

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 1

March 20, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward the Soviet
Satellites in Eastern Europe
and
Exploitation of Soviet and European
Satellite Vulnerabilities



- REFERENCES:
- A. Progress Report on NSC 174, dated February 29, 1956
 - B. Progress Report on NSC 5505/1, dated December 14, 1955
 - C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites", dated October 20, 1955

After discussion of the reference Progress Reports and of the recommendation in the enclosures to the reference memorandum of October 20, 1955, the NSC Planning Board recommends that the National Security Council adopt the enclosed draft NSC Action in connection with its consideration of the subject at its meeting on Thursday, March 22, 1956.

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
The Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 86-339 #1

BY DJH DATE 11/10/87

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DRAFT NSC ACTION

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES IN
EASTERN EUROPE

and

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES
(Progress Report on NSC 174, dated February 29, 1956; Progress Report on NSC 5505/1, dated December 14, 1955; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites", dated October 20, 1955)

- a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Reports on the above subjects, and the recommendation in the enclosures to the reference memorandum of October 20, 1955, that the NSC Planning Board review NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in the light of and subsequent to revision of NSC 5501 (NSC 5501 superseded as of March 15, 1956, by NSC 5602/1).
- b. Directed the NSC Planning Board in the light of the discussion to prepare a revision of U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, to supersede NSC 174, with the understanding that East Germany will be dealt with primarily in relation to U.S. Policy toward Germany following receipt of a forthcoming Progress Report by OCB on Germany, including East Germany and Berlin.
- c. Directed the NSC Planning Board to review NSC 5505/1 in the light of para. 6-c of NSC 5602/1 and submit such policy recommendations with respect thereto as may be appropriate.



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Authority MR 86-339 #1

By bc

NLE Date 11/10/87

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

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COPY NO. 1

October 20, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites

REFERENCES: A. NSC 174
B. NSC 5505/1
C. NSC 5501/1



The enclosed memorandum from the Operations Coordinating Board is submitted herewith for consideration of the recommendation that the NSC Planning Board review NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in light of and subsequent to revision of NSC 5501/1.

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.4 (b)

MR 86-476 #1

BY *Lks* DATE 12/4/90

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

October 19, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT: Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites

Attached is a memorandum dated September 30 from the Chairman of the Planning Coordination Group requesting that the Operations Coordinating Board recommend to the National Security Council that the NSC Planning Board review NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in light of and subsequent to revision of NSC 5501/1.

The Operations Coordinating Board concurred in this memorandum on October 12, 1955.



Elmer B. Staats
Elmer B. Staats
Executive Officer

Attachment:

Memo for the Chairman, OCB,
from Chairman, FCG, 9/30/55

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

September 30, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

Subject: Review of NSC Policy on Soviet European Satellites
(NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1)

1. By NSC Action No. 1349-c, approved by the President, March 12, 1955, the Planning Coordination Group was made responsible for advising and assisting the responsible operating agencies in the coordinated development of plans and programs to carry out NSC 5505/1, "Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities."

2. By letter of March 23, 1955, recognizing that the future implementation of NSC 174 was directly affected by the policies set forth in NSC 5505/1, the Chairman of the OCB suggested that the Planning Coordination Group be assigned responsibility for coordinating the implementation of NSC 174. This assignment was accepted by my letter of March 29.

3. At its meetings of August 10 and September 21, the OCB considered an "Outline Plan of Operations on NSC 174" and noted that the policies set forth in NSC 5505/1 (based on the general strategy outlined in NSC 5501/1, "Basic National Security Policy," especially paragraph 26-c) reflect a somewhat subtler strategy and different emphasis than the policy conclusions underlying NSC 174. Nevertheless, OCB issued the outline plan, in view of the continuing validity of the objectives of NSC 174 and the need for the plan in the field in the light of developments since the meeting of the heads of government in Geneva in July 1955.

4. The Planning Coordination Group believes that the policy conclusions underlying U.S. actions respecting the Soviet European satellites, including actions to exploit vulnerabilities, should be consistent with the policy and strategy outlined in basic national security policy, currently under review by the NSC Planning Board.

5. Accordingly, the Planning Coordination Group requests that the Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board recommend to the National Security Council that the NSC Planning Board review NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in the light of and subsequent to revision of NSC 5501/1.



/s/ Nelson A. Rockefeller

Nelson A. Rockefeller, Chairman
Planning Coordination Group

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COPY NO. 1
NSC 5505/1
January 31, 1955

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES



ATTENTION
THE ENCLOSED TOP SECRET CONTROL
FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BY EACH
INDIVIDUAL (1) WHO READS THIS
DOCUMENT WHOLLY OR IN PART OR
(2) WHO PERSONALLY HANDLES IT
AND HAS ACCESS TO ITS CONTENTS

NSC
5505/1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MR 97-215#1
By JW NLE Date 7/28/97

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172
Authority PLE 2005 - []
By MMK NLDDE Date 2/15/06

COPY NO. 1
Progress Report on
NSC 5505/1
December 24, 1955

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PROGRESS REPORT

on

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

by

THE PLANNING COORDINATION GROUP



ATTENTION

THE ENCLOSED TOP SECRET CONTROL FORM MUST BE COMPLETED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL (1) WHO READS THIS DOCUMENT WHOLLY OR IN PART OR (2) WHO PERSONALLY HANDLES IT AND HAS ACCESS TO ITS CONTENTS

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COPY OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 14, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Through the National Security Council

Subject: Progress Report on NSC 5505/1

In compliance with the request of the Planning Coordination Group (PCG), I am forwarding herewith the Progress Report on NSC 5505/1 dated December 14, 1955.

You will note from General Parker's memorandum dated December 16, 1955 that the PCG did not approve but merely "agreed to note and forward without comment to the Chairman, OCB, the attached progress report on NSC 5505/1 for transmission to the National Security Council".

Since this is not an approved Progress Report, it would not appear to commit the OCB or any of its member agencies, including the Department of State. The views of the Department of State on materials in this report will be available in the usual manner when the report is under consideration in the NSC Planning Board.

/s/ Herbert Hoover, Jr.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Chairman

Attachment:

Memorandum from Gen. T. W. Parker,
transmitting Progress Report on
NSC 5505/1 (Copy 1).

C O P Y

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PLANNING COORDINATION GROUP
Washington, D.C.

December 16, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Operations Coordinating Board

SUBJECT: Progress Report on NSC 5505/1

At its meeting of December 14, 1955, the Planning Coordination Group agreed to note and forward without comment to the Chairman, OCB, the attached progress report on NSC 5505/1 for transmission to the National Security Council.

/s/ T.W. PARKER

T. W. Parker
Brigadier General, USA
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Copies 1, 2 and 3 of subject
Progress Report, Dec 14, 1955.

PLANNING COORDINATION GROUP

December 14, 1955

PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 5505/1, "EXPLOITATION
OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES"

SUMMARY

A. Actions and Executions of Policy:

1. The Planning Coordination Group has developed an agreed working list of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities*, which is included in the detailed supplementary report. This list also includes vulnerabilities of the European satellites. Since actions taken to exploit European satellite vulnerabilities are reported on separately in connection with NSC 174, and since a full and balanced consideration of the vulnerabilities of the world-wide communist effort must take account of many free world factors beyond the scope of this report, primary emphasis has been placed on problems of inducing favorable evolutionary trends in the USSR.

2. Using the agreed list, the member departments and agencies (USIA was invited to participate in the development of this progress report) here report on the actions they have taken to exploit these vulnerabilities during the period January 31, 1955, to December 1, 1955.

