

SECRET

Security Information

*File
Confidential
EB.*

*Filed by
C. R. Jackson
3-20-54*

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

DECLASSIFIED	
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)	
MR 94-108#2	
BY <i>RLS</i>	DATE <i>1/31/95</i>

VOLUME ONE

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Cambridge . . . Massachusetts

SECRET

Security Information

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

1952



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

*
VOT, Refuse

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

Table of Contents

VOLUME ONE

Preface

Part I Recommendations Secret

Part II

- A. The Origins, Present Status, and
Prospects for Soviet Society Restricted
- B. The Vulnerability of the Soviet
Union and its European Satellites
to Political Warfare Secret

Part III Staff Papers

- A. Cancellation Secret
- B. Some Problems of Radio Broadcasting
to the Soviet Union and its
European Satellites Confidential
- C. Some Problems of Policy in Respect
to the non-Russian Soviet Peoples Secret
- D. A Statement of U. S. Interests
and Objectives in Russia and
Eastern Europe Secret

VOLUME TWO

Appendix A. The Dynamics of Soviet Society Unclassified
W. W. Rostow

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

VOLUME THREE

Annexes to Appendix A.

- Annex 1. A Gallery of Soviet
Prototypes Unclassified
Raymond A. Bauer
2. Some Observation on the Re-
action Patterns of Bolshevik
Leadership Unclassified
Alex Inkeles
3. Three Succession Crises in
Russian History Unclassified
Alfred Levin
4. A Note on Frustration in the
Totalitarian State Unclassified
Harry L. Naylor
5. Some Theories of Soviet
Society Unclassified
Robert V. Daniels

VOLUME FOUR

- Appendix B. The Problem of Succession Secret
R. W. Hatch
- C. The Nationalities Problem Secret
Isaac Patch, Jr.

VOLUME FIVE

- Appendix D. Cohesive Forces, Tensions and
Instabilities in the European
Satellites Unclassified
Andreas F. Lowenfeld
Coordinating Editor

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

VOLUME ONE

Refuse



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

5
~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

PREFACE

The Conception of the Project

Preface

This report represents an experimental effort at operational research in the social sciences. It aims not merely to analyze the present position within the Soviet Union and its European satellites, but also to link research conclusions to certain issues of choice and policy-making which the United States confronts in the conduct of political warfare. As a group bearing no operational responsibility we have been keenly aware of our limitations in making this link; and we would regard our observations on U.S. policy as preliminary staff papers at most. It is, nevertheless, our conviction that academic research done on behalf of the government can be justified, in terms of the outlay of taxpayers' money and the diversion of scarce intellectual resources, only if it is built on a precise conception of the questions which the government needs to have answered, and if it is finally brought into operational focus. The man doing research outside the government can never know fully all the factors which must, in the end, enter into policy judgments; on the other hand, we take it that he bears a portion of the responsibility for linking his research to the living issues of policy formulation.

This conception of our task has shaped the project from its beginnings, and it is reflected in the organization of this report.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ii

Basic Research

The material product of our research is contained in the four Appendixes, which constitute Volumes Two, Three, **Four and Five of our submission.** The titles of these Appendixes and the names of those who have mainly contributed to them follow:

Appendix A: The Dynamics of Soviet Society

Officer responsible: W. W. Rostow

Principal Associates: Robert V. Daniels
Alfred Levin

Contributors: Richard W. Hatch
Andreas F. Lowenfeld
Harry A. Naylor
Isaac Patch, Jr.

Annex 1 A Gallery of Soviet Prototypes by
Raymond A. Bauer

Annex 2 Some Observations on the Reaction
Patterns of Bolshevik Leadership by
Alex Inkeles

Annex 3 Historic Russian Succession Crises by
Alfred Levin

Annex 4 A Note on Frustration in the Totalitarian
State by
Harry A. Naylor

Annex 5 Some Theories of Soviet Society by
Robert V. Daniels

Appendix B: The Problem of Succession

Officer responsible: Richard W. Hatch

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Page

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

iii

Appendix C: The Nationalities Problem

Officer responsible: Isaac Patch, Jr.

Appendix D: Cohesive Forces, Instabilities, and
Tensions in the European Satellites

Officers responsible for country analyses:

Poland:	Marian K. Dziewanowski
Czechoslovakia:	Paul Zinner
Bulgaria:	Adam B. Ulam
Yugoslavia:	Adam B. Ulam
Eastern Germany:	Andreas F. Lowenfeld

Coordinating Editor: Andreas F. Lowenfeld

In addition, the following have served as re-
search consultants on aspects of the project:
George Denicke, and Gustav Hilger.

Preface

The research foundations for this report could not have been laid, and thus the project itself could not have been conducted, without the most intimate collaboration and assistance from the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. Although the Director of this project assumes, of course, full responsibility, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that this report is a joint product of Harvard and M.I.T. The Director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Professor Clyde Kluckhohn, has been a constant advisor and guide who, in the midst of numerous other major responsibilities, has continuously made available his time, energy, and wisdom. Over and above the direct contributions to this report of men associated with the Russian Research Center, we have had the benefit of invaluable advice and criticism on aspects of our research from: Raymond A. Bauer, Merle Fainsod, Alex Inkeles, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Alfred Myer.

In addition to these experts on Russia,
McGeorge Bundy, George C. Homans, William L. Langer, and

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Edward S. Mason, also of Harvard, have served as helpful critics of portions of the research. Similarly, we have benefited from the guidance and suggestions of Jerome B. Wiesner and Elting E. Morison of M.I.T., and Bertram Wolfe, historian and student of modern Russia and official of V.O.A.

Like the Russian Research Center at Harvard, the Russian Institute at Columbia has been exceedingly helpful, although distance has precluded an equal range and intimacy of collaboration. In particular, we have benefited from the Russian Institute in our work on nationalities, to which two Columbia men have notably contributed. Philip E. Mosely, Director of the Russian Institute, reviewed and commented on several of the studies.

The Links to Policy

Parts I, II, and III (Volume One) contain our efforts to link our research analysis to problems of American policy. They are organized as follows:

Part I: Recommendations

- Part II: A. The Origins, Present Status, and Prospects of Soviet Society, (a summary of Appendix A).
- B. The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and Its European Satellites to Political Warfare

Part III: Staff Papers

- A. Cancellation
- B. Some Problems of Radio Broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Its European Satellites
- C. Some Problems of Policy in Respect to the Non-Russian Soviet Peoples
- D. A Statement of U.S. Interests and Objectives in Russia and Eastern Europe

Refuse

These papers represent views which have been thrashed out in common within the project and with outside consultants. Within the project, Francis M. Bator (Assistant to Director of CENIS) J. P. Dickson (special responsibility, Staff Paper B), Richard W. Hatch (special responsibility, Staff Paper A), Max F. Millikan, (Director of CENIS), Isaac Patch, Jr. (special responsibility, Staff Paper C), have mainly shared this task. We have been notably assisted, in addition, by James B. Ames of Boston and Richard D. Hughes of St. Louis, who, in the midst of heavy professional burdens, gave of their time as consultants with extraordinary spirit and good will. They had a major hand in forcing us to elaborate the meaning for policy of our analysis, and in helping create the main lines of that elaboration. It should be recorded that the authorship of the phrase "Strategy of the Third Choice" belongs to Mr. Hughes. We have been similarly assisted, to our great advantage, on this range of issues by McGeorge Bundy of Harvard and Richard M. Bissell of the Ford Foundation.

Our most distinctive debt is to the many responsible officers of the government who have helped us. From the beginning this project was based on the notion that its success required, at every stage, close consultation with those whom it was designed to serve, that is, the men who are carrying the burden of day-to-day responsibility in the government. Aspects of political warfare belong with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Psychological Strategy Board. Not only have men from these agencies given of their time in Washington with extraordinary generosity, but many have also journeyed to Cambridge to give us the benefit of their knowledge and insights and, even more important, to impart a sense of the problems and limits which must be faced and accepted if a political warfare policy is to be effective. Although we believe that such full exchange of views is essential to fruitful outside research for the government, we are aware of the extra

burden such consultation has involved.

We are greatly indebted to our Advisory Board: Loftus Becker, Charles Bohlen, Allen Dulles, and Vice Admiral Leslie G. Stevens. Individually and collectively they have helped steer the project and enabled us to avoid many errors in research and in judgment. It goes without saying that they are in no way bound by the views we have expressed, for which CENIS and the Project's Director assume full responsibility.

Richard A. Knight and, then, William R. Jones have been our administrative officers, aided by Miss Mary Burns. They solved as a matter of course the irregular and difficult problems that inevitably confront an institution in its pioneering days.

I wish, now, to express my thanks to the staff which produced this report. Assembled from a variety of backgrounds and experience at short notice, they have completed the project in nine months of sustained hard work. They have worked in a spirit which admirably balanced the need for strong independent thought and the requirements in fellowship and humility of a communal task.

Aside from the contributions acknowledged above in connection with various portions of the text, a special and absolutely indispensable contribution was made by Richard W. Hatch, who acted as my deputy, bringing to the array of tasks involved a rare resourcefulness, wisdom, and good cheer.

Although carrying other urgent responsibilities, Francis M. Bator, Assistant to the Director of CENIS, has made a major contribution to the project at every level from administration to policy formulations. His energy, competence, and insight have been a source of strength throughout the year's work.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

viii

PROJECT PERSONNEL

Special Advisor

Clyde Kluckhohn

Staff of the Project

Robert V. Daniels

Andreas F. Lowenfeld

Barbara Davis

Doris L. Morberg

John P. Dickson

Harry L. Naylor

Richard W. Hatch

Isaac Patch, Jr.

Barbara L. Hall

W. W. Rostow

Mary T. Heron

Mary M. Siplas

Arseny Karpovich

Martha N. Tucker

Alexander A. Korol

Adam B. Ulam

Alfred Levin

Paul E. Zinner

Research Contributors

Raymond A. Bauer

Alex Inkeles

D. Chatara

Michael M. Luther

George Denicke

Barrington Moore, Jr.

Leo Dudin

T. Osmachka

Marian K. Dziewanowski

Richard E. Pipes

Merle Fainsod

Milema Rudnycka

Gregory Gurdjian

Raymond S. Sleeper

Gustav Hilger

Rita Zakarian

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

12

Page 12

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

vii

We are all in the incalculable debt of a group of young women who did our typing at all hours, kept the papers straight, and generally maintained a foundation of order in this somewhat adventurous enterprise. Miss Martha Tucker, the project director's secretary, proved a model of equilibrium and omniscience under the special responsibilities that she has carried.

My acknowledgments would, indeed, be incomplete if I did not record the personal debt I owe to Julius A. Stratton, Vice-President and Provost of M.I.T., and to Max F. Millikan, Director of CENIS. Their unfailing confidence in this project and substantive support of it were the foundations on which it has been built.

W. W. Rostow

July, 1952

CENIS

Cambridge, Massachusetts

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

PART I
RECOMMENDATIONS

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

1952

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Part I
Recommendations

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I
Recommendations

This section of the report is no more than a check list of the recommendations which emerge from our research and analysis. They are bluntly listed without substantial supporting argument. We are aware that whether the government should act on these recommendations, when it should act, and in what precise forms it should act, must hinge on whatever validity attaches to the supporting evidence and argument in this report; and it may well also hinge on factors we could not take into account, and which it would be inappropriate for an outside research project to attempt to take into account. What we are recommending, therefore, is merely that the responsible branches of the government consider the following suggested courses of action both in the light of the research and analysis from which they arise, and in the light of their own information and special responsibilities.

Over and above continuing efforts to maintain the strength, stability, and democratic quality of our own society; over and above the maintenance and development of American armed strength adequate in scale and appropriate in composition; over and above the maintenance and development of adequate military alliances; over and above efforts to prevent the further expansion of Soviet power by the development of conditions of economic progress and democratic political stability in the non-Communist world; we recommend:

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

I A General Approach to Political Warfare

The principal lines of American political warfare should rest on the holding out to those within the enemy's control of a realistic and attractive alternative to the choices they now face, designed, under a variety of circumstances, to induce them to act positively both in their own interest as they conceive it and in our own. Political warfare, thus defined, is based on the clarification and effective exploitation of areas of common interest and aspiration between the United States and those whose action we seek to influence. The practice of political warfare therefore requires:

(a) clarity within the U.S. Government concerning U.S. interests and objectives and concerning the potentialities for implementing them under a variety of possible circumstances.

(b) clarity within the U.S. Government concerning the interests and aspirations of various groups and individuals under the enemy's control whose action may be decisive to the course of events within the enemy's society;

(c) clarity within the U.S. Government concerning the alternative courses of thought and action which are likely to be judged realistic, at any period of time, by those under the enemy's control; and

(d) the effective and persuasive overt and covert projection of the alternative offered, in forms and timing appropriate to the occasion.

It is believed that all arms of policy, military and civil, have a legitimate place in a program of political warfare thus conceived.

II. Forward Planning in General

The U.S. Government should formulate in a tentative way, and keep steadily under review, political warfare plans covering action by all arms of American

Part I Recommendations

policy under a variety of possible future circumstances of which the following three, relevant to the area and the problems considered in this report, appear to justify the government's urgent attention:

(a) A Soviet offer for the unification of Germany which would include effective provisions for a free election in Eastern Germany and for some form of international limitation on German armed strength.

(b) The development within the Soviet Union of a covert or an overt struggle for the powers now held by Stalin.

(c) The outbreak of major war.

This report includes tentative suggestions, in some detail, on policy appropriate to each of these eventualities.

Part I Recommendations

We believe, in general, that a clarification within the U.S. Government of long-run American interests and objectives in the area of Western Eurasia is necessary and desirable, and, specifically, that such clarification is most likely to be achieved by a professional consideration of appropriate American actions under various particular circumstances. Moreover, we believe it may be useful if preliminary forward planning of political warfare include a conscious effort to achieve a consensus within the government concerning the nature of long-run American interests and objectives. We do not believe such a consensus now exists.

III. U.S. Action Under Circumstances of No Change in the Soviet Regime and Its External Policy

The purpose of U.S. Policy under circumstances of no change is to further such slow change or internal crisis in Soviet society as would be consistent with American interests and objectives, to make preparations to act (or not to act) should slow change or internal crisis

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

4

come about; to avoid major war if possible; and to make preparations to cope with major war should it be initiated by the Soviet regime.

We recommend that a political warfare program designed to fulfill these purposes should include the following action which, to the maximum extent possible, should be coordinated with those of our major allies. The importance of these recommendations is underlined by the obvious current need for the United States to counter the persistent but recently accelerated propaganda policy of the Soviet regime, which portrays U.S. interests and objectives in the image of Hitler's and thus seeks to associate the regime with the patriotic sentiments of the Great Russian people and the security interests of the satellite peoples.

A. To Increase the Possibilities of Slow Change

(1) The steady pressing on the Soviet regime, through repeated American and Allied diplomatic initiatives, of an alternative pattern for handling existing security and political conflicts, based on a low and controlled level of world armaments, a democratically unified Germany, and an Eastern European settlement.

(2) Systematic and sustained efforts, by all means available, to associate American objectives with the Russian national interest as opposed to the interests of the Soviet regime, and with conditions which would permit the resolution of popular dissatisfactions and the better fulfillment of particular group aspirations within the Soviet Union;

(3) Intensive efforts to inform elements in the higher bureaucracy (especially the upper levels in the Soviet armed forces) of U.S. objectives, stressing their limited nature and their compatibility with legitimate Russian national interests;

(4) A program addressed to the satellites based on a U.S. supported framework for Europe as a whole which might offer to Eastern Europe a long-run opportunity for security as well as national independence.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Part I - Recommendations

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

5

B. To Increase the Possibilities of Soviet Internal Crisis and to Prepare for a Soviet Internal Crisis or Major War

(1) A concentration of our intelligence effort on the basis of the following priorities:

(a) collection and analysis of intelligence concerning the interplay of personalities, power interests, and policy views among the present members of the Politburo, with special reference to the courses of action they might pursue after Stalin's death;

(b) the collection and analysis of intelligence concerning the present outlook and aspirations of men within the higher levels of the Soviet bureaucracy, especially the armed forces.

(2) A communications program holding out a realistic and attractive American alternative, designed to impress on key groups within Russia the possibilities of their acting to effect change in the Soviet regime without endangering the Russian national interest. Under circumstances of Cold War, where negotiation with the present regime is not excluded, overt propaganda might avoid this particular elaboration on the fundamental theme, but covert communication with key persons along these lines would not be excluded.

(3) The preparation of channels of communication with higher levels in the Soviet and satellite regimes designed to permit, at a time of internal crisis or war, effective contact and exchange of views.

(4) The preparation of a network for covert operations under conditions of an internal crisis or war to accelerate effective dissidence--within, however, a strict and publically enunciated long-run policy of non-interference in Russian domestic affairs.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



Part I
Recommendations

(5) The building and holding in reserve of special means of mass communication, over and above those now regularly used, and to be employed only at a time of Russian internal crisis or war for the purpose of transmitting, against the background of previous propaganda, concrete American terms or offers.

(6) Preparation, in preliminary form, of terms which might be offered to one or another emerging group at a time of internal crisis or war.

(7) The adoption of the military war plan so as to be consistent, to the extent militarily feasible, with U.S. political interests and objectives.

IV. U.S. Action Under Conditions of Slow Change in the External Policy of the Soviet Regime

The purpose of U.S. policy under conditions of slow change is to bring about, if necessary step by step, an accomodation with the Soviet Union which will further our own interests and objectives. These objectives, in Western Eurasia, are taken to be essentially:

- (a) Effective international control of armaments.
- (b) A democratically unified Germany.
- (c) A diminution if not elimination of Soviet influence and control in Eastern Europe.

Over a considerable period of time these three objectives are believed to be intimately related, in the sense that the achievement of one would tend to set in motion forces which would, with an appropriate, vigorous American policy, increase the chances of achieving the others. Of the three objectives, the democratic unification of Germany appears to be the most possible of achievement without internal Russian crisis or major war.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

8

objectives and terms designed to maximize the possibility that the crisis unfold in such a way as to bring mass dissatisfactions into play in a manner consistent with the American interest.

VI. U.S. Action at the Outbreak of Major War

The purpose of U.S. policy in the period after the outbreak of major war would be to bring the war to an end consistent with U.S. interests and objectives as quickly as possible and at minimum cost in lives and destruction. Against the background of the preparatory actions listed in II above, including especially the preparation of special means for overt and covert communication, the United States should be prepared to make known at the very early stage of a major war the nature and limits of the armistice and peace terms it would be prepared to offer the Soviet Union. This action is judged of potential importance due to:

(a) the likely character and timing of the effects of strategic air attack on the Soviet Union; and

(b) the possibility that the continued loyalty of important groups in the Soviet Union to the war effort of the regime may be partially determined by their view of American war and postwar intentions vis-a-vis Russia.

The possibility of protracted major war would, of course, raise the need for a vast array of political warfare actions on a continuing basis. This project has not attempted to enter this area of thought and forward planning.

VII. Special Recommendations for Radio Broadcasting

Against the background of our analysis and recommendations in the field of political warfare, radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union and the European satellites takes on importance as a major instrument for communicating, at various stages, the nature of the realistic and attractive alternative for the peoples of

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

9
Part I - Recommendations

To establish the existence of slow change and to exploit it are prime tasks for American diplomacy. We would, therefore, recommend that the Department of State, bearing in mind other American interests, consider the possibility of increasingly positive, concentrated, and sustained efforts to negotiate the unification of Germany by democratic means. The unification of Germany by such means would in no way lessen the need to maintain the other lines of American political warfare policy, including action designed to achieve effective controlled world armaments and a diminution or elimination of Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

V. U.S. Action Under Conditions of Soviet Internal Crisis

Against the background of the preparatory actions listed in II above, the United States might take the following actions designed to further a resolution of a Soviet internal crisis compatible with our own interests and objectives:

(a) Effectively communicate to the key groups concerned in the Soviet Union both the limited nature of the American interest and the U.S. willingness to negotiate settlements of outstanding issues on a basis compatible with the Russian national interest, as opposed to the interests of the Soviet regime.

(b) Vigorously exhibit U.S. willingness to permit the internal crisis to continue without direct interference or encroachment on the legitimate Russian national interest.

(c) Within the framework of (a) and (b) accelerate the crisis within the satellites and even, perhaps, the Soviet Union, as circumstances permit, by both overt and covert means.

(d) Project to popular groups within the Soviet Union by mass means of communication (including, possibly, means reserved for this purpose), U.S.

Part I - Recommendations

these areas which is implicit in U.S. objectives.

Over and above the themes presently projected to the Soviet Union and its satellites we recommend that a series of themes now be elaborated and projected which would clarify in appropriate forms, depending on the circumstances:

(a) The nature of long-run American interests and objectives in the area.

(b) The relationship between American interests and objectives and the historic national and regional interests of the area.

(c) The relationship between American interests and objectives and the particular problems and aspirations of various groups.

We believe that the association deemed desirable under (c) can and should be achieved without committing the United States in detail to particular forms of future action and intervention in the societies of Russia and Eastern Europe.

We believe that the planning of American radio broadcasts on these principles requires a degree and intimacy of cooperation between those responsible for high policy and those responsible for radio broadcasting which does not now exist.

VIII. Special Recommendations on the Nationality Question

We have examined in detail the evidence available to us on the history and present position within the Ukraine, Armenia, and the Caucasus. We have concluded as follows:

(a) The discontents within the three nationality areas examined are, essentially, similar to those which characterize Soviet citizens in other regions, including the Great Russians.

Part I - Recommendations

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

11

10

(b) In addition, these general discontents are heightened with varying force, by a sense of national identity which is increasingly violated by current Soviet policy.

(c) There is no reason to believe that any of these three areas has the capability to create and maintain a national political state without steady outside support and, perhaps, even continuing external enforcement.

(d) There is no evidence to indicate that the discontents of these peoples, whatever their source, are positively associated to a significant extent with an aspiration for national political independence. *at the point where*

In the light of these conclusions and in the further light of our general recommendations on U.S. political warfare, we would hold that the United States should continue in the foreseeable future to avoid a commitment to support the national political independence of any of these three regions.

We do not believe that firm American avoidance of such commitment will hamper political warfare efforts designed to mobilize effectively the dissidence of these regions in thought and action against the Soviet regime.

Part I - Recommendations

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Pp. for Gen Leach:

pp. 35-38

pp. 35-41

also 17-35



pp. 2-8

CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. The Fundamental Hypothesis	3
III. The Priority of Power	6
IV. The Evolution of Soviet Rule	11
V. The Pattern of Soviet Society	30
VI. The Prospects for Soviet Society	41

Part II a - Dynamics

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

THE ORIGINS, PRESENT STATUS, AND PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET SOCIETY

I. Introduction

This paper is an effort to summarize the main lines of argument and the conclusions of Appendix A, "The Dynamics of Soviet Society". As against Appendix A, this essay focuses, in particular, on the pattern of cohesive forces, instabilities, and tensions which characterize Soviet society as of the present; on the forces making for change; and on the alternative patterns such change may assume in the foreseeable future. Since Soviet society is ruled with great thoroughness by a dictator and his appointees, acting through bureaucratic chains of command they intimately control, a considerable emphasis is given here to the motivating forces of the Soviet regime and to the possibilities of change in its structure and policy, including alterations in the locus of power at the highest level. It is our view that such change, should it come about, will arise from forces generated by the prior history of the whole of Soviet society, in the context of the world situation it confronts, and will have consequences for that society at every level, and possibly as well for its relations with the external world.

The conduct of foreign policy between states always involves, implicitly or explicitly, a net judgment concerning the relative power and significance of the forces at work in the camp of ally, negotiating

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

2

partner, actual or potential enemy. The operational purpose of this paper is to set down explicitly what we have concluded concerning the position within a hostile state, around those issues believed most relevant to the making of American policy. These conclusions on Soviet society, it will be seen, flow directly into the staff papers which follow. Much foreign policy is based, implicitly or explicitly, on the assumption that no significant change will occur in the society of an opposing state over the time period relevant to the decision in hand. This is, indeed, a possible and workable assumption on which to proceed; and it is one of the cases examined in our conclusions about Soviet society. In the U.S.-Soviet relations, however, exceptional clarity concerning the potentialities for change would appear justified. The present state of our relations with Soviet Russia is unsatisfactory and, evidently, we must look to a future in which the issues at contention are moved towards positions more nearly in the American interest. Such movement may hinge on potentialities for change in the whole structure of Soviet society. More than that, such changes may come about because of the interplay between the external world and Soviet society. Since American policy is a major determinant of the position in the world external to the Soviet Union, it would appear that what we do or fail to do as a nation may cause to take place developments within the Soviet Union more or less in our own interest. It is a persistent theme of this report as a whole that the making of an effective American policy of political warfare demands that we, at once, recognize this margin of influence--however narrow it may be--and exploit it with purposeful and, especially, concentrated effort; but at the same time, that we avoid illusions of grandeur concerning our capabilities and avoid underestimating the great power of the forces at work in Soviet society which we can influence marginally, if at all.

It would be widely agreed that the understanding of any society requires knowledge of its history. There

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

Part II a - Dynamics

is a quite technical reason for this familiar judgment. For profound psychological reasons, the outlook of men, individually and collectively, is generally susceptible only to slow change. It is something of an oversimplification but broadly true that ideas and habits long held and long successfully applied are adhered to with great loyalty. Thus, to weight with reasonable accuracy the various characteristics of a society, or of any group within it, at any moment of time, we must know something of its history, of its cumulative communal experience. It is for this reason that Appendix A is, so substantially, an analytic essay in history. The present paper must, of course, summarize drastically the historical argument which is its underpinning and, therefore, can impart neither a satisfactory sense of the process of change whereby Soviet society has arrived at its present posture, nor the basis for isolating certain factors as decisive to the future of that society, whatever particular forms the future may take. For this reason the reader is urged, if possible, to consult the more spacious exposition of our argument contained in Appendix A.

II. The Fundamental Hypothesis

It is the present hypothesis that the modern Soviet state is to be understood primarily as the consequence of a peculiarly single-minded and sustained effort, by an extraordinarily centralized regime, to pursue two related but not identical goals: namely, the maintenance of its own absolute internal power over Russian society, and the maximization over time of its power vis-a-vis the external world. These twin objectives have interacted on each other. Moreover, they have been to some extent self-supporting, but not on all occasions; and, when conflict has arisen between them, the first has had priority thus far in the history of the Soviet regime.

These interlocking characteristics of the regime emerged step by step out of an historical process rather than from a conscious plan. The origins of the process can be traced back to certain elements in the history

Rostov II-A

Part I & 2 - references

and thought and personality of the chief revolutionary leaders, notably, of Lenin and the political party he organized at about the turn of this century. These men were predisposed to make certain policy choices when confronted with the alternatives open to them, before, during, and after the Russian Revolutions of 1917. They did not consciously plan the Soviet regime which, in fact, emerged. Their predispositions, when confronted by events and forces outside their control, led to a series of short-run decisions which, over time, shaped the course of the Soviet regime. In particular, this accumulation of decisions led systematically: (1) toward the evolution of a system of centralized and absolute political power, dominated by one man; (2) toward a bureaucratized, hierarchical structure of institutions and a related system of income distribution designed to maximize efficiency; (3) toward a systematic statist and nationalist alteration in Marxist ideology, and, within the framework of the modified ideology, toward a conservative, traditionalist pattern for social, intellectual, and cultural life; (4) toward that organization of the Russian economy which would maximize the rate of industrial growth and military strength, leaving for consumption that minimum allocation compatible with the maintenance of life and efficiency within the working force. The emergence of this pattern for society--fully formed in the course of the 1930's--has set in motion forces, not fully within the power of Soviet executive control, which are, in turn, changing the pattern of Soviet life and institutions and which promise to alter that society still further in the future.

On this view, then, Soviet society as it now stands, as distinct from the Soviet regime, represents the cumulative consequences of the interaction between the objectives of the Soviet regime and the problems thrown up to the regime for decision by the nature of the area and the peoples they have sought to rule and by the course of events in the outside world. The decisions of the regime appear to have been governed by a set of priorities which exhibit remarkable continuity from the November Revolution forward. It is judged that a converging series of influences made

Reston II
Part II - Dynamics

Lenin and the hard core of the Communist Party he dominated choose that course which would increase their own direct short-run power, as opposed to any other possible goal open to them, at moments of decision. The means to power early became, in fact, an end in themselves: a result implicit in the Hegelian bases of Marxism, as well as in Lenin's conception and organization of the Communist Party, and fully evident in the policy of the Soviet regime by 1921. While the priority of power was evident consistently in the performance of Lenin, it was only under Stalin's rule, notably after 1928, that it was carried forward to a fully logical conclusion in the form of the totalitarian system presently at work in the Soviet Empire. In its contemporary form that system appears to be governed less by a conscious series of choices among a wide set of alternatives than by fixed attitudes of mind and heavy bureaucratic procedures which incorporate institutionally the priority of power.

When the Bolsheviks seized the authority of the Russian state in 1917 they were equipped not merely with a rare purposefulness with respect to their own power but also with a complex set of economic, social, and political objectives derived from Marxism and with a theory of history based on the notion that the political, social, and even cultural aspects of a society are largely determined by its economic structure. In their own minds they seized power in order to install in Russia their policies and to move towards their long run ideological objectives by a process to be guided by the Marxist theory of historical change. Parts of their ideological heritage converged with the priority of power, but important elements within it conflicted. From the November Revolution forward to the late 1930's, one can observe a piecemeal but consistent process of modification which has altered the regime's policies towards its own peoples in such a way as to minimize if not wholly eliminate conflicts between their ideology and the pursuit of power. The extraordinarily unchanged pattern of institutional arrangements and policies from the late 1930's down to the present represents the consequence of this modification, which has evidently satisfied Stalin as a stable basis for his rule.

Roston II-A

Part II A - oligarchy

Thus the next two sections of this paper analyze, in turn, the nature and roots of the priority of power; and then the shapely series of changes, from the Revolution forward, at every level of Soviet policy, including its ideology, which have, in effect, made the operations of that society as consistent with the power interests of the Soviet regime as modern totalitarian techniques permit. Later sections consider the position of various groups of citizens within that society at the present time, and the prospects for the society's change.

III. The Priority of Power

It is important to recognize that the pursuit of their own power was only in part a direct psychological motivating interest with Lenin and his followers who made the November Revolution. Like other politicians before and since, they were certainly men who enjoyed the exercise of authority over others and found it easy to believe that so long as power remained firmly in their own hands larger human purposes would be served. There are, however, two other elements which contributed to the emergence of their remarkably consistent pattern of performance: first, the Hegelian element in Marx's political thought; second, their long apprenticeship as conspirators against the tsarist state.

Marx's doctrines were formulated at a time in the nineteenth century when men were excited by apparent analogies between the course of societies and the process of change in the natural world, as elaborated by a sequence of scientists who defined evolution in terms of certain fixed laws of adaptation, which, in Marx, assumed the form of an hypothesis which made the social, political, and cultural texture of societies dependent on material and economic forces.

Applied to societies, the evolutionary hypotheses resulted in theories of historical change. Men differed, of course, in their interpretation of the pattern history had followed and was likely to follow. The analogy with the evolution of the physical world, however, had

Part II a - Dynamics

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

7

the following important effect: it appeared to define a future which would be correct in terms of natural laws, and apparently independent of the individual judgments of men or of the short-run processes of politics. It was the notion of a scientifically objective and, therefore, "correct" course for history which, in part, led to the frame of mind of the Marxist revolutionaries. To this allegedly scientific conception the Russian revolutionary conspirators harnessed the full emotional force of their personal dissidence against the tsarist autocracy, and their aspirations for change. These men believed that Marx had formulated the theory which would determine, and therefore permit prediction concerning, the course of history; and they were led thereby to the view that political action was correct which moved societies along this historically predetermined path. They never accepted, or they abandoned, the lessons of some two thousand years of Western thought which regarded the handling of state power in relation to the individual as a distinct problem in all forms of society. Marxism, in one of its aspects, simply assumed away the problem. It held that the state was solely the instrument for class oppression by the historically dominant class; and that the correctness of political action lay not in its substance or method of application but in its relation to the effective exercise of class power at different historical stages. It was on these quasi-scientific foundations that Lenin built his conception of the Party as the disciplined instrument of history, responsible only to its own correct analysis and for the correct application of the laws of historical change.

The Party--the true Marxists--became a type of Hegelian hero. The acceptance of the notion of a correct and predeterminable path for history gave special status in the process of politics to those who understood that path. They appeared to receive sanction, by the acceptance of this doctrine, to take whatever steps might appear to them necessary, in the light of their Marxist analysis, to move the political process in the predetermined direction. The acceptance of this element in the Marxist dogma relieved the Soviet revolutionaries from the responsibilities of

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

Part I a - dynamics

considering systematically the manner in which the individual aspirations of men related to the political process; or the manner in which the political process must be shielded from the frailties of human ambition and ignorance in the handling of power.

There were, of course, other elements in the contradictory heritage of Marxism in the pre-1917 period: e.g., the notion that the transition from capitalism to socialism would automatically bring with it the achievement of certain democratic values in the 18th and 19th century sense; and the notion that all societies would pass, by means of class struggles, from feudal to bourgeois-capitalist to socialist stages, which would end with the mystically defined withering away of the state. These elements were alive in post-revolutionary Russia and, within the Communist Party especially, they led to conflict with the simpler notion that the first and overriding duty of the Party was to gain and to hold power effectively. These other Marxist strains are not even today wholly gone from the Soviet scene. But, in the end, Lenin built the Russian Communist Party and Lenin and Stalin have built the Soviet regime on the view that their knowledge of "historical correctness" imparted legitimacy to their acts, whatever the will of the majority of individuals whom they seek to rule, whatever the methods that may be required. They quickly appreciated, however, that their title to legitimacy hinged not on an academic virtuosity as Marxists but on their practical ability to seize and to hold power. The right to define the "correct" line--in the first instance within the Communist Party, and later within the Soviet regime--fell to him who triumphed in a power struggle. Thus, in one of its aspects, Marxism provided an easy identification of ideology and the pursuit of power, and offered a handy rationale for whatever policies seemed best to accord with the short-run interests of those who regarded themselves as the best and truest Marxists.

There was another and more practical basis for Lenin's belief that a disciplined dictatorial group must dominate political action if such action was to be

"correct". He and his colleagues were engaged in revolutionary agitation. They worked largely underground in Russia or from exile by means which were substantially illegal. They faced the real dangers and practical problems of subversive action. Lenin's elder brother, Alexander, had been hanged as the result of an abortive student's conspiracy. Lenin's justification for a tightly disciplined, centrally directed political party was thus made not only in terms of one strand in Marxist political theory, but also in terms of efficient revolutionary practice. The marriage of Marxism with the urgent tasks of energetic revolutionaries was natural. It led to a conception of the handling of political power by a central small unit, operating without any formal check on the legitimacy or correctness of its judgments except that of discussion within the kind of politically irresponsible group which tends to fall under the domination of a single leader.

The history of Russia in the nineteenth century also contributed to the development of this cast of political thought. The autocracy of the tsars made insufficient concessions to the developing ideas and to the rising social and political forces of the era between 1815 and 1917. Those who looked to social and political change were largely frustrated by the society in which they lived, and came to look upon the violent overthrow of the tsarist regime virtually as a goal in itself. Although this deep dissidence among Russian reformers yielded a wide range of prescriptions and political methods, and although pre-1917 Leninist Communism was distinctly a minority movement, Lenin's modifications of Marxism and his conception of the Communist Party are a part of the main stream of Russian radical thought.

Although the willingness of the Russian Communists under Lenin to accord an overriding priority to their own power can be traced in pre-revolutionary thought and action, its full practical implications became clear only in the period between April, 1917, when Lenin returned to Russia from Switzerland, and early 1922, by which time the Kronstadt revolt was crushed



Part II A - References

Postwar II-A

and the New Economic Policy installed. In these years Lenin succeeded in overthrowing the Provisional Government and dispersing the Provisional Assembly which had been elected in the only free election Russia has ever had: an election in which the Communists received some 25% of the vote, as compared to some 58% for the moderate socialist grouping, the Socialist Revolutionary Party. More than that, Lenin had maintained his dominance over the Communist Party in the face of probably majority opposition and crushed with military force a revolt conducted largely in the name of the November Revolution. He had concentrated effective power in his own hands and those of his direct appointees and installed the secret police as an institution to execute ruthlessly the will of the regime. He had created a massive bureaucracy to execute the regime's decisions, and removed from the trade unions, the soviets, and the mass of Communist Party members themselves any significant voice in the making of public policy. Stalin was already at work organizing and controlling from the center the Communist apparatus, as Lenin's Party boss. Finally, in order to preserve the power of his regime, Lenin had installed a domestic economic policy and a foreign policy which directly conflicted with the ideological presuppositions of the November Revolution.

By the later high standards of Stalin, Lenin's dictatorship of 1922 was partial and evidently lacking in thoroughness. Social and intellectual life remained remarkably free for almost a decade; and, within the higher reaches of the Communist Party, public debate was conducted on many issues. Nevertheless, the essential pattern of the Soviet regime was set in wholly recognizable form. This form constituted, in effect, the projection upon a whole society of the centralized, disciplined structure of the Communist Party itself, where, after discussion among a few, and final decision by one leader if necessary, a line of policy was laid down to be executed without question or modification by a bureaucratic apparatus. Perhaps more significant, by 1922 the habitual operational performance of those Bolsheviks who had survived and now dominated the Soviet structure had become evident; that is, a tendency to

Rostow II A

Part II - documents

give to the maintenance and enlargement of their own power an overriding priority, and an ability to pursue this objective with considerable tactical flexibility and ruthlessness.

IV. The Evolution of Soviet Rule

From 1922 down to the late 1930's the policies of the Soviet regime altered, in sector after sector of the society it controlled, in a manner consistent with the priority of power. In some instances, as with government ownership of industry and rapid industrialization, the revolutionary objectives converged with the priority of power; in others, notably in political and social organization and objectives, and in foreign policy, there was conflict. This evolution was not the consequence of a fixed plan, but rather of a relatively fixed pattern of response to changing problems and circumstances. The transition towards a consistency already implicit in Lenin's regime of about 1922 can be traced in the evolution of high power, in the functions of the bureaucratic structure, in economic policy, in ideology and social policy, and in Soviet relations with the external world.

