

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Scan ID

119962SS

Subject Code:

FG264

Original OA/ID Number:

CF 1690

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
25	3	11	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject: ACDA Annual and Compliance Report. Record ID: 9504481. (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
WHORM Subject File-CF
FG264
OA/Box Number: CF 1690

FOLDER TITLE:

119962SS

2006-1363-F
vz5548

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am pleased to transmit the 1994 Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

The ACDA was established in 1961 in part because Dean Rusk, Secretary of State at that time, believed the President needed access to unfiltered arms control analysis.

After a comprehensive review in 1993 and a second review in early 1995, it is clear to me that Secretary Rusk was correct: sound arms control and nonproliferation policy requires an independent, specialized, and technically competent arms control and nonproliferation agency.

In the absence of such an agency, neither I nor any future President could count on receiving independent arms control advice, unfiltered by other policy considerations. A President would thus at times have to make the most consequential national security decisions without the benefit of vigorous advocacy of the arms control point of view.

Moreover, I have found that ACDA's unique combination of single-mission technical expertise with its painstakingly developed capability for multilateral negotiation and implementation of the most intricate arms control and nonproliferation agreements could not be sustained with equal effectiveness outside of a dedicated arms control agency.

The ACDA's first major success was the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Twenty-five years later, its most recent major success is its long-term effort culminating in permanent and unconditional extension of that same Treaty. On both counts, America and the world are far more secure because of the ability and dedication of ACDA's leadership and professional staff.

I have therefore decided that ACDA will remain independent and continue its central role in U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy.

*Noted:
NMSC*

Whether the issue is nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear missile reduction, chemical weapons elimination, or any of the other growing arms control and nonproliferation challenges America faces, ACDA is an essential national security asset.

In that spirit, I commend this report to you.

Sincerely,

William T. Clinton

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Sincerely,

William S. Clinton

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7/13/95

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 12, 1995

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached is a Lake memo and transmittal letters for the annual report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The memo highlights some ongoing areas of concern, especially regarding chemical and biological weapons. The transmittal letters argue for the continued separate existence of ACDA. NSC hopes to transmit the Report tomorrow.

Todd Stern
Todd Stern

7/13/95
okay for autopen
by Todd Stern
C. Cleveland

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
~~September 11, 2006~~ 5/16/2017
By VZ NARA, Date 9/13/2018
2006-1363-F3

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE CLERK
TRACKING SHEET FOR PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

TITLE: ACDA - annual report for 1994

TYPE DOCUMENT:

PROCLAMATION

LETTER(S)

*EXECUTIVE ORDER

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS/SENATE

*MEMORANDUM

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

DECISION MEMORANDUM

SIGNING STATEMENT

DETERMINATION (numbered)

TREATY/CONVENTION/AGREEMENT, etc.

OTHER: _____

*Soft & Pos
Chun. Sen Cante
on Foreign Relat.*

RECEIVED: (Advance: 1/1/95 Time: a.m./p.m.)
In final: 7/12/95 Time: 11:05 a.m./p.m.

SENT TO CORRESPONDENCE FOR TYPING IN FINAL:

(Advance: 1/1/95 Time: a.m./p.m.)
In final: 7/12/95 Time: 11:40 a.m./p.m.

TO ~~JOHN~~ *Todd Stern's* ~~PODESTA'S~~ OFFICE:

(For staffing: 1/1/95 Time: a.m./p.m.)
In final: 7/12/95 Time: 1:25 a.m./p.m.

INFO, INCLUDING STENCIL AND DISC, TO PRESS OFFICE:

Date: 7/16/95 Time: 3:50 a.m./p.m.
POSTED: 7/15/95 Time: 4:45 a.m./p.m.

NOTIFICATIONS:

(initials)

(Person/time)

(Person/time)

(Person/time)

*Copies of all signed EOs or Memos to
W.H. Counsel, 2d Floor, West Wing

NSC, when appropriate -- Desk Officer;
W.H. Situation Room -- x6-2585.

Mike Andricos NSC X 69176

(Other)

(Other)

OTHER INFORMATION: *NOTE: DUE NLT JAN. 31st annually -
usually late.*

CLASSIFIED PART IS IN THE SAFE.

*Steve Andreasen, NSC Case Ofcr. X 6-9191
called & left voice msg. to call us back, re
Press Rel. on text of 11:15. *W.H. 6*
7-13-95 (12:11p)
8:00p he'll check w/ ACTA
w/ Mr. R.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

July 13, 1995

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM
THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. Chairman:)

I am pleased to transmit the 1994 Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

The ACDA was established in 1961 in part because Dean Rusk, Secretary of State at that time, believed the President needed access to unfiltered arms control analysis.

After a comprehensive review in 1993 and a second review in early 1995, it is clear to me that Secretary Rusk was correct: sound arms control and nonproliferation policy requires an independent, specialized, and technically competent arms control and nonproliferation agency.

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Moreover, I have found that ACDA's unique combination of single-mission technical expertise with its painstakingly developed capability for multilateral negotiation and implementation of the most intricate arms control and nonproliferation agreements could not be sustained with equal effectiveness outside of a dedicated arms control agency.

The ACDA's first major success was the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Twenty-five years later, its most recent major success is its long-term effort culminating in permanent and unconditional extension of that same Treaty. On both counts, America and the world are far more secure because of the ability and dedication of ACDA's leadership and professional staff.

I have therefore decided that ACDA will remain independent and continue its central role in U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy.

more

(OVER)

Whether the issue is nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear missile reduction, chemical weapons elimination, or any of the other growing arms control and nonproliferation challenges America faces, ACDA is an essential national security asset.

In that spirit, I commend this report to you.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

#

*Hand from this
proof: WH:RC
7-12-45*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Washington, D.C. 20515

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
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LTR HEAD (if classified)

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WASHINGTON

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7. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Whether the issue is nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear missile reduction, chemical weapons elimination, or any of the other

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edit
7-12-95

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Washington, D.C. 20515

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of	Department STATE	Subject Executive H - 90-2
7/9/68:	Transmitted to the Senate.	(Treaty was signed 7/1/68 in a ceremony at the White House)
3/13/69:	RESOLVED, (Two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in Washington on July 1, 1968, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and 53 other states (Ex. H., 90th Congress, 2nd session).	
3/13/69:	Received at the White House from the Senate.	(NOTE: The vote was 83 to 15)
3/13/69:	Ratification to the State Dept., Rm. 7512	
11/24/69:	Instrument of Ratification signed by the President in a ceremony in his West Wing Office this morning. (4 copies were signed) (NOTE: It was also stated by Secretary Rogers that a ceremony would be held in 10 days or two weeks for the deposit of the U. S. instrument)	
12/2/69:	4 signed Instruments of Ratification received in the Records Office.	
12/2/69:	4 signed Instruments delivered to State Dept., Rm. 7512.	
3/5/70:	Proclamation signed by President Nixon in a ceremony in the Main Conference Room at the State Dept.	

March 5, 1970, entry into force.

*Last year's
final Hr.*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 28, 1994

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to transmit the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Annual Report for 1993.

As a national security agency, ACDA works in collaboration with the Department of State and with other agencies of the U.S. Government. This report addresses ACDA's part in national security policy development and implementation.

On July 3, 1993, after a comprehensive review, I decided to strengthen and revitalize ACDA in order for it to play an active role in meeting the arms control and nonproliferation challenges of the post-Cold War era.

This report, although mandated by current law, reflects new priorities for ACDA in pending legislation. This legislation was initially developed under the leadership of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Claiborne Pell, has received wide bipartisan support in both Houses of Congress, and has now been approved by the Senate.

The ACDA's revitalization reaffirms and strengthens the agency's key function in developing and implementing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies. A specialized, technically competent, and independent arms control institution remains important to the Nation.

The ACDA's responsibilities include:

- Providing advice:
 - the ACDA Director acts as principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament;
 - the ACDA provides legal advisers to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament negotiations.

*To the President of the Senate: 3/28/94
To the Speaker of the House: 3/28/94*

*Noted
M. K. B.*

-- Negotiating:

- leading the U.S. Comprehensive Test Ban negotiating team at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;
- leading the U.S. negotiating team at the 1995 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Conference;
- chairing the Washington backstopping (policy support) group for the Conference on Disarmament;
- participating in the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement Talks.

-- Implementing and verifying:

- leading the U.S. delegation to the Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission, and to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that will succeed it;
- leading the U.S. delegations to all meetings and conferences on the Biological Weapons Convention;
- leading the U.S. delegation to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty;
- leading the U.S. delegation to the Special Verification Commission of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty;
- leading the U.S. component of the Standing Consultative Commission of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty;
- leading the U.S. delegation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission of the Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
- drafting, with interagency coordination, the Annual Report to Congress on *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements*;
- providing the Principal Deputy Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency;

- participating in the U.S. delegation to the Joint Consultative Group of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty;
- participating in the U.S. delegation to the Open Skies Consultative Commission of the Open Skies Treaty.
- Controlling exports:
 - participating in meetings of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group on nuclear weapons related exports;
 - participating in meetings of the Australia Group on chemical and biological weapons related exports;
 - participating in the meetings of the Missile Technology Control Regime.
- Coordinating and reporting on research on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.
- Informing and educating the public:
 - leading the Interagency Working Group on Public Diplomacy for Arms Control and Nonproliferation;
 - publishing extensively on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

My decision to strengthen and revitalize ACDA, combined with continued congressional support, will help the U.S. Government move vigorously to eliminate the overarmament of the Cold War, stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and apply arms control solutions to regional problems.

The report offers a summary of the broad range of complex issues that ACDA deals with each day; I commend it to your attention.

Sincerely,

William B. Clinton

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

*** ACTIVITY REPORT ***

TRANSMISSION OK


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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 13, 1995

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am pleased to transmit the 1994 Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

The ACDA was established in 1961 in part because Dean Rusk, Secretary of State at that time, believed the President needed access to unfiltered arms control analysis.

After a comprehensive review in 1993 and a second review in early 1995, it is clear to me that Secretary Rusk was correct: sound arms control and nonproliferation policy requires an independent, specialized, and technically competent arms control and nonproliferation agency.

In the absence of such an agency, neither I nor any future President could count on receiving independent arms control advice, unfiltered by other policy considerations. A President would thus at times have to make the most consequential national security decisions without the benefit of vigorous advocacy of the arms control point of view.

Moreover, I have found that ACDA's unique combination of single-mission technical expertise with its painstakingly developed capability for multilateral negotiation and implementation of the most intricate arms control and nonproliferation agreements could not be sustained with equal effectiveness outside of a dedicated arms control agency.

The ACDA's first major success was the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Twenty-five years later, its most recent major success is its long-term effort culminating in permanent and unconditional extension of that same Treaty. On both counts, America and the world are far more secure because of the ability and dedication of ACDA's leadership and professional staff.

I have therefore decided that ACDA will remain independent and continue its central role in U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy.

Whether the issue is nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear missile reduction, chemical weapons elimination, or any of the other growing arms control and nonproliferation challenges America faces, ACDA is an essential national security asset.

In that spirit, I commend this report to you.

Sincerely,

William S. Clinton

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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William S. Clinton

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THREAT CONTROL through ARMS CONTROL

**U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency**

1994 Report to Congress

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DIRECTOR'S OVERVIEW

Arms control is threat control. It is national defense by cheaper means. Every foreign weapon eliminated is a weapon the United States no longer needs to counter. In military, diplomatic, and budgetary terms, arms control is an essential component of sound national security strategy for the 1990s and beyond.

Arms control has not been successful every time in every situation. But arms control can frequently address threats unreachable by military force. If viewed as a "weapon" for removing threats, arms control is staggeringly cost-effective. America is far more secure with it than without it.

Consider, for example, the tens of billions of dollars the United States and the Soviet Union spent on capabilities to forcibly destroy each other's ICBM silos. Now arms control is destroying those same silos with far higher confidence, without fear of bloody retaliation, and at cost three orders of magnitude lower.

Consider also the condition of our national security if the World Trade Center terrorists had been armed with a nuclear weapon. In ten minutes, we would have lost twice as many American lives as in the ten years of Vietnam. Preventing a recurrence would have become our highest national priority, at very high cost and uncertain probability of success. But the terrorists had no nuclear weapons because the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty denied them nuclear material.

These two examples illustrate the great and growing need for arms control and nonproliferation.

On the one hand, we are now harvesting the benefits of existing agreements to eliminate the over-armament of the Cold War. Both sides are willing in principle; very far-reaching treaties have been negotiated. But the essential and difficult work of implementing will stretch out before us for decades. We must not forget that, without dedicated and competent implementation, no agreement is worth the paper on which it is written. The arms reduction iron is hot; if we fail to use the hammer of peace on it now, our children will not thank us.

On the other hand, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an ever-increasing threat. The bipolar world is no more. In its place is a far more complex, and in many respects more dangerous, multipolar world. In this multipolar world, drawing a line between technology for commercial uses and technology for weapons of mass destruction is increasingly challenging. Nonproliferation agreements are our first line of defense against the creation of a far more unstable and hazardous world than we have ever known.

We are in one of the most critical periods in arms control history. The permanent and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on May 11, 1995 is an immense step forward for the security of all nations. At the same time, other significant challenges remain, stretching out far into the future.

I have touched on only two of the vital arms control and nonproliferation issues with

which America must deal in the coming years. The report will speak to them in detail. I wish now to briefly discuss the Agency I am privileged to serve.

This report marks the completion of my first full year as Director of ACDA. I find myself ever more persuaded, first, of the great and growing national need for ACDA as an independent, technically competent arms control agency and, second, of the intellect, vigor, and competence of ACDA's dedicated professional staff.

As a lean, single-mission, high-performing agency, ACDA has long given the taxpayers outstanding value. During 1994, I directed a management review process that is enhancing ACDA's cost-effectiveness even further. With an annual budget approximating the unit flyaway cost of a single fighter aircraft, our national security product per dollar is second to none.

Augmenting the output of an already high-performing agency, on a fixed budget and with growing responsibilities, is not easily done. In part, we are doing it through automation: always aggressive in its use of advanced computer capabilities to reduce cost, ACDA is becoming even more so. In part, we are doing it simply by asking the dedicated professionals who already work long and hard to work still longer and harder; this is necessary in today's budget environment.

This report differs from its predecessors in that it responds to several mandates of law enacted in 1994. Under 51(a)(5) and 51(a)(6) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, we have added a new chapter assessing the adherence of the United States and other nations to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements. Under 51(a)(1) through 51(a)(4) of the same Act, we include detailed statements of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament objectives, descriptions of negotiations during the past year, and projections for the coming year; for the sake of readability, we meet this requirement with passages distributed through the first six chapters of the report.

ACDA has always been responsive to Congressional concerns; this report is intended to continue in that tradition. I hope and expect it will add to a fruitful dialog between ACDA and Congress on the vital national security matters within our purview.

I. CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear weapons are by far the most destructive weapons ever devised. ACDA's highest priority is to protect U.S. security by reducing the probability of nuclear aggression.

In many respects, the potential for nuclear security is better now than at any time in the past. Recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives are creating real reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. These agreements may, in turn, lead to further enhancements to stability.

But while the nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union is diminishing, the challenge of preventing nuclear proliferation around the world is becoming dramatically more severe. The United States is, therefore, determined to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to negotiate a nuclear explosive test ban to discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals.

Our 1994 nuclear weapons efforts have centered on four tracks:

- Minimizing the number of entities with nuclear weapons available for use;
- Banning nuclear explosive testing;
- Eliminating the massive nuclear over-armament of the Cold War, through arms control agreements designed to regulate and reduce nuclear weapons and to enhance stability; and
- Banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives.

We are making progress along all four of these tracks to contain and reduce the nuclear threat to America's national security.

A. HALTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

1. NPT EXTENSION

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. With 178 Parties, it is the most widely-accepted multilateral arms control treaty in history and represents the world's primary legal and political barrier against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT establishes a framework essential for global and regional stability, for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for facilitating and regulating cooperation among states in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Key Elements of the NPT:

Article I: Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty (U.S., UK, Russia, France, and China) pledges "...not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce a non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."

Article II: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty pledges "...not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

Article III: Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities as a means to verify the pledge under Article II.

Article IV: NPT Parties have a right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and all Parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Article VI: NPT Parties undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Although Article VI does not mandate any specific action regarding any specific weapon, it has nevertheless been implemented in significant ways:

- SALT capped U.S. and Soviet strategic missile launchers;
- the INF Treaty eliminated an entire class of delivery systems and banned U.S. and Soviet short and intermediate range nuclear missiles;
- the 1991 reciprocal initiative on tactical nuclear weapons constituted a rapid and cooperative withdrawal for elimination of thousands of U.S. and former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons;
- since the signing of START I the U.S. and Russia have made major cuts in deployed strategic delivery systems; and in the near future
- START II, if ratified, will take another major step by eliminating MIRV ICBMs and heavy ICBMs, and bringing total U.S. and Soviet deliverable strategic warheads to one-third of the Cold War level.

Permanent Extension Achieved

In April and May of 1995, as required by the NPT, a conference of parties met to "decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or fixed periods." On May 11 the parties agreed, by consensus and without formal dissent from any party, that the Treaty would continue in force permanently and unconditionally.

The significance of this achievement cannot be overstated. It is critically important to containing the number of nations with nuclear weapons, and ultimately to reducing the probability of nuclear weapons use.

ACDA's Role. The U.S. Government has long been committed to indefinite, unconditional extension of the NPT. As the lead agency within the Executive Branch for the NPT and its extension, in 1994-95 ACDA continued its long-term work to build international support for the Treaty's indefinite extension. Throughout 1994 and early 1995, ACDA also continued to address Parties' noncompliance with NPT obligations, and to promote universal adherence to the Treaty.

Throughout 1994 and early 1995, ACDA held bilateral consultations with key NPT parties¹ as part of our effort to promote broad international support for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Before the NPT Conference began, indefinite extension had been endorsed by all of the members of NATO, OSCE, South Pacific Forum, and the G-7. In addition, substantial support among non-aligned states was emerging.

Preparations for the 1995 NPT Conference took place during some of the greatest challenges the international nonproliferation regime has yet faced. These include the refusal of Iraq to disclose fully the extent of its weapons programs, and North Korea's balking at its obligation to permit IAEA inspections as required by its NPT commitments.

ACDA has played an active role in U.S. efforts to deal with Iraq, and seeks to ensure that the recently concluded "agreed framework" with North Korea results in that country becoming a fully compliant NPT party. ACDA has also supported initiatives to improve and strengthen the IAEA safeguards system.

Three initiatives outside of NPT have had a significant positive effect in gaining support for permanent NPT extension, or for directly supporting nuclear nonproliferation:

- negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) in the Conference on Disarmament;
- agreement to seek negotiation of a multilateral convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes; and

¹In the national capitals of China, Ecuador, Egypt, Holy See, Indonesia, Kenya, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela, in Washington, and in diplomatic centers in New York, Geneva, and Vienna.

- implementation of START I by the United States and its treaty partners beginning at the end of 1994, and continuing attention to ratifying START II.

These initiatives are discussed in other parts of this report.

In addition to preparing for the 1995 NPT Conference, ACDA continued an active program throughout 1994 to encourage adherence to the NPT.

Following the accession of seven states in 1993, seven more – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine – joined the Treaty in 1994. The accessions of Kazakhstan and Ukraine were particularly significant because both still had nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union stationed on their territories. All of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union have joined the NPT.