3. Analysis of U. S. actions taken to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities reveals that their effect appears to have been modest and for the most part marginal, despite a substantial covert effort designed to exploit virtually every vulnerability cited. U. S. agencies concerned likewise have recognized that, for the foreseeable future, U. S. efforts in this direction will probably continue to be marginal in their impact.** Lack of prospects for immediate success should not lead to the conclusion that the U.S. must abandon efforts to create conditions which will lead to the favorable evolution of the Soviet system.

*Definition as contained in NSC 5505/1, "An exploitable vulnerability exists in a foreign society only if three elements are present: (a) a 'weakness' to be exploited, (b) a U.S. objective, and (c) a U.S. capability we can employ or develop to exploit the weakness in a way which will advance the objective

**General comment on covert operations will be found in the detailed report. A more extended report on covert actions taken to exploit the listed vulnerabilities will be made directly to the PCG and the NSC.

4. Certain U. S. actions may have somewhat encouraged evolutionary development in the character and policies of the Soviet Government, such as the following:

a. Exercise of influence or pressure by U.S. participation in International Conferences with the Soviet Union.

b. Exchanges of delegations with the Soviet Union; first steps have been taken towards planning an integrated program of exchanges for which State would attempt to get Soviet approval.

c. Continuing pressures, particularly at the second Geneva Conference, on the Soviet Government to allow expanded contacts and freer communication with the Soviet people.

d. Presentation through information media of comment on Soviet developments; however, the bulk of overt U.S. information output to the USSR is and should be concerned with presenting U.S. and free world policies, explaining U.S. objectives and conveying a picture of U.S. society.

5. Implicit in this report is recognition that effective U.S. action taken to deter Soviet external expansion and to increase free world strength and cohesion has been and will continue to be essential for progress towards inducing favorable evolutionary developments in the Soviet Union.

B. Evaluation of Progress in Implementing NSC 5505/1

1. A re-examination of agreed Soviet vulnerabilities indicates that most of them are not subject to overt exploitation (1) because of the lack of current capability or (2) because such exploitation would not serve over-all U. S. policy requirements. For example, overt exploitation of Soviet nationality problems appears undesirable as long as the main groups which the U.S. seeks to influence are the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia, which are largely Great Russian. Likewise, overt U.S. criticism of Soviet internal economic and political developments would appear very marginal in most cases in stimulating evolutionary changes. Such criticism would probably be resented by the people the U.S. seeks to influence as interference in domestic Soviet affairs. Also, the U.S. frequently does not have the necessary detailed information on such developments to insure effective criticism.

2. The actions outlined above, which were taken during the past year, may have contributed to eventual changes in Soviet policy. Special attention should be given to the role played by recent international conferences in this regard. The unity and determination of the Western nations at the two Geneva Conferences doubtless impressed the Soviet leaders. These leaders may also have come to recognize, to a greater degree than before, that Western defense policies did not represent a threat to Soviet security. These intangibles, although hard to measure, are no less important than the publicized Conference discussions.

3. During the past year the Soviet Government has allowed more Americans to visit the Soviet Union. More important in the longer run perhaps has been the Soviet willingness to facilitate exchanges of delegations with non-communist groups in the Free World. But an increase in officially sanctioned exchanges is not an unmixed blessing. Aside from the possible security risk and apart from Soviet technological gains, there is the danger that increased contacts could be interpreted at home and abroad as a relaxation of U.S. vigilance against communism. On balance, however, increased two-way movement of Soviet and American citizens may aid eventually in changing the outlook of the Soviet intelligentsia and bureaucracy towards their society and the role which they might play in the development of their country. Likewise, the contacts between influential Americans and the Soviet leaders should lead to a greater degree of realism about conditions in the two countries, thereby counteracting certain mutual misconceptions.

4. The same rigid and extensive controls which make it so difficult to influence the Soviet Union also largely prevent us from learning the result of our efforts. It is impossible to evaluate with precision the impact to date of greater contacts. Only a relatively few Soviet citizens have been involved and in fact no mass program of exchange is currently contemplated or would appear to be feasible. Yet, unless the level of contacts eventually becomes much greater, their over-all impact will probably remain low. However, the present Soviet leaders did have their first significant contacts with American leaders other than diplomats during the past year and there is reason to believe that they acquired, as a result, a clearer picture of American international intentions and capabilities.

5. It is difficult to evaluate the effect of overt U.S. information efforts. The Voice of America appears to have reached a significant number of the Soviet bureaucracy and intelligentsia, the major U.S. target group, and the picture projected by the Voice of America of U.S. attitudes and institutions has probably been a factor in keeping alive certain doubts about the Soviet system. This in turn should serve as a direct if marginal contribution to stimulating evolutionary tendencies. However, any real success in this field will depend in the long run on reaching the Soviet target group more effectively. Western attacks on the Soviet "iron curtain" have shown that the Soviet Government is most sensitive to this issue. These continuing attacks combined with other factors were probably responsible for the slight lowering of barriers which has taken place.

6. Despite the difficulties referred to in paragraph 4, some progress has been made during the past year toward determining the effectiveness of covert activities directed against the Soviet orbit.
 There is still very little hard evidence of reaction within the USSR, but most of the indications we do have are encouraging. At least a small measure of success has been achieved.....
 in countering the massive Soviet effort to block the free flow of ideas and information.



7. In looking at the Soviet system, however, there are as yet no indications of substantial evolution in a direction favorable to the U. S. Certain evidence is perhaps hopeful. For example, there has been some reduction in the powers of the secret police. The managerial class seems to want less political interference in business operations. There also seems to be a growing realization on the part of the Soviet leadership that in this thermo-nuclear age total war is unacceptable as an instrument of national policy. Nevertheless the Soviet Government remains a monolithic communist state, committed to its long-range objectives, hostile to the U.S. and determined to combat U.S. moves to strengthen the unity of the Free World.

8. As previously stated, lack of prospects for immediate success should not lead to the conclusion that the U.S. must abandon efforts to create conditions which will lead to the favorable evolution of the Soviet system. Since preventive warfare is unacceptable to the U.S. as an instrument of national policy and since the promotion of revolutionary changes appears to be beyond our national capabilities, the promotion of evolutionary changes appears to offer the most acceptable course for the U.S. and the Free World to follow.

CONCLUSIONS

9. If we accept this factor and if we take note frankly of the marginal U.S. potential in that direction, what general conclusions can we draw?

a. To induce the evolution of the Soviet system in a direction more compatible with U.S. interests, the U.S. must not only convince the Soviet Government that its national security is not threatened by the U.S., but it must also demonstrate that no scope for further expansion of Soviet control exists. Only if these conditions are satisfied would the regime be stimulated to concentrate on internal development. Development of major U.S. deterrent powers and increased efforts to achieve free world unity and stability as well as to neutralize the forces of communism within the Free World assume a key importance in this effort.

b. Evolution in the Soviet system will be slow, so slow that it may be difficult to detect.

c. The U.S. probably can do little more in the near future than create an atmosphere favorable to such change. This can be accomplished chiefly by projecting to the Soviet intelligentsia and bureaucracy a picture of a U.S. strong and confident in its determination to preserve and strengthen the free world without being provocatively hostile toward the Soviet Union. The public statements of top executive, legislative and military leaders will play an important positive or negative role in this regard, according to their contents, and an increased awareness of these possible positive or negative effects must continually be sought.

