Visitors and Diplomatic Installations
in the United States

This memorandum is an addition to my earlier one to you of November 19th, concerning the above referenced subject.

On November 20, J. French of my office received an oral request that an E. P. S. officer be stationed in front of the Brazilian United Nations Mission in New York City because of bomb threats. The request came from the Office of the Chief of Protocol. After checking with me, Mr. French informed the Protocol office that any requests for E. P. S. or U. S. S. S. protection would have to be submitted in accordance with the provisions in my memorandum of November 19th. Further, he asked that the request be submitted by the Acting Secretary of State in the absence of the Secretary.

Assistant Secretary John Thomas responded to Mr. French's request on November 21, by informing him that a review and coordination process was being established, as of that date, and further, that in the future all requests would be forwarded from the Office of the Secretary.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Phil:

With the conclusion of the Palestine debate November 22, our Mission to the United Nations has been considering the security coverage which will be necessary for Arab and Israeli personnel and installations in New York. The New York City Police are understandably anxious to terminate their special security measures, although they will continue to provide coverage of Arab and Israeli personnel and facilities at the lower level that existed before the debate. We understand that the Secret Service role has terminated. State Department security will also redirect the limited forces it had in New York and Washington with the exception of the coverage it will continue to provide to individual foreign ministers remaining in New York.

We also believe that fixed post coverage by EPS can be reduced substantially, but we would like your agreement to continue nine posts at the following offices: the Arab League Office, Office of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Missions of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia (Mission and Consulate), Algeria, Syria and Egypt. These would be in addition to continuing EPS coverage of the Missions of Cyprus and Brazil and the Mission and Consulate of Turkey.

The Honorable
Philip W. Buchen,
Counsel to the President,
The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS

WLM 5/9/00



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The EPS posts which we are prepared to have terminated are the Missions of Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic and Kuwait.

Our request for continuing EPS protection for the Israeli and some Arab installations in New York is based on the judgment that, continuing threats from the Jewish Defense League, Israeli fears of world-wide Black September attacks on Israeli installations and a high volume of anonymous telephone calls to both Israeli and Arab installations indicate an uncomfortably high risk of violence against these installations, which we are responsible for protecting under the Headquarters Agreement. We have also had evidence of this in the vandalism in the Egyptian Information Office, an extortion attempt against the PLO, as well as the several demonstrations against the PLO.

Thus, at this point, we must be primarily concerned with the preventive and deterrent measures and fixed post protection at Israeli and Arab offices inside buildings, which EPS posts alone can provide. The New York police will continue to provide street-level protection. There must necessarily be a considerable amount of judgment involved as to the seriousness of the security threat, but our security people on the scene believe these measures are the minimum consistent with safety at this time. I need not tell you that if the requested protection for the Arab and Israeli Missions is not granted and an incident occurs, there would be repercussions both in New York and in the Middle East. The Missions and organizations we have designated for protection are the most highly visible and likely targets for incidents. These countries and organizations played the dominant role in the participation of the PLO at the Palestine

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JOHN F. FORD LIBRARY

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-3-

debate and are the principal actors in the on-going Middle East peace negotiations. In New York the U.S. Government would be subject to the charge of not having fulfilled its obligations under the Headquarters Agreement to provide protection to UN Missions and their personnel. In the case of Israeli installations there would certainly be strong political reactions from Congress and the public at large. In the case of Arab missions, given the general suspicions of Arab states respecting U.S. policy, there undoubtedly would be resentment among these missions and at least some belief that the U.S. Government was indifferent to their safety.

The political repercussions in the Middle East could be extremely serious. The possibility of retaliation would be grave, and the threat to the lives and property of U.S. officials in Arab countries, already great, would be substantially increased. Incidents involving Arab missions would damage our ability to continue to play an effective role in Middle East peace efforts and could set back those efforts.

In view of the foregoing, I would greatly appreciate it if you would give favorable consideration to continuing EPS coverage at the requested posts until the conclusion of the General Assembly debates about December 17. I do appreciate the careful attention you have given our requests and have the utmost respect for the splendid performance of EPS in New York.

Very best regards.