ACDA continues to urge non-parties in all regions, including South Asia and the Middle East, to join the Treaty, and has worked vigorously to encourage all NPT parties that have not done so to complete the IAEA safeguards agreements required by the Treaty.

2. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

For over 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency has furthered vital U.S. security and nonproliferation interests through its program of international safeguards which provides assurance that nuclear materials are not diverted from civilian to military purposes. The IAEA also plays a central role in international efforts to make the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to countries worldwide, and has helped make nuclear facilities safer through its worldwide nuclear safety program.

The United States is one of the IAEA's strongest supporters and provides about one quarter of its annual budget. The United States is also a significant contributor to technical assistance and cooperation programs, which are supported by voluntary contributions of the membership.

The IAEA budget has not grown in real terms since 1984, but the Agency has nevertheless met the challenge of new responsibilities. Since 1992, however, the IAEA has been forced to cut or defer some programs, and to curtail some safeguards inspections of lower priority material. New activities – including safeguarding U.S. material from dismantled nuclear weapons, preparing for verification of a potential fissile material production cut-off convention, and responding to the voluntary acceptance, by newly-created non-nuclear weapons states, of full-scope safeguards – are placing additional resource demands on the IAEA. The U.S. is committed to ensuring adequate resources for safeguards, and recognizes that significant resources will be required. ACDA and the Department of State are working to define long-term funding approaches for increased IAEA responsibilities.

IAEA Safeguards

The IAEA's international nuclear safeguards system was developed to assure states that:

- nuclear activities subject to safeguards are directed toward peaceful purposes;
- potential proliferators will be dissuaded from using safeguarded nuclear materials for other than peaceful purposes; and
- diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses will be detected.

IAEA safeguards are a comprehensive system of accounting and reporting procedures, on-site inspection, nuclear material measurements, and containment and surveillance techniques. The system is codified in a network of 194 separate international agreements between the IAEA and participating states, based on membership in the NPT or a nuclear-weapon-free zone, or on agreed conditions of supply of peaceful nuclear technology and materials from other states.

The IAEA's experience in carrying out inspections under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, including its discovery of Iraq's violations of its safeguards agreement, has led the IAEA and its member states to consider and implement measures to strengthen the safeguards system, particularly with respect to undeclared activities.

During 1994 the IAEA conducted extensive field tests and assessed measures aimed at both strengthening and, where possible, lowering the cost of nuclear safeguards. These include:

- increased access for IAEA inspectors;
- more information provided to the IAEA on nuclear activities;
- environmental monitoring to detect nuclear materials and facilities;
- increased cooperation by states; and
- greater use of advanced technology, including unattended surveillance and measurement instruments and remote transmission of data.

In 1993² the IAEA safeguarded about 38 tons of separated plutonium, 413 tons of plutonium in irradiated nuclear reactor fuels, 10 tons of highly-enriched uranium, 39,000 tons of low-enriched uranium, and inspections 86,000 tons of natural and depleted uranium. The IAEA conducted 2,042 , verified the integrity of 21,000 seals, reviewed approximately 6,000 surveillance records, and analyzed 1,211 samples. 499 nuclear facilities and 330 smaller installations were involved in safeguarding this material; most are in nations that do not have nuclear weapons and which accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.

²Final 1994 figures were not available at time of printing.

ACDA's Role. ACDA supports and works directly with IAEA staff to improve and strengthen safeguards. In 1994, ACDA worked with the IAEA to correct shortcomings in safeguards revealed by the existence, nature, and scope of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. These efforts include development and employment of very advanced techniques, including environmental monitoring, for detecting clandestine nuclear facilities. ACDA also continued to promote adoption of improved safeguards for civilian nuclear facilities that will process or use separated plutonium for nuclear fuel.

During 1994, the U.S. Government established a steering committee to coordinate all IAEA matters. ACDA actively participates in this committee, and chairs its Subcommittee on International Safeguards and Monitoring, which establishes and coordinates U.S. policy on IAEA safeguards.

Also in 1994, ACDA and other U.S. agencies held bilateral consultations with Australia, the European Atomic Energy Community, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom on strengthening existing safeguards and implementing safeguards in new plutonium facilities. The U.S. agreed with each of these parties to continue support for IAEA field testing and assessment of new safeguards techniques.

IAEA Technical Assistance

The United States strongly supports the IAEA's program of technical cooperation. Under Article IV of the NPT, the United States has pledged to foster "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of developing areas of the world."

The IAEA provides peaceful nuclear assistance in many fields, including medicine, agriculture, and electric power generation. The United States provides support to its technical assistance programs, both through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund and through voluntary "in-kind" contributions. These contributions include equipment for research, donations of expert services, training courses, and fellowships for study in the United States. The United States has considerable discretion over the distribution of these contributions, giving preference to states that have joined the NPT or are Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In this way, the United States helps demonstrate the link between economic development and nuclear nonproliferation.

The IAEA's technical cooperation programs largely focus on projects and activities requested and carried out by individual member states. Regional programs that support training and joint projects have also been instituted in Latin America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. By making a positive contribution to human health, agriculture, and other fields utilizing nuclear techniques in many developing countries, which comprise the majority of IAEA members, the technical assistance and cooperation programs generate widespread international support for the Agency. Many developing countries also view the technical assistance programs as the major benefit they receive for their continuing support of the NPT and IAEA safeguards. The U.S. pursues technical assistance and cooperation programs, therefore, not only for the important developmental assistance they provide, but also as an integral part of our broader nonproliferation policy. In addition, the

technical assistance programs help bring systematic oversight and stability to the international transfer of nuclear-related technology.

ACDA's Role. ACDA supplies critical technical expertise to the review and monitoring of the IAEA's various technical programs by the U.S. International Nuclear Technical Liaison Organization, an interagency group overseeing U.S. technical cooperation with the IAEA. ACDA encourages technologies that decrease the probability of nuclear proliferation and discourages those that promote proliferation.

The U.S. supplies essential technical support to IAEA safeguards through its extra-budgetary contributions. This support seeks to match U.S. technology and expertise to the special safeguards problems faced by the IAEA in a time of tight budgets and increasingly broad responsibilities. ACDA has continued to provide policy and technical expertise, both to the IAEA directly and to the interagency process within the U.S., to address such problems as environmental monitoring of undeclared nuclear activities, making safeguards more efficient and effective, and modern information processing systems to expand the IAEA's ability to analyze an increasing array of data sources.

3. INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROLS

The United States has long urged cooperation among countries that export nuclear and nuclear-related commodities and technology to ensure that commerce in this area does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. This cooperation ranges from bilateral discussion of individual cases to development and implementation of multilateral guidelines. Multilateral cooperation on nuclear supply largely takes place in the NPT Exporters' Committee and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In Chapter VI, we describe the groups themselves. In this section we describe the work of these groups and other international export control activities in 1994.

Zangger Committee

The Committee, also called the Nuclear Exporters' Committee, focused on two matters in 1994: the role it will play in the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, and the need to clarify portions of the list of equipment and material subject to export controls. The purpose of the Committee is to clarify and harmonize the way countries implement Article III.2 of the NPT, which requires the application of IAEA safeguards to exported nuclear equipment and material. Thus, the Committee has a key role in reviewing implementation of this provision and explaining to all NPT parties the requirements and benefits of the Treaty's export control provisions. This issue was a principal discussion topic at both of the Committee's meetings in 1994.

One of the main activities of the Nuclear Exporters' Committee since its creation has been to produce and clarify the control list, often called the "trigger list." By 1994, all major sections of the trigger list had been clarified by listing relevant equipment and material, except for the sections on reactors, non-nuclear material, and fuel fabrication. The U.S. has proposed updates to the list in these areas; efforts to adopt appropriate changes are under way.

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

In addition to annual plenary sessions, the NSG now holds two consultations annually on its arrangement to control nuclear-related dual-use commodities and technology. Working groups on conditions of supply, information sharing, and technical issues also meet regularly.

The 1994 NSG plenary was held in April in Madrid, Spain. It agreed to amend NSG Guidelines to address two issues: retransfer of controlled items and technologies, and governments that cause concern despite having full-scope IAEA safeguard agreements.

First, NSG members want to ensure that their export control principles are not undermined by retransfers through third countries. The former version of the Guidelines contained retransfer controls but dealt only with transfers to non-nuclear weapon states. The changes agreed to in Madrid extend the retransfer controls to transfers to all states, and strengthen the retransfer controls themselves.

Second, the former Guidelines contained no clear proscriptions against transfers to countries such as Iran that have full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA, but whose behavior nevertheless causes proliferation concerns. In Madrid, the NSG agreed to a new

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guideline that provides the basis for refusing transfers to such countries.

The Madrid Plenary also accepted Argentina as a new member. It decided to give particular attention to encouraging Belarus, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, and Ukraine to adhere to the Guidelines. Following a seminar in Warsaw for states of the former Soviet Union, the Group decided to offer practical assistance in export controls to these nations.

Emerging Nuclear Suppliers

Promotion of responsible nuclear export policies by new suppliers to the international nuclear market was a major issue during 1994. The U.S. believes that new suppliers should minimize the danger of nuclear proliferation by adopting export rules equivalent to those governing the behavior of existing supplier nations; this should include the fundamental nuclear export norms embodied in the NSG Guidelines and, for NPT suppliers, the Zangger Guidelines.

If a new supplier is an NPT Party, the task is somewhat easier because parties to that Treaty have already agreed to require IAEA safeguards on nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states. For example, South Africa's accession to the NPT led it to join the NPT Exporters' Committee in 1993. Some non-NPT suppliers have also adopted responsible export control policies. For example, Argentina has adopted comprehensive nuclear export controls and adhered to the NSG Guidelines.

We are deeply concerned about nuclear exports from other suppliers, particularly Russia and China.

China's nuclear cooperation with Iran and Pakistan raises serious questions about its nuclear export policies. The United States continues to oppose China's decision to supply a nuclear power plant to Pakistan without requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards, and has protested China's plans to provide a similar power plant to Iran. We are also seeking to convince China to adopt the multilateral export control guidelines.

We have communicated to the Russian government our concerns about Iranian nuclear intentions, and we have urged Moscow to forgo nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Highlights of Nuclear Exporters' Committee Guidelines

Covered items include:

- fissile material;
- nuclear-grade graphite
- heavy water; and
- facilities and equipment for reactors, reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water enrichment.

Supplier state must:

- require peaceful end use assurances;
- satisfy itself that IAEA safeguards will be applied to the relevant nuclear material; and
- obtain assurances that the item will not be exported to a non-NPT non-nuclear weapons state unless the receiving state accepts safeguards on the item.

Highlights of Nuclear Suppliers' Group Guidelines

Covered items:

- Part 1: Same as those of Nuclear Exporters' Committee, with the addition of facilities and equipment for uranium conversion
- Part 2: Nuclear-related dual-use items.

Conditions for transfer of Part 1 items:

- recipient's assurance of no explosive use;
- physical protection of materials and facilities;
- recipient has brought full-scope IAEA safeguards agreement into force; and
- for most transfers to non-NSG states, prior consent of supplier required before transfer.

Conditions for transfer of Part 2 items:

- no transfer to nuclear explosive or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities, or where there is a risk of diversion;
- end user statement that items will not be used for proscribed activities; and
- acceptance of requirement of prior consent for retransfers to non-NSG states.

4. NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES

The end of the Cold War and the consequent cessation of the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union has conferred new momentum to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZs) in many areas of the world. The United States supports the creation of such zones in regions where they would contribute to the achievement of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals and would be consistent with our established criteria for recognizing such zones and with other U.S. national security interests.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco

The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishes the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated region.³ 29 Latin American and Caribbean States have pledged not to develop, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons. As required by the Treaty, Contracting Parties have accepted the application of IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear activities.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco will come fully into force when all eligible states have signed and ratified the Treaty and its two Protocols, and concluded the required comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Individual states can waive this requirement for universal adherence and declare the Treaty in force for their respective territories, creating the nuclear-free zone piecemeal. In 1994, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Belize brought the Treaty into legal force in this way, as had all previous states that ratified. St. Kitts/Nevis and St. Lucia have signed but not yet ratified; Cuba and Guyana have not yet become signatories, although both have declared they intend to.

The situation in Argentina and Brazil has significantly improved in recent years; both governments have come to realize that the road to influence and prosperity lies not in acquiring nuclear weapons, but in renouncing them. In their 1991 bilateral treaty for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Argentina and Brazil created the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), a bilateral agency dedicated to applying IAEA-like safeguards in both countries. In December 1991, Argentina, Brazil, and ABACC concluded and signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This agreement entered into force in March 1994, placing all nuclear material and activities under both IAEA and ABACC supervision.

As a Protocol Party, the United States remains firmly committed to the goals of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and will continue to seek its full implementation. The Treaty makes a substantial contribution to regional peace and stability, as well to the world nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

In August 1985, 8 members of the South Pacific Forum signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty, known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty is now in force for 11 of 15 Forum members: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Naurau, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. The Treaty bans the manufacture, possession, stationing, and testing of any nuclear explosive device in treaty territories for which the parties are internationally responsible; it also bans the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. Three Protocols extend the Treaty's provisions to states outside the zone:

- Protocol I requires states with territories in the region to apply the prohibitions on manufacture, stationing, and testing of nuclear explosive devices to their territories;

³ Nuclear weapons are banned in Antarctica, outer space, and on the seabeds.

- Protocol II commits the five declared nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against Parties to the Treaty or Protocol parties' territories within the zone; and
- Protocol III commits the five nuclear weapon states not to test any nuclear explosive device within the zone.

Russia (with understandings) and China signed and ratified Protocols II and III; neither has zonal territories that would require its adherence to Protocol I. France (which maintains an active testing range within the zone) and the UK declined to sign any of the protocols.

The U.S. has also declined, but has stated that its regional activities are not inconsistent with the Treaty's provisions.

African NWFZ

The U.S. has supported the concept of the denuclearization of Africa since the first United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in 1964. No real progress was made until South Africa, the continent's most advanced state in terms of peaceful and military nuclear technology, joined the NPT in mid-1991.

A joint group of experts of the U.N. and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) produced a draft text based on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The African draft adds new provisions on physical protection of nuclear material and prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations; otherwise, its three protocols are similar to those of the South Pacific NFZ Treaty. The draft designates the zone of application of the Treaty as the African continent, its territorial waters and island member states of the OAU. Because the U.S. has no territorial responsibilities in the African region, it is only eligible to sign the non-use and non-testing Protocols.

An OAU Intergovernmental Group will convene in March 1995 for a final review of the draft Treaty text. The final Treaty may be opened for signature in June of 1995.

B. BANNING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TESTING

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the most significant arms control measures of the nuclear weapons era. It has also been the most elusive. For the first time, due in large part to U.S. leadership, a multilateral, effectively verifiable CTBT is now within reach.

Negotiations on a CTBT began in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in January 1994 following the unanimous adoption of a resolution calling for a CTBT in the United Nations General Assembly in December 1993.

The United States has not conducted a nuclear weapon test since September of 1992. In March 1994, the President announced a further extension through September 1995 of the original 1992 Congressionally mandated moratorium on U.S. nuclear explosive testing. The further extension of the moratorium underlines the priority the United States places on achieving a test ban treaty.

When ACDA Director John Holum addressed the Conference on Disarmament in January at the inaugural meeting of its 1994 session, he brought a firm message from President Clinton:

"This conference has several important items on its agenda as the 1994 session begins....None is more important than the negotiation of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on nuclear explosions. This challenging, but crucial, objective is the conference's top priority. It reflects our common desire to take decisive action that will support and supplement the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and will further constrain the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons."

"I am confident that Ambassador Ledogar and the U.S. Delegation will join with you in taking bold steps toward a world made safer through the negotiation at the earliest possible time of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that will strengthen the security of all nations."

Arms Control and Nonproliferation Objectives

A CTBT advances both U.S. arms control and nonproliferation objectives.

- A CTBT will strengthen international security by constraining the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. The ability to make weapons smaller and lighter while more powerful will be significantly constrained.
- A CTBT will strengthen the global norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and constrain development of nuclear weapons capabilities in proliferant states. Even though a primitive nuclear weapons capability is feasible without tests, a proliferator could have reduced confidence in the performance of such weapons.

A CTBT cannot, of itself, reduce existing nuclear forces. But it will sharply restrain modernization and refinement of the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states. It can break the back of a main driver of arms races – the qualitative competition – and thus open the way to further reductions.

Status of Negotiations

The CD held three negotiating rounds during its 1994 session, as well as a special three-week intercessional CTBT negotiating period. In addition, the U.S. conducted bilateral and multilateral consultations on CTBT throughout the year.

The third negotiating round concluded with the creation of a "rolling text" which contains both agreed treaty provisions and disputed text marked by brackets.

There is general agreement that the verification regime will include four monitoring techniques:

- seismic,
- hydroacoustic,

- radionuclide, and
- infrasonic,

although the number of sensors has yet to be decided. There is broad support for an effective regime for on-site inspections. The negotiators also are considering "associated measures," such as information exchanges dealing with large chemical explosions, that could contribute to ensuring compliance with the treaty.

Prospects for the forthcoming year

The U.S. hopes and expects that the CD can reach resolution on the major outstanding issues in the next year, including the scope of the treaty, its withdrawal provisions, its entry into force provision, and other verification provisions.

President Clinton has made it clear that the U.S. is committed to concluding the CTBT at the earliest possible time. In particular, the United States seeks as much progress as possible by the time of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in April 1995. To meet this objective, at the end of the third CD negotiating round in September, the United States called on all nations participating in the negotiations to redouble their efforts.

ACDA's Role. ACDA leads the U.S. Government in the CTBT negotiations. ACDA's responsibilities include:

- Heading the U.S. delegation in the negotiations in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament, and providing expert members;
- Leading in consultations of the P-5 (so-named for the five permanent members of the Security Council, who are also the five declared nuclear weapons states: China, France, Russia, UK, and U.S.) and in discussions with other delegations at the Conference on Disarmament;
- Chairing with the Central Intelligence Agency the interagency group in Washington that prepares and coordinates negotiating guidance for the delegation, and co-chairing, with the Department of Energy, the Verification and Monitoring Task Force that addresses technical matters;
- Briefing Members of Congress on the negotiations; and
- Presenting the U.S. position on the negotiations to the American people.

C. REDUCING COLD WAR NUCLEAR STOCKPILES

The demise of the Soviet Union significantly increased prospects for reducing the magnitude of the nuclear threat to the United States. This reduction has not been, and will not be, automatic, nor spontaneous, nor easy to accomplish. Severe national security challenges remain, including:

- the continued presence of decreasing but still massive stocks of strategic nuclear weapons and materials of the former Soviet Union, now on the territories of four countries rather than one, while these countries undergo severe social, economic, and political stress;
- the technical, political, and economic demands of dismantling nuclear weapons in a

- safe, cost-effective manner;
- the possibility that scientists and technologies in the former Soviet Union nuclear weapons complex could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and
- the need to:
 - safely and securely store warheads awaiting dismantlement;
 - ensure dismantlement in an irreversible and transparent way; and
 - store fissile material derived from dismantled warheads in physically safe ways that prevent theft or diversion.