The first and certainly the most important element in this evolution was Stalin's success in establishing himself as a personal, absolute dictator. Lenin, in the period between his final stroke in March, 1923 and his death in January, 1924, came to the conclusion that some form of diffused authority should succeed to his unique if sometimes subtly exercised powers. He appears to have envisaged some kind of communal arrangement among his principal survivors within the Politburo, and the maintenance of a measure of authority within the much larger Central Committee of the Communist Party, which might serve to check the Politburo or assist in the maintenance of its unity. Lenin saw that Stalin's position within the party machine and, especially, his evident desire to enlarge his personal authority from that base, would probably be incompatible with this solution.

Rosow II A

Part I & - diagrams

Lenin's so-called Testament, which ran counter to the actual trend of political events after 1917, was not applied. Stalin, in fact, moved from his base as Secretary of the Communist Party to a full dictatorship in which he was so placed as to control intimately all the instruments of power within the Soviet state. Elections within the Communist Party could be controlled by those who dominated the party machinery at the top. There was no appeal outside the party. At every level the Communist Party, despite its elective apparatus, was, or could be, converted by the high level machinery of its organization, into a co-optive body. He who controlled the machinery of organization controlled, in the end, the voting. And, although it took Stalin some time to work out satisfactorily the full implications of his central perception, the result was implicit in his effective dominance of the Communist Party organization at a time when that organization, in turn, dominated the instruments of power in the Soviet state. A bench-mark in this process was the mass recruitment into the party of hitherto non-political workers, early in 1924, which assured those in control of the party apparatus of control from the grass roots up.

In the process of achieving his dictatorship--roughly between 1923 and 1928--Stalin succeeded in eliminating all his major potential rivals: Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky. Although these years were shot through with debate within the Communist Party--notably on the appropriate rate of industrialization and on policy towards the peasantry--they are best understood as a struggle for power within a party which, in turn, had already consolidated its dictatorship over the country.

Towards the end of 1928 the First Five Year Plan was announced, and in 1929, on his fiftieth birthday, Stalin emerged openly as the dictator of Russia. It was further announced in that year that all Politburo decisions were taken unanimously, and public high level discussion of policy within the Communist Party ceased. Stalin's principal colleagues from this time forward included none of the major figures of Lenin's entourage,

Rostov II A

Part II a - dynamics

but rather men personally linked to Stalin at an earlier time or brought forward by him subsequently.

Stalin's assumption of dictatorial powers brought with it a program of rapid industrialization and enforced collectivization of agriculture--measures he had opposed until his own authority was fully established. The execution of these measures, under the Politburo's direction, confirmed and strengthened the bureaucratic cast which the Soviet structure of organization had already assumed. The trade unions, long stripped of any significant power to make economic and political decisions, became primarily instruments for the increase of productivity. Agriculture came increasingly under the administration of collective farms which formed part of the state's chain of command. The Soviets--the original instrument of Bolshevik power--atrophied to virtually symbolic bodies. The Army and the Secret Police were kept on short rein by powers of appointment and surveillance which centered, finally, in Stalin's hands. The Communist Party itself, with the leaders of potential opposition to Stalin removed from authority, became a bureaucratic instrument for propagandizing, executing, and reporting on policies decided upon solely within the Politburo.

This process of bringing the structure of Soviet society into the most intimate and direct control of the dictator technically possible was climaxed by the Great Purges which began in 1936 and reached a spectacular, insane climax in the course of 1938. In the course of this phenomenon, some nine million persons appear to have been arrested, of whom many were executed, most sent to prison camps, and, in the end, some released. Those arrested generally fell into categories apparently judged prima facie to be antagonistic to Stalin's rule and its policies; e.g., Old Bolsheviks, citizens from non-Russian areas within the USSR, those believed associated with Stalin's rivals of the 1920's, foreign technicians; and, above all, the upper levels of the bureaucracy, including the Communist Party. Since the technique of the purge was based on the extraction of confessions which would identify the prisoners' colleagues with non-existent conspiracies, the arrests ramified out in all directions.

Roston I A

Part II A - documents

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

14

Whatever Stalin's motives, one result of the purge was largely to eliminate from power in the bureaucratic chain of command those who had held authority over the previous years and to bring in a new generation of bureaucrats judged more amenable to Stalin's rule. No element in the Soviet structure appears to have been more weakened by the purges than the Communist Party apparatus, which lost authority to the other chains of bureaucratic command, and, notably, to the Secret Police.

This adjustment in the organization of Soviet power was accompanied not only by rapid industrialization and forced collectivization in the Soviet economy but also by a remarkable series of modifications in Soviet ideology and social policy. Like the other changes of this era, they can be regarded either as the logical elaboration of totalitarian elements already present in Soviet life as of 1922--as the ironing out by Stalin of Lenin's temporizing inconsistencies--or as Stalin's creation in Russia of a self-conscious totalitarian state. Our own analysis would emphasize strongly the former view.

In his criticism of Hegel, Marx claimed to have turned that confused German professor on his head. In one part of his doctrine Hegel had made the state the decisive instrument for implementing historical change; Marx regarded the state as the reflection of the economic structure of society and the power relations which derived from the economy. Further, Marx's analysis of the class struggle led him to a view that was profoundly international. The noun "nationalism" was only rarely used in pre-1917 Marxist circles without the derogatory prefix "bourgeois".

By 1922 Lenin had already taken a series of decisions the consequences of which were: first, the creation of a powerful, centrally controlled state; and second, the abandonment, or relegation to low priority, of the goal of world revolution. Both of these moves could be, and were for a time, rationalized as necessary means to the eventual Marxist goal of a classless world society, in which national states would have withered away. Step by step, however, Soviet ideology has moved

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

Part II a - dynamics

into conformity with the facts of the regime's operations; and while the older Marxist elements have by no means disappeared from the scene or totally lost their influence, they have been replaced by concepts which exalt the state and its leaders as the determining forces in history, and which have raised the most primitive and traditional forms of Great Russian nationalism to a pathological level of importance they have, perhaps, never before enjoyed in Russian history. It is not without meaning to assert that Stalin has set Hegel right side up again.

As early as 1924, in opposition to Trotsky, Stalin promulgated the doctrine of socialism in one country, a position which not only appealed to Russian nationalism and conformed to the limited revolutionary capabilities of the regime in the outside world, but also offered a rationale for the role of a powerful state in communist Russia as a means of defense against an ideologically hostile world. Shortly after the inauguration of the First Five Year Plan and forced collectivization (1930) Stalin gave a new importance to the role of the state in the context of the economic policies then being implemented while mocking those who looked to its early withering away. And in 1939 he positively asserted, in general language, the role of the state as the prime mover of history, against the background of a decade's extraordinary glorification of himself as its undisputed leader. Since 1929 Stalin has been progressively deified in the classic manner of ancient autocrats--by the employment of all the propaganda instruments of a modern totalitarian state. Formally, still, these anti-Marxist conceptions are still justified in terms of transitional problems; but it is evident, as time has gone on, that the ideology of the means has triumphed over that of the ends they were deemed to serve.

Parallel with this emergent Hegelian conception of the state and its leaders there has been a progressively increased reliance on Great Russian nationalism as the ideological basis for the regime's rule. The usefulness of nationalism as a tool of the regime became

strongly evident for the first time in the course of the foreign interventions in the Civil War which followed the November Revolution. A significant number of political enemies rallied to the regime in this struggle, reflecting both a simple loyalty to the nation among groups with anti-Bolshevik feelings, and a loyalty to the Revolution, broadly conceived, among radicals who held non-Bolshevik doctrinal positions. By 1922, with the regime's position consolidated, the Civil War and foreign intervention at an end, Lenin still faced a fundamentally hostile people on whom he wished to impose forms of organization which they did not find wholly attractive. The Soviet regime early fell into the habit of presenting the external world as hostile to Russia and thus justifying an atmosphere of internal crisis, including extreme police measures. There was a merging of the Russian historic instinct to fear and distrust the external world with the Marxist conception of a socialist island in a hostile capitalist sea; and this merging, a conscious act of Soviet policy, had personal roots in the fact that those who progressively triumphed within the Soviet power structure were generally without extensive experience outside Russia and increasingly motivated by a desire to preserve both the structure they had created within their own nation and the considerable national achievements of the regime. The national and doctrinal roots of Soviet xenophobia have thus tended to unite.

In the course of the 1930's, as noted below, the national orientation of the regime's policy was accentuated in many directions, stretching from elementary education to the uniforms of the Red Army. The course of the reaction of Soviet citizens to the Second World War appears to have confirmed Stalin in the conception that a xenophobic nationalism, generated among the Great Russian population of the USSR, was the most solid possible popular basis for the regime. The postwar years have seen a steady accentuation of the effort of the regime to identify itself with the long pull of Great Russian nationalism, and especially to portray Russia at bay in the face of aggressive American intent. The United States has come to be presented in Soviet propaganda less as the leader of an ideologically hostile

capitalist world than as a successor to the historic sequence of Western invaders of Russia, of whom Hitler was the most recent. Current anti-American propaganda is, essentially, a repetition of Russian anti-Hitler propaganda as projected at the height of the Second World War.

Thus, as in so many other aspects of the evolution of Soviet policy, a technique of harnessing a means to an end--in this case the use of nationalism as a prop to a shaky Marxist revolutionary regime--has come, in fact, to be a dominating policy in itself. The inculcation of a crude xenophobic patriotism appears now the principal aim of Soviet information policy, in its widest sense, although it runs counter to some of the deepest elements in Marxism.

The transition towards an Hegelian view of the role of the state and towards a progressive reliance on a crude and heightened nationalism was accompanied by a dramatic shift in the whole field of social and cultural policy in the course of the 1930's. The first phase of the transition, associated with the early frantic years of the First Five Year Plan, saw all forms of expression and activity in the Soviet Union subordinated to the immediate needs of the party line. The relatively free social and cultural policy of the 1920's, which incorporated in education, family policy, prison organization, literature, and the arts many of the avant garde conceptions of the Revolution (and of the Western world), was shifted on to an empirical short-run basis, in which a united maximum effort on the tasks in hand was the overriding criterion. By the mid-thirties this literal propaganda approach had been found unsatisfactory and, in area after area, a further transition was being made to what has subsequently remained the pattern of Soviet policy.

In terms of social action the new dispensation frankly recognized the hierarchical structure of Soviet life and confirmed as a virtue the sharp gradations in income and privilege which had generally emerged from the process of bureaucratization--in the first instance,

Rostow II A

Part II & - dynamics

it would appear, in the Secret Police. The old notions of equality of income and status, and even the special privileged status of the industrial worker and his children, were largely abandoned. In the armed forces this move was expressed in a revival of the old-fashioned virtues of discipline, the reinstallation of the old ranks and the old Russian military heroes. In education the progressive ideas which had cheered John Dewey on his visit to Russia in the 1920's were abandoned in favor of a more traditional discipline. In literature and the arts a policy of "Socialist realism" was installed, in which traditional forms were encouraged, with an overlay of ideology addressed to the glorification of Stalin's regime. Artistic experiment has been almost nonexistent in the Soviet Union for the past fifteen years. Family policy, the civil law, the handling of prisoners, the study and teaching of history, and, to some lesser extent, even policy towards the Orthodox Church all followed in the same conservative pattern.

At the core of these changes was the view that what the regime needed were disciplined, orderly, efficient, and loyal citizens who would fit well into the vast centrally controlled machine which had been created, under Stalin's direction, on Lenin's foundations. The radical notions of the 1920's, based on versions of Marxist environmental determinism, ran counter to a de facto situation where the regime judged itself capable and prepared to determine the environment of the society. Stalin looked to the state and his own powers to make history--not to the interaction of individual and group interests with their material setting. Although these changes were much deplored by Marxists within and outside Russia, as was Stalin's dictatorship itself, this form of organization was already implicit in the notion of the disciplined party prepared to "swim against the stream" and the will of the majority, put forward by Lenin as early as 1902. In a sense, Stalin's policies of the 1930's simply cleared away an anomalous position left by Lenin, heightened in its importance by the accelerated industrialization after 1929, which increased the importance to the regime of efficiency and discipline within the population.

During the Second World War there was a considerable relaxation in the controls over cultural life, notably after the successful defense of Moscow and evidence of an authentic national response among the Great Russians to a foreign invader. This period saw some limited enlargement of formal contact with the Western world, which was reinforced for millions of Soviet citizens by direct experience as prisoners and as members of invading or occupying armies. Almost immediately after the war, however, the regime reimposed, certainly responding, in part, to the disturbing effect of the outside world on its citizens, tight political controls, and there re-emerged the pre-war pattern of a politically controlled cultural orthodoxy addressed systematically to the praise of Stalin, the Soviet state, and the Great Russian people.

But there has been steadily maintained a strand of at least verbal continuity with the tradition of Marx, Engels, and Lenin; and, in the face of the vast change in substance of Soviet ideology, it is fair to ask the reasons for this. The relevant judgments, in order of increasing importance, appear to be these.

1. It may be that some part of the top leadership still believes in the ideology it has imposed, although this is doubtful. All available evidence points to the domination of Stalin's mind and that of his colleagues by an ideology derived from their own experience in the pursuit and maintenance of power. Its effective touchstones of good and bad are the consequence of any given act for their own power. If other elements enter into the rationale for their action, they are on the whole now likely to be based on Russian nationalism rather than on Marxism. Nevertheless, they may still believe, in some part of their beings, that they represent correctly the Marxist revolutionary heritage. They most certainly are loyal to the institutions they have built in Russia, and take pride in the material advance of the society to whose control they have devoted their mature lives. This institutional loyalty may easily merge with their ideological heritage. They may thus have successfully and, in some sense, sincerely identified their own



History II, A

Part II c - Summary

success, as a ruling group in Russia, with the ultimate goals of communism. On the whole this seems unlikely; but dogmatism is not justified on present evidence. It can be asserted, however, with reasonable confidence that such a residuum of ideological faith is not likely to have appreciable effect on policy when it conflicts with the short-term interests of the regime with respect to the maintenance of its internal stability or the enlargement of its external power.

2. Even if the top leadership ceased to take Marxist doctrine seriously, it would be inconceivable for it to admit this view publicly; this would both destroy the basis for the regime's legitimacy and involve the admission of prior error or cynicism which even (or perhaps, especially) totalitarian politicians cannot do with impunity.

3. Some political support accrues to the regime on the basis of the revolutionary ideology, notably among the youth, although ideological enthusiasm appears to be a much less important element in the regime's calculations than it was before the mid-1930's, and may be definitely on the wane among the effective motivations of the postwar generation. Ideology has in the past kept some otherwise wavering supporters uncertain enough not to break with the regime until too late. And, in general, ideology acts as a frame for viewing the realities of Soviet life which diminishes, to some extent, the disaffections they otherwise create; although some aspects of the residual ideological heritage may heighten popular consciousness of the gap between promise and performance in Soviet life.

4. The postwar ideological retightening has made evident the role of ideology in controlling what the regime regards as the vital educational and propaganda functions of intellectual and political activity. A distinctive feature of the Soviet system is the complete subordination of all organized social activity to the purposes of the state; and a rigid and authoritative form is required for stating those purposes, to guide the activities that bear on the molding of citizens'

Row D A

Row D A

minds. The ideology, as amended and reinterpreted serves as such a guide and standard.

5. The foreign support (exclusive of the European satellites) enjoyed by the Soviet state is based largely, if not entirely, on the identification by people abroad of the Soviet regime, through its revolutionary ideology, with their own revolutionary aspirations. This support is extremely important in the international power position of the Soviet Union and cannot be dispensed with, although it involves some complications and embarrassments. The Soviet regime has to profess its continuity with the Marxist revolutionary tradition in order to maintain the allegiance of its foreign sympathizers. This requirement limits somewhat the rate at which ideological changes can be introduced within the USSR, since foreign communist parties not in power are not so well insulated from alternative explanations of events. Further, this situation imposes the necessity of concealing much of Soviet life even from communist adherents abroad.

6. Most important of all, the Soviet political and social system, as it has now crystallized, has a basic need for an external enemy; and Marxist ideology conveniently defines such an enemy. The functions served by the postulation of threatening foreign forces include:

(a) Justification of the economic privation and rigorous controls which have to be imposed in the interest of building national power.

(b) A partial outlet for the hostility generated by the rigors of the regime.

(c) A stimulus for the evocation of patriotic defense motives, which are an important source of strength for the regime.

(d) A presentation of internal dissidents as agents of foreign powers or as dominated by the ideology of the international enemy-- that is, by a bourgeois ideology.

Roston II A

Part II A - Dynamics

(e) Justification and reinforcement for the policy of keeping contact with the West at a minimum, which in turn is necessary to curtail disaffection and to prevent the free circulation of ideas which might challenge official positions.

(f) Accordance with the military state of mind which has prevailed in Soviet politics, in part since the Revolution and completely since 1929. The regime evidently cannot conceive of politics and political measures except as aspects of a struggle against an enemy. The Marxist-Leninist ideology is extremely important in this respect, because it not only defines the enemy but actually creates the sense of enmity on both sides. Without ideology, there would be little material basis for the present East-West conflict. Thus an ideology is maintained with great effort, highly at variance with actual Soviet practice, to create an artificial sense of conflict and foreign danger which the Soviet regime believes it requires to assist in the maintenance of internal stability.

But this is not all. An ideology is a complex phenomenon. It includes a set of goals and criteria for good and evil. More than that, it includes a vocabulary--a set of terms--which governs the way men look at the world and interpret it. The Soviet leaders were trained in a Marxist vocabulary. They talk and think, notably about the world abroad, in terms of economic interests, class groups, and class struggles. Since it is wholly outside their direct personal training and experience, it is very doubtful if they understand the ethical and even religious foundations of Western societies, or the conception of politics as the arena for the settlement of differences among individuals and groups, such a settlement being made within rules designed to protect the individual as well as the community, to protect the minority as well as to permit the majority to govern. They probably still believe or half-believe in Wall Street as the center of American policy formation. Practical experience and ample sources of intelligence have certainly made them modify their judgments on many aspects of the external world--as probably, for example,

on the question of a serious American depression. But this modification has probably been made piecemeal and ad hoc, not by a basic reappraisal of Western society and its foundations. Men tend to be taken in by their own magic; and part of their magic consists in the concepts they use to describe and interpret the world around them. In this sense it seems likely that the Marxist ideology is still alive and vital in the higher reaches of the Soviet regime. And it may be dangerous, because, to the extent that it operates, it limits or distorts the regime's perception of the external world and its probable response to the situations it confronts--including the response to aggressive Soviet initiatives.

Soviet relations with the external world have, in general, come to be governed by the same empirical criteria for the exercise of power which evolved in Soviet internal policy. One can observe, in the immediate post-Revolutionary years, a similar struggle between inherited ideological notions and the raw limitations which the historical environment imposed on the new Soviet state. From 1917 to 1923 Lenin made a series of foreign policy decisions governed by short-run practical power considerations, which, as in internal policy, set the format which Stalin has more fully elaborated. After an ineffective rear guard action, those who clung to an ideological basis for Soviet foreign policy were eliminated from effective power by 1929 and, for the most part, physically eliminated by the end of the Great Purge a decade later. On balance the foreign policy techniques of the Soviet state have been generally conventional, and its performance similar to that of other ambitious national states with the following extremely important exceptions:

(a) As with internal policy, a residue of what might be called ideological rationale for foreign policy has been maintained and applied in those circumstances where it has been judged empirically to be useful or where it has not conflicted with the maintenance and enlargement of Soviet power.

Rostow II A

Part II A - Dynamics

(b) In particular, the Soviet state has (with a few recent exceptions) maintained its direct control over Communist parties abroad and has manipulated their policies, on an ostensibly ideological basis, to conform to changing judgments concerning the power needs of the Soviet state.

(c) An ideological residue has combined with the needs of internal policy to maintain the Soviet state in a posture of almost continuous hostility to the external world; and this hostility is aggressive in the particular sense that, within the limits imposed by its prime goal of protecting its control over Soviet domestic society and the perhaps unconscious limits imposed by the techniques it is prepared to use, the regime seeks, as opportunity may offer, to expand indefinitely its external power.

(d) The status of direct authority acquired in Eastern Europe by the Soviet regime after the Second World War has led to a progressive imposition of a system of total control which has reflected fully the patterns of contemporary Soviet internal policy.

(e) The system of internal controls, including information controls, has permitted the Soviet regime, notably since 1929, to alter its foreign policy tactics more sharply than is possible in more democratic societies in which governments are dependent on the understanding and support of public opinion.

There is no evidence that before 1939 Soviet foreign policy was governed by a long-range plan. It appears to have responded to problems, threats, and possibilities thrown up by the course of events outside the Soviet Union, which it was, for the most part, incapable of determining or controlling; and response took the form of such actions as were judged most likely to maintain or expand the national power of the Soviet regime, on a short-range basis. Further, over this period the Soviet regime chose in general to forego an enlargement of its external power where such enlargement was judged to involve the risk of war or other major

Roston II A

risks to internal stability and its national base. Similarly, in its conduct of relations with Communist parties abroad the Soviet regime has chosen to maintain direct and absolute control over their policies, and to govern those policies on the bases of the believed short-run interests of the Soviet Union, rather than to permit in Communist parties abroad those forms of organization and policy which would maximize their effective power in their own areas. Although the post-1945 status of the Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe and the development of Communism in Asia and the Middle East have given the Soviet regime a new and more promising environment in which to operate, there is no evidence that the foreign policy criteria of the regime have changed.

It is a theme of our analysis, however, that, while the external expansion of Soviet power holds a priority second to the maintenance of the regime's internal control, the maximization of external power over time is a persistent goal of the present regime. What, then, are the roots of this posture of aggression?

Part I a - Dynamics

1. We would doubt that the Soviet regime is operating by a schedule or timetable of world domination. Nevertheless, Marx's and Lenin's analysis of the course of future world history still exerts a hold on the minds of Soviet leaders. It will be recalled that, while Lenin made his peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk and the regime was unprepared to take major risks to aid the later revolutionary efforts of German Communists, still the notion of world revolution became institutionalized in the ties of the Soviet regime to the Communist parties of the world in the Comintern. These ties have been used in the interests of the Soviet national state and often at the expense of the progress of Communism abroad. Nevertheless, the ingrained habits of thought of the Soviet regime look to an expansion of its world power, even though this expansion is not an overriding priority nor governed by a fixed plan; and these habits of thought have their origins in the original ideological conception of Communism's world triumph.

2. As noted at several points, the internal stability of the regime has come to be judged dependent on the maintenance within the Soviet Union of the view that the enmity of the external world justifies Soviet hostility. Even if this Soviet hostility were a pure position of propaganda, which it has never been, it would tend to set in motion reactions which would, in turn, give substance to the propaganda. As Kennan has pointed out, the assumption for governments, as for individuals, of enmity is one way of creating it. Chronic hostility and the insecurity that goes with it lead to actions of aggression. Psychologically, in part, it may be that Soviet aggression is defensive rather than offensive, based on fear rather than hope. In the end, for practical purposes and notably in the context of paragraph 1. above, Soviet hostility is to be judged positively aggressive, even if partially based on an insecurity which stems from an overriding concern with the maintenance of the regime's domestic base; for there is no evidence that any action of assurance or appeasement by the external world is likely to give that sense of security which would lead the present Soviet regime to settle down, and there is considerable evidence that weakened positions in the external world will be fully exploited by the Soviet regime. In short, if Soviet external aggressiveness is partially rooted in its domestic insecurity, it does not lie in the power of foreign diplomats to assuage that insecurity.

3. The habits, now firmly bureaucratized, for handling power within the USSR condition the external behavior of the regime. The exercise of the domestic power of the regime is based on attitudes and methods of as nearly total control as modern techniques permit--attitudes and methods which make it difficult if not impossible for the present regime to operate comfortably in situations of diffused or shared authority. In Germany and Eastern Europe, notably, the somewhat muscle-bound stage of internal Soviet evolution has certainly contributed to behavior which, objectively, is to be judged aggressive during the post-1945 period.

Thus far the Soviet regime, under Lenin and Stalin, has positively avoided major war. The roots of

this caution, at each point when the decision has had to be faced, appear to lie not merely in the view that major war might be lost, but in a concern with the impact of major war on the regime's hold over its own society.

The present analysis may shed some light on the question of the circumstances under which the Soviet regime is likely to resort to major war. Given its persistent objectives, the regime would almost certainly initiate a major war if it felt with a substantial margin of assurance that war could be decisively won without endangering the regime's hold on Soviet society. In turn, this would appear to imply that the external world was judged sufficiently weak and lacking in political unity and purpose to rally from an initial blow sufficiently to mount a military effort which might damage or destroy the regime's domestic position.

The regime might also undertake major war in a variety of conditions under which it became convinced that major war was the only realistic alternative to loss of control over Soviet society. In other terms, the regime is likely to choose to go down fighting rather than surrender its domestic base without a fight. For example, on the knowledge available to us it seems likely that an overt ultimatum to the regime, whose acceptance would be judged to involve both loss of essential positions and open capitulation to an external threat, would be rejected. On the other hand, the Soviet regime has, in its history, exhibited a marked ability to retreat and to take its losses without detonating major war when it felt that such losses were not incompatible with the continued maintenance of power over its domestic base. The significance the regime attached to any given loss in its external position might thus turn, in part, on the manner in which it was induced and, especially, on the believed consequences of the loss for its internal position.

If this view is correct, it implies that the avoidance of major war with the USSR under present tense circumstances, when a limited conflict of interest might flare into general mutual defiance, may hinge in part

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

28

on the diplomatic techniques by which such conflict is handled on both sides. It seems altogether possible that war might begin not because the substantive interests at stake in a given conflict were judged to be decisive, but because the Soviet regime felt that overt defeat on the limited issue might have general decisive consequences. It is to be noted that in its postwar aggressions against Greece, Berlin, and South Korea, the Soviet regime has taken pains to avoid taking positions such that limited defeat would be tantamount to general defeat. As the competitive armaments race proceeds with increasingly powerful weapons, however, the danger is likely to recur in an acute form, if it is believed that the side which strikes first will gain thereby a major military advantage.

There is a third and more remote category of danger that the Soviet Union initiate major war. We have thus far considered the Soviet regime as it is and has been, a state committee deeply to external expansion, but with a long-time scale in mind, a willingness to wait, and a substantial vested interest in avoiding external action which would endanger its internal security position. There is no guarantee, however, that its internal position will remain indefinitely secure. A violent internal struggle for power, while, on current evidence, not probably in the foreseeable future, is not to be ruled out. Such a struggle would, of course, weaken the external power of the Soviet Union in the first instance; and, to this extent, it would make the undertaking of major war on the grounds of a rational calculus less likely rather than more likely. It might also, however, make one group or another contending for power more desperate and, in a sense, less responsible than the Soviet regime has hitherto been. If real or imagined action by the external world could be successfully presented to the Russian peoples as a recurrence of foreign interference or aggression, war might be undertaken as a last desperate means of reuniting the nation and establishing the internal control of a group which sought power.

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

Postwar
Dynamics

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

29

We need not count, then, on Soviet initiation of a major war in terms of a fixed plan for world conquest; and it is proper to underline the apparent inhibitions on the regime's use of this power tool. But we cannot rule out the possibility of such action, notably under conditions of weakness and disunity in the external world, under actual or believed conditions of an external ultimatum or imminent attack, or even under conditions of grave internal instability.



Part IIa - Dynamics

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

V. The Pattern of Soviet Society

We turn now, briefly, to the pattern of society which has emerged from the interplay of these policies with the human beings who comprise Soviet society. This demands an effort to judge the net contemporary impact of the regime on the lives of various kinds of individuals and groups within the society it controls, and to assess the secondary, and not wholly controllable, impact of the Soviet system on the institutions and attitudes it has created to meet its needs. It should be emphasized that even in a cross section analysis of this type the dynamics of Soviet society cannot be forgotten or set aside. The cohesive forces, instabilities, and tensions all take their meaning from the paths which the Soviet system has followed and from the alternative future courses it may follow. We are here trying simply to examine the balance of forces within a moving society as they interplay with the expectations of men, and the workings of certain key institutions.

The central characteristic of the Soviet regime is taken to consist in an extraordinary degree of unification of power at the top of the structure. The instruments for the exercise of this power include the armed forces, the state administration, the Secret Police, and the Communist Party. To these must be added Soviet information policy, including, in its positive aspect, propaganda, and, negatively, the denial of information except as selected and interpreted by the regime.

Projected down into the lives of individuals and groups, the purpose of the system is to induce them to behave in such a way as to carry out those actions believed required for the maintenance of the internal power and the maximization of the external power of the Soviet state. For each group, the specific tasks believed necessary for the execution of this aim, the context in which it is carried out, and the frictions to which it gives rise are likely to differ.

Broadly speaking, the technique of the Soviet state is to offer to each group a pattern of incentives and restraints designed to deny to it any realistic alternative to carrying out the will of the regime. In order to induce men to execute with reasonable efficiency the tasks believed required, the Soviet regime recognizes the need for their deriving from their roles in the

system certain minimum satisfactions. These satisfactions constitute, in a sense, the positive cohesive forces tending to hold the regime together. On the assumption that these positive incentives may not suffice, the regime provides ample restraints designed to maintain the efficiency and stability of the system, and notably to prevent the effective crystallization of dissatisfaction in any form of independent political activity. The policing function is supported by Soviet information policy, both in the form of propaganda and, negatively, in a limitation on the facts or ideas made available. Soviet information policy is thus designed to deny to men the data and concepts required to formulate an alternative to the system. Police and party control are designed to prevent men from crystallizing effective action should they formulate an alternative.

On the side of incentives, the Soviet regime provides sufficient real income to maintain life; and, more importantly, it provides the possibilities of a rising scale of real income for those who work harder or who are prepared to accept more responsible tasks on the regime's terms. The process of bureaucratization has been accompanied by a wide spread in income distribution. Its range would certainly appear wider than statistical measurement allows if due weight could be given the non-monetary requisites of higher bureaucratic positions: e.g., superior resort hotels, cars, housing privileges, etc. In general, it may be said that in allocating its national income for purposes of consumption, the Soviet system has followed an approximation of Ricardo's and Marx's "iron law of wages". In a typical series of decisions taken in the context of particular circumstances the regime has, on balance, allocated resources to consumption, as opposed to capital investment and military end-products, on that minimum basis required to permit the working force to survive and to function efficiently. In part, since its beginnings, and completely since 1929, the increase in economic welfare has not been an independent goal of Soviet policy. Within this Iron Law system of consumption allocations, however, it has been necessary to adjust the distribution of income in such a way as to maintain significant

Roston II A

Part II & - Dynamics

material incentives for hard and steady work in priority fields.

A second positive incentive has taken the form of public prestige for efforts believed to be in the interest of the state as a whole. Not only is there the Stakhanovite movement; an elaborate gradation of awards and prizes has also been developed to supplement material incentives with the almost universal desire of men for communal approval. In general, the regime does not frustrate those ambitious to acquire prestige or to exercise authority over their fellows, even if their power, in turn, is hedged about by orders from the top and surveillance from various lateral directions.

A third range of incentives to loyalty can be grouped under the general heading of security. This term is designed to embrace not merely the material security (at a low real income level) which the system affords, but also certain basic needs of the individual in relation to society which the Soviet system more or less adequately fulfills. Although there are many conflicts between the concepts publicly projected by the regime and the facts which men confront in their lives, the existence of an ideology which claims inner consistency and continuity, and which, in particular, tends to give to individual men an explicit place in a larger communal organism, exerts a cohesive influence on society, as does an institutional structure of a markedly hierarchical character. These ideological and institutional values are capable of engaging the loyalty of men partially at least, and on a basis such that they function effectively within the system. This is notably the case because the whole system of Soviet education is designed to accentuate that general quality of men which seeks the security of a communal connection. It has been a notable characteristic of Soviet defectors that, in their process of adjustment to more individualistic societies, they have appeared to miss for a time the sense of direct connection with society which the Soviet system afforded, even when, in their later evaluation, this aspect of the system was far outweighed by other faults. Soviet defectors tend, in the first instance,

to be anti-communist, but also somewhat anti-individualistic. They do not at first find the notion of an atomistic society quite comprehensible, let alone attractive.

Finally, as noted earlier at length, the regime has permitted and even encouraged the continuance of powerful elements of nationalism in the society, not only in the form of a xenophobic patriotism, but also in the maintenance of certain lines of cultural continuity with the Russian past. And this sense of nationality may have been reinforced to some extent by the sense of material, military, and diplomatic achievement of the Soviet Union over the past several decades. Defectors who exhibit, in general, a profound hatred for Stalin and his system appear, nevertheless, to reserve a certain grudging respect and national pride for the extent of Russia's successes under Stalin.

Although it is important to appreciate that some considerable positive forces operate cohesively in Soviet society, it is evident that these alone do not determine its present shape. There is a heavy reliance on what might be called negative cohesive forces, i.e., forces designed not to induce but to compel the individual to behave in the manner desired by the regime. Of these the most powerful and pervasive is, of course, the centralized structure of the institutions within which Soviet citizens normally work. The process of bureaucratization, described earlier in the argument, has gradually developed over time a set of institutions organized on the principle of rigid hierarchical discipline. Virtually all sectors of Soviet life are permeated by structures of organization in which each individual is subservient to those above in a detailed, formal, virtually military manner. This system not only results in a maximum of direct control, but places an automatic premium, in the process of advancement within the society, on the precise, effective execution of orders from above.

But Soviet bureaucratic organization is not simple. In addition to standing within his own chain of command, the citizen is under surveillance, with



Roston II A

Part II A - dynamics

Rostov II A

symma

Part I a-

relatively few exceptions, from lateral directions. The Soviet administrator in industry, for example, does not look in one direction for orders, criticism, or opposition but rather in three. He is responsible to his own superior, but is watched by the party organization from one side and by the secret police from the other. The party and police organizations themselves are impregnated with techniques of surveillance as well as command. Although rough areas of clear responsibility have evolved, and have been allocated to the party, the police, and the administration, they substantially overlap and are meant to overlap in such a way as to give no man a sense of security. The gradual abandonment of the substantive goals of revolution, at a high level, has been accompanied by a diminution of reliance within the society on idealism and good will as motivating forces. The Soviet regime appears to rely on incentives to material advance, power, and prestige on the one hand, and on disciplined organization, surveillance, and fear on the other.

The suspicion of human beings which this mode of operation implies extends, apparently, to the very top of the regime. It is only at the level of Stalin himself that the administration, the party organization, and the police are really identified. There is ample evidence that from the level below Stalin down to the grass roots of Soviet organization, the three elements of direct control are in uneasy and even purposeful conflict, a conflict kept in equilibrium only by their ultimate unification in Stalin's hands.

Among the negative aspects of cohesion must be included one function of the system of propaganda. As noted earlier it is designed to do what it can to make persuasive the regime's rationale for its policy and to minimize the dissatisfactions which might arise in the minds of men in confronting the reality of their ordinary life. It is also designed to deny to men the information and concepts which would permit them to formulate an alternative to the lines of policy which they are meant to implement and support. Over and beyond these functions of propaganda, however, there appears to be

another. The system of Soviet propaganda is apparently designed, in part, simply to exhaust the intellectual and political energies of men. Almost all levels of Soviet (and satellite) life appear to provide for special, required forms of indoctrination. These take an important part of the time of hard working people after their work hours or otherwise in their free time. Whether or not these propaganda dosages are meant to convince men, as that term is normally understood in the West, they certainly have the effect, which is undoubtedly known, of exhausting their intellectual and political energies. Propaganda carried to surfeit helps produce, within the whole environment of Soviet life, a political apathy which, with this generation of Soviet rulers, may be judged as a useful or more useful result, even, than political enthusiasm. Very roughly, then, we can group the cohesive forces in Soviet society under the following headings:

Positive Cohesive Forces

1. Real income incentives.
2. Public prestige.
3. Limited power.
4. Positive propaganda.
5. A linking of the individual to the community by ideology and institutional structure.
6. Fear and suspicion of outside world.
7. Russian nationalism and culture, including pride in certain Soviet achievements.

Negative Cohesive Forces

1. Disciplined bureaucratic organization.
2. Surveillance and arbitrary power of secret police.

Rostow II A

Part II a - dynamics

3. Pervasive control of party.
4. Denial of knowledge and exhaustion of political energy by information policy.

The Soviet system, as it has emerged, is a form of political organization designed to function with reasonable efficiency in the face of widespread dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction is here taken to arise from a clash between the realities men confront and the expectations created by their cultural setting, including, in the present case, expectations encouraged by residual humanistic elements in Marxist ideology still alive in the Soviet Union. From its initial seizure of power in November 1917 the Soviet regime confronted its people with policies and situations contrary to those they had been led to expect. Its subsequent methods produced increasing opposition. While the system makes some effort to persuade and satisfy the people who live under it, the regime has by no means counted on the creation of what would be regarded as majority support within a democratic society. The existence of dissatisfactions, therefore, cannot be equated with instability. As a general rule it may be said with some confidence, on the basis of existing evidence, that the instruments of negative cohesion available to the regime are ample to cope with the dissatisfactions in Soviet society, so long as these instruments remain effectively unified at the top of the structure.

This does not mean, of course, that the tensions and dissatisfactions in the society are without meaning for the future of Russia or for American policy towards Russia. It does mean, however, that they are unlikely to become politically significant in changing the shape of Soviet society except after a split among the instruments of force at the top. In general, men are prepared to act to relieve their dissatisfactions only when a realistic alternative is open to them. The Soviet system has purposefully suppressed, by inducement and constraint, any realistic alternative to conformity to the regime. Under these circumstances the average among men becomes apathetic, lowers his horizons of self-expression,

and retreats to those areas of life into which the regime is least likely to intrude. Modern totalitarian regimes do not generate heroic opposition among their citizens, but confusion, fear, and withdrawal to those areas still left for some form of human self-expression. When, however, history offers to the Russian citizen the possibility of an alternative course which better suits his aspirations it is altogether likely that he will seize it, as indeed considerable numbers of Soviet citizens did under the unpromising circumstances of German invasion. But it should be strongly emphasized that, on present evidence, the desire for an alternative course and its shape is a matter which men within the Soviet system hardly articulate to themselves and rarely to each other, even to their closest friends. One of the aims of a totalitarian regime is to isolate the individual as a political being, and by a combination of inculcated fear and suspicion on the one hand, and organized activity on the other, to limit his political exchanges with others to occasions where state surveillance and control are possible.