Sincerely,



Robert S. Ingersoll
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



TRANSMITTED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

074 NOV 23 PM 10 22

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

74 NOV 23 PM 10:37

LDX MESSAGE NO. 991

CLASSIFICATION

CONF

NO. PAGES 3

DESCRIPTION OF USE

Ltr from Mr. Ingersoll to Mr. Buchen on EPS

FROM:

McNee

S/S

28448

7241

Officer

Office Symbol

Extension

Room Number

LDX TO:

DELIVER TO:

EXTENSION:

ROOM NUMBER:

Mrs. Jeanne Davis,

Advance Copy For INFO

ORIGINAL Follows By COURIER

appropriate
(notation)

FOR:

CLEARANCE ☒

INFORMATION ☐

PER REQUEST ☐

COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

Please transmit to Mr. Buchen

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:

Executive Secretariat Officer

copies sent to Horan, Oakley and Kennedy



Nov. 25, 1974

To: General Scowcroft's office

From: Phil Buchen's office

The attached memorandum of November 19 should have preceded our memo of 11/21, in which this memo was referred to. I don't know what happened! But here 'tis!

(For your info, attached is a copy of the 11/21 memo mentioned.)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 19, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Scowcroft

FROM: Philip W. Buchen *P.W.B.*

SUBJECT: Requests for Protection of Foreign
Visitors and Diplomatic Installations
in the United States

Recently we discussed revising the procedure by which the Department of State reviews, coordinates, and forwards to my office the requests for Executive Protective Service and Secret Service protection of foreign visitors and installations in the United States. I understand that such a new procedure has been established.

It would further assist me in reviewing these requests to receive a written statement explaining the need for protection in each instance. The statement might briefly mention the recommendations of each department and agency involved in the review procedure. Finally, I would appreciate it if this written request were sent directly to me or Mr. Phillip Areeda by the responsible State Department official.

NOV 21 1974

EVJ

Please get this to
Scrowcroft's secretary
with advise that its delivery
should have preceded
later memo on same
subject in which reference
is made to this 11/19 memo.

P



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/19/74

TO - Mr. Buchen

This is the memorandum which we discussed sending to Genl Scowcroft.

I tried to keep it brief, although, if you would like me to draft it in greater detail, please let me know.

Jay



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


November 25, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In behalf of the President, I am directing protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service for the Brazilian Diplomatic Mission to the United Nations located in New York City.

This protection should relate to the office installation of the Mission at its upper floor location within the commercial building where it is operating. The protection should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue through December 6, 1974. These directions are, of course, subject to change as the situation may require from time to time.

Sincerely,



Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223



DATE SENT: 11/24/74

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

Copy for Addressee

V 1216417

FROM: DIRECTOR S/S-1 7241 US
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room) (Bldg.)

TO: The Honorable Philip W. Buchen, White House
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room) (Bldg.)

PART V

DATE RECEIVED S/S XXXXX 7423127 **CONFIDENTIAL**
IDENTIFICATION

DATE
SENT:

11/24/74

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V 1216417

TO:

DIRECTOR S/S-1 7241 HS

FROM:

The Honorable Philip W. Buchen, White House

PART IV

DATE
RECEIVED:

(Signature of Addressee)

IDENTIFICATION

S/S ~~XXXX~~ 7423127 CONFIDENTIAL

FORM JF-6
2-70

(Formerly DS-406)

ADDRESSEE SIGN AFTER CHECKING AND RETURN TO SENDER.
RETAINED BY SENDER FOR 3 YEARS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 23, 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Phil:

With the conclusion of the Palestine debate November 22, our Mission to the United Nations has been considering the security coverage which will be necessary for Arab and Israeli personnel and installations in New York. The New York City Police are understandably anxious to terminate their special security measures, although they will continue to provide coverage of Arab and Israeli personnel and facilities at the lower level that existed before the debate. We understand that the Secret Service role has terminated. State Department security will also redirect the limited forces it had in New York and Washington with the exception of the coverage it will continue to provide to individual foreign ministers remaining in New York.

We also believe that fixed post coverage by EPS can be reduced substantially, but we would like your agreement to continue nine posts at the following offices: the Arab League Office, Office of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Missions of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia (Mission and Consulate), Algeria, Syria and Egypt. These would be in addition to continuing EPS coverage of the Missions of Cyprus and Brazil and the Mission and Consulate of Turkey.

The Honorable
Philip W. Buchen,
Counsel to the President,
The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS

WHM 5/9/00



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The EPS posts which we are prepared to have terminated are the Missions of Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic and Kuwait.

Our request for continuing EPS protection for the Israeli and some Arab installations in New York is based on the judgment that, continuing threats from the Jewish Defense League, Israeli fears of world-wide Black September attacks on Israeli installations and a high volume of anonymous telephone calls to both Israeli and Arab installations indicate an uncomfortably high risk of violence against these installations, which we are responsible for protecting under the Headquarters Agreement. We have also had evidence of this in the vandalism in the Egyptian Information Office, an extortion attempt against the PLO, as well as the several demonstrations against the PLO.

Thus, at this point, we must be primarily concerned with the preventive and deterrent measures and fixed post protection at Israeli and Arab offices inside buildings, which EPS posts alone can provide. The New York police will continue to provide street-level protection. There must necessarily be a considerable amount of judgment involved as to the seriousness of the security threat, but our security people on the scene believe these measures are the minimum consistent with safety at this time. I need not tell you that if the requested protection for the Arab and Israeli Missions is not granted and an incident occurs, there would be repercussions both in New York and in the Middle East. The Missions and organizations we have designated for protection are the most highly visible and likely targets for incidents. These countries and organizations played the dominant role in the participation of the PLO at the Palestine

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

debate and are the principal actors in the on-going Middle East peace negotiations. In New York the U.S. Government would be subject to the charge of not having fulfilled its obligations under the Headquarters Agreement to provide protection to UN Missions and their personnel. In the case of Israeli installations there would certainly be strong political reactions from Congress and the public at large. In the case of Arab missions, given the general suspicions of Arab states respecting U.S. policy, there undoubtedly would be resentment among these missions and at least some belief that the U.S. Government was indifferent to their safety.

The political repercussions in the Middle East could be extremely serious. The possibility of retaliation would be grave, and the threat to the lives and property of U.S. officials in Arab countries, already great, would be substantially increased. Incidents involving Arab missions would damage our ability to continue to play an effective role in Middle East peace efforts and could set back those efforts.

In view of the foregoing, I would greatly appreciate it if you would give favorable consideration to continuing EPS coverage at the requested posts until the conclusion of the General Assembly debates about December 17. I do appreciate the careful attention you have given our requests and have the utmost respect for the splendid performance of EPS in New York.

Very best regards.

Sincerely,



Robert S. Ingersoll
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 26, 1974

Dear Bob:

I have received your letters of November 22 and 23, requesting protection by the Executive Protective Service of certain foreign Diplomatic Missions in New York City.

On November 22, in behalf of the President, I directed protection of the Brazilian Mission for a period of fifteen days. Also, I have directed continued protection of certain other Missions until the conclusion of the General Assembly debates about December 17. A copy of each directive is attached for your information. Protection of all other Diplomatic Missions in New York City has been concluded as of November 25.

In regard to these directives, the Department of the Treasury has raised the issue of the necessity for continued protection of the Cyprus Mission and the Turkey Consulate. Would you be kind enough to inform me if, after further review, you conclude that such protection may be discontinued.

Finally, I note that you request continued protection for the Egyptian Mission. In checking, I find that the Executive Protective Service does not maintain a post at this Mission. Accordingly, I am not directing any protection at this time. Should you determine that it is necessary for such protection, please let me know as soon as possible.


Warmest regards,

Sincerely,



Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable Robert S. Ingersoll
Acting Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 26, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary:


In behalf of the President, and pursuant to my earlier letter to you of November 1, 1974, I am directing that protection within the powers and duties of the Executive Protective Service and the United States Secret Service be continued for the following foreign Diplomatic Missions located in New York City:

Palestine Liberation Organization	Algeria
League of Arab States	Syria
Jordan	Israel
Lebanon	Turkey Mission
Saudia Arabian Mission	Turkey Consulate
Saudia Arabian Consulate	Cyprus

Additionally, protection for the Mission of Brazil shall continue in accordance with my letter to you of November 25, 1974.

In the case of each such Mission, the protection should relate to the office installation of the Mission at its upper floor location within the commercial building where it is operating. The protection should be maintained during the hours when the office is open for the business of the Mission and should continue until the conclusion of the General Assembly debates about December 17, 1974.

Sincerely yours,



Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President

The Honorable William Simon
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20223



12C
12/2

7423298

Copy sent to
Mr. French

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 30, 1974

Dear Phil:

Thank you for your letter of November 26 informing me of continued Executive Protective Service coverage of the UN missions I requested, as well as the addition of an EPS post at the Brazilian Mission. I very much appreciate the careful and immediate attention you have been willing to give these requests.