As the United States seeks the overall goal of enhancing national security in the post-Cold War era, it pursues the following main objectives:

- Reducing and limiting nuclear-capable weapons in ways that improve nuclear stability and reduce the risks of nuclear war;
- Implementing the START I, START II, and INF Treaties;
- Exploring whether reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces could contribute to strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security following START II ratification;
- Enhancing the safety and security of substrategic nuclear weapons within Russia, given the potential for political instability and the possible diversion of these weapons and weapons materials to unauthorized parties by criminals or corrupt officials;
- Exploring possible mechanisms to encourage the elimination of Russian substrategic nuclear weapons;
- Facilitating the irreversible and transparent dismantlement and secure storage of nuclear weapons and their fissile material in the former Soviet Union as quickly and safely as possible; and
- Facilitating the conversion of a major portion of the former Soviet Union's nuclear and defense research and development and production complex to market-oriented peaceful activity.

1. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Strategic offensive arms include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and their nuclear warheads. While it is generally presumed that these devices are unlikely to be the first nuclear weapons to be used in a conflict, they possess not only the longest range of any weapon, but also the greatest destructive power; they would be the most devastating by far. The START I and START II Treaties reduce this destructive potential while enhancing U.S. national security by shaping strategic arsenals toward more secure, survivable, and stabilizing force structures.

a) *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and the Lisbon Protocol.*

The START I Treaty entered into force on December 5, 1994, upon the exchange of instruments of ratification among the Parties. Although this treaty was signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on July 31, 1991, the demise of the Soviet Union contributed to the long delay between signature and entry into force.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol to START I on May 23, 1992, accepting their obligations as successor states to the former Soviet Union for START I. The Lisbon Protocol commits Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to START, and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states in the shortest possible time; associated letters from the Presidents of these three states further commit them to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms located on their territories within the seven year START I reduction period.

The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of START I on October 1, 1992. The parliaments of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine also approved ratification of START I. The conditions set by the Russian parliament in ratifying START I prevented the exchange of instruments of ratification until Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acceded to the NPT. By 1994, Kazakhstan and Belarus had acceded to the NPT. On November 16, 1994, the Ukrainian parliament voted to accede to the NPT, thus clearing the way for the exchange of instruments of ratification and START I entry into force on December 5, 1994.

Since 1991, the United States and the four other Treaty states have been working out details of Treaty implementation in regular meetings of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), established by START I. In general, START implementation issues fall into four broad categories: (1) issues which were not resolved in START I, but upon which the Treaty required agreement prior to entry into force; (2) resolution of ambiguities discovered in Treaty provisions during the course of preparation for implementation; (3) issues arising from temporary application of certain Treaty provisions; and (4) resolution of new problems resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

During 1994, eleven JCIC Agreements were signed and five Joint Statements were initialed to enable effective implementation of START I. We expect this pace to continue as START I moves into its next phase.

START I is the first treaty actually to reduce strategic offensive arms. It requires overall reductions of 30-40%, and 50% reductions in the most destabilizing weapons. These large scale reductions of strategic weapons are critically important, both intrinsically and because they reduce the likelihood of new nuclear-weapon states emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union.

ACDA's Role: ACDA's expertise and experience is essential to the complex and often highly technical work of START implementation.

- ACDA chairs the interagency committee that has principal responsibility for developing U.S. positions for the JCIC and for drafting diplomatic communications on START implementation to the governments of the other START parties. This work was made even more challenging by the emergence of four successor states to the former Soviet Union which must participate in START implementation.
- ACDA co-chairs the interagency working group that develops guidance for U.S. operations that implement inspection and monitoring under START.
- ACDA houses and support the Office of the United States Representative to the JCIC.

b) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II.

Recognizing their mutual interest in creating smaller and more stabilizing nuclear forces than those allowed under START I, the U.S. and Russia signed START II on January 3, 1993. START II clearly codifies a stabilizing and orderly drawdown of strategic nuclear forces that is in the security and economic interests of both the United States and Russia. START II relies heavily and explicitly on START I's definitions and extensive verification procedures. By its own provisions, START II could not have been implemented before START I entered into force. START II will remain in effect as long as START I does.

START II will dramatically reduce the total number of strategic nuclear arms deployed by both countries to one-third of the pre-START levels. By the end of the second stage of reductions, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 warheads. But START II's qualitative stabilizing features are even more important than its numerical reductions. By prohibiting heavy ICBMs and multiple warhead ICBMs, START II will significantly reduce first-strike potential and thereby increase stability. These weapons have long been considered destabilizing because they have been at once the most vulnerable strategic systems and those most capable of destroying large numbers of hard targets on the other side. Like START I, START II will serve U.S. nonproliferation interests by helping to allay the security concerns of the other successor states to the former Soviet Union, and by demonstrating U.S.-Russian commitment to deep reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

At the summit in September 1994, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin confirmed their intention to seek early ratification of START II. They stated their desire to exchange the instruments of ratification for the START II Treaty at their the next summit.

Significantly, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin concurred that, once START II is ratified, the United States and Russia will develop methods to deactivate all strategic delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to

remove them from combat status. Additionally, the Presidents agreed "that their defense ministers would exchange information every three months on strategic systems that have been deactivated and eliminated." This data exchange is a useful confidence-building measure and will give the United States a clearer picture of the status of deactivation activities occurring in Russia. An initial exchange occurred at the October meeting of the Strategic Stability Working Group; future exchanges will be transmitted via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

ACDA's Role. An ACDA official was the START II chief negotiator. The agency provided substantial support to the high-level exchanges that led to the Treaty's signature. ACDA will play a key role in the Executive Branch's efforts to obtain Senate advice and consent to START II ratification. ACDA would lead in START II's implementation, chairing the interagency committee providing guidance to the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), which is the implementing body for START II. The Office of the U.S. Representative to the BIC will reside in ACDA.

c) Future Strategic Arms Control

To examine and define new directions in U.S. strategic policy mandated by the end of the Cold War, the Department of Defense undertook a Nuclear Posture Review, approved by the President in late September. ACDA participated in the interagency review of the analysis underpinning the report, and is now engaged with other agencies in formulating policy for future nuclear arms control.

At the September 1994 summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin ordered their "experts to intensify their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces." They also discussed nuclear confidence-building and transparency measures.

In 1995, ACDA will explore innovative policy options, including the use of arms control to further promote international stability, further reducing first-strike potential.

2. SUBSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The political instability that gave rise to the aborted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 raised serious questions about how control would be maintained over the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons located in the Soviet republics. Because of their larger numbers, smaller size, and in some cases simple design and relative ease of employment, tactical nuclear weapons pose more difficult command, control, and safety concerns than strategic nuclear weapons. As political instability increased in the Soviet Union, there was growing concern that a breakdown in authority and the military command and control of these weapons could lead to their being sold on the black market, used in political blackmail, involved in accidents, or even employed in civil conflict.

To address this problem, and with the expectation of Soviet reciprocity, the United States announced on September 27, 1991, that it would unilaterally withdraw approximately

2,400 tactical nuclear weapons from overseas to the continental United States.

Within a week, former Soviet President Gorbachev responded by announcing similar measures that would result in the withdrawal of all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for centralized storage. These measures were to include elimination of most Soviet short-range missile warheads and nuclear artillery shells, withdrawal and elimination of all Soviet nuclear land mines and nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles, and removal of all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines.

This Soviet response spurred U.S. and Soviet interest in enhancing the safety and security of nuclear weapons to be transported and centrally stored in Russia, which led to the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) effort funded by the Nunn-Lugar program (see Sections I.C.5 and VI.D). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian President Yeltsin accelerated the dismantlement schedule for substrategic weapons, and he informed the United States that all of these weapons had been returned to Russia by May 1992.

Indications are that elimination of former Soviet substrategic nuclear weapons is underway. Nevertheless, we continue to be concerned at the presence of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in a politically and economically strained Russia.

In the United States, elimination of most tactical nuclear weapons is also in progress. All surface-to-surface tactical nuclear missiles and artillery shells have been withdrawn from overseas locations and returned to the United States. All warheads for ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons have been removed to central storage in the United States. Artillery-fired nuclear projectiles have also been returned to the United States and their elimination is expected to be completed in 1995. At present, all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from U.S. surface ships and multi-purpose submarines, as well as from land-based naval aviation, and have been placed in centralized storage on U.S. territory. All nuclear warheads for nuclear depth bombs and naval aviation bombs are scheduled to be destroyed by 1996. In addition, U.S. ground forces no longer train for nuclear missions and have no nuclear capability under current organization. The U.S. Army has deactivated all Lance missiles and all remaining nuclear projectiles for artillery. Elimination of these warheads is expected to be accomplished by 1995.

3. INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) entered into force June 1, 1988. It provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles having ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The last of the declared INF missiles was eliminated by May 31, 1991.

The INF Treaty provides an extensive inspection regime, including an annual quota of short-notice inspections (currently 15 per year) and continuous monitoring at missile assembly plants at Magna, Utah, and Votkinsk, Russia. The inspection regime continues through May 31, 2001, but the INF Treaty and its prohibitions will remain in force indefinitely.

There are 12 successor states to the Soviet Union for purposes of the INF Treaty. These 12 states accept their status as successors, and there is agreement that only four states with inspectable INF facilities on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine) will participate in inspections and take part in the INF implementation body, the Special Verification Commission (SVC). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each have one inspectable INF site, but the U.S. and these two states, with the consent of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, have developed an understanding whereby Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will not participate actively in implementation of the Treaty, and the U.S. as a policy matter will not exercise its right to conduct inspections in these two states.

Mechanisms were put in place in 1994 for continued implementation of U.S. inspection rights in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as in Russia. There are now points of entry open in each of those states and we have added direct government-to-government communications links with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Additionally, these four states have reached basic agreement on sharing among themselves the rights of the Former Soviet Union to conduct inspections of U.S. INF facilities.

The United States has been working out details of Treaty implementation with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine within the framework of the SVC. The SVC has met in fifteen sessions since 1988. In recent sessions, the Commission has worked to adapt the Treaty to the realities of the post-Soviet world. A regular meeting of the Special Verification Commission took place in Geneva, Switzerland, during January and February 1994. Equally important have been the exchanges on INF Treaty issues among the Parties through diplomatic channels or on the margins of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission sessions.

During 1994 the Special Verification Commission dealt primarily with the multilateralization of the Treaty's inspection regime. Issues included:

- multilateral operating procedures for the Special Verification Commission;
- new points of entry and exit for inspections;
- implementation of multilateral inspection procedures;
- allocation of costs for inspection activities;
- inspection procedures for new missiles that will be exiting from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia; and
- concurrent continuous monitoring under the START I and INF Treaties at Votkinsk.

ACDA chairs the working group that develops U.S. policy for implementation of the INF Treaty and develops instructions for the SVC. ACDA develops diplomatic communications regarding INF Treaty implementation, for delivery to the governments of the INF Parties in their respective capitals. The Office of the U.S. Representative to the SVC is in ACDA.

4. MAKING NUCLEAR WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT TRANSPARENT AND IRREVERSIBLE, AND CONTROLLING THE RESULTING FISSILE MATERIAL

Existing arms agreements do not require dismantling, nor even accounting for, retired nuclear warheads as distinct from the launchers and vehicles that carry them. Hence, such agreements do not limit stockpiles of nuclear warheads, nor the fissile material for them. One of our next critical arms control objectives is to make dismantlement transparent and irreversible.

Transparency can support irreversibility in several ways:

- Transparency can give each side more confidence in its knowledge of the size of the other's nuclear weapon and fissile material stockpiles, and in the rates of change in those stockpiles.
- Monitoring warheads and fissile material can strengthen arms reduction regimes by increasing confidence that neither side can rapidly reconstitute its nuclear forces to gain a military advantage.
- Transparency can help confirm that nuclear material in weapons removed from deployment by arms reduction is not simply being recycled into new warheads.
- Transparency can also help confirm that this material has been changed into forms much less suitable for use in nuclear explosives.

Transparency can also contribute to nonproliferation by accounting for nuclear warheads and fissile material, and by building international political support for global nuclear nonproliferation.

At the January 1994 U.S.-Russian Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin explicitly agreed to seek "the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons" and to "exchange detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials and on their safety and security." To that end, they established a Joint Working Group on Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility, with a broad mandate to seek ways to improve transparency and irreversibility. This group has begun several separate transparency efforts; a broad strategy for transparency and irreversibility in arms reduction is emerging. The September 1994 Summit added specific several new initiatives for the group including:

- exchanging data on inventories of nuclear materials removed from dismantled warheads;
- designing and establishing safeguards, including reciprocal inspections of storage facilities, for nuclear material removed from nuclear warheads; and
- defining appropriate safeguards for the cutoff of fissile materials production.

At the January 1994 Summit, Russia agreed to consider voluntarily accepting IAEA safeguards on all source and special fissionable materials, excluding only those having direct national security significance. The Russian government, following the U.S. lead, also specifically agreed to consider putting excess fissile material released from military uses as a result of nuclear arms reductions under IAEA safeguards.

But Russia has subsequently been reluctant to engage in Stability and Transparency discussions and have not responded to U.S. initiatives tabled in December 1994 and January 1995. Although the Russian government has named a head of its working group, it has not agreed to a meeting date.

We believe the world should, as quickly as possible move to an international convention banning production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives. This convention, which was proposed by President Clinton on September 27, 1993, would include strong international transparency measures.

5. NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM: COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION FOR DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLEMENT OF FORMER SOVIET WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Current goals of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program are:

- complete denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine;
- accelerated reduction of Russia's nuclear weapons and strategic delivery vehicles;
- elimination of Russia's chemical weapons; and
- nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction to or from the region.

Concerns over danger to nuclear safety and stability in the Soviet Union in the wake of the coup attempt in August 1991 grew as the Soviet Union disintegrated during the autumn of that year. The U.S. was particularly concerned over the disposition of theater nuclear weapons (see Section I.C.2). The United States Senate noted that then-President Gorbachev had requested Western assistance in dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and President Bush had proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate on the storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear weapons. In late 1991, Congress authorized the Department of Defense to establish a program, popularly known as Nunn-Lugar,⁴ to assist what would soon be the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union in the safety, security, and dismantlement (SSD) of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons including strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Nunn-Lugar assistance is provided to FSU states which are certified as eligible because nuclear weapons were located in their territory when the Soviet Union dissolved: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Before this assistance can be given to a state, the President must certify that the recipient state meets Congressionally-mandated criteria, including a commitment to arms control and related obligations.

⁴Congress first authorized the Nunn-Lugar program in Title II of Public Law 102-228; Title XIV of Public Law 102-484, and Title XII of Public Law 103-160. Current program authority is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, Title II of Public Law 103-139. For fiscal years 1992 and 1993, Congress authorized transfer of \$400 million of Department of Defense appropriations for each year. For fiscal years 1994 and 1995, Congress directly appropriated \$400 million for the program for each year. To date, \$1.6 billion has been authorized.

The safety, security, and dismantlement of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction has been a principal U.S. policy goal since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991. This includes complete military denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, combined with accelerated reduction of Russia's nuclear weapons and elimination of its chemical weapons.

As a result of the Nunn-Lugar program, it is now possible to reduce weapons not only through traditional negotiated arms control agreements, but also through innovative cooperative efforts.

The initial thrust of Nunn-Lugar programs was the safety and security of nuclear warheads being returned to Russia for dismantlement under the 1991 U.S. and Soviet Presidential initiatives (see Section I.C.1). Withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons was completed in May 1992, before the U.S.-Russian Umbrella Agreement, which allowed assistance to proceed, was signed. Nunn-Lugar funds have supported the design and construction equipment for a long-term storage facility for fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons, and to facilitate the safe, secure dismantlement of strategic offensive arms.

This program both complemented and accelerated START entry into force and implementation. Implementing agreements are now largely complete with substantial amounts of U.S. assistance in place or en route. Included in these are assistance to Russia's ongoing program to dismantle its extensive chemical weapons stockpiles.

ACDA's Role. ACDA supported this Department of Defense program by helping to identify, develop, and negotiate agreements dealing with dismantlement of strategic offensive arms, including;

- missile airframes;
- bomber airframes;
- SLBM launch tubes;
- SSBN hulls;
- silo launchers; and
- rocket motor fuel.

We have contributed to successful conclusion of concrete agreements to:

- facilitate and expedite the elimination of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and chemical weapons. Both the United States and Russia have already begun to eliminate strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles that are subject to START I limits;
- facilitate the deactivation and safe secure return of nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement;
- assist Russian efforts to provide safe secure storage for special nuclear materials recovered from dismantled weapons; and
- provide support for establishing continuous communication links in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine for the timely exchange of arms control treaty-related notifications.

The Nunn-Lugar program is now reaching maturity. Active U.S. assistance, particularly in the areas of dismantlement and nonproliferation, is being provided to all four eligible Nunn-Lugar recipient states. Umbrella agreements which provide this bilateral program's legal framework have been concluded, and 36 implementing agreements on individual assistance projects are in force. As of December 1994, nearly \$970 million in Nunn-Lugar funding had been proposed to be obligated for CTR projects. Obligations total approximately \$480 million.

Nonproliferation is also a principal Nunn-Lugar goal. The U.S. is also helping Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine ensure that expertise, special materials for weapons of mass destruction, and of course the weapons and delivery vehicles themselves, remain under control of authorized personnel and do not spread beyond their borders to other countries or to sub-national groups. Thus, the U.S. is providing CTR assistance to meet specific nonproliferation and disarmament objectives, including:

- transportation, storage, safeguarding, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) of the independent states of the former Soviet Union;
- preventing proliferation of WMD and destabilizing conventional weapons of these states;
- preventing weapons-related expertise of the former Soviet Union from being diverted to third countries or terrorist groups;
- supporting conversion of defense-related industry to civilian purposes in the independent states;
- expanding military-to-military contact between the U.S. and the independent states
- establishing and enhancing the existing national systems of nuclear material control and accounting and physical protection, to help these states better protect nuclear materials against possible internal or external proliferation threats;
- helping design, establish, and improve new export controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies;
- promoting the conversion of defense industrial, technological and scientific facilities and personnel to more productive and peaceful endeavors. This includes establishing technology centers in Moscow and Kiev to fund scientific projects for this specific purpose.

ACDA has urged that these objectives remain a primary thrust of U.S. Nunn-Lugar efforts. The bulk of Nunn-Lugar funding is, in fact, devoted to the arms control objectives of nonproliferation and weapons dismantlement.

In 1994, CTR has moved from policy development to implementation, which by law is handled by the Department of Defense. Thus, with the focus shifting, ACDA's attention and efforts are now increasingly directed to the Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility initiative, discussed in section I.C.4. Nevertheless, ACDA remains engaged in those Nunn-Lugar areas requiring ACDA's unique expertise and policy input.

6. DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONVERSION

Major legacies of the Cold War include not only the weapons of mass destruction, but also the industries and people capable of producing them. The competitors in that confrontation now face enormous defense industrial overcapacity. Conversion of that capacity to peaceful commercial uses that contribute to economic growth is essential.

The problem is especially acute in the former Soviet Union because these nations are attempting to convert a major portion of their military production to commercial purposes, in the context of a broader transformation from command economies to a market system.

According to the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, there are 100,000 people in that country's nuclear weapons complex, of whom 3,000 have access to "paramount secrets." As a result of government cutbacks and general economic hardship in Russia these scientists, accustomed to being among Russia's elite, suddenly confront an uncertain future for themselves and their families.