Despite the limited significance of popular dissatisfaction, it is not impossible that the tensions in Soviet society may play a role in the alteration of the present system in two other respects:

1. It may be that those who hold the instruments of force may ultimately differ sufficiently to damage their unity on an issue of policy which involves one or another form of internal dissatisfaction; and

2. having split at the top, and if the split degenerates into an open, protracted crisis, those who hold one or another instrument of power within Soviet society may well look to popular groups in Russia for support in their effort to defeat their rivals for power.

In the light of these observations the instabilities and tensions may now be grouped as follows:

1. The instability of executive power, notably the problem of the succession.

2. The long-run instability of relations between concentrated executive power and the higher bureaucracy, notably as between the executive power and the armed forces.

3. Dissatisfactions general throughout Soviet society, created by the gap between expectations and reality:

- (a) The role of police power
- (b) The standard of living
- (c) The position of religion
- (d) Popular distrust of official propaganda
- (e) Lack of popular participation in government

4. Group dissatisfactions, created by the gap between expectation and reality, with special meaning for:

- (a) The peasant
- (b) Nationality groups
- (c) The intellectual
- (d) The bureaucracy
- (e) The industrial worker
- (f) Prison and forced labor

Broadly speaking, it is our view that it is the instabilities under 1 and 2 above which are most likely to be significant in detonating a major future crisis or in changing more gradually the nature of the Soviet regime; although those in 3 and 4 are likely to play an important part in the working out of a crisis, should a

Dynamics
4 A
Rostow

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

39

split among the instruments of power develop and generate into open struggle. These dynamic elements are examined at some length in other parts of our report.

Part II - Dynamics

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

VI. The Prospects for Soviet Society

It is essential to the view taken here that history can by no means be judged inevitable ex ante. The existence of forces which are certain to affect the future course of history can be firmly established; but the exact forms which they may take in relationship to one another and to future events is beyond the wit of man scientifically to formulate. The number of unknowns is evidently greater than the number of equations.

To say that the future cannot be predicted in detail is, however, not to say that speculation about the course of future events is useless. We can establish the existence of certain persistent factors of changing strength within the Soviet Union and its European satellites. Further, we can identify certain problems that the Soviet system will have to face, in one form or another, sometime over future years. It would indeed be foolish to base our national calculations on one or another particular form in which these forces might work their way out, or on one or another assumed solution to the problems the Soviet Union will confront. The task of American policy is so to act as to be prepared to cope with whatever particular form the future may take, and to do what lies within the power of the United States to produce that form of Soviet evolution most in our own interest. For that reason it is worth examining speculatively (and on a continuing basis, as our information and judgment improve) the alternatives which the future may hold. We cannot usefully peer far into the future; and a loss of humility in prediction is extremely dangerous. But the connection between action and prediction is unavoidable.

If the analysis set forth here is reasonably correct, the decisive area for change in the Soviet system lies in the evolution of executive power. Interacting with changes in this area are likely to be changes in the role of the Soviet bureaucracies and in the political effectiveness of the popular tensions and aspirations which are now contained by the unified control system. Soviet totalitarianism is the product of the mutual

Part II - Dynamics

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

42

interaction over time between the regime on the one hand and, on the other, the land and the peoples it has controlled and sought to manipulate efficiently in the context of an external world not within the regime's power wholly to control. The process has hinged on the unity of the instruments of the state's power at the top of that society; and, although all aspects of that society are likely to contribute to its future change, it is proper to focus attention in the first instance on the future organization of the executive arm.

Among the possible alternatives (which need not be mutually exclusive, over time) three major patterns of change can be defined, taking their shape from the future disposition of the powers now concentrated in Stalin's hands:

1. The successful succession of a new dictator to full power.
2. A smooth transition to a "constitutional" ruler.
3. A prolonged conflict for power.

The following observations can be made on these alternatives:

1. A successful replacement of Stalin by a single succession is, of course, not impossible; but this solution will face the following difficulties:

(a) The possible opposition of his present colleagues, and notably the residual Old Bolsheviks, to dominance by a new dictator.

(b) The relative weakness, as compared to the position after Lenin's death, of the party (or any other single bureaucratic base for power), as a foundation for moving towards absolute power.

(c) The initial position among several potential successors of relatively even balance apparently created by Stalin's disposition of functions.

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

Rostow II A

Part II a - dynamics



A single successor capable of both exerting a decisive voice in the Politburo and keeping all bureaucratic arms of power under his direct control would undoubtedly minimize the changes necessary in the Soviet system. Our knowledge is by no means sufficient to estimate the likelihood of this outcome. What can be said is that grave problems, arising directly from the dynamic consequences of Stalin's dictatorship, make this outcome probably more difficult of attainment than Stalin's succession to Lenin. Beneath Stalin's level a considerable de facto distribution of power exists. The re-creation of its unity around a new figure, in the present matured stage of the Soviet state, is judged a difficult though by no means impossible task.

2. Should no single potential successor feel himself strong enough to seize full power or be willing to risk the disruptive possibilities of the attempt, the Politburo may organize itself on the basis of an agreed ruler with limited powers. This is, in our judgment, the most likely form which the much discussed case of a triumvirate would assume, if in fact it were to operate with any effectiveness. In particular this solution would be likely to separate the right of executive decision (or arbitration) from intimate control over the bureaucratic agents of power. In turn this separation--which would, in effect, distribute elements of Stalin's authority--would be likely to require more sharp and formal definition of the limits of competence of the various bureaucratic instruments than now exists. They now purposefully overlap within the framework of their ultimate unification in Stalin's hands. Under the assumed circumstances of a "constitutional" chief of state, a failure to achieve an agreed delimitation of powers would be likely to lead to dangerous conflicts of authority as among the instruments of power and the men controlling them. If "constitutionality" should thus extend downward through the levels of the bureaucracy it might well have further profound consequences. The inherent long-run tendency of these bureaucracies to develop independent policy positions would be accentuated; for, in effect, decisions would be now reached in the Politburo more nearly by open negotiation, with the head of state as arbitrator, than by the dictator's fiat. Over time, a system of this kind, if in fact it would work on the Russian scene, might well have its consequences for the

Part I a - Dynamics

position of the individual Soviet citizen. The diminished unity of power and the need to organize its structure on more explicit rules for the handling of authority might serve to diminish the arbitrariness with which the individual Soviet citizen is now controlled. It is an old story in history that the rights of the citizen are, in the end, protected by the division of power. The mechanism for this protection arises from the fact that the manipulation of distributed power requires the existence of accepted rules which define the procedures and limits by which authority is exercised. It is the lack of such known procedures and limits which defines, in one of its aspects, a totalitarian state. Habeas corpus is the ultimate foundation for the quality of democratic organization in a society. A distribution of authority among Stalin's heirs, along the lines assumed here, would necessarily require, for example, a more sharp definition of the powers of the secret police than is now necessary while the secret police is firmly and directly under the control of the single dictator; and so, also, with the party, the army, and the arms of state administration in industry and agriculture. In such a situation the citizen would have increased potentialities for finding protection than at present, and even, perhaps, for making his political interests felt.

It is by no means evident that the group of men trained under Stalin are likely to prove capable of operating in a stable manner a situation of this kind. What can be said is that some such evolution is implicit in any successful effort to separate the multiple powers generated, unified, and operated by Stalin.

3. The third major possibility is, of course, that the successors to Stalin prove incapable of achieving either a fully unified succession or a stable distribution of Stalin's authority, and, in consequence, that they permit a degeneration into overt struggle for power.

Although the lessons of history and the posture in which Stalin is likely to leave his regime make this a thoroughly possible development, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the legatees of Stalin at the top will

have an almost overriding interest in maintaining their unity or, at least, in preventing any struggle for power from spreading outside the Kremlin. If such a struggle proceeds for any time, however, it is likely to engage the main bureaucratic instruments of power; i.e., the main contestants for dominance are likely to bring into play the potentialities of the secret police, the party, the army, and the state administration. If the Soviet armed forces remain outside the contest it is likely that the secret police, as presently organized (including some fully armed formations), could master the situation. Although the Russian communist tradition and experience would emphasize the dangers of invoking the armed forces, or even the secret police, as participants in a political struggle, it would also underline the importance of instruments of raw power in such a situation. It is altogether typical of the modern Soviet mentality that, in its political contest with Tito's government, the Soviet regime devoted a major effort to subverting the Yugoslav army. It is thus wholly possible that one contestant for power or another under the assumed circumstances would look to the armed forces as a counterweight against his rivals.

It is not useful to peer too far into such a wholly imaginary situation. Three characteristics of such a contest for power are, however, to be emphasized:

(a) In modern Russia (as opposed to Russia of previous centuries) an overt struggle for the succession would be difficult to confine: once the bureaucratic instruments of force became engaged, the struggle might well fan out over the whole Soviet empire.

(b) If such a struggle were to proceed for any considerable period of time, the contestants might well reach back into the society for popular support and thus bring politically into play the dissatisfactions and positive aspirations of various groups; and, in any case, a split among the instruments of power is likely to give mass political feelings (for virtually the first time since 1921) a realistic opportunity to express themselves.

Part II a - Dynamics

(c) The evolution of such a full political crisis, and its outcome, may well be affected by the actions taken with respect to it by the non-Communist world, and notably by the extent and manner of foreign intervention; in this context there is a possibility that real or feared intervention might cause a surge of nationalist feeling in Russia which would override the divisive forces at work in the crisis.

These three simplified alternatives are cited mainly to dramatize the nature of the forces believed to be at work in the Soviet structure at its present stage of history; and especially to indicate the believed character of the dynamic connection between the Politburo, the major arms of bureaucratic power, and the political feelings and aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet empire. It is evident that these three alternative lines of development, taken over time, are not mutually exclusive; for example, an effort at a "constitutional" division of powers might break down and give way to a single full succession, in some new version of Stalin's succession to Lenin during the period of 1923-1929; an apparently successful full successor might, on the other hand, prove over time to be incapable of maintaining the unity of his powers, and the situation might move slowly towards a "constitutional" division of authority or into open struggle for power. Even with complete current information, the prediction of the future would be impossible in any detail; and our information in these matters of higher Soviet politics is anything but complete.

What can be said firmly is, nevertheless, of some importance: the techniques, institutional arrangements, and human attitudes generated by Stalin for the purposes of maintaining and enlarging his power have, of their own historic momentum, posed problems of the gravest kind for the continuity and the stability of control of the Soviet system over the Russian peoples.

Setting aside now this stylized effort to sort out the possible patterns of change for the future, it may be well to conclude by underlining what appear to be the characteristics of Soviet society, each created

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

47

by the society's evolving history, which are judged to be the essential dynamic elements for its future:

1. The inherent long-term instability of the executive arrangements created by Stalin.

2. The creation of a substantial group of higher bureaucrats, well and rationally trained in the techniques of modern society, who are made to carry responsibility without sharing in the making of high policy, who are evidently regarded with abiding suspicion by the regime, and whose loyalty may lie rather with their own institution or the nation at large than with the regime. Of these elements in the Soviet structure the higher officers within the armed forces may prove to be the most important in the pattern of future change.

3. The creation of an increasingly intense nationalist mood within the Soviet Union.

4. The deflation of individual idealism as a major source of desired behavior; and the elevation of conformity, discipline, material advance, and Great Russian patriotism as the accepted norms of the society.

5. The failure of the regime to make its propaganda effective and to achieve government by consent; that is, the stabilization of government by fear, coercion, and the acceptance by the regime of chronic popular apathy and a wide range of specific, more or less conscious discontent.

6. The enormous increase in popular education, including increased knowledge of the world outside Russia acquired from wartime and postwar experiences.

Appropriately related to American objectives and capabilities, these appear to be the foundations on which an American political warfare program addressed to the Soviet Union should be built.

~~R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D~~

Part 4 a - 8 premises

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

PART II B

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

1952

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. What is Political Warfare?	3
1. The Concept of Vulnerability	3
2. Definition of Political Warfare	4
3. The Innovation Stage of U.S. Political Warfare	5
4. Strategy of Political Warfare: the "Third Choice"	6
5. Aims, Capabilities and Intelligence: Vulnerabilities	11
III. How Much Can U.S. Political Warfare Vis-a-vis the Soviet Empire Accomplish?	13
1. The Range and Limits of U.S. Political Warfare	13
2. The Evolution of the Soviet State: the Major Alternatives	15
3. The Purpose of U.S. Policy	16
IV. What Are the Principal Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union?	19
1. Summary of the Principal Vulnerabilities	19
2. Russian Nationalism	21
3. The Instability of High Power	22

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

	Page
4. The Higher Bureaucracy	23
5. Popular Dissatisfactions	24
6. The European Satellites	26
V. How Can the U.S. Best Exploit These Vulnerabilities?	29
1. Containment as a Positive Policy	29
2. The Role of American Interests and Objectives in U.S. Political Warfare	30
3. U.S. Policy under Conditions of No Change	31
4. U.S. Policy under Conditions of Slow Change	34
5. U.S. Policy under Conditions of Internal Soviet Crisis	36
6. U.S. Policy at a Time of Major War	37
7. Morale and a Political Warfare Offensive	41

Part II
B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES TO POLITICAL WARFARE

Is it not a simple fact that in any form of government revolution always starts from the outbreak of internal dissension in the ruling class? The constitution cannot be upset so long as that class is of one mind, however small it may be.

Plato

I. INTRODUCTION

Part II 8

This project has sought to maintain a sharp separation between the social science analysis of the evolving position within the Soviet Union and its European satellites and the problems of policy which confront the United States in its relations with those areas. Part II A of our report summarizes the view we have developed out of our research of Soviet society. (The full results of our research are presented in the Appendixes to the report, Vols. II, III, and IV). The present paper suggests some of the problems and possibilities for U.S. policy which appear to arise from our research conclusions. Neither this paper nor the four papers which follow (Staff Papers A-D) are meant to be final policy or planning papers. They are meant, rather, to assist in linking our research analysis to the issues of choice and policy-making which those operationally responsible in the government confront. They are, in effect, preliminary staff papers.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

II. WHAT IS POLITICAL WARFARE?

1. The Concept of Vulnerability

It follows from this separation of research from policy-making that the notion of cohesive forces, instabilities, and tensions used in our research analyses must be sharply distinguished from the concept of vulnerability. Vulnerability is inherently an operational concept. This means that an enemy's vulnerability depends not only upon the nature of the enemy's society but equally upon American objectives and capabilities. Our research, we believe, presents substantial evidence of the existence of instabilities and tensions at various levels of Soviet and satellite society. In themselves these characteristics of a changing society are not vulnerabilities. They become vulnerabilities from the United States' point of view only if (1) their exploitation is likely to further American interests and objectives and (2) their exploitation lies within the capabilities of various arms of American policy. Thus an analysis of Soviet society of the type we have conducted must be merged with a responsible analysis of American objectives and capabilities before it can be made fully relevant to the design of an American program of political warfare directed against the Soviet Union and its European satellites. It is evident that it is not the business of an external research group to work out the details of such a merger, which can be effected, in the end, only within the government itself. It may, nevertheless, be helpful if we set out our own reflections on the possible meaning of our analysis for

Part II B

U.S. policy--in full awareness that any such effort conducted outside the government can, at most, be suggestive.

2. Definition of Political Warfare

We define political warfare as the coordinated exploitation by conflicting states of all possible techniques (diplomacy as well as subversion, propaganda as well as sabotage, military force as well as infiltration) in the pursuit of their respective interests. Political warfare thus implies much more than, though it fully includes, the use of the instruments of diplomacy and armed force exploited in conventional ways. The concept of political warfare arises directly from an increased awareness, in our time, of how societies are constructed, how their political, social, and economic processes interact, and how various forces may affect, over time, their contours and the efficiency of their performance. It arises also, of course, from the increased technical feasibility of communication between countries, the increased intimacy of the interactions between states still formally sovereign. In a sense, then, political warfare is another term for Secretary Acheson's phrase "total diplomacy"; but political warfare does not necessarily exclude the use of military force against hostile states. Even under conditions of major war the need to wage political warfare persists. The aim of warfare is not military victory but a political and power realignment in our interest. Total victory in the field followed by an enemy's unconditional surrender is one way of preparing the ground for such a realignment, but it is not the only way; and, in itself, it by no means guarantees that our objectives will be achieved. In fact, as a nation, we hope to move towards our objectives without war. If war is unavoidable we would wish to accomplish our objectives with the shortest and least destructive war compatible with our interests. Since it is likely that in a war with the Soviet Union American objectives might be something short of unconditional surrender and occupation of Russia, the importance of a political warfare approach to U.S. policy under such circumstances might well be heightened.

3. The Innovation Stage of U.S. Political Warfare

For some time now, perhaps since the Russian Revolution of November 1917, and certainly since the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, the relations between hostile states have tended to acquire the characteristics of political warfare; i.e., they have tended to embrace instruments other than conventional diplomacy and armed force. The United States appears to be in the midst of shifting its conduct of relations with hostile states onto a political warfare basis. Specifically, this transition has had three major implications for the United States:

(a) It has led to the development of new techniques in American policy, such as the Voice of America and covert operations.

(b) It has suggested that the older instruments of national policy (i.e., formal diplomacy and armed force) may be used in new ways.

(c) It has led (in the Psychological Strategy Board) to fresh efforts to coordinate the relevant arms of political warfare policy around a common conception of American interests and objectives.

The history of the introduction of new military weapons suggests that, initially, there is likely to be a period of exploration and groping until they are effectively harnessed to broad military purposes in proper relation to other weapons. In this century, for example, the tank and the bombing aircraft were, at first, handled with distinct immaturity. Only after a period of false starts and wasted effort were the possibilities and limitations of these instruments understood and a strategic and tactical doctrine created which permitted their effective use, along with other weapons, in the achievement of clearly defined military objectives. In particular, it took some time before the fundamental principle of concentration of effort against key points was effectively applied in the light of sober appraisals of capability and well organized intelligence.

The United States appears to be in such a period of innovation and experiment with respect to political warfare, a field where the strategic objectives, the tactical targets, and the weapons are vastly more complex and difficult to comprehend than in conventional military operations. Many new techniques and new uses for old techniques have been developed, but notions about how to use political warfare (in the broadest sense) have been vague or piecemeal. There is no generally accepted and workable strategic doctrine to govern U.S. political warfare. Such doctrine is essential if total American policy is to be effective.

4. A Strategy for Political Warfare: the "Third Choice"

It is our view that the nub of a strategic doctrine for political warfare is provided by the notion that political warfare, rightly pursued, consists of holding out to those within the society of a hostile power a realistic and attractive alternative to the choices presented them by that power--an alternative which will induce them to act in ways conducive to the objectives of the initiating power. Political warfare seeks, from the outside, to set in motion -to trigger- forces latent in a hostile society which, if made effective, would work in the interest of the initiating power.

This view of a proper political warfare strategy arises directly from the conceptions used in Part Two of Appendix A to describe and analyze the cohesive forces, tensions, and dissatisfactions in Soviet society. Throughout this report we have regarded the action of men as the net result of a two-sided process. On one side are man's needs and aspirations. On the other side are the possibilities offered by his environment. Men are content or dissident depending on whether their expectations conform or clash with the reality of their environment as they view that reality. If men believe their environment is unchangeable or unlikely to change for the better, they tend to satisfy their needs and adjust their aspirations to it. A totalitarian state tries to make the aspirations and expectations of its citizens conform to the possibilities in the environment and, equally, it tries to deny the possibilities of change for the better in the environment, by propaganda and constraint. It thus seeks to achieve enthusiastic conformity at best, apathy and negative acceptance at worst.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

7

One line of approach in American political warfare would seek to make Soviet (and satellite) citizens more dissatisfied with their lot by underlining the evils in their environment and by contrasting it with, say, the kind of environment available to American or Western European citizens. We would regard this as a necessary but insufficient approach to political warfare. Although we can heighten somewhat men's awareness of their dissatisfactions, on the whole, they are likely already to be aware of them in quite an acute way. More than that, it does a man in Kiev or Cracow little good to know that things are better in Chicago or Paris. If he sees no realistic possibility that his environment might change or be changed by himself for the better, even in the remote future, he may react against those who try to heighten his dissatisfactions without holding out the vision of a realistic and attractive alternative that has meaning for him. Thus we would conclude that an effective American political warfare strategy must seek to operate, as it were, on both sides of the equation: it must both heighten men's awareness of the unsatisfactory features in their own lives and hold out a realistic and attractive alternative. Since, on the whole, men in Soviet and satellite societies are reasonably aware of what they do not like in their own lives, but quite unclear concerning the possibilities of a realistic and attractive alternative, the effective projection of the latter may be the more important and urgent operational task for the practitioners of American political warfare.



While we believe that this conception of a political warfare strategy should be central to American policy, and while we believe that the principle of concentration of effort urgently needs to be applied in this field of American action, we would, of course, recognize that there are other legitimate and important aspects to political warfare. The major area not covered by this Third Choice strategy might be called "spoiling operations", i.e., political warfare designed not to make the enemy's citizens act positively in our interest, but designed, rather, to produce a result which directly weakens the enemy's effective strength.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

In some cases such "spoiling operations" can be carried on from the outside, in no way involving the enemy's citizens, as, for example, in economic warfare or the execution of sabotage by our own men behind the enemy's lines. In some cases "spoiling operations" can effectively exploit aspects of the enemy's society and structure of organization. For example, it is not impossible that the successful implanting of suspicion and rumor, weakening the enemy's confidence in his own capabilities or increasing the real cost of his efforts, may work to our advantage. Where "spoiling operations" lie within our capabilities, and the result is judged to outweigh the cost, they belong, of course, within an American political warfare program. We would simply record our view, in the light of the research we have conducted, that the major dividends in American political warfare, now and especially in the future, are likely to lie in the elaboration of strategy based on the holding out of a realistic and attractive alternative sufficiently meaningful to individual men and groups within the enemy's society to lead them to undertake action which happens to be in our own interest as well as their own.

In the present context the meaning of the Third Choice approach to political warfare may best be seen by recalling more specifically the nature of Soviet internal policy.

It is the policy of the Soviet regime to confront its citizens with the apparent choice of either conforming to the will of the regime or suffering another historic invasion of the Russian homeland by a foreign power. It is the essential aim of Soviet information policy in its widest sense to dramatize these as the only realistic alternatives available to the Russian peoples. This is the operational purpose, in our view, of the exaggerated revival of Great Russian nationalism and the extraordinary concentration in Soviet propaganda on the alleged aggressive designs of the United States on Russia. Similarly, in the European satellites the Soviet regime has confronted the peoples of Eastern Europe with the apparent choice between conformity to

the existing satellite governments or the installation of German imperialist domination under American auspices. Needless to say, ample precaution is taken, both within the Soviet Union and in the satellites, to deal with the possibility that men in this region will reject these alternatives and oppose or defy Soviet control. But justification of summary handling of disaffection is, again, in terms of the dual alternatives; any opposition to the regime is held to serve aggressive foreign designs.

In a sense, then, the Soviet policy within its empire constitutes the obverse of American political warfare. It seeks to deny the possibility of a realistic and attractive alternative to conformity.

Outside the Soviet empire the regime seeks to hold out Communism as a realistic and attractive alternative to the situations men confront in the non-communist world; and the problem of American information policy in non-communist regions is to combat that persistent effort. Although it lies outside the compass of the present report, we would judge that the proper basis for an American information policy in those regions, as inside the Soviet empire, would lie not merely in unmasking the true nature of the Communist alternative but also in dramatizing the positive realistic and attractive potentialities inherent in an association with American interests.

The notion of political warfare as the offering of a realistic and attractive alternative appears to be of quite general application. The essential purpose of leaflets dropped to the soldiers of a hostile army, for example, is to hold out a realistic and attractive alternative to their current position in the line; such leaflets offer them opportunity to transfer to a position where protection, regular food, and decent treatment are promised. The conception of a realistic and attractive alternative holds equally for the most abstract kind of ideological warfare. When we argue over the VOA that the Soviet regime is not a government dedicated to the interests of its people but an

Part I B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

10

imperialist autocracy concerned with its own survival, when we dramatize the unnecessary poverty of Soviet life or the arbitrary terror of the secret police, we are holding out an alternative vision of the reality confronted by men within the Soviet empire which is designed, in the end, to make them take a course of action different from the course they would take if they believed or half-believed the Soviet propaganda they daily hear and read. (See Staff Paper B). Similarly, the purpose of a covert operation where, for example, guns are dropped to citizens of a hostile state, is to provide them a realistic alternative to passive submission. Even formal diplomacy can be regarded as one form of offering a realistic and attractive alternative designed to move another power towards conformity with the interests of the power initiating such diplomacy.

The adjectives "realistic" and "attractive" are, emphatically, essential to this formulation. The alternative held out must be meaningful in the sense of suggesting courses of action realistically within the capabilities of those to whom it is offered, and it must appeal more strongly than other (realistic) alternatives in terms of the past history and aspirations of the men and women to whom it is addressed. Above all, it must be translated effectively into language and actions which carry meaning in terms of the living, daily problems of groups of individual citizens.

It is evident that the alternatives held out must not only attract the minds and interests of men within the enemy system and fall within the realistic possibilities for action at any moment within that system, but also conform to the interests and objectives of the initiating power. It is the identification of those objectives with the possibilities of thought and aspiration and action within the society of the enemy which gives to political warfare its purpose and justification. Our recommendation of a strategy of the Third Choice is founded on the view that the real interests of the United States and of the peoples in the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

B
Pur II

areas under Soviet domination permit a reconciliation different from the present position and different from the choices now held out by the Soviet regime.

5. Aims, Capabilities, and Intelligence: Vulnerabilities

If the strategy of the Third Choice is sound, the practice of political warfare demands a high degree of clarity and agreement among its practioners concerning the interests and objectives of the initiating power. Such aims are necessary:

(a) to determine, in the light of capabilities, what enemy tensions and instabilities constitute vulnerabilities;

(b) to guide and coordinate the employment of existing capabilities in the light of knowledge of enemy vulnerabilities;

(c) to guide the directions in which capabilities are expanded in the light of estimates of likely alternative evolutions of enemy vulnerabilities;

(d) to provide a basis for a precisely aimed priority program of intelligence collection and analysis.

It is our belief that U.S. political warfare will become effective only as American interests and objectives in Western Eurasia are defined with sufficient clarity to constitute effective touchstones for operational planning; as capabilities are developed in the light of those objectives; and as our understanding of the target is improved by more purposeful intelligence collection and analysis. These three tasks, at the present innovational stage of political warfare, cannot be conducted usefully except in relation to one another. Therefore, although this project is primarily a study of the target, we find ourselves impelled to consider, although speculatively, the nature of American interests and objectives and to touch upon certain American

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

12

capabilities. It should be strongly emphasized once again, however, that with respect to aims and capabilities we are aware that our work within this project must remain distinctly limited in character.

Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

III. HOW MUCH CAN U.S. POLITICAL WARFARE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET EMPIRE ACCOMPLISH?

1. The Range and Limits of U.S. Political Warfare

It is our view that an effective American political warfare policy must be built on an awareness of two dangers. The first danger is that we over-rate the possibilities of American influence on the course of affairs within Soviet society, and, in so doing, undertake actions which fail in their purpose and which may even work against our own interests. The second danger is that we fail to understand and to exploit the relationship between our own action (or inaction) and the forces at work in Soviet society and thus fail to appreciate that what we are, what we say, and what we do helps determine the course of events in the Soviet Union at all times, and that at certain historical moments our influence may be decisive to the path Russia may take.

It is evident from our analysis in Appendix A that important forces are at work in the Soviet empire tending slowly, or perhaps violently, to change its internal arrangements, and thus to create potentialities for a more peaceful and stable adjustment of Russia to the rest of the world. It is also a conclusion of our analysis that the outcome will be partially determined by the situation in the world external to the Soviet empire. It follows that whatever the United States does, given its present influence in world affairs, it

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

14

will exercise some influence, however small it may be, on the course of events within the Soviet empire. Internal Soviet history has been and will continue to be the result of interactions between extremely powerful internal forces and various forces acting on that empire from the outside.

Thus one way of stating the task of U.S. political warfare is the following: we must so apply that margin of influence which the present disposition of world power has given to the United States as to further that course of events within the Soviet empire which appears most in the American interest; and, equally, we must prepare ourselves to deal with the possibility that our influence may be insufficient, and that history may not yield us the outcome we most would desire.

A large part of American political warfare should, and in fact, does consist in preparing the ground for the exploitation in the American interest of those strategic moments in the future when American action may well significantly influence the course which Russian history will take. Historically, the climactic moments of political warfare have come at periods of unsettlement in the internal situations of states. Wilson's Fourteen Points, enunciated at a time when there was no longer a consensus in Germany to fight to the finish, shifted the course of world events by holding out a realistic and attractive alternative to the German government and the German people. Hitler, in France in 1940 and in the Ukraine in 1941-1942, had similar opportunities to hold out a realistic and attractive alternative which might well have aligned with him otherwise hostile populations. In deliberate, wholly conscious acts of policy Hitler denied himself the advantages which might have accrued from a dignified treatment of France, within a German-dominated Europe, and from a policy towards the Ukraine which would have built on the underlying hostility of that area towards the Soviet Russian regime.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Part I B

On this view, then, the double task of American political warfare is to exploit effectively that modest but real margin for influence on the evolution of the Soviet state which lies within our capabilities, and to prepare to cope with alternative possible courses of evolution of the Soviet empire and its external policy and action.

2. The Evolution of the Soviet State: the Major Alternatives

Even if we recognize that it lies within American capabilities to have some impact on the course of evolution of Soviet society and the policies of its state, we must also recognize that it is impossible to predict with certainty what the outcome of the interplay between American policy and internal Russian history will be, and impossible to guarantee that the results sought by the United States will in fact be achieved. Our policy must be planned, therefore, not only to bring about that evolution most in the American interest, but also to cope with whatever development the interacting history of Russia and the external world may yield. There are, roughly, four major possibilities:

(a) That there will be no major change in the internal organization of Soviet society and in its external policy. Over the very long period this is, of course, impossible. Surely both Soviet society and its external policy will change. Nevertheless, the assumption that in the foreseeable future there will be no change is important and operationally meaningful. In terms of the analysis of Soviet society presented here in Part II A and Appendix A, this implies the possibility that, say, Malenkov will fully succeed to all of Stalin's powers; maintain Stalin's dominance over the other members of the Politburo, the bureaucratic instruments of force, and the Soviet citizenry generally; and follow the main lines of Stalin's external policy. Although, on the whole, we regard it as unlikely that Soviet external policy will change without some significant change in the internal disposition of power, this case cannot be

excluded. It constitutes, in fact, the framework within which most current American diplomacy is now conceived.

(b) That the Soviet regime will slowly change in its internal organization, its external policy, or both, in such a way as to become increasingly amenable to the American interest. This case might be associated with some sort of diffusion of Stalin's authority (examined in Part II A and Appendix B) which would permit increasing independence of view and authority on the part of those charged with the instruments of power but would avoid an overt struggle. On the whole it appears likely that an internal evolution along such lines--in the improbable case that it came about slowly and peacefully--would increase the possibilities of negotiation compatible with American interests.

(c) That the Soviet Union will undergo a violent internal crisis, weakening temporarily its ability to influence the external world and lessening the dangers of Russian aggression, and thus offering opportunities to the United States for the furthering of its objectives, as well as certain dangers of an aggressive outbreak (Part II A).

(d) That the Soviet Union will consciously initiate or stumble into a major war with the United States (Part II A).*

3. The Purpose of U.S. Policy

In terms of these possible evolutions, all of which are conceivable, the purposes of American policy towards the Soviet Union and its European satellites, over and above efforts to cope with the present situation, might be described as follows:

(a) To do what lies within our capabilities to further either slow change in Soviet society or an internal crisis.

*This analysis excludes from consideration the possibility of the United States initiating a major war with the Soviet Union.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

17

(b) To be prepared fully to take advantage of such slow change or internal crisis in the American interest.

(c) To formulate and execute our policies, in respect to (a) and (b) above, in a manner such as to minimize the possibilities of the Soviet Union initiating major war.

(d) To be prepared to implement the American interest in the event that a major war occurs.

It is possible to argue, one way or the other, as to whether it would be more in the U.S. interest for Soviet society to undergo slow change (a gradual adjustment in a direction close to American objectives) or to undergo a violent internal crisis. On the one hand, slow change is less likely to produce unstable circumstances which might increase the risks of major war, and is also less likely to produce one of those internal convulsions which, in Russian history as well as that of other nations, has tended to yield a reaction in the form of an autocratic state. On the other hand, slow change will be slow; and the costs of coping with Soviet totalitarianism are high.

The present analysis and recommendations bear on the question in two ways, which, taken together, would make this an academic issue. First, it seems likely that whether change is slow or violent lies mainly outside the control of the U.S. policy. Second, and more important, the kinds of action we would recommend in preparation for an internal crisis and for its exploitation in our own interest converge with and would reinforce the (mainly diplomatic) actions designed to establish the existence of and to exploit a situation of slow change.



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

IV. WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPAL VULNERABILITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION?

1. Summary of the Principal Vulnerabilities

In the light of the foregoing general observations, and further assuming that U.S. interests and objectives are not fundamentally incompatible with a decent Russian national future or with the underlying aspirations of the satellite peoples, the basic aspects of Soviet society capable of conversion into vulnerabilities by American political warfare may be listed as follows:

(a) The Soviet regime, while not, in fact, pursuing a policy in the Russian national interest, is highly dependent on the national motivation of its citizens and is continuously heightening, in its whole program of education and information, the intensity of such motivation.

(b) Stalin has achieved a rare unification of control over the instruments of force in the Soviet empire which, from the nature of the means he has used, may prove extremely difficult to maintain in the period after Stalin's death or even should he progressively withdraw from the scene.

(c) In particular, Stalin has created a vast bureaucracy of whose personnel the regime is profoundly suspicious and distrustful. The motivations of the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

bureaucrats do not appear identical with those of the regime; and the regime's control over them is dependent on instruments of surveillance and compulsion, the effectiveness of which depends on the continued unity of the executive power in the state. Of all elements in the bureaucracy the upper levels within the armed forces appear the most vulnerable as well as potentially the most important for American political warfare.

(d) The present deep impulse towards the expansion of Soviet external power is costly in terms of alternative uses of Russian resources, and, if successfully frustrated by the West, may produce conflict within the upper reaches of the Soviet bureaucracy and perhaps even within the Politburo which might lead to a change in external policy, notably in the context of (b) and (c) above.

(e) Within the Soviet empire there is a considerable array of popular and group dissatisfactions which, though now effectively denied expression, might come into play in any protracted crisis in which the instruments of force had split.

(f) Within the European satellites there is not merely negative dissatisfaction with the present regimes, but also the basis for an appeal in the form of an alternative long-run organization of the area in relation to Germany and to Europe as a whole.

Reduced to their essentials, these appear to be the six fundamental vulnerabilities whose systematic and coordinated exploitation in the American interest would constitute an American political warfare policy. They are believed to constitute the targets on which American instruments of political warfare should converge in a program founded in the principle of concentrated and sustained effort. A discussion of each follows.

2. Russian Nationalism

Any serious program of American political warfare against the Soviet Union must take into account the following two fundamental facts:

(a) A prime purpose of Soviet information policy is to achieve in the minds of the citizens of Soviet society an identification of the regime with the Russian national interest.

(b) An essential element in the Soviet information effort is a continuing attempt to identify American aims vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with the aim to invade and subjugate the Russian national state along lines made familiar by Hitler.

It is by no means evident that all citizens within the Soviet Union are prepared to accept at face value the present lines of Soviet propaganda. Nor do they necessarily accept the regime's interpretation of American objectives. On the other hand, the negative and positive aspects of Soviet information policy have probably succeeded in obscuring if not nullifying any real understanding of U.S. objectives which may have existed in Russia; and U.S. information policy, in its widest sense, has not addressed itself systematically to this theme. It should be possible for the United States to nurture a doubt in the minds of at least some of the upper bureaucracy and intellectuals, and notably in the armed forces, as to whether the maintenance of the existing regime is as conducive to the interest of the Russian peoples and themselves as an alternative regime pursuing policies more in the U.S. interest. It is evident that, in the end, any effort by the United States to minimize in the minds of Soviet citizens the association of the Russian national interest with the regime, and to associate Russian national aspirations more nearly with U.S. objectives, requires prior decision as to whether, in fact, it is in the American interest, or at least compatible with the American interest, that Russia enjoy in the future a degree of sovereignty, within its borders, no less than that of any other state, although within the limits, presumably, of world-wide

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

22

collective security arrangements. In the present paper we do not attempt a formulation of the nature of American interests vis-a-vis Russia, although this matter is treated in a tentative way in Staff Paper D. It is assumed here, however, that it is not impossible to undertake, on the basis of American interests and objectives, a program designed to do what present capabilities permit to dissociate Russian nationalism from the present regime and associate it, rather, with the common aspirations of men in the world outside of Russia, and, in particular, with long-range U.S. objectives. As emphasized above, this requires not only that the nature and limits of American objectives be made clear but also that they be effectively associated with the solution to particular problems and discontents which Soviet citizens confront; and this demands, in turn, that our messages be conveyed by language and action which key Soviet citizens and groups will find persuasive.

4. The Instability of High Power

As indicated in Staff Paper A, it is our view that the strategy for U.S. policy with respect to the possibilities of future conflict over the disposition of executive power in the Soviet state should be based on an appeal to real, as opposed to Bolshevik, Russian national interests. The United States and the outside world will maximize the possibility that Soviet leaders and high figures in the bureaucracy would be prepared to engage in an internal struggle for power to the extent that we successfully persuade these men that such a struggle could take place without endangering the Russian national existence. As indicated in Staff Paper A, the tactics derived from such a strategy might include a series of actions from the present forward in the fields of presidential statement, conventional diplomacy, overt American propaganda, covert operations, and intelligence priorities. These are detailed in Sections V-3 and V-5 below.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Part I B

4. The Higher Bureaucracy

From present limited evidence, two possibilities have been discerned with respect to the position of the higher bureaucracy.

(a) It seems certain that many within this category resent the surveillance and control by the Party, and especially by the Secret Police, which are a normal part of the workings of the Soviet system.

(b) It is possible, though the evidence is inadequate, that certain groups within the higher bureaucracy may have conceived of, or be prepared to support under appropriate circumstances, a national policy for Russia different from that followed by the present regime and more consistent with American interests.