Your letter asks whether continued EPS protection is necessary for the Cyprus Mission in New York and the Turkish Consulate there. The post at the Cyprus Mission can be dropped but we would like to continue the one at the Turkish Consulate, at least until the U.S. Congress finishes its current session. At the moment we have no intelligence of a threat to the Turkish Consulate but the issue of U.S. assistance to Turkey will be debated again in the Congress and it is likely that passions will run high among the Greek-American community. We must assume there will be demonstrations at official Turkish installations with the attendant possibility of injury to persons or damage to property. We would be willing to review the need for continued EPS protection at the Consulate at the end of the Congressional session.

The Honorable
Philip W. Buchen,
Counsel to the President,
The White House.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines


By WKM, NARA, Date 5/9/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Your letter also asked whether an EPS post was necessary at the Egyptian Mission at New York. We have ascertained that no coverage is necessary at this time.

Very best regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bob", written in dark ink.

Robert S. Ingersoll
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1974-535-245

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11/30/74

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TO:

Director J.F.E. 7241 HS

FROM:

The Honorable Philip W. Buchen

PART IV

Counsel To The President The White House

DATE
RECEIVED:

(Signature of Addressee)

IDENTIFICATION

7423298

FORM JF-6

2-70

(Formerly DS-406)

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12/2/74

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V 1446532

TO:

Director

S/S-I

7241

MS

The Hon. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the Pres.

FROM:

~~The White House~~

PART IV

DATE
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(Signature of Addressee)

IDENTIFICATION

S/S 7423403

FORM JF-6

2-70

(Formerly DS-406)

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12/2

cc to Jay French



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Phil:

Early in October, the Executive Protective Service withdrew the guards who were at fixed posts at the Embassies of Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and at the Residences of the Ambassadors of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The Jordanian Embassy and Residence had had fixed post protection for at least the past two years, the Syrians have had it since they opened their Interests Section here this past spring, and the Saudis and Egyptians have had it intermittently over the last year or two. We understand that these Embassies and Residences are now being covered by roving patrols, although in the wake of an attack on the Egyptian Tourist Office in New York some fixed post coverage has recently been reinstated at the Egyptian Embassy.

Since the fixed posts were removed early in October, the Ambassadors of these four countries have on several occasions expressed to Department of State officials deep concern over their missions' security and requested the reinstatement of fixed post protection. The Jordanian Foreign Ministry has raised this matter formally, by diplomatic note, with our Embassy in Amman.

All four of these Embassies are under a general continuing threat of harassment or terrorist action by extremist individuals and groups. The Syrian Embassy

The Honorable
Philip W. Buchen,
Counsel to the President,
The White House.

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WWM 5/9/00



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
-2-

is particularly threatened by radical Jewish elements which might seek violently to protest Syria's position on Middle East issues. Syrian installations in this country have frequently been subjected to demonstrations or harassments by extremist Jewish groups. The Jordanians have been the targets of radical Palestinians since the civil war between the government and the Palestinian guerrillas in 1970-71, and this threat continues despite the apparent reconciliation between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization during the Rabat Arab Summit. Egyptian and Saudi Arabian representatives are likely targets for anti-Arab action by Jewish extremists because of their prominence in the Arab group and their high profile here, or possibly from dissident radical Palestinians. The attack on the Egyptian Tourist Office in New York in mid-November, apparently carried out by the Jewish Defense League, is a concrete reminder that there is a genuine, continuing threat.

We appreciate that roving patrol coverage is now being provided to all these missions. Although we know that roving patrol coverage is considered highly effective, it does not solve the political and psychological problems which we face as a result of the threat that exists to these Embassies. The fact is that the Ambassadors, their families and staff will not feel protected unless they are covered by fixed posts. Should an incident occur in the absence of fixed post protection, we would be blamed by these Ambassadors and their governments and could expect possibly serious repercussions in our bilateral relations. This would be particularly undesirable since these countries are all of primary importance in the Middle East peace negotiations. I should also point out that Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt provide our Embassies with elaborate protection, including multiple around-the-clock stationary guards and in some cases personal bodyguards for our Ambassadors.

In view of the foregoing, we believe it imperative that around-the-clock fixed-post EPS protection be re-established at the Jordanian, Saudi Arabian,

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-3-

and Egyptian Residences and that, at a minimum, the Jordanian, Syrian, Saudi, and Egyptian Embassies each be given fixed-post protection during working hours. I would greatly appreciate your assistance in ensuring that such coverage is provided.

Very best regards.

Sincerely,



Robert S. Ingersoll
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