We are concerned that some of these scientists may be driven to sell their skills, or their access, to proliferators in Russia or abroad. It is in the interest of both the U.S. and Russia to prevent this by providing opportunities in Russia. Some of these scientists are becoming entrepreneurs in the new civilian market, some will work for new civilian businesses, and some will continue to do research through contracts and grants. By maximizing the opportunities in Russia, we seek to minimize the incentives for these scientists to go abroad.

It is also in the U.S. interest that Russia and other New Independent States convert their defense industries rapidly and effectively. To accomplish this, the U.S. has established, with ACDA participation, bilateral Defense Conversion Committees with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. A Defense Conversion Commission, including ACDA, has also been established with China.

Through re-orientation of nuclear weapons R&D to industrial R&D, there is potential for former military scientists to create long-term, high-technology, civilian enterprises that can be commercially viable. To evaluate this concept ACDA, together with the U.S. Department of Energy and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), has co-sponsored entrepreneurial workshops in Russia and the United States. The objectives of these workshops are:

- to facilitate conversion of a major portion of Russian nuclear weapons R&D complexes into market-driven, commercially viable industrial R&D enterprises;
- to encourage weapons scientists to contribute to a market-based economy;
- to exploit the enterprise- and job-creation potential of the high technology capabilities of the Russian nuclear weapons complex.

Following successful defense conversion workshops in 1992 and 1993, ACDA helped sponsor a third defense conversion workshop at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in May 1994. The workshop included industrial participation, and performed business planning case studies based on competitively selected technical proposals from the MINATOM labs. The workshops have trained the participants in the basic entrepreneurial skills of:

- R&D capability and production capacity assessment,
- market research;
- capability-to-market matching;
- market-driven product development;
- business plans;
- business organization;
- intellectual property rights evaluation and protection;
- capital investment; and
- funding plans.

The focus of the training has been on developing effective business plans. Such plans will enable scientists formerly involved in nuclear weapons development to establish viable civilian businesses that can attract American venture capitalists and joint venture partners.

The MINATOM minister has requested more workshops be held in the U.S. and Russia. A fourth workshop is currently planned for the spring of 1995.

D. FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION CUTOFF AND CONTROL

1. Fissile Material Production Cutoff

In September 1993, President Clinton proposed a global treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards. In December 1993, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution endorsing such a treaty.

The cutoff would cap the production of fissile material for explosive purposes but would not deal with existing stockpiles.

Such a cutoff would, in and of itself, constitute a decisive turn away from the nuclear arms race. Equally important, it would support nuclear nonproliferation by providing an international commitment to constraining weapons material.

Capping the amount of material available for nuclear weapons in each country would limit the number of nuclear weapons that could be produced. In areas such as South Asia, such a limit would be an important first step toward eliminating weapons of mass destruction. This ultimate goal will be neither easy nor quick of achievement. We view a fissile material cutoff as a key step in the process.

Member states of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed that the CD was the most appropriate forum to negotiate a cutoff, but could not agree on a negotiating mandate. The 1994 session ended in September with a handful of non-aligned states blocking the start of negotiations by insisting that the mandate language also cover existing fissile material stocks. Canada circulated a mandate based on the 1993 UNGA resolution, which the U.S. and most of the other CD member states endorsed.

The U.S. will continue its efforts to obtain consensus on a negotiating mandate, and begin negotiations as soon as possible on a cutoff treaty. We will also continue our

discussions with individual states, encouraging them to take steps in advance of the treaty to promote a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

ACDA's Role. ACDA will continue to lead the U.S. Government's efforts to achieve a fissile material cutoff treaty. This includes heading the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and chairing the interagency backstopping process in Washington that develops guidance and instructions.

2. Fissile Material Control

Blending highly enriched uranium (HEU) with natural or low enriched uranium for nuclear electric power plants is the most widely accepted solution for reducing accumulations of HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons. ACDA is committed to transparency in HEU disposition. As part of an agreement to purchase low enriched uranium blended by Russia from 500 or more tons of HEU extracted from dismantled nuclear weapons, we have urged measures to confirm that the source material used in the blending has actually come from dismantled nuclear weapons. To that end, we have provided technical experts to evaluate the transparency measures and have recommended improvements to those measures.

ACDA has turned its expertise in nonproliferation and plutonium management to the comprehensive review of long term U.S. options for plutonium disposition now underway. This review deals with a complex set of technical, nonproliferation, environmental safety, health, and budgetary considerations. We will continue to evaluate of potential options for proliferation resistance and technical feasibility. ACDA has also provided technical expertise to the joint U.S.-Russian technical working group on fissile material disposition and acquisition launched by the Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting in January 1994.

The United States does not use plutonium for electric power generation, and we do not support its use in civil nuclear programs anywhere. We believe the proliferation risk from this practice far exceeds any potential economic gain. To limit the possible proliferation risk if plutonium is to be used for electric power generation, the U.S. has engaged other developed nations in discussion of means to limit the stockpiling of civilian plutonium for electric power generation. These discussions have taken place in Vienna over the past year on the margins of the IAEA Board of Governors meetings. ACDA helped to develop the concepts for a regime that would limit accumulation of plutonium by balancing plutonium separation with civilian plutonium consumption.

The U.S. has taken steps to submit to IAEA safeguards our nuclear material no longer necessary for our deterrent. Several tons of HEU are already under IAEA safeguards at one facility, and substantial quantities of plutonium will be placed under IAEA safeguards at two more facilities by March 1995.

3. Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown Agreement

ACDA played a key role in the agreement signed by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in June 1994 on Shutdown of Plutonium Production Reactors and the Cessation of Use of Newly Produced Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons. The agreement specifies that:

- shut-down reactors will remain in a non-operating status;
- any remaining operating reactors will be shut down by the year 2000; and
- a compliance regime to assure these tasks and to assure that no newly produced plutonium is used in nuclear weapons was to be negotiated by December 23, 1994, but the negotiations have been delayed until early 1995.

The only remaining former Soviet plutonium production reactors still in operation are the three located at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26 in Russia. Until these are shut down, the plutonium they produce must be placed into storage and remain under monitoring by the United States. ACDA has played a leading role in organizing groups of U.S. production-reactor and storage facility experts in crafting such a regime and negotiating specific monitoring activities.

II. ELIMINATING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) can be many times more destructive than conventional high-explosive bombs and shells, yet the technology and materials to design and manufacture CBW munitions are far more readily available than those needed for nuclear weapons.

In the past year we have made notable strides toward the ultimate goal of totally eliminating chemical and biological weapons.

A. ELIMINATING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The U.S. is pursuing chemical disarmament in two ways. In one, we are urging universal adherence to, and effective implementation of, the multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In the other, we seek full implementation of two bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation: the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA).

1. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

The CWC prohibits all development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It requires destruction of all existing chemical weapons within 10 years after the treaty enters into force, with a five-year extension possible only on the recommendation of the Executive Council of the International CWC Organization and final approval of the Conference of States Parties.

More than 20 years of negotiations on the CWC were completed on September 3, 1992, when the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva forwarded the finished treaty to the United Nations General Assembly. On November 30, 1992, the General Assembly endorsed by consensus the supporting resolution, cosponsored by 145 countries.

The CWC was opened for signature at a ceremony in Paris on January 13-15, 1993; 130 countries, including the United States, became original signatories.

The CWC will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the 65th nation's instrument of ratification. As of the end of 1994, 159 countries had signed the CWC and 19 had deposited instruments of ratification. Signatories include China, India, Pakistan, Israel, all of the European countries except the former Yugoslavia, all former Soviet republics except Uzbekistan, and all Western Hemisphere states except Suriname and some English-speaking Caribbean nations. While significant non-signatories include Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, North Korea, and Syria, three-fourths of the countries of chemical weapons concern have signed the Convention.

President Clinton submitted the CWC to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on November 23, 1993, stating that "This Treaty is one of the most ambitious in the history of arms control, banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It is a central

element of my Administration's nonproliferation policy. The Treaty will significantly enhance our national security and contribute to greater global security."

The Administration seeks prompt Senate advice and consent to CWC ratification.

Arms Control and Nonproliferation Objectives. The CWC is both a disarmament treaty and a central element of U.S. nonproliferation policy. It will result in the destruction of existing chemical arsenals while strengthening the global norm against the proliferation of these mass-destruction weapons.

CWC Implementation. Because CW facilities are similar to many commercial chemical plants, and because many member nations have a developed commercial chemical industry, CWC implementation will be a far more massive and ambitious undertaking than for any previous arms control agreement.

Verification and other aspects of implementation of the CWC will be overseen by a new international agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). OPCW will have a full-time staff of approximately 500, including some 215 inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities throughout the world.

For treaty verification to begin as soon as the Convention enters into force, the signatories have established a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) to develop detailed verification procedures, procure inspection equipment, hire and train inspectors, and lay administrative groundwork for the OPCW. A Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) provides technical and administrative support to PrepCom. The Hague, capital of the Netherlands, was chosen as the location of both the PrepCom and the future OPCW.

The PrepCom held four formal plenary meetings during 1994 to consider recommendations prepared by expert groups working year-round on specific issues. Accomplishments through 1994 include:

- developing the structure of the future organization and hiring 114 staff for the PTS;
- establishing guidelines for inspection team composition and inspection and laboratory equipment lists;
- developing the training program for future inspectors;
- developing staff and financial regulations;
- finalizing a Host Country agreement;
- completing substantial work on required declarations and on an information management system;
- developing a handbook and draft forms for preparing declarations and annual reports required by the CWC;
- assisting member States in their ratification efforts;
- sponsoring regional seminars for member States; and
- supporting preparations by National Authorities for complying with the Convention.

Three issues were particularly contentious during the 1994 PrepCom discussions.

First, the definition of a chemical weapons production facility was questioned by several nations. One country proposed that facilities that had been totally converted to peaceful purposes before CWC entry into force do not require declaration. Another country requested special status for facilities that had never produced a chemical for weapons purposes, but had made small quantities of supertoxic chemicals for medical or pharmaceutical purposes. We interpret the CWC to require declaration of facilities that produced chemicals defined as chemical weapons at any time since 1946, regardless of the purpose of production or the present state of the facility. Our position was shared by all other PrepCom members expressing views. Therefore, consensus will not be reached until the minority positions are modified.

Second, several developing countries are using the discussions of technological cooperation and assistance within the CWC to protest export controls and trade restrictions. In particular, Iran, Cuba, India, and Pakistan desire that all trade restrictions among States Parties on chemicals and chemical technology be removed. This position has some support within the Non-Aligned Movement and will continue to be a subject of contention within the PrepCom. The U.S. and most PrepCom participants regard export licensing as a sovereign right, and support continuing export controls consistent with CWC obligations.

Third, the PrepCom was unable to agree on the level of security to be required for the future OPCW computer system. The U.S. and most delegations are comfortable with a level similar to the present business standard, while a few prefer a higher level. This issue appears headed for resolution in early 1995.

Prospects for the Forthcoming Year. The PrepCom has solved most of the easy problems of CWC implementation and is now grappling with the remaining tough political issues on which consensus among numerous countries with divergent interests will be difficult to achieve. While the CWC negotiations in Geneva occasionally papered over differences with vague treaty language, the PrepCom must interpret the Convention to develop specific, workable, and unambiguous verification procedures. Several PrepCom expert groups are struggling to achieve the appropriate balance between effective verification on the one hand, and protection of industrial trade secrets and national security information unrelated to chemical weapons on the other.

Progress toward entry into force has slowed noticeably recently because the United States has not ratified the CWC. Many countries are looking to the United States for leadership; the state of CWC preparation for implementation in the coming year will depend to a considerable extent on the status of U.S. ratification.

ACDA's Role. ACDA is the lead U.S. Government agency on CWC implementation. Its responsibilities include:

- leading the U.S. CWC PrepCom delegation;
- chairing interagency meetings on the CWC;
- developing guidance for U.S. negotiators working on CWC implementation;
- supervising U.S. budgeting for the CWC;

- acting as the Office of National Authority (ONA) that will work with the OPCW and coordinate U.S. administrative and logistical actions in the United States after entry into force of the CWC; and
- educating the U.S. chemical industry on the requirements of the CWC.

Our industry outreach informs U.S. companies about their obligations under the CWC. ACDA's outreach is built around annual industry seminars around the country and includes information papers, presentations at trade meetings, and coordination with U.S. chemical trade associations including the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association.

In 1994, ACDA held six day-long CWC seminars, published four information papers, gave presentations to trade associations, participated in Department of Commerce seminars around the country, and responded to scores of inquiries and requests for copies of the CWC. On October 1, 1994, the Department of Commerce formed a Treaty Compliance Office, with whom ACDA is now coordinating its industry-outreach efforts to achieve maximum dissemination of up-to-date CWC information. Six CWC industry seminars, jointly sponsored by ACDA and Commerce, are planned for April and May 1995.

2. UNITED STATES -- RUSSIA BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS

The Russian Federation has the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons. The United States has initiated bilateral CW agreements with the Russian Federation to dispose of these weapons, in parallel with preparation for implementation of the multilateral CWC.

Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

On September 23, 1989 in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a two-phase Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) requiring mutual declaration and verification of data on CW capabilities. This initiative was designed to build confidence in mutual willingness to declare information needed to implement the CWC.

Phase I provided for an exchange of general data on chemical stocks and production facilities, and for a series of reciprocal visits to CW facilities. This phase was successfully completed in February 1991.

Phase II provided for an exchange of detailed data and for reciprocal inspections at facilities that had been declared as part of each country's CW program. Its implementing documents provided for:

- completion of data exchange by 150 days after signature;
- a trial challenge inspection by each side between 180 and 225 days after signature; and;
- two routine inspections plus two challenge inspections by each side of declared CW facilities, to be completed within 330 days after signature.

Phase II began with signature at the Moscow summit on January 14, 1994. During 1994, each side asked to examine selected inspection equipment belonging to the other.

Russia failed to provide all the equipment the U.S. asked to see; we therefore rejected the equipment that was not provided. Despite such difficulties, Phase II was concluded on December 10, 1994, with the sides exchanging and consulting on the data, and conducting the agreed inspections. Both sides continue to seek additional information to clarify apparent inconsistencies in previous MOU declarations.

Bilateral Non-Production and Destruction Agreement (BDA)

In this agreement, signed June 1, 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia) each agreed to destroy all but 5,000 tons of their respective chemical agents and to halt any further production.

The Soviet Union and then Russia did not fulfill its obligation to begin destroying CW agents by the end of 1992. Russia's pilot CW destruction facility never began operation, allegedly because of environmental protests by the local populace. The tumultuous political events of 1991-92 also slowed the development of implementing procedures to verify that CW agents were no longer being produced and were indeed being destroyed. By mutual agreement, the BDA schedule has now been aligned with the CWC schedule, which will require destruction of U.S. and Russian CW stockpiles within 10 years after entry into force.

ACDA's Role. In March 1993, ACDA led United States a delegation to Moscow which successfully conducted the complex and detailed negotiations for implementation of Phase II.

The same ACDA-led United States delegation simultaneously negotiated draft protocols to the BDA. Within one month, the United States had approved the draft and so notified the Russian Government. Subsequently, we have made repeated but so far unsuccessful attempts to obtain formal Russian adoption of the BDA protocols; the most recent was in December 1994, when Russia refused to accept BDA provisions on conversion of former CW production facilities consistent with the CWC. Russia has taken a minimalist approach to declaration requirements and verification costs of CWC production facilities that is inconsistent with the CWC. We continue to seek the earliest possible implementation of the BDA.

United States - Russia CW Destruction Program

On July 30, 1992, the United States and Russia signed an agreement under the Nunn-Lugar program to cooperate in destroying the Russian CW stockpile. Pursuant to this agreement, the U.S. has offered to provide \$25 million in funds under the Nunn-Lugar legislation to help Russia plan CW destruction facilities and demonstrate CW destruction technology. A work plan outlining an approach to U.S. assistance in the Russian CW destruction program was concluded in January 1994. In May 1994, the U.S. Government selected Bechtel National, Inc. as the Comprehensive Implementation Plan Contractor to help develop the Russian CW destruction program.

An additional \$30 million of Nunn-Lugar funds will help Russia establish and equip the Central Analytical Laboratory for reliable and efficient environmental control of CW destruction. A protocol for establishing this laboratory was signed March 14, 1994.

ACDA's Role. ACDA participates in interagency policy coordination for the CW destruction agreement, which is executed by the Department of Defense.

We are concerned that Russian progress in CW destruction has been extremely slow. While a concept plan exists, no sites have been approved for destruction facilities, no final decisions have been made about destruction technology, and no funds have been appropriated for construction. The Russians admit their effort is stalled, blaming lack of funds and local opposition at some of the proposed destruction sites.

B. ELIMINATING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (BW)

The 135 parties to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (BWC) undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.

Arms Control Objective. Over the two decades since entry into force of the BWC, confidence in the effectiveness of the Convention has been undermined by instances of non-compliance, notably on the part of the former Soviet Union. To deter noncompliance and reinforce the global norm against proliferation of biological weapons, we support negotiation of a legally binding protocol that provides for reasonable, cost-effective, and mutually reinforcing mandatory measures that enhance compliance with the BWC. These measures could include openness and transparency measures, including on-site visits to biological facilities.

Status of Negotiations. The 1991 BWC Review Conference held in 1991 mandated the convening of an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts which, after four sessions in 1992 and 1993, reported on the scientific and technical merit of potential verification measures.

A Special Conference held in Geneva in September 1994 established another Ad Hoc Group, open to all parties, to consider verification and all other measures to strengthen the BWC and incorporate them into a legally binding document. The Group will report to the Fourth Review Conference of the BWC in the fall of 1996.

Prospects for the Forthcoming Year. The Ad Hoc Group has established its work program for 1995. The group will complete its work as soon as possible and will submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus, to the States Parties for consideration at the Fourth Review Conference in the fall of 1996.

ACDA's Role. ACDA is the lead U.S. Government agency for BWC negotiations. Our responsibilities include:

- leading the U.S. delegations in Geneva to the BWC Special Conference, the Ad Hoc Group, and the BWC Review Conferences, including providing experts;
- developing and preparing guidance on BWC issues for U.S. negotiators;
- developing and evaluating measures to enhance compliance;
- briefing Members of Congress and staffs on BWC issues; and
- informing U.S. industry and the general public on the negotiations.

U.S.-British-Russian Trilateral Process. In a Joint Statement in September 1992, senior government officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation affirmed their commitment to full compliance with the BWC and declared that biological weapons have no place in their armed forces. The Russian Government agreed to take tangible steps to resolve U.S. and British concerns about the offensive BW program inherited from the former Soviet Union.

Russian President Yeltsin proposed a number of steps to remove ambiguities about BWC compliance, including visits to non-military biological facilities. A delegation of U.S. and U.K. officials visited Russian sites in October 1993 and in January 1994. The Russians reciprocated during February-March 1994, visiting three U.S. non-military facilities and one British facility. The three governments also agreed to hold expert working group sessions, the first of which took place in April 1994 in London and the second in Moscow in October 1994. As with the CWC, we are emphasizing the need for Russian compliance.

C. STEMMING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (CBW)

Progress toward entry into force of the CWC and establishment of an Ad Hoc Group to draft a legally binding protocol to the BWC are significant advances toward international control of both types of weapons.