Put II B

The above two possibilities make it mandatory that intelligence attempt, on high priority, to establish what views, if any, have been formulated in the minds of men in the higher bureaucratic positions (especially in the armed forces) concerning an appropriate future for the Soviet regime and an appropriate future for Russian internal and external policy. Meanwhile, the most promising assumption on which to pursue political warfare is that this group, which is likely to be drawn into a struggle for power should such struggle expand beyond the Politburo, and which would play an increasing role in the making of Soviet policy should the succession problem be gradually and peacefully resolved, is vulnerable to a national approach of the kind indicated above. This is, distinctly, the conclusion to which our research has brought us, as Appendixes A and B attest. It may be, of course, that the higher bureaucracy is more inclined to identify itself with the Politburo and less inclined to conceive of a Russian internal and external policy different from that now pursued than our analysis would suggest. Despite our inability to be dogmatic on the basis of present information, it is, nevertheless, urged that a national line of approach be pursued as the most promising which can now be formulated; and the higher officers of the Soviet armed forces be regarded as a target of first priority in this effort.

5. Popular Dissatisfactions

Our analysis has isolated a considerable but by no means complete list of dissatisfactions within Soviet society. These fall into two groups: dissatisfactions general throughout society, and dissatisfactions peculiar to particular categories of Soviet citizens. A summary listing follows:

Dissatisfactions created by the gap between expectations and reality and general throughout Soviet society. These have their sources in:

- (a) The abuses of police power
- (b) The unsatisfactory standard of living
- (c) The present position of religion
- (d) Popular distrust of official propaganda
- (e) Lack of popular participation in government

Group dissatisfactions, created by the gap between expectation and reality, and having special meaning for:

- (a) The peasants
- (b) Nationality groups
- (c) The intellectuals
- (d) The bureaucracy
- (e) Industrial workers
- (f) Prisoners and forced labor.

It is our general hypothesis that, while these dissatisfactions are likely to play only a secondary role in the detonation of a crisis within the executive authority of the Soviet Union, their existence might

Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

25

play a major role in the unfolding of such a crisis once it had spread beyond a purely internal struggle within the Politburo. The existence of popular dissatisfaction may pose for the executive authorities certain policy choices on which disagreement might arise; but such disagreement on the handling of discontent is not likely to be a sufficient condition for a split among those in control of the instruments of power of the Soviet state. It is our view that only after a struggle for power and proceeded beyond the confines of the Politburo and had engaged the bureaucratic instruments of force, is it likely that the dissatisfied peoples within Soviet society would find a realistic opportunity to express their discontent and to play a dynamic role in the evolution of the crisis.

Despite these important limitations on popular discontent as a vulnerability, and despite further severe limitations on American capabilities to communicate with the bulk of the Soviet population, it seems essential that the United States do what it can to maximize the chances that Soviet citizens act in a manner consistent with the American interest at such time as their action may be effective. This necessitates, in particular, the holding out to them, from the present forward, of ideological and practical alternatives which are consistent with the American interest. Some specific possibilities for such an approach are discussed in Staff Paper B on radio broadcasting.

In general, it is our view that the strategy of approach with respect to these general discontents and special groups should not be in the form of concrete and explicit American promises. For fundamental reasons (discussed in Staff Paper D) it is our view that the United States should not take direct responsibility for the amelioration of particular discontents or for the solution of problems peculiar to special groups in Soviet society; nor should the United States propose or commit itself to any particular organizational form of future Russian society. The strategy of the American position vis-a-vis these particular discontents and groups should consist in the offer of a framework of future relations to the United States, Europe, and the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



Part I B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

26

rest of the world consistent with both the American and the Russian interest, and within which the Russian peoples would have the possibility and responsibility of removing the presently undesirable features of their daily lives and of organizing, on their own, a form of society closer to their aspirations. The elimination or amelioration of existing discontent should, however, be explicitly linked to the framework offered by the United States. For example, it can properly be emphasized that the implementation of a world collective security scheme in which Russia participated would immediately remove a major rationale for the secret police and release resources for improvement of the welfare of Russian citizens, the secret police, chronic poverty and other extremely specific aspects of Soviet life are the actual force of discontent for most Soviet citizens. The gap between a broad conception of American objectives with respect to Russia and the very particular dissatisfactions of individual Russian citizens and Russian groups must, indeed, be bridged. A bridge can be effected by associating the United States with popular aspirations in general and by indicating the manner in which American objectives would provide a framework for the effective expression of such aspirations and a removal of current causes of discontent. In short, it is our view that it is possible to exploit these popular vulnerabilities while avoiding elaborate or particular U.S. commitments which, in any case, have proved historically beyond our capabilities to implement.

Part II B

6. The European Satellites

The position within the European satellites represents an extreme version of the general situation of popular discontent within the Soviet Empire. The progressive crisis which the Soviet Union confronts in the handling of the European satellites, and especially its difficulty in finding satisfactory local leadership prepared to meet the institutional requirements for Soviet bureaucratic control, may give satellite discontent a special importance in the evolution of a major internal crisis--or even in its detonation. In

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

particular, the Soviet Union may be moving towards a situation in which it must make the following choice: should the regime fully incorporate these satellites into the Soviet Union and subject them, simply and openly, to the conventional forms of Soviet internal administration; or, accepting the profound dissidence of these peoples, their bankruptcy as reliable political allies, and the very long-run and powerful forces which lead them to resent Soviet rule, should the Soviet Union bargain their present positions for some advantage in the Russian national interest. The case of Eastern Germany is, of course, an extreme example of this dilemma.

So far as American policy is concerned, it is evident that a long-run appeal to these peoples must, again, be made on the basis of an association of their positive individual, group, and national aspirations with specific American objectives. This means more than the promise, in some form, of liberation at some undetermined time. The fear of Germany, which is strong throughout this area, notably in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the aspiration of these peoples to be associated with Europe would appear to make persuasive, if it conforms with the American interest, an approach to Eastern Europe based on the notion of a form of European organization, embracing a united Germany, in which Eastern Europe would fully participate and which would at the same time help guarantee, with American backing, both a peaceful Germany, and Eastern European independence of Russia.

It is, of course, evident that what the peoples of this region want is their liberation. If our understanding of present American policy is correct, it is not judged to be in the American interest to undertake a major war to liberate these peoples at the present time. There is, however, the danger that implicit promises of early liberation or of imminent major subversive operations slip into our propaganda efforts. (See also Staff Paper B.) This, it is believed, is dangerous and destructive. It is dangerous to the American interest because it is likely to lead to premature action which would disclose to the enemy the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

28

personnel and techniques available to us, while yielding no positive result. More generally, such abortive efforts lead to progressive discouragement and apathy, already systematically encouraged by Soviet policy. If the United States is primarily relying on bringing about a slow change in the Soviet regime or helping to bring about or to exploit some future internal crisis, then this longer-run framework should be indicated. Given the long-run and painful history of the peoples of this area, they are much more likely to understand such a program, based on the gradual unfolding of history and the exploitation of the opportunities it may offer, than are we in America, who have enjoyed freedom without break, and who, for 175 years, have not experienced foreign domination.

An acceptance of this limitation on our national policy demands more than the avoidance of explicit or implicit commitments on which we, as a nation, are not prepared to make good. It demands also that we enunciate and steadily document our faith that the largely non-military struggle between two conceptions of society will end in the disintegration of the present Soviet regime and the end of its hegemony over Eastern Europe.

Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

V. HOW CAN THE U.S. BEST EXPLOIT THESE VULNERABILITIES

1. Containment as a Positive Policy

Put II Q

If our analysis of the forces working within the Soviet Union is correct, a condition--in fact a minimum essential condition--for either slow change or internal crisis within the Soviet state working in the U.S. interests is the denial to the Soviet Union of further advance in its unilaterally exercised power. A political warfare program addressed to the Soviet and satellite areas thus will depend for its success on the outcome of efforts now launched by the United States to strengthen the political, economic, and military foundations of Western Europe, to prevent the further spread by military means of communism in Asia, and to assist in generating healthy and progressive societies in the under-developed areas of the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere. An important aspect of this program must consist in a steady effort to dramatize the choice faced by the non-Communist world between Soviet domination, as it in fact operates, and the potentialities of the non-Communist world alliance. If the Soviet Union can continue to enlarge its sphere without risking major war, it seems most unlikely that it will either change its external policy or undergo a major internal crisis. Successful regimes generally hold together. Put another way, a Western World weak and in retreat is in no position to hold out a realistic and attractive alternative to Soviet rule. On the other hand, the frustration of further Soviet expansion, with mounting costs in competitive armaments and in other efforts required to hold the areas which the Soviet Union now dominates, may well

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

30

induce, over time, major conflicts within the Soviet regime and among various bureaucratic interests over the appropriate course for external policy--or, perhaps even, an agreed change in the orientation of Soviet foreign policy, without major internal change. Although our analysis would leave us somewhat skeptical concerning the latter possibility, we would be transgressing the real limits of our knowledge if we were to exclude it.

2. The Role of American Interests and Objectives in U.S. Political Warfare

There are two essential and separable functions for American aims in the making of an effective U.S. political warfare policy. By aims in this context is meant the objectives sought in the area to which political warfare is addressed, formulated with sufficient precision to permit:

(a) the effective coordination of intelligence, military, covert, diplomatic, and propaganda planning and action on a common basis, with clear working priorities;

(b) an approach to the peoples of this region which would rest on an attractive and realistic alternative to the choices they now face.

For reasons which are discussed in Staff Paper D, it is not believed that American objectives are now formulated in such a way as to fulfill these basic functions.

The meaning of these two functions can best be seen, perhaps, if one considers, in the light of the concept of political warfare outlined above, the problem of exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Soviet empire in the context of the four major circumstances within which the United States may be seeking to implement its objectives: a continuation of the present organization of the Soviet state and its present policy vis-a-vis the external world; a situation of slow change in the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Part I B

organization of the Soviet state and its external policy;
a condition of internal crisis within the Soviet state;
and the circumstances of major war.

3. U.S. Policy Under Conditions of No Change

Under the assumption that no important change takes place in the organization of Soviet power or in its policy towards the external world, there are, evidently, five tasks which confront U.S. policy:

- (a) To prevent further expansion of the Soviet system.
- (b) To do what can be done to bring about either slow change or an internal crisis.
- (c) To prepare the ground for exploitation of any slow change or crisis in the American interest.
- (d) To formulate and execute our policies in a manner such as to minimize the possibilities of the Soviet Union initiating major war.
- (e) To prepare against the possibility of a Soviet-initiated major war.

Actions to implement these tasks would include the following, of which (a)-(c) fall outside the range of the present analysis:

- (a) The development within the United States of a stable accommodation to such a long-term policy, involving improved public understanding, the avoidance of inflation, and, in general, the maintenance of the essential qualities of American democracy, while meeting the requirements of the continuing crisis. Although this project has not addressed itself professionally to the problem of America's domestic accommodation to its long run external responsibilities, we have come increasingly to feel the importance of this matter and would wish to record our conviction that this aspect

Part II 13

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

32

of the American position deserves increased attention, in official thought and action as well as in public discussion.

(b) The development and maintenance of armed forces sufficient in scale, quality, and composition both to deter the Soviet Union from further military or political aggression and to permit the United States to cope successfully with a Soviet military offensive should such an offensive be undertaken.

(c) The containment of further Soviet expansion by political means through U.S. action designed to create the conditions for economic development and political stability, notably in Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, including in such action an effective American information policy addressed to non-Communist areas.

(d) The holding out of a realistic and attractive alternative to those within the Soviet empire, using all means at the disposal of the United States. A program based on this principle might include the steady pressing on the Soviet regime, through diplomacy, of an alternative pattern for handling existing security and political conflicts, based on a low and controlled level of armament, a democratically unified Germany, and an Eastern European settlement; systematic efforts, by all means available, to associate American objectives with the Russian national interest; special efforts to inform elements in the higher bureaucracy of U.S. objectives; a sustained information policy designed to associate American objectives with conditions which would permit the resolution of particular dissatisfactions and the better fulfillment of particular group aspirations within the Soviet Union; and a program addressed to the satellites based on a U.S. supported framework for Europe as a whole which might offer to Eastern Europe a long-run opportunity for security as well as national independence. To the maximum extent possible our policies and public statements in this area should be coordinated with those of our major allies.

Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(e) Preparation against the possibility of a major internal crisis or major war. In particular, a program to this end might include:

(1) An intelligence effort based on two priorities: collection and analysis of intelligence concerning the interplay of power interests and policy views among the present members of the Politburo, with special reference to the courses of action they might pursue after Stalin's death; and the collection and analysis of intelligence concerning the present outlook and aspirations of men within higher levels of the Soviet bureaucracy, especially the armed forces.

(2) A communications program built on the holding out of a Third Choice and designed to impress on key groups the possibilities of their acting to effect an internal change in the Soviet regime without endangering the Russian national interest and the interest of its peoples. Under circumstances of Cold War, where negotiation with the present regime is not excluded, overt propaganda might avoid this particular elaboration on the fundamental theme, but covert communication with key persons along these lines would not be excluded.

(3) The building of a net of communications with higher levels in the Soviet and satellite regimes designed to permit, at a time of internal crisis or war, effective contact and exchange of views.

(4) The preparation of a network for covert operations under conditions of an internal crisis or war to accelerate effective dissidence--within, however, a strict framework of non-interference in Russian affairs.

(5) The preparation of special reserved means of mass communication, over and above those now regularly used, for the purpose of transmitting, against the background of previous propaganda, concrete American terms or offers at a time of internal crisis or war.



Part I B

(6) Preparation, in preliminary form, of tentative terms which might be offered to one or another emerging group at a time of internal crisis or war.

(7) The preparation of specific programs (to be kept under steady review) to be set in motion under conditions of either major internal crisis or war, covering intelligence, overt communication, covert communication, and covert operations.

In general it is our conclusion that the persuasiveness of U.S. political warfare at a time of internal crisis or war will depend heavily on the extent to which the United States has succeeded in building up, in the period prior to such time, a foundation of fundamental ideas and connections with the peoples concerned, in addition to that kind of credibility which only a sustained flow of reliable communication can achieve.

4. U.S. Policy Under Conditions of Slow Change

Policy under conditions of slow change converges with the actions discussed above under conditions of no change. The exploitation of the possibilities inherent in a slow change in the internal disposition of power within the Soviet Union and a consequent shift in its willingness to reach an accommodation with the external world is, of course, a central task for American diplomacy. It requires the steady holding out of positive alternatives to the present impasses, and the assertion, for the settlement of particular issues, of formulae consistent with both American aims and Russian national interest. It may well be that the existence of a slow change in Soviet objectives can be established only by actual negotiation and, more than that, by securing Soviet reactions to a series of positive specific American proposals. Like people, governments can act only in the light of the alternatives believed open to them; and it is a prime task of American diplomacy to hold out and to dramatize these alternatives to the present position which the United States is prepared to envisage. It should also be noted that,

even where it proves impossible to negotiate towards our objectives, the assertion of positive American positions would reinforce the general propaganda program of the Third Choice, by widening the circle of those within the Soviet system who have a concrete conception of the alternative solution for which America stands.

A problem is, of course, raised by the fact that the United States might well be prepared, on a short-term basis, to accept accommodations with the present Soviet regime which are far short of ultimate American objectives. It is essential, therefore, to establish whether ultimate U.S. objectives will be compromised by any particular incremental improvements in the American position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. American short-term efforts to improve our position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union by diplomatic means might conflict with the persuasive enunciation of long-run objectives. These are issues which deserve the closest scrutiny. Although they can be decided finally only in the light of particular cases and circumstances, it is the tentative conclusion of this project, as set forth in Staff Paper D, that:

(a) ultimate American aims are probably compatible, and can be persuasively presented as compatible, with smaller ameliorative changes in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in the area of western Eurasia; and

(b) that conflict need not result from simultaneously seeking through diplomacy such favorable changes as are possible and holding up a version of ultimate U.S. objectives.

The Soviet regime is now engaged in seeking to portray its external objectives to the world as different from those attributed to it in this analysis. It is likely to continue with such propaganda efforts. In a sense, it is trying to present an appearance of slow change; that is, to dramatize the possibilities of a stable and peaceful accommodation of the Soviet Union, as a national region, to the rest of the world. We believe

that the United States will be most successful in unmasking that posture where it is false, and in exploiting in our own interest such real negotiating potentialities as it may have, by meeting Soviet propaganda proposals with serious proposals of our own. In effect, we have done this on the problem of disarmament and have had success in dramatizing the key issue of effective control. We have, in part, done this on Germany; and we have succeeded in dramatizing the issue of free elections in Eastern Germany. When the U.S. government is clear about American interests and objectives, and when it has developed formulations which advance them in particular contexts, we can see nothing but advantage in seeking to meet the vague gestures of Soviet propaganda with serious American proposals.

5. U.S. Policy Under Conditions of Internal Soviet Crisis

This case is considered at greater length in Staff Paper A, against the background of Appendixes A and, especially B. Should a full-fledged internal crisis develop within the Soviet Union, the task of American policy would be so to act as to maximize the chances of a result in accord with the American interest. This might mean doing what lies within our capabilities to assist that grouping inside Russia believed most likely to be prepared to envisage the Russian national interest in a manner consistent with the American interest. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that all American operations at a time of internal Russian crisis will take place with a Sword of Damocles hanging over our heads: namely, the possibility that U.S. action may be effectively interpreted by the regime to important Russian groups or to the Russian people in general as direct foreign interference and thus help to re-crystallize a powerful national state antagonistic to an accommodation with the external world, and perhaps so unstable as to undertake major war despite grave risks. This may well be a case where American inaction would be more effective than American action--although the issue cannot be judged except at the time. With these objectives and this limitation in mind, it appears

Part II B

possible and necessary to take action at a time of internal crisis which would:

(a) effectively communicate to the key groups concerned both the limited nature of the American interest and the U.S. willingness to negotiate settlements of outstanding issues on a basis compatible with the Russian national interest;

(b) vigorously exhibit U.S. willingness to permit the internal crisis to continue without direct interference in Russian domestic affairs or encroachment on the legitimate Russian national interest;

(c) within the framework of (a) and (b) accelerate the crisis within the satellites and even, perhaps, the Soviet Union;

(d) project, by mass means of communications (including, possibly, means reserved for this purpose), to popular groups within the Soviet Union U.S. objectives and terms designed to maximize the possibilities that the crisis might unfold in such a way as to bring mass dissatisfactions effectively into play in a manner consistent with the American interest.

6. U.S. Policy at a Time of Major War ✓

It is assumed that, should major war break out between the United States and the Soviet Union, it would be in the U.S. interest to avoid, if consistent with the implementation of American objectives, protracted ground warfare. (This in no way implies, of course, that the use of ground forces would not be of the greatest importance in such a war or that protracted ground warfare would prove to be avoidable.) It is also assumed that it is the U.S. intent to avoid, insofar as consistent with higher priority U.S. objectives as described above, direct responsibility for the occupation of Eastern Europe and Russia after the successful completion of a major war.

Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

38

The history of the Soviet regime under Stalin (as well as Lenin), and the care with which, since 1945, the Soviet Union has thus far avoided the risk of major war with the United States (even under the marginal circumstances of Korea), make it proper to assume that, should the Soviet Union initiate war, it will be over the opposition of certain groups who now hold positions of power within the Politburo. More generally, the most likely assumption on which to base American policy, given the role of air power in our plans, is that either at the outbreak of war or after it has proceeded for a time, some groups might emerge willing to negotiate with the United States terms short of unconditional Russian surrender. It is evident that military plans cannot be based on the surety that such a position will emerge. They must take into account the possibility that the Soviet regime will remain unified and pursue the war to the limit of its military capabilities; but political action must include planning on the possibility of the other, more attractive, alternative. Indeed, only action of this kind will foster the emergence, if not at the beginning then later in the war, of a desire by a Russian government or by important groups within Russia, for a settlement short of unconditional surrender, and compatible with legitimate American and Russian interests.

The following discussion is limited to a consideration of one assumed aspect of the early stages of a major war, namely, the situation and potentialities created by U.S. strategic air attack on the Soviet Union with atomic weapons. A full consideration of the political problem of major war would demand an evaluation of total Allied versus Soviet military capabilities at the outbreak of war and immediately thereafter. It would thus have to include a consideration of ground, naval, and air capabilities. A full consideration would also demand that political planning look beyond the opening stages of the war to its likely or possible course over a longer period. The above limitation is accepted not only to make the present paper manageable, but also to focus attention on certain special attributes of our position with respect to air attack on the Soviet Union

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Part I B

and certain particular characteristics of the situation which might be created by such attack.

(a) The Soviet Union may at any time detonate major war, and the United States may, therefore, be called upon at any time to put into effect its strategic air plan. The United States may, then, be confronted on very short notice with a situation having important potentialities requiring political action.

(b) The maximum political and morale effects of strategic air attack may be relatively short-lived; that is, certain potentialities for American political action which may exist in the period immediately before and immediately after attack might disappear as Soviet authorities re-evaluated their capabilities, made new dispositions, and re-established a system of political control.

(c) The kinds of political action the United States might wish to take under the assumed circumstances may require careful and long preparation to have their maximum effect.

We believe that the primary political effect of strategic air attack would lie in the lowered military capabilities of the Soviet Union, and thus in the possibility that a successful attack would encourage overt manifestations of existing or potential opposition to the pursuit of war. This would notably be the case if terms short of unconditional surrender and consistent with a dignified Russian national future had been offered by the West.

Within the satellites the response to war would be, even more sharply, to open men's minds to the possibilities of removing Soviet controls. The actions taken by individuals and groups to assist the West would depend on:

(a) the view taken of the likely outcome of war, and its timing;

Part I B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

40

(b) the degree of organized military resistance and other counter-Soviet activity prepared by the West;

(c) the degree to which the West had formulated and made known an attractive long-run policy for Eastern Europe;

(d) the degree to which the West appears prepared to prevent Germany from turning the war to its long-run advantage in Eastern Europe: e.g., by the firmness of the organization of the European army, the presence of Eastern European units, etc.

Appropriate preparatory action, which would largely converge with circumstances already examined, and which is, in part, already under way, might include the following:

(a) The United States would make known the nature and limits of its long-run interests and objectives in the Western Eurasian area, as indicated above, including a statement of the limits beyond which it is not prepared to allow the enlargement of the power of a unified Germany.

(b) Against the background of such a basic statement, the United States would begin to build up, in the context of specific groups in the Soviet and satellite areas, a concrete picture of the meaning of its objectives in terms of the particular dissatisfactions, interests, and aspirations of the various peoples concerned. These lines of propaganda should emphasize the potentialities the U.S. framework offers for them to solve their current problems and frustrations. The approach should be extremely specific in terms of the problems, and enunciated in terms which have meaning for the individual citizen, without making specific U.S. commitments to implement particular solutions (see Staff Paper B).

(c) In greater detail and more professionally, the United States would seek to implant the ideas under (a) above within high echelons of the Soviet structure, and in particular within the Soviet armed forces.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Put II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

41

(d) The United States would develop a maximum network of covert contacts, reaching to high levels in the Soviet and satellite structure, against the day when specific communications with persons at that level may be necessary and desirable.

(e) The United States would prepare certain means of mass communication which would guarantee that we could, at the time of and perhaps immediately before the outbreak of war, make its views known to the Soviet and satellite peoples in general.

(f) The United States would prepare a covert network for such special forms of military and political action as may become meaningful in Russia and the satellite areas in the context of war.

(g) The United States would so prepare its military plan as to be consistent, to the extent militarily feasible, with U.S. political objectives.

(h) The United States would be prepared to implement a political war plan, exploiting the political potentialities and instruments already created; to issue certain public statements enunciating more clearly than peacetime conditions permit its war objectives; and to take appropriate action in the United Nations and elsewhere in order to associate other countries with those objectives at the outbreak of war.

7. Morale and a Political Warfare Offensive

The concept of political warfare developed here is, essentially, offensive in character: i.e., it would seek to see established and maintained in the areas concerned conditions judged to be in the American interest. Its practice requires a conception of the American interest and of American objectives sufficiently precise to guide and coordinate action by the various arms of American policy, looking to the creation and/or exploitation of future circumstances. In this sense political warfare represents an approach to

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

42

the problem of American policy different from containment as that policy is popularly understood.

In fact, it is simply an elaboration and development of the containment policy which the country has pursued since, roughly, 1947. Containment has its roots in the faith that the concepts of the West will triumph in a nonmilitary conflict with the Soviet regime and the web of Communist parties it controls-- if the West remains loyal to principle and effective in action within the regions where it still has freedom of initiative. More particularly, containment was founded on a conviction that the Soviet system, like other great autocracies of the past, was in the long run unstable, and that its unstable features could be accentuated by a successful frustration of its external drives.

Our research analysis, incorporated in the Appendixes to this report, has, we believe, given increased substance to this view. More than that, we have sought to define the character of those actions over and beyond present policies which the United States might pursue from the present forward and which would help bring about a situation more consistent with the long-run interests of the United States. In making this definition we have confined our suggestions within two limits:

(a) that the United States not initiate war with the Soviet Union, a condition accepted in this project not only because it appears to be U.S. policy but also because we are convinced that the American interest will be best served by the avoidance of major war, if possible;

(b) that the narrow but real area within which U.S. policy and action impinges on the course of Soviet and satellite societies be recognized and exploited, while respecting also the profound and powerful forces at work in those regions which lie outside our ability fully to control. While isolating some possible tasks for the political warrior, we have sought to define those tasks within limits which are realistic. We respect the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

43

power of history while denying that, in the clash with the Soviet Union, our destiny lies wholly outside our own influence or control.

It is our conviction, from what we have been privileged to learn of the problems of the government in this area, that, if the limits of political warfare are defined and agreed, many of the conflicts which now mark its practice would disappear and a high degree of unity could be achieved in Washington and in the country as a whole concerning the lines of political warfare action on which our national energies should be concentrated.

At its core, the concept of political warfare we have suggested involves the steady holding out and elaboration upon a concrete vision of the sort of world we want, designed to associate ourselves with individuals and groups now under Soviet domination. We seek peace, disarmament, German unity, all-European unity, self-determination for peoples, and a higher degree of the democratic element in the organization of the world's societies. Almost without exception, these conceptions have been appropriated, with appalling cynicism, by Communist propaganda. We have tended to react to this appropriation by withdrawing from their use, or becoming somewhat shy about their enunciation. A primary condition for the pursuit of the policy we propose is that the West recapture its fighting standards, and give to them a new vitality.

One reason for the insufficient response of the West to Soviet political aggression is that, even within our own societies, these standards have become somewhat threadbare, in the particular sense that they are not persuasively linked to the actions we take from day to day. If we are to take a moral offensive, based now on the strategy of the Third Choice, we must give a fresh meaning to our objectives. It is of the nature of democracy that its continuous moral goals be kept alive by new actions and initiatives, by new content responsive to the living problems of the day. In our policy

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



Part I B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

44

towards Western Eurasia (as well as the rest of the world) we feel strongly that a fundamental clarification of the ideological and power interests of the United States must now be achieved in the government and by the American people as a whole. Staff Paper D seeks to contribute, in a small way, to this result. The United States must, and we believe it can, bring its ideals and its actions into a closer and more conscious relationship to each other and thereby provide a stronger foundation for the great and perhaps prolonged struggle in which we are engaged.

Part II B

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

STAFF PAPER A
CANCELLATION

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

1952

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S.P. A

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. The Divisive Potentials	2
III. Personal Power Relationships	2
IV. Possible Differences at the Level of Economic Policy	5
V. The Balance of Power Between the Old and New Bolsheviks	7
VI. The Special Position and Political Orientation of the Soviet Military	11
VII. Some Other Considerations	15
VIII. Conclusions	16
IX. Interim Conclusions for U.S. Policy	18
X. A Comment on Possible Immediate U.S. Action	21
XI. Recommendations	24

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S.P.A

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CANCELLATION

I. Introduction.

1. Among the situations considered in Part II B which U.S. policy may wish to help create and then exploit are slow change and internal crisis in the structure and policy of the Soviet regime. The death of Stalin is an event which may set in motion forces already at work in the Soviet structure leading to either slow change or an internal crisis.

2. In the first instance, the pattern and sequence of events after Stalin's death are likely to lie in the hands of his immediate subordinates who comprise the Politburo. In the event of any crisis or struggle following Stalin's death, continued effective control of the higher bureaucracy, including the military, will depend on unity in the Politburo as the then supreme control authority--as will the continued effective control of the people, already dissatisfied in varying degrees.

3. The present paper first summarizes from Appendix B what we have been able tentatively to establish concerning the present position within the Politburo. We have sought to explore the personalities of the members of the Politburo, Stalin excepted, in relation to each other and to the handling of power, and to examine the very limited available information on these matters in the context of the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to political warfare. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that what follows is distinctly a preliminary study in an area of information not susceptible now to wholly satisfactory evaluation, and certainly not to final judgment. The validity of available evidence, the sources exploited, and the arbitrary use of the terms New and Old Bolshevik are discussed in Appendix B.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

4. This more detailed appreciation is thus a supplement to the general analysis of the problem of Stalin's succession presented in Appendix A and summarized in Part II A. This concentration of attention on the Politburo is judged valid because the deeper causes of change or crisis after Stalin's death will, we believe, either be reflected in the Politburo or originate from relationships generated within that body. The analysis seeks to identify, in a highly preliminary way, certain divisive potentials which might come into more effective play in the period after Stalin's death.

5. This paper closes with a consideration of those lines of US policy most likely to bring about a slow change or crisis after Stalin's death and to exploit such situations in the American interest.

II. The Divisive Potentials.

6. We believe that evidence suggests at least four divisive potentials:

- (1) Personal power relationships
- (2) Possible differences at the level of economic policy as it is related to foreign policy
- (3) Balance of power between the Old and New Bolsheviks
- (4) The special position and political orientation of the Military.

These are discussed below in separate sections.

III. Personal Power Relationships.

7. It is possible to see at least one set of widely confirmed special relationships in the Politburo:

- (1) Molotov as closest to Stalin at all-over policy level
- (2) Voroshilov as closest to Stalin as an old comrade
- (3) Kaganovich as Stalin's Old Bolshevik protégé and disciple

Cancelled
S.P.A.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

3

- (4) Malenkov as Stalin's New Bolshevik protege and disciple
- (5) Khrushchev as a one-time protege of Kaganovich
- (6) Andreev as a one-time protégé of Molotov.

8. We get hints of personal rivalries inside the Old and New Bolshevik groups and cutting across those lines: the contest between Malenkov and Beria for the balance of real power in the control and administration apparatus; the struggle between Molotov and Malenkov for Stalin's closest confidence; the rivalry between Mikoyan and the New Bolsheviks for power in the economic field. Andreev is said to detest Kaganovich, who replaced him at a crucial point in the collectivization crisis; while both Beria and Malenkov are said to be anti-Semitic and desiring Kaganovich's removal. Yet Molotov's wife is Jewish; Stalin's daughter is reportedly married to Kaganovich's son; and Kaganovich's sister Rosa has been called both mistress and secret wife of Stalin. Andreev and Khrushchev are said to be rivals as agricultural experts.

9. We have seen only one personal conflict given wide confirmation: the Zhdanov-Malenkov struggle, terminated by Zhdanov's death in 1948. There is evidence to suggest that this was more than a policy conflict; that it was at heart a struggle for personal power involving the building of supporting cliques in the state apparatus, involving struggle for the position, next to Molotov's, perhaps, closest to Stalin--and between an old powerful policymaker and a pushing young upstart. It is interesting to ask: What if Stalin had died before Zhdanov did?

10. Although this is a most speculative area of inquiry, as we increase our knowledge of the temperaments and characters of the Politburo members through reported firsthand insights and observations, especially those by Russians and others who have had repeated firsthand contacts, definite personalities begin to emerge to which considerable reality is given by confirmations and agreements over a wide range of experience and background in the sources.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S.R. A

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

4

11. Concretely, we have firsthand observation of a juggling of responsibility between Kaganovich and Mikoyan in administering Soviet policy in postwar Germany in an attempt to maintain prestige; and of the definite feeling of fear of Kaganovich on the part of his subordinates, whereas it was not noticeable among men working under Mikoyan. The observation of Mikoyan's subordinates was that he had little effect on Politburo political "weather." Malenkov's subordinates felt that he was, above all, politically minded--and strong. Mikoyan's disapproval of the dismantling of German industry was well-known to his subordinates; he uniquely omitted Stalin's name from his policy speech to his administrators. He apparently believed the dismantling policy unsound; and there is some evidence that he and Malenkov were in direct opposition in this area over a considerable time--with Mikoyan winning out in the end. Firsthand observations of both Beria and Malenkov reveal them as careful builders of loyal supporting groups--the former employing cunning and instinct traceable back to his school days; the latter by his considerate treatment of erring subordinates. A long-time associate of Beria's characterizes him as a power-seeker essentially oblivious to Communist ideology. Molotov's rigid conformity to the current line is seen by one who worked with him over many years to be purely an official conformity. Looking back into childhood factors which may be character determinants, it is interesting to discover from one of his schoolmates that Beria was the butt of schoolboy jokes because he was short and his ears stuck out, and that his schooling was paid for by the merchant in whose home Beria's mother was a servant.

Cancelled

S. P. A

12. The complete results of such firsthand observations have been embodied in portraits which are a part of Appendix B. At this point it is sufficient to observe that our limited inquiry suggests that it is valid to assume the existence of a divisive potential in Politburo personalities. In any realignment or adjustment of power, personal compatibilities, rivalries, predilections, theories, convictions, family backgrounds, experience, and so on play a subtle but often powerful part. It must not be overlooked that the presence and supreme power of Stalin constitute the strongest unifying and repressive

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

force limiting the interplay of Politburo personalities at the emotional level. The death of Stalin may well release divisive potentials at this level which will considerably affect the actions of the Politburo in any transfer of power.

IV. Possible Differences at the Level of Economic Policy.

13. The present Soviet international policy position of hostility toward the free world, supported at home by an intense propaganda campaign directed especially at the United States, imposes on the Soviet national economy an overbalanced commitment to the production of war goods. This condition hinders healthy economic development and drastically reduces the production of consumers' goods. Although war production and basic capital development significantly overlap in their requirements, allocations to military end-products also cut into the enlargement of basic capital. The Soviet international position, presumably dictated by Stalin, has also seriously dislocated Soviet foreign trade. Certain personal factors in the Politburo suggest a possible conflict between the major interests and convictions of some Politburo members and the Stalin policy.

14. Mikoyan, top Politburo trade expert, has repeatedly expressed the conviction that a fully developed Soviet foreign trade, impossible now, is essential to successful internal Soviet economic development. Although his expressions of respect and admiration for American methods and products, and his desire especially for friendly Soviet-United States trade, were made when they were in harmony with official policy, they are believed to represent his real feelings. He is reported to have favored Soviet participation in the Marshall Plan, and to hold that present Soviet policy encourages a Soviet-United States war. A practical man, he opposed the dismantling of German industry after 1945 as inefficient and wasteful. At present Mikoyan has been forced to turn his back on the West and reorient Soviet trade in the direction of Asia, a huge and probably anything but satisfying task. Mikoyan is a ruthless trader without scruples, and it would be a mistake to credit him with any altruistic motives; but he and those he influences may well feel that, at this stage of Soviet history,

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

6

a prerequisite to sound development of the Soviet economy is a foreign policy of ostensible international good will on the part of the Soviet state.

15. Kaganovich, although first of all a transport and heavy industry expert, was originally a factory worker and trade union organizer turned revolutionary soldier. He is credited with unusual understanding of the worker; and he has devoted his whole career to building Soviet industrial economy. He slavishly follows Stalin--but he apparently has no real interest in political theory, his eyes are toward Russia only, and he may well share Mikoyan's practical view.

16. Kaganovich, by reason of his career, and Mikoyan, according to repeated and emphatic reports, both seem to be men of power in the economic field who, in the absence of Stalin, would put practical considerations ahead of any theory of Bolshevik world movement that requires subordinating normal internal Soviet development to a war economy.

17. Kosygin, youngest and newest member of the Politburo, but apparently one of the bright new Bolsheviks of growing power, is a former textile worker. Shvernik, candidate Politburo member, although probably wielding little power, served in the Red Army, has always been in especially close contact with trade unions, and has a reputation for accessibility to the common people. Kosygin's position as Minister of Light Industry and Shvernik's closeness to labor suggest at least a real awareness on their part of the needs of the people and, possibly, an interest, identified with their own careers, in a popular rather than a Stalin view of the national economy.

18. Of the emerging figures whose closeness to Politburo membership is still a mystery, Suslov, probably very close to Malenkov, is reported as having special interest in the working class and the "connection between the depressed status of workers and war policy"; Shkiryatov is by trade a tailor, a worker in clothing factories. These are slight clues, but, taken in connection with the careers of Kaganovich, Shvernik, and

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S. P. A
Candellin

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

7

Kosygin, they indicate a continuing tendency to promote to high positions men of worker and factory experience who broaden the base of popular "feeling" in the Politburo. There is implied the rise of men whose experience with and hard knowledge of consumer economy make the economic policy of the state a very real issue--not something subordinated emotionally and intellectually as a figment of over-all Party theory.

19. Mikoyan and Kaganovich are Old Bolsheviks of great power and prestige. The others we have noted here are lesser men. One can see at least the possibility of a group within top Soviet leadership who, because of their worker origins, their personal awareness of the unsatisfied economic wants of the people, their special technical knowledge, and their positions in industry, might, with Stalin dead, vigorously oppose a continuation of the present Soviet position vis-à-vis the West--and, therefore, oppose the bid for power of any individual or group committed to an aggressive anti-West policy.



V. The Balance of Power Between the Old and New Bolsheviks.

20. Stalin's skillful and constant shifting of Politburo members in positions of power and prestige has been discernible from the outside for many years, and it appears that he balances not only man against man but Old against New. One might cite the all-powerful wartime State Defense Committee, having (excluding Stalin) at its inception as its members two Old Bolsheviks, Molotov and Voroshilov, and two New Bolsheviks, Beria and Malenkov; then, by the addition of Mikoyan and Kaganovich and Voznesenski, four Old and three New; and finally, by the replacement of Voroshilov by Bulganin, three Old and four New. Since the war one might say Stalin has balanced Molotov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich (foreign affairs, trade, heavy industry) against Beria, Bulganin, and Kosygin (police, army, finance, and light industry)--while dividing Party control between Malenkov and Andreev. Public rebukes and consequent loss of prestige have been suffered since the war (1950) by Andreev, an Old Bolshevik and disciple of Molotov, and (1951) by Khrushchev, a New

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S.P.A. cancelled

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

8

Bolshevik, both agricultural experts. The only member who appears to have been purged since the war is Voznesenski, distinctly a New Bolshevik.

21. The statistics of the Stalin juggling act, in themselves unimportant perhaps, are interesting and provocative in the context of supplementary information when one is contemplating the disappearance of the juggler. Some brief observations are made here.

22. The Old Bolsheviks are pre-Revolutionary Party members who have been personally close to each other and to Stalin over the entire period of the growth of Stalin's power. They are the real builders of the foundations of that power, the basic policy makers and executors who have manipulated the evolution of Bolshevik theory and practice into triumphant Stalinism. As such they have a conscious security, prestige, and power that set them apart. They are a clan united by historic and conspiratorial ties, their thinking and emotions rooted in the total history of Russian Bolshevism. The New Bolsheviks, especially the four youngest, are not the founders but the products of the Soviet State, not builders but managers--in a sense, inheritors. Essentially postpurge and postwar newcomers to real power, they are not so much the makers as the creatures of Stalinism. They are united by a common history of fighting and intriguing their way up in the dangerously competitive complex of an established power system, in which insecurity and the fatal consequences of failure are the most compulsive forces. Their thinking has real roots neither in revolutionary theory nor in historic Bolshevism but in the exigent and very real present--a present dominated by the established machinery of totalitarian bureaucracy.

23. It seems worth noting that the Old Bolsheviks were already in power at the period of comparatively friendly Soviet-United States relationships before and during the war, and that, as individuals, they have had many normal contacts with United States and other foreign personnel. There are many indications that their adherence to present Soviet policy is conditioned primarily by personal long association with and loyalty to Stalin

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Amellin

S. P. *

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

10

increase in the power of the Secret Police--as an instrument of terror to insure popular conformity in the face of a continuing war economy, as the eradicator of all possible western thought brought home by returning soldiers, as the destroyer of whole tribes suspected of lukewarm loyalty, and as the assumed custodian of the Russian atomic effort. Moreover, the interlocking of the whole postwar economic program with the forced labor system, supplied and administered by the Secret Police, suggests a new and significant penetration of the whole state structure by police power. And this power is directed by Beria, one of the New Bolsheviks. We can also note Kosygin's rise to power in the economic sphere. For the last three years the special honor of making the Anniversary Address has fallen to New Bolsheviks.

26. If Stalin dies while the Politburo is constituted as at present there will remain in key positions of power three Old Bolsheviks: Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan; and three New Bolsheviks: Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin. Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria seem to stand out strikingly head and shoulders above all the other members as wielders of power, as personalities, as enjoying the greatest prestige, and as potential leaders. Informed opinion varies as to Molotov's native aptitude for leadership; possibly his strength is derived from his special relationship to Stalin and the fact that he is acknowledged head of an Old Bolshevik group. Malenkov and Beria may have greater native ability than Molotov. They are apparently builders of loyal supporting groups--if not of personal power machines. Beria, as head of the vastly increased police power, is certainly a symbol of the decline of pure Party power represented by Malenkov, and presumably a check on Malenkov. In some respects Beria seems the most sinister figure of the three. But there is strong evidence that Malenkov is the strongest, most ambitious of all if one can judge by the sheer impact of his personality and by his steady rise to power, in a strictly Stalinist pattern, via the Party apparatus. The cold facts seem to be that these three men aided by their supporters may decide the immediate destiny of the Soviet State after Stalin's death; that each has strong claims to and support for his accession to single supreme

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Condolence

S. R. A

and would not necessarily survive him. The New Bolsheviks have come to power mainly during the period of Soviet hostility to the West. They have had few normal contacts with Western personnel. Their adherence to present policy may well be conditioned primarily by their self-identification with the system rather than with Stalin, and so, paradoxically, they may cling to present anti-West policy, even though it is dictated now by Stalin, because it sets up an internal climate favorable to the rigid totalitarianism in which they have reached power.

24. We have been pointing out theoretical differences between the Old and the New Bolsheviks which could conceivably affect personal and group power and policy alignments after Stalin's death. Proceeding from theory to fact, we see the steady encroachment by the New Bolsheviks on the power preserves of the Politburo system, one resultant struggle having been already recorded in the history of the Zhdanov-Malenkov conflict. There is some evidence, as already noted, of a struggle between Malenkov and Mikoyan in the realm of postwar economic policy in East Germany.

25. Bulganin, strictly a "political soldier," replaced Voroshilov on the all-powerful State Defense Committee in 1944, was Minister of Armed Forces 1947-1949, headed the USSR Delegation to the Meeting of Defense Ministers of Eastern Europe, Prague, 1950, and is now, although no longer Minister of Armed Forces, unquestionably top military authority in the Politburo. Party power, indicated by membership and authority in the Organoburo, and the Secretariat, and especially by control of Party appointments, seems to have been firmly held since Zhdanov's death by Malenkov, with Andreev in a lesser position. Malenkov was reportedly Stalin's political representative in Korea in 1951. Although Molotov is evidently still the Politburo authority in foreign affairs, there is evidence of increasing penetration into the Soviet diplomatic organization of police power under Beria, and the belief on the part of some well-informed sources that there is direct connection between that penetration and the rise of younger men like Malik and Gromyko. Since the war there has apparently been an

S.P.A. Cancellation

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

11

leadership; that no one of them can succeed to leadership without the support of one of the others. The wholesale emergency cooperation which might immediately follow Stalin's death would not change underlying personal and group factors. The opinion of our best-informed source, based on long and intimate experience in the Soviet state, is that "The Old Bolsheviks will hang together; they will never submit to leadership by the New."

VI. The Special Position and Political Orientation of the Soviet Military.

27. The Soviet state would seem to offer no exception to the axiom that the armed forces are the ultimate key to the power and survival of any dictatorship: their obedience must be completely reliable in time of crisis. No lasting transfer of power can be made without their acquiescence. In a dictatorship, which, by its suppressive nature, creates many disaffected and disloyal elements, even in a privileged military, obedience in the military is not merely a matter of detecting disloyalty but rather one of personnel shifting and dispersal, and prevention of unofficial communication--that is, of control, the primary object of which is to make impossible any conjoining of sufficient disloyal elements to make an aggregate internal military threat to the regime. In the Soviet state Trotsky made political supervision of the military coeval with the founding of the Red Army. In the organization of Stalin's dictatorship close control of the Soviet military has always resided in Stalin and the Politburo, and has been exercised through the Party and the Secret Police.

28. One result of our interviews is information which strongly suggests that, despite certain features of the Soviet system since its beginnings, designed to prevent the crystallization of localized or "deviationist" attitudes in the Soviet armed forces, the Soviet Military has a special position in the Soviet society and, possibly, a political orientation which could bear directly on the situation in the USSR following Stalin's death.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S.P. 4
Cancellation

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

12

29. There is evidence that the Soviet armed forces, theoretically drafted and recruited from all classes, has a large percentage of men of peasant origin and of officers who have volunteered not out of loyalty to the regime but to get better food and more privileges than offered by their positions in the civilian economy. The practical requirements of military leadership, especially during the war, have compelled the promotion of officers on merit rather than political conformity probably to a larger degree than in any other part of the Soviet system. Even Old Bolshevik army leaders like Voroshilov and Budenny are, according to observers, deficient in political enthusiasm; and Soviet army loyalties seem to have been long rooted in devotion to Russia--not to Bolshevism or Party. Thus the very texture of the Soviet Military would give it a special position in Soviet society as a potential reservoir of political unreliability. Moreover, the position of the Military in the eyes of the people since the war is that of the real savior of the homeland; and we have been told that it is the only one of the four power elements in the Soviet state which does not symbolize repression and which, therefore, the people neither distrust nor fear.

30. Every inference that can be drawn from the established and recent policies of Soviet political leadership confirms the special position of the Soviet Military--from the time of the Kronstadt Rebellion to the demotion of Zhukov. The system of political commissars outranking genuine military officials, which goes back to 1920, has been relaxed only at temporary intervals when fighting morale seemed endangered by it. In 1937 Stalin struck wholesale at the military command in the Tukhachevsky purge, which reportedly eliminated 75 percent of officers above the rank of colonel. Since that time the Military has been "loaded" with Secret Police informers. Malenkov has risen to power from a beginning as a Red Army political commissar; and Beria's rise to power during the war is associated with his influence in the military sphere. Bulganin, strictly an officer without military experience except as a political commissar, has been made a marshal and placed at the head of national defense--while the mention of military heroes has been struck from official

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S. P. A. Consultation

histories of the war, and Zhukov, probably the most widely known as a popular hero and to western military commanders, has been relegated to obscurity in a minor position. Since 1937, of five Soviet Air Marshals four disappeared from power after an average two years in command, and the only one who lasted five years terminated his career with a long prison term. Outside of the Soviet Union the Allied Command in Berlin observed firsthand the subordination of the Soviet Military to political and police control (with a resultant drastic change for the worse in personal and official Russian-American relationships). From inside the Soviet Union we are told of a special army with artillery and tanks within the Secret Police system, the inference being that there is official doubt of the reliability of the Military if called upon in certain situations, say large scale overt popular discontent.

31. But there is a wealth of evidence that the Politburo has never been wholly successful in its methodical and systematized effort to make the Soviet Military politically reliable. Most striking was the so-called Vlasov movement during the war, based specifically on opposition to the Stalin dictatorship. The morale in the ranks of the Soviet Military in Germany and other occupied countries at the end of the war was, in the opinion of qualified observers, very low, with breaches of discipline and desertions far exceeding expectancy based on all normal military experience. Some insight into the political orientation of Soviet officers in the Berlin area was afforded by the many friendships between U.S. and Soviet personnel. In the considered opinion of many Americans of lieutenant to major rank Soviet officer fraternization was not based merely on friendly curiosity and liking for the better American food and quarters, but also on some genuine interest in democratic concepts. And in at least two instances cited by sources whose perception and judgment are beyond question Soviet officers of high rank expressed privately a sincere desire to see Germany united under a political system embracing such specific democratic concepts as free schools, free press, and freedom of speech in the western meaning of the terms.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

14

32. Glimpses of Soviet military sentiment obtained from recent interviews indicate that the enduring Russian peasant desire for land ownership seems to be strong among Soviet soldiers. General officers express a desire to own property, have servants, and live in typical bourgeois style upon retirement. The Soviet Military as a whole apparently has old-fashioned Kutusov nationalist sentiments, fought for Russian soil, and has little sympathy with Soviet imperialist expansion. Soviet Army lieutenant-colonels in 1947, talking in assured privacy, gave a low estimate of the ability of Stalin's aviator son Vassily; were scornful of Bulganin's promotion to Marshal; and expressed total disbelief in the official line that Russia was in danger of attack by the United States.

33. We cannot ignore these indications--nor the continuing evidence from Soviet military defectors emphasizing widespread resentment in the Soviet Army and Air Force directed at the instruments of political control--the Party and the Secret Police. Against them we must weigh the fact that, as the Soviet Military have never forgotten the lesson of the Tukhachevsky purge, there is no such thing as a shared group "attitude" in the sense that a free society employs the word, with connotations of discussion and group identification. We do not see how disaffected Soviet military sentiment can find either effective expression or leadership unless there is a breakdown in the present effective control exercised by the Politburo. The special position of the Soviet Military and its political orientation are potentials awaiting crystallization.

34. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the Politburo has not chosen to embark on any military offensive outside Soviet territory since the war. Tito has met only threats; and Mao's army has been the tool of the Politburo in Korea. These may be indications of the Politburo's evaluation of the reliability of its armed forces in any operation not strictly in defense of the homeland interests. Moreover, the effectiveness of Politburo control depends on Politburo unity--which, we have seen, may not be preserved after Stalin's death. Therefore, while emphasizing the very limited scope of our

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S. P. A
Cancellation

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

15

research into Soviet military personnel and leadership, we feel that the kind of information we have received has direct relevance to any consideration of the situation in Russia following Stalin's death, and that we have sampled an area in which extensive research is urgently advisable.

VII. Some Other Considerations.

35. The foregoing enumeration does not pretend to be exclusive; and it will be observed that we have tied possible differences at policy level in the Politburo to the single concrete issue of economic policy, apparently ignoring the possibility of Politburo split, for instance, on the vital issue of political-military policy. It is easy and tempting to theorize on the basis that there always has been and therefore must be now within Soviet leadership a division of opinion between two groups: (1) those who would proceed to world conquest by way of the Cominform, employing subversion and discriminating aid to any nationalist or religious upheaval which invites conditions susceptible to "Communist" exploitation, but avoiding all risk of war; and (2) those who would extend existing, and incite and indiscriminately aid future, local armed conflicts, in effect defying the West and willingly accepting the risk of a Soviet-West war. Theorists cite the Zhdanov-Malenkov split as a recent precedent, assuming that now, with the Soviet Union more powerful than ever, the West having failed to use anything but words in defense of satellite independence, and the Chinese Communist Revolution a startling success, there are surely leaders who would follow the so-called Zhdanov aggressive policy. These men would, for instance, urge Mao to attack Formosa and Indo-China. On the other side would be Malenkov, more powerful than ever, and aides like Suslov, upholding Cominform methods of building "Communist" strength outside of Russia as the sure way to Soviet objectives. This kind of speculation is abetted by so-called "inside" information purporting to originate from high-level and Politburo meeting "leaks," and taking the form of reports, difficult if not impossible to evaluate, by persons who do not hesitate to

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

16

give various lists of Politburo members who represent one view or the other. Our research had the specific goal of securing, by interviews, only firsthand information on Politburo members; and such information furnishes no real basis at present for making any such lists. It is our judgment that until we have more verifiable sources of ~~current inside-Soviet Union information~~--perhaps until Stalin's death, when Politburo members may, if they disagree, proclaim their political attitudes vis-a-vis the rest of the world--it is impossible to assign accurately a part to any given Politburo member. To enlarge present sources suggests a delicate and difficult intelligence task, but one which, if feasible, could have, obviously, results of great value to the United States.

36. It will also be observed that we have not attempted any categorical analysis and listing of individual Politburo members in terms of motives--the balance between loyalty to Bolshevik ideology, patriotism, and the cynical desire for personal power. Here, again, is an area for endless speculation and theorizing, in which there is wide disagreement. We have accepted the judgment of our best-informed sources that, as long as Stalin retains his present position of power, there can be no prima facie evidence of a Politburo member's real ideological loyalty. What we can glean are new insights into character and behavior from which one can draw inferences of attitudes, for instance in the context of national welfare and sympathy with the people, which could conceivably conflict with Bolshevik ideology and practice. Such insights, the concrete result of our research, we have incorporated in the portraits attached to Appendix B, which are, of course, subject to addition and correction in the light of continuing research.

Cancelled
S.P.A

VIII. Conclusions.

37. Our limited study, based on available knowledge of the present political and social organization of the Soviet state, but consisting primarily of an examination of the Politburo, suggests certain tentative conclusions:

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

17

(1) At the time Stalin dies the political-social climate in Russia, if the present pattern is sustained, will contain elements of widespread dissatisfaction and tension at every level below the Politburo, but will not be such as to cause, in itself, any significant crisis unless the present effective control apparatus is deranged by a split in the Politburo.

(2) It is conceivable that a split in the Politburo could be confined, in its effects, wholly within the Politburo itself, and resolved, say, by a few summary secret executions. But unless it is so confined, any spreading effects could ramify throughout the whole Soviet power structure--the Party, the Secret Police, the Military, the bureaucracy, deranging the entire Soviet society.

(3) Therefore, such powerful motives of self-preservation both as individuals and as a group will urge the Politburo to unity of action that it is conceivable Stalin's death may result in some orderly, even constitutional transfer of power effecting a peaceful transition to what will be really a new system of rule. But the nature of Stalin's dictatorship indicates the probability of an eventual struggle for absolute control between members of the Politburo.

(4) The relationship between the Politburo, as symbol of totalitarian authority, and the people suggests that any struggle within the Politburo would not be decided by popular support but by the alignment of power factors in the Politburo itself, especially as it would be related to continued effective power over the Party, Secret Police, Military, and the state bureaucracy.

(5) The history of Stalin's dictatorship suggests that, although a struggle for power in the Politburo after Stalin's death could, like any other personal power struggle, embrace many causes for conflict, it would be nominally a struggle over national policy issues.

(6) Except for the possibility of the emergence of some great military figure such as Zhukov, and allowing for their distinction as individuals of Voroshilov,

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S.P. A
Cancellation

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

18

Kaganovich, and Mikoyan, the real power figures (as of the present) in a Politburo struggle will be Molotov, Beria, Malenkov--and, possibly, Bulganin.

(7) Available information on the members of the Politburo and partial insight into the Soviet Military suggest at least four divisive potentials in the Soviet state power structure:

- A. Personal power relationships
- B. Possible differences at the level of economic policy as it is related to foreign policy
- C. Balance of power between the Old and New Bolsheviks
- D. The special position and political orientation of the Military.

IX. Interim Conclusions for U.S. Policy.

38. The foregoing tentative conclusions lead to certain observations on the death of Stalin which can be made in the specific context of U.S. political warfare:

(1) Any internal crisis such as a Politburo struggle following Stalin's death may offer the opportunity to the United States to take action which might be decisive in terms of future U.S.-Soviet relationships. Such action might take one or more of the following forms:

A. The attempt to incite or widen a personal split in the Politburo.

B. Concrete and/or propaganda support to maximize an internal crisis outside of the Politburo--popular or military.

C. Precipitation or maximizing of a simultaneous external crisis or diplomatic problem by action, say, in the UN and/or a satellite area, which would force a vital policy decision.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Cancelled

*A
S. P.*

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

19

(2) Any plan to exploit the death of Stalin in the U.S. interest would have to be, so to speak, a day-to-day plan--flexible, cumulative, subject to constant revision, probably never susceptible to crystallization in any arbitrary pattern. Its execution on any worthwhile scale, regardless of the detail of its composition, would require decisions, especially as to timing, involving a preponderant element of calculated risk. There would always be the chance that any action the United States might take would consolidate the very elements of power we would be trying to split apart.

(3) Whatever form U.S. action might take, the preparation for it from this time forward and execution of it would have to embrace some projection of U.S. aims vis-a-vis the USSR in such contexts as: foreign intervention, legitimate Russian aspirations and spheres of influence, right of self-determination, the place of the Russian peoples and the nationalities. Such projection would have to include the assurance that U.S. aims are not in conflict with Russian (as distinct from Bolshevik) national interests, and that an internal Russian struggle would not result in any U.S. intervention in violation of those interests.

(4) The preparation and execution of such a plan would have to embrace the continuing collection of information about Politburo members and other, especially military, key figures.

(5) The successful execution of any plan to exploit the death of Stalin in the U.S. interest would require the prior establishment of effective covert channels of communication with and within the USSR.

(6) The greatest danger--we would say an ever-present danger in political warfare aimed at splitting apart such a power group as the Politburo, and, therefore, one to be kept constantly in mind when contemplating any plan to exploit Stalin's death in our interests--the greatest danger lies in the possibility that the very action calculated to split the Politburo would unify them more strongly than ever.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S-E-C-R-E-T

20

39. The immediate shape of any U.S. official pronouncements and other messages designed to penetrate Russia in the period following Stalin's death will be determined by information collected from this time forward and, of course, by special circumstances unforeseeable at this time--i.e. contemporary events requiring prompt U.S. action and response in the special context of Stalin's departure. It is probably impossible in the interim to do more than collect information and prepare tentative flexible plans subject and adaptable to rapid post D-day use--always within the over-all framework of U.S. policy and aims vis-a-vis Russia. However, it is both possible and necessary now to consider in some detail what form US action will take at the time of Stalin's death. Some suggestions are made here by way of illustration of lines to be taken in one or several instances:

(a) Recognition of the fact of Stalin's death as a news event, without any mention of the customary tributes or condolences, specifically marking it as the end of a dictatorship compared to which the rule of the Czars seems mild; possibly going into a straight historical review with mention of some details of Stalin's dictatorship specifically aimed to show that it cut off the Russian people from their friends in the rest of the world; but avoiding the two extremes--regret or joy at his passing, and refraining from any attack on Stalin's motives or character, leaving that to inference. This message might be part of a presidential speech, part of an official U.S. pronouncement in the United Nations, and the subject of dissemination by VOA, Radio Free Europe, and all other available means. Most important to be considered in contemplating this sort of official U.S. reaction would be high level secret agreements to make similar official announcements on the part of the other free countries, especially Britain and France.

(b) The expression of one regret--that Stalin never visited the United States (or any democracy) so that he could have known the truth; then going on to the feelings of Americans toward the Russian people, etc.; this to be also the subject of high level speech (but not in the United Nations) and wide broadcasts.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S. R. A. cancellation

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

21

(c) A high level speech addressed specifically to the Russian people and their rulers of the moment, and given world dissemination, emphasizing the fact that now Russia has reached an historic moment: she is great and strong because her people are great and strong, and now she can take stock, evaluate the folly and suicidal danger of hatred and iron curtain and arms race, and join the world. This would be a momentous policy speech, an invitation, so to speak, to Russia, a tribute to the Russian people, a crossing-out of the past; it would be a call to freedom, better life for the Russian people, and, above all, it would seize upon the idea of peace and challenge the Russian leaders to take the historic opportunity to make peace possible; it would stress the idea that now is the moment of decision, of destiny, etc.

(d) A high level pronouncement dealing only and specifically with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and the satellites: the fact that there is no conflict between U.S. aims and the legitimate aims of the Russian people, etc.--in as much detail as possible, and recalling military friendships and so on; concluding with the idea that the United States is waiting for Russia's answer and ready to confer at any time.

X. A Comment on Possible Immediate U.S. Action

40. In confronting the present threat of Bolshevik imperialism we are dealing with a permanent Bolshevik hostility to U.S. aims which is inherent in the ultimate purpose of Bolshevism--the debasement of humanity in the totalitarian pattern. To achieve this purpose Bolshevism must move from a strong base; and its first goal is still the strengthening of that base--Bolshevik Russia. To this end the Bolshevik process in Russia is essentially the imposition on its people of total conformity inspired by fear. The chief instruments of this process are the Party and the Secret Police. Malenkov controls one, Beria the other.

41. Censorship, propaganda, and the Iron Curtain are simply prerequisites to the maintenance of Party control

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

22

and Secret Police power, neither of which could long survive free intercourse between Russia and the western world. The exchange of ideas which would accompany Russia's taking an honest place in the family of nations, and the accompanying necessity of ceasing subversive Bolshevik activities abroad, would not only strip the Party at home of its most potent propaganda weapons and ultimately cause universal and effective revulsion to the Secret Police and its slave labor system, but would also rob world Bolshevism of real power, thus destroying the organizations with which Malenkov and Beria are fatally joined.

42. It seems impossible to us to separate U.S. aims, whether considered narrowly as immediate aims merely of self-preservation in the present world system or broadly as the ultimate political, economic, and social goals of a free democratic society, from the concept of a world situation which would, of necessity, include Russia as an honest member of the family of nations. It seems to us, then, that U.S. aims are bound to be irreconcilably opposed by Malenkov and Beria.

43. These two power-seekers, whose natures and careers make them, more than any other Politburo members, copies of Stalin, will have to perpetuate Stalin's policies if they are to survive. They will presumably outlive Stalin, and at his death will have enormous real power. Together they could take a position which could not be successfully challenged from within Russia without sweeping and organized opposition on the part of the Military.

44. We conclude that U.S. political warfare directed at Bolshevik leadership should aim first of all to destroy the power of Malenkov and Beria, and that this is a process which can be set in motion immediately, achieving a cumulative effect before Stalin dies.

45. It is not necessary or desirable to attack these men by name. The process would be a consistent repeated attack on the roots of internal Bolshevik power--the Communist Party and the Secret Police, not as institutions

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Cancelled

S. P. A

by themselves but as the agents of a narrow dictatorship seeking to maintain its power against the will of the people. Those within these bureaucracies should, as Soviet citizens, be among the targets we should aim to reach with Third Choice propaganda, on the view that they are, equally, victims of the regime.

46. Such a program would lay special emphasis on reaching the Military, where lies the only potential force which could effectively decide the issue in any struggle for power after Stalin's death--if it can unify its action.

47. If we can believe present limited evidence, significant elements within the Soviet military establishment are inspired by patriotism in its old-fashioned sense, are not in agreement with Bolshevik imperialistic expansionist aims, and have reacted favorably to contact with the free world. They resent the intrusion and surveillance of Party and Secret Police. They may prove a fertile ground for disaffection with everything those tools of totalitarianism represent. The Military could be such a vital factor in the determination of Stalin's successor that every attempt would have to be made to reach its leaders and personnel, a process which would have to include unequivocal assurance that U.S. aims do not conflict with legitimate Russian national aims.

48. The combined process of attacking Party and Secret Police, with the aim of destroying their hold on the minds of the Russian people at every level, thereby destroying Malenkov and Beria, and of informing the Russian Military, would have to be skillfully and persistently carried out over a period of time if it were to be effective. It presents a difficult task, to say the least. Although radio listening is still possible for certain Military, Secret Police, and state bureaucracy personnel in Russia, it is obvious that a real effort to reach them must employ, in addition, other and unorthodox, covert means. Possibly, the lower levels of Soviet society cannot be reached with any worth-while degree of effectiveness by any orthodox means. We would be less than frank if we did not point out that such a program

as we envisage implies a degree of effective coordination in the U.S. political warfare effort which is not visible to us at this point. But we believe that the period from now to the death of Stalin and the period following Stalin's death may offer the United States a unique opportunity to influence what could well be an historic decision, in Russia in the period following Stalin's death, affecting the whole future course of Russia's relationship to the free world. And, unless some carefully planned and sustained action is taken from now forward in anticipation of the death of Stalin, we do not see how that event, no matter how much we hope for it, can react, except by sheer accident, in the interest of the United States.

XI. Recommendations.

49. We believe that, under present conditions, considerations of comparative effectiveness and ease of access place first emphasis on U.S. information and political warfare action aimed to prevent the further spread of Bolshevism outside of Soviet Russia, rather than on action aimed directly at the present Soviet state in hopes of changing conditions there. Obviously, however, such emphasis cannot be wholly exclusive unless we are content to leave the disintegration of Bolshevism wholly to time, possibly too long a process for our own interests. So we must direct action also at the Soviet state, the center of Bolshevism. Therefore it is recommended:

(1) That the United States plan and enter upon a course of political warfare action to be pursued from this time forward and to be directed at all levels of Soviet society, with special emphasis on the Soviet Military. The task would be defined as the producing of a cumulative effect between this time and the death of Stalin which will (a) encourage the Soviet Military to unify in opposition to control by the Party and Secret Police after Stalin's death, and (b) by direction at every level of Soviet society, destroy the effectiveness of the Party and Secret Police, and their heads Malenkov and Beria, in the period following Stalin's death. It

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

25

would embrace the projection of U.S. aims vis-a-vis Russia and the assurance that U.S. aims do not conflict with Russian national (as distinct from Bolshevik) interests, and would not lead, in case of internal Russian struggle, to U.S. intervention in violation of those interests. It would not employ the names of any Russian leaders except, as it became appropriate, Stalin's.

(2) That there be assigned to responsible authority the preparation of a plan for future use, the task being defined as the exploitation of the death of Stalin in the interests of the United States. This plan would be developed over time, and would embrace the use of a special file of information to be maintained on a current basis and in the custody of the planning authority. It would be the basis for action to be taken after Stalin's death, at a time to be then decided by the best possible evaluation of the situation.

(3) That no action be taken at the present time aimed specifically at any Politburo member as a possible successor to Stalin, although at any time when events warrant action should be aimed at Politburo members individually or collectively as they openly take positions hostile to the United States, being careful always to identify such positions with obedience to Stalin.

(4) That urgent priority be given the task of establishing communication networks, both current and reserve, with and inside Russia.

(5) That urgent priority be given the task of collecting on a current basis from this time forward information on the members of the Politburo, Soviet military leaders, and a limited number of persons believed to be key subordinate Soviet officials.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S.P. A
Cancellation

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

STAFF PAPER B

SOME PROBLEMS OF RADIO BROADCASTING
TO THE SOVIET UNION AND
ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

1952

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



S.P. B Radio broadcasting

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

CONTENTS

I.	Introduction	1
II.	The Strategy of Truth and the Maintenance of Morale	1
III.	The Implicit Commitment	3
IV.	The Two Unanswered Questions	5
V.	The Nature of American Intentions	7
VI.	The Implementation of American Intentions	9
VII.	The Implementation of These Themes	11
VIII.	A Note on Political Warfare and People	14

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

S. P. B

Rostow III B Radio Broadcasting

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

SOME PROBLEMS OF RADIO BROADCASTING TO THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES

I. Introduction

It is evident that radio broadcasts initiated or carried out by the United States and directed to the Soviet Union and its European satellites constitute the major form of U.S. political warfare now operative in that region. This paper is by no means a full analysis of the present and potential role of U.S. radio broadcasting. Rather, it considers a few central problems which now confront those responsible for creating and executing such broadcasts, problems upon the solution of which, it is believed, an improvement in the effectiveness of our broadcasting now depends. More broadly, this paper is an essay in the practical application of political warfare, defined as the offering, in this instance by the United States, of realistic and attractive alternatives, for thought and action, to nations and peoples under hostile domination. It is essential to the nature of this offering that it produce action consonant with the basic interests of the United States.

II. The Strategy of Truth and the Maintenance of Morale

Over the past several years our broadcasting has sought to project to those under Soviet rule a version of the facts they confront in their daily life, and the facts in the world outside Soviet control, alternative

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

2

to the version presented in Soviet and satellite propaganda. This effort has consisted partially in the combatting of Soviet and Communist lies. A substantial portion of our broadcasting is at present concerned, for example, with correcting false statements about American unemployment, the status of workers and minority groups in American society, the use of bacteriological warfare by United Nations troops in Korea, and so on. The strategy of truth, in this minimum sense, is a limited and indispensable part of any broadcasting policy aimed at the Soviet satellite peoples.

Beyond this limited task our broadcasts have projected several groups of themes whose purpose has been to present an image of the Soviet and satellite dictatorship and an image of United States and Western purposes different from that which is contained in the information otherwise available to those directly or indirectly under Soviet rule. The ideological program of VOA, for example, the analysis of the Soviet dictatorship both internally and in its operations within the satellites, and the Western interpretation of the origins of the Korean War are all meant to reinforce in the minds of the peoples concerned the conception of the Soviet regime as an imperialist and aggressive power, employing on the peoples it controls repressive means, and unfaithful, even, to its own ideological origins.

Another set of positive themes has been designed to project a broad picture of the motivating forces of the United States and the Western World: for example, Western belief in the right of men everywhere to know the truth, Western faith in the ultimate victory of freedom over enslavement, Western belief in the right of all peoples to cultural and political self-determination, the firm opposition of the United States to Soviet enslavement of peoples and nations. Further, U.S. broadcasts have sought to present not merely a general conception of Western principles and purposes, but also a concrete image of growing Western strength and unity, as illustrated in such palpable acts as the Berlin Airlift, the Marshall Plan, NATO, U.N. intervention in Korea, the Fourth Point program, Without a conviction that the

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

Rostow III b Radio Broadcasting

Rostow III b Radio Broadcasting

West is strong and, even, increasingly strong, Western beliefs, values, and ultimate purposes can not constitute a meaningful alternative to those under Soviet rule, no matter how attractive they may be as abstract conceptions.

While there is a sense in which these latter themes fall within a strategy of truth, they are based on an assertion of fundamental Western values and are designed for an operational purpose: that is, to sustain in the minds of those within the Soviet and satellite lands a conception of their own position and America's relationship to it which would, by keeping alive the knowledge of moral and political values different from those the regimes would impose, maintain a basis in morale on which these peoples might in the future act in their own interests and those of the United States and the Western World. Simply stated, our purpose has been to prevent the complete retreat of the Soviet and satellite peoples into apathy.

It can be fairly said that the above themes and the aims behind them form a minimum foundation for an American broadcasting policy toward the Soviet Union and its European satellites, granting necessary flexibility in the assignment of priorities as the situation may require.

III. The Implicit Commitment

Our broadcasting carries with it, however, a meaning which transcends the facts and themes transmitted. Sound evidence exists to indicate that the activities of the Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe as well, constitute of themselves the assumption by the United States of a profound responsibility toward its audiences, more particularly toward the minority peoples of the USSR and the Soviet Satellites. This holds true especially of the Voice of America, but is also implicit with respect to Radio Free Europe. In contesting the alternatives presented to these peoples by the regimes which now control them, the United States assumes authority; and that assumption in itself involves responsibility.



~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

4

The very fact of initiating and continuing mass communications with these audiences constitutes, in itself, a message with profound implications; for such communication inevitably links the communicator, as time passes, in some relation to his audience. A cumulative image, implicit or explicit, emerges from such communication as it is combined with all other knowledge available to the audience. The existence of large, complex, and growing organizations to maintain mass communication by the United States to the Soviet and satellite peoples in general, or even to certain small minorities within them, implies the intent to associate the interests of the United States with these peoples.

Regardless of the literal meaning and the cautious phrasing of our individual messages, in the minds of the radio audience the United States assumes some form of quite specific responsibility for the future of that audience. Even, or perhaps especially, if our responsibility is left implicit - if the manner and time and form in which the United States intends to implement its responsibilities towards that audience is avoided - as time goes on, the gap inevitably is filled in the minds of the audience.

There is ample evidence that American broadcasting to the Soviet Union and, perhaps especially, to the satellite peoples has created such a sense of association and has raised expectations that the United States will assume a degree of responsibility for the resolution of their present problems. It should be emphasized again that this situation has arisen not necessarily because the broadcasts have carried explicit promises, but because of the fact of their existence, both in the context of America's clash with the Soviet Union on the world scene, and in the context of the repression and isolation of the individual citizen under totalitarian rule. Whether we like it or not, radio broadcasting is a serious, major instrument of policy; and there now appears to be a need, reflected in what we know of the audience response, as well as in the minds of those responsible for broadcasting, to make more explicit the character and extent of the American relation to the future of these peoples.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

Radio Broadcasting
b
III
Postow

Our broadcasting programs raise questions which are not answered by the statement of correct fact, or by American interpretations of the evils of the Soviet regime, or by broad and abstract statements of the American and Western loyalty to certain fundamental political and moral principles which the audiences and the Western governments and peoples hold in common. Put another way, there is a gap between the explicit alternatives held out to these peoples and the implicit alternative which, given the nature of the operation and the position of the peoples concerned, is unavoidably read into the broadcasts.

Listeners tend to vacillate between a view that liberation by Western arms is imminent and a view that the West has no serious concern with their destiny. In the end both views lead to an apathy and resignation contrary to our interests.

The future success of American broadcasting to the Soviet and satellite areas may thus hinge on a clarification of America's intentions towards their peoples.

IV. The Two Unanswered Questions

The gap in policy may be defined in terms of two fundamental questions which the United States has thus far left unanswered in its broadcasting to the Soviet and satellite peoples:

1. Over and above the American desire that the satellite peoples be liberated and the Soviet regime eliminated, what, ultimately, are American intentions with respect to these societies?
2. When and how does the United States intend to implement its intentions?

These questions are not in any sense hypothetical. They are reflected in a growing body of written and oral audience responses. They continue to rise with force

Review III b Radio Broadcasting
Rostow III b Radio Broadcasting

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

6

from the mass of our listeners. They profoundly affect the listeners' present and future relationship to the United States and the Western world. Whatever our own understanding of our policies and purposes may be, these questions cannot be ignored with impunity.

They are, of course, extremely searching. To answer them involves commitments under future circumstances, which it is the sound instinct of all governments to avoid if possible. More than that, answers given in too great detail are unlikely to prove wholly valid in the future, and are, therefore, likely to do more harm than good. It is, nevertheless, our view that even under our present circumstances of cold war, and even under the present policy that the United States not undertake an aggressive war against the Soviet Union, answers can be formulated which would give to our broadcasting policy in particular, and our political warfare program in general, a better foundation than now exists.

The finding of appropriate formulae for this purpose requires most careful staff work. Conflicting interests are involved: the answers must be responsive to Russian and satellite problems and aspirations, but must also conform to American interests; the answers must be detailed enough to carry meaning to Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, but must avoid commitments which the United States will not or should not in the long run sustain; the answers must carry a serious and persuasive message of hope without raising false expectations in the satellite areas or convincing the rest of the world, including the Soviet government, that a U.S. military crusade is imminent; the answers to various peoples and groups must be mutually consistent; and so on.

Having considered both the advantages and difficulties of an American clarification of its intentions, we are persuaded that the task is possible. The following paragraphs sketch the main lines of one possible set of answers, although we are aware that much further work will be required by those operationally responsible for U.S. policy before a wholly satisfactory formulation is established.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

Rostow III B RADIO BROADCASTING

V. The Nature of American Intentions

It is the burden of our analysis of the Soviet and satellite vulnerabilities that there are certain fundamental themes which, if judged compatible with the American interest, might serve as a foundation for an answer to the first of the two questions. It is, further, our tentative conclusion, as presented in another part of our report, that the exploitation of these themes falls fully within the range of ultimate American interests in Russia and Eastern Europe.

With respect to the Soviet Union the foundation for such an approach might lie in the following propositions:

1. Of its very nature, the Soviet regime is not pursuing internal or external policies in the common national interest of the Russian and other peoples now under Soviet rule.
2. The American interest in Russia is wholly compatible with a dignified Russian national future within the framework of a system of world security and order.
3. The United States has no interest in interfering in the detailed organization of a future Russian society.
4. The framework of American objectives, if accepted by a Russian government, would give to the Russian peoples an opportunity to organize a society free of many of the most pressing unsatisfactory features of life under the Soviet regime.

With respect to the satellite peoples it is held that the full exploitation of their present position and outlook demands more than a simple association of the United States with a desire for their liberation from Soviet domination. It requires an association of the United States with their abiding long-run interest:

- (a) that no single power ever again dominate the Continent of Europe;



Postwar III
Radio broadcasting

- (b) that Eastern Europe be associated for certain clearly defined security, economic and cultural purposes with Western Europe, leaving within such a general European framework ample scope for Balkan and other East European regional groupings; and
- (c) that a unified Germany be supported by the West within the framework of such an organization for all of Europe.

In general, these are judged the essential elements required to counter the concerted Soviet effort to identify the present regime in Russia with the Russian national interest and to associate the United States with the intent to install in Eastern Europe a German-spearheaded imperialist domination.

Behind these conclusions lies an extremely simple judgment which, if correct, defines the most important of the Soviet vulnerabilities: namely, that American interests, defined in hard-headed American terms, more nearly conform to or are more compatible with the historic interests and aspirations of the Russian and satellite peoples than the interests and policies of the Bolshevik regime. Statements of broad aspiration which now are used to suggest U.S. aims cannot effectively achieve that association. The Russian peoples have freshly in their memory and deep in their history a conception of the West as a source of military invasion and attack on the Russian national state. The Eastern European peoples have fresh in their memory and deep in their history the notion that they are condemned to be pawns in an eternal game of power politics, notably between Germany and Russia, in which Western Europe and the United States have never exhibited a sustained and major interest. There are, indeed, contrary memories, interests, and historic connections on which an association between Russia and Eastern Europe with the West may be based. There are notably profound two-way cultural links which justify repeated emphasis, including especially Russian cultural contributions to the Western world. But broad, pious, and moralistic statements on American and Western purposes are not sufficient to achieve effective association of these peoples with the U.S. or the Western interest.

It is only by a formulation and unceasing projection of American intentions in terms which meet the historic problems of these areas, and which are linked to the solution of day-to-day problems in men's lives, that an effective association may be achieved.

VI. The Implementation of American Intentions

The second question, i.e., when and how the United States intends to implement its intentions, is, of course, even more difficult to cope with than the definition of America's specific intentions in Western Eurasia. As noted earlier, however, it is not a question that can be evaded with impunity. The avoidance of verbal commitment only leaves the answer up to the listener himself - or worse, up to Soviet and Communist propaganda. In this difficult yet decisive matter, as in others, it is believed that the strategy of truth should prevail.

By truth in this context is meant the clearest and most honest statement of which we are capable covering our operational intentions with respect to this region. At the present time our intentions could be stated generally as follows:

1. We do not accept as permanent the subjugation of the satellite states by the Soviet regime, regarding it as a violation of formal agreement as well as of fundamental principles for international and human conduct.
2. We do not intend to initiate a war against the Soviet Union to destroy the present regime and liberate the satellite peoples.
3. We are prepared to go to war to the limit of our capabilities should the Soviet Union initiate any further military aggression.
4. We intend to do what we can, from a world-wide position of increasing strength, to induce

whatever regime there may be in Russia to accept a world-wide security arrangement and, within such a framework, to withdraw from direct political and economic control over Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe in general, leaving these areas to form a safe and productive European society.

5. We maintain a fundamental faith that the principles on which Western societies are founded, including their political systems, are more durable than those on which the Soviet regime is based, and that the West will win in the historical test of strength now proceeding.

A statement built on these elements would not involve, of course, any simple promise of liberation. This view would look to the sustained processes of history - within the Soviet Union, in the satellite areas themselves, and in the non-Communist world - to produce, if possible without major war, a resolution of present problems which would be in the primary interests of, and conform to, the aspirations of all the peoples of the world. It removes the process of liberation from the simple notion of an act to be achieved by (primarily) U.S. military forces to a sequence in which responsibility is shared by all the peoples concerned.

It is perfectly evident that the desire of most of the peoples of Eastern Europe for liberation from the Soviet yoke is urgent and, almost, overriding. It is evident that the United States is not now prepared to act to remove that yoke as a matter of first and overriding priority. No useful purpose is served by permitting ourselves to believe that our present policy wholly meets their urgent desires; and, equally, no useful purpose is served by leaving this message implicit. On the contrary, our failure to speak explicitly to this point, in the light of Soviet and satellite propaganda about aggressive American intentions, can only leave the implicit hope, for a time at least, that the United States will move in with military force; and, as this hope is

disappointed, month by month, it can only increase the already existing apathy among the satellite peoples.

It is our view that it would be far more wholesome, notably if the United States is prepared to answer the first question with more precision than it has done thus far, to state openly and at the highest level that we intend to implement our intentions by a participation in a sustained historical process looking to change in the policy of the Soviet (or other Russian) regime. The experience of the peoples of these areas, who have known many times in the past what it is to live under oppressive autocracy, but who have also known that history has afforded moments when the strength of these autocracies has been broken by events, is likely to make such a frank, if not simple, reply to the second question more persuasive and more satisfying than we in the United States might believe.

VII. The Implementation of These Themes

It is evident that if the United States government is prepared to answer the two great unanswered questions in some formal manner, the answer must take the shape of an extremely high level and authoritative statement. Of its nature such a statement could not be highly specific, although it would have to go somewhat beyond existing statements. The task then confronting the broadcasting instruments available to the United States would be to build on these policy formulations, which more precisely defined the alternative that the United States was holding out, a continuing flow of programs which would more intimately associate the American position with the particular problems and aspirations of each area and major grouping in the populations concerned, without enlarging or extending the scope of the American commitment.

As indicated in another part of our report, it is our view that the United States should avoid detailed and particular commitments with respect to particular countries, groups, or problems. The task

Postwar III b Radio broadcasting

confronting those responsible for broadcasting would be to drive home, on the foundation of fundamental statements of American intent, the meaning and potentialities of American objectives in terms of the particular problems and aspirations of the various areas and groups.

This is, evidently, a task for thorough professionals in the broadcasting field. We would suggest, by way of illustration only, the following:

For Soviet Russia

- A. Broadcasts designed to show how the hostility created between Russia and the rest of the world has been a product of the Soviet regime's desire to maintain its own domestic power within Russia, and not a product of the real Russian national interest.
- B. Analysis of the character of the Soviet failure to gain real alliances and real strength from Eastern Europe; of the manner in which Soviet control of this area fails to provide Russia with any significant security protection, given the nature of modern weapons; of the long run damage to Russian interests of maintaining in Eastern Europe a "prison of nations."
- C. Analysis of the crude self-interest of the Soviet regime in trying to create a xenophobic Great Russian nationalism, and how the general interest of the Russian state, including the interest of the Great Russians, lies in a more tolerant attitude towards other peoples and an enlarged degree of federalism for the nationality groups in Russia.
- D. Broadcasts aimed at the Soviet bureaucrat designed to show the manner in which the control system under which he lives and operates stems from the narrow power interests of the regime, and how an alternative Russian government would give him enlarged human liberty as well as increased scope and authority, and efficiency in his work.

- E. Broadcasts aimed to show how the acceptance of a world-wide security framework would release Russian (and other) resources for welfare purposes, including housing for workers, increased consumers' goods for peasants, etc.
- F. Broadcasts discussing the similarity of the historic interests of the United States and Russia in Europe (that no single power dominate the European Continent); indicating the depth and inevitability of U.S. opposition to Soviet unilateral domination of Eastern and Central Europe; defining broadly the shape of a settlement in the common interest; and pointing to the present regime's desire for unilateral expansion as the reason for a failure to find agreement and for a failure to provide the Russian peoples with real security.

For The European Satellites

- A. Broadcasts emphasizing the common interest of this area and the United States - that no single power dominate the European continent - as borne in on the United States out of its twentieth century experience.
- B. Discussion of U.S. policy towards Germany, emphasizing the U.S. concern that Germany find its proper constructive place within a European structure.
- C. Discussion of the potentialities - security, economic, and cultural - of certain forms of all-European organization, including the scope within it for a Balkan Federation and other possible East European groupings for particular tasks (e.g., Danube development).
- D. Discussion of the legitimacy of the Russian national interest that it not again be invaded from the West, but emphasizing the illegitimacy of the present Soviet effort unilaterally to

Rostow III b
Radio Broadcasting

dominate Eastern Europe and subvert Western Europe, and the roots of Soviet aggression in its internal policy.

- E. Discussion of the possibilities of settling outstanding historic conflicts between nations of Eastern and Central Europe within a framework of all-European structure: e.g., Polish-German problem, Czech-Polish problem, future for Austria, Czech-Hungarian problem, etc.

VIII. A Note on Political Warfare and People

We would hold strongly to the view that a successful political warfare program must be based on hard-headed clarity concerning the real interests involved. Without such a stable foundation propaganda is an irresponsible and, in the end, dangerous tool to him who uses it. F. M. Cornford's definition of propaganda should stand as a constant warning to all practitioners of political warfare: propaganda is "that branch of the art of lying which consists in very nearly deceiving your friends without quite deceiving your enemies."

Nevertheless, in the end, the political warrior deals with people rather than with interests, cohesive forces, tensions as abstractions. In our research we have sought to convey some of the complex human feelings that are in play in various areas and in various groups behind the Iron Curtain. The task of building on a foundation of minimum shared interests and objectives a meaningful vision of a more attractive future, for whose achievement individual men may be prepared to keep the faith and, ultimately, act at extreme peril, is a great and subtle task. We do not pretend to expertise in this area; but we would wish to add in conclusion one tentative suggestion.

It is of the essence of a totalitarian state to isolate the individual in fear and suspicion of his fellows, and to channel as much of his life with others as is possible into formal group activities susceptible to

intimate surveillance by the state. The power of our broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe partly derives from the fact that it somewhat allays the human loneliness resulting from this situation. It appears to us that one purposeful aim of our broadcasting should be to help reduce the sense of isolation felt by the individual. The individual feels isolated from the outside world; and effective broadcasting which takes into account the full range of experience and aspiration shared between broadcaster and listener can do much to alleviate this feeling. But the citizen of the totalitarian state also feels isolated from his fellows. We cannot, of course, urge men to take disproportionate risks in establishing and maintaining contacts with others, or in aiding fellow-citizens in trouble with the regime. We can, perhaps, by factual example, convey systematically a sense of shared experience and aspiration and thus help keep alive the feeling of human brotherhood which somewhat paradoxically lies at the core of individualistic societies and is corrosive of the values of that extreme corporate society, the modern totalitarian state.



Radio broadcasting
Roston III b

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

STAFF PAPER C
SOME PROBLEMS OF POLICY IN RESPECT TO THE NON-RUSSIAN
SOVIET PEOPLES

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

1952



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. Summary of Research	2
1. The Evolution of Soviet Nationality Policy and the Popular Response in General	2
2. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	9
3. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic	10
4. The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic	13
5. The Present Situation in Brief	15
6. The Emigres	17
III. Some Possible Implications for U.S. Policy	18

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

SOME PROBLEMS OF POLICY IN RESPECT TO THE NON-RUSSIAN SOVIET PEOPLES.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is based on a study of the attitudes and aspirations of the Soviet Ukrainians, Georgians, and Armenians in the light of the evolving course of Soviet nationality policy (Appendix C). Some effort is also made to compare the outlook of these peoples with that of their emigre counterparts. The intent of the present paper is to consider the meaning and potentialities of the current nationality position within the Soviet Union for American political warfare policy.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the conclusions reached in Appendix C are based on limited data mobilized within an extremely limited period of time (six months). Therefore the research foundations for this paper must be taken as tentative. The sources of information on the Soviet non-Russians are, indeed, scarce, and even the available materials have not been fully exploited. Captured German war documents, for example, have been in part examined, and these have proved of great interest; but we have not had the time or resources to exhaust them. Similarly, there are believed to be many persons in Western Germany and the Near East who could supply data which would help clarify the present status of the nationality question. A systematic study of the printed materials (old and new) as well as the tapping of recent defectors on a continuing basis

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S E C R E T~~

2

appear required to achieve a clearer understanding of the attitudes and desires of contemporary non-Russians within the Soviet Empire. Thus both Appendix C and this paper should be judged as pioneer undertakings in a complex and difficult field.

For this reason a considerable portion of the present staff paper is given over to a summary of our interim research findings.

II. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH

1. The Evolution of Soviet Nationality Policy and the Popular Response in General

From its very beginning the Bolshevik regime inherited the ancient Russian problem of handling the diverse hostile and separatist national minorities. Under the tsarist regime national differences had been encouraged in some areas only as a tactical means of inciting one minority group against another and thus increasing the power of the central authority. Tsarist policy in general is reflected in its slogans: "One Tsar, one religion, one language"; "Russia one and indivisible". Contrary to the desired effect, it left a heritage of bitterness and resulted in an increase of national political consciousness as well as the growth of a national intelligentsia who, in one way or another, have remained a key element in the nationality problem down to the present.

The view of the early Russian Marxists on the nationality question deprecated national sentiment as a serious political force and looked to its adaptation to the class criteria of socialism, a view which led to a concept of ultimate unification and amalgamation of the ethnic groups under socialism. Lenin and his followers, in considering the nationality question before the Revolution, however, took an early stand in favor of self-determination insofar as it did not lead to the breakdown of ethnic groups into self-governing bodies. Fearing the development of the national-cultural autonomy concept,

~~S E C R E T~~

///C

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

3

Lenin sent Stalin to Vienna in 1913 to study the minority question and to prepare an article. The resulting work, entitled "Marxism and the National Question," was directed primarily against the doctrine of national-cultural autonomy as proposed by the Austrian Social Democrats. Before the Revolution, then, the Bolsheviks were somewhat ambivalent on this issue, recognizing the force of nationality sentiment and, at the same time, struggling for a formula which would take account of its reality without interfering with the workings of a centralized socialist state.

Nevertheless, despite this measure of realism about nationality sentiment, the strength of the centrifugal forces unleashed among the nationalities following the Revolution was a surprise to the Bolsheviks, who had believed that the nationalities would rally with greater unity around the banners of the socialist revolution. Lenin and his followers quickly relaxed their earlier opposition to federalism and advanced a new policy with a triple objective:

- (a) to assure the Russians that their national geographic heritage would be preserved;
- (b) to convince the non-Russians that they would not be discriminated against;
- (c) to assure the non-Russians that the tsarist program of forcible Russification had been abandoned.

Politically, the policy adopted was to grant varying forms of apparent political self-expression which were effectively nullified by the fact that they could operate only through the Communist Party, which was, of course, centrally controlled and operated from the early post-Revolutionary days. The grant of linguistic autonomy was considered to be a responsive answer to the cultural demands of the minority peoples.

The new Bolshevik policy quite effectively reduced the initial friction engendered between the Bolshevik regime and the minorities. The Soviet leaders were

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

4

hopeful that, through the extension of cultural freedom, political loyalty would be assured. They sharply criticized those who would proclaim the supremacy of Russian culture, and continued to assert that "national cultures must be permitted to develop and expand."

This policy of fostering a national culture, including the use of native languages, was hailed as a forward step by the non-Russian intelligentsia and particularly by its younger representatives; but in the Soviet Ukraine the non-local population, principally the Russians and the Russified Ukrainians, opposed Ukrainization as they had the policy of the short-lived Ukrainian Republic of 1918-1920. They felt that their position, bound as it was to Russia rather than to the Ukraine, was threatened. Despite opposition, the policy of fostering minority cultures was well on the way to implementation by 1924. The institution of this minority policy was accompanied by and, in fact, was part of the same phase of concessions to popular feeling as the New Economic Policy. In general, the cultural and economic policies of these years created a feeling of relative satisfaction among the peasantry, workers, and intelligentsia; and, taken as a whole, they fostered the rise of a feeling of national political and cultural consciousness within the Ukrainian Republic and, to a lesser degree, in the Caucasus.

Gradually, however, from about 1927, as Stalin assured his personal grip on the Soviet state, the regime executed a definite shift of policy regarding cultural autonomy and the relations between the Great Russians and non-Russians, a change of attitude which had a major effect on many sections of the population. Perhaps the greatest impact was on literature and the arts--the most important factors in sustaining a sense of national identity. National leaders and writers were subject to purges beginning in the late twenties and continuing until 1938.

The change in nationality policy coincided approximately with the end of NEP and the shift in economic

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

5

policy to a concentration on large-scale development of industry and the collectivization of agriculture. The opposition to collectivization was particularly bitter in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the Georgian and Armenian Republics opposition took the form of peasant uprisings and, in part, was translated into antagonism toward the Great Russians. As the Ukrainian urban working class was largely Russified, there were no apparent major tensions in the Ukrainian factories. In the Caucasus, where the working class was small, minor tensions resulted from the mixing of nationalities in the new industrial enterprises. For the Armenians and Georgians, industrialization signified a new source of wealth of which the native elements were proud; but the lowering of living standards under the Soviet convinced many of the older and middle generations that the newly developed industrial wealth was being exploited by Moscow.

111C
Stalin clarified this change in policy by declaring in 1934 that "local chauvinism has grown into a danger to the state." His policy included a throwback to tsarist Russification, with emphasis on Russian as the second language of all nationalities. Russian officials, particularly in the late thirties, were sent into the non-Russian areas as "more reliable elements" to assume responsible positions. The program for cultural uniformity was given new impetus with the emergence of the concept of "Soviet patriotism". This doctrine, giving priority to the Soviet state over the regional attachments of the non-Russian peoples, made it possible to emphasize the cultural leveling and assimilating aspects of Soviet life, and to deflate the spirit of autonomous cultures which earlier Soviet policy had encouraged.

The nationality policy of the thirties was, in effect, a thorough reversal of previous policy and resulted in a rise of resentment and bitterness, particularly among the intelligentsia. To counteract this development, the Soviet regime continued to stress the importance of the nationalities in Soviet politics and the popularization among the masses of peasants and workers of their cultures, although in a greatly censored form. In these efforts the regime was not entirely

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

6

successful. National consciousness was still alive and in evidence in some areas, although its extent was difficult to gauge. The tenor of prewar Soviet policy was well reflected in the Great Purge, when the nationality groups (including Communist Party leaders) were hit with force and thoroughness.

In economic terms, the regime had succeeded by 1941 in bringing the economies of the nationality areas fully within the orbit of the central planning and administrative machinery of the USSR as a whole.

It is evident that, in general, the regime was not sufficiently successful in gaining the loyalty of Soviet citizens to avoid major defections when war and invasion made that possibility realistic. The rapid advance of the German army created a condition under which pent-up dissatisfactions could be translated into action. Antagonism toward the Soviet regime expressed itself first in the wholesale desertions and surrender of the army units to the Germans, and in the welcome extended by the villagers to the supposed liberators.

The Soviet Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians, and other nationals deserted and surrendered to and welcomed the Germans--not as such, but as the enemy of the regime. The conditions created in the initial rout of the Soviet armies was seized upon as a promise of liberation from oppression rather than as an opportunity to establish independent national minority states. The fact that the Ukrainians predominated among the defectors was principally a geographical accident of war. The same pattern of behavior on the part of the Soviet population was repeated--if more hesitantly--in other than predominantly Ukrainian areas.

Although defection was not a function of nationalist impulses, mass desertions and attempts to cooperate with the Germans on a community basis were the more easily organized and effected where a given community or a given military unit was unified ethnically and linguistically. In that sense the concentration and the density of nationally and culturally similar people did play an important

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

11C

role. It was this experience which has probably determined the postwar Soviet policy of breaking up and diluting the population of the nationality areas by cross-migration and other means. Similarly the postwar reorganization of the Soviet army has seen the elimination of distinct nationality units.

Even more broadly, postwar Soviet policy has sharply increased the trend toward Russification, including the growing numbers of Russian officials in nationality areas, the expanding use of the Russian language, the rewriting of non-Russian histories, emphasis on the special status of the Great Russians in Soviet propaganda, and continued resettlement of peoples. Reaction to this policy has been reflected in the recurrent minor purges since the war and the more recent drastic housecleaning in the Ukrainian and Georgian Republics. Apparently segments of the non-Russian intelligentsia are having a difficult time keeping within the formula "national in form, socialist in content"--which suggests that a nationalist spirit is by no means defunct, and that it has, perhaps, been increased as a result of current Russification policy. Having been encouraged to develop in the past a degree of at least cultural identification with their nationality region, some non-Russians may now acutely resent an accentuated shift in policy in the other direction.

On the other hand, the greatly intensified Russification program has probably achieved some success. The application of the Great Russian symbols to the non-Russians cannot be judged wholly ineffective. The Russian language and many aspects of Russian culture may increasingly influence, either consciously or unconsciously, the minds of the Soviet minorities youth, since their educational opportunities have increased under the Soviet system. Soviet officials, engineers, and others among the non-Russians probably derive some satisfaction from participation in the economic and political life of a large and strong country. Perhaps the greatest strength of the Soviet nationality policy is that it tends to draw the individual non-Russian into the Soviet pattern and to diminish his sense of identity with his ethnic group.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

8

"Voluntary" migration and resettlement of peoples may also contribute to the success of the Russification policy. Something akin to the American "melting pot" does appear to operate, to a degree, in the Soviet Union, notably at the level of the bureaucratic middle class.

This does not mean, of course, that non-Russian Soviet citizens are satisfied with their lot. The peoples of the Soviet Union are dissatisfied with their economic position; they resent the rigid police and party controls which penetrate even their personal lives; and they are subject to other frustrations (detailed in Part Two of Appendix A). These dissatisfactions are fully shared by the non-Russians, and in some areas are undoubtedly accentuated by the clash between a sense of national identity and the policies of the Muscovite regime. It is our broad conclusion that the attitudes of the non-Russians towards the regime are only stronger versions of those prevailing among the Russian Soviet citizens of comparable social strata in other than the minority areas; and that the most important grievances of the non-Russians are similar to those of the Great Russians. It does not follow from this conclusion that the animus or frustration of the non-Russians is unrelated to the aspiration for national independence, nor that the nationality dimension of popular dissatisfaction is of uniform weakness in all the non-Russian areas.

The effectiveness of Soviet nationality policy and the popular reaction to it in the Ukrainian, Georgian, and Armenian Soviet Socialist Republics vary widely, in response to the history and tradition of the peoples concerned. The national heritage of the Ukrainian and Armenian peoples is mainly cultural, while the Georgians, in addition to a distinctive cultural heritage, also possess to a certain degree a tradition of national independence.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

11C

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

9

2. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

On the basis of historical experience it is evident that the Ukraine has not demonstrated a capability for viable political independence. During the great Ukrainian revolt of 1648, Bogdan Khmelnytsky, the hetman, battled and negotiated with the Poles, first for the full autonomy of the Ukrainian steppe lands, then for independence from the Polish crown. It proved impossible to secure independence without the armed support of either Muscovy or Turkey. The agreement with the tsars followed in 1654, but its clauses were never implemented; and this struggle for independence failed mainly because it became a struggle less for the independence of the Ukrainians as a whole than for the privileges of the Cossacks.

The next attempt resulted in the two-year existence of the Ukrainian Republic, 1918-1920. During this period the Ukrainian lands were the scene of civil war and chaos. A revolutionary but anti-Bolshevik independent government under Petlura was founded in Kiev. Denikin, at the head of the White Russian armies, opposed Ukrainian nationalism. Both Petlura and Denikin were defeated by the Bolsheviks, who were assisted by the Ukrainian industrial working class and by some peasant bands. The appeal of social revolution to the peasants proved to be stronger than that of nationalist slogans. The success of the Bolsheviks was due, in part, to their energy and ruthlessness, but perhaps more to the mistakes of and division among anti-Bolshevik forces and the Ukrainians themselves.

More recent evidence indicating the effect of Russification and the extent of nationalist sentiment in the three areas has come to light in captured German war documents. Numerous memoranda and letters from German officials traveling in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to their respective offices in Berlin emphasize the weakness of nationality sentiment in the Soviet Ukraine. These reporters underline the effectiveness of Russification as well as the absence of any substantial



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

10

desire for independence from the Russians. Both Ukrainian and Russian postwar defectors report that the Eastern Ukrainians do not look to national independence, and indicate that the average Eastern Ukrainian is on good terms with the Russian, his grievances being basically the same as those of other Soviet citizens. Nevertheless, the establishment and maintenance of effective political control over the Ukrainian population has been, evidently, a major problem of postwar Soviet policy. The Ukrainian party organization's history before the war had been marked by alleged deviations and purges; and recent press and defector reports suggest a fairly widespread purge over the past year.

The Western Ukraine, having been drawn into the Soviet Union as late as 1945, is of course feeling the first full effects of Russification. The Ukrainian population in the Western Ukraine, unlike their brethren in the Eastern Ukraine, had little contact with the Russian language or Russian cultural tradition until 1945. Their historical orientation had been toward the West; and there is no doubt whatsoever that a profound anti-Russian feeling exists among this portion of the Ukrainians, who constitute nearly a quarter of the total Ukrainian population of the USSR.

11C

3. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic

The pride of the Georgians in their cultural heritage has always been a potent force among the intelligentsia and can still be counted on to inspire some resistance to Russification. The Georgian intelligentsia were the principal carriers of the national and progressive ideas which developed in Georgia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and even today they represent, with their traditions of Western orientation, a potentially dynamic political force.

Of all the non-Russian ethnic groups, the Georgians have shown the greatest aptitude for self-rule. Georgian political development was at its height during the reign of Queen Tamara, in the thirteenth century, when the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

11

kingdom stretched from the Caspian to the Black Sea. The memory of that past is much alive in Georgian consciousness, and probably explains why the Georgians were able to establish a democratic and fairly stable state in 1918. From 1918 to 1921 the government of the independent Georgian Republic, elected and supported by the people, stood on its own feet and progressed towards stability. Its economic situation, at first almost hopeless as a result of the loss of trade with Russia, was somewhat improved by 1920. Its democratic leadership was responsible for the introduction of social and land reforms which were favorably received by the Georgian people. The republic might have weathered the economic problems and the diplomatic difficulties with the West if the Red Army had not invaded and conquered it--although another factor contributed to its downfall: the inability of the Georgian national groups to overcome their mutual hostility and their fear of the Armenians and Azerbaidzhanians, as a result of which some elements of the population looked toward the Bolsheviks as arbiter in their conflicts.

Events following the Soviet conquest of Georgia testify to the popular opposition to Bolshevik control. In October 1921, eight months after the subjugation of Georgia, the Tiflis workers held a mass demonstration and presented a number of demands to the Soviet government. Among other things, they called for the restoration of Georgia's independence. A general strike, called to protest certain Soviet measures on November 1, 1921, was crushed by force. Insurrections took place in Svaneti in 1921 and in Khevsureti in 1922; and a nation-wide uprising occurred in 1924.

The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic is, from nearly every point of view, the most important member of the Transcaucasian group of nations. It is the most populous. Politically and socially it is the most developed, and it is the heart of the Transcaucasian economy. The Georgians, who are reportedly a "favored people" in the Soviet Union, still possess deep nationalist feelings based on their century-old national pride. The continued presence of a small pre-Revolution trained intelligentsia

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

12

is probably the chief creative force in the Georgian Republic. They appear to share in a special degree the general insecurity of Soviet intellectuals, subject as they are to chronic purges and to the problem of conforming to Soviet intellectual patterns at once rigid and subject to change on short notice. Georgian educational institutions, however, graduate more students than can presently be used in the Georgian Republic. They are sent to other Soviet republics and, like others, drawn into the Soviet bureaucracy, may develop a kind of loyalty to the regime at the expense of their nationality connection. At least one of our informants holds the view that the Georgians, in time, will be so Russified that opposition in that region on nationality grounds will be practically impossible to generate. Georgian defectors are in general agreement that they like the Russians, although they resent Russian officials in their Republic. Some recent Georgian defectors express the view that Georgian peasants are more dissatisfied with collectivized agriculture than the Russians or the Ukrainians, largely because individual farming, before the Revolution, had a strong hold in the Caucasus.

The Georgians are, if one may generalize, political realists. Throughout their history they placed themselves under the protection of a succession of Near Eastern powers: Rome, Byzantium, the Arabs, Mongols, and Persians. Thus they succeeded in keeping their nation intact in a cultural sense, and in preserving a measure of freedom. The same intention motivated their voluntary subordination to the Russian tsar at the end of the eighteenth century. Georgian political activity did not, on the whole, display signs of Irredentism or excessive aggressiveness in relation to the large neighboring powers but, rather, a tendency to compromise, based on a realistic appraisal of the weaknesses of a small nation. Apparently the Georgians believe they can still maintain their identity as a people and a culture under the Soviet system. In any case, choosing between the Russians and the Turks, they appear still to prefer Soviet control as the lesser of two evils.

The persistence of nationalist feeling in Georgia is suggested by the frequent Soviet attacks on "bourgeois

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

nationalism", although the Soviet regime's use of such labels is designed to conceal rather than identify the real nature of the discontent which it confronts. The most recent purge of top Georgian officials, begun in the fall of 1951 and culminating in the recent dismissal of K. Charkviani, First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party's Central Committee, may indicate a serious internal situation. The exact reasons for Charkviani's dismissal are still not clear. The Soviet press charges embezzlement and claims that the party has been weakening in its ideological work. Actually this move may indicate a further effort to liquidate the last remnants of the old intelligentsia or to clean out "unreliable elements" among the Soviet intelligentsia.

4. The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Armenians have a strong cultural tradition. Their language and church heritage are the binding forces which have preserved the national culture as an entity for more than a thousand years. From the point of literacy, the Armenians occupy one of the highest places in the USSR, and they have a large intelligentsia in proportion to their total population.

The Armenian experience as an independent nation was not successful. Prior to 1918 Armenia had been for nearly a thousand years under the control of the Ottoman Empire and Persia and, since 1828, partly under that of Russia, which took the area from Persia. From 1918 to 1920 a democratic Armenian Republic was in existence. The Dashnak Party, one of the leading emigre groups, points to this era as that of the "glorious days". However, the historical data indicate that the republic failed to achieve stability. The nation's markets in Russia were closed, and there was insufficient food to support the native population in addition to the thousands of Armenian emigres. The state was run by the Dashnaks, who were revolutionary-terrorists with no experience in government, and who, after the first year, lost the support of the people, who were in general sympathetic to the Russians. The resulting confused situation, coupled with the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

14

Armenian hatred and fear of the Turks, provided the Bolsheviks with a relatively easy target for conquest.

In considering present-day attitudes of the Soviet Armenian, two basic points must be kept in mind:

(a) During the past seventy-five years the Armenians have suffered terrible persecution, especially from the Turks and Kurds. In the 1894-1896 and 1915 massacres, undertaken by the Ottoman Government, over one million Armenians perished, and at least as many were expelled from their homes in Turkey. Roughly one third of the population of Soviet Armenia and most of the Armenians living outside of the USSR are refugees from Turkey. Persecution has left the Armenians bitter and insecure. They want both to have revenge on the Turks and to reassert their national greatness. On the other hand, their past experiences have taught them to be cautious and to seek outside help for the realization of their ambitions.

(b) In the past the Armenians have tended to look to the Russians for political and economic support, because the Russians have found it useful to utilize the Armenians as a tool in Caucasian and Near Eastern politics.

Underlying the attitudes of the Soviet Armenian intelligentsia--insofar as they can be ascertained from recent publications, party purges, and interviews with defectors--is an extremely strong nationalism of an aggressive character. Armenian nationalism, however, even though it is one of the strongest manifestations of that feeling in the entire USSR, is unlike that of the other minorities in that it is not anti-Russian in character. If anything, the Armenians in the USSR are sympathetic to the Russians and have good relations with them. Armenian nationalism, in its aggressive form, is directed mainly against the neighboring peoples: the Turks, whom they hate and fear; the Azerbaidzhanians, who are also a Turkic people; and, above all, the Georgians, with whom they compete for intellectual, political, and economic primacy in the region.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

15

The paramount issue in the minds of the politically conscious segment of Soviet Armenian society appears to be the problem of the borders: present Soviet Armenia is only a small section (perhaps one fourth) of the total land which nearly all Armenians, regardless of political affiliation, consider to be historically theirs. The wish to re-establish a "Greater Armenia" (to include North Eastern Anatolia with Kars, Ardahan, Erzerum, Van, Trapezund--now in Turkey; Nakhichevan and Karabakh--now in Soviet Azerbaidzhan; and the Akhalkalaki region--now in Soviet Georgia) is still alive. It is a recognizable emotional factor in Armenian life, although possibly diminishing in importance; it appears to be particularly strong among the third of the population of Soviet Armenia which once lived in Turkish Armenia, or whose parents came from there.

As in other Soviet republics, the forces of Russification are at work here; and the Armenians are perhaps more susceptible than the other Soviet non-Slavs because of their sympathetic attitude toward the Russians. They resent, however, both the suppression of Armenian national culture and the importation of Armenians from other Soviet republics to assume responsible positions in the Armenian Republic--the "outside" Armenians being Russified and therefore considered a more "reliable" element by the Soviet government. The Armenians also resent the regime's refusal to allow the Armenian Republic to build its own railroad traversing the heart of Armenia from Erivan to Akstafa, despite the regime's promise to build it in the 1930's.

5. The Present Situation in Brief

The Soviet nationality policy has had ranging degrees of success in the three areas under discussion. The Soviet policy of resettlement of peoples appears to be an effective means of improving Soviet security and furthering the cause of Russification. The policy of economic integration of the Soviet Republics on an all-Union basis tends to break down national differences and to draw the individual republics together. Russification

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

16

is probably the strongest force employed by the Soviet authorities to assure conformance throughout the Soviet Union. Russian symbols and the Russian language already constitute elements of the consciousness of the non-Russian peoples, and the youth will be further subjected to this influence. In the Ukrainian Republic, excepting the Western Ukraine, this policy, essentially continuous with that of the tsars, appears generally successful. Those educated Ukrainians, Georgians, or Armenians drawn into the Soviet bureaucracy probably find some satisfaction in the role of participants in the machinery of a great empire, and the strictly national element in their dissatisfaction is probably diminished.

Notwithstanding these developments, national consciousness among the non-Russians is not dead. There are strong undercurrents of national feeling which, under changed conditions, might be considerably strengthened. Pride in their ancient native cultures is particularly strong among the Georgians and the Armenians. Recent accelerated Russification, while to a considerable degree successful among younger elements, has probably intensified the consciousness of nationality, particularly among those who know the old culture well, or who were affected by the Soviet policy of the early and middle 1920's. Attacks on the church have caused antagonism toward the regime, especially in the Western Ukraine, which is the least Russified and the most nationally conscious area of those discussed in this paper. In the Armenian Republic the border question is still an issue; and many Soviet Armenians can be aroused by the idea of a "Greater Armenia". In fact, the demand for the return of areas lost to Turkey is an issue exploited by the Soviet propaganda machine.

Continuing attacks in the Soviet press on "bourgeois nationalists"--a term which now refers only to non-Russians--indicate that nationalist feeling still persists in the non-Russian peoples we have discussed. Recent purges in the Georgian Republic, apparently directed against elements of the intelligentsia, point to the same conclusion. The intensity of the feeling is impossible to estimate, except roughly, as the above comparison of the three areas has sought to do.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

11C

6. The Emigres

The politically minded segment of the Ukrainian emigration is dominated by western Ukrainians who strongly advocate separation from Russia. The Bandera group, the largest and most vociferous Ukrainian emigre organization, and fascist and autocratic in character, asserts that the Ukrainian people are entitled to an independent Ukraine. The evolution of the Ukrainian nationalist sentiment and the experience of that region as an independent state from 1918 to 1920 do not support the view that the area and the peoples who inhabit it have the capability of building and maintaining a viable political unit except with steady and major outside support and, perhaps, by continued application of force. The Ukrainian leaders of 1918-1920 proved unable to win the support of the majority of Ukrainian citizens, who apparently felt no strong desire to establish a state independent of the Russians, and who, on balance, did not even take with enthusiasm to cultural autonomy. Recent reports reaffirm the profound Russification and the lack of separatist inclination among the eastern Ukrainians, who comprise approximately three fourths of the Ukrainians in the Republic today.

The Georgian emigration, as a whole, advocates an independent Georgia, but its political groups are not well organized and do not wield effective influence. Its aspirations do not appear to accord with those of the Soviet Georgians who, in general, are apparently not inclined to separatism, and whose history exhibits a recurrent political accommodation to major powers combined with a successful defense of the integrity of their race and culture. The Soviet Georgians find themselves in a somewhat more favored situation than most non-Russian Soviet peoples. They might well welcome a change in the present Russian regime, but no persuasive evidence indicates an aspiration for national political independence.

The Soviet Armenians do, indeed, aspire to a "Greater Armenia", but this goal is generally envisaged within a Russian sphere of influence. As long as Turkey exists as a

nation, the Armenians appear likely to accept as satisfactory their present position vis-a-vis Russia--while of course sharing the general dissatisfactions of Soviet citizens. Of the emigre Armenian groups, the Dashnaks, who are the strongest politically, firmly advocate an independent Armenia. The Progressives, a communist organization, and the Ramgavars, apparently pro-Soviet, advocate the continuance of Armenia's present position. They state that the Republic has made great strides under the Soviet regime, and that nothing can be gained by attaining independence and thus exposing Armenia to the Turks. The Ramgavars claim to be non-political, and, although the organization is apparently controlled by pro-Soviet elements, the majority of the membership appears interested primarily in Armenian culture and the preservation of the Armenian nation. They tend to believe that the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic is the best realistic solution for the Armenians at present.

In one way or another the emigre groups appear significantly to misrepresent the attitudes and possibilities within their native lands.

III. SOME POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The broad conclusions of our preliminary survey are as follows:

1. The discontents within the three nationality areas examined are, essentially, similar to those which characterize Soviet citizens in other regions, including the Great Russians.
2. In addition, with varying force, these general discontents are heightened by a sense of national identity which is increasingly violated by current Soviet policy.
3. There is no reason to believe that any of these three areas has the capability of creating and maintaining a national political state without steady outside support and, perhaps, even continuing external enforcement.

4. There is no evidence to indicate that the discontents of these peoples, whatever their present source, are positively associated to any substantial degree with an aspiration for national political independence.

The actions which the United States might undertake under various present and future circumstances in respect to these peoples and sentiments must be viewed in the light of the argument developed in Part II B (The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and Its European Satellites to Political Warfare). In particular, the following broad conclusions should be recalled. First, an American approach to the citizens of the Soviet Union should seek to establish a basis of common interest between their legitimate national aspirations and U.S. interests and objectives. Second, U.S. interests and objectives should be defined in this as in other areas on a minimum basis: that is, they should embrace the necessary and sufficient conditions believed required in the American interest but should not transcend such conditions. Third, with respect to popular discontents, in general the United States should seek to associate itself with the aspirations of various individuals and groups behind the Iron Curtain while avoiding elaborate and detailed commitments which the United States is not likely to be prepared to support, given the long-run nature of its interests and objectives; and this association should be accomplished by dramatizing for such groups the potentialities which inhere in the acceptance of the American framework of interests and objectives.

Under the assumption of continuing cold war circumstances it is believed that an appropriate American policy should, essentially, follow the persistent lines of history in the nationality region; that is, we should sharply distinguish our support for cultural autonomy and for the dignified maintenance of the identity of the races concerned from the notion of political independence. We see no basis either in the orientation of the peoples or in the nature of American interests and objectives for the United States government to proclaim its positive support for national political independence for the three regions examined here.



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

20

Nevertheless, there appear to be ample opportunities within the limits of this position for the effective association of these peoples with American interests and objectives. The postwar measures of Russification--the forced relocation of people, the increased number of Russian officials in the nationality areas, the rewriting of non-Russian histories, and the general glorification of the Great Russian people and its history--all these are unquestionably distasteful to many, if not most, non-Russians. We can, and should, express our disapproval of current Soviet nationality policy as a typical and important example of the Soviet regime's pursuit of its own power at the expense of the peoples it dominates and in violation of the ideology to which it claims to adhere. It should be noted that this disapproval then can properly be projected to both Russian and non-Russian Soviet citizens. We can associate ourselves with support for the maintenance of the culture of these peoples and for their identity. We can dramatize the legitimate conception, likely to be fully understood on the evidence available to us, that the common enemy of the Russian and non-Russian peoples is the Soviet regime. In general, the United States is in favor of the principle of self-determination, although we have by no means rigorously governed our actions on all occasions in accordance with this broad concept. In our judgment, neither this principle nor any other single abstract principle should be mechanically applied in our foreign policy. So far as the political future of these areas is concerned we can avoid explicit guarantees of self-determination, while leaving open that possibility, among others, under circumstances of a changed Russian regime.

11C

At a time of internal crisis in the Soviet structure, if our general conclusions are correct, the United States would have to avoid any association with a policy of dismemberment of the historical Russian national state. But there is no reason why the United States should associate itself with Great Russian nationalism as it is now being exploited by the Soviet regime. In fact, we could successfully attack the exaggerated Soviet effort as inconsistent with the Russian national interest and as a self-seeking device of the present

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

regime. At the same time, we would have to avoid violating what the bulk of the Great Russians would regard as the legitimate Russian national interest, namely, the geographical integrity of the historic Russian Empire.

Under conditions of internal crisis there might well be opportunities for effective political expression of popular discontents, including the special discontents within the nationality areas. Under cold war circumstances, however, it is believed to be in the American interest that America encourage such discontents without giving to any group within Russia a basis for raising the vision of an American interest in Russian dismemberment.

Under circumstances of a major war with the USSR the nationality issue might arise in both tactical and strategic circumstances.

Tactically, it is not impossible to envisage a course of military events in which American or allied troops would occupy one or another of the nationality areas. Under these circumstances there might emerge strong groups who would effectively rally sentiment around the notion of national political independence, since the presence of an outside military force would make that conception more realistic than any other that could be envisaged. It is our view that, under such imagined circumstances, despite the pressures and temptations, the United States would probably wish to avoid according any permanent recognition to a temporary local regime. A provisional regime might be useful and even important. Moreover, the evolution of events might make its permanence a realistic possibility in the American interest. Policy evidently cannot be made now for such problematic circumstances. On present evidence, however, it would be a mistake, even at the height of a war against the Soviet regime, to give to that regime the powerful weapon of association of American policy with the intent to dismember the Russian national state.

Strategically, unless unforeseen circumstances arise--and they might well arise, there would not appear

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

22

to be an American interest in dismembering the Russian Empire by the creation of independent states in the nationality areas, even should Russia suffer total defeat. There are two reasons for this conclusion:

(a) On the basis of their history these areas do not appear capable of sustaining national political independence without major continuing outside support, which under these circumstances would probably constitute American support. It seems unlikely that the United States would be prepared, over the time period necessary, to devote its energies and resources to maintaining such national states on a scale requisite to counter pressures towards reassociation with Russia.

(b) Such dismemberment would be almost certain to form a rallying point for a revived Russian nationalism, with aggressive intent, likely to be regarded as legitimate by the bulk of the Great Russian people.

These two considerations argue strongly, in our view, for not including the dismemberment of the Russian national state among the major objectives of an American war policy; while, of course, leaving open the possibility that the future may yield circumstances in which the creation and support of independent states in nationality areas might be in the American interest.

This conclusion does not, of course, require that the United States accept as permanent the present boundaries of the Russian Empire. The questions of the status of the Baltic states, the Polish boundary, the Western Ukraine, and other marginal areas would arise in the context of any settlement of a major war with Russia. An appropriate American position on each would have to be formed in the light of many factors which can not now be predicted. We would argue, simply, the general case for avoiding a long-run American commitment to see established and maintained independent national states in the three areas thus far examined in detail.

Although our conclusions on the nationality situation are, in part at least, negative, we feel it

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

important to emphasize that, in our view, failure of the United States positively to associate itself with political independence for these areas is not likely to make impossible an effective association with these peoples in political warfare against the Soviet regime. It is our understanding that there are emigre groups with a highly national motivation who are prepared to cooperate with the United States in political warfare operations directed against that regime. From what we know of such matters, effective cooperation should prove possible on the political basis of a common interest in weakening, altering, or removing the Soviet regime. Should it prove to be the case that such cooperation can be forthcoming only under the condition that the United States commit itself to support for national independence for the nationality areas, it is our view that the United States should forego the possible advantage of this cooperation.

On this issue we feel we can do no better than hold up to those responsible for American nationality policy the famous caution of Machiavelli:

How Dangerous It Is to Trust to the Representations of Exiles

It seems to me not amiss to speak here of the danger of trusting to the representations of men who have been expelled from their country, this being a matter that all those who govern states have to act upon almost daily;... We see, then, how vain the faith and promises of men who are exiles from their own country. As to their faith, we have to bear in mind that, whenever they can return to their country by other means than your assistance, they will abandon you and look to the other means, regardless of their promises to you. And as to their vain hopes and promises, such is their extreme desire to return to their homes that they naturally believe many things that are not true, and add many others on purpose; so that, with what they really believe and what they say they believe, they will fill you with hopes to that degree that if you attempt

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

24

to act upon them you will incur a fruitless expense, or engage in an undertaking that will involve you in ruin...A prince therefore should be slow in undertaking any enterprise upon the representations of exiles, for he will generally gain nothing by it but shame and serious injury.*

* Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Discourses (New York: The Modern Library, 1940), ch. 31, p. 388.

11C

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND ITS EUROPEAN SATELLITES
TO POLITICAL WARFARE

STAFF PAPER D

A STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND
OBJECTIVES IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

1952

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



S.P. D

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction	1
II. The Historical Background	5
1. The Historic Problem of U.S. Interests	5
2. The Analogy of Lincoln	10
III. American Security and the Threats Which Confront It	13
IV. Ultimate American Objectives	17
1. The Character of Ultimate American Objectives	17
2. The American Interest in Disarmament	18
3. The Conditions for Sustained Disarmament	22
4. The Ideological Interest of the United States in Western Eurasia	28
5. The American Economic Interest	30
6. A Summary Statement	32
V. A Note on a Peace Offer	35
VI. American Objectives Short of Major War	39
VII. The Enunciation of Objectives	51
1. Russia	51
2. Eastern Europe	52
3. Germany	52
4. France	53
5. The United States Government	54
6. The American People	55

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

A STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

I. INTRODUCTION

A number of considerations arising directly from our work on this project have led to the view that a clarification and, in some appropriate form, a public enunciation of American interests and objectives in Russia and Eastern Europe are essential for the effective prosecution of a political warfare program directed to these regions. The present paper is an effort to set down a reasoned statement of those interests and objectives.

We are fully aware that an analysis of such fundamental matters conducted outside the government, and without full knowledge of all the considerations involved, is of limited utility. We have, nevertheless, judged it proper to annex to our project a statement of this character. It has seemed possible that the luxury of time for reflection, largely denied to men bearing operational responsibility in the government, might permit us to make a marginal contribution in this area. As will appear, we believe our analysis to be largely an explicit statement of interests and objectives already implicit in current American thought and action, rather than the statement of a new foreign policy; but there appear to be virtues in achieving, within the government and within the nation as a whole, a greater clarity concerning our long-run interests and objectives in respect to the external world. Whether or not our formulation of U.S. interests and objectives is judged

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

2

appropriate by those responsible for U.S. policy, we believe the case made in Part II B (The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and Its European Satellites to Political Warfare) for some such clarification stands in its own right.

It will be recalled that at least five separable elements in our consideration of political warfare have led us to the view that a clarification of American interests and objectives in Russia and Eastern Europe is an essential element in the further development of an effective political warfare program.

1. The fact that political warfare is, by definition, carried out by many arms of policy requires that these arms must be coordinated with each other in action consistent with long-run American objectives. Such knowledge as we have acquired in the course of this study of American diplomacy, covert operations, intelligence collection, military planning, and broadcasting makes it clear that a substantial requirement for coordination exists and is likely to continue to exist, given the complex nature of political warfare and the many instruments that play a part in its conduct. Such coordination, if it is to be effective, must be based on a common conception of American interests and objectives, sufficiently precise to furnish practical touchstones for the making of day-to-day policy in different branches of the government. It is our view that such workable formulations do not now exist.

2. Of its nature, U.S. political warfare looks to the future. Our political warfare actions at the present time are largely concerned, and must be concerned, with the preparation of the ground for some future circumstances in which our capabilities for effective action will have been increased either by a change in the policy of the Soviet regime which would permit effective negotiation, or by an internal crisis within the Soviet structure, or by the existence of major war. As Staff Paper B (Radio Broadcasting) indicates, the fundamental rationale for the present flow of broadcasts to Russia and Eastern Europe is to keep alive certain

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S. P. 1

conceptions and aspirations which will lead, under future circumstances, to action in the common interest of the peoples concerned and of the United States. If such preparatory actions are to be effective in a moment of future crisis, they must prepare the ground for the sort of solutions which the United States is likely to seek in these contingent circumstances. They must, at the minimum, be consistent with U.S. objectives and interests in the area, and if possible they should assist in bringing about circumstances in which U.S. interests and objectives might be implemented.

3. It seems likely that, even in the case of a major war with the Soviet Union, the United States would not seek unconditional surrender of the Soviet Empire. Full occupation of the enemy's territory is, indeed, one serviceable way of permitting an implementation of our interests and objectives, although it is no substitute for clarity concerning those interests and objectives. If, however, it is agreed that we are likely to seek something short of unconditional surrender and full occupation in a major war with the Soviet Union, a clarification of what we do, in fact, seek in the region now dominated by the Soviet regime appears to us as urgent as the formulation of any other part of an emergency war plan.

4. False conceptions of American objectives and interests in Russia and Eastern Europe are central to current Soviet and Communist propaganda. If we wish to meet head-on the information program now being addressed to the peoples of Russia and Eastern Europe, we must somehow cope with the fact that they are daily being informed that American objectives in Russia are analogous to those of Hitler and incompatible with the Russian national interest, and that American objectives in Eastern Europe envisage the creating of an imperialist hegemony in which the re-entrance of unilateral German power would play a large part.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

4

5. A program of political warfare based on the strategy of the Third Choice - the offering of a realistic and attractive alternative - give to U.S. interests and objectives a special importance. If we are to hold out alternatives which are attractive and which will be consistent with the actions we may take at future moments of crisis (or when negotiation may be possible), they must be consistent also with the fundamental American interests and objectives in the area. The extent to which we may now make them known to the world is, in part, independent of the question of our own clarification of our interests and objectives. Even if it should be decided that they cannot now be enunciated, or can be enunciated only in part, we must be clear that what we in fact say and do which has an impact on the minds of persons within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is consistent with those interests and objectives.

Broadly speaking, then, we regard a clarified conception of American interests and objectives as important in two fundamental respects:

(a) as a basis for the coordinated planning of current and future operations (1-3, above); and

(b) as a vital part of political warfare itself - since the nature of American interests and objectives, as they are understood by the peoples concerned, is one of the forces likely to lead men to act either in our interest or against it (4 and 5, above).

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. The Historic Problem of U.S. Interests

There is another more general consideration which has led us to include within this project a statement of U.S. interests and objectives. It would appear to us that the United States, having been plunged after the Second World War into an enormous array of new and difficult problems and relationships with the external world, is now in the midst of an effort to clarify the fundamentals of those relationships. Given certain aspects of American history, notably the history of our foreign relations since the beginning of this century, the task is exceedingly difficult.

Much in American life - in fact, in the best of American life - stems from the fact that our country was created in the late eighteenth century, at a time when men's minds were much engaged by certain abstract and fundamental principles concerning the individual and his relationship to the state. Even the Civil War failed to break the continuity of these fundamental abstract conceptions which constitute the core of American ideology. From 1775 forward our security interests and our ideology merged naturally in the making of foreign policy. The United States regarded itself as embarked on a unique historical experiment in democracy; and Washington's injunction in his Farewell Address, that the United States avoid entangling alliances, converged with the fact that the United States was pioneering, on a continental scale,

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

6

a new organization of society for free men. In good conscience Americans could devote themselves to the extension of American power on this continent and to the diminution of European influence in this hemisphere.

The foreign policy of the United States from the onset of the Revolution to the end of the nineteenth century was concerned: with the winning of independence, in which a French alliance, temporarily accepted, played a decisive part; with the expansion to the West, which involved a war with Mexico as well as extensive dealings with France and Spain; with the protracted negotiations which finally established the peaceful Canadian boundary, with the avoidance of British intervention during the American Civil War; with the formulation of relations with Latin America around the somewhat elastic concept of the Monroe Doctrine; and with an extension of the American interest to Alaska and the mid-Pacific islands. In the main, over this first century and a quarter, American diplomacy was simply a function of the larger domestic effort to establish and consolidate an independent continent-nation, and to protect its position in the Western Hemisphere.

American security and ideological interests thus converged. It should be noted, however, that over this period the United States did not fully appreciate the extent to which its posture of isolation - its continental policy - hinged on a control of the seas by a power which, if not intrinsically friendly, had deep continuing interests (in Canada and elsewhere) in avoiding war with the United States. There was a hard-headed basis of mutual power interests between the United States and Britain, which made American isolation a technically sound as well as an ideologically acceptable basis for our foreign policy in the nineteenth century.

When the United States entered the First World War, under Wilson's leadership, our participation was presented mainly as an ideological crusade rather than as a course of action in the direct American security interest. It was appreciated by some that the control of the Atlantic by a hostile European power - implied by

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S.P.D

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

7

the threat of German submarine warfare - was contrary to the American security interest. Both during the war and afterwards, however, American interests and objectives in Europe tended to be publicly defined in ideological rather than in security terms. And when the ideological objectives defined by Wilson and largely accepted by the American people proved difficult or impossible of immediate attainment, a shattering wave of disillusion struck the United States. The United States largely withdrew from serious commitment in Europe, never having clarified its basic and persistent security interests in the area.

Over the inter-war years the structure of arrangements which the United States had, in large part, fostered fell apart: the League of Nations itself, German disarmament, the small democratic national states created in Eastern Europe, and so on. Many elements entered into this disintegration, but the failure of the United States to appreciate that it had fundamental and continuing interests in the organization of the power and political structure of Europe was, certainly, an extremely important if not decisive factor.

In the Second World War a strong ideological bias also affected the American view of our own interests and objectives, although in this case it was buttressed by a narrow focussing on the recurrent danger of German aggression. Unconditional surrender and a conception of German occupation originally devoted to a long-run weakening in German military potential mainly represented the formulation of American security, as opposed to ideological, interests in Europe. Step by step the realities of Soviet strength and aggressive intent have forced the United States to change its focus until it is now concerned primarily with the building in Europe of a security basis against Soviet power. There is evident danger that this new threat to American security may lead to yet another ad hoc formulation of American interests and purposes in Europe as inadequate as German unconditional surrender.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

8

Another element has marked the American conception of our interests and objectives in Europe during this century: namely, the tendency to define them in terms of formal or legal arrangements. Like the American tendency to define its security interests in terms of ideology, it also goes back to our eighteenth century origins. We tend to formalize desired relationships in legal documents. In foreign policy, however, unlike our domestic life, we have tended to regard such documents and such legal formulations as having a power independent of the continuing efforts made to sustain them. The Kellogg-Briand Pact between the wars is an example of this tendency as, indeed, were certain of the wartime and immediate postwar agreements among the Allies. It is evident that a mature American relation to the outside world must, like our democracy at home, be based on the conception of endless striving for certain basic purposes, in which formal arrangements may play a key role but are not ends in themselves.

A substantial reaction has evidently now set in against our tendency to formulate security interests in ideological terms and against our tendency to regard legalistic formulations as a substitute for a continuing concern with the realities of international politics and power. Realpolitik is enjoying a rare fashion in the United States. Recent writings of Professor Hans Morgenthau and Ambassador Kennan reflect this mood, which, in general, would tend to elevate the importance of America's security interests, narrowly defined, and to deprecate the role of ideology in the making of foreign policy. It is impossible not to detect these days in Washington a kind of schizophrenia in which responsible officials leave ideology to the preamble of NSC papers and occasional high-level speeches, while making their day-to-day decisions in terms of short-run power interests. They pass from one side of the moon to the other without knowing the route or examining carefully the connection. While this reaction is totally understandable, and contains within it an evident element of wisdom, we regard it as an inadequate basis for the making of an American foreign policy in general, and of a political warfare policy addressed to Russia

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

9

and Eastern Europe in particular. We believe it necessary that the United States find in its foreign policy as it has in its domestic life a more orderly reconciliation and a nicer balancing of its ideological and security interests.

S.P.D

To put this point more operationally, it would appear possible that there exist certain gaps in the formulation of American objectives within the government; that there may have been a failure adequately to conceive of and to display the various elements in American policy in their relations to each other and to fundamental principles and purposes; and that the complex of American interests and objectives may have been inadequately projected to the American people, to our allies, and to those living under Soviet rule. It seems evident, for example, that the government itself has not clearly formulated its objectives towards Germany in relation to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia; nor would it appear that it has yet clarified the nature of American objectives at a time of major war with the Soviet Union. Further, for wholly understandable reasons, the government tends to develop policies and actions in different parts of the world in response to a variety of American interests which often conflict, and which require incessant and delicate balancing. To those outside the government - and perhaps even for those within the government - the common threads of interest which unite these various policies are not wholly clear; and, in any case, these policies are to be found mostly in files of NSC papers, occasional speeches by high officials, and even more inaccessible documents. The creation of a unified view of the changing pattern of American foreign policy is not an easy task. Nevertheless, we take it to be a necessary condition for the long-run effectiveness of American policy that its fundamental purposes be understood in relation to its detailed and varied manifestations. Finally, it seems possible that insufficient attention may have been given to projecting effectively what, in fact, our policies are even when they have been established within the government and are fully understood there. There appears to be an enormous long-run task

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

10

which the country confronts in learning to furnish its citizens with a continuing flow of knowledge adequate for the formation of their responsible and sustained support of our foreign policy.

While, in part, these possible deficiencies stem from the lack of staff work addressed to their remedy, and from a chronic state of overwork among responsible officials, we believe they are also linked to a fundamental lack of clarity concerning national objectives, from the effects of which even our most knowledgeable government officials suffer.

2. The Analogy of Lincoln

In reconciling the exigencies of survival with American ideology, there is some comfort to be derived from one instance in our history where such a reconciliation was attempted and largely achieved: namely, in the handling by Abraham Lincoln of the conflict between the North and the South. From his full-scale entrance into this problem in 1858 until his death at the close of the Civil War, Lincoln saw that the nation had two related but separable interests in the problem of slavery. There was, first, the problem of the unity of the country. This he saw as an issue of structure and security, on which negotiation was possible and, should negotiation fail, military victory would be meaningful. Before 1860, and even in the course of the Civil War, he remained prepared to negotiate with the South on the basis of national unity at the cost of a rigid ideological position. Lincoln fully faced the fact that the United States confronted a profound and important ideological problem in the relation of the Negro and the white man within American society. He appreciated, however, that this was an issue which would take a long time to resolve. War in itself could not solve this problem; although Lincoln believed that a unified country would be a better setting for ultimate solution than a divided continent. He was prepared, in the course of the war, legally to free the slaves; but he did this as a measure to hasten military victory. He

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

knew that the Emancipation Proclamation was the beginning and not the end of the solution of the problem of the Negro in American life. Lincoln's reconstruction plans took fully into account the long-term nature of the ideological problem that engaged the country and the slow process to which the nation had to look for its solution.

In short, Lincoln did not permit himself the luxury of a crusade, that is, a false identification of security and ideological interests. He recognized the reality of both interests in the United States. He recognized, also, the limitations of military force as a technique for achieving an ideological end; but, in that humility, he did not fail to appreciate the importance of absolute clarity on the overriding issue of structure and security: namely, the unity of the nation. Lincoln's ability to recognize both interests in their complex relationship to one another, and his ability to deny himself the emotional self-indulgence of a crusade were of the greatest operational importance. It was precisely this distinction which permitted him to carry the border states with the Union and thus, in the end, to win the Civil War. The analogy between Lincoln's problem with respect to the border states and the contemporary American problem with respect to Western Europe and (say) India is evident.

Although Lincoln's clarity about the fundamental issue of national security - i.e., the unity of the country - was fundamental to his success as a war leader, it should be noted that behind this issue there lay another fundamental ideological interest. His concern with the unity of the country was based on his desire to prove that a nation dedicated to maximum freedom for the individual could maintain itself as a community and demonstrate to a sceptical world that it was capable of avoiding anarchy. Lincoln's battle for a unified country was inextricably bound up with a desire to see perpetuated in the United States a free and democratic society.

III. AMERICAN SECURITY AND THE THREATS WHICH CONFRONT IT

As in the case of Lincoln's formulation, we take it that the roots of a hard-headed American security policy for the present day must lie not simply in a desire to protect the United States as a geographical area, but to protect the United States as a form of society dedicated to certain basic propositions concerning the appropriate relationship of the individual to the state. In these terms, the U.S. security interest might be defined as the creation and maintenance of a world environment which will permit American society to evolve within the framework of its traditional principles and institutions. This definition would, in no measure, imply that the forms of American society are eternally fixed. Over the life of the country American society has changed radically in its external forms while maintaining, however, an inner core of loyalty to the principle that the purpose of the state is to reflect and protect the interests of the individual citizens, and loyalty, also, to methods of operation which would leave to the decision of individuals and private groups the maximum possible areas of economic, social, and cultural life compatible with the communal interest. In terms of the democratic criteria set out in another portion of this study (Appendix A, Part One, Section A-1) both the procedures and aspirations of American society reflect a high degree of the democratic element.

This definition of the security interest of the United States is, on one sense, negative. We wish to be left alone to work out our destiny on this continent. We have no pressing interests in terms of

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

14

economic advantage or of territory. In that sense our present position is wholly consistent with the long American past. The nature and the seriousness of the threats to American security have, however, profoundly changed, and they have almost certainly changed in an irreversible way. Even though, tactically, the United States is responding to outside threats rather than to its own positive or external aspirations, strategically we must look far ahead and develop our positive principles and objectives in order to cope with those threats. More than that, the nature of the threats we now confront are of such a character that they are likely to remain with us, as imminent or latent, over the foreseeable future. They arise from historical shifts in relative power, from the development of new weapons, and from the emergence of ideological doctrines which are not likely to disappear, but which must be coped with as a part of the persistent environment of our society in this century. Thus the negative interests of American society have come to require extremely positive action and objectives if they are to be satisfied.

9
A
S

The current and foreseeable threats to American security may be usefully summarized as follows, in an approximate order of priority:

(a) The United States might be defeated in war.

(b) A totalitarian political victory in the whole Eurasian continent (with consequences for Latin America and Africa) either as a result of war or as a result of Communist (or other totalitarian) successes short of war might so isolate the United States as a society as to make it increasingly difficult to sustain our basic principles and institutions.

(c) The United States might be so damaged and weakened by an apparently victorious war as to damage the principles and institutions of American society.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(d) The United States might become involved in a competitive armaments race, and a nonmilitary struggle for power, which might so over-extend and divert U.S. resources and energies and so alter U.S. institutions as to damage U.S. society.

(e) The United States might take on, even after a victorious major war, such unilateral responsibilities for the world's security, political, and economic arrangements as to over-extend and divert U.S. resources and energies and alter U.S. institutions and thus, again, damage U.S. society.

If we start, then, with a definition of security which embraces the quality of our society as well as its geographic and military integrity, the power and ideological interests of the United States flow naturally, side by side, in a coherent relationship to one another; but it should be noted that this unified definition immediately poses those important questions of priority, balance, and even conflict between elements in our security problem which, in fact, are the heart of the problem of making and sustaining an effective American foreign policy from day to day.

As nearly as we can make out, the present foreign policy of the United States in fact derives from some such definition of the American security interest and from some such evaluation of the threats which confront it. The specific purposes and policies of the United States vis-a-vis the rest of the world can be regarded as responses to one or another of these actual or potential threats. The threat of defeat in war (a) in combination with the possibilities of a Communist political victory throughout Eurasia (b) largely justifies United States rearmament, NATO, and economic assistance to our military allies and to Point Four areas. The threat of defeat in war (a), and, more particularly, the possibility that even a victorious war might result in political defeat (c) and (b), largely determine our desire to avoid major war if possible. Threat (d) (i.e., a dangerous overextension



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

16

and diversion of U.S. resources and energies) largely determines our efforts to seek by nonmilitary means a resolution of the conflict with the Soviet Union. Threat (c) (i.e., the danger to American society assuming too great a unilateral responsibility) in part determines our efforts to work through a maximum number of allies sharing the common burden of the struggle against the Soviet threat.

In short, the main lines of current American foreign policy may be seen to flow naturally and directly from a definition of the American security interest when security is defined not simply in military terms but in terms of the preservation in the United States of a particular form of society. It should be noted that, on this view, a potential ideological isolation of American society in an otherwise totalitarian world can be ranked second only to the threat of military defeat.

American policy consists broadly, then, in an effort to maintain and, if possible, to enlarge the military and ideological balance-of-power position held by the non-Communist world. This effort is proceeding within two limits: that the United States avoid major war, if possible; and that it avoid or minimize damage to the democratic institutions of the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world insofar as this appears compatible with the overriding requirement of not losing a major war.

The present disposition of the military and ideological balance cannot be regarded as satisfactory from the point of view of American interests. The Cold War is increasingly costly in terms of resources and, more important, in terms of values to which the non-Communist world is attached. Although there are sound reasons for the avoidance of major war, if possible, the United States must, evidently, look to a set of relations in the arena of world politics which better conforms to its interests than those inherent in the Cold War situation. The balance of this paper constitutes an effort to translate American interests into a set of reasonably precise objectives, and to elaborate their apparent meaning for U.S. relations to Russia and Eastern Europe under various current or possible circumstances.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

IV. ULTIMATE AMERICAN OBJECTIVES

1. The Character of Ultimate American Objectives

We would emphasize here, as in Part II B, the elements of continuity in American interests and objectives in the full spectrum of circumstances shading from a firmly established system of world disarmament in a preponderantly democratic world to total war.

It may be useful first to consider the nature of American objectives under the extreme case of major war with the Soviet Union. Although the United States is and should be prepared to consider a partial settlement of the present conflict on terms short of those it would seek in a major war, this extreme case is worth examination both because major war may be thrust upon us at any time and because such an examination may help to clarify certain characteristics of America's world position which transcend a war situation.

It is believed that any formulation of American objectives in a major war, as at any other time, should be the minimum necessary to satisfy American interests, and should minimize the possibility of political differences concerning them within the United States and between the United States and its major allies. This demands a sharp distinction between conditions in the external world which are necessary in the American interest and those which would be merely desirable. Fundamentally this conception of minimum objectives--even should we defeat Russia in a major war--arises

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

from the negative nature of America's interest in the external world. We wish to see established and maintained those external conditions which will permit our own society to evolve in conformity to its basic principles. This has, indeed, required a deep and detailed involvement with the world's affairs; but our interest persists in making that involvement the minimum compatible with our objectives.

In this setting, it is believed that the creation and maintenance of an optimum realistic American security position has four elements:

(a) The achievement and maintenance of a structure of world disarmament (or limited armaments).

(b) The maintenance, with American leadership, of an effective coalition among those powers which have an interest in sustaining a system of disarmament, or limited armaments.

(c) The use of American influence to foster the growth and enlargement of the democratic element in societies in various regions of the world.

(d) The continued use of American economic resources for purposes (b) and (c) within limits compatible with the maintenance within the United States of an economic base for a progressive democratic society.

The following paragraphs examine the implications of these basic elements in an appropriate long-run security policy for Russia and Eastern Europe.

2. The American Interest in Disarmament

Although current American efforts to achieve world-wide disarmament (or a low controlled level of world armaments) are widely accepted as legitimately in the American interest, it may be well to underline three long-run aspects of the American position in the

world which, in particular, appear to make it desirable for the United States, at this stage of its history, to achieve, if possible, a world framework in which the institutions and habits of disarmament can flourish. First, of course, is the destructiveness of the new weapons and the possibilities for their delivery against the United States. Second, it may prove to be a characteristic of atomic and other new weapons that, over considerable time periods, they may be capable of production in such large numbers and at such low cost that the distinction between major and minor military powers may be diminished. Put another way, military potential may cease to be proportional, in any strict way, to industrial potential. Even second-class industrial powers may come to develop the potentiality of doing grievous damage to major powers. This trend might, in the long run, reduce the relative power and influence of the United States in the arena of world politics and make the implementation of American interests and objectives increasingly a task for coalition politics rather than a function of U. S. military strength or hegemony.

This conclusion must, of course, be regarded as provisional, since the capabilities for the delivery of atomic weapons on the one hand and for defense on the other may well require increasing outlays of resources. The relative cheapness of atomic weapons is not sufficient evidence. Nevertheless, it seems likely that modern science may produce results which have the effect over time of so redistributing military power that the advantages accruing to the United States from its present relative industrial potential may be diminished.

Third, the course of population trends and of political and economic developments in the Asiatic world makes it altogether likely that the relative power of these regions will rise over the next century. As they come nearer to their full industrial and military capabilities, it may well be to the American advantage that they emerge into a world where the institutions and habits of disarmament are strongly established. In

the very long run, as well as in the near and middle future, there thus appears to be a strong American interest in building a framework of effective disarmament into world politics.

Thus, with respect to Russia, the first American interest appears to consist in seeing that region - evidently a major power base for the present and foreseeable future - brought under an effective world-wide system of armaments control.

This judgment relates to the view that under circumstances of a major war with the Soviet Union, American aims would be satisfied by a result short of unconditional surrender, and by a result which did not require American or Allied responsibility for full occupation of Soviet territory. There are two major reasons for this conclusion, one tactical, the other related to fundamental U.S. purposes:

(a) Given the size and net reproduction rates of the Soviet population on the one hand and those of the United States and Western Europe on the other, it would appear to be to the advantage of the Western World to avoid, if possible, protracted ground warfare and the very heavy casualties that it implies. An offer short of unconditional surrender might increase the possibilities of ending the war with Russia short of conquering and occupying its territory.

(b) Although it is in the interest of the United States to see Russian society move towards more democratic norms, this objective is not likely to be aided by a demand for unconditional surrender and by the total subsequent responsibilities which surrender would involve for guiding intimately the political, social, and economic course of that very large and complex region. There is a fair chance that an effort at occupation by the United States might produce a reaction in Russia which would move that society away from rather than towards more democratic norms; and it would in any case be enormously expensive in terms of men, resources, and energy.

In order to formulate an alternative to unconditional surrender, however, the interests and objectives of the United States in the whole region of Western Eurasia, of which Russia is a part, must be clarified. It is now widely agreed that unconditional surrender was an inadequate and probably inappropriate formulation of U.S. interests and objectives in the Second World War against Germany. It was an appealing formulation in the short run, partly because it permitted the United States to avoid facing a fundamental clarification of the nature of its interests and objectives in the situation which followed. During World War II there was no accepted doctrine in the United States which spelled out the nature of our aims in Western Eurasia. Nothing short of that was required as a framework for the enunciation of our war aims in the struggle against Germany; and nothing less is now required as a basis for policy vis-a-vis Russia and Eastern Europe.

6
2
6
The primary U.S. military aim for the Eurasian continent - to which disarmament is a subordinate means - is that no power exist there which might either defeat the United States in war or so threaten our security that the country is forced to allocate a substantial proportion of its national income and its national energies over a long period to defensive military and other purposes. Not only does the United States share the eternal and universal security interest of any country that it not be defeated in war, but its form of society thrives best under conditions where the threat of war is not continuous, and under conditions where the government is not forced to assume disproportionate powers and responsibility for purpose of defense.

Historically, the security requirements of nations have been met by a combination of their own military strength and systems of alliance which were believed sufficient to deter aggression or to prevent defeat should war come. It was the failure of the Allies to pursue such an historic policy of coalition which gave Germany its opportunities for European hegemony before the Second World War. It was an implementation of this

policy which permitted German defeat, and which the United States is now employing to minimize the likelihood of Russia's initiating a major war or winning such a war should the Soviet government initiate it.

Under present circumstances we can do no other than to build and maintain a military coalition adequate to these purposes. Looking to the special circumstances assumed here, however, the limitations of the balance-of-power system must be faced. Traditionally the balance-of-power system functioned with freedom of action for all countries with respect to armaments. Its purpose was to mobilize a system of alliances which could match the strength of any other power or existing group of powers, and thus avoid a war if possible, or win a war should war come. The destructiveness of the new weapons and the possibilities for their delivery against the United States make it strongly to the American interest to avoid a major war, even if the possibilities of direct American defeat in war are remote. Moreover, it may prove corrosive of important values in American life to sustain conditions where a major war may have to be faced at any moment.

These factors in combination lead, then, to the view that the first and overriding interest of the United States in Russia is that this power area be brought within the structure of a world security system which will effectively enforce disarmament or a limited and controlled level of armament. The traditional balance-of-power technique is thus judged inadequate for ultimate purposes of American security; but, if our view is correct, a substantial element of its validity remains in the indecisive present position and, also, for the foreseeable future.

3. The Conditions for Sustained Disarmament

It is one of the burdens of this argument that the maintenance of American security would not be wholly satisfied merely by the achievement of a world disarmament agreement. The United States would then

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

23

indefinitely have to seek to avoid a recrystallization of a power or a power grouping capable of overthrowing the armament control arrangements. This would necessitate our maintaining a coalition of such strength and cohesion that the temptation for any power or power grouping to back out of the control scheme and seek enlarged power by military means would be minimized. In short, the achievement of an arms control agreement would simply move the American security problem into a new and more wholesome framework; it would not solve that problem. This is a sense in which, in the present argument, we would wholeheartedly accept Secretary Acheson's view that our security problem will be with us forever, like "the pain of earning a living". Major favorable as well as unfavorable changes are possible in the framework within which we protect our society; but it is unlikely that the United States will ever again be able to take its security for granted.

So far as the continent of Europe is concerned it is believed that this continuing American interest is most likely to be achieved by the creation and effective maintenance of certain European organizations addressed to key security and economic issues. The natural allies of the United States in respect to its European security interest are those smaller European powers who, from their own long history, have known the threat of occupation or even temporary national extinction at the hands of major powers. The major underlying security purpose, so far as the United States is concerned, of an all-European organization would consist in its role as a point of assembly for the effective combination of those European powers which share the long-run American interest in avoiding the hegemony of any single power in Western Eurasia. In the period between the wars, despite French attempts, the interests of these smaller powers were not brought effectively into play in maintaining German disarmament in particular or the European balance of power generally. Excepting France's efforts to maintain the Little Entente - efforts without American, British, or Russian support - the balance of power was left to the major powers, none

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

of whom took responsibility for holding German ambitions within check. The smaller powers, without effective leadership, watched impotently as, step by step, German power expanded to a point where nearly the full weight of the rest of the world's military resources was required to prevent Germany's acquisition of the world balance of power. The present posture of the Soviet Union confronts us with a similar threat. Any long-run conception of American purposes in Western Eurasia must provide a method for maintaining a balance of power to our advantage in Western Eurasia - after the present menace of the Soviet Union has been dealt with, and even after a system of armament control has been installed.

A second lesser, but important, function for a unified European organization would consist in the communal handling of certain fundamental economic problems. The inter-war history of Germany in respect to Eastern Europe, and of Russia since 1945, has emphasized the close connection between unilateral economic arrangements between major and minor powers and political and ultimately military penetration. One function of an all-European organization would be to provide a multi-lateral forum in which, on key economic issues, the common interests of the smaller powers in Europe might be brought together to balance the full bargaining weight of the major powers who might seek political or military penetration by economic means.

Against our post-1945 experience with the vaguely defined and not wholly successful efforts to achieve unity in Western Europe, it appears important to define narrowly and clearly the operational purposes for which unity is sought. Although in the United States as in Europe the notion of European unity has a deep emotional appeal (and, if achieved in some meaningful form, would carry with it profound social and even moral benefits), its major purpose in terms of the American security interest is to constitute institutional arrangements which, with steady American backing, would help to maintain a balance of political force sufficient to perpetuate a system of effective armament controls

S.A.S.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

25

once they had been instituted. Not only is such narrowing of purpose likely to lead to the development of more effective organisms and institutions in Europe; clearly and narrowly defined federal agencies are also likely to attract the interest and loyalty of European powers, e.g., Great Britain and Sweden, which have remained cautious concerning an association with more generally defined European organisms.

Although it would be inappropriate for us to attempt to blueprint in detail an all-European structure under the assumed circumstances, certain of its possible characteristics might be suggested:

(a) On the level of security it might have the functions of conducting, on a regional basis, the tasks of inspection required by the international armaments control agreement; of establishing the existence of violations; and of serving as a court of first appeal (below the level of the U.N. Security Council) on lesser regional security issues.

(b) On the level of security all European states might be represented, and the organization would work on a majority vote basis, or on a basis proportional to population (or permitted armaments), without veto. In this manner the organization would differ in method and conception from the U.N. Security Council, which is based on the notion of major power accord rather than on an effective balance of power mobilized against potentially aggressive major powers. It should be noted, however, that it would be operating within the clear limits of an already established armaments agreement which it would be beyond its own authority to alter.

(c) Reflecting the legitimacy of their long-run security interests in Europe, both the United States and Russia might be members of the European security organization, the membership of the latter being dependent on the strength of the Russian negotiating position at the time when the agreement was established.



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(d) On the level of economic organization the European structure might be functionally organized around special problems (e.g., coal-steel; transport; electric power, trade, etc.). It would generally work by unanimous agreement among powers interested in particular joint operations; but, once a joint technical operation was set in motion by such agreement, majority vote would govern.

This rather loose conception of an all-European organization is based on several fundamental judgments about the area:

(a) Serious political and economic integration, as opposed to effective cooperative or joint activity, are unlikely to be achieved without the dominance of a single power prepared to enforce them and, substantially, to administer the Continent: a task which it is against the American interest to undertake or see any other power undertake.

(b) Therefore, this loose all-European structure might well contain lesser groupings of states (East and West, North and South) whose interests, as well as cultural, social, and political institutions, make more intimate association possible and realistic.

(c) From the American point of view, what is required is simply a forum in which it can lead and rally those who share the U.S. interest that no single power dominate the Continent; and an instrument for this purpose should be provided, independent of more complex instruments for European cooperation or integration. It seems important, for example, that East Europeans as well as Americans not confuse certain desirable and perhaps even possible forms of East European integration with a solution to the balance of power problem. In our view, an East European federation, in any form we can realistically envisage, is not likely to generate by itself (without a security association with the West and the United States) sufficient strength and unity of purpose to prevent its domination by Russia, Germany, or

S.S.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

27

those two powers in combination. Further, the structure for all of Europe should be such as not to interfere with the continued development by the United States of a long-run pattern of intimate association with (say) Great Britain or the Atlantic Community generally.

u
u
L
(d) Under the assumed circumstances, it would certainly be the U.S. interest to see Eastern Europe cleared of Russian influence as now exercised and guaranteed a degree of military, economic and, thus, political independence by attachment to the all-European security and economic organizations. From the American point of view, Eastern Europe is an extremely important area, which shares the American security interest and which, when attached unilaterally to either Germany or to Russia, threatens the whole balance of power in Western Eurasia. It is no accident that the First and Second World Wars both arose from power conflicts in which the orientation of Eastern Europe was the key detonating element. In a war with the Soviet Union it would clearly be an American interest to see Russian totalitarian power removed from the area and not replaced by unilateral German power. This is, in a sense, however, a negative interest. The United States does not require the kind of intimate long-run association with Eastern Europe that may be desirable and even necessary, say, with Great Britain or France. There may, therefore, be play for negotiation concerning the American relation to Eastern Europe, even in a settlement with Russia during or after a major war. The present Russian relationship to the area is, evidently, unacceptable to the United States in the long run. As between the present position and full incorporation of Eastern Europe in an intimate anti-Russian coalition there may be a number of stages and forms which, given the actual balance of Russian-American strength at the time of negotiation, would be worth exploration.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

4. The Ideological Interest of the United States in Western Eurasia

It is also a major interest of the United States in Western Eurasia, as in other parts of the world, to see developed systems of society which increasingly share the fundamental presuppositions of American life, when these are narrowly defined in terms of an increasingly democratic relationship between the individual and the state. Although this ideological objective relates closely to the possibilities of building a political coalition of the kind required for the maintenance of disarmament, it is extremely important that these two political objectives not be identified in our own minds, or in negotiations with Russia, or should there be a major war, in the formulation of peace terms. Minimum American security interests may be satisfied by the creation in Russia and Eastern Europe of something short of societies, democratic by American standards. The capacity of different societies effectively to operate democratic political processes cannot be created quickly and universally, as the United States has learned in many parts of the world where its interest has been engaged since 1945. The United States should, indeed, press for the maximum degree of political democracy that can effectively be supported in various parts of the world; and, more operationally, it should seek to apply its influence and resources to help societies move towards democratic norms. Democracy is never a finished product. It is, at best, always evolving towards certain ideals of performance. The sharing of democracy as a goal in a maximum area of the world and a condition of gradual progression towards it are, indeed, vital American interests. But the United States should not make its security arrangements, in the narrow sense, dependent upon the prompt achievement of recognizably western forms of political democracy. It was a confusion of these two real but separable interests which contributed to the failure of American policy in Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War; and it has been evident elsewhere in more recent times.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

29

It should be noted, further, that the achievement of world-wide armament control would have an important bearing on the possibilities of evolution of more democratic societies. Many of the most repressive features of the Soviet system, for example, take their shape from the posture of hostility and insecurity which Soviet Russia has adopted towards the external world. A world in which disarmament was assured would constitute the optimum setting within which such capabilities as may exist in Russia and in Eastern Europe for generating a higher degree of the democratic element within their societies might come into play. Over and above affording these societies an international framework of security, the United States may, by example, by the judicious use of economic assistance, and by the selective, well-timed application of its political influence at the margin, somewhat accelerate evolution towards more democratic forms of society.

It is absolutely essential, however, that the United States be fully aware that the economic, social, and political institutions we have found appropriate on this continent for the implementation of the democratic process cannot be successfully imposed on other societies. The balance between liberty and order of which different societies are capable varies widely and will continue to do so; and the forms, if they are to be stable, in which different societies will find this balance, will vary in response to their culture, their history, and the current problems they face. It is necessary that the United States learn to distinguish the fundamental elements of political democracy from the particular forms or manifestations which they may take; and that the American people and the Congress develop an increasing understanding for and tolerance of the varied forms which democratic societies may take.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

5. The American Economic Interest

Analogous to its effect on ideology, a framework of world disarmament would have important consequences for the viability of the world economy and for the possibilities of developing an increasing element of democracy in different societies to the extent that such an evolution is dependent upon economic progress. A diminution in the volume of resources devoted to military end products would markedly increase the volume of the world's resources available for productive investment. It may well continue to be an American interest to use some margin of our resources to stimulate economic development in other parts of the world, notably in under-developed countries, where the link between economic advance and the movement towards democracy is, indeed intimate. What is essential, however, is that throughout the world the total volume of resources devoted to military end products diminish; for, even without increased American loans or gifts for economic development abroad, a higher volume of productive investment would ease the current problems both of Europe and of the under-developed portions of the world.

D
2
51

Beyond this general economic interest in seeing resources used in such a way as to foster the development of increasingly democratic societies, both as a direct U.S. interest and as an indirect support for our narrow security interests, there are certain narrow economic interests to which the United States must look. At the present time (and abstracting from the Cold War) it appears to be in the interest of the United States that the economic relations of Russia and Eastern Europe to the rest of the world be such that those regions serve as expanded sources of supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. The industrialized areas of the world, notably Great Britain, Germany, and Japan, feel sharply the limitations in the world markets where their products might be sold; and they feel, simultaneously, the effects of restrictions on foodstuffs and raw materials. The re-entrance of Russia and Eastern Europe as effective trading partners might significantly ease the fundamental

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

31

economic problem confronted by these major industrial areas whose rate of progress appears to depend upon a very high level of foreign trade. Two provisos must be noted with respect to this proposition: first, the nature of the economic problem in the world trading area may alter considerably under circumstances where a large proportion of the world's income is not allocated to armaments, and it may alter so as to diminish the present relative scarcity of foodstuffs and raw materials, although the forces making for the present imbalance have deeper roots than the current phase of world rearmament; second, the United States and the western countries must avoid presenting or implementing this economic interest in such a manner that Russia and Eastern Europe regard our purpose as a return for them to a position of economic and therefore political subservience to the older industrial nations. It is our view that, despite the increased industrialization of Russia and Eastern Europe, a basis of mutual interest exists and will continue to exist for an enlarged volume of exchange whose net effect might diminish the painful structural distortion of the world trading area.

Still more narrowly the United States has certain direct lesser interests in world trade: first, that it be able to acquire at reasonable cost an increasing volume of imports, as our rate of industrial growth and of growth in real income outstrip domestic supplies of certain foodstuffs and raw materials; and second, that the world monetary and trading framework as well as its international capital flows be so organized as to mitigate the effect of undue fluctuations in the demand for the products of certain industries which have been built up in the United States under the assumption of a substantial export market. These ancillary American interests can, it is believed, best be looked after in a world under the sort of disarmament control described above, and with Western Eurasia organized in the manner indicated.



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

6. A Summary Statement

The long-run maximum American objectives in Russia and Eastern Europe, as elaborated above, may be summarized in the following five propositions:

(a) That an effective general disarmament plan, covering atomic energy control as well as the control of other weapons, be put into effect on a world basis.

(b) That the alignment of political power be achieved and maintained in Western Eurasia which would be most likely to sustain a world disarmament plan; and, in particular, that the Eastern European states emerge independent of both Russia and a united Germany and organized with respect to select security and economic issues within a pattern of all-European organizations.

(c) That U.S. and Western influence be used in such a way as to strengthen those internal forces making for an increased degree of political democracy.

(d) That there be created in these areas conditions of economic progress designed to maximize the stability of conditions (b) and (c) above.

(e) That neither Germany nor Russia dominate the foreign trade of Eastern Europe, and that a substantially increased volume of trade over present levels re-emerge between Eastern Europe and Russia on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other.

As indicated in the analysis above, it is believed that this complex of objectives, if persisted in, would be mutually reinforcing. When elaborated in reasonable detail, they constitute, in our view, a rough foundation for a definition of American war and postwar aims.

There may be a reason of special importance for clarifying and even generating some public discussion of maximum American objectives. Should war come, it is


~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

33

altogether likely that, for the first time in more than 140 years, major damage will be wrought by an enemy on our own soil. Cities may be destroyed, with heavy civilian casualties; and an unparalleled national effort at reorganization and recovery may be required to sustain our position and purposes in the world. The popular emotional response to such a situation is likely to be violent and may lead to the formulation and acceptance of exaggerated war aims which are not in the American interest, whose acceptance might complicate relations with our Allies, and whose promulgation to the enemy might foreclose the possibilities of political developments in his camp necessary for the attainment of a negotiated peace in the American interest.

No man can guarantee that an emotional reaction inconsistent with the American interest will not occur and produce undesirable results. As in other aspects of such a situation, however, much will depend on the coolness of American leadership, and its ability to clarify the nature of the situation and the appropriate forms of American action. Such coolness and purposeful vigor are most likely to be forthcoming if men have soberly thought through the nature of the problem, examined the alternatives, and fixed on a general (but not inflexible) solution consistent with the long-run interests of the United States. As in other moments of warfare, intellectual and moral discipline will count heavily in the period after the United States has suffered atomic attack.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

V. A NOTE ON A PEACE OFFER

S.P.D.

The present conception of long-run American objectives relates to the terms the United States might wish to offer to Russia at a time of major war; but they are not identical with such terms. On the one hand they include principles and objectives which would not appear explicitly in such an offer (for example, the long-run use of American influence to increase the degree of democracy in Russian society); and, on the other hand, they evade a number of extremely practical and difficult issues which the offer of such terms would involve. Peace terms would have to include, for example, a definition of the group or government with which we were prepared to deal on a conditional basis; they would have to include a form of guaranteed truce which would cover the disposition of troops and weapons, including, especially, atomic weapons, in the armistice period, if any; they would have to take into consideration the question of Russian boundaries and, depending on the circumstances, the status of the Baltic States, and perhaps even the nationality areas.

The appropriate American position at such a time would obviously have to be determined in detail in the light of an exceedingly precise appraisal of existing and foreseeable relative military capabilities, and of the existing and foreseeable political bargaining position. If, for example, the United States had demonstrated, despite Soviet attacks, its capability to maintain a decisive delivery advantage with atomic weapons while the Russians maintained large ground forces in being, American terms might consist simply in a demand that Soviet troops withdraw to a defined

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Russian border (or to some other defined line), and that the residual Soviet atomic weapons, with their means of delivery, be handed over to us. This would be a form of unconditional surrender in the sense that it would confirm a de facto situation in which the Soviet Union was at our mercy; but it would not be unconditional in the sense that we might be prepared to permit the Soviet Union not only to keep its armies within its borders until an effective international armaments scheme was installed, but, further, to organize some government other than the regime which began the war and with which we would be prepared to talk. In this case, excepting the suggestion that we do not occupy Russia or install our own government, these American objectives as here defined would become only operative guides to policy after armistice terms had been accepted, and when peace terms were actually being negotiated in detail.

Our analysis of American interests and objectives would also suggest certain areas for potential negotiation: that is, issues in which Russia might have an important interest, but which are secondary to the American interest. In offering peace terms it is most unlikely that we would regard the question of effective international control of atomic energy and other armaments as a matter for negotiation; and it is unlikely that we would regard a Russian position of direct authority in Germany as a matter for negotiation. There are, however, questions on which, if the Russian bargaining position were still judged considerable, we might make concessions of a secondary kind if we were convinced our primary objectives were being met: questions, for example, such as the precise nature of Eastern Europe's attachment to Europe as a whole and to our direct sphere of influence; the exact Russian borders; the precise status of Russia in an international security arrangement; and the status of the nationality regions. It may be that the nature of modern weapons may lead to situations of total victory and defeat where such refined considerations of bargaining advantage are irrelevant. Nevertheless,

9
A
S

in trying to think through alternative possibilities at the present time, it is useful to distinguish primary from secondary American interests in relation to Russia; for history may present us with the possibility of an arrangement with Russia in our own interest but in which our bargaining advantage is something short of absolute. The analysis conducted here, seeking to isolate the hard core of the primary American interest from issues of secondary interest, aims to contribute touchstones for particular policy formulations even under the extreme circumstances of major war. It goes without saying that we would not in any way regard the present analysis as definitive. But we would regard a clarification of these matters and the development of a consensus within the government as urgent.

It is clearly outside the compass of the present project to examine possibly appropriate American peace terms, embracing all the elements involved, under alternative circumstances of bargaining advantage. We would limit ourselves to two observations on this problem, both foreshadowed in the discussion of the case of major war in Part II B:

(a) We believe that the United States Government should have on file, under periodic review, staff papers covering this problem. It may be thrust on us for immediate action at any time, and under circumstances not conducive to deliberate well-balanced thought.

(b) The likelihood of a Russian government or some effective Russian group accepting American terms, as opposed to fighting to the limit on the ground, would appear to hinge on three factors:

1. The Russian appreciation at that time of relative immediate and foreseeable military capabilities.
2. The exact terms offered to Russia, including the detailed military provisions for an armistice.

3. The view held by key Russians, and notably the Russian military, concerning the postwar American interest and intention with respect to the Russian national state.

It is to this third factor that our analysis of political warfare has mainly been addressed, and to which a delineation of the limits and priorities of U.S. interests in Russia is directly relevant. We would not wish to overestimate its significance. We believe it, nonetheless, to be a real element in the problem. It will be recalled that, with some success, Hitler and Goebbels succeeded in inculcating a view of Russia's intentions towards Germany which was a major factor in maintaining the coherence of the German armed forces on the Eastern front and the will to fight throughout the country. It is evident that Stalin is now seeking to create, perhaps for similar ultimate purposes, a parallel conception of American long-run intentions towards Russia. We believe it not impossible that what we say and do from the present forward, as it bears on the Russian view of our long-run interests and objectives, may be a factor of importance at a time of major war when, at some moment, a real alternative may exist between a quick peace consistent with our own interests and a bloody protracted infantry war between societies grievously damaged by atomic weapons.

A
N
S

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

VI. AMERICAN OBJECTIVES SHORT OF MAJOR WAR

The world of American objectives differs, evidently, from the harsh realities of the present. Whatever the virtues of clarifying our conception of what we should like to achieve, we are now engaged in a struggle to hold a precarious military and ideological balance of power, in which the dangers of a deterioration of our position remain real.

The present cold war position appears to have the following characteristics:

(a) The military strength of the Soviet Union is such that a major war would be required to achieve ultimate U.S. objectives, including disarmament (or controlled armaments), unless the Soviet regime comes to accept them in formal diplomatic negotiation.

(b) The Soviet regime de facto controls Europe roughly to the Elbe, and its present policies in respect to that region are incompatible with U.S. objectives as earlier defined.

(c) In general, the Soviet Union has chosen to seek its security by the maintenance and, if possible, the enlargement of total, unilateral control in the geographical positions it held at the close of the Second World War.

In the face of this situation the present policy of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union appears to be that the United States is prepared for the time being, to accept the costs of the present position, in

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

terms of military and economic outlays at home and abroad, with their attendant effects on American society, rather than to initiate "preventive" war or surrender to those further aims of the Soviet Union that conflict with primary U.S. security interests. It should be noted that the United States is prepared to risk a major war rather than forego its present rearmament program; and that it is prepared to wage major war with the Soviet Union should the Soviet Union seek to enlarge the sphere of its power in any of a number of directions by the use of Soviet armed forces. Further, the United States is prepared to take such steps as do not risk major war to induce the Soviet regime to accept U.S. objectives; and it is prepared to take certain actions which might lead to the removal of the present regime, so long as these do not risk major war or compromise other fundamental aspects of American principle and policy.

In concrete diplomatic terms the United States, in seeking now to further its objectives, confronts the following questions: is it likely or possible that the present regime in the Soviet Union will seriously offer to negotiate

- (a) The unification of Germany by free elections?
- (b) A general program of atomic control and disarmament in other areas?
- (c) A withdrawal of direct Soviet control of Eastern Europe?

The following paragraphs weigh the possibility of achievement of these American objectives by negotiation with the present regime.

There is no reason whatsoever to believe that the present Soviet regime would agree to German unification on Western terms without some provision for German disarmament (or a controlled level of armaments) in the control and supervision of which the USSR had an effective part. For that reason the notion of a simple

attachment of a democratically unified Germany to NATO is excluded from the present discussion.

The following factors might possibly lead the Soviet Union to contemplate accepting a Germany unified by free elections with some form of effective international control over German armaments:

(a) Fear of the addition to Western military strength represented by a substantial rearmament of Western Germany.

(b) Disruption of present Western plans for unification of Western Europe which the demilitarization of Germany, under international control, might bring about.

(c) Potentialities for Russia of economic and political alliance with Germany - even with an internally democratic, all-German government - which might extend Soviet power.

(d) That the disarmament of Germany would necessitate a withdrawal of Soviet troops only to the Polish border, whereas it might involve a more substantial withdrawal from the center of Europe of Western troops.

(e) More generally, the effect that these proposals might have on the ability of the United States, politically as well as technically, to maintain an important ground force position on the European continent.

(f) The ineffectiveness of Soviet policy in Eastern Germany in generating a reliable long-run political or military base.

The arguments against the present regime accepting a German solution of this type would appear to be the following:

(a) It would involve the dismantling of a Communist state, with profound morale effects unfavorable to the Soviet Union within its own borders as well as in satellite areas; while the extension of the democratic process eastward would hearten Western Europe and the rest of the non-Communist world.

(b) Eastern Europe, and notably Poland and Czechoslovakia, would be further opened up to Western political warfare.

(c) The withdrawal of Soviet bases into Poland would increase the logistical problem of invading Western Europe in a single-phase ground force attack, and necessitate the location of very large Russian forces in a highly nationalistic satellite state.

(d) The Soviet Union may appreciate that the major military force of significance arrayed against it consists in U.S. atomic weapons and delivery capabilities; and it may, therefore, not rate highly the military advantages of detaching Western Germany from the Western military sphere.

(e) The Soviet Union may, in the next years, regard its main area for advance as Asia, in which case it may judge its advantage to lie in the present position of commitment of a substantial portion of U.S. resources and military strength in a manner not likely to affect the outcome in Asia.

It would seem that, on balance, the argument partially hinges on the Soviet appreciation of the military significance of Western Germany as an American and Western European ally in an atomic age; on whether or not the Soviet Union envisages the infiltration and subversion of Asiatic areas as its major objective in the near future; and, especially, on the Soviet judgment as to whether the United States could effectively reorganize its European position to meet and exploit the changed status of Germany. It will also be noted that the advantages to the Soviet Union of its present position in Eastern Germany as a forward military area are real and immediate (despite the long-run unreliability of the Germans themselves), whereas the advantages of a German settlement of the kind envisaged consist in potentialities of greater or lesser likelihood. Stalin has consistently made his choices for facts rather than potentialities, on occasion to his cost. On balance,

9
2
5

then, the likelihood of the Soviet Union offering to either Western Germany or to the Western Occupying Powers free elections and military neutralization must be rated low. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ruled out, given the important potentialities which inhere from the Soviet point of view.

It appears to be to the American interest to prepare against the possibility of such an offer and to prepare to exploit it fully within the framework of a positive American policy. If the United States adopts the position that Germany can be disarmed only in the context of a world disarmament scheme, the justification of what might prove to be an unpopular position among certain U.S. Allies must be carefully prepared. Although we lack sufficient information to make a fully responsible judgment, we would simply record our tentative view that, within the framework of a positive American policy for all of Europe, it would appear to be an American interest to see Germany unified by free elections even at the cost of international control over the level of German armaments, narrowly defined. On our view, the advantages of pushing Eastward politically could be made to outweigh the loss of German divisions, if the United States persisted in a positive and vigorous program of political warfare.

With respect to an effective program of atomic and other disarmament, the following appear to be the arguments for acceptance by the present Soviet regime:

(a) Disarmament would release Soviet resources for nonmilitary purposes at a time when the present armaments race is cutting into both industrial and agricultural investment and into the standard of welfare within the Soviet Union and within the European satellites.

(b) An effective disarmament program might be judged by the Soviet regime to diminish the importance and power of direct U.S. leadership in the non-Communist world by eliminating or diminishing its strictly military foundations.

(c) Disarmament might be judged not to inhibit the pursuit of Soviet and Communist ambitions in Asia, where military force may not be the principal means envisaged for bringing the area under Soviet domination.

The arguments against the acceptance of a serious disarmament program appear to be the following:

(a) It would involve an abandonment or weakening of the notion of a dangerous external enemy on which the bulk of Soviet internal administration and propaganda has been based; and it would involve, as well, a violation of the fundamental Marxist doctrine (still extant, although not central to Soviet propaganda) of continuing hostility on the part of the capitalist world and, ultimately, imperialist war.

(b) The inspection provisions of an effective disarmament program would tend somewhat to open up the Soviet empire to external political and ideological influences and is likely to be judged disruptive by the present regime, although not necessarily intolerable.

(c) Disarmament would remove from the Soviet Union a major technique as well as a primary justification for maintaining detailed control over its satellites.

On the whole it must be judged exceedingly unlikely that the present Soviet regime would accept a serious disarmament program. The degree of our ignorance concerning the current and future views of Soviet leaders, as well as the known views of citizens throughout the non-Communist world, argues strongly, however, that the United States should persist in its positive efforts to negotiate a German settlement and a disarmament program. In particular, the highest priority should be assigned to staff work designed to establish whether or not various degrees of armanent control are possible without violating fundamental American interests and objectives.

With respect to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from its present positions of control in Eastern

S.S.

Europe, no short-run direct advantages would appear to exist likely to commend themselves to the present Soviet regime, one of whose major and abiding characteristics has been its pursuit of security through areas of direct, unilateral control - a pursuit analogous to and, perhaps, springing from its domestic policies. Only under conditions which amount to the acceptance of an ultimatum from the West or to an internal crisis does it appear likely that the Soviet Union might withdraw from its present position in Eastern Europe; although, for reasons later developed, we believe a German settlement closely relates to the ultimate possibilities of achieving a Russian withdrawal from the satellite areas.

The reasons for this judgment may be summarized in the form of the advantages to the Soviet Union of the present position:

(a) It constitutes both a ground warfare cushion in case of attack against the Soviet Union and a base for Soviet offensive operations.

(b) The loss of Communist control over all of Eastern Europe might have decisive effects on Communist prestige throughout the world and even on the prestige and power of the present regime within Russia.

(c) Although it is difficult to form a clear picture of Soviet economic advantages in the present organization of Eastern Europe, it appears likely that some significant net advantage accrues to the Russian economy.

It is the enunciated aim of American foreign policy to generate within the non-Communist world positions of strength which will permit of more successful negotiation of American aims in this area than has been possible in the past. American policy envisages the economic and political strengthening of non-Communist areas and thus a denial of Soviet acquisition by political means and subversion. American policy also is devoted to the expansion of the military strength of the United States and of the whole non-Communist world.

The potentialities of using these positions of strength, when more fully achieved, for effective negotiation appear to hinge on two major possibilities:

(a) That an effective frustration of Soviet Communist ambitions in the non-Communist world, and a forcing of the Soviet Union into an expensive and fruitless arms race, may induce a fundamental change of policy on the part of the regime which would lead it to seek its security by collective means. As discussed in Part II B (Vulnerability), we believe that such a change is not entirely impossible, even without major changes in the internal disposition of Soviet power, although we believe it is more likely to come about as a consequence of such change, slow or violent.

(b) The second possibility would consist in the presentation of an ultimatum to the present Soviet regime which would, in effect, make the acceptance of U.S. objectives earlier defined an alternative to U.S. military attack.

On present evidence, there is no reason to believe that the present Soviet regime would prefer the acceptance of U.S. conditions to a major war. There is little direct evidence for this judgment. The evident seriousness of Soviet preparations for defensive or offensive war make it clear, however, that there are certain conditions under which they are prepared to fight rather than submit, if indeed they do not envisage offensive war.

It should be emphasized that we are still largely ignorant of the outlook of the major groups within the Politburo or within those upper levels of the Soviet hierarchy which have access to the key instruments of control. It is not impossible that a situation may develop as between, for example, the chief members of the Politburo and the higher levels of the bureaucracy and army in which the latter, regarding the present policy as wasteful of Russian resources and unnecessary in the Russian national interest, are prepared to accept

a means to Russian national security which hinges on collective arrangements rather than unlimited unilateral strength. Such a situation has occurred in our time, and was not exploited, when Hitler entered the Rhineland and his generals hoped he would meet sufficient resistance to justify his overthrow. It must be emphasized that no evidence exists which would justify the view that a parallel situation now exists in Russia. The possibility suggests, however, the decisive importance of improved intelligence on the political views within the upper strata of the Soviet structure and bureaucracy (including the Army) and of establishing, if possible, contacts with such groups.

The three major American objectives in Western Eurasia, then, are not likely to prove negotiable with the present regime. In the end, our doubts as to negotiability arise because of the relation between the consequences of American objectives and the possibilities of maintaining within Russia the form of organization the Soviet regime has created: a German settlement which effectively neutralized Germany but pushed Western institutions and ideas to the East would endanger the whole satellite structure while removing a key element from Soviet propaganda addressed to the external menace; effective disarmament (or controlled armaments) would strike even more directly at the "isolated fortress" mood which the present regime has systematically sought to create; while loss of direct Soviet power in Eastern Europe is likely to be judged a major blow to the foundations of the present regime and its foreign policy.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that this skepticism is not based on firm knowledge. We would be foolish, indeed, to rule out the possibility that, for reasons unknown to us, or because of a different evaluation of the situation than that presented here, the Soviet regime might accept, say, a German settlement of a kind compatible with American interests or even a measure of effective armament control. We cannot know until we find out; and, since

time is a key element in the problem, we must steadily continue to hold up specific formulations judged compatible with American long-run objectives. We see nothing in the nature of American interests and objectives in this area which would make a short-run movement towards them incompatible with their ultimate attainment. On the contrary, an effective settlement in Germany, if steadily backed by a strong and purposeful American policy, might make more realistic the notion of a general disarmament agreement, and might gradually create a situation in Eastern Europe which would diminish the value of that area to the Soviet Union.

Germany represents the area of balance in the economics and politics of Western Eurasia. It is of evident importance in the military balance as well, although its exact meaning in a world of atomic weapons is somewhat less clear than in earlier times. A decision to handle Germany by collective security means, which would effectively separate the domestic politics of Germany (to be decided by free elections) from its military power position (to be decided by international agreement), would, in effect, create a pattern in a major area of exactly the kind the United States would wish to see extended. The German issue and the question of disarmament are profoundly related.

The unification of Germany under such circumstances would, indeed, create dangers as well as potentialities for the United States, of which the most notable is that Germany might be induced to enter a political, economic, and, ultimately, military coalition with Russia. We believe this and other dangers can, however, be diminished if the United States takes the position that a German settlement without world disarmament and without an Eastern European settlement in no way would diminish its concern with the Western Eurasian region, and if it were positively to push on, by means short of major war, with the bringing about of the long-run framework it seeks for the region.

The decisive point in this matter of Germany is that the Germans themselves seek their unity on democratic

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

49

terms as a matter of highest priority, and the greatest danger to the United States of losing Germany from the non-Communist coalition may lie in a German conviction that the United States does not envisage German unity as a fundamental American interest and objective in Western Eurasia. To put the point another way, it may not lie within American political capabilities to prevent the acceptance of German unity on democratic terms, even if it involves military neutralization. If this judgment is correct, it behooves the United States to elaborate for the pursuit of its interests a strategy and tactics which would embrace this fact.

With respect to Eastern Europe, the democratic unification of Germany and its neutralization by international agreement would affect profoundly its whole orientation to the Soviet Union. It would remove a basic propaganda rationale for Soviet policy in the satellite areas, exhibit the possibility of dismantling a satellite regime, and open up the possibility of increased communication to the West. The pressures on the Soviet Union drastically to alter its intimate dictatorship of internal affairs in Eastern Europe would increase; while the basis of military interest of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe would be much diminished if Germany were effectively neutralized. In short, it is not impossible to envisage some form of Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe under the circumstances of a German settlement - if the West (including the United States) were to maintain adequate political strength and coherence and conduct effective political warfare in the widest sense. And since, as noted earlier (p. 27, par. (d) above), the American interest in Eastern Europe is to some extent negative, a variety of degrees and patterns of change there could be made compatible with American objectives.

Under present circumstances, then, Germany - and its unification on terms compatible with our own long-run interest - would appear the most promising point on which to focus our diplomatic efforts; and there is some reason to believe that the dynamic

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

50

consequences of success in that area might increase the chances, at a later time, of achieving our other objectives. We would strongly emphasize that the chances of achieving success in Germany and of having that success result in subsequent changes in the American interest will depend on the clarity with which we envisage our ultimate objectives and the persistence with which we pursue them. Given America's power in this century, the course of history will be, in part, what we make it if we appraise the possibilities realistically and avoid the larger illusions of grandeur.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

U.S.S.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

VII. THE ENUNCIATION OF OBJECTIVES

We have maintained the view, in this project, that both the enunciation of our interests and objectives in some appropriate form and their clarification within the government are urgent. It may be useful to note briefly once again the possible usefulness of enunciating, in broad outline at least, the nature and limits of our interests and objectives, assuming some agreed formulation of them within the government.

1. Russia

In our negotiations with the Soviet Union and in our information policy towards the Russian peoples an enunciation of our objectives would provide a basis for pressing our interests while, at the same time, distinguishing our position sharply from that of Hitler or other historic enemies of the Russian nation. It is possible to urge with some persuasiveness that the present policy of unilateral action by the Soviet Union, (for example its direct domination of Eastern Europe) neither provides Russia with security nor operates generally in the Russian national interest. Further, an assertion of American willingness to see Russia evolve its own forms of society within the framework of world security arrangements, and the reiteration of our faith that these forms would prove to be increasingly democratic, might well carry some conviction, over time, to groups and individuals important to the evolution of the Russian state and Russian society. In short, the conception of U.S. interests and objectives presented here, if effectively projected to the Soviet Union, might

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

help counter the central themes of current Soviet propaganda to its own people, increase the chances, if only slightly, of an evolution of Soviet society consistent with U.S. objectives, and prepare the ground for an effective exploitation of future circumstances, however generated, in our own interest.

2. Eastern Europe

The projection of these American interests and objectives to Eastern Europe might provide a new and more sturdy foundation to our association with that area. Public recognition that the United States shares the interest of that region in avoiding the dominance of Western Eurasia by a single power would make more persuasive our efforts to prevent its apathetic acceptance of present subservience to the Soviet Union. Such a hard-headed basis of common security interest, in the narrow sense, would be understood fully in Eastern Europe, and, perhaps for the first time, might begin to remove from the minds of its people the notion that the United States is destined to remain a rather "short-winded crusader" in their behalf.

3. Germany

Enunciation of the above conception of U.S. interests does, of course, involve public acknowledgment that the United States is determined that its current struggle against the Soviet Union not result in the re-installation of German hegemony in Europe. Given the still remembered failures of Hitler's efforts, this is not likely to be, in itself, unpopular with the majority of Germans. And, on the other hand, this conception would provide a solid basis for positive American support for German unification. Our relations with Germany are now complicated by the German conviction that the United States, somewhat frightened by the possibility that the Soviet Union might make an authentic offer of free elections in Eastern Germany that could

not be refused, is only a reluctant advocate of German unity. The danger of a German deal with Russia at the expense of the United States and Western Europe might be sensibly diminished if Germany felt that the United States was operating on a conception of its own interests that looked positively towards a unified Germany as part of an all-European structure. Further, Germany's location and economic interests would make mightily attractive to her a general (multilateral) organization of Europe, even if such organization were likely to deny to Germany the possibilities of enlarging its unilateral political and military power. There is some evidence that many of the most thoughtful Germans would see in such a conception the maximum possibilities of developing constructively the best in German talent and energy.

4. France

France and Western Europe generally now fear German unity and would wish to see it delayed if not prevented. This attitude, if probed deeply, stems largely from a fear that Germany, by exploiting her strong bargaining position in the present East-West struggle, might either alone or in alliance with Russia ultimately recapture the whole of the European continent. This fear is reinforced by the belief that the United States, focused on the present Russian danger, may be insensitive to the longer-run possibilities of a new German or German-Russian danger. The above conception of American interests and objectives, based on a more general view of the dangers to be avoided in Europe, might prove reassuring. Even more specifically, it would hold out to Western Europe the long-run hope, backed by the United States, that an association might be achieved between the smaller countries of the East and West in Europe. The Little Entente has not been wholly forgotten, and its rationale lives just beneath the surface of European politics.

Finally, this conception of American purposes might alleviate somewhat the increasing strain in U.S.



relations with Western Europe. Viewing the current scene, many Western Europeans see two hard choices: an increase in East-West friction leading to a war in which, unlike the United States, their region would be the battlefield and, perhaps, even occupied; or, an increased direct involvement with the United States as subordinate and dependent allies. Nothing in the enunciation of long-run American interests and objectives would, in itself, alter the necessity for military and other forms of intimate collaboration with the United States. On the whole, many if not most of the current frictions and dissatisfactions are to be judged inevitable costs - facts of life - in a common effort whose advantages easily outweigh its disadvantages to all parties. A belief, however, that the United States was looking seriously to a long-run future, in its own interest, in which the forces for equilibrium in Europe were effectively mobilized, and that our current deep involvement was judged merely a necessary tactical stage towards the making of a dignified quasi-independent European structure, might have a profound heartening effect. Given the European view that the United States lacks a mature and stable conception of its long-run interests and objectives, the enunciation of such a framework to which our current tasks and short-period goals might be coherently related might in itself have a wholesome effect on our relations with our allies.

5. The United States Government

One function for a formulation of American interests and objectives of this type might well be to give a common basis to forward planning within the government. A running conflict has persisted in Washington over the past year at least between those who have felt that need for more detailed guidance concerning American intentions with respect to Russia and Eastern Europe and those who have believed it wise to avoid making forward commitments. The former group have been driven on by an awareness that the nature of their current operations and plans carried with them, implicitly if not

explicitly, some conception of long range American objectives. The latter group have been constantly aware of the enormous complexity of the problem and the impossibility of predicting accurately the setting in which the United States would have to seek to effect its objectives in the future. As privileged observers of the scene, without operational responsibility, we have come to feel that there is a meaningful middle ground. Put more precisely, we believe that there are certain American interests and objectives which, although broadly defined, would have two characteristics:

(a) They would be sufficiently precise to serve as operational touchstones for the planning of military, covert, propaganda, and intelligence operations.

(b) They would be sufficiently broad to cover a wide range of possible future circumstances and to avoid overelaborate or precise U.S. commitments.

527
The body of this paper is our own limited contribution to the resolution of the wholly legitimate but conflicting points of view arising from the differing nature of the operational responsibilities of various agencies of the government. Whether or not our own formulations are judged helpful, we would urge with some confidence that the task of resolution is possible if it is approached with a common awareness of the reality of the needs felt by both the contending groups: i.e., the requirements, on the one hand, for a meaningful framework of long range objectives and, on the other, for great flexibility in day-to-day movement towards these objectives.

6. The American People

It has been urged to us, in the course of this project, that two dangers exist in holding up openly the nature of our long-run objectives with respect to Russia and Eastern Europe: the danger that this act would be regarded by the Soviet regime (or by our Western Allies)

as a form of ultimatum; and the danger that it would be regarded in the United States as the raising of a crusading banner preliminary to the launching against the Soviet empire of a war of liberation. Neither of these dangers is to be lightly dismissed. The former can, we believe, be dealt with by the form in which our objectives are enunciated and the boldness with which we state our faith and purpose that these objectives be achieved without war. But subtlety in formal pronouncements by the government might, it is feared, be overridden by the weight of an overemotional response by the American people; put another way, the relative complexity of the conception of American interests and objectives outlined here might not be understood.

This is a matter for the highest and most responsible political judgment. We can merely record our faith that the American public has a high capacity for temperate and wise political judgment when all the relevant considerations are laid before it. There have been moments in our recent history when the choices faced by the nation have been so grave that the government had no choice but to expose fully the facts available and the situation it confronted: e.g., on Lend-Lease in 1941; on the Marshall Plan in 1947-1948; on the dismissal of General MacArthur in 1951. Although differences in judgment on the course of action taken may persist, it is unlikely to be argued that the American public was incapable of absorbing the essential facts intelligently and forming a mature conclusion.

More than that, we sense that the bulk of the American people are prepared to sustain a costly and prolonged pursuit of its interests and objectives when these are well understood. If our analysis is at all correct, there appears to be a greater unity of conception and purpose in the diverse tasks and responsibilities we have undertaken in recent years than the public is aware of. On domestic policy the essential facts and situations to which the country must react are easily accessible and palpable in the daily lives of citizens. On such issues we are capable of conducting

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

57

an enormously subtle political life. Evidently, the task of public information on the issues of foreign policy is more difficult and probably never capable of wholly equivalent solution. Nevertheless, on such knowledge and insights as are available to us we would hold that an enunciation of our interests and purposes along some such lines as those suggested here would strengthen rather than weaken American public support in the long slow struggle in which we are now engaged.

In a sense the American people, like those of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe, see themselves confronted with unpalatable choices; they see no end to our efforts except war or an endless, costly, essentially defensive exercise in countering Soviet and Communist initiatives. The holding up of a positive set of goals with their rationale fully explained and widely discussed, would, on our view, help dissolve the widespread sense of frustration, even if the achievement of these goals were sternly limited by the discipline of avoiding a war initiated by the United States.



~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~