10. Within this general framework, the following specific conclusions emerge:

a. It is generally recognized that the efforts of the Soviet bureaucracy and intelligentsia to achieve a more rewarding life and a greater measure of self-expression offer the best hope for accomplishing the central aim of NSC 5505/1. U. S. effectiveness in influencing the course of such a development depends in the first instance upon our ability to reach this group. However, the effectiveness as well as the scope of our main instrumentalities for accomplishing this purpose (radio, publications exchange, exchange of persons and personal contacts) are limited, in large part because of Soviet obstructions. Continuing free world pressure must be devoted to reducing these obstructions.

b. There appear to be new opportunities for influencing the direction of Soviet development through even the minimal efforts of the Soviet Government to increase trade with the United States. For example, the acquisition of technology for producing consumer goods or the direct acquisition of these goods could conceivably have the effect of producing rising demands for a better life in the USSR.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

11. The foregoing suggests that while NSC 5505/1 is adequate in its core concept (that favorable evolutionary developments must be encouraged), it should be revised:

a. To recognize the marginal character of U.S. capabilities in this field, and the long time required to achieve success in this endeavor.

b. To enumerate the major U.S. policy objectives towards the Soviet Union, with particular emphasis on those objectives toward which efforts to stimulate evolutionary trends should be directed.

c. To point more closely to the target groups which the U. S. must reach.

12. Perhaps the major inadequacy of NSC 5505/1 is its single concentration on the vulnerabilities concept. Concentration of overt actions on the exploitation of discontents would, if followed, prevent giving a forward-looking, constructive tone to our public statements and informational output; USIA and State have recognized this factor and have worked on the assumption that open U.S. criticism of internal Soviet developments would have a largely negative effect on the target group on which the U. S. must concentrate its efforts.

13. This does not mean that there should be no criticism of Soviet internal developments. Rather it means that overt criticism, if it is to nourish evolutionary trends, must be selective, subtle, and designed to support the realistic hopes and tendencies of the target group. On the other hand, covert and unattributed attacks on the fundamental concepts of communism as outmoded and self-contradictory should continue.

C. Emerging Problems and Future Actions

1. General

The following problems with regard to NSC 5505/1 need particular attention in the coming year:

a. We need to study more carefully our objectives and our potential for aiding an evolution of the Soviet system in the light of our most recent experience and information. Thinking about the evolution of the Soviet system has to date been along lines of the direction in which the U.S. would like to see the USSR evolve. We should give more attention to the direction in which the USSR is likely to evolve. Only by so doing can we determine whether there are favorable trends which could be stimulated, if only marginally, by U.S. actions.

b. In the light of the above and of the conclusions in Section B, we need to revise NSC 5505/1. (The FCG has previously recommended that the NSC Planning Board review NSC 174 and NSC 5505/1 in the light of an subsequent to revision of NSC 5501.) The scope of NSC 5505/1 tends to be too broad to allow it to act as a guide to operations. Consideration might be given therefore to the desirability of including the key ideas in NSC 5505/1 in papers on the following subjects (or in new papers to be written) and according to the priority in which they are listed:

(1) The satellite states - increased flexibility in this area suggests that NSC 174 be revised, pointing up the special problems of and potential for U.S. influence in Eastern Europe. Separate country papers in this area may also be desirable.

(2) Communist China, including possibly a revision of NSC 5429/5, with particular emphasis on internal Chinese developments.

(3) The Soviet Union - to include the major portions of NSC 5505/1.

(4) International Communism -- although exploiting foreign dominance of the Communist movement in particular countries depends on local factors, International communism operates through a world-wide mechanism. Its integrated campaign cannot be defeated by improvised counter-attacks alone. We require a globally conceived strategy executed on a regional or country basis. After examining guidance available in other policy papers it may be found desirable to develop a U.S. policy statement regarding International Communism.

c. We need to continue our efforts to acquire more knowledge about Soviet institutions and attitudes as a basis for further operations in this field. Efforts to acquire such information continue to be given high priority. The limitations imposed by the Soviet Iron Curtain still remain formidable.

d. We need to create better means of getting to the Soviet bureaucracy and intelligentsia: (1) through promoting more effective person-to-person contacts; (2) through breaking down barriers to other means of communications. Both phases of this problem were thoroughly discussed prior to the Geneva conference and a number of proposals were made to the Soviet government at that conference. The answer to these proposals was a sharp attack on the West for bringing up the embarrassing problem of the Soviet peoples' lack of freedom of contact with the outside world and tacit expressions of content with present Soviet policies on exchange of persons and tourism. It is quite apparent, however, that in the technical and scientific fields the Soviet government wants to expand contacts with the Free World and particularly with the U.S. This desire should be used as a lever to:

- (1) break down barriers to communications;
- (2) establish a broad integrated information and cultural program;
- (3) create the kind of exchange of persons program which will advance the long-range factors considered under NSC 5505/1.

2. The Need for Continuing Efforts to Obtain Soviet Acceptance of an Information and Cultural Program.

In the long run, a carefully planned information and cultural program, aimed at extending knowledge of the United States among Soviet citizens and particularly emphasizing increased and freer personal contacts, seems to offer useful possibilities for the promotion of desirable evolutionary changes within the Soviet system. We should seek to establish such an integrated program through bilateral negotiations with the USSR. This program might include distribution in the USSR of an official Russian language magazine, sponsorship of exhibits, the introduction of American films, and a larger publications exchange.

3. The Need for Continuing Efforts to Establish a Controlled Contacts Program.

a. Freer person-to-person contacts could play a major role in aiding the process of a slow evolution of the Soviet system. Some types of contacts will move forward by their own momentum. Visits by tourists to the Soviet Union will continue to increase but will probably, for the present, be nominal in effect because of the language barrier and the conducted-tour nature of travel there. Controlled contacts between U.S. and Soviet diplomats have been expanded. Soviet diplomats are having more contacts with the peoples of the countries to which they are accredited. Likewise, U.S. diplomats in Moscow are beginning to have wider contacts there. Casual contacts between businessmen and journalists resident in or visiting the Soviet Union are becoming more common and freer. This type of influence will be haphazard and difficult to judge for effect in the short run.



This influence, however, will be effective only to the degree that American travelers are aware of political problems which they will meet in the Soviet Union and of how they can best react to them. Despite difficulties inherent in "political indoctrination" of private American travelers, an effort should be made to find acceptable ways of informally briefing American citizens traveling to the Soviet Union.

b. The objective of the development of a planned, integrated exchange of persons program with the Soviet bloc at a level and in areas acceptable to the U.S. must be pursued if the Soviet Government is not to retain the propaganda and intelligence initiative in this field. State has undertaken in close conjunction with CIA to develop such a program. Special attention is at present being given to the possibilities for exchanges in the fields of agriculture (with the Department of Agriculture), medicine (with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare), mining and smelting (with the Department of Interior), and general industry (with the Department of Commerce). No exchanges of labor delegations are presently planned. This initial planning is designed not to create a high level of exchange but to insure that U.S. interests are maximized. Since the level of person-to-person contacts will probably remain small the over-all impact on the evolution of the USSR will be limited. The present informal framework for interdepartmental coordination of such exchanges appears to be adequate.

c. The chief difficulty faced by State is the lack of personnel to carry out the detailed planning for each trip, to negotiate the necessary details with the Soviet bloc government, and to backstop the supervision of each Soviet group coming to the U.S. The present budgetary estimates also do not provide for meeting certain necessary program costs which must usually be incurred over the above-mentioned administrative support; chiefly the payment of salary and trip expenses for "tour directors" and translators.

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d. The policy directives given in NSC 5508/1 for the exchange program are in general adequate but need minor revisions. Liberalization of that policy in order to allow for the admission of Soviet citizens for a longer period as exchange students should be considered at this time. Many problems not envisioned at the time of the approval of NSC 5508/1 have subsequently arisen. For example: the need to admit as officials all Soviets visiting the United States, since the Soviet Government has refused to allow its citizens to be fingerprinted; the lack of reciprocity involved in business trips; and the methods of handling exchanges in sensitive industrial fields. These problems have been solved, however, within the bounds of that policy and such developments can probably be covered in the progress report on that paper. More complicated machinery or limitations in action should not be written into that paper.

4. All of the foregoing measure will require a higher degree of Congressional and public awareness of the problems and prospects for contacts with the Soviet peoples as an instrument for accomplishing the purposes of NSC 5505/1. State and other agencies concerned should undertake to discuss these problems with Congressional leaders. Thereafter what may be needed is a clear statement by a high administration official, preferably the President, defining our hopes, our prospects, and the ground rules under which we must operate.

D. Future Plans

A tentative outline plan designed to effect greater coordination of U.S. effort with reference to the exploitation of the agreed list of vulnerabilities has been developed. This tentative outline plan was transmitted to the member agencies of the FCG on October 7. It provides an initial basis for inter-agency planning in this field. Further implementation of this policy depends upon a greater flow of ideas, in part through increased contact, between the U.S. and the USSR.

PLANNING COORDINATION GROUP

PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 5505/1, "EXPLOITATION OF
SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES"

DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT

A. List of Vulnerabilities:

1. The Planning Coordination Group developed a working compilation of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities (See TAB A), which was, after several submissions and reviews of the member departments and agencies, accepted as a statement of exploitable vulnerabilities within the Soviet bloc.

2. Based on this list, the member departments and agencies (USIA was invited to participate in the development of this progress report) reported on the actions they have taken to exploit these vulnerabilities during the period of this reports.

B. General Comments of the Departments and Agencies

1. State: The chief program for which the Department of State is responsible, concerning the exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities, is the program for expanded contacts with the Soviet Union. The advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a broader program of contacts has been under active discussion all during the past year. Beginning with NSC 5503/1, and perhaps more realistically with the Soviet expressions of the desire to expand exchanges, the Department of State has taken active measures to develop a positive program of its own. The results of this would be to channel all requests by governmental and private organizations for visits of Soviet groups through State. Likewise, a limited U. S. initiative in regard to visits in certain categories is under active discussion with..... Departments of Defense, Justice, Agriculture, Commerce and Interior.

2. Defense: While most of the vulnerabilities are not such as to lend themselves to full exploitation by the Defense Department, there are a number of Defense programs which contribute to the exploitation of certain vulnerabilities. All of the military departments are participating actively in programs designed to encourage and induce defections among the Soviet and Satellite populations, including military personnel.

3. USIA: USIA at present is limited almost exclusively to the medium of radio for reaching the peoples of the USSR. VOA programs are on the air in the Soviet Union for 22 hours a day and consist of Russian language programs and programs in Armenian, Georgian and Ukrainian, as well as Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian. The Russian language programs include two hours of original programming from the U.S. and 45 minutes of original programming from Munich. They are on the air in the USSR (except in the Far East) for 20 hours, including repeats and relays. The other languages, which comprise 3 -1/2 hours of original programming from the U.S. and 1 hour from Munich, are on the air in the USSR for 16 hours. A one-hour English language program, "Panorama USA", originated in Washington and relayed from Munich, was inaugurated on October 31, 1955 as an additional means of increasing VOA's audience in East European countries and the western part of the USSR.

The Agency also reaches the USSR with a two-hour daily program of popular music and jazz, called "Music USA" which, while ostensibly beamed to Scandinavia, aims at gaining an audience among Soviet youth. USIA intends at a later date to include a limited amount of news and possibly commentary in English which would be worked out with the interests and curiosity of Soviet youth in mind.

In the medium of television, USIA is providing materials and offering suggestions for subject matter to be included in an American commercial firm's exchange of television films with the USSR.

The general scope and nature of possible exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities by USIA's radio output to the USSR are determined by two NSC resolutions of October 22, 1953. The first, setting forth the mission of USIA, places considerable emphasis upon:


(a) explanation and interpretation of U.S. policies and objectives,

(b) depicting their correlation with the legitimate aspirations of other peoples, and

(c) delineation of important aspects of U.S. life and culture which facilitate understanding of U.S. policies and objectives. The second NSC resolution, based on Recommendation No. 2 of the Jackson Report, states that VOA broadcasts should consist primarily of objective factual news supplemented by commentary.

In accordance with the foregoing, radio output to the USSR has been designed primarily to provide Soviet listeners with an understanding of U.S. and free world objectives, and essential information about U.S. policies and culture concealed from them by the Soviet Government. To a far lesser extent, news and commentary in the form of features and analyses have been presented on topics suggested by specific events or developments within the Soviet Union, the Soviet orbit or the international sphere. Exploitation of Soviet vulnerabilities has therefore been limited to (1) an indirect approach through the selections of news items and commentary on free world (especially U.S.) achievements and methods designed to engender certain conclusions in the listener's mind regarding comparative Soviet performances and conditions known to him, and (2) a somewhat more direct approach through the careful preparation of commentary upon events and developments within the Soviet orbit.


4.



Some of our operations against the satellites have, of course, an additional impact on the USSR itself and particularly on the Soviet leadership. For example, during the discussions of the exchange problem by the Foreign Ministers, Molotov on 14 November specifically attacked Radio Free Europe with such bitterness as to suggest that RFE is a real obstacle to the maintenance of Soviet controls in Eastern Europe.

We also have numerous ways of attacking the vulnerabilities of the Communist international apparatus in the free world, and some of our action in this regard at the same time serves indirectly to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities. An extensive effort is made to expose, harass, and discredit Communist elements in all areas, especially where they represent an active threat to the security and stability of free governments.

Taken altogether, these actions involve a considerable investment in funds, skilled manpower, and operational resources.



A word of precaution is necessary with respect to exploitation of the vulnerabilities themselves U.S. assumptions as to what constitute Soviet-Communist vulnerabilities must be kept under continuing critical review. Many of the items cited in the agreed list remain to be confirmed as truly exploitable vulnerabilities, in terms of the agreed definition of this phrase. The answer will of course lie in slowly and painfully acquired knowledge as to the kind of reaction which is induced by calculated U.S. cold war action, and as to whether this reaction does indeed serve to satisfy the requirements of national strategy as defined in NSC 5501 or any future revision thereof. Lacking enough of this knowledge despite our increasingly intensive efforts to obtain it, we must often fall back on two certainties: (1) it is clearly worthwhile to break through the communications barrier; (2) we must maintain communications' channels against a day when they may be vital to our national security.



Notwithstanding reservations about the vulnerabilities, the present concepts and language of NSC 5501 and NSC 5505/1 are satisfactory related planning have for some time past been proceeding within the framework formalized in these two policy documents, and their effect has been to lend assurance that we are on the right track. While, in any revision of these policy papers, we would subscribe to an acknowledgment of the modest character of what the U.S. Government can hope to accomplish in its day-to-day efforts to exploit the Soviet-Communist vulnerabilities cited, we feel that these vulnerabilities probably are, in the main, valid for the long haul and that we should continue to take advantage of them.

C. Statement of Action

So that actions with respect to identical vulnerabilities may be compared, selected illustrative actions are indicated

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in instances where at least two agencies have reported on them:

1. The failure of Communist ideology to capture the minds and determine the ideals and goals of many Soviet youth.

State: State has given approval in principle to requests of reputable American youth organizations, the ASA* and the Young Adult's Council, to invite several small groups of Soviet youth to the U.S. in the coming year. In order not to give Communist youth groups extra prestige or to take action counter to our interests in strengthening free world anti-Communist youth groups, these invitations will not be extended to the Komsomol. State is also suggesting to the Soviet Government that a beginning be made on student exchanges in the field of American and Soviet youth interested in the study of the other country's language and culture.

USIA: VOA's Russian Service has occasionally exploited this vulnerability by making the point that, in spite of systematic pressure and indoctrination, Soviet youth continues to be a problem to the regime. A major peg was "An Incident in the 6th Grade" (of one of the Moscow schools), described first in the Literary Gazette, and then elaborated upon both in letters to the editors and Literary Gazette and in Pravada. VOA commented in a number of scripts on the implication of this incident, namely the natural reluctance of young people (a) to submit to the type of ideological discipline imposed upon them by Communist authorities, and (b) to act as informers against their friends. Another case in point was an example of a Komsomol youth who was chided for faithfulness to religious customs; Bishop John, of San Francisco, commented on this in one of his weekly Sunday talks over VOA.

Another Soviet development utilized was the intention of the Soviet government, as disclosed by the Soviet press, to curtail the number of admissions to institutions of higher learning, which naturally created disillusionment among young people.

The two-hour "Music USA" program, consisting of one hour of popular music and one hour of jazz, was initiated with a view to the enthusiasm of Soviet youth for this type of music despite the regime's opposition to it as being "decadent."

2. Desire of the people for freedom of self-expression in some form and the lack of free access to information.

State: One of the chief aims of an expanded exchange program is to use the desire of the Soviet people for more freedom of

*American Student Association

expression in an attempt to induce slowly an evolution of Soviet policy and internal institutions in a direction favorable to U.S. national interests. State has abolished the requirement of specific validation of American passports for travel to the USSR and has allowed and in some cases invited a larger number of Soviet citizens to visit the U.S., steps which should increase Soviet desires for even greater and more normal contacts.

USIA: This vulnerability has been exploited quite frequently whenever opportunities presented themselves. VOA broadcasts, based on developments at the Second All-Union Writers' Congress at the end of 1954 and a Writers' Conference early this summer, analyzed the lack of creative freedom, or left-handed relaxation of restrictions which constitutes "authorized freedom." Scripts showed how the Communist Party has tried to enslave artists, writers, and intellectuals in general, by requiring their servile adherence to the fluctuating party line, and use them to serve political objectives of the regime.

3. The dilemma that the Soviets can probably obtain real results in agriculture, necessary for continued substantial economic growth, only by diverting resources and altering the collectivist structure of agriculture in ways which would reduce their political control over the largest segment of the population, the peasantry, which in turn would seriously undermine the bases of Communism in the USSR.

Defense: The global base structure of the Air Force and the rotation and staging operation of strategic and tactical aircraft have influenced Soviet foreign and domestic policies, and will continue to do so. The military strength represented by the United States Air Force is a contributing factor in the huge Soviet investment in armaments. This investment competes directly with resources available for consumer goods.

USIA: This being one of the most vulnerable sectors of Soviet economy, VOA had frequent opportunity to analyze it in its general, as well as in its specific, aspects, including such subject matter as that listed under vulnerabilities (9) -- the peasants' continuing hatred of collectivization and their natural desire for owning their own land and freely enjoying the fruits of their labor, and (10) -- the regime's continued reliance on collective farming in spite of all its grave shortcomings. VOA comments on these matters were pegged to such events as Malenkov's resignation for alleged inability to cope with agricultural problems; the decree on increased local authority in agricultural planning; the Khrushchev speech in Suratov on the same matter; the decision to send 30,000 party workers to kolkhoz management posts, etc.

Among the points made in VOA commentary was the fact that such concessions as the lowering of agricultural taxes were not solving the basic evils of a system that continues to deprive the peasant of free ownership of land and of free initiative in his work. VOA also commented upon the fact that decentralization of agricultural planning merely shifted the burden of ultimate responsibility from the bureaucracy to the little people, the peasants.

The Soviet agricultural delegation's U.S. visit provided VOA with an excellent opportunity to present a series of scripts on American agriculture which indicated the possibilities offered by the American system of private land ownership, coupling individual initiative, farmers' free cooperation, and governmental services, for resolving many of the difficulties which beset Soviet agriculture, largely as a consequence of its collectivist organization.

4. Counter-measures to defection are costly in terms of money and efficiency.

Defense: Implementation of the Volunteer Freedom Corps concept, although it has been postponed to a more propitious time, and therefore not specifically an implementing action, is considered a latent capability for exploiting the vulnerabilities concerned with defection.

Air Force rules of engagement have indirectly permitted and encouraged defection by Communist pilots by providing that no offensive action will be taken against an intruder aircraft unless the intercepted aircraft commits a hostile act. USAFE pilots are to direct intruding aircraft to USAF bases. Cash rewards have been offered for Soviet aircraft desired by the Air Force.

USIA: VOA Washington has exploited the Soviet vulnerability to defection, in general, within the limited possibilities of the Washington/New York area, (i. e., the recent arrival of the Tuapse sailors). Use was made of tape recordings received from the Munich Radio Center and covering defectors' organizations, both here and abroad, in its news items and has carried many successful resettlement stories.

5. Contradictions between Communist theory and Soviet practice.

State: This theme is used repeatedly in State's speeches and public statements, but directly for its effect on the free world. However, the use of this theme may be counterproductive as far as the Soviet people themselves are concerned.

USIA: Centrally produced USIA special materials, such as a 100 - page packet containing 12 documentary articles exposing

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Communist election travesties, a pamphlet, "Facts About Communism-Justice", a weekly series, "Religion vs. Communism," containing current documentation of Communist anti-religious practices, and periodic backgrounders on such subjects as the objectives underlying Soviet peace propoganda and conditions in East Germany, an anti-Communist cartoon feature, "Comrades," featuring discrepancies between Communist words and deeds etc., were distributed to numerous USIS posts for appropriate local placement.

Typical articles appearing in Problems of Communism contrasted Marxist and early Leninist pronouncements regarding "classless society" with the rigid stratification prevailing in the USSR; compared Soviet claims of the special qualities of "New Soviet Man" and the new Soviet society with the facts of increasing alcoholism and delinquency which are engendered by the nature of the Soviet way of life; distinguished Soviet practices from Marxist theory; reviewed in scholarly manner three books on Marxism regarding the relation between Marxism and Stalinism, subjecting both to critical examination; noted the disparity between the image of socialist society as projected by Marx and Lenin and the notoriously harsh and cruel characteristics of Soviet criminal law.

Under Scrutiny carried articles, for example, which called attention to the discard by Brazilian Communists of their doctrinal worker-peasant appeal in order to capitalize on anti-U.S. sentiments; analyzed the contradiction between the Soviet trade offensive and Soviet claims to self-sufficiency.

Books distributed under the ideological book program, which contrasted Communist theory with Soviet practice, included "Stalin vs. Marx" by Klasu Mehnert and "The Dynamics of Soviet Society" by Walter Rostow.



TAB A TO PROGRESS REPORT ON NSC 5505/1

LIST OF AGREED VULNERABILITIES PERTAINING TO NSC 5505/1

The following list of vulnerabilities* represents a consensus of agreement as to these Communist orbit vulnerabilities which are most exploitable and which deserve the highest priority of U. S. effort.

A. Social Discontents

1. The failure of Communist ideology to capture the minds and determine the ideals and goals of many Soviet youth.
2. Desire of the people for freedom of self-expression in some form, and the lack of free access to information.
3. Desire of the intelligentsia to be part of a cultural world community.
4. The conflict between Communist attitudes toward religion and the persistence of religious feelings.

B. Nationality and Minority Problems

5. The inferior position and Russification of many minority groups.
6. The political unreliability of many minority groups.
7. Pride of national groups in their cultural heritage and their desire for self-expression.

*Definition as contained in NSC 5505/1. "An exploitable vulnerability exists in a foreign society only if three elements are present: (a) a 'weakness' to be exploited, (b) a U.S. objective, and (c) a U.S. capability we can employ or develop to exploit the weakness in a way which will advance the objective."

C. Economy

8. The dilemma that the Soviets can probably obtain real results in agriculture, necessary for continued substantial economic growth, only by diverting resources and altering the collectivist structure of agriculture in ways which would reduce their political control over the largest segment of the population, the peasantry, which in turn would seriously undermine the bases of communism in the USSR.

9. The persistent and deep hatred of collective farming by the peasantry.

10. The dedication of the regime to maintaining the collective farm system, and its stated intentions to collectivize the peasantry even further. (i. e., Khrushchev's abortive agrogorod plan).

11. The prolonged depression of the standard of living, accompanied by the unrelenting pace of industrialization with its continuing demand of heavy sacrifices from the people.

12. The unequal share of those goods actually available received by different elements of the population.

13. Soviet desire to exploit the scientific and technical progress of the West despite the attendant security risk to the Soviet system.

D. Political

14. The stratification of Soviet society, contrary to the "classless" Communist concept; for example, the favored position of the intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and Army and Party officials.

15. Personal power relationships.

16. The conflict between the high centralization of decision making and the efficiency of the internal operation of the system.

17. The potential threat to Party control from the professional interests of the growing managerial class.

18. Conflict between foreign economic policy demands and internal development.

19. Cleavages at the top in objectives and methods.

20. Conflict between Soviet practice and Soviet propaganda.

E. Military

21. The special position and possible political importance of the military.

22. Morale problem of Soviet troops when stationed in European countries for any period of time.

23. The effect of desertions upon the Soviet leadership's confidence in the reliability of Soviet officers and troops.

24. Soviet exploitation of demobilized soldiers in the new lands and other areas of economic crisis (i. e., coal mines).

25. Counter-measures to defection are costly in terms of money and efficiency.

F. Satellites*

26. Nationalism in the Satellites.

27. Germany striving for reunification

28. Passive resistance in the Satellites.

29. Desire of Satellites to be part of a European community.

30. Reaction to Russian or Pan-Slavic nationalism and imperialism in the Satellites.

31. Unrest caused by subjugation of Satellites to a traditionally hated power.

32. Confusion, dissension, and opportunism in Satellite regimes.

33. Patriotic sentiments of the Satellite peoples.

34. Questionable political reliability of the satellite armed forces.

*These vulnerabilities are included solely for the sake of completeness. No report will be required for them since they are being reported on elsewhere in conjunction with NSC 17.

35. Conflicts between the Soviet Communist Party and the parties of the various Satellites.

36. Popular dissatisfaction with Communism and Soviet domination which will continue to slow the attainment of Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe.

37. Opposition to the regime based on anti-Communism, nationalism, liberal opposition to socialism, and desire for freedom from controls over person, press, religion, and education.

38. Peasant opposition.

39. Inconsistencies in ideology and weakness in leadership.

40. The persistence of many historical and cultural ties with the West.

41. High cost of living.

42. Resentment against Soviet economic control.

43. Conflict between the demands of the Satellite consumer and the requirements of the USSR upon productive capacity.

44. Shortages of materials, labor opposition, incompetent planning.

45. Low investment in agriculture.

46. High defections to the West from the East German police jeopardized East German control.

G. Communist China

47. The inadequacy of Chinese food resources is aggravated by Soviet demands for payment in agricultural products for military and other assistance.

48. Dependence on Bloc shipping for essential imports.

49. Sensitivity to prestige considerations in international relations, including possible sensitivity of the Chinese Communist leaders to the predominant position of the current Kremlin leadership.

50. Dependence upon the Soviet Union.

51. Traditional territorial and racial conflicts between Russia and China.

H. Communist International Apparatus

52. Contradictions between Communist theory and Soviet practice.

53. Basic fallacies of the Communist doctrine.

54. Dependence of local parties on Soviet support.

55. Conflict between the national aspirations of a country and the espousal by the local communist party of the policies which advance the interests of the Soviet Union.

56. The manipulation of "front" organizations to serve Communist purposes.

57. The subordination of the interests of national communist parties to Soviet requirements (i. e., record of betrayal of nation communist parties).



NSC 5505/1
January 31, 1955

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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

References: A. NSC 5501
B. NSC 5502
C. NSC 5505
D. NSC Action No. 1314



The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 234th Council meeting on January 27, 1955, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5505, subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1314-c.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 5505, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith, as a basic guide to all appropriate executive departments and agencies in exploiting discontents and other problems in the USSR and its European satellites, in conformity with paragraph 26-c of NSC 5501, which paragraph states one element of the general strategy contained in NSC 5501.

The President has designated, as the coordinating agency for the statement of policy contained herein, a Special Committee chaired by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, and composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and with the participation as appropriate of representatives of the Department of Justice, the Foreign Operations Administration, the U.S. Information Agency, and other interested departments and agencies, for the purpose of:

- (1) Reviewing current programs and developing new programs to carry out the statement of policy contained herein, and ensuring coordination of actions taken thereunder.

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(2) Making periodic progress reports to the National Security Council; including evaluations of the adequacy of the policy in relation to existing or anticipated conditions, and the need for any modifications in the policy, together with illustrative examples of current and projected programs.

The "Report" contained in the Annex to NSC 5505, and the "Summary" thereof contained in NSC 5505, are hereby referred to the above-mentioned Special Committee, to use as background material relevant to carrying out its assignment.

It is requested that special security precautions be taken in the handling of this report, and that access to it be on a strict "need to know" basis.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller



EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND
EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

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STATEMENT OF POLICY

on

EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET
AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

1. NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy", outlines the following general strategy:

"26. ... U.S. policies must be designed to affect the conduct of the Communist regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interests and to encourage tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general strategy, our effort should be directed to:



"a. Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with U.S. security.

"b. Maintaining and developing in the free world the mutuality of interest and common purpose, and the necessary will, strength and stability, to face the Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the hope and confidence of free peoples.

"c. Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed to foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:

"(1) By influencing them and their peoples toward the choice of those alternative lines of action which, while in their national interests, do not conflict with the security interests of the U.S.; and

"(2) By exploiting differences between such regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways consistent with this general strategy."

"27. To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a flexible combination of military, political, economic, propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise of U.S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to reinforce one another. Programs for the general strategy between now and the time when the USSR has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a matter of urgency."

2. a. This paper prescribes the principles to be applied, in conformity with paragraph 26-g quoted above, in exploiting discontents and other problems in the USSR and the European Satellites, such as tensions inherent in the police state, low standards of living, opposition to collectivization, cultural and intellectual regimentation, interference with religion, dissatisfaction of minorities, nationality problems, the governmental structure of the USSR, ideological weaknesses of the Soviet system, and disaffection in the Satellites.

b. Such discontents and other problems can be usefully exploited only if the U.S. (1) has or can develop a capability for such exploitation and (2) will thereby advance a specific objective within this capability.

3. In exploiting such discontents and other problems, the following principles should apply:

a. Measures for exploitation should be mutually consistent and should be directed toward specific U.S. objectives which are within existing or potential U.S. capabilities.

b. Seek to create and increase popular and bureaucratic pressures on the Soviet regime through the exploitation of discontents and other problems to promote evolutionary changes in Soviet policies and conduct which will be in U.S. interest and tend to lessen the chance of Soviet attack upon the U.S. As appropriate, seek (1) to cause the regime to occupy itself increasingly with internal problems and (2) to pose difficult decisions tending to create uncertainty or divisions within the regime.

c. Continue basic opposition to the Soviet system and continue to state its evils; but stress evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. At the same time make clear that while the U.S. is determined to protect its vital security interests by force if necessary, it does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force.

d. Generally depict the causes of the discontents and other problems which are to be exploited not as inherent conditions reparable only by revolution but as conditions susceptible to correction by the regime if it should choose to take the necessary action.

e. Apply these principles to the European Satellites, taking advantage as appropriate of the special opportunities existing in these countries to exert greater pressures, and to weaken the ties which bind the Satellites to the USSR.

f. Because substantial change in basic conditions in the USSR or the Satellites (including the imminent threat or initiation of general war) might render these principles inappropriate, they should be continuously reviewed. In order to be prepared to meet any such substantial change, the U.S. should continue to develop and maintain capabilities which would be required in the event of such change, in so far as this can be done prior to such change without impairing the carrying out of these principles.

g. Covert operations (including experimentation with such anti-regime measures as might be applicable to substantially changed circumstances) will not necessarily have to conform to the above principles, but should be conducted so as not to impair the effectiveness of such principles.

4. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in accordance with the above principles can be expected to modify the policies



of the USSR and the European Satellites along lines more compatible with U.S. security interests only if further Communist expansion is prevented. The USSR and the European Satellites are not likely to experiment with alternatives more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques of military and political pressure on and in the free world show signs of achieving success. It is to be emphasized that no political warfare strategy can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World. Therefore, success in carrying out the above principles will depend upon:

a. Maintenance by the U.S. and its allies, for an indefinite period, of military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop; and united determination to use military force against such aggression.

b. Building the strength and cohesion of the free world and taking adequate actions for the purpose of



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(1) creating cohesion within and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily improving the relative position of the free world and
(2) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the free world.



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SUMMARY OF REPORT BY SPECIAL COMMITTEE
on
EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. An exploitable vulnerability exists in a foreign society only if three elements are present: (a) a "weakness" to be exploited, (b) a U.S. objective, and (c) a U.S. capability we can employ or develop to exploit the weakness in a way which will advance the objective.

2. The general objective of U.S. political warfare operations against Soviet and Satellite regimes is to reduce their capabilities and alter their policies so as to reduce the threat they pose to the U.S. This objective can be broken down into four related sub-objectives, the first of which is:

a. To reduce the actual military capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite countries, both in the short and the long run.

The U.S. does not possess at the present time the actual or potential means to conduct political warfare operations that will significantly reduce Soviet military capabilities. Therefore, the prime task of U.S. political warfare is to affect choices on the part of top leaders, middle bureaucrats, and the people in the USSR and the Satellites in such a way as to accomplish the remaining three sub-objectives, which are:

b. Reduce the chance that the leaders will choose war.

c. Increase the chance that they would accept a quick end of hostilities on terms compatible with U.S. interest.

d. Increase the chance of evolutionary change over time of a nature to reduce the Soviet threat.

It is sometimes assumed that a necessary and sufficient condition for the achievement of all three of these objectives is the removal or overthrow of the present Soviet regime. It is not safe to assume that it is either a necessary or a sufficient condition. While unlikely, it is not impossible that over a number of years or decades the policies of the regime might evolve in ways favorable to U.S. interest. And it is certainly by no means a foregone conclusion that a revolutionary successor regime would inevitably behave better.

3. a. Accordingly, the political warfare strategy should attempt to promote evolutionary change within the USSR and the Satellites in directions consistent with U.S. interest:

(1) Through measures designed to expand the field of realistic and attractive alternatives perceived by persons at various levels within the society.

(2) Through measures designed to induce the Soviet and Satellite decision-makers, by persuasion and pressure, to adopt courses of action more in U.S. interest.

b. This political warfare strategy must rely upon, and be consistent with, those major domestic and foreign policies on which the U.S. depends to meet and counter the Soviet threat. In particular the success of this strategy will depend on:

(1) U.S. maintenance of sufficient military strength, and the will to use it, to threaten the USSR with military defeat should it undertake direct military aggression anywhere in the free world.

(2) Denial, through vigorous political, economic and military policies within the free world, of opportunities for the USSR to extend its control and influence by subversion and other non-military means.

There will be no internal experimentation by the Soviets with alternative techniques more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques of military and political pressure on and in the free world show signs of achieving notable success.

4. This political warfare strategy should have appropriate implementation where possible in military, foreign and economic policy, as well as in information policy and special operations. It should be continuously reviewed in the light of existing circumstances.



POTENTIALLY EXPLOITABLE SOVIET AND SATELLITE VULNERABILITIES

5. The major Soviet vulnerabilities which lend themselves to some degree of effective U.S. exploitation are:

a. Popular discontents (tensions inherent in the police state, low standards of living, opposition to collectivization, cultural and intellectual regimentation, suppression of religion, dissatisfaction of minorities, ideological weaknesses of the system).

b. USSR nationality problems.

c. The structure of the USSR economy.

d. The governmental structure of the USSR.

e. Disaffection in the Satellites.

6. Popular Discontents in the USSR. The U.S. does not possess the capability of inducing successful revolution from below in the near future through the exploitation of popular discontents.

a. U.S. political warfare strategy should vigorously attack the terror and tension induced by police measures, the military rather than civilian bias of the economy, and the restriction of communication with the outside world. These targets would be mainly attacked, however, not as inherent features of the Communist state correctible only by revolution, but as mistaken policies and practices which could be readily modified if the leaders would only consent to do so and which in any event are not really necessary to their legitimate ends.

b. This strategy should emphasize specifically ways in which present discontents could be met by the existing regime, so as to bring effective pressure to bear on current decisions and to dramatize for officials at all levels of the bureaucracy the fact that realistic alternatives to present policies are conceivable.

c. In taking this line, the U.S. should not abandon its basic position that the whole Soviet system is fundamentally wrong, and should continue to state what are thought to be its errors. In doing so, however, the U.S. should make clear that it does not seek to impose its ideas of government on the USSR by force.

The line taken under this strategy should be aggressive in pressing for change, but evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and generally avoid a tone openly and stridently hostile to the system. Stressing through open propaganda our implacable opposition to the whole Soviet system, may confirm for all who identify themselves in any degree with that system the image spread by the leadership of an external world aggressively hostile, which will greatly narrow popular and bureaucratic conceptions of alternatives open to the USSR.

d. Exploitation of discontents resolvable only through revolution should be avoided.

7. USSR Nationality Problems.* It is not now in the U.S. interest to give the impression to the Soviet leadership by either official actions, or unofficial actions likely to be attributed to the U.S., that the U.S. desires the dismemberment of the USSR. On the other hand, the exploitation of minority nationalities' discontents, either openly within this limitation or in truly covert fashion, should be continued as feasible.

8. The Structure of the USSR Economy. Although the U.S. capability to affect Soviet agricultural output and consumer goods production is extremely limited, political warfare operations should be so designed as to encourage greater investment in agriculture and increased production of consumer goods as a desirable diversion of resources from war production. A program of positive U.S. trade offers, primarily of consumer goods, should be considered by the appropriate departments and agencies.

9. The Governmental Structure of the USSR. It is in the U.S. interest to encourage the current trend toward "constitutionalizing government" rather than a return to the Stalinist system. Encouragement of more delegation of authority and regularization within the bureaucracy may in time act to widen the range of more acceptable alternatives evident to at least some elements in the present or potential leadership

*See NSC 5502, "U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities", January 11, 1955.



and to that extent render more difficult adoption of policies leading towards general war. Those relatively junior officials without present power of major decision are an important target because from their ranks will come the leadership of later decades. Within this context, divisive issues within the bureaucracy should be exploited, i.e., how far to relax police power, how much to expand consumer goods, how to expand agriculture, how to conduct foreign policy, and so forth.

10. Disaffection in the Satellites. All the internal weaknesses of the Soviet system are present in the European Satellites in a much exaggerated form. Therefore, U.S. capabilities for the exploitation of vulnerabilities in this area, as compared with the USSR, vary both as to substance and degree. In the Satellites the basic strategy might well attempt to raise expectations farther and depict alternatives more radically different from present practice. Programs to encourage Satellite peoples to make strong but limited demands on their leaders for improvements should be even more effective in influencing choices both of the Satellite and the Soviet bureaucracies, than would similar programs in the USSR. Moreover, there are greater potentialities in the Satellites for some clearly revolutionary and underground activities as well as for anti-regime propaganda in general. The U.S. should take advantage of such opportunities so far as consistent with the basic strategy. Nevertheless, the following considerations should govern main lines of strategy toward the Satellites:

a. Barring external military aid and intervention, no anti-regime revolt in the Satellites could succeed at present. The United States is not now prepared to undertake such aid and intervention. Accordingly, although it is in the interest of the U.S. to foster conditions which, in the event of either general war or changed circumstances may be favorable to revolt (or related activities, such as sabotage, partisan movements, etc.), it is not in U.S. interest at the present time to encourage revolution as a major element of its strategy toward the Satellites.

b. Belief on the part of Satellite and Soviet leadership that the U.S. is implacably dedicated to the overthrow of both Satellite and Soviet regimes may negate the possibility of exerting U.S. influence towards a more acceptable evolution of Satellite or Soviet society.

FUTURE CONTINGENCIES

11. It would be folly to adopt any political warfare strategy so irrevocably that the U.S. could not change it if developments made this seem wise. There is every reason why planning should be done on the basis of a variety of contingencies. Despite the present unlikelihood of a revolutionary situation, the U.S. should prepare plans and seek to maintain assets to exploit crisis situations or general war, so far as this can be done without prejudicing carrying out the above strategy. This strategy does not preclude experimentation with such anti-regime measures as might be more applicable in changed circumstances (e.g., general war). However, at any particular time, U.S. political warfare operations should be guided by the above over-all strategy, departure from which should be undertaken only for cause and with a clear recognition of possible conflict.



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

6 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

Subject: Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities,
Comment and Recommendation by the JCS
Adviser.

1. The JCS Adviser considers the foregoing Planning Board paper, subject: "Summary of Report by Special Committee on Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities", to be an adequate summary of the Millikan Report on the same subject.

2. While in agreement that political warfare strategy of the type stated therein should be developed as a part of an integrated U.S. national cold war strategy, the JCS Adviser feels that measures growing out of such a strategy, whatever they may be, will not be meaningful in creating, prior to atomic plenty, conditions under which the U.S. and its Allies can meet and alleviate the Soviet Communist threat under proper safeguards.

3. U.S. and free world military strength and the determination to use it if necessary to prevent further Communist aggression are assumed by the Millikan Report to be a sine qua non for successful implementation of a policy promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Bloc. The collective military strength of the U.S. and its Allies, if properly employed, would have been sufficient in recent years to have put a stop to Communist aggression. However, the limited success which has been achieved is due only in part to the utilization of this military strength.

4. With the above in mind, there is little cause to believe that greater resolution in the use of collective military power against Communist aggression will exist after atomic plenty; the opposite is probably true. If free world vitality and determination to resist Communist aggression are undermined by unreasoning fear of atomic holocaust, the major pre-condition for a policy of evolutionary change will not be met. If the free world is thus inhibited, and the Communists continue to absorb new territory by any and all means at their

disposal, it is difficult to perceive how the U.S. can present to the Soviets alternatives attractive to them which do not conflict drastically with the security interests of the United States.

5. The views of the JCS on NSC 5440 are equally applicable to this report. For emphasis, the following extract from their views is stated in conclusion:

"The JCS are of the opinion, therefore, that our national strategy should recognize that until the Communist regimes are convinced that their aggressive and expansionist policies will be met by countermeasures which inherently will threaten the continued existence of their regimes it will not be feasible to induce a change in their basic attitude or bring about the abandonment of their present objectives."

6. The JCS Adviser recommends that the NSC note the summary of the Millikan Report and refer it to the OCB for further study in connection with developing appropriate implementing actions consistent with NSC 5501 as approved.



(SIGNED)

JOHN K. GERHART
Major General, USAF
JCS Adviser to the
NSC Planning Board

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 1

January 26, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite
Vulnerabilities

REFERENCE: NSC 5505

At the request of the Department of Defense the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the draft statement of policy contained in the reference report on the subject are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 5505 at its meeting on January 27, 1955.

James S. Lay, Jr.
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary



cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

25 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Exploitation of Soviet and European
Satellite Vulnerabilities - NSC 5505



1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy, subject as above, prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the Council at its meeting on 27 January 1955.

2. The draft statement of policy does not provide for an over-all political warfare program vis-a-vis the Soviet-Communist Bloc, as envisaged in subparagraph 26 c of NSC 5505. It prescribes principles to be applied in exploiting discontent and other problems in the USSR and European satellites alone and makes no reference to the vulnerabilities of Communist China. Among the most pressing current problems of U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc are those concerning Communist China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a political warfare program which fails to explore the vulnerabilities of that country and to prescribe principles for their exploitation would be seriously deficient, and the development of an over-all program is urgently needed. It would, therefore, appear necessary that a study be made to determine the practicability of expanding the proposed policy into an over-all political warfare policy or, as an alternative, to formulate as a separate program one dealing with Communist China alone.

3. The principles set forth in paragraph 3 of the draft statement of policy are derived substantially from the study titled "Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities" (Annex to NSC 5505, distributed separately). That study clearly indicates that this concept of political warfare strategy is supplementary to political and military policies designed to strengthen the Free World and that its effectiveness "depends as much on concomitant moves in the military and political field as on the skill with which information and

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covert operations are conducted." It is considered that the draft statement of policy should be amended to indicate clearly, as in the conclusions of the subject study, that the proposed policy set forth therein is supplementary to rather than a substitute for adequate military, economic, and political programs. Accordingly, the following changes are suggested (changes indicated in the usual manner):

"4. Exploitation of vulnerabilities in accordance with the above principles can be expected to modify the policies of the USSR and the European Satellites along lines more compatible with U.S. security interests only if further Communist expansion is prevented. The USSR and the European Satellites are not likely to experiment with alternatives more consistent with U.S. interest as long as the accustomed Communist techniques of military and political pressure on and in the free world show signs of achieving success. It is to be emphasized that no political warfare strategy can in any sense substitute for adequate military, political, and economic programs designed to strengthen the Free World. Therefore, success in carrying out the above principles will depend upon:

"a. Maintenance by the United States and its allies, for an indefinite period, of military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with general war should it develop, and united determination to use military force against such aggression.

"b. Building the strength and cohesion of the free world and taking adequate actions for the purpose of (1) creating cohesion within and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and steadily improving the relative position of the free world and (2) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in the free world.

~~"c. -- Thereby convincing the Communist rulers that aggression will not serve their interests, that it will not pay. -- So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR."~~

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the deletion of the bracketed phrase in subparagraph 3 f in the belief that such an indefinite restraint on the continued development of adequate over-all security posture is not in accord with approved U.S. security policy.

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5. With respect to the proposed new subparagraph 3 h, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that its retention or omission would not be of real consequence if the amendments proposed in paragraph 3 above were adopted.

6. It is requested that the foregoing views be presented to the National Security Council for consideration by the Council in connection with NSC 5505 at its meeting on 27 January 1955.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ ARTHUR MADFORD,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.



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