But all the news is not good. More than two dozen countries are researching or developing chemical weapons. A number of countries, including Iraq, Iran, and Libya, have chemical weapons stockpiles. In many cases, BW programs have historically followed closely on the heels of CW programs.

We must, therefore, create international barriers against chemical and biological weapons proliferation by expanding and strengthening multilateral export-control regimes.

Status of Activities. In 1994, the U.S. led the international community in CBW nonproliferation, including:

- expanding and strengthening the Australia Group,⁵ including providing technical and legal expertise to Slovakia to enable it to meet the requirements for membership, and beginning similar assistance to Romania;
- strengthening oversight of the export of small samples of controlled chemicals;
- intervening diplomatically with proliferant countries; and
- enforcement of the 1991 Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act, which provides the authority to impose sanctions on foreign governments that use CBW or foreign individuals engaged in chemical or biological weapons proliferation. The U.S. has effectively used the consultative provisions of this law to secure foreign governments' cooperation in terminating their companies' support for third-country chemical weapons programs.

⁵For a description of the Australia Group, see Chapter VI.

ACDA's Role. In 1994, ACDA continued to participate in CW and BW nonproliferation initiatives, and in the U.S. delegation to the Australia Group. ACDA was instrumental in diplomatic efforts with non-member states which supply chemicals, and in efforts to expand the Group.

During 1994, ACDA reviewed approximately 1,500 license applications to ensure that U.S. companies were not contributing to foreign CBW programs, and sought opportunities to harmonize U.S. CBW export controls with those of other nations.

As a charter member of the U.S. Government's interagency Chemical and Biological Weapons Interdiction Group (SHIELD), ACDA helped to stem the flow of chemical weapons precursors to rogue states including Iran and Libya. This U.S. effort included arrest and successful prosecution of individuals attempting illicit trade in precursors and dual-use equipment. ACDA also led efforts to induce countries that possess chemical or biological weapons to conform and eventually adhere to the CWC and BWC by admitting possession of these weapons and destroying them.

III. CONTROLLING MISSILES AND SPACE WEAPONS

A. CONTROLLING ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is a fundamental element of U.S. national security policy; the U.S. is committed to its continued effectiveness. This Treaty plays a critical role in enabling achievement of significant stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear weapons under the START treaties.

Signed in 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union, the ABM Treaty prohibits deployment of a nationwide defense against strategic ballistic missile attack. By a Protocol signed in 1974, the Treaty now allows one precisely limited ABM deployment area in each country, to protect either the national capital or an ICBM launch area. The Soviet Union chose, and Russia now maintains, an ABM defense of its national capital, Moscow. The United States completed the Safeguard ABM system defending the ICBM complex near Grand Forks, North Dakota. This system was operational for a very short time and has been inactive since 1976.

To implement the Treaty, the Parties established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which meets at least twice a year. The Treaty specifies that a formal review shall be conducted every five years.

Recent ABM Treaty Developments

Interpretation. In 1993, the U.S. Government reviewed U.S. policy toward ballistic missile defense and the future of the ABM Treaty. The review confirmed the traditional interpretation of the Treaty, which prohibits development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components regardless of the technology used. The review found the alternative interpretation to be inconsistent with the Treaty. The U.S. Government has also withdrawn earlier proposals that would have amended the treaty to permit deployment of ABM defenses beyond those currently permitted.

Succession. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States decided we will accept as a Treaty Party any of the New Independent States (NIS) that choose to be party to the treaty; negotiations are under way in the SCC to multilateralize the ABM Treaty.

Theater ballistic missile defense. When the ABM Treaty was negotiated, the demarcation between ABM defenses which are limited by the treaty, and other systems such as theater ballistic missile defenses (TMD) which are not, was not clearly defined. Now because of the need to defend against the growing threat posed by third country theater ballistic missiles, we believe we must define the demarcation. The demarcation is being negotiated in the Treaty's implementing forum, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

SCC meetings on ABM Treaty succession and demarcation were held in Geneva in four sessions from late 1993 to late 1994. At the most recent session, Kazakhstan joined the

other regular participants – Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States – with Latvia as an observer. In addition to the formal SCC sessions, ACDA Director Holum led an interagency delegation to Moscow, Minsk, and Kiev to discuss the demarcation issue on July 13-14, 1994.

In these negotiations, the United States and other participants are considering measures to provide a workable demarcation between ABM and non-ABM systems, and thus to preserve the Treaty under today's political and technological circumstances.

Despite differences of view, the negotiations demonstrate a significant commonality of approach to theater ballistic missile defense. There is general agreement that:

- (1) the ABM Treaty should be maintained and clarified;
- (2) the threat from proliferation of theater ballistic missiles is real;
- (3) there is a shared interest in defending against this threat; and
- (4) the demarcation between theater ballistic missile defense and strategic ballistic missile defense must be clarified.

Completion of a final agreement on ABM Treaty succession arrangements and ABM demarcation requires further negotiation. The President has directed close consultation with Congress on this matter.

Arms Control Objectives. The principal ABM Treaty objectives of the Administration include:

- Negotiation of a demarcation between strategic ballistic missile defenses which are limited by the ABM Treaty, and other weapons such as theater ballistic missile defenses which are not; and
- Development of the legal instrument to provide for multilateral adherence to the Treaty.

B. MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE BAN

In 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the INF Treaty on elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (See Chapter I section A3). That Treaty, which remains in force today with the successor states of the Soviet Union, prohibits possession, testing, production, and deployment of both ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. It resulted in the complete elimination of these missiles from the U.S. and Soviet arsenals.

Current Status

With the end of the Cold War, we are deeply concerned about the threat to U.S. and allied national security from global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems capable of delivering them, particularly those with ranges similar to those of missiles covered by the INF Treaty. A growing number of countries are acquiring missiles, and the technology to produce them, at the low end of this range and gradually working upward. This threatens U.S. friends and allies, U.S. forces abroad, and regional stability around the world. During the Gulf War, Iraq's use of modified SCUD missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia, *

and against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, was a dramatic demonstration of this growing threat.

The United States and other states have been seeking to stem the spread of such missiles principally through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Although the MTCR is a voluntary arrangement rather than a legally binding treaty, it has slowed the proliferation of missiles, missile components, and missile-related technology. Complete interdiction has not been possible, and reversing the growing proliferation problem will require additional measures on a more comprehensive scale.

With the INF Treaty as an example, ACDA is exploring the concept of a negotiated global medium-range missile ban (MRMB). In this context, "medium-range missiles" are broadly comparable to those covered by the INF Treaty, and to nonstrategic systems covered by MTCR. Such a treaty would require that states that do not possess such missiles agree never to acquire them, and would require states that do possess them to eliminate them. It would complement other U.S. arms control regimes and defense initiatives, including MTCR and theater missile defenses.

ACDA's concept of a global missile ban on medium range missiles is currently being evaluated within the U.S. government. No decision has as yet been made whether to pursue it.

C. CONTROLLING MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Proliferation of missile delivery systems is a major threat to U.S. security. We seek to prevent missile proliferation multilaterally through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and bilaterally by negotiating directly with missile-developing nations as well as non-MTCR states capable of exporting missile technology.

The MTCR is the only multinational instrument for dealing with missile proliferation. Its 25 members include most of the missile technology producing nations.

The MTCR establishes two categories of restricted items: Category I items are ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems, their complete subsystems, and their production facilities. Category II items are components for Category I items.

During 1994, the U.S. sought to gain agreement on new steps to deal proactively with serious missile proliferation problems. We will continue to press for them.

U.S. efforts resulted in several significant bilateral agreements which terminated programs of proliferation concern and increased the number of nations that adhere to the MTCR.

Under a 1993 agreement with the U.S., Russia agreed to observe the MTCR and terminated the technology transfer elements of its missile-related cooperation with India. This cleared away a key barrier to Russian membership in the MTCR and expanded U.S.-Russian cooperation in civil and commercial space fields.

South Africa concluded a bilateral missile nonproliferation agreement with the U.S. in October 1994, committed to observe the MTCR, and began terminating its Category I missile and SLV programs. It is now a candidate for early membership in the MTCR.

Ukraine signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. in which it agreed to observe the MTCR and, with U.S. assistance, to work toward Regime membership qualification.

Most recent U.S. missile nonproliferation efforts focused on supplier states that are not MTCR members and that continue to engage in activities of concern.

China presents continuing missile proliferation problems that were partially resolved in 1994. U.S. economic sanctions, imposed on a Chinese firm for transfers of Category II MTCR technology and missile-related equipment to Pakistan, were lifted when China signed a joint agreement in October 1994 reaffirming its commitment to the MTCR and committing not to export ground-to-ground missiles capable of delivering a 500kg payload to a range of 300km. We remain concerned about possible past transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, and are urgently seeking clarification and resolution of this matter.

North Korea is developing several Category I WMD-capable missiles which it probably intends to offer for sale regardless of the consequences for peace and stability. As the U.S. effort to halt the North Korean nuclear program proceeds, we are focusing renewed attention on North Korean missile-related activities.

India and Pakistan are also nuclear-threshold states outside the NPT; we are deeply concerned that technological development could lead to nuclear-tipped missiles on both sides. The U.S. has proposed a ballistic missile non-deployment agreement between India and Pakistan, and participated in an MTCR team visit to both countries to press for a balanced resolution of this issue. Because of the tension between these two states, a ballistic missile arms race between them is a matter of grave concern.

ACDA's Role. ACDA is an active participant in internal U.S. policy formulation and implementation, and in U.S. delegations to bilateral discussions, to the annual MTCR Plenary meetings, and to periodic meetings of technical experts. ACDA serves as executive secretary to the interagency Missile Trade Analysis Group, which is responsible for U.S. interdiction efforts and reviews of export transactions that may be subject to missile-related sanctions. ACDA also participates in review of missile technology export licensing through the Missile Technology Export Control Group, and provides inputs to the review process of the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex in the Missile Annex Review Committee.

D. CONTROLLING MISSILES USED AS SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Since the signing of the START I Treaty, some of the START Parties have begun programs for using ballistic missiles for non-military space launch purposes. Such use has both strategic and proliferation implications.

START I Treaty permits ballistic missiles to be used, with certain restrictions, as space launch boosters. Any such use must conform to the treaty's accountability and verification provisions:

- launches must be notified;
- the booster must not carry a warhead;
- unencrypted telemetry must be transmitted; and
- telemetry tapes and acceleration profiles must be exchanged.

Although START I does not preclude such launches from the territory of non-START parties, the ownership and control of such systems cannot be transferred to non-START Parties. The location and number of space launch facilities are also restricted, as are the number of ICBMs and SLBMs which may be located at them.

MTCR Guidelines also permit members to support the space programs of other countries or international cooperation in such programs "...as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction." Any space launch booster export must ensure that there is no contribution to a missile program of MTCR concern. The U.S. Government will support cooperative space programs with Russia, so long as there is no contribution to a missile program of concern under the MTCR.

Issues concerning the use of ballistic missiles for space launch have been delegated to the NSC-chaired Excess Ballistic Missile Working Group, in which ACDA is an active participant, and to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, which ACDA heads, for START issues.

IV. CONTROLLING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

A. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL REGIMES IN EUROPE

European security concerns have changed dramatically since the early 1990s when members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact agreed to bring the conventional forces balance in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) region into approximate numerical parity at lower levels. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe remains a critical cornerstone for security in Europe and is complemented by other useful agreements.

1. TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

The 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is the cornerstone of European military stability. Its full implementation remains a fundamental U.S. objective. It has substantially improved predictability, transparency, and stability, and paves the way for further arms control progress. It sets limits on:

- tanks;
- armored combat vehicles;
- artillery pieces;
- attack helicopters; and
- fixed-wing combat aircraft

for two groups of states – NATO Allies and members of the former Warsaw Pact – in Europe west of the Ural Mountains. It provides for information exchanges in unprecedented detail, and for unprecedented levels of inspections. The CFE Treaty has become, therefore, the foundation for building military stability in Europe.

Over 37,000 conventional weapons have been destroyed as of the end of 1994, and about 2,000 inspections of

- weapons destruction,
- declared sites, and
- specific areas

have been conducted. The possibility of a major international conflict within the ATTU region has been significantly reduced and the way is now clear for a more concentrated focus on how arms control can be applied to regional instability in Europe.

ACDA's Role. In 1995 and beyond, ACDA will continue to participate in the interagency back-stopping process for the CFE Treaty. Under the leadership of the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE, ACDA's senior representative on the delegation has day-to-day responsibility for issues relating to the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG), which oversees CFE implementation and meets regularly in Vienna. In these capacities, ACDA will continue to promote the completion of CFE-mandated equipment reductions by November 1995 by all 30 States Parties. ACDA will also participate in developing policy initiatives and recommendations for the follow-on CFE requirements and preparations for the May 1996 CFE Review Conference.

CFE Treaty Evolution

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 by 22 members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact.

On June 14, 1991 the Soviet Union entered into two accompanying commitments: one legally binding and one a political commitment. The former details the Soviet reduction obligation for naval infantry and coastal defense forces. The latter agreement commits the Soviet Union to specified reductions of over 14,500 items of military equipment by the end of 1995, of the same types as those limited by the treaty, located east of the Ural Mountains even though that area is outside the CFE Treaty area of application.

The CFE Treaty entered into force on November 9, 1992. In the two years between signature and entry into force, both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. On June 5, 1992, all States Parties agreed upon arrangements by which eight successor states to the former Soviet Union – Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Georgia – undertook to exercise fully the rights and observe the obligations provided in the CFE Treaty and its associated documents. For example, each state agreed that maximum levels of conventional armaments and equipment for all eight states' combined holdings were not to exceed the total ceilings established for the Soviet Union.

Treaty Implementation

Reductions to the CFE equipment limits must be completed by November 16, 1995. Considering the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the international political conflicts in some new states of the former Soviet Union, implementation of this complex Treaty has generally been smooth. It has improved throughout the course of the past two year as nations gained familiarity with CFE procedures.

CFE Treaty compliance overall has been good. Through 1994, over 37,000 major conventional weapons have been destroyed or demilitarized under CFE; its 30 States Parties have provided detailed information on the status and location of their major conventional weapons. Approximately 2,000 detailed on-site inspections have been conducted.

Some problems have developed regarding full site access by local authorities, and late or incorrect notifications. Most of these have been successfully addressed by the Joint Consultative Group.

Some problems remain. Russia's pace of destruction or conversion of military equipment outside the CFE area of application, as required by the political agreement of June 1991, has been slow. Russia is required to complete these reductions by September 1995. By moving much of this equipment out of the CFE area before CFE entry into force, the Soviet Union sought to protect it while still remaining within the letter of the Treaty.

The CFE Treaty's four subzone ceilings further restrict the deployment of equipment by CFE states or groups to prevent destabilizing concentrations of forces in any one region of Europe. The flank zones are subzones of particular political and military importance. Russia and Ukraine are the only CFE states whose national territory falls into more than one subzone.

Russia and Ukraine have sought relief from CFE Treaty equipment limits for the flank areas. Russia cites military security concerns on its southern border, and Ukraine emphasizes its economic hardships. We believe that full implementation of CFE's commitments is critical to future European security, and have urged both countries to solve their problems in a way that is consistent with the terms of the Treaty.

For the United States, the CFE Treaty has never been an end in itself, but has been part of a continuing effort to achieve stability in Europe. Careful CFE implementation is important in the new security relationship in Europe. The Treaty has significantly enhanced stability, security, accountability, cooperation, and openness throughout its area of application.

2. CFE - 1A.

CFE limits major offensive military equipment but does not limit personnel. Follow-on negotiations produced a political agreement to limit the personnel strength of the conventional armed forces of each State Party in the CFE area of application. This agreement was signed in Helsinki on July 10, 1992 and is formally known as the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE-IA.

3. CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY- BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMs)

There remain challenges to stability not addressed by the CFE Treaty. The December 1994 Budapest Summit has directed the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) toward regional security problems, with the aim of developing regional arms control and confidence building regimes that respond to specific security needs. It also directed development of an overall framework for arms control in Europe.

CSBMs codified within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have allowed member states to monitor each other's military force structure and activities. The unprecedented sharing of information about military structures and activities called for in the Vienna Document 1992 has significantly contributed to stability in post-Cold War Europe.

The OSCE states conducted their fifth exchange of military information on December 15, 1994. In addition, 12 states provided information on defense planning. Additional activities conducted under the Vienna Document 1992 that serve to enhance confidence and transparency include:

- Spain, Austria, Greece, Hungary and Portugal hosted air base visits in 1994, bringing to 22 the number of states to have hosted air base visits since the measure went into effect in 1991. In conjunction with these visits, Hungary and Portugal hosted visits to military facilities.
- France and the United Kingdom conducted demonstrations of new types of major weapons and equipment systems during 1994.
- A total of 49 evaluation visits were conducted in 1994, including first-time visits to Moldova, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Ireland and Malta. Evaluation visits provide each participating state with the opportunity to visit active formations and units, in their normal peacetime locations as reported in the Annual Information Exchange of Military Forces, in order to evaluate the accuracy of the information exchanged. Evaluation visits are also allowed to non-active formations and units.
- 15 inspections were conducted in 1994. Significantly, first time inspections were conducted in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Albania, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan.

To further support stability in Europe, the 53-member OSCE continues to improve existing and develop new CSBMs. New CSBMs were adopted in November 1994, and new provisions were incorporated into Vienna Document 1994, which supersedes Vienna Document 1992. This ability to refine and update provisions, and to construct new measures, allows the OSCE to respond to political-military changes.

On November 28, 1994, the OSCE adopted the Vienna Document 1994 to supersede Vienna Document 1992 as of January 1, 1995; it also adopted a new measure providing for a separate Global Exchange of Military Information.

ACDA continues to participate actively in CSBM policy formulation, and provides on-site support to the U.S. delegation to the OSCE in Vienna.

4. OPEN SKIES TREATY

The Treaty on Open Skies establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its signatories. It is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in observing military or other activities of concern to them. Currently covering territory from Vancouver, Canada to Vladivostok, Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort in history to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

The Treaty is based upon the following principles:

- complete territorial openness and access;
- use of unarmed aircraft for observation flights;
- a sensor suite using commercially available equipment;
- annual quotas for reciprocal overflights; and

— data dissemination to all States Parties.

The Treaty allows for consensus decisions to upgrade sensors, adjust quotas, and admit new participants to enhance its effectiveness. The Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) in Vienna is the forum established to facilitate the Treaty's implementation.

The Treaty on Open Skies is based upon a U.S. initiative of May 1989; it was signed by 25 states on March 24, 1992, and ratified by the U.S. on November 2, 1993. Currently there are 27 signatories which include Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. Additional nations can apply for membership after entry into force, but the former republics of the USSR can accede at any time.

Ratification by three additional states — Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine — is required for the Treaty to enter into force.

In anticipation of entry into force, many signatories have been conducting joint trial flights, designed to test flight procedures and air traffic control mechanisms, train flight crews and sensor operators, build confidence and gain experience for operations under the Treaty once it enters into force. In 1994, the U.S. conducted trial flights with Germany, Greece, Ukraine, and Canada using the official U.S. OC-135B aircraft. The U.S. also participated in sensor test flights conducted in Russia.

In its present form, Open Skies can help increase transparency and build confidence in Europe. It might later be expanded geographically, either by adding new countries to the present regime, or by developing similar regional regimes elsewhere using the rules and procedures for Open Skies as a basis. As envisioned in the Preamble to the Treaty, with the agreement of participating states Open Skies could be expanded to other uses, including conflict prevention, crisis management, and environmental monitoring. Open Skies might also monitor compliance with other arms control treaties and agreements.

Current discussions in the OSCC are focussed on aircraft certification procedures and other issues related to implementation of observation flights, including flight procedures, sensor methodologies, and notification formats.

ACDA will continue to play a key role in the interagency backstopping process in 1995 and beyond, and will continue to promote entry into force by June 1995, and is urging ratification of the Open Skies Treaty by the signatories who have not yet ratified.

B. REDUCING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DUE TO MINES

In the time required to read this report, more than ten noncombatant civilians will be maimed or killed by anti-personnel landmines. Because the rate of mine emplacement exceeds the rate of mine clearing by at least ten to one, the severity of this human tragedy will, if left unchecked, worsen over time. Many, perhaps most, of its victims will be children or farmers.

By domestic law, the U.S. Government is observing a unilateral moratorium on all anti-personnel landmine exports. We are urging other nations to join in this moratorium. But while the moratorium is a useful step, no export regime will require changes in the large numbers of mines now stockpiled, nor will it affect mines a nation makes for its own use. We need to go much further, to create permanent controls on use, production, and stockpiling as well as transfers.

The U.S. Government is committed to eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines. But such a prohibition presently enjoys little international support. On the contrary, even the suggestion of such an agenda reduces international support for very useful interim measures.

Such measures begin with the fundamental problem of post-combat civilian mine casualties, and seek reduction or elimination of the mine properties that cause these casualties.

Our negotiators believe this can be done, and that it can save the tens of thousands of innocent civilians who will otherwise be maimed or killed while the world waits decades or longer for a total mine ban. If we can save these people, to fail to do so for the sake of "making a statement" would be unconscionable.

The U.S. objective is to develop and implement practical measures to reduce post-combat civilian mine casualties. We believe that reduction of these casualties, consistent with military requirements, is the most valid measure of success for mine control efforts.

Mines are generally intended to serve a military purpose for hours or days. But their unique evil is that they usually are designed to remain lethal for years or decades after the combat has moved on. Since post-combat mine casualties result from the long life of mines, the clear negotiable solution is to replace long-lived mines with short-lived mines.

There are two useful methods for limiting mine life:

Self-destruction is performed by a timer which detonates the main charge after a set period of time. In present U.S. mines, self-destruct times range from 4 hours to 15 days. A self-destruct mechanism can be viewed as a built-in demining device; its cost is more than 100 times cheaper than that of conventional demining. Self-destruction has the advantage of completely removing the mine; it has the disadvantage that it can sometimes fail, leaving a lethal mine in place.

Self-deactivating renders the mine inoperable through exhaustion of an essential part of the mine such as the battery. In present U.S. mines, self-deactivate times range from 14 to 60 days. The advantage of self-deactivation is that it never fails; batteries always die. The disadvantage is that it leaves behind an object which must be removed.

The U.S. Government favors making mines short-lived by requiring self-destruction with a self-deactivation backup feature. Each measure can then compensate for the limitations of the other.

We are presently negotiating landmine control in two forms:

The *Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)*, a Law of War treaty which restricts the use of landmines, will be amended at a Review Conference in Geneva in September-October 1995. In preparation for this conference, four Experts' Meetings have been held in 1994 and early 1995. We have proposed that the Conference greatly strengthen its present landmine restrictions, by requiring that all anti-personnel landmines used outside of marked and monitored areas be self-destructing and self-deactivating.

The U.S. Senate approved ratification of this convention March 24, 1995; President Clinton ratified and deposited the instruments of ratification the same day.

The *Mine Control Program* is a political regime that would regulate production, stockpiling, and transfer of long-lived mines, and prohibit their export entirely. We seek international support for this regime as soon as possible after the CCW Amendment Conference.

ACDA's role. ACDA supplies two members of the CCW delegation and one member of the Mine Control Regime group. ACDA delegation members have played a leading role in creating precise and effective restrictions on long-lived mines, and in building multilateral support for these restrictions.

C. CONTROLLING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

Unlike chemical and biological weapons which we hope to eliminate, and unlike nuclear weapons which we hope will never again be used, conventional weapons are the ordinary tools of armed conflict. While they cannot be eliminated nor their use prohibited in the foreseeable future, their availability and use can be significantly controlled and restrained. Conventional arms control ranges from unilateral arrangements through multilateral agreements to global conventions.

In most arms-exporting countries, the end of the Cold War has produced a reduction in military procurement, and a corresponding increase in military and commercial pressures to export. Maintenance of a defense industrial base in major arms-producing/exporting nations has therefore become a higher priority to national defense and to the economic future of military producers. Meanwhile, the widespread development and acquisition of advanced conventional military capabilities are being accelerated by erosion of the distinction between military and advanced commercial technology.⁶

Controlling conventional weapons transfers, therefore, is becoming increasingly critical to national security in the 1990s. ACDA is the only U.S. agency tasked to examine exports solely from the arms control and regional stability perspective, with no competing objectives. Under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, ACDA reviews proposed commercial arms exports licensed by the Department of State, and government-to-government Foreign Military Sales and military assistance programs. We also evaluate licenses administered by the Department of Commerce for the export of dual-use items subject to nonproliferation controls on missiles and nuclear/chemical/biological weapons.

As directed by law, ACDA evaluates proposed transfers or exports to determine whether they might:

- contribute to an arms race;
- support international terrorism;
- increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict;
- prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms-control arrangements; or
- adversely affect the arms control policy of the United States.

In assessing export cases, we also take into account:

- regional stability and military balance;
- legitimate defense needs relative to threats;
- the military force structure, strategy, and doctrine of the proposed recipient and its neighbors;
- whether the transfer would constitute a "new," offensive, power-projection, or destabilizing capability;
- proliferation implications; and
- risks of misuse or unauthorized retransfer.

We pay particular attention to exports involving significant high-technology military or power-projection capabilities including:

- aerial refueling;
- submarines;
- unmanned aerial vehicles;

⁶ Full details on worldwide arms transfers can be found in the latest edition of ACDA's report, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1993-1994*.

- standoff and "smart" weapons;
- supercomputers; and
- advanced weapons development manufacturing technology.

In 1994, ACDA evaluated more than 2,500 government-to-government and commercial arms-transfer applications, along with dual-use cases subject to missile, nuclear, and CBW export controls.

ACDA participates in various interagency committees and working groups concerned with technology- and arms-transfer, and security assistance issues. These bodies and their functions include:

- **Nonproliferation and Export Control Interagency Working Group:** Develops and oversees implementation of U.S. policy on the full range of nonproliferation and export-control issues.
- **National Disclosure Policy Committee:** Makes decisions on the foreign release of classified U.S. defense systems and technology.
- **Missile Technology Export Control Group:** Reviews license applications for export of items of missile proliferation concern to non-MTCR countries.
- **Missile Trade Analysis Group:** Assesses worldwide diversion or transfer of missile-related technology and attempts to interdict those that could contribute to proliferation; analyzes missile-related transfers that could be subject to U.S. sanctions.
- **Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Group:** Referred to as SHIELD, this group reviews export-license applications for dual-use CW- or BW-related goods, technology, or services; it seeks to persuade foreign governments to prevent exports that could contribute to CBW proliferation, and analyzes CBW-related activities that could be subject to U.S. sanctions.
- **Supercomputer Working Group:** Reviews proposed supercomputer exports and determines security conditions that should be attached to the export.
- **Technology Transfer Working Group:** Reviews intelligence reports, open marketing literature, and other documentation for possible improper use or diversion of U.S.-origin defense articles, dual use items, and technology to unauthorized applications or end users.
- **Advisory Committee on Export Policy:** Adjudicates and decides dual-use export cases that have not been resolved because of lower-level interagency differences.

ACDA's Role. ACDA contributed its nonproliferation perspective, including introduction of several of the major issues addressed, to the U.S. Government's comprehensive review of conventional arms transfer policy in light of the end of the Cold War. ACDA focussed particularly on:

- defense export financing;
- U.S. participation in upgrades of former Soviet equipment;
- criteria to be applied to case-by-case evaluation of proposed arms transfers; and
- the role of arms control in U.S. restraint.

ACDA contributed to the U.S. initiative, pursued with 22 like-minded nations, to develop a new multilateral export-control regime as a follow-on to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). COCOM formally ended on March 31, but members agreed to keep national controls on former COCOM-controlled items until the new regime is established. Negotiations toward a post-COCOM regime continue. Partners seek a new regime that will promote transparency and responsibility with regard to the transfer of arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. The new regime will complement, not duplicate, existing nonproliferation regimes. Membership will be open to supplier nations meeting international nonproliferation and export-control norms. We envisage Russia as a founding member of the new regime, subject to the membership criteria and resolution of the issue of Russia's arms sales to Iran.

D. TRANSPARENCY IN ARMAMENTS (TIA)

1. UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

The U.N. Register of Conventional Arms entered its second year of operation in 1994. The Register is designed to serve as a global confidence building measure, rather than as an explicit control on military arms transfers or capabilities. States are asked to provide data on the number of conventional arms imported and exported in each of seven categories of military equipment:

- tanks;
- armored combat vehicles;
- large caliber artillery systems;
- fixed wing combat aircraft;
- attack helicopters;
- warships; and
- missiles or missile systems.

The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the Register met three times in 1994 to consider Registry operations. Although no consensus on expanding the Register currently exists, the Group will reconvene in 1997 to continue its review.

ACDA's Role is to:

- Chair the backstopping group that addresses the UN Register of Conventional Arms;
- Prepare and coordinate guidance for the U.S. representative to the Group of

Governmental Experts;

- Provide an expert to the Group of Experts as needed;
- Coordinate policy with close allies;
- Brief Members of Congress and their staff on TIA issues;
- Present the U.S. position on TIA issues to the public;
- Respond to Register requests for information from other nations;
- Assemble, coordinate, and submit the U.S. data to the United Nations; and
- Maintain the repository for the U.S. Register data.

2. TRANSPARENCY IN ARMAMENTS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Transparency in Armaments (TIA) was discussed within the CD in the Ad Hoc Committee for TIA in 1994. Among the issues considered were the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, military holdings, procurement through national production, weapons of mass destruction, and codes of conduct for conventional arms transfers. The U.S. delegation actively sought to engage the more reluctant participants of the CD in the TIA discussion.

The U.S. is committed to continued work on TIA in the coming year.

ACDA develops U.S. government policy for TIA discussions in Geneva. ACDA's responsibilities are to chair the backstopping group that addresses TIA issues, and to prepare and coordinate guidance for U.S. government negotiators and experts.

V. REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

The United States is bordered by two great oceans and two friendly neighbors. Most nations are not so fortunate. For many, proximity equates to hostility, with "hate thy neighbor" being all too often the guiding principle. Regional arms control can help turn local cold wars away from hot wars and toward peace. During 1994 ACDA sought to promote regional arms control in Eurasia, Latin America, Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and the Middle East.

A. EUROPE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)

Very significant progress has been made in European arms control. It is discussed in Chapter IV, Section A.

B. EURASIA

Collapse of the former Soviet Union and its replacement by 15 independent states has fundamentally altered the geo-strategic environment in Eurasia. Eurasian (as distinguished from European) regional arms control is in a very early stage. At this early point, our objective is to explore what can be accomplished by bilateral or multilateral arms control with China and with the states of the former Soviet Union, as well as region-wide arms control. Our goals in this region are greater transparency, maximum security for and control of nuclear weapons and, above all, adherence to the principles of nonproliferation.

Our arms control contacts in the region have been primarily with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine, which are parties to START, INF Treaty implementation, and SCC discussions on ABM Treaty issues. We are also reaching out to the other states of the former Soviet Union. Many are beginning to understand that arms control and nonproliferation are significant tools that can improve any nation's security.

The START agreement and the collapse of the Soviet Union could lead to new opportunities for a strategic dialogue between the U.S. and China. In light of China's growing military and economic power, its troublesome proliferation history, and its impact on nuclear policies in India and Pakistan, there is an abundance of problems that need to be addressed by a U.S.-China arms control dialogue. We are cautiously optimistic that strategic dialogue with China can lead to improved nonproliferation behavior, better transparency, security and control of China's strategic nuclear forces, and reduced tensions among the major powers of the region.

C. EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC REGION

1. NORTH KOREA

The Korean Peninsula remains a heavily armed area of high tension where military preparedness is intense and political intentions are difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program has been substantially reduced by conclusion

of the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994.

North Korea acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 but originally refused to place all of its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Toward the end of 1991, North Korea began to take steps to convince the world that its nuclear program was peaceful. These included negotiating its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and signing an agreement with South Korea that banned nuclear weapons and reprocessing and enrichment facilities on the Korean Peninsula; it also included a commitment to negotiate a bilateral inspection regime. At about the same time, the two Koreas also signed an agreement of reconciliation and non-aggression.

North Korea's NPT safeguards agreement came into force in April 1992, and for a time North Korea appeared to be cooperating fully with the IAEA in implementation of the agreement. North Korea revealed several nuclear facilities, including a reactor capable of producing significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium that began operating in 1986, a reprocessing plant, and two larger reactors under construction.

However, detailed analysis of nuclear samples taken by the IAEA raised questions about North Korea's initial declaration of plutonium production, and the U.S. learned that North Korea was attempting to conceal two nuclear waste sites. Ultimately, North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect these two sites.

The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on February 25, 1993, urging North Korea to extend full cooperation to the IAEA and to permit access to these sites. North Korea continued to refuse, and on March 12 sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General stating its intention to withdraw from the NPT. On May 11, the Security Council passed a resolution urging North Korea to reconsider its stated intention to withdraw from the NPT and to comply with its NPT safeguards agreement. The Security Council invited all U.N. members to support that effort. This set the stage for direct U.S.-North Korean talks.

On June 11, 1993, following a week of talks in New York, the U.S. and North Korea issued a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. In a separate statement, the U.S. also noted that North Korea had been told that certain steps must be avoided if the dialogue is to continue, e.g., additional reprocessing, any break in the continuity of IAEA safeguards, or a withdrawal from the NPT.

A further step was taken at the next round of talks, which were held in Geneva from July 14-19. In the joint statement issued at the close of these discussions, North Korea agreed that it was "prepared to begin" consultations with the IAEA on outstanding issues and with South Korea on bilateral issues including the nuclear issue. The U.S. made clear that continuation of our dialogue requires continuation of safeguards on North Korean nuclear facilities and a resumption of the North-South dialogue.

The U.S. agreed that it was prepared to support substitution of light water reactors for North Korean graphite-moderated reactors as part of a broad and thorough solution to the nuclear issue. Light water reactors are not optimal producers of plutonium for nuclear weapons programs and can be more effectively safeguarded than North Korea's current graphite moderated reactors.

On October 21, 1994, after sixteen months of negotiations, the United States and North Korea signed an Agreed Framework, designed to lead to an end to the threat of proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, and to provide the basis for more normal relations between North Korea and the rest of the world.

In the framework, North Korea agrees to:

- forgo reprocessing and eventually ship out its spent fuel from its existing 5 MWe reactor;
- immediately freeze, and later eliminate, its entire graphite moderated reactor program under IAEA monitoring; and to
- remain in the NPT and ultimately allow full implementation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including special inspections.

The framework also provides that the U.S. will organize an international consortium to supply two light water reactors to North Korea to replace the graphite reactor program which is terminated under the framework. But no critical components will be supplied until North Korea has satisfied the IAEA that it is in full compliance with its NPT obligations.

The framework does not rely on trust. All of its steps will be verifiable. The framework will probably defuse one of the most dangerous nuclear hot spots in the world, and will ultimately resolve this nonproliferation threat.

ACDA's Role. ACDA has played a substantial role in formulating U.S. policies to convince North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue. ACDA has actively participated in all U.S.-North Korea high-level negotiations that contributed to the U.S.-North Korea agreed framework, and will play an important role in implementing the agreed framework. In particular, ACDA is the lead agency on diplomatic issues related to the disposition of North Korea's plutonium-bearing spent fuel, and for coordinating U.S. assistance to South Korea on implementation of the bilateral inspection regime to be negotiated under the South-North denuclearization agreement.

In November 1994 and January 1995, ACDA led an interagency team to Yongbyong, North Korea to examine the spent fuel situation there, and to discuss storage of spent fuel pending ultimate shipment out of North Korea. This was the first American visit to the Yongbyong reactor.

2. SOUTH KOREA

ACDA participated in meetings with the South Koreans that preceded the adoption of Korea's export control law on strategic trade items, and visited South Korea to observe the law's implementation. In these meetings, the U.S. pressed strongly for South Korea to expand its controls to include all items of proliferation concern, and Seoul is now planning to do so.

3. CHINA

In the past year, there has been some progress in China's commitment to nonproliferation. The U.S. Government supports a comprehensive and integrated package of

measures to modify China's proliferation behavior in concrete ways, in the context of a bilateral relationship.

Most notable is the October 4 Joint Statement on Missile Proliferation. In this statement, China agreed to ban the export of surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the MTCR. This commitment exceeds the "strong presumption of denial" requirement of the MTCR Guidelines. In addition, China accepted the principle of inherent capability in defining an MTCR-covered missile, and reaffirmed its initial commitment to observe the MTCR Guidelines.

In January 1994, ACDA and the Department of Defense led a site survey visit to defense conversion sites in China. An ACDA Assistant Director was a member of the Secretary of Defense's delegation to the 1994 meeting in Beijing that established the U.S.-China Defense Conversion Commission. He also began discussions with Chinese officials on other areas of strategic arms control.

ACDA Director John Holum's 1994 talks in Beijing revived arms control discussions with the Chinese that had been initiated with then- ACDA Director George Seignious' visit to Beijing in 1980. The 1994 talks were held in the context of other high level discussions with the Chinese on nonproliferation issues. They dealt with a broad range of global arms control issues. These talks, of course, do not substitute for our on-going negotiations on missile, CBW, CTBT, and other arms control issues. But bilateral talks allow for an exchange of information and views on current issues and initiatives in a more concentrated way.

4. TAIPEI

ACDA advised the American Institute in Taiwan during its consultations with its Taiwan counterpart, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, regarding Taiwan's adoption of a comprehensive export control regime. ACDA pressed strongly for Taiwan to also implement controls on items of nonproliferation concern; Taipei has indicated a willingness to do so but only after implementing controls on strategic items.

D. SOUTHEAST ASIA

In October 1993 Japan hosted, in cooperation with the U.S. and Australia, the Asian Export Control Seminar for officials from Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei, South Korea, and Hong Kong. This seminar was designed to educate these officials on the various nonproliferation regimes. ACDA participated in the U.S. delegation, and briefed the seminar on the Missile Technology Control Regime.

To follow up, in June 1994 ACDA co-led an interagency delegation to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore for further nonproliferation and export control discussions, to seek these countries' cooperation in controlling items of proliferation concern and items controlled by the post-COCOM regime. In July of 1994, ACDA was a member of the U.S. delegation to the first meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the newly established security dialogue forum for the East Asia/Pacific Region.

Working with other agencies, ACDA is developing arms control initiatives and confidence-building measures that can contribute to East Asia/Pacific security.

E. SOUTH ASIA

South Asian territorial, ethnic, religious, and political disputes could escalate into a fourth Indo-Pakistani war. We are deeply concerned about India and Pakistan because of their advanced, unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic missile programs. We continue to believe that both nations could assemble nuclear weapons within a short time; both have tested missiles and acquired aircraft capable of delivering such weapons. The existence of these programs in this region creates grave risk that a future conflict in the region could include nuclear use.

Recognizing this potential for conflict, India and Pakistan have undertaken several steps to reduce regional tensions. The two countries have signed and ratified bilateral agreements on avoidance of airspace violations, notification of military exercises, and establishment of a hotline at the senior military level.

In 1991, India and Pakistan ratified an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Lists of facilities covered by the agreement have been exchanged since 1992.

India and Pakistan have also declared a regional ban on chemical weapons, and are working on a similar statement concerning biological weapons. Both have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and agreed in principle to seeking to negotiate a multilateral, verifiable cut off of fissile material production and a global comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Despite these encouraging steps, we remain concerned that neither side has fully implemented its bilateral agreements. In the absence of adequate dialogue, noncompliance may add to regional tension. In bilateral meetings with both India and Pakistan, ACDA has encouraged establishment of a joint implementation body to oversee the monitoring of current confidence-building measures and address disputes that might arise. We stressed the value of continuing arms control/CBM discussions regardless of political differences.

Regional instability, and therefore proliferation, continue to be driven by Pakistani security concerns vis-a-vis India, by Indian security concerns vis-a-vis China and Pakistan, and by underlying issues of status-seeking and desire to be viewed as a major world power. While Pakistan and China supported in principle the establishment of a security dialogue for the region involving all key parties, India has not accepted the proposal, insisting instead that proliferation is a global issue that must be addressed in global fora. Further, relations between India and Pakistan appear to be deteriorating, fueled by Pakistani concerns regarding the continuing insurgency in Kashmir, the lack of progress made at Foreign Secretary talks held in January, Indian Prithvi ballistic missile trials, Indian uncertainty over possible Chinese M-11 ballistic missile transfers to Pakistan and Indian concern about possible Pakistani support to Kashmiri militants.

The U.S. seeks to promote arms control initiatives including:

- a multilateral dialogue on security, arms control, nonproliferation and regional security in South Asia;
- regional solutions that lead to a cap followed by a roll-back and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery capabilities; and,
- global initiatives including the CTBT and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty that help de-emphasize nuclear weapons worldwide.

ACDA is developing regional arms control techniques and confidence-building measures to promote tension reduction in the region. Proposals are communicated to the region in both governmental and nongovernmental fora. In February of this year, Acting Deputy Director Thomas Graham led an ACDA team to Pakistan for discussions on the concepts and techniques of arms control, and presentations on how arms control has helped enhance U.S. security. In October, Director John Holum traveled to China and India to engage those nations on similar arms control topics.

Major arms reduction in South Asia will not be achieved overnight. But this is a beginning which may, in the long term, yield very significant results. At every opportunity, ACDA has provided information to India, Pakistan, and China on the national security benefits of arms control.

Effective verification is essential if regional arms control is to be accepted by nations on the verge of armed conflict. ACDA is developing ways to assist countries to verify their regional agreements, and continues to stress the importance of verification and compliance to proper treaty implementation.

We are determined to prevent the export of missile and nuclear weapons related material, technology, and equipment to India and Pakistan. We have been greatly aided by the actions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to restrict the export of 65 dual-use commodities to countries of proliferation concern, and to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of significant new nuclear supply. In addition, the missile and rocket programs of both countries have been slowed by export license denials by the MTCR partner countries. The U.S. continues to urge both India and Pakistan to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and to adopt responsible national export control policies and regulations to prevent the proliferation of WMD and missiles capable of delivering them.

Because of continued tension, a major factor influencing conventional arms transfer policy toward South Asia is the regional balance. In this regard, we are particularly concerned that arms sales to the region not:

- upset or magnify the current military balance;
- aggravate threat perceptions; or
- substantially enhance offensive warfighting capabilities.

Finally, we are encouraging India to adopt global export control standards, particularly as its technological capabilities expand.

F. MIDDLE EAST

The past year brought unprecedented efforts to attain a comprehensive and just peace in this violence-plagued region. Jordan joined Egypt in formally establishing peace with Israel, while other Arab nations began to establish governmental and commercial contacts. The Palestinians began exercising limited control over the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, while Syria and Lebanon entered genuine peace negotiations with Israel.

For the past 45 years, Middle Eastern conflicts inhibited the establishment of formal relations between Israel and other governments in the region. There have been few opportunities for arms control agreements, or even for arms control discussions, within this region.

As the negotiated settlements of the Middle East Peace Process are completed and implemented, governments will establish relations. In this more stable security environment, we expect opportunities for concrete and visible arms control to emerge. We will continue to sponsor and participate in bilateral as well as regional meetings to encourage this process.

ACDA's Role. ACDA seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East. We continue to promote a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone, including application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. We are also pressing for regional compliance with and acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have also urged several states in the region to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines.

ACDA's more specific activities are described in the following subsections.

1. ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP

As part of the multilateral track of the Middle East peace process, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group was formed in 1991 under the direction of the Department of State. The ACRS is one of five multilateral groups in the peace process, which compliment the bilateral talks between Israel and its immediate neighbors. It is the only such group devoted solely to security issues. Thirteen Arab states, Israel, and a Palestinian delegation, together with more than 20 extra-regional entities, participate in semi-annual plenary meetings. Smaller intercessional meetings involving the regional parties, the U.S. and Russian cosponsors and a few non-regional parties focus experts' attention on both conceptual and operational arms control measures that can be applied in the Middle East.

The fifth ACRS plenary, in November 1994, was the first such meeting to be held in the region. An intercessional meeting was held in Jordan, and the sixth plenary was in Tunisia in December 1994.

During 1994, the ACRS work group

- agreed to establish a regional communications network;
- agreed on several maritime and military information exchange texts;
- conducted a nuclear verification-related workshop including examination of a German

- nuclear power plant;
- conducted a workshop on the Chemical Weapons Convention implementation, including a tour of a Swiss chemical weapon verification laboratory;
- agreed to create a conflict prevention and regional security center;
- demonstrated an Incident-at-Sea arrangement and conducted a senior naval officers' symposium.

ACDA's Role. ACDA has been a key participant in the ACRS process since its inception. It is a lead agency on establishing the communications network, based on its experience with setting up the original CSCE network and as the architect of the new OSCE communications network. ACDA has presented numerous papers and briefings on arms control both to the ACRS working group and governmental and non-governmental entities in the region. ACDA serves as the main provider of source material both to participants new to arms control and to those wishing to understand the intricate details of specific agreements.

ACDA's unique contributions to the peace process – historical interaction with regional and extra-regional participants on arms control; negotiating experience on agreements of relevance to the region; and the ability to integrate ACRS work with other ongoing negotiations will enable it to provide substantial and sustained efforts in support of regional security in the Middle East.

2. UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION FOR IRAQ (UNSCOM)

Following Iraq's defeat in early 1991 in the Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council adopted three resolutions (SC Res. 687, 707, and 715) to eliminate future threats from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Among other things, these resolutions:

- condemned Iraq's violation of its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations;
- requested and empowered the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA to destroy or remove from Iraq virtually all materials, equipment, and facilities related to nuclear weapons, chemical or biological weapons, and specified missiles; and
- directed monitoring and verification to ensure that these weapons and missile programs are not resumed.

Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Objectives. UNSCOM and IAEA objectives in Iraq are enforcement of Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, and are non-negotiable. Elimination of all weapons of mass destruction is required of this nation whose leader has committed large-scale international aggression.

Status of Activities. As of the end of 1994, UNSCOM and the IAEA had conducted over one hundred inspections to first document, then destroy or render harmless, key nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile related buildings, equipment, and material.

Even after elimination is completed, continued monitoring and verification is essential. After prolonged delay, on November 26, 1993 Iraq accepted U.N. Resolution 715, which provides for long-term monitoring.

On October 7, 1994, the UNSCOM Chairman reported in his six-month status report to the Security Council that the "Ongoing Monitoring and Verification" (OMV) regime was "provisionally operational." Monitoring of missiles and of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons has begun. Nevertheless, Substantial information on Iraqi past biological weapons programs and further inspections are needed before OMV can be fully operational. The "Baghdad Center" has been established to house OMV operations and monitors who will maintain a continuous presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future.

Prospects for the Forthcoming Year. Despite Iraq's recent statements on recognition of Kuwait, the U.S. still considers Iraq to be non-compliant with UN resolutions regarding full and final disclosure of its WMD programs, return of Kuwaiti property, Kuwaiti prisoners and missing, and human rights in Iraq. With October's Republican Guard movements fresh in memory, the U.S. view is that Iraq has yet to display the "peaceful intentions" required by the Gulf War Ceasefire Resolution, UNSC Res. 687. Other Security Council members have suggested that Iraqi cooperation over the last year should be taken into account and that sanctions be lifted within six months of OMV's nominal inception. However, Iraq has not provided detailed, accurate information on past programs, especially in chemical and biological fields. Due to these constraints, OMV may not be fully operational for some time.

Pursuant to SC Res. 715, an export/import monitoring mechanism is being developed which covers any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of SC Res. 687. It sets out procedures for notifications to the Commission and IAEA of exports of dual-purpose items to Iraq. Such notifications would be made both by the exporting country and by Iraq, once sanctions have been lifted.

ACDA's Role: Over the past three years, an ACDA official has served as the UNSCOM Deputy Executive Chairman in New York. For most of 1994, ACDA provided a biological weapons expert to the UNSCOM staff in New York who developed inspection protocols and participated in BW inspections in Iraq. ACDA will provide policy and analytical studies and evaluations in support of OMV.

3. IRAN

We are very concerned about Iran's nuclear program, and continue to monitor the nuclear activities in that country very closely. In 1993, the Director of Central Intelligence testified publicly that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons despite being a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He estimated that Iran will take 8 to 10 years to produce its own nuclear weapons, less if it receives critical foreign assistance; we continue to review and update this assessment. Through multilateral and bilateral contacts ACDA, working with other U.S. agencies, will continue to urge all supplier countries not to engage in any nuclear cooperation with Iran until that country provides persuasive evidence that it will abide by its NPT obligations.

G. LATIN AMERICA

We continue to work closely with the Department of State, promoting arms control in Latin America. In 1994, ACDA made significant progress toward WMD nonproliferation and development of CSBMs in Latin America.

Organization of American States

ACDA has provided arms control and nonproliferation expertise and guidance to the Organization of American States Special Committee on Hemispheric Security since its inception in 1991. An ACDA staff member is accredited to the regional organization, takes active part in committee deliberations, and contributes to the work of that body. United States Organization of American States (USOAS) Mission has relied on ACDA for support to the committee's work. This year at U.S.OAS request, ACDA again provided a staff member to advise and coordinate all arms control and nonproliferation matters for the U.S. delegation to the OAS. This effort led to a productive year of promotion of U.S. nonproliferation and arms control objectives.

In 1994, the Special Committee experienced its most active and productive year. It considered three particular topics:

- security of small states;
- nonproliferation and export controls; and
- promotion of openness in the transfer of conventional weapons.

The U.S. served as the rapporteur on the issue of nonproliferation and export controls. ACDA drafted the key nonproliferation report for the U.S. Government submission to the OAS. The report contained a comprehensive resolution on nonproliferation which was adopted by the General Assembly later in the year. We are pleased at this resolution's emphasis on the security threats arising from potential WMD proliferation, and on the need for nonproliferation.

On March 15-18, 1994, the OAS held the governmental experts' meeting on CSBMs in Buenos Aires, Argentina. ACDA led the U.S. delegation.

A working group developed an illustrative list of CSBMs for the region, and a second group prepared a final report with recommendations to the OAS Permanent Council. Those recommendations were incorporated in the resolution which passed by consensus at the OASGA in June.

The OAS conference on CSBMs was a historic milestone for the region, the OAS and its member states. The conference established several precedents for the region including the first formal arms control meeting in Latin America by countries representing all regions of the hemisphere, and the establishment of an illustrative list of CSBMs.

In 1992, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Chile proposed to hold a regional conference on mutual confidence-building and security-building measures in Latin America. The conference will be held in 1995.

The OAS General Assembly in Belem, Brazil, adopted an unprecedented six resolutions on arms control and security topics. The U.S. adhered the comprehensive resolution on non-proliferation and was the major influence on a resolution that commits the OAS to carry forward its involvement in confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) for another year. Canada successfully pressed for a resolution on land mines. A U.S.-Canadian initiative to exchange data on military expenditures and conventional arms transfers

became the first CSBM adopted by the OAS. A Mexican resolution endorsed recent progress in regional nuclear non-proliferation.

Under a U.S. Government plan initiated by ACDA, bilateral arms control consultations with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico will occur in 1995.

H. AFRICA

ACDA has long advocated and supported efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons free zone in Africa; we are now also seeking to foster conventional arms control in Sub-Saharan Africa.

As first steps, in 1994 ACDA presented its views on arms transfers and the benefits of arms control to the African Studies Association meeting in Toronto, and exchanged views with delegates to the Organization of Africa Unity Conference on "Post-Conflict Demobilization in Africa" in Kampala, Uganda.

In 1995, ACDA will participate in the interagency integrated long-term plan to provide support for the enhancement of conflict resolution capabilities and demobilization activities in sub-Saharan Africa. This report was mandated by the 1994 African Conflict Resolution Act. ACDA is also seeking to support a regional effort to set forth guidelines for the creation of a "Africanized" Helsinki process.

VI. NEGOTIATING AND IMPLEMENTING ARMS CONTROL

A. CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The CD is the single, multilateral arms control negotiating forum.

Recent Accomplishments: Its most notable recent accomplishment was the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was signed by the United States in January 1993 and submitted to the Senate for advice and consent with regard to ratification on November 23, 1993.

Negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) began in the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) of the CD on January 25, 1994. Other AHCs of the CD considered negative security assurances, transparency in armaments, and outer space.

Unfortunately, agreement was not be reached in 1994 on establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for negotiation of a treaty on the cut-off of fissile material production for nuclear weapons but, together with other cut-off supporters, we will continue to press this issue.

Membership: The CD's original active membership of 40 states was reduced to 37 following the unification of Germany and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Members are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Zaire. Yugoslavia has a seat but it is not occupied. The Conference permits non-member states to participate as observers. In 1994, participation by non-members continued at a record high number of 50 because of general increasing interest in arms control since the end of the Cold War, and because of particular interest in the nuclear test ban negotiations.

Operating Procedures: The CD meets for three sessions annually; each session is seven to ten weeks long. With the assistance and support of the UN Secretariat, representatives of Member States work in Ad Hoc Committees with a variety of mandates and procedures, and report material to the Plenary for approval by consensus.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA provides the primary leadership, delegations, staff and support for the U.S. CD Delegation. ACDA also chairs the Washington backstopping efforts for the work of the CD, and prepares all guidance to the delegation. Ambassador Steven Ledogar leads the U.S. Delegation.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The CD is the successor to the previous multilateral negotiating bodies, reconfigured in 1979 to include all of the nuclear weapon states.

Location: Currently, the CD meets three times a year from January-April, May-July, and August-September, for a total of twenty-four weeks, in Geneva.

B. CONFERENCE ON THE TREATY on the NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Jurisdiction and Purpose: As this Report goes to print, the 1995 NPT Conference has decided that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) shall continue in force indefinitely. The Conference has also reviewed the operation of the NPT to assure that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The NPT itself is a multilateral treaty which proscribes the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear weapon states. The Treaty also commits all Parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Membership: 175 of the 178 parties to the NPT attended the Conference. Nine non-parties and 195 non-governmental organizations attended as observers. The parties to the Treaty are Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Western Samoa, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Operating Procedures: The Conference's operating procedures are contained in its rules of procedures which are adopted by the Conference. While these procedures provide for votes if consensus cannot be achieved, the key decision on indefinite and unconditional extension was taken by consensus.

ACDA's Role:

Under the leadership of the Vice President of the United States, ACDA was the primary agency in preparations for and conduct of the Conference. ACDA personnel participated in bilateral discussions and group meetings regarding the Conference. ACDA headed the U.S. delegations to Preparatory Committee meetings for the conference and played the primary role in the Conference itself.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970. Article X (2) of the NPT provides that twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference will be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. In addition, Article VIII (3) provides that at intervals of five years, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of conferences with the objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. A majority of NPT parties made such a proposal through a United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1992.

Location: Four Preparatory Committee meetings were held in New York and Geneva. The 1995 NPT Conference was held in New York.

C. (START I) JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION (JCIC)

Justification and Purpose: The Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) is the implementation body established by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) of 1991. The purpose of the JCIC is to promote the objectives and implementation of the START Treaty's provisions, and specifically to: (a) resolve compliance questions; (b) agree on additional provisions needed to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty; (c) clarify ambiguities discovered in Treaty provisions during implementation; and (d) determine how to deal with any new kind of strategic offensive arm (SOA) declared by a Party.

Membership: After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine became Parties to the START I Treaty as successor states to the obligations of the Soviet Union. All Parties to the START I Treaty are represented in the JCIC.

Operational Procedures: The JCIC operating procedures were developed following the break-up of the Soviet Union by the U.S. and the four successor states. These procedures permit equal participation by the four successor states to the Soviet Union that are Parties to the Treaty.

Each Party is entitled to participate in concluding any JCIC agreement. A Party may provide its consent to be bound by signing the agreement, although certain agreements may be concluded without all Parties actually signing them. If at least two Parties, including the United States, sign an agreement, the agreement will be sent to the non-signing Parties for their review. Each non-signing Party will provide its response in one of three ways: (1) a diplomatic note of acceptance within 30 days; (2) its objection to the agreement within 30 days, in which case it must attend the next session of the JCIC to resolve its concerns; or (3)

inaction or silence, i.e., it shall be considered to have expressed its consent to be bound if it provides neither a diplomatic note nor an objection within 30 days. The only exception to this third rule is if one of the signing Parties declares an agreement to be one in which the "consent by silence" rule shall not apply. The intent is to ensure clear and positive assent by a Party when the agreement in question has practical consequences or imposes serious obligations on that Party.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA leads the United States Delegation to the JCIC, and provides the United States Representative, the executive secretary, the legal adviser, policy and technical experts, and administrative support. Ambassador Steven Steiner is the U.S. Representative.

ACDA also chairs the U.S. Government's interagency JCIC Backstopping Committee, which develops U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the START I Treaty.

Year and Circumstance of its Founding: The JCIC was created by START I, and held its first meeting in the fall of 1991. The Commission has held a total of eight sessions since the Treaty was signed, most recently in October-November 1994.

Location: The JCIC normally meets in Geneva.

D. (START II) BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION (BIC)

Justification and Purpose: The Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) is the implementation body for the bilateral U.S.-Russia START II Treaty. Specifically, the BIC resolves questions relating to compliance with Treaty obligations, as well as agrees on additional provisions needed to improve the "viability and effectiveness" of the Treaty. Because the START II Treaty depends, with a few exceptions, on the START I Treaty for definitions, counting rules, and verification and implementation provisions, the work being done in the JCIC on the implementation of the START I Treaty will be directly relevant to the implementation of the START II Treaty.

Membership: Both Parties of the Treaty – the United States of America and the Russian Federation – are members of the Commission.

Operational Procedures: The Commission has not yet convened, and its operating procedures have not been formulated or agreed upon.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA will lead the United States Delegation to the Bilateral Implementation Commission, and provide the United States Representative, the executive secretary, the legal adviser, policy and technical experts, and administrative support.

ACDA will chair the U.S. Government's interagency Bilateral Implementation Commission Backstopping Committee, which develops U.S. policy guidance related to the

activities of the Commission and the implementation of the START II Treaty.

Year and Circumstance of its Founding: Paragraph 2 of Article V of the START II Treaty establishes the Bilateral Implementation Commission, but the Commission will not convene until after the Treaty enters into force.

Location: When it convenes, the BIC will probably meet in Geneva.

E. NPT EXPORTERS COMMITTEE (also known as ZANGGER COMMITTEE)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Nuclear Exporters' Committee is to coordinate implementation of the NPT's Article III.2 among parties to the Treaty that are nuclear suppliers. Article III.2 requires each NPT party to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to their exports to non-nuclear weapon states of source or special fissionable nuclear material and "especially designed or prepared" equipment and material.

Membership: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and U.S.

Operating Procedures: The group is informal; its decisions are taken by consensus and not legally binding upon its members. The Committee continues to meet to refine the list of controlled items and to review implementation of Article III.2 in the light of nuclear commerce and procurement practices. Consensus is implemented through coordinated unilateral decisions of governments in their export legislation. The original chairman, Dr. Claude Zangger of Switzerland, retired in 1989, but the Committee has continued to call itself the Zangger Committee in honor of his long and valuable service. Austrian diplomat Fritz Schmidt is now chairman.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA participates in all Nuclear Exporters' Committee activities, attending meetings and developing U.S. policies, particularly on the relationship between the Committee and the NPT.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: Between 1971 and 1974 a group of 15 states -- some already party to the NPT, others prospective parties -- held a series of informal meetings in Vienna chaired by Professor Zangger. As suppliers or potential suppliers of nuclear material and equipment, they sought to reach a common understanding on what constituted "especially designed or prepared" equipment or non-nuclear material and on the conditions and procedures that would govern exports of such equipment or material to meet the obligations of Article III.2 on the basis of fair commercial competition.

Location: The Committee meets in Vienna, Austria, normally twice a year. It has also met on the margins of NPT meetings.

F. THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The NSG was created to coordinate nuclear export controls in a multilateral forum not directly tied to the NPT. While the Nuclear Exporters' Committee Understandings primarily ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to certain exports to non-nuclear weapon states, the NSG Guidelines go further.

For example, the NSG Guidelines require that a recipient non-nuclear-weapon state accept safeguards on all its nuclear activities, not just the exported item, as a condition for the supply of nuclear material, equipment, and technology. The Guidelines also emphasize the importance of exercising restraint in the export of sensitive commodities and technology, such as enrichment and reprocessing, and call for consultation in cases where such exports might increase the risk of conflict or instability.

Membership: The 33 members of the NSG are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, FRG, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and U.S.

South Africa has adhered to the NSG Guidelines but is not yet a member.

Operating Procedures: After not having met in the 1980s, the NSG resumed regular meetings in 1991. In addition to annual plenaries, the NSG now holds two consultations annually on its arrangement to control nuclear-related dual-use commodities and technology, as well as regular meetings of working groups on conditions of supply, information sharing, and technical issues. The current chair country is Spain; the next annual plenary will be held in Helsinki, Finland, in April 1995, after which Finland will chair the NSG for the following year. Like the Nuclear Exporters' Committee, the NSG takes decisions by consensus.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA plays an extensive role in all NSG activities, attending plenary and other meetings, representing the U.S. in some working group meetings, and developing U.S. positions, particularly on policy issues. ACDA is also involved in all U.S. nuclear export cases, including those on dual-use commodities.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: Impelled by the 1974 nuclear explosion by India, the U.S. proposed the formation of a Nuclear Suppliers Group and initially approached six other major supplier states. The primary purpose was to expand beyond the controls of the Nuclear Exporters' Committee and to involve the key non-NPT supplier, France. The NSG Guidelines were first agreed in 1976. The group grew to 15 countries by early 1978, when the Guidelines were first published. They have now been adopted by 31 countries.

Location: The NSG has no permanent location, although many meetings are held in Vienna. The annual plenary is held in the country chairing the NSG for the following year.

G. NUNN-LUGAR LEGISLATION AND COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION INCLUDING SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT OF FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Nunn-Lugar program is to help achieve the complete denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, accelerated reduction of Russia's nuclear weapons and elimination of Russian chemical weapons, and to contribute to nonproliferation.

In late 1991, Congress authorized the Department of Defense to establish a program, generally known as Nunn-Lugar, to assist what would soon be the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in the safety, security and dismantlement (SSD) of the nuclear (both strategic and substrategic), chemical and other weapons (to include strategic nuclear delivery vehicles). Through 1995, \$1.27 billion is available for the Nunn-Lugar program.

Membership: The FSU states eligible for Nunn-Lugar assistance are those receiving Presidential certification that a recipient state meets Congressionally-mandated criteria for commitment to its arms control and related obligations. These countries must be recertified by the President annually to retain eligibility for assistance.

Operating Procedures: The Nunn-Lugar program is not a formal treaty or regime. Rather, it is comprised of bilateral executive agreements between the governments of the participants and implementing agreements between concerned agencies. Specifically, "umbrella" agreements which provide the legal basis for all subsequent implementing agreements were negotiated between the United States Government and the governments of all four recipient states between June 1992 and December 1993. For each country, the conclusion and entry into force of an "umbrella" agreement was a necessary prerequisite before implementing agreements defining particular projects could be negotiated. To date, 36 implementing agreements have been negotiated and are in force.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA provides a representative to the U.S. SSD Delegation and SSD Working Group, providing arms control policy input in the coordination of Nunn-Lugar activities..

ACDA seeks to advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives, especially in ensuring that expertise or materials for weapons of mass destruction — as well as the weapons themselves — do not fall into the wrong hands, both within and beyond the borders of these countries.

ACDA contributed to the Umbrella agreements and key implementing agreements on weapons dismantlement, fissile material storage and nonproliferation.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The Nunn-Lugar program was initiated by Senators Nunn and Lugar in November 1991. Concerns over the "danger to nuclear safety and stability" in the Soviet Union arose in wake of the August 1991 coup attempt, and grew as the Soviet Union disintegrated during the autumn of that year. These concerns were especially acute over the disposition of substrategic nuclear weapons (see Section I.C.2.). *

The Senate also noted that then-President Gorbachev had requested western assistance in dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and former President Bush had proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate on the storage, transportation, dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons. These concerns and proposals led to the passage of the initial legislation.

Location: Meetings are generally held in the capitals of the five countries involved. The United States also discusses SSD issues with our NATO and G-7 allies on a periodic basis, usually in Brussels. We also occasionally have bilateral meetings with the same allies in Washington or their capitals. Delegation meetings and technical discussions also take place in field sites in both the United States and FSU; e.g., Albuquerque for nuclear safety matters, various nuclear institutes in Russia for storage of fissile materials and nonproliferation issues, or missile dismantlement facilities in Ukraine, to name a few.

H. (INF Treaty) SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION (SVC)

Justification and Purpose: The SVC is the implementing body for the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), which entered into force on June 1, 1988. Although elimination of declared missiles under the INF Treaty has now been completed, we must be able to satisfy ourselves that more are not being produced. The Special Verification Commission (SVC) was established by the INF Treaty to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. When the SVC is not in session, business related to the Treaty is conducted through diplomatic channels.

Membership: Initially, the United States and the Soviet Union were the only SVC participants. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the twelve former Soviet republics have become successor states to the INF Treaty. Six of those states – Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – have inspectable facilities covered by the INF Treaty on their territories. Of these six, four are active participants in the work of the Commission: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Each of the remaining two has only one inspectable facility on its territory; with the consent of all Parties, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not attend meetings of the Commission or participate in inspections.

Operational Procedures: The initial SVC procedures were developed by the two original INF Treaty parties – the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – in a Memorandum of Understanding signed on December 20, 1988. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the successor state Parties participating in the Special Verification Commission have been discussing new operating procedures to reflect the multilateral character of the forum. Pending agreement on new procedures, the position of the United States is that the originally agreed procedures remain in force.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA leads the United States Delegation to the Special Verification Commission, and provides the United States Representative, the secretariat, the legal adviser, certain policy and technical experts, and administrative support. Ambassador Steven Steiner is the U.S. Representative.

ACDA chairs the U.S. Government's interagency Special Verification Commission Support Group, which develops U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the INF Treaty.

Year and Circumstance of its Founding: The SVC was established by Article XIII of the INF Treaty and first convened on June 6, 1988. It has met a total of 15 times, most recently in January-February 1994.

Location: The SVC normally meets in Geneva.

I. AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (OPANAL)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (known by its Spanish acronym OPANAL), was created by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. OPANAL's mission is to ensure compliance of the Contracting Parties with the Treaty's provisions. The Treaty obligates all Contracting Parties to use nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes, and

"to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:

"...the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and...the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way. "

All Contracting Parties also undertake to apply IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear activities.

Membership: 29 Latin American and Caribbean States are Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and are therefore Member States of the Agency. In 1994, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Belize brought the Treaty into legal force for their territories, and became OPANAL members.

Operating Procedures: OPANAL consists of a small Secretariat, a Secretary-General, and a five-member Council to direct Agency activities between general conferences of all the Contracting Parties. Every two years, OPANAL convenes a General Conference, during which resolutions pertaining to Agency operations, Treaty matters, or even general regional *

issues are put forth, debated, and voted upon. OPANAL occasionally calls special general conferences to consider amendments to the Treaty or to deal with special topics, such as administrative and budgetary issues pertaining to the operation of the Agency.

While not a member of OPANAL and therefore bearing no financial responsibility for its activities, the United States can participate in OPANAL General Conferences as a non-voting State Party by virtue of its signature and ratification of the two Protocols to the Treaty, and can officially speak to General Conference resolutions and proceedings. The United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and the Netherlands have similar rights as members of either or both Protocols. Of the four Latin American states which have not brought Tlatelolco into force, St. Kitts/Nevis and St. Lucia (who have signed but not ratified the Treaty) can also attend as non-voting State Parties; Cuba and Guyana, which have yet to take any formal action, can attend as observers.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA has primary U.S. responsibility for all matters relating to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and heads all official delegations to OPANAL general and special conferences.

The United States supports the universal regional adherence to and implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a significant contribution to regional peace and security. ACDA is the lead agency in implementing that policy, and works with OPANAL to further that objective.

Year and Circumstance of Founding: OPANAL was created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Treaty was opened for signature in 1967, and entered into force on April 22, 1968 upon the eleventh ratification of the Treaty pursuant to Article 28(2) of the Treaty. The Treaty depositary state, Mexico, convened a conference of the initial Contracting Parties in June 1969 to create the Agency; the first General Conference was held in September 1969.

Location: Mexico City.

J. PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (PrepCom)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) is to carry out necessary preparations for effective implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC). The PrepCom develops detailed verification procedures for the CWC and lays the foundations for a new international treaty-implementing agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague.

Membership: All signatories to the CWC (159 countries as of the end of 1994).

Operating Procedures: With the support of technical experts employed by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (the predecessor of the OPCW Technical Secretariat), representatives of Member States develop consensus recommendations that are then formally approved at quarterly Plenary sessions.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA provides personnel and funding support for the permanent U.S. delegation to the PrepCom;

ACDA has been designated the lead agency within the U.S. Government for developing policy related to issues discussed during PrepCom meetings; and

ACDA funds the annual U.S. assessment for support of the PrepCom.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The PrepCom was established in February 1993 by the 130 original signatories of the CWC. The Commission will remain in existence until the CWC enters into force, at which time it will be superseded by the Conference of States Parties and the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

Location: The PrepCom conducts daily meetings at the Netherlands Conference Center in The Hague, The Netherlands.

**K. (Chemical Weapons) BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT
NEGOTIATING FORUM**

Jurisdiction and Purpose: To negotiate implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) between the United States and the Russian Federation. Under this agreement, both countries commit to destroy all but 5,000 agent-tons of their existing chemical weapons and to produce no more of them, regardless of what other nations may or may not do.

Membership: the United States and the Russian Federation.

Operating Procedures: The BDA provides for destruction of CW stockpiles according to an agreed timetable.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA led the interagency U.S. delegation that negotiated draft protocols to the BDA, which were agreed ad referendum in March 1993. Since then, however, the U.S. has made repeated unsuccessful attempts to secure formal Russian adoption of the BDA.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The BDA was signed on June 1, 1990, between the United States and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation).

Location: Negotiating sessions take place on an ad hoc basis in Washington and Moscow.

**L. (Chemical Weapons) WYOMING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
NEGOTIATING FORUM (MOU)**

Jurisdiction and Purpose: To negotiate implementation of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russian Federation). The purpose of the MOU is to build confidence in the two countries' mutual willingness to declare information necessary for compliance with the CWC. Phase I of the agreement, calling for an exchange of general data on CW stocks and production facilities and a series of reciprocal visits to CW facilities, was completed in February 1991. Phase II, calling for an exchange of more detailed data and routine and challenge inspections at both declared and undeclared facilities, was completed in December 1994.

Membership: The United States and the Russian Federation.

Operating Procedures: Implementing documents, which were signed during the January 1994 Moscow Summit, provided for completion of the Phase II data exchange by 120 days after signature, a trial challenge inspection by each side between 180 and 225 days after signature, and two routine inspections plus two challenge inspections by each side to be completed by 300 days after signature. Phase II was concluded on December 10, 1994, with both sides having exchanged and consulted on the data and conducted the requisite inspections.

ACDA's Role

In late 1993, ACDA led an interagency negotiating team to Moscow to complete work on the Phase II implementing documents. ACDA also participated in the MOU implementation process.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The Wyoming MOU was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) at a ministerial meeting in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.

Location: Negotiating sessions in 1994 took place on an ad hoc basis in Washington and Moscow.

M. AUSTRALIA GROUP (AG)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The "Australia Group" is an informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede CW and BW proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on CW precursor chemicals, BW pathogens, and CBW dual-use production equipment, sharing information on CW proliferation developments, and seeking other ways to curb the use of CBW.

Membership: The 28 members of the AG are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Requests by other states to join the group are considered on a case-by-case basis.

Operating Procedures: The Group has no charter or constitution. It operates by consensus. The Group has established common export controls for chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation. For CW, members of the AG control 54 chemical precursors as well as specified CW-related production equipment. For BW, members have established export controls on certain microorganisms, toxins and equipment that could be used in a BW program.

In tandem with export controls, the AG has periodically used warning mechanisms to sensitize the public to CBW proliferation. The Group has issued an informal "warning list" of dual-use CW precursors, bulk chemicals, and CW-related equipment. Members develop and share the warning lists with their chemical industry and ask it to report on any suspicious transactions. The AG has also used warned industry, the scientific community, and other relevant groups of the risks of inadvertently aiding BW proliferation.

ACDA's Role

ACDA personnel participate in U.S. delegations to bilateral discussions, to the annual AG Plenary meetings and to periodic meetings of technical experts, as well as in the internal policy process of the U.S. government.

ACDA personnel also participate in the U.S.G's internal chemical and biological nonproliferation efforts. ACDA is a charter member of the U.S. government's interagency chemical and biological weapons interdiction group (SHIELD), which is responsible for U.S. interdiction efforts and CBW sanctions review. ACDA members also participate in review of chemical and biological technology export licensing through SHIELD.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The Group was formed in 1984 as a result of CW use in the Iran-Iraq War. Members meet annually in Paris, where the 1925 Geneva Protocol is deposited. The Group's actions are complementary to provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.

Location: The Australia Group holds annual plenary sessions in Paris, France.

N. (ABM Treaty) STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) was established under the terms of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty. The ABM Treaty provides that the SCC should consider questions of compliance with the Treaty, possible changes in the strategic situation which would have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty, and proposals for amendments to the Treaty.

Membership: Initially, the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two ABM Treaty parties, were the only SCC participants. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question arose as to which state or states would assume the former Soviet Union's ABM Treaty obligations. The United States has made clear that it is willing to accept as Treaty Parties any of the New Independent States (NIS) that want to be Party to the Treaty. During the last session of the SCC in 1994, which concluded in November, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States participated, with Latvia attending as an observer.

Operational Procedures: SCC procedures were developed by the two original ABM Treaty parties and can be modified by consensus by the SCC participants who succeed to the Treaty. These procedures are being "multilateralized." In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding Establishing the SCC, the Commission meets no less than twice a year.

ACDA's Role

ACDA leads the United States Component of the SCC, providing the U.S. Commissioner, the secretariat, the legal adviser, policy and technical experts, and administrative support. Dr. Stanley Riveles is the U.S. SCC Commissioner.

ACDA chairs the U.S. Government interagency SCC Backstopping Committee, which has overall responsibility for developing U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and implementation of the ABM Treaty.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The SCC was established during the first negotiating session of SALT II (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) by a Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union dated December 21, 1972.

Location: The SCC meets in Geneva.

O. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the MTCR is to arrest missile proliferation worldwide through export controls on missiles and their related technologies.

Membership: The 25 members of the MTCR are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Operating Procedures: Members of the MTCR follow an agreed set of Guidelines for transfers of missile technology as listed in the Missile Equipment and Technology Annex. The MTCR operates by consensus on all issues. France serves as an informal Point of Contact for correspondence with the MTCR.

ACDA's Role

ACDA personnel participate in U.S. delegations to bilateral discussions, to the annual MTCR Plenary meetings and to periodic meetings of technical experts, as well as in the internal policy process of the U.S. government.

ACDA personnel also participate in the U.S.G's internal missile nonproliferation efforts. ACDA serves as the executive secretary to the interagency Missile Trade Analysis Group which is responsible for U.S. interdiction efforts and missile sanctions review. ACDA members also participate in review of missile technology export licensing through the Missile Technology Export Control Group, and provide inputs to the review process of the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex in the Missile Annex Review Committee.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: In April 1987, the United States and its six major trading partners (Canada, the former West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) created the Missile Technology Control Regime to restrict the proliferation of missiles and related technology.

Location: The MTCR holds annual plenary sessions in different partner countries on a rotating basis. Monthly "Point of Contact" meetings are held among Partner embassy representatives in Paris.

P. AMENDMENT CONFERENCE OF THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: CCW is a Law of War treaty, dealing with the use of certain conventional weapons. Its purpose is to prevent the use of conventional weapons that cause injury and suffering not required for military purposes. It is particularly focused on weapons that injure or kill innocent civilians or are excessively injurious. In its present form, it includes three protocols restricting the use of (1) weapons with undetectable fragments, (2) personnel landmines, and (3) incendiary weapons. The U.S. supports the landmine and undetectable fragments protocols, but not the provisions dealing with incendiaries. The Treaty permits ratification by approval of any two out of the three protocols. The primary purpose of the Amendment Conference is to strengthen the protocol dealing with landmines. Debates and proposed amendments have been largely confined to the landmine issue, although participants have also proposed restrictions on sea mines and small-caliber bullets which are unlikely to be accepted. A proposal on blinding laser weapons appears to have more substantial support.

Membership: 44 nations, including the United States, have ratified CCW.

Operating Procedures: The Amendment Conference will be held in September 1995. Four preparatory Experts' Meetings were held in 1994 and early 1995. The Experts' Meetