The President

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NSC 5505

January 18, 1955

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

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SIGNATURE	OFFICE	DATE
Evelyn L. Roper	N.S.C.	1-18-55
S. LeMaster		1-25-55

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NSC 5505

January 18, 1955

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
Reference: NSC 5502

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board with the participation of a representative of the Department of Justice, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, January 27, 1955. Attention is invited to the divergent views with respect to paragraphs 3-f and 3-h of the enclosed draft statement of policy.

The enclosed draft statement of policy has been prepared in the light of a "Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities", dated November 30, 1954, which was prepared by a Special Committee, appointed by the Chairman of the NSC Planning Board, in agreement with the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence. This Special Committee Report is being separately circulated for information, as an Annex to NSC 5505, to each NSC member and other participants in the forthcoming NSC meeting on this subject; copies having already been made available through the NSC Planning Board to the interested departments and agencies. A Summary of this Special Committee Report prepared by the NSC Planning Board, together with the views of the JCS Adviser with respect to the Report and its Summary, are enclosed herewith for the information of the Council.

It is recommended that the National Security Council, after resolution of the divergent views expressed in the enclosed draft statement of policy, take the following action:

a. Note the "Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities", dated November 30, 1954, prepared by a Special Committee, appointed by the Chairman of the NSC Planning Board, in agreement with the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and the attached "Summary" thereof, prepared by the NSC Planning Board.

b. Adopt the enclosed statement of policy on "Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities" as a basic guide to all appropriate executive departments and agencies in exploiting discontents and other problems in the USSR and the European satellites, in conformity with paragraph 26-c of NSC 5501, which paragraph states one element of the general strategy contained in NSC 5501.

c. Recommend that the President designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency for the enclosed statement of policy; utilizing a Special Committee chaired by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, and composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence (who may be represented in day-to-day operations by deputies appointed by them), and with the participation as appropriate of representatives of the Department of Justice, the Foreign Operations Administration, the U.S. Information Agency, and other interested departments and agencies, for the purpose of:

(1) Reviewing current programs and developing new programs to carry out this statement of policy, and ensuring coordination of actions taken thereunder.

(2) Making periodic progress reports directly to the OCB for transmittal to the NSC.

d. Refer the "Report" and the attached "Summary", noted in a above, to the Special Committee referred to in c above, to use as background material relevant to carrying out its assignment.

The JCS Adviser to the NSC Planning Board considers that it is inadvisable for the National Security Council to adopt the enclosed draft statement of policy based on the Special Committee Report dated November 30, 1954, until the Operations Coordinating Board has had an opportunity to weigh the principal conclusions and recommendations of that Report against Basic National Security Policy recently promulgated in NSC 5501. The JCS Adviser therefore recommends that the Council note the Summary of the Special Committee Report and refer it, together with the full Report, to the OCB for

further study in connection with developing appropriate implementing actions consistent with NSC 5501.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling of this report, and that access to it be on a strict "need to know" basis.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

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DRAFT

STATEMENT OF POLICY

on

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET
AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

1. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", outlines the following general strategy:

> "26. ... U.S. policies must be designed to affect the conduct of the Communist regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests and to encourage tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:
>
> > "a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S. security.
> >
> > "b. Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of interest and common purpose, and the necessary will, strength and stability, to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of free peoples.
> >
> > "c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:
> >
> > > "(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and

"(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy."

"27. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. Programs for the general strategy between now and the time when the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency."

2. a. This paper prescribes the principles to be applied, in conformity with paragraph 26-c quoted above, in exploiting discontents and other problems in the USSR and the European Satellites, such as tensions inherent in the police state, low standards of living, opposition to collectivization, cultural and intellectual regimentation, interference with religion, dissatisfaction of minorities, nationality problems, the governmental structure of the USSR, ideological weaknesses of the Soviet system, and disaffection in the Satellites.

b. Such discontents and other problems can be usefully exploited only if the U.S. (1) has or can develop a capability for such exploitation and (2) will thereby advance a specific objective within this capability.

3. In exploiting such discontents and other problems, the following principles should apply:

a. Measures for exploitation should be mutually consistent and should be directed toward specific U.S. objectives which are within existing or potential U.S. capabilities.

b. Seek to create and increase popular and bureaucratic pressures on the Soviet regime through the exploitation of discontents and other problems to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and conduct which will be in U.S. interest and tend to lessen the chance of Soviet attack upon the U.S. As appropriate, seek (1) to cause the regime to occupy itself increasingly with internal problems and (2) to pose difficult decisions tending to create uncertainty or divisions within the regime.

c. Continue basic opposition to the Soviet system and continue to state its evils; but stress evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. At the same time make clear that while the U.S. is determined to protect its vital security interests by force if necessary, it does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force.

d. Generally depict the causes of the discontents and other problems which are to by exploited not as inherent conditions reparable only be revolution but as conditions susceptible to correction by the regime if it should choose to take the necessary action.

e. Apply these principles to the European Satellites, taking advantage as appropriate of the special opportunities existing in these countries to exert greater pressures, and to weaken the ties which bind the Satellites to the USSR.

f. Because substantial change in basic conditions in the USSR or the Satellites (including the imminent threat or initiation of general war) might render these principles inappropriate, they should be continuously reviewed. In order to be prepared to meet any such substantial change, the U.S. should continue to develop and maintain capabilities which would be required in the event of such change, [in so far as this can be done without impairing the carrying out of these principles.]*

g. Covert operations (including experimentation with such anti-regime measures as might be applicable to substantially changed circumstances) will not necessarily have to conform to the above principles, but should be conducted so as not to impair the effectiveness of such principles.

[h. Application of the principles set forth in subparagraphs a through e above does not preclude experimentation with such overt anti-regime measures as might be applicable to substantially changed

*The Defense Member and The JCS Adviser propose deletion.

circumstances. The U.S. can take apparently contradictory lines of action, provided it avoids solidifying the conviction that the U.S. in determined to overthrow the whole system by direct intervention./7*

4. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in accordance with the above principles can be expected to modify the policies of the USSR and the European Satellites along lines more compatible with U.S. security interests only if further Communist expansion is prevented. The USSR and the European Satellites are not likely to experiment with alternatives more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques of military and political pressure on and in the free world show signs of achieving success. Therefore, success in carrying out the above principles will depend upon:

a. Maintenance by the U.S. and its allies, for an indefinite period, of military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop; and united determination to use military force against such agression.

b. Building the strength and cohesion of the free world and taking adequate actions for the purpose of

*Proposed by the Defense Member and the JCS Adviser.

(1) creating cohesion within and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily improving the relative position of the free world and (2) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the free world.

c. Thereby convincing the Communist rulers that aggression will not serve their interests, that it will not pay. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

SUMMARY OF REPORT BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE
on
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. An exploitable vulnerability exists in a foreign society only if three elements are present: (a) a "weakness" to be exploited, (b) a U.S. objective, and (c) a U.S. capability we can employ or develop to exploit the weakness in a way which will advance the objective.

2. The general objective of U.S. political warfare operations against Soviet and Satellite regimes is to reduce their capabilities and alter their policies so as to reduce the threat they pose to the U.S. This objective can be broken down into four related sub-objectives, the first of which is:

a. To reduce the actual military capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite countries, both in the short and the long run.

The U.S. does not possess at the present time the actual or potential means to conduct political warfare operations that will significantly reduce Soviet military capabilities. Therefore, the prime task of U.S. political warfare is to affect choices on the part of top leaders, middle bureaucrats, and the people in the USSR and the Satellites in such a way as to accomplish the remaining three sub-objectives, which are:

b. Reduce the chance that the leaders will choose war.

c. Increase the chance that they would accept a quick end of hostilities on terms compatible with U.S. interest.

d. Increase the chance of evolutionary change over time of a nature to reduce the Soviet threat.

It is sometimes assumed that a necessary and sufficient condition for the achievement of all three of these objectives is the removal or overthrow of the present Soviet regime. It is not safe to assume that it is either a necessary or a sufficient condition. While unlikely, it is not impossible that over a number of years or decades the policies of the regime might evolve in ways favorable to U.S. interest. And it is certainly by no means a foregone conclusion that a revolutionary successor regime would inevitably behave better.

3. a. Accordingly, the political warfare strategy should attempt to promote evolutionary change within the USSR and the Satellites in directions consistent with U.S. interest:

(1) Through measures designed to expand the field of realistic and attractive alternatives perceived by persons at various levels within the society.

(2) Through measures designed to induce the Soviet and Satellite decision-makers, by persuasion and pressure, to adopt courses of action more in U.S. interest.

b. This political warfare strategy must rely upon, and be consistent with, those major domestic and foreign policies on which the U.S. depends to meet and counter the Soviet threat. In particular the success of this strategy will depend on:

(1) U.S. maintenance of sufficient military strength, and the will to use it, to threaten the USSR with military defeat should it undertake direct military aggression anywhere in the free world.

(2) Denial, through vigorous political, economic and military policies within the free world, of opportunities for the USSR to extend its control and influence by subversion and other non-military means.

There will be no internal experimentation by the Soviets with alternative techniques more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques of military and political pressure on and in the free world show signs of achieving notable success.

4. This political warfare strategy should have appropriate implementation where possible in military, foreign and economic policy, as well as in information policy and special operations. It should be continuously reviewed in the light of existing circumstances.

POTENTIALLY EXPLOITABLE SOVIET AND SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

5. The major Soviet vulnerabilities which lend themselves to some degree of effective U.S. exploitation are:

a. Popular discontents (tensions inherent in the police state, low standards of living, opposition to collectivization, cultural and intellectual regimentation, suppression of religion, dissatisfaction of minorities, ideological weaknesses of the system).

b. USSR nationality problems.

c. The structure of the USSR economy.

d. The governmental structure of the USSR.

e. Disaffection in the Satellites.

6. Popular Discontents in the USSR. The U.S. does not possess the capability of inducing successful revolution from below in the near future through the exploitation of popular discontents.

a. U.S. political warfare strategy should vigorously attack the terror and tension induced by police measures, the military rather than civilian bias of the economy, and the restriction of communication with the outside world. These targets would be mainly attacked, however, not as inherent features of the Communist state correctible only by revolution, but as mistaken policies and practices which could be readily modified if the leaders would only consent to do so and which in any event are not really necessary to their legitimate ends.

b. This strategy should emphasize specifically ways in which present discontents could be met by the existing regime, so as to bring effective pressure to bear on current decisions and to dramatize for officials at all levels of the bureaucracy the fact that realistic alternatives to present policies are conceivable.

c. In taking this line, the U.S. should not abandon its basic position that the whole Soviet system is fundamentally wrong, and should continue to state what are thought to be its errors. In doing so, however, the U.S. should make clear that it does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force.

The line taken under this strategy should be aggressive in pressing for change, but evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and generally avoid a tone openly and stridently hostile to the system. Stressing through open propaganda our implacable opposition to the whole Soviet system, may confirm for all who identify themselves in any degree with that system the image spread by the leadership of an external world aggressively hostile, which will greatly narrow popular and bureaucratic conceptions of alternatives open to the USSR.

d. Exploitation of discontents resolvable only through revolution should be avoided.

7. USSR Nationality Problems.* It is not now in the U.S. interest to give the impression to the Soviet leadership by either official actions, or unofficial actions likely to be attributed to the U.S., that the U.S. desires the dismemberment of the USSR. On the other hand, the exploitation of minority nationalities' discontents, either openly within this limitation or in truly covert fashion, should be continued as feasible.

8. The Structure of the USSR Economy. Although the U.S. capability to affect Soviet agricultural output and consumer goods production is extremely limited, political warfare operations should be so designed as to encourage greater investment in agriculture and increased production of consumer goods as a desirable diversion of resources from war production. A program of positive U.S. trade offers, primarily of consumer goods, should be considered by the appropriate departments and agencies.

9. The Governmental Structure of the USSR. It is in the U.S. interest to encourage the current trend toward "constitutionalizing government" rather than a return to the Stalinist system. Encouragement of more delegation of authority and regularization within the bureaucracy may in time act to widen the range of more acceptable alternatives evident to at least some elements in the present or potential leadership

*See NSC 5502, "U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities", January 11, 1955.

and to that extent render more difficult adoption of policies leading towards general war. Those relatively junior officials without present power of major decision are an important target because from their ranks will come the leadership of later decades. Within this context, divisive issues within the bureaucracy should be exploited, i.e., how far to relax police power, how much to expand consumer goods, how to expand agriculture, how to conduct foreign policy, and so forth.

10. Disaffection in the Satellites. All the internal weaknesses of the Soviet system are present in the European Satellites in a much exaggerated form. Therefore, U.S. capabilities for the exploitation of vulnerabilities in this area, as compared with the USSR, vary both as to substance and degree. In the Satellites the basic strategy might well attempt to raise expectations farther and depict alternatives more radically different from present practice. Programs to encourage Satellite peoples to make strong but limited demands on their leaders for improvements should be even more effective in influencing choices both of the Satellite and the Soviet bureaucracies, than would similar programs in the USSR. Moreover, there are greater potentialities in the Satellites for some clearly revolutionary and underground activities as well as for anti-regime propaganda in general. The U.S. should take advantage of such opportunities so far as consistent with the basic strategy. Nevertheless, the following considerations should govern main lines of strategy toward the Satellites:

a. Barring external military aid and intervention, no anti-regime revolt in the Satellites could succeed at present. The United States is not now prepared to undertake such aid and intervention. Accordingly, although it is in the interest of the U.S. to foster conditions which, in the event of either general war or changed circumstances may be favorable to revolt (or related activities, such as sabotage, partisan movements, etc.), it is not in U.S. interest at the present time to encourage revolution as a major element of its strategy toward the Satellites.

b. Belief on the part of Satellite and Soviet leadership that the U.S. is implacably dedicated to the overthrow of both Satellite and Soviet regimes may negate the possibility of exerting U.S. influence towards a more acceptable evolution of Satellite or Soviet society.

FUTURE CONTINGENCIES

11. It would be folly to adopt any political warfare strategy so irrevocably that the U.S. could not change it if developments made this seem wise. There is every reason why planning should be done on the basis of a variety of contingencies. Despite the present unlikelihood of a revolutionary situation, the U.S. should prepare plans and seek to maintain assets to exploit crisis situations or general war, so far as this can be done without prejudicing carrying out the above strategy. This strategy does not preclude experimentation with such anti-regime measures as might be more applicable in changed circumstances (e.g., general war). However, at any particular time, U.S. political warfare operations should be guided by the above over-all strategy, departure from which should be undertaken only for cause and with a clear recognition of possible conflict.

C O P Y

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

6 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

Subject: Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities, Comment and Recommendation by the JCS Adviser.

1. The JCS Adviser considers the foregoing Planning Board paper, subject: "Summary of Report by Special Committee on Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities", to be an adequate summary of the Millikan Report on the same subject.

2. While in agreement that political warfare strategy of the type stated therein should be developed as a part of an integrated U.S. national cold war strategy, the JCS Adviser feels that measures growing out of such a strategy, whatever they may be, will not be meaningful in creating, prior to atomic plenty, conditions under which the U.S. and its Allies can meet and alleviate the Soviet Communist threat under proper safeguards.

3. U.S. and free world military strength and the determination to use it if necessary to prevent further Communist aggression are assumed by the Millikan Report to be a sine qua non for successful implementation of a policy promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Bloc. The collective military strength of the U.S. and its Allies, if properly employed, would have been sufficient in recent years to have put a stop to Communist aggression. However, the limited success which has been achieved is due only in part to the utilization of this military strength.

4. With the above in mind, there is little cause to believe that greater resolution in the use of collective military power against Communist aggression will exist after atomic plenty; the opposite is probably true. If free world vitality and determination to resist Communist aggression are undermined by unreasoning fear of atomic holocaust, the major pre-condition for a policy of evolutionary change will not be met. If the free world is thus inhibited, and the Communists continue to absorb new territory by any and all means at their

disposal, it is difficult to perceive how the U.S. can present to the Soviets alternatives attractive to them which do not conflict drastically with the security interests of the United States.

5. The views of the JCS on NSC 5440 are equally applicable to this report. For emphasis, the following extract from their views is stated in conclusion:

> "The JCS are of the opinion, therefore, that our national strategy should recognize that until the Communist regimes are convinced that their aggressive and expansionist policies will be met by countermeasures which inherently will threaten the continued existence of their regimes it will not be feasible to induce a change in their basic attitude or bring about the abandonment of their present objectives."

6. The JCS Adviser recommends that the NSC note the summary of the Millikan Report and refer it to the OCB for further study in connection with developing appropriate implementing actions consistent with NSC 5501 as approved.

(SIGNED)

JOHN K. GERHART
Major General, USAF
JCS Adviser to the
NSC Planning Board

The President

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
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November 30, 1954

Memorandum for General Robert Cutler
National Security Council

1. Transmitted herewith is the Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities prepared by the undersigned Committee pursuant to a memorandum dated August 13, 1954 from you to the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. The members of the Committee, while nominated by their respective agencies, have participated in the Committee's deliberations in their personal capacities rather than as official representatives of their departments. Accordingly the views expressed in the report are solely those of the members of the Committee itself and do not represent the official position of any department or agency.

3. The State Department representative originally nominated to the Committee, Mr. Francis Stevens, participated in the early stages of the drafting of this report but was prevented by another urgent assignment from continuing with the Committee and has had no opportunity to review the final draft.

4. The Committee will submit at a later date two appendices to the report as follows:

a. A draft policy statement on the nationalities problem as it affects general U. S. foreign policy and specific operations.

b. A selected bibliography of earlier studies of the problem of Soviet vulnerability.

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5. The Committee has limited the scope of its work to the USSR and the Eastern European Satellites. No consideration is given in this report to the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of Communist China.

Max F. Millikan

Max F. Millikan, Chairman
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Richard M. Bissell
Central Intelligence Agency

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Department of State

Randolph Zander

Randolph V. Zander
Department of Defense

Tilghman B. Koons

Tilghman B. Koons, Executive Secretary
Member, Special Staff, NSC

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REPORT ON THE EXPLOITATION

OF

SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

November 30, 1954

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ANALYTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

Many attempts have been made both within the government and without to list Soviet vulnerabilities. They never seem to supply what the requester wants. We believe this is both because there are ambiguities in what people mean by vulnerabilities and because there are specific difficulties in applying that concept to the USSR. We therefore feel it necessary to preface our discussion of specific vulnerabilities with some propositions intended to clarify our point of departure. For brevity these propositions are stated baldly, without qualification and without supporting argument. We have made no systematic effort to explore the vulnerabilities of Communist China, and what is said in this report does not necessarily apply to that country.

1. Definition. A vulnerability of a foreign system can be defined only if each of three elements is clearly specified: (a) a characteristic of the society (a "weakness" to be exploited); (b) a U. S. objective (a result we hope to achieve by exploiting the vulnerability); and (c) a set of instruments we can employ or develop to exploit the vulnerability.

In past efforts to list vulnerabilities the need for the second and third elements have usually not been adequately understood. It has been implicitly assumed that any event that would "make trouble" for the regime, whatever its other effects, would serve U. S. interests.

We believe a precise statement of what we want will frequently reveal this to be untrue. It has likewise been often assumed that it will be possible for us to find instruments short of war capable of effectively exploiting any major "weakness," if only we are ingenious enough. We think there are broad areas where this is impossible.

2. Assumed foreign policy context. For the purposes of this exercise we assume that political warfare vis-a-vis the Soviet Union takes place within the framework of two presently established policies of the United States:

a. The U. S. will maintain sufficient military strength to threaten the USSR with military defeat should they undertake direct military aggression anywhere in the Free World.

b. The U. S. will vigorously promote economic, political, and military policies within the Free World designed to deny to the Soviet Union opportunities for extending their control and influence by suvversion and other nonmilitary means.

3. Objectives of political warfare. Within this framework of policies designed to make both military and nonmilitary aggression unprofitable for the USSR, we take it to be the general objective of our political warfare operations against Russia to reduce Russian capabilities and alter Russian policies so as to reduce the threat they pose to us. We believe it is useful to break this objective down into at least four related sub-objectives, as follows:

a. To reduce the actual military capabilities of the Soviet Bloc countries, both in the short and the long run.

b. To render it less likely that whatever leadership controls Russia will choose to use the military capabilities of the Bloc against us.

c. To render it more likely, should hostilities occur, that whoever controls enemy areas will choose to cease hostilities on terms acceptable to us at the earliest possible moment.

d. In any event to promote changes in Russian society which will tend, if only in the long-run, to reduce or remove the latent threat posed by that society to our way of life. These changes might occur by violent crisis and revoultion or by gradual evolution. They will in any case depend on choices made by Russians.

4. Interdependence of political warfare measures. Individual political warfare measures cannot be evaluated separately in isolation from each other. In a modern industrial society with advanced communications a series of such measures interact and interrelate in a great many ways. If they are separately designed rather than as parts of an over-all pattern it is highly likely that the effects of some measures will contradict those of others in such a way as to minimize rather than maximize the effect of the program as a whole. This is so because:

a. A measure aimed primarily at one objective may have unfavorable consequences for another. Some things we might do, for instance, to reduce present military capabilities may at the same time increase the likelihood that the leaders will choose war or reduce the chance of a quick cease fire if hostilities occur.

b. A measure aimed at one target group or element in the population, say the peasant, may produce reactions unfavorable to our interest in another target group such as the upper bureaucracy.

c. A measure whose effects are expected to be favorable in the short run may produce delayed consequences unfavorable to us. For instance, a measure which reduces immediate military capabilities may contribute importantly to a growing image of our purposes which will ultimately stiffen the resolve of important groups to oppose us to the death rather than make terms compatible with the U. S. interest.

These points will all be illustrated in the discussion of specific vulnerabilities which follows in Section II. If they are valid, it follows that a simple listing of separate vulnerabilities is most unlikely to give a correct impression of our capabilities for influencing events in the Soviet Bloc.

5. Operations designed to reduce capabilities. Political warfare operations could promote the first of the objectives listed above, namely reduction of the present or future military capabilities of the Soviet Bloc, in two ways:

a. They could operate directly on the physical plant (sabotage, etc.) or organizational efficiency (overload, etc.) on which military strength depends.

b. They could influence morale and support for the regime, inducing groups or individuals to make choices which would lower military effectiveness.

We do not believe the U. S. presently has the capability, actual or potential, to conduct political warfare operations that will significantly reduce present Soviet military capabilities by either of these means. Our reasons are:

a. We know of no weaknesses we can exploit which will directly affect Soviet offensive atomic weapon capabilities.

b. We know of no way we can reduce Soviet atomic defensive capabilities other than through our influence on the choices some Soviet citizens might have to make in the event of atomic attack (or its imminent threat) as to whether to continue to support the regime. We believe we might influence these choices gradually over time, but we think it unlikely that anything we can do in peacetime will sufficiently affect attitudes in the near future to change defensive capabilities markedly.

c. Present offensive and defensive capabilities in conventional weapons might be influenced if we could affect the probable behavior of members of the Soviet or satellite armed forces in combat, and to a much lesser degree if we couldaffect the behavior of supporting civilian groups. We believe our potential present influence on the behavior of these groups is small, though we probably have some margin of influence in the satellites. If we could bring it about, an increase in discontent and resistance to the policies of the regime might reduce the leadership's estimates of their capabilities for undertaking aggression without threat to their own power.

d. The direct costs we can currently impose on the Soviet economy by any operations we can think of are unlikely to be great enough to reduce significantly current military capabilities.

6. The task of political warfare -- to influence choice. If the preceding propositions are accepted, it follows that the prime task for political warfare is to attempt to affect the choices likely to be made in the future by leaders or people in Russia and the satellites in such a way as to achieve the second, third, and fourth objectives outlined above; that is reduce the chance that the leaders will choose war, increase the chance that they will agree to a quick cease fire in the event of war on terms compatible with the U. S. interest, and increase the chance of changes over time in Russian policy, revolutionary or evolutionary, which will stably reduce their threat to us. It may also be possible to affect future (not present) choices in such a way as to serve indirectly the first objective of reducing Soviet military capabilities.

It is sometimes assumed that a necessary and sufficient condition for the achievement of all three of these objectives is the removal or overthrow of the present Soviet regime. We do not think it safe to assume that it is either a necessary or a sufficient condition. While unlikely, it is not impossible that over a number of years or decades the policies of the regime might evolve in ways favorable to our interest. And it is certainly by no means a foregone conclusion that a revolutionary successor regime would inevitably behave better. We have tried to state our objective in terms of the choices we would like any Russian regime to make.

Our principal task, then, is to affect choices. Choices by individuals or groups, leaders or people, depend upon the way they perceive the alternatives. Political warfare can thus affect choices in three ways:

a. By words and acts which suggest to the target that the range of realistic alternatives is wider than he had supposed. (A major purpose of Soviet internal propaganda is to narrow the range of alternatives, persuading the target that there really is no choice between present practice and anything else.)

b. By words and acts which impress the target with the unattractive features of courses of action (alternatives) not consistent with our objectives.

c. By words and acts which impress the target with the practicability and desirability of courses of action (alternatives) which are in fact consistent with our objectives.

7. Denial of the choice of aggression. In one area of policy the Soviet conception of the alternatives is particularly sensitive to what we say and do. Our military and political posture determines in large measure what they believe will be the consequences for them of external aggression, local or general, military, political, or economic. We have the capability of persuading them that military force, wherever used outside the present boundaries of the Bloc, will be met by overwhelming force sufficient to threaten the destruction of the regime. We believe we also have the capability, through policies we follow in the Free World, of denying to the Soviets the opportunity of extending their control and influence by nonmilitary means. As we understand it,

it is present U. S. policy to do everything in our power to render external aggression unattractive to Russia. Discussion of the means of implementing this policy is outside the scope of our assignment, but the effectiveness of any of the political warfare measures considered in what follows hinges critically on our effectively denying them this alternative. As explained below, we believe this to be the only way of encouraging any Soviet leadership to explore constructively other ways of achieving legitimate Russian objectives.

8. Developing alternatives. Assuming that our military and political posture is such as to remove from Russian leaders and people all hope of successful external aggression, we believe we will influence their choices more by suggesting alternatives to present policies than by emphasizing present evils. To the extent that we can stir up popular discontent or increase the leadership's estimate of its extent we can emphasize in their minds the internal dangers of external aggression. But we can do this better by suggesting alternatives than by attacking present conditions. Making a bad situation look worse will not affect behavior (choices) unless the subject sees something he can do about it. We therefore believe that to be effective the bulk of our political warfare effort must go into portraying for leaders and people a positive conception of the realistic and attractive alternatives open to them, consistent with our interests. We believe this because:

a. There is abundant evidence that the peoples of the Soviet Bloc are fully aware of the unsatisfactory nature of their lot. It is improbable that we can worsen that lot or heighten their distaste for it sufficiently to induce them to act differently.

b. While there are signs that elements in the present leadership may be developing a somewhat more flexible view of the alter alternatives open to them, there remain major limitations in the conception of alternatives held by both people and regime.

The possibility of choice for most people, even for totalitarian leaders, is not continuously present. At intervals events force a re-examination of alternatives and choices present themselves. Policies are then adopted or rules of thumb laid down and decisions for a time follow conventional patterns. There are moments of history, periods of internal crisis, the chaos during and following wars, the occasion of major international negotiations, when the range of possible choices widens suddenly and rapid change is possible. There are other more frequent times when more limited alternatives for marginal changes are considered. Even slow change is not continuous but consists of a series of more or less discrete choices interspersed with periods of following rules already decided on.

On the other hand, the conception of the alternatives which decision makers bring to these moments of choice is shaped and determined by everything that has happened over a long period. The possibility of unfamiliar alternatives takes hold slowly in men's minds. Thus whether choices will be made favoring our interest at moments of decision depends in part on the groundwork that has been laid by our acts and words over a considerable period of time in shaping the concept of the alternatives. In many cases preconceptions are so deeply embedded that they cannot be changed at the moment when the choice presents itself. Preconditioning is essential and whatever we do and say will inevitably precondition.

9. Implications for political warfare. This has a number of implications for political warfare:

a. We cannot influence the perception of alternatives, either now or at moments of crisis, unless we can communicate with those we wish to influence. A high priority should therefore be placed on developing and maintaining the best possible channels of communication with both individuals and groups, notably those now, or potentially close to the levers of Soviet power. Even if we have no high priority content for these channels at the moment we should devote major energies to establishing and maintaining them.

b. Since the formation of attitudes and perceptions takes time, we should be trying now to influence attitudes in ways which will affect choices under a variety of possible future contingencies. This means that we must devote a great deal of thought (1) to exploring possible future situations in which choices in Russia may be important and (2) to considering how our present behavior (acts and words) will in fact influence or could be made to influence those choices when they arise.

c. As long as communication is as difficult and limited as it now is we cannot hope to establish subtle and complex new perceptions of alternatives. Such simple ideas as we hope to get across must be reiterated, and everything we say and do must lend them credibility.

The above set of propositions colors in important ways the committee's conception of its task. Narrowly conceived, the "exploitation of vulnerabilities" is usually thought of as the "exaggeration of weaknesses," - emphasizing how bad conditions are, and making bad conditions worse, - by special means outside the scope of the conventional instruments of foreign policy. Thus conceived we see little promise in the exploitation of vulnerabilities, first because we do not believe we have the capability to exaggerate present organizational and physical weaknesses enough to produce a significant direct reduction of military strength, and second because we do not believe that an unselective exaggeration of weaknesses narrowly conceived can by itself have much effect on choices confronted by leaders or citizens of the Soviet Bloc. Further we are not clear that such effect as it does have is necessarily in our interest. The next section of this report lists a number of what we believe to be the most serious weaknesses of the Soviet system and illustrates with respect to each the propositions developed above.

On the other hand we do see as an important and promising task of political warfare the building in certain minds in the Soviet Union of a conception of realistic and attractive alternatives to present lines of policy, - alternatives which would be much more in our interest. For this to be done effectively, we feel that individual political warfare operations must be put in the context of a general strategy designed to make these various operations reinforce and support rather than conflict with and negate each other. A number of such strategies are possible, each implying a somewhat different pattern of individual

actions. In the third section of this report we attempt to outline one such possible strategy and to suggest its implications for types of exploitation of vulnerability. We are aware that this section perhaps goes beyond our terms of reference as originally conceived, since it suggests certain tasks for diplomacy and the more conventional instruments of foreign policy. None the less, we see as the key "vulnerability" of the Soviet system the fact that realistic and attractive alternatives to present Soviet policy consistent with both American and Russian long-run interests do in fact exist. Put another way, we see a possibility that forces at work within Russia, interacting with appropriate and sustained U. S. acts and words, might in time bring about significant changes in the Soviet Union which would diminish its threat to us.

SECTION II

POTENTIALLY EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESSES OF THE USSR

A number of studies have been prepared systematically cataloguing strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system. A selected bibliography of such studies is appended hereto. No attempt to reproduce such an exhasutive catalogue will be made here. Rather it is the purpose of this section to discuss a selection of those most important for political warfare in order to illustrate the points made in Section I above and to prepare the way for the discussion of alternative political warfare strategies in Section III.

1. Popular Discontents

There is a whole family of weaknesses which can be classed under the general heading of popular discontents and which can appropriately be discussed together since both the objectives which their exploitation may be designed to serve and the instruments which we might use to exploit them are similar. We may list them as follows:

a. Resentment at the tensions imposed by all the instruments of the police state. These include constant and secret surveillance of even intimate human relationships, the forced labor system, arbitrary and unpredictable denunciation and arrest, and the necessity to participate constantly in unwanted political activity. In all levels of the bureaucracy and in some segments of the intelligentsia this takes the more acute form of fear for the personal safety of oneself and one's family. In the rest of the

population it is more a brooding sense of never being left alone, of never being able wholly to relax than of immediate personal danger. There is abundant evidence that this sense of sustained tension is one of the characteristics of the system most deeply resented by all classes from the man in the street to the upper levels of the control structure.

b. Resentment at continuing low standards of living. Many elements in the population are aware that they have benefited little if at all from the much discussed economic advances of the system. Their daily experience brings home to them the contrast between announcements of greatly expanded production and the continuation virtually unchanged or reduced of the levels of diet, housing, recreation, and consumer goods which have prevailed for decades.

c. Opposition to collectivization. No feature of Soviet economic organization is so persistently and deeply hated by any group as collective farming is hated by many of the peasantry.

d. Resistance to cultural and intellectual regimentation. This is important only for limited groups in the intelligentsia, but for some of them, who could be critical in the process of change, it is no doubt very important.

e. Resentment at the suppression of religion. This has been most marked in the older age groups, but a recent recrudescence of official attacks on religion suggests that since the war religious interest has been growing even among the youth. For most Russian idealists religion is the only set of philosophical principles to which it is possible to turn when and if disillusion with Communist

ideology sets in. The trend in Soviet society over the past two decades has been toward a marked reduction of the idealistic (as against the organizational and bureaucratic) content of Communism in Russia, which may account for some revival of religious interest.

f. Resentment at the treatment of minority nationality groups. This involves special problems which are separately treated below.

g. Ideological objection to the philosophical roots of the system. There are undoubtedly some idealist types who have been impressed by the discrepancy between the stated aims of Communism and its day-to-day performance and for whom Greek Orthodoxy is not a substitute. These would welcome an opportunity to support some alternative political philosophy if there were any realistic way it could be promoted. Included in this group are a growing number whose loyalties attach more to the Russian national state than to the Soviet system. The prospects of any alternative are so dim, however, that most of those who would have belonged in this category under other circumstances have resigned themselves to apathy.

These popular discontents constitute weaknesses of the system in the sense that their existence imposes heavy costs of control on the regime, and sets limits to what can be accomplished through voluntary action. Whether they represent vulnerabilities depends first on what choices the U. S. hopes to influence through intensifying these discontents if we could, and second on whether the instruments at our command permit us to affect the discontents enough to influence choices. Further, decision as to the particular discontents we should work on will depend on both our objectives and our capabilities.

Four possible goals of U. S. exploitation of these discontents may be distinguished:

(1) We may hope to encourage important groups to undertake open revolt and overthrow the leadership.

(2) We may hope by increasing the level of popular discontent to increase the leaders' estimate of the internal danger of external aggression and thus reduce the chance they will choose war.

(3) We may hope to maintain and increase the level of popular dissatisfaction against the day when a crisis, brought on in some other way--a war or an open power struggle at the top--opens to at least some of the population an option to switch their loyalty from the present leadership to someone else, Russian or foreign.

(4) We may hope to create popular pressures on the regime over time which will induce officials at various levels to modify governmental policies in ways which will move the system closer to one with which we can live with reduced apprehension.

Certain political warfare measures may serve all these purposes equally, but others which serve one will make another harder to achieve. We can illustrate this by examining each of these purposes in turn.

Promote revolution. The first purpose--revolution--might serve our interests in two ways. First, a country in revolution is almost inevitably a country weakened militarily. The immediate threat to us would be abated at least briefly. Second, we might get a new regime more willing, over time, to accommodate itself to our interests. This, however, may be something of a gamble since no one can predict what will emerge from the socially disintegrating process of revolution.

Whether any basic American interest beyond the short term one of an abatement of the immediate military threat would in fact be served by an early overthrow of the regime is perhaps an academic question since virtually all observers agree that we do not have the capability of inducing successful revolution from below in the Soviet Bloc in the near future. Unless we offer major actual military support no group without present power has any realistic alternative to adaptation to the conditions imposed by the system.

Discourage a choice of war. Many proposed political warfare measures are based on the implicit premise that things that tend to increase resentment against the regime will operate in our interest even though this resentment finds no outlet in overt acts. Where this premise is explicitly formulated it is frequently justified on the ground that an awareness on the part of the leadership of a high level of resentment in the population will dissuade the leadership from aggression because it will make them doubtful of the loyalty of their subjects. There is no boubt that the leadership is almost pathologically sensitive to situations which might threaten their internal power. They may well be more concerned about relatively minor indications of disaffection than would be justified by an objective appraisal of the situation. Thus even measures which do not in fact seriously threaten them may cause them enough concern to inhibit them from external aggression while they concentrate on tightening up the home base.

The contrary implication can be almost equally persuasively argued, however. There is no doubt that up to now the Soviet leadership has used the threat of external conflict to justify many of the measures

that create popular resentment. One of the classic ways of dealing with discontent in the Soviet system is to generate enough external friction to give plausibility to the external threat and thus persuade people to put up with their troubles. There is very probably a school of thought amongst the Soviet decision-makers that believes that when discontent increases it should be met by repressive measures whose sting is modified by focussing attention on external dangers. This intensification of world frictions might not be explicitly designed to provoke hostilities but might well increase the chance of international tension getting out of hand and resulting in war. Thus a policy on our part of generating greater discontent, if we had the capability to make it effective, might induce choices on the part of some of the leadership which would increase our immediate danger.

Much depends on the way this is done. If in the course of emphasizing through open propaganda the unhappy lot of the Soviet citizen we at the same time stress our implacable opposition to the whole Soviet system, we confirm for all who identify themselves to any degree with that system the image spread by the leadership of an external world aggressively hostile. Indeed, if we are right in our assumption stated in the first section that nothing outsiders can say can greatly heighten the discontent of the citizen since this is already shaped by his personal experience, the net effect of repeated attempts to do this over time may be to solidify an unfavorable image of our purposes in the popular and more important in the bureaucratic mind which will greatly narrow their conception of alternatives open to Russia.

Maintain dissatisfaction against a future crisis. Another common argument for the stimulation of popular discontent as a political warfare goal is that it lays the groundwork for a possible period of crisis. Keeping people aware that they are being ill-treated prepares them, so runs the argument, for a quick switch of loyalties in the event that an alternative leadership appears. This switch may be to an alternative Russian leadership or, in the event of war, to allied forces invading Russia. This is a plausible basis for propaganda and other operations designed to emphasize popular discontents, but again there are many ways of doing this which may have contradictory effects.

The mere re-emphasis of present discontent is unlikely to predispose people to a future shift of loyalties unless they are also given a positive image of how they might be treated by an alternative regime. But this requires specification of some of the characteristics of such a regime, which will apply to some alternative regimes but not to others. For instance, the alternative might be a Communist leader now somewhere in the hierarchy whose policies would be more acceptable to us but who would continue to accept much of the symbolism of Communism. If we emphasize ideological discontents and the incompatibility of Communist philosophy with the good life we do little to predispose the Russian public to take risks for an alternative Communist leader. Much more important is the probable effect of our efforts in this event on potential deviationist leaders themselves. If we behave in ways which repeatedly re-enforce their conviction that we are determined to try to destroy any regime that carries the Communist label, their disagreements with the present leadership are likely to be submerged in the common cause against us.

On the other hand, if we are looking mainly to an occasion when we hope to persuade large numbers to lay down their arms in war and come over to our side against their Russian leaders, our objective must be to leave as little hope in their minds as possible that any moderate change in the leadership can relieve their lot. The methods we use and the images we draw in anticipation of these two contingencies will be quite different and in some cases conflicting. And these are only two of the kinds of change in loyalties which might be in our interest in the event of conflict. Another highly possible development is the emergence at the top in a period of crisis of a strong military leader with little conviction about political philosophy, Communist or otherwise, but with a fierce dedication to a traditional Great Russian nationalism. We cannot discuss this or other possibilities further here since our purpose in this essay is merely illustrative, but these examples should serve to emphasize the conclusion stated in Section I that if we are trying in our political warfare to predispose persons in Russia to make choices in our interest in some future crisis we must be much clearer than we have been to date as to what the various alternatives may be that we and they may face when the crisis occurs.

Exaggerate popular discontents in order to affect over time the choices of the leadership. Our habit of thinking of the USSR as a monolithic and all-powerful dictatorship is so ingrained that we tend to fall into the assumption that the only way popular attitudes can affect the regime is through an open challenge to authority. In fact, however, any bureaucracy, even one in which power is sharply concentrated, is sensitive to public reaction and will endeavor to meet public demands

insofar as this can be done without prejudicing a vital interest of the regime. There is abundant evidence that the Soviet leadership has always been aware of the major dissatisfactions of the public and of special groups within it. Stalin and his advisors presumably followed the course they did not in ignorance or in disregard of these dissatisfactions but because they felt that vital interests (including the maintenance of their own power) required the maintenance of the terror, the low standards of living, and the like.

The precise degree to which dissatisfactions can be assuaged without danger to vital interests is a difficult matter to determine and it is inconceivable that there are not wide differences of opinion on this issue within the Soviet bureaucracy. There have been frequent shifts of Soviet policy reflecting the ascendancy of different views on this point. These have been most notable in the post-Stalin period, though Stalin himself followed an erratic course, easing and tightening as pressures and problems altered. A possible objective of political warfare measures designed to exploit popular discontents is to attempt, by influencing these discontents, to influence the choices of the leadership as to how to deal with them.

Dependence of this vulnerability on our objectives. Some purposes we might be pursuing and some methods we might use to do this are suggested in Section III in the discussion of a possible political warfare strategy. At this point in the argument what we must explore is how our exploitation of popular discontents might differ if we are pursuing this objective from what they would be in the two preceding

cases. The principal differences lie in the selection of the discontents we choose to emphasize and in the sorts of choices we try to present as open to people and regime.

If our purpose is to affect choices by governmental decision-makers we should clearly emphasize those discontents with respect to which some governmental decision-makers now see or can be led to see some possible choices as open. More simply, we would in this case avoid exploiting those discontents which appear to be resolvable only through revolution, and we would avoid talking about others as though only revolution could affect them. If we wish to affect the choices of those in the control structure we must not present the alternatives to the public in ways which confirm the bureaucrats' conviction that there are no alternatives acceptable to them.

One implication of this approach would be that we would drop a theme (appropriate to other objectives) to the effect that the interests of the Russian people are implacably opposed to those of the regime. If the only alternative for the people is portrayed as the throwing out of the regime root and branch the bureaucrat must identify with either the people or the regime. The further up in the control structure he is, the more likely he is to think of such appeals as directed against him rather than as opening up alternatives to him. If, as many observers hold, change, violent or gradual, can begin in the Soviet system only near the top, political warfare measures which solidify the leadership in the view that the only alternative to the present state of affairs is their own destruction are unlikely to produce changes in our interest.

The "leadership" for the purposes of this argument probably extends farther down than is sometimes recognized. Thousands of officials are identified in the public mind with the imposition of the measures which produce popular discontents. Thousands are themselves responsible for decisions in detail which implement these measures. If the attack is on the whole structure they will see it as an attack upon themselves, even if they have major disagreements with the instructions they have been carrying out. Events since Stalin's death have probably tended to increase morale in the middle and upper ranks of the bureaucracy in the sense that more persons now have a sense of participating meaningfully in decision-making and therefore identify more with the "regime." If this is so, measures implicitly designed to promote revolution among the people at large are less likely than ever to appeal to the group from which the leadership for such a revolution must be recruited.

If our purpose in emphasizing discontents is to affect the choices of the bureaucracy, another corollary follows. One would emphasize those discontents with respect to which fairly small changes are possible. For instance in talking about abuses of police power in one's radio broadcasting or in the pronouncements of Western officials one would emphasize not that these abuses are an inherent feature of the Soviet system and can be got rid of only by violent overthrow of that system, but rather that they are unnecessary and that it is in the interest of the Soviet regime to modify them. The line might run,"Everyone knows that these police abuses are one of the most disliked features of the Russian scene. Is any constructive Russian purpose really served by

measures as unpopular as these? We note with approval signs that certain Soviet leaders are trying to modify the system. But is there any reason why they should not go a good deal further in this direction than the very limited steps they have already taken? For instance, . . ."

In connection with standards of living, one would not lay great stress on how many consumers goods could be produced if the entire Soviet military machine were dismantled, though one might make this calculation in passing. Nor would one compare Western and Soviet standards of living. Rather one would question whether a little more attention might not be paid to housing standards, pointing out that the sort of limited relaxation of international tensions that might be possible with a limited (and therefore conceivable) international settlement could free at least a margin of resources now devoted to military purposes without really weakening Soviet defensive capabilities. One might plant rumors that quite conceivable modifications of police or economic policy were about to be announced by the regime.

These rumors, which should be highly specific and detailed, should not be so bizarre as to be implausible to the average man but should imply that changes will be made which depart substantially from present practice and from what are probably presently considered alternatives. These rumors would almost certainly travel widely since they concern everyone, and might well create expectations which at least some elements in the bureaucracy would be in favor of satisfying at least in part.

All of this would make sense only if one's objective were to try to promote gradual change in the system in the direction of a relaxation, or to promote conflict and controversy within the bureaucracy as to the

desirability of such change. At the moment we are not concerned to pass judgment on whether or not this is sound policy, but only to illustrate the point that what constitutes a vulnerability is very different if this is your objective than if your purpose is to promote revolution. We shall say more about the middle and upper leadership as a target presently. Here we wish mainly to stress that measures designed to exploit popular discontents may have effects that are different in the short run from what they are in the long run, and are almost certain to have effects on targets (such as the leadership) other than those at which they are directed. These effects must be considered in the light of an over-all strategic concept of what we are trying to achieve by our political warfare program.

Our capabilities to exaggerate popular discontents. These are limited for any of the four purposes outlined above. We doubt very much whether we have sufficient capacity to communicate with broad elements in the Soviet populace to the degree necessary to convince them that systems radically different from the one under which they live are a practical possibility. In certain of the more advanced of the European satellites such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia where broad elements of the population have had personal experience of radically different systems the situation is different. Here radio broadcasting, the skillful placing of information in the grapevine, visits of Westerners, and even clandestine contacts can be very important in keeping a popular image of the West alive in the face of Soviet propaganda. But the history of early attempts of the Voice of America to communicate a "full and fair picture" of American life to the Soviet

people seems to bear out the contention that in Russia this is too far from reality to carry conviction.

There are, however, numerous ways, some of which will be suggested later, for emphasizing that limited changes in present practices, which would be enormously popular and which could be meaningful even in the USSR are possible. Some increase in the volume of overt communication would probably be desirable but no large additional costs need to be incurred. Probably the most effective way of spreading knowledge of alternatives to present practice is to encourage maximum contact of Soviet citizens with Westerners in every way possible. Certain of our present policies discourage both visits of Russians to this country and visits of Americans to the Soviet Union. These at least should be revised.

2. Dissatisfaction of Minorities

One weakness in the Soviet system which has been listed under the preceding heading deserves separate treatment because its possible exploitation poses special problems for the United States. The weakness is found in the fact that the USSR contains within its borders cultural, ethnic, and racial groups whose loyalty to their local society and tradition may be greater than to Great Russia. Most observers would agree that control over these groups has been so effectively established by the regime that there is no possibility of generating from the outside open and effective resistance to Soviet authority by these groups under present conditions. None the less indications of current support in principle and possible future support of a more concrete kind could serve a number of U. S. purposes.

It could perhaps be argued, for instance, that such support, by keeping alive belief in an eventual independent alternative, might so weaken the loyalty of these people to the regime that its capability of waging war would be reduced. As long as the USSR was doing well in such a conflict there is no reason to suppose that the control measures which have been effective in peace could not continue to be exercised as effectively as now. Should the USSR suffer reverses, however, and in particular should the territory of the Soviet Union be invaded by Western ground forces, the military and other costs of such an invasion might be greatly affected by the views of minority groups concerning our attitude toward them. Hitler received potentially valuable support from residents of the Ukraine and of the Caucasus during his invasion of Russia. He threw this support away by making it clear that these minorities could expect no better treatment from him than from their Soviet masters. This is a lesson the Soviets are not likely to let the minorities forget, but we could probably insure a less than totally hostile reception for our armies should they invade certain minority areas by giving over a period of time enough evidence in pronouncements and acts that we were prepared actively to support local dreams of independence.

Similarly in the event of intercontinental atomic warfare, should we effectively destroy from the air the centers of Soviet control and wish to negotiate a settlement with separate widely scattered groups in Russia our chances of doing this quickly would be materially improved by a history of support for the minorities.

Finally should a crisis occur at the top of the Soviet power structure which at least temporarily weakened the system's instruments of control it might be quite possible to organize active resistance on the part of some of the minority groups if careful plans had been laid.

On the other hand there are other contingencies in which a history of U. S. support for the minority groups would effectively block developments in our interest. Suppose, for instance, that the crisis in the leadership should take the form of consideration by the Soviet military of whether they should displace the Party and the secret police and assert full control. They would be influenced in this decision by their estimate of the probability of foreign intervention during the resulting crisis. The army is, by and large, devoted to the unity of the Russian state and would probably not wish to precipitate a crisis which they thought might lead to its dismemberment.

Or consider the situation after an atomic bombardment which knocked out the nerve centers of Party control in the cities but left intact large armies in the field. In this event it would be the military with whom we would be negotiating a cease fire. Their willingness to come to terms would be influenced by whether they thought they could salvage intact the Russian federation. A prior commitment on our part to independence for the minority groups might hold things up seriously.

The impact of our exploitation of minority sentiments on the prospects for long-term evolution of Soviet society in directions favorable to us would depend on many things, including how we supported minority interests. If we did this in such a way as to confirm our aggressively hostile intent in the minds of the people and the leadership, our ability to encourage slow change would be reduced. This should not, of course, deter us if our choice of strategy excludes emphasis on promoting evolution. We should also give serious thought to whether in the long run the various nationality groups are sufficiently capable of stable independent existence so that our interests would be served by the establishment of separate states if this were at some future time feasible. This contingency is probably so far in the future that it is impossible now to form a judgment.

Our capabilities for exploiting nationality sentiments are considerable if we decide that this is worth doing vigorously in spite of its ambiguous effects. We cannot promote effective present resistance, but we could lay the groundwork for such resistance in a period of crisis. Should we decide to do this, it should be with full realization of the risks we run of prejudice to other parts of our political warfare program.

Of course this is an area in which, if we are careful, we can continue to support covertly a variety of groups and activities among the minorities at the same time that we maintain a publicly neutral view. This may be desirable as a kind of insurance against the day when we may wish to use these groups more actively.

The existence of émigré groups in this country, promoting the interests of separatism, exposes us to the danger of exaggerating the desire for independence of the minorities still living in the Soviet Union. It has been suggested that in some cases these groups are discontented more because they are not fully accepted as Russian citizens on a par with all others than because their separatist ambitions are being thwarted. It is important to have better evidence than we now have as to the true nature of their discontent before planning major measures to exploit it. Some of the special problems posed by the émigré groups are discussed in an appendix to this report.

3. The Structure of the Economy.

The most outstanding weakness of the Soviet economy is to be found in its failure, to date, to solve its agricultural problem. A second weakness important from some points of view is its failure, in part related to agriculture but in part springing from other factors, to provide a growing supply of consumers goods to the Russian people. Finally a third weakness toward the exploitation of which major American efforts have been directed is the partial dependence of the Soviet economy for certain products on sources outside the Bloc.

The vulnerability of the USSR to the exploitation of these weaknesses must again be considered in the light of the various objectives we may have in our political warfare efforts. We may operate on the economy to reduce capabilities, to deter a choice of war by Russian leaders, to promote a quick choice of peace in the event of war, or to promote revolutionary or evolutionary long-run change in Soviet society.

The weakness of Soviet agriculture. The impact of agricultural stagnation on present military capabilities has probably not been great. The food supply is adequate to feed the troops and prevent the starvation of civilians. The military machine does not depend in a crucial way on nonfood agricultural raw materials. We do not have the capability in being to affect Soviet agricultural output directly. It is somewhat uncertain whether with a substantial additional effort we could develop this capability through developments in biological and chemical warfare, weather warfare, and the like. Supposing we could, what U. S. interests would this serve?

It would take a very substantial reduction in Soviet agricultural output to reduce markedly current Russian capabilities to mount a ground offensive. In a long war lasting several years sharp reduction of agricultural output would no doubt ultimately become crucial. The instruments to effect this are more appropriate to hot war than to cold, but fear of agricultural failure might be an important deterrent to risky adventures by the leadership. A decision to risk general war would almost certainly not be taken by the leadership during an agricultural crisis believed to be temporary, but chronic agricultural failure might encourage local aggression in an area like Southeast Asia to secure added food for the Bloc.

Taking a longer-run view it is probable that continued agricultural failure and the measures taken by the USSR to overcome it would in time reduce the rapid rate of Soviet economic growth and would thus slow down the growth of economic capabilities for war of the Bloc. It seems

quite likely that in spite of added investment in agriculture there will be continued shortfalls against Soviet plans. If we had the capability of rendering these shortfalls more extreme we might encourage the larger allocation of resources to agriculture which will probably take place to some extent in any event.

Insofar as we can influence the choices of the regime as to how large a volume of resources to allocate to investment in agriculture, we will probably reduce both growth and military strength by encouraging as large an allocation as possible. The productivity of investment in Soviet agriculture is probably relatively low. In other words the capital resources which must be invested in agriculture (in irrigation, fertilizers, and the like) to increase the value of output by a given amount are probably a good deal greater than in other sectors of the economy. Hence the more resources are shifted from other purposes to agricultural improvement the slower the over-all rate of growth will be.

What are our capabilities for influencing choices as to investment in agriculture? This is part of the general problem of the degree to which we can by our behavior affect the total pattern of Soviet bureaucratic choice. As explained later these choices will depend in part on how safe the leadership feels it is to divert resources from more directly military uses and in part on the pressures on them from the population to increase the availability of foodstuffs. The totality of our acts, diplomatic, military, overt and covert propaganda will probably have some effect on their estimate of risk, particularly if these acts are consistent . Insofar as we can devise

measures to increase popular pressures for agricultural improvement and for more food, as discussed in the preceding section, these will have an influence on such choices about resource allocation as the bureaucrats conceive to be open to them.

Clearly there is little prospect that anything we can do can have a sudden and dramatic effect on these choices. The best we might hope is that over ten or fifteen years of consistently following an integrated political warfare strategy we might have some marginal influence on the rate of shift in the allocation of resources. Such a shift, if it came about, would not only affect future military capabilities but might also promote long-run changes in Soviet society which would make it less menacing.

Note that our techniques of exploitation will depend on the kind of influence on choice we hope to have. If we conclude that our best hope is to promote eventual revolution, we will emphasize in all our acts and words the impossibility of dealing with the Soviet agricultural problem without completely altering the whole system of organization of agriculture. Our tactic will be to try to make that system, in any and all of its variants, perform as badly as possible in order to generate the conviction in at least a few minds that only complete and violent change can produce significant results. This tactic implies abandoning any effort to exert influence on present bureaucrats in the ultimate hope of getting them all thrown out in favor of others.

The alternative tactic would be to promote primarily technical and a-political consideration of the Soviet agricultural problem, to focus attention on changes which would not appear to involve a complete change in the system, and thus to stimulate among the existing bureaucracy belief in a wider range of alternatives than they now see. There are many ways we could do this, particularly against a background of continued difficulty in Soviet agriculture. We could disseminate technical information on the kinds of investment in agriculture that are possible. This would not be news to the upper bureaucrats, but it need not threaten them in any way. It might affect popular discontent by emphasizing that there are things that can be done to relieve the food situation that are not being done. It might impress today's middle and lower bureaucrats, who are tomorrow's upper bureaucrats with the notion that there are possibilities that could be exploited if the priorities of the top leadership were shifted a little. This would be particularly appealing to those locally responsible for agricultural output.

We could organize international conferences on agricultural techniques with field trips to projects in all parts of the world (including the USSR). We could perhaps even pry open some Soviet minds to the possibility of alternative forms of organization of agriculture by proposing in international bodies, with a strictly technical tone, studies of the relative influence on productivity of different systems of peasant incentive and control with examples from China, India, Russia, Hungary, France, etc.

It may be objected that this tactic could promote actual improvement in the agricultural situation in Russia and thus remove a weakness rather than exploit it. There are several comments to be made on this objection. In the first place, the Soviets can probably obtain real results in agriculture only by diverting resources and changing organization in ways which would almost certainly reduce the threat that system poses to us. This would result partly from the reduction in heavy and military investment which a major large-scale program of agricultural investment would require, and partly from the relaxation and re-emergence of private peasant incentives which is the organizational change most likely to increase productivity. In the second place, there is a question as to whether small improvements in the lot of the citizen -- in this case some increase in the availability of food stuffs -- reduces or increases his effective discontent. Such increases please him for a time, but they also create expectations which can be satisfied only by a continuation of the same process. There was wisdom in Stalin's apparent conviction that relaxation and improvement in standards of living may well be an irreversible process which leads to ever-increasing demands.

Whether this is correct or not, our concern here is to point out that the steps one takes to exploit possible vulnerabilities in Soviet agriculture depend on the total pattern of effects one is trying to achieve.

The lack of sufficient consumers goods. Turning to the weakness in consumer goods production, a virtually identical set of considerations applies. There are probably no ways short of war in which we can

directly reduce the volume of goods other than food available to the Soviet consumer. Neither present nor possible trade controls have the capability of pinching the consumer significantly. A relaxation of such controls combined with a drive for nonstrategic East-West trade might increase the possible volume of consumer goods available if we thought this would be in our interest. This is further discussed below in connection with trade policy.

Our potential influence, then, if we have any, must be exercised largely through an effort to affect the choices of the present or an alternative regime as to the allocation of resources between consumer goods and other things. To the extent that we can induce or promote an increase in the proportion of Soviet resources devoted to consumers goods we will, as in the case of agriculture, probably reduce the rate of growth and possibly induce structural changes which will make the system less menacing. This is particularly true of housing, whose annual yield of services per dollar of capital invested is lower than that of any other form of investment.

The exploitation of this vulnerability, it should be noted, is to be effected by instruments which operate directly on either popular discontent or bureaucratic choice, and must therefore be closely related to programs for exploiting many of the other vulnerabilities we outline in this section. Again, a strategy of maximizing strains between people and regime in order to promote revolution may dictate measures inconsistent with those designed to induce change by smaller increments.

Vulnerability to East-West trade policy. The avowed purpose of East-West trade control as practiced to date has been to reduce direct military capabilities. It is our judgment that the vulnerability of the Soviet economy to such controls is not great enough to justify a greatly expanded effort at restriction on our part. Judged by the sole criterion of direct effect on military capabilities present techniques of exploitation are probably in the right direction although the magnitude of their effects is probably not great. East-West trade policy should at least be examined, however, in relation to other objectives of political warfare. Little thought has been given to the use of East-West trade policy as an instrument for affecting the choices, now or in the future, of the populace or the bureaucracy.

One consideration is that a highly publicized policy of trade restriction or economic warfare can be and has been used by Soviet propaganda to verify the image of the United States as a hostile and aggressive force. Over the years this may well act to reconcile the Soviet public to the present Soviet system and limit the perception of alternatives. By itself trade policy would probably not be of great importance, but taken together with a pattern of other apparently hostile acts it adds its contribution.

Further consideration should be given to the possibility of using trade offers, trade conferences, and the like as an instrument to dramatize for people and bureaucrats some alternatives to present courses of action. An obvious example would be an American offer to help raise standards of living of Russian consumers by supplying

consumers goods in exchange for Russian nonstrategic materials. This could be used to stir up popular pressures by explaining to the Russian people what attractive articles they could obtain at what low prices if such a program were to be undertaken. An examination of possible terms, lists of goods, samples, prices, and the like taking place quite widely through the Soviet bureaucracy, might have a substantial influence in widening the interest of some Soviet bureaucrats not only in the deal at issue but in the consumer goods sector of their own economy. This is merely an example of a political warfare use of East-West trade policy quite different from, and perhaps inconsistent with, the use we have made of it so far which deserves closer examination, particularly if an altered conception of over-all political warfare strategy were to be adopted. One attractive feature of such a new type of exploitation of Soviet weakness is that our capabilities for playing the game of trade offers are much greater than theirs. We need not fear having our bluff called, as they must, since our capacity to supply consumer goods is almost limitless.

4. The Governmental Structure

The dilemma of centralized power. Perhaps the most serious long-run weaknesses in the Soviet system are those arising out of the difficulties of maintaining centralized power in a police state and at the same time achieving efficiency and imagination in administration. Efficiency requires delegation of authority, clear lines of jurisdiction, and the development of subloyalties to units of administration which must work smoothly as teams. But each of these things carries a potential threat to the centralization of power. Delegation of authority means delegation of power, clear lines of jurisdiction permit administrators to solidify their control within their own field, bureaucratic subloyalties can become so strong that they supersede loyalty to the top in the event of disagreement.

Stalin dealt with this dilemma by boldly seizing one horn. He provided minimum delegation of authority, he did his best to keep lines of jurisdiction muddy and changing, and he instituted an elaborate system of cross-spying and interagency infiltration designed to prevent the development of lasting subloyalties. At times when the penalties of this system in inefficiency were too great it was modified. During the War, for instance, the autonomy, and internal cohesion of the armed forces on whose efficiency the survival of the state depended was permitted to increase. After the War, Party and police controls were widely reinstituted throughout the armed forces.

There is good evidence that the Stalin system generated deep resentments and discontents through the bureaucracy, but the only elements that could even speculate about alternatives were those in command of instruments of power -- the military, the Party, and the secret police. Of the three the military were apparantly least happy about the state of affairs, but the system of police and Party controls through the military was too pervasive to permit action, and we have no firm evidence that any steps were ever contemplated by army leaders to take such action. Our capabilities to exploit this weakness other than by direct military intervention were extremely limited. Even offers of direct intervention would have had ambiguous effects, since the military are restrained from thinking about resistance to the regime by the fear that any sign of internal weakness will be seized upon by us as a pretext not merely to destroy the regime but to dismember Russia.

The constitutionalizing of government. There are many signs that the new regime is experimenting with a somewhat different policy of attempting to secure greater efficiency by regularizing the bureaucracy, clarifying lines of jurisdiction, and permitting a greater sense of cohesion to develop within departments and bureaus. This "constitutionalizing" of government, if it is taking place, poses other but equally serious problems for the maintenance of centralized power, which constitute a weakness which it may be possible to exploit. Under this kind of a system

the limitations on the capacity of any bureaucrat to contemplate a wider range of alternatives are much less severe. Differences of view as to how to deal with particular individual problems are much more likely to arise and once having arisen to become institutionalized in departmental positions. Furthermore independent contemplation of a wider range of alternatives is likely to be found a good deal further down in the hierarchy as fear of sudden and arbitrary removal for deviationism abates somewhat.

This greater freedom to consider new choices is likely to be felt first and most in the areas furthest removed from traditionally political or ideological issues. As the test of a policy becomes increasingly its success in achieving its goals and decreasingly whether it corresponds in detail to a current Party line, officials have more and more opportunity to experiment, particularly when such experiment runs little risk of carrying them into ideological issues. As the bureaucratization of decisions proceeds, officials will be slow at first to take advantage of the option it gives them to experiment. At this point marginal nudges suggesting possible choices they believe to be realistic alternatives under the circumstances may be most important. Any student of American bureaucracy knows that once departmental positions are established, interagency and interpersonal conflict can grow around what began as purely technical disagreements until the full array of instruments of power is called into play by each protagonist to establish his

position. Under these conditions an attempt to revert to completely centralized decision-making will meet stiff resistance and may even provoke open conflict in the leadership.

Our intelligence is too poor to permit a firm estimate of how far this process of constitutionalism and regularization of procedures has already gone. While it has almost certainly not yet gone very far, there have definitely been some changes from the Stalin technique of rule. There are three reasons why, however far it may have gone, it is probably in the United States' interest to promote it. The first is that the process itself constitutes some dispersion of power through the bureaucracy and thus increases the likelihood that officials can be found in the hierarchy more willing to consider policies attractive to us. The second is that the farther it goes the greater become the possibilities of open resistance to a top leader who attempts to reverse it and to re-establish the mantle of Stalin. The third is that such dispersion of power if it progresses a good deal farther, may make it harder for the system quickly to make "strong" decisions of the kind most dangerous to us.

Issues potentially divisive in the bureaucracy. It is not difficult to list the major issues about which there is almost certain to be some disagreement in the upper bureaucracy. They probably are:

a. How far should the relaxation of internal tensions, the reduction in police power, the limitations on arbitrary arrest go? It would be strange if there were not some who

felt that the regime had already departed too far from Stalin's rules and that no good could come from this stirring up of expectations of a more peaceful life. The fact that some measures in this direction have in fact been taken suggests that there are probably others who would like to see it pushed a good deal farther, who feel that the secret police method is a costly and dangerous method of maintaining control and that if more voluntary adherence to the regime were to be encouraged the state's affairs could be run much more efficiently.

b. To what degree should resources be shifted from heavy industry and military output into consumers goods production? Those responsible for national security undoubtedly view with alarm the minor shifts that have already taken place. On the other hand there must be a group of technicians who are itching to demonstrate what the economy can do in civilian output and who rationalize this as necessary to build morale, even from the narrow point of view of military effectiveness. No doubt there are also in this latter group those who feel privately that the external danger has always been somewhat exaggerated and perhaps some who argue that the atomic bomb now makes "cheap defense" possible and reduces the need for quite such large efforts in conventional weapons.

c. What methods should be used to boost agricultural output? How far should the reinstatement of peasant incentives be pushed as against a really all-out effort to make full collectivization work?

d. How far should the recent new line in foreign policy be pushed? Was it merely inviting trouble to relax the iron curtain even a little? Does the London Pact demonstrate the failure of the "soft" line to split the allies? Or has there not yet been time to gain the full fruits of the new line, and is the trouble rather that it has not been carried far enough or maintained long enough?

A much longer list could and should be drawn up. We are not implying that the policy disagreements on these matters have been or will be permitted to threaten the unity of action of the regime. We are merely saying that an area of controversy, however narrow, must exist and that it is to our interest to widen it.

Our capabilities to broaden the conception of alternatives. The degree to which alternatives in both internal and external policy are considered will depend in part on the success of Soviet external policy. If Soviet efforts to extend Communist influence abroad and to weaken the Western Alliance are progressing favorably the bureaucracy is much more likely to remain united and satisfied with present courses of action. Thus if we are to

encourage any bureaucrats to think about alternatives, we must exploit to the full our capabilities of confronting the Soviet Bloc with sufficient military force to deny them the benefits of external military aggression and with sufficient Free World cohesion, and economic and political vitality, to deny them subversive victories wherever possible.

Second, and this is much more difficult, if we are to exploit our capacity to affect marginal decisions, and probably even if we hope at any stage to encourage an open revolutionary break we must so far as possible avoid creating the impression that we are unalterably hostile to the continuation of any regime in which any present bureaucrats participate. As already pointed out, insofar as our purpose is to affect choices we will fail if we convince the target that our real purpose is to eliminate him. It will be objected that all Communist bureaucrats believe this anyway since capitalist encirclement is a cardinal principle of Communist doctrine. This may be true of the fanatical Communist, but the repeated shifts in the official Soviet attitude toward coexistence suggest that practical men find plenty of room for operational maneuver within the limits of dogma. There may well be a tendency in the new race of tough-minded practical bureaucrats to operate on the basis of much less rigid and abstract assumptions than their revolutionary predecessors. This does not mean that these men are not good Communists, or in some sense do not believe in their ideology.

A majority of Americans genuinely believe themselves to be Christians, and would resist to the teeth any direct attack from abroad on Christianity, but few base their political decisions on a rigid application of Christian principles.

Within this framework of firm denial of the option of successful external military or subversive aggression combined with continual reiteration in word and deed of the idea that we are not opposed to the legitimate interests of any reasonable Russian regime we have many opportunities for affecting choice at various levels of the bureaucracy. We can do this as suggested above partly by operating in a variety of ways on popular discontents. We can affect in limited ways the effectiveness of the Soviet economic system. We can influence the behavior of people and possibly even of bureaucrats in the satellites. Above all we can do this by direct contacts with members of the bureaucracy itself in our normal diplomatic dealings, in the U. N., in specialized conferences and meetings such as the technical committees of the ECE, by broadcasts and other information media activities which reach bureaucrats much more easily than the people, and by inserting ideas into the stream of publicly available news in the West (newspapers, domestic radio, speeches, etc.) most of which gets to certain levels in the bureaucracy. We can give much more attention than we have to opening a variety of diplomatic alternatives by a constant stream of proposals of all kinds. Indeed the notion that the bureaucracy, in the broad sense of the whole

of civil and military officialdom, should be a principal conscious target and will almost always be an actual audience to anything we do is one of the main conclusions we would draw. It is a target we must regard as crucial because it is the only target we can reach that may have the power to produce change over time in Soviet behavior.

In considering this target our instruments must be chosen, however, with several points in mind. First, we probably cannot hope to have major short-term influence on any Soviet choices except foreign policy choices. The images we create of our purposes and of the alternatives open to the regime will take effect only slowly and cumulatively through time. This means that to create consistent images we must engage in words and deeds that are consistent through time and with each other.

Second, if we are playing for the long pull we should not be too distressed if our political warfare program appears to have little influence on the top three or four figures in the hierarchy. We are playing for keeps, and in the long run it is the present middle and lower bureaucrats with whom in almost any event we are going to have to deal.

Third and most important, we should decide what kind of an influence we are going to try to exert in a pattern of activities related to each other and then engage in other activities directed at other ends only after consideration of how far they contradict our central purpose. In other words, we should establish a strategic concept for our political warfare and then adhere to it.

5. Disaffection in the Satellites

The fact that the satellite countries of the Bloc are under the detailed control of an alien and in many cases a traditionally hated power constitutes one of the most crippling weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc system. Since the nature of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe is quite different from that in China we will limit ourselves to the case of Eastern Europe in what follows.

Weaknesses in the satellites. All the internal weaknesses of the Soviet system are present in the European satellites in much exaggerated form. The popular discontents are probably more deeply felt, first because they exist in a context of daily oppression by representatives of a foreign power and second because in many of these areas there linger memories of a recent different and freer system. This is especially important in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. What in Russia are minority discontents of uncertain strength are in the satellites deep sentiments of national pride with roots in historic traditions of independence. The economic weaknesses of the Soviet Union are similarly magnified in the satellites. The agricultural failures of collectivization are more recent and dramatic, standards of living have in some cases not only not been raised but actually depressed far below former levels by collectivization and industrialization, and East-West trade controls imposed mainly by the Russians have wrenched traditional trading patterns into new and frequently less desired patterns. Within the governmental structure there is added to

the dilemma of maintaining efficiency under highly centralized authority the dilemma of providing incentives positive or negative which will induce bureaucrats of one nationality to serve the interests of another.

Precisely because these weaknesses are so much more pronounced it is especially tempting to design measures to exploit them vigorously in all directions at once. However, the problem of determining the full impact on all our objectives, direct and indirect, of political warfare in the satellites is even more complex than in the Soviet Union, and it is even more essential that various objectives be sorted out and a consistent strategy to pursue them developed.

Objectives of political warfare in the satellites affecting military capabilities. In the first place, we cannot rule out quite so easily in the satellites the possibility that we can directly affect military capabilities by operations of one sort or another. At the least there are real possibilities of covert support for organized resistance groups which might perform valuable sabotage functions in the event of hostilities. Preparatory measures to maintain contact with any such groups that may exist and perhaps even to encourage the formation of new ones should not be beyond our capabilities. In considering what we would gain from such operations we should, however, carefully weigh the consequences for our other political warfare objectives if operations of this sort should become known to persons in the satellites who are targets of other programs and appeals.

Affecting choices. Insofar as our political warfare operations in the satellites are designed to affect choices rather than to reduce military potential by direct physical means, we must bear in mind that there are at least three and perhaps four quite different groups whose choices may be important to us. These are (1) the bulk of the satellite populations, (2) possibly some potential anti-Communist leadership, (3) the bureaucracy of the Communist governments of the satellite countries, and (4) the Soviet bureaucracy.

If we conclude that it is desirable and practical to attempt to promote actual revolution in a satellite, certain sorts of rather large-scale propaganda efforts to encourage open resistance by substantial numbers of people may be in order even if, by engaging in such operations, we limit the possibility of affecting decisions of the satellite Communists and the Soviet bureaucracy in our favor. At the moment, from the evidence available to us, we are inclined to doubt whether there is any possibility that such a mass uprising could be successful in any satellite country against the strength of the Red Army. Conditions may very possibly change, however, and it would be short-sighted not to have plans laid and possibly even a skeleton organization in being to exploit a situation of crisis if one should arise. These plans should, however, be laid in the utmost secrecy so as not to prejudice efforts we may wish to make to achieve our objectives by more evolutionary means.

Apart from these preparatory measures there is reason to believe that a strategy of encouraging the satellite populations to make strong but limited demands upon their leaders for improvements in their conditions of life may be even more effective in affecting choices both of the satellite and the Soviet bureaucracies than similar programs in Russia. Since both the people of the satellites and their own present leaders know from pre-Communist experience what is possible in the way of an alternative way of life, their pressures for change will be much greater, and minimal concessions will do much less to relieve those pressures. The satellite bureaucracy must contain many men who resent the squeezing of their own peoples for the benefit of the military or political strength of the Soviet Union and who will be sympathetic to attempts to improve the lot of their citizens so long as they believe this to be consistent with retaining their own power domestically. Finally, there must be many in the Soviet bureaucracy who are aware of the huge cost of keeping satellite populations in line entirely by repressive police measures and who must find tempting the idea that maybe an occasional carrot can save the expense of several divisions of troops.

In short, throughout the decision-making apparatus of the satellites the question of how far to yield to popular pressures for economic improvement, relaxation of police pressures, religious liberty, and the like must be a question on which there is wide difference of opinion. It could be the purpose of our

political warfare to widen those differences by attempting to increase pressures for kinds of concessions that might quite conceivably be granted without menacing the whole structure of Communist control. The granting of such concessions, or their denial, might equally increase the difficulty for the Soviets of imposing the restrictive measures which a war would require, and thus, by raising a question as to the loyalty of the satellite peoples, deter a Soviet choice of war.

Certain other types of appeals can be made direct to the satellite bureaucracy which can similarly encourage them increasingly to assert independence of their Soviet masters without obviously risking their positions and their necks. We can make economic offers to the satellites of trade of a sort which they would find very tempting, but which would be inconsistent with the plans the Soviets have for their development. We can encourage their self-respect by treating them as independent on issues on which they probably disagree with the Soviets, even where we know they are in fact puppets. We can solicit increasing contacts with satellite diplomats, technicians, scientists, artists, and the like to emphasize to them that we would like to accept them, Communist or non-Communist, into the society of free nations, and that it is the Soviets who are preventing such contact.

These measures will all have an audience in the Soviet bureaucracy. They can be so designed as to conflict to a minimal degree with our attempt to construct an image of our purposes not

implacably hostile to true Russian interests. We can suggest what some Soviet bureaucrats probably already suspect, namely that the Soviet family of nations can only continue to be operated successfully if increasing freedom of action is given to the satellites. We can warmly welcome whatever steps have been taken in this direction, point out how limited they are, and urge continued further steps. We cannot expect, of course, to endear ourselves to the Soviet hierarchy by this posture. The effects we hope for from it would be mainly in the satellites themselves. But it would at least be consistent with the view that our interest is not necessarily in the destruction of the Soviet Union but rather in the promotion of freedom everywhere, an ideal the Soviets cannot publicly reject. Beyond this, this line provides no ammunition, as does a "liberation" policy, for the Soviet propaganda effort to prove to the satellite leadership that our real purpose is to establish either our own hegemony or that of the Germans over all of Eastern Europe.

In summary, since we cannot now predict by which of a number of alternative processes Soviet control in the satellites might ultimately be weakened, it may be desirable to adopt so far as possible a political warfare strategy which supports as many of these processes as possible. We may find our lever in choices by the public in the satellites, we may find it in decisions taken by anti-Communists (thought this does not look promising), we may find it in alternatives considered by the satellite Communist leadership,

or we may even conceivably in time find it in choices made by the Soviet bureaucracy itself. If we follow a strategy with the satellite peoples implying our relentless enmity for their present leadership, and a strategy with the satellite leaders implying that we will bend all our energies to the overthrow of the Soviet regime in Russia, we may deny ourselves the possibility of exerting any influence over the evolution of either satellite or Soviet society. This may be a loss worth taking if we are fairly sure that we can thereby achieve our goals in more revolutionary ways, but we must at least recognize that possible contradictions exist, both between alternative policies directed at the satellites and between satellite policy and policy toward the USSR. We should make up our minds what we want to do about such contradictions.

SECTION III

A SUGGESTED POLITICAL WARFARE STRATEGY

The Need for a Strategy

The purpose of the preceding section has been to emphasize by example the degree to which the vulnerabilities one can effectively exploit depend on the general strategy one has decided to adopt. We have pointed out a number of kinds of U. S. action usually assumed to be desirable which turn out when examined to have ambiguous effects on a U. S. interest or contradictory effects on two different interests. Thus it is not clear without further argument that we should try to divide the Russian people to the maximum extent from the regime or that a worsening of the position of the common man in the USSR would be in our interest. It is not clear whether we want to encourage ever more repressive measures by the regime or whether some relaxation would serve our long-run purposes more. What is clear is that it is wasteful and ineffective to follow separate political warfare measures whose effects offset each other.

This does not mean, of course, that it is necessary to place all our bets on one series of developments. There are some measures that will work equally well whatever contingency develops. In other cases we can take one set of measures to prepare for one possibility and another set to prepare for a

different one, providing the effects of the two do not cancel each other out. We can even follow one line publicly and quite a different one covertly provided we make certain the contradiction is not revealed and provided the actual effects of the two courses of action do not negate each other.

The Strategy in General

In order to illustrate the central theme that we must have a strategy to guide political warfare we attempt in the following paragraphs to indicate the broad outlines of a possible strategy which we believe to be consistent with our present foreign policy as enunciated in the relevant basic NSC papers. We try to indicate what kinds of exploitation of vulnerabilities this strategy would exclude as well as those it suggests. This strategy has not been designed to apply to China.

In essence the strategy here outlined is a scissors with two blades. The first which is not the immediate concern of this committee is the effective denial to the Soviets of the possibility of external expansion by military or nonmilitary means. The second is the attempt to promote evoultionary changes internally in the Soviet Bloc in directions consistent with our interest. This we would pursue first by measures designed to expand the field of realistic and attractive alternatives perceived by the people and by various levels of the bureaucracy and second by measures designed to persuade them to adopt alternatives in

our interest. The aim of this strategy would be hopefully the gradual evolution of the system over time to something less menacing, and in any event the setting up of resistances to reversion to the Stalinist system strong enough to assure that if the attempt were made it would seriously weaken the control structure and perhaps produce a split at the top.

The elements of the strategy in information policy, in special operations, in military policy, and in diplomatic and economic policy might be somewhat as follows:

In information policy: The strategy would imply a continued vigorous attack on the terror and tension induced by police measures, on the military rather than civilian bias of the economy, and on the restrictions of communication with the outside world. These would be mainly attacked, however, not as inherent features of the Communist state correctible only by revolution but as mistaken practical policies which could be readily modified if the leadership would only consent to do so and which in any event are not really necessary to their legitimate ends. In speeches and via information media we would welcome as encouraging signs the recent measures indicating some disposition on the part of the government to relax police pressures, to shift resources to consumers goods production, and to permit more contact with the rest of the world. Our line would point out how limited these measures have been so far and would suggest ways in which they could be extended, perhaps gradually and bit by bit.

These suggestions would not be general exhortations to better behavior but quite specific ideas as to particular sorts of change for which the people might press and which the bureaucracy might well consider. We would suggest that we were sufficiently interested in seeing them move in these directions to be willing to assist in every way we could, by supplying technical information about consumers goods production, samples and prototypes, even possibly agreeing to trade consumers goods, etc. The line would emphasize the possibilities of coexistence and urge the regime to try a variety of measures moving in this direction, such as sending Soviet technicians to many more international conferences, cooperating with us on technical and other studies, and the like. We would emphasize (and political policy would have to be changed to permit this) that we welcomed visits by Soviet citizens for cultural, scientific, and even recreational purposes and were even prepared to subsidize such interchange.

In taking this line we should not abandon our basic position that the whole Soviet system is fundamentally wrong. We would continue to state what we think its errors are, and reiterate our conviction that Russians will come in time to recognize them. We would draw a sharp line, however, between those security interests which we are determined to protect by overwhelming military power if need be, and our philosoply of government which we know we could not impose by force even if we wanted to, but which we believe they will come around to in

due course because it would serve their interests better. Meanwhile we would warmly welcome any steps, however limited, toward a system designed more fully to satisfy such human aspirations as security from surveillance and pressure, a free exchange of ideas, higher standards of individual material well being, and the like. We would point out practical ways in which, within the context of their present system, they could move ever further in these directions without fear. The key to this element of our strategy is to make suggestions which seem plausible enough to ordinary citizens and even to some bureaucrats to raise their expectations markedly but which are sufficiently beyond present practice to prove embarrassing to the regime.

This line, which would have the effect for the ordinary citizen of dramatizing his discontents by suggesting the possibility of realistic and attractive alternatives, could differ in the satellites from that addressed to the Soviet Union. In these areas it might well attempt to raise expectations farther and depict alternatives more radically different from present practice. Both in the satellites and in the USSR it should be aggressive in pressing for change, but evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and generally avoid a tone openly and stridently hostile to the system. Should this strategy be adopted the tone might be set by a major Presidential speech.

Excluded by this strategy would be any direct attempt to encourage revolution by mass uprising, violent ideological attacks

which would reinforce the conviction of the bureaucracy that the U. S. would continue to be a major threat to any Communist government whatever its external policy; also efforts to drive a wedge between the people and the leadership which would have the effect of solidifying the entire bureaucracy in opposition to any change, and the suggestion that we were determined to isolate the Soviet Union and its citizens from contact with the Free World.

In special operations: Many operational projects could be designed to give effect to this strategy. Expectations could be aroused by the planting of rumors that further relaxation of police controls, increased availability of consumer goods, more scope for private production by peasants and the like were about to be announced by the leaders. It is known that rumors of this kind concerning events closely touching the lives of Soviet citizens spread with extraordinary rapidity and accuracy in Russia and the satellites, especially if they are sufficiently specific and detailed to carry conviction. It is believed to be within our capabilities to start such rumors, which might exert considerable pressure on at least some segments of the bureaucracy.

We could perhaps arrange for the publication in Communist journals outside the Bloc or elsewhere of discussions, quite nonpolitical in tone, of techniques of political and economic administration conceivable to Communists but varying from those now employed in Russia and designed more fully to meet known discontents.

We might supply to groups of peasants, workers, intellectuals, and the like in the satellites information and advice on how to make effective marginal demands on the satellite regimes for limited changes in their own interest, without endangering their safety or freedom. It should be possible for us to help groups behind the curtain increase the effectiveness of pressures they are already applying to force concessions which will make life more tolerable. Operations designed to do this are already in progress.

We cannot expect people in the Bloc to risk their lives and make martyrs of themselves in what they know will be a vain attempt to destroy the whole system. But even without our aid many are daily taking risks to force adjustments in the system which will make it less oppressive. They already see practical alternatives. It could be an object of our clandestine activities to widen their conception of what is practical.

Simultaneously we could be attempting through various chains of personal contact such as neutral technicians and diplomats to reach middle Soviet bureaucrats with ideas about somewhat altered policies. It should be much easier to communicate through such channels ideas less threatening to the whole status and value system of the target official than open treason. The development of indirect channels of communication of this kind to Soviet officials at all levels would be of great value in itself even if it had no immediate effect on decisions.

In individual cases where this looked particularly promising and could be done under deep cover we should continue to attempt to persuade individual Soviet officials to defect. Our principal approaches to the middle bureaucracy, however, would be not so much to tempt them to defect as to urge a variety of feasible changes in all kinds of policies. Whenever defectors are used, under U. S. Government sponsorship, to make statements addressed to Russians as to evils of the system, these statements should emphasize practical errors of Soviet administration rather than fundamental ideological disagreements.

Excluded measures in this area would be the open promise of military support to resistance groups, sabotage and wrecking operations in which U. S. Government support would become known to elements of the bureaucracy, official support of measures to train and equip revolutionary units to take active part in the event of trouble, measures explicitly designed to provoke tighter and more repressive controls on the part of the regime, and the like. Measures which, if known to the Soviets, would be inconsistent with our public posture could, of course, be undertaken with due precautions to keep them truly covert. The guiding principal in undertaking spoiling operations would be to avoid solidifying the conviction throughout the bureaucracy that we were determined to overthrow the whole system by direct intervention.

In military policy: Military and political policy are perhaps outside the proper scope of this paper, but we cannot emphasize too strongly our conviction that a concept of political warfare strategy such as that here suggested depends as much on concomitant moves in the military and political field as on the skill with which information and covert operations are conducted. In the field of military policy it must be stressed again that this strategy requires an uncompromising determination to resist both major and minor aggressive moves by the Bloc with every military resource at our command. There will be no internal experimentation by the Soviets with alternative techniques more consistent with our interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques of military and political pressure on and in the Free World show signs of achieving notable success. If, therefore, this strategy is to have a chance of success the Soviets must be convinced that we intend to respond with massive retaliation to any attack on us or our allies, that we will develop means of countering with force attempts to use military pressures more locally, and that we will defend ourselves against aggression of any kind with sufficient force to threaten Russia with certain defeat.

Within this framework of a firm military posture, we must find as many ways as we can to bring home with conviction the genuinely defensive character and purposes of our military plans. The impact of our acts on the Soviet image of our purposes should be a consideration in deciding, for instance, on the scale of our

continental defense effort and the publicity to be given to it. The most careful thought should be given to ways in which we could convincingly reassure the Soviets as well as our allies that we do not intend to use our military force to destroy Russia except in self defense. The strategy here outlined calls for redoubling our efforts to find acceptable disarmament plans which we can plausibly present, accompanying them each time with statements as to the costs to the Russians as well as to ourselves of the current state of tension.

Should it be concluded that no disarmament plan acceptable to us can be devised at the present time, we would be somewhat embarrassed in the pursuit of the strategy here proposed but probably no more so than in pursuit of alternative strategies which do not envisage an early showdown. Excluded would be military ultimatums, implied or explicit, concerning Soviet internal policy, military acts giving rise to an expectation of U. S. military intervention in the event of internal crisis, and the like. Since German military power is such a potent symbol of aggressive threat, especially to the satellites, special attention should probably be given to ways of insuring that German rearmament would not be used aggressively against the Bloc, and of countering Soviet propaganda fostering the contrary view.

In diplomatic and economic policy: This strategy requires redoubled efforts to deny the Soviets the fruits of efforts to subvert and divide the Free World. We can pursue this contest

for men's minds most aggressively without posing any direct threat to the Russian state or to fundamental internal Russian or even Soviet interests. We must pursue it sufficiently vigorously and effectively by both diplomatic and economic means to force some Soviet minds ultimately to re-examine their tactics and their strategy. If the Soviets meet with continued success in subversion and division of the West there is little hope for the development in Russia of policies more consistent with our interest. If this alternative is blocked to them, and particularly if they were to lose ground outside the Bloc, there is a chance that other alternatives will increasingly be considered. Indeed, we believe that one of the most persuasive arguments for the entire strategy here proposed is that it will generate much more whole-hearted support among our allies than alternative postures we might assume. Thus we believe this strategy would itself powerfully unite the Western alliance and deny to the Soviets the option of dividing the West.

Again, assuming this vigorous and aggressive though non-military political and economic posture with respect to Free World developments, this strategy would give diplomatic activity a major role to play in expanding in Soviet minds, and particularly those dealing with foreign affairs, the conception of possible alternatives. The strategy calls for confronting the Soviet bureaucracy in a friendly way with all sorts of choices they or their constituents might possibly feel they had to take seriously.

This would include increasing the number of problems to be taken up cooperatively in the U. N. It would include proposals emphasizing our interest in free communication, such as proposals for free use of the air around the world under suitable U. N. safeguards. It would involve further exploration of possibilities for the unification of Germany and the ending of the occupation of Austria. It might involve new proposals, repeated in a number of alternative forms, for world economic programs in which the Soviets would be invited to participate. It would certainly involve maximizing contacts between Americans and Russians at all levels and on all kinds of problems. This last implies a major change in our present policy with respect to the admission to this country for nonpolitical purposes of citizens of the Soviet Bloc countries.

This strategy would exclude attempts to isolate Soviet citizens or officials from the West and to shut them out of international councils and discussions. It would require that while keeping our guard up, we act on the premise that when Soviet proposals are put forward there are some Soviet officials who take them seriously. It would exclude treating Soviet and satellite officials as mere puppets even, and perhaps especially, when we know them to be such. Rather we would encourage their desire for independent decisions by acting as though we thought they were free to take them.

One of the major questions posed by this strategy is whether it is possible to maintain its various essential parts simultaneously. Can we persuade first our allies and second our own people to maintain a vigilant military posture and to engage in an aggressive political and economic contest with Communism in the Free World and at the same time to accept an atomsphere of straightforward personal relations, a more sympathetic understanding, and a relaxation in various types of institutional relations between our country and the countries of the Soviet orbit? We believe that with appropriate leadership this can be done. Indeed we think this combination of firmness and flexibility would be much better understood by our allies and much more acceptable to them than the somewhat blustery and trigger-happy hysteria that some of them believe characterizes our present attitude. This strategy does not constitute a "soft" policy. Indeed it has no chance of success unless we keep our guard fully up until the very day and hour when the Soviets actually enter concretely and irreversibly into effective collective security arrangements, and unless we see to it that the Free World successfully resists Communist encroachment. It cannot be overemphasized that what is here proposed does not involve giving up anything or surrendering our relative position in the arms race in reliance simply on Soviet assurances or on a more friendly general climate. It is a flexible policy in that it attempts to exploit whatever chance there may be that the Soviet system can gradually evolve into something somewhat different.

On the home front we cannot accept the view that for America to be firm and vigilant it is necessary for us to be stridently hostile and angry. If we reject the pursuit of peace by preventive war, we believe Americans can adopt a confident posture of readiness and still encourage gradual evolution.

Of course our intelligence is so limited and the future so uncertain that it would be folly to adopt this or any other strategy so irrevocably that we could not change it if developments made this seem wise. There is every reason why planning should be done on the basis of a variety of contingencies. Should open resistance and an effective split between the present leadership and the people suddenly appear more plausible we should be ready to exploit it. In order to be ready, and continually to test the situation, we must keep our hand in by well-considered spoiling operations appropriate to a different approach and philosophy. Also we must not be inhibited by the difficulties of predicting the full consequences of an action from taking any action at all. The essence of political warfare is experiment and ingenuity. The burden of our argument here is that at any particular time our political warfare operations should be guided by an over-all strategy and that departure from that strategy should be undertaken only for cause and with a clear recognition of possible conflict.

Conclusions

This committee was asked to list Soviet vulnerabilities and to indicate what would be required effectively to exploit them. We have listed what we believe to be some of the important vulnerabilities, but the principal conclusion to which we have been forced is that for reasons given in this report a mere list of separate items would not supply the guidance the National Security Council requires. We believe an appraisal of specific vulnerabilities can be made only with reference to a general political warfare strategy. In more detail:

1. We do not believe the U. S. presently has the capability, actual or potential, to conduct political warfare operations that will significantly reduce present Soviet military capabilities.

2. We believe the principal task of political warfare directed to the Soviet Bloc countries is to affect choices made both by the Russian and satellite people and by officials at all levels of the Bloc bureaucracy in such a way as to reduce the probability of war and to increase the chance of evolutionary change.

3. We have outlined briefly a political warfare strategy emphasizing the promotion of evolutionary change within the Soviet Union. This strategy does not preclude experimentation with such anti-regime measures as might be more applicable in changed circumstances (e.g., general war). We have listed some of the measures such a strategy might call for as well as some of those that might be soft-pedalled.

4. We believe this strategy is most likely to advance U. S. interests within the framework of our present basic foreign policy as enunciated in official documents. Should there be a major change in basic national policy, such as the undertaking of courses of action designed to bring about a decisive reduction of Soviet power within a short period, important elements of this strategy would not be appropriate.

5. We wish to emphasize that no political warfare strategy can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World. In particular it is an essential requirement of the strategy here proposed that the Soviet Bloc be denied opportunities for further military or nonmilitary expansion.

6. We conceive of the strategy here proposed as an active rather than a passive one. It definitely does not call for any reduction of the level of either administrative or financial effort devoted to political warfare, military preparation, or economic measures. Although we have not reviewed present programs in detail, we believe that at least the present magnitude of effort is necessary, and some expansion may be required if this strategy is to have a chance of being effective.

7. While this strategy is designed primarily to serve the objective of bringing about long-run changes in the character of the Soviet system which will make it less menacing to us, we think it will also serve to create conditions which will make it

less likely that the Soviet leadership will choose to undertake military aggression and more likely that, if hostilities occur, they can speedily be brought to a satisfactory end.

8. While we have felt it outside our terms of reference to give explicit consideration to the effects of the strategy here proposed on the attitudes of other nations of the Free World or on domestic attitudes in the United States, we believe these effects are likely to be favorable. We believe the adoption of this strategy might help replace the image, widely held abroad, of the United States as a country aggressively and implacably hostile to Russia with an image, much closer to the truth, of a nation dedicated to the preservation and encouragement of democracy, peace, and the principles of an open society. It might even help us to reaffirm these basic principles in our own minds.

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Bibliographical Note on Soviet Vulnerability Studies

1. The most intensive and complete examination of strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system is to be found in the series of reports of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, prepared by the Russian Research Center at Harvard University under contract with the Department of the Air Force (Contract AF 33(038) - 12909). Under this contract, which extended over several years, teams of analysts interviewed several thousand ex-Soviet citizens in the United States and Western Europe on all aspects of Soviet life. The findings were checked against all available unclassified materials bearing on the subject. Numerous detailed monographs were prepared on various special subjects.

The final report of the project, entitled Strategic, Psychological, and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System, (unclassified) was submitted to the Air Force in December 1954.

2. An early report, focussed on communications to the Iron Curtain area, but dealing with a broad range of social and political as well as technical matters, was Project Troy Report to the Secretary of State; February 1, 1951 (Volumes I through III, Top Secret; Volume IV, Secret). This report was prepared by a group of ten natural scientists and twelve social scientists assembled for a four-month period by Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Volume I, the Main Report, (81 pages), gives both the technical and social and political conclusions of the study. Volume II (30 pages) and Volume III (60 pages) contain various special reports on social and political topics and on non-electronic

means of communication. Annex 8 on "Political Warfare, U. S. versus Russia" contains a summary of strengths and weaknesses. Volume IV (76 pages) is devoted to technical reports on electronic communication. A more recent review of technical developments is given in Project WS Gossard (see below).

3. The Center for International Studies at M. I. T. produced, in August 1952 under contract with C. I. A., a five-volume report entitled The Vulnerability of the Soviet Union and its Satellites to Political Warfare (Secret). This report was the result of some eighteen months' work by a variety of scholars under the direction of W. W. Rostow. Volume I (222 pages) contains the Recommendations, a summary of Volume II on the Origins, Present Status, and Prospects for Soviet Society, a summary statement of Vulnerabilities, and four staff papers (1) on the problem of Stalin's death, (2) on radio broadcasting, (3) on the nationalities problem, and(4) on U. S. interests and objectives in Russia and Eastern Europe. Volume II, The Dynamics of Soviet Society, by W. W. Rostow, has subsequently appeared separately as an unclassified book. It contains the principal judgments of the project on the strengths and weaknesses of Russian society. Volumes III, IV, and V contain special studies of the leadership, the nationalities, the satellites, and other problems.

4. The status of our political warfare effort was extensively reviewed and recommendations for the future made in the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities under the chairmanship of Mr. William Jackson. This report does not examine Soviet strengths and weaknesses in detail, but does give conclusions

as to what are and what are not promising lines of activity, based upon testimony of experts in the field.

5. The report of Project WS Gossard (Top Secret) April, 1954 (53 pages plus annexes) gives a comprehensive review of a wide range of proposals for exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities, including a number, such as "The Malenkov Reforms" (Annex 3) which fit the strategy proposed in this report. The focus of Project WS Gossard, prepared over several months by a group in C. I. A., is operational rather than academic.

6. A committee of OCB, operating under terms of reference dated February 17, 1954, produced a report on June 8, 1954 entitled Report on U. S. Policy for the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities. The body of the report (23 pages) reviews the views set forth on this subject in replies prepared by the Department of State and C. I. A. to a questionnaire drawn up by the committee. Annex B (37 pages) of the report gives a "Review of NSC Policy Toward the Soviet Union Emphasizing U. S. Policy on Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities."

7. There was prepared by C. I. A. for this committee a Preliminary Catalogue of Soviet Bloc Vulnerabilities (Top Secret), September, 1954, (Outline and Summary 14 pages, text 174 pages). As its title implies this is a listing intended to be exhaustive rather than selective, and no attempt is made at critical evaluation of the vulnerabilities listed.

8. From the long list of published works that bear on the subject of this report, we would select the following as particularly helpful:

Fainsod, Merle, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954.

Fischer, George, Soviet Opposition to Stalin, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952.

Leites, Nathan, A Study of Bolshevism, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953.

Moore, Barrington, Terror and Progress, U. S. S. R., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1954

MR. PRESIDENT:

We think that the attached report on the EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET VULNERABILITIES, prepared by an expert Interdepartmental Committee, chaired by Dr. Max Millikan, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is the best original paper which has come to the Planning Board during your Administration.

This report is especially notable for its thoroughly realistic approach to the problem of vulnerabilities. It recognizes that an exploitable vulnerability exists in a foreign society only if three elements are present: (a) a weakness to be exploited; (b) a U.S. objective, and (c) adequate U.S. capability to exploit the weakness in a way which will advance the objective.

Because of this realistic approach, the conclusions of the report necessarily throw out all kinds of measures which have been discussed and advanced in past years, but which fail to meet one or more of these three criteria.

This report has had a profound influence on the Planning Board in preparing the draft of Basic National Security Policy, to be discussed next week.

The report is so closely knit, and so well written, that it is difficult to pick out certain parts for you to read. I have underlined in red those parts, the reading of which would inform you adequately of the consistent line which runs through the report. There is a highly informative analytical table of contents on pages i - v.

It is interesting that while the development of this report began last summer, much of its thinking and conclusions run parallel to views which you have been expressing in more recent months.

Bobby

ROBERT CUTLER
Special Assistant
to the President

Attachment

Hope you can glance at this before Tuesday

TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities

The enclosed report on the subject, prepared by a Special Committee, is transmitted herewith for preliminary discussion by the Planning Board at its meeting on Monday, December 6, 1954.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosed report, which is being given a limited distribution.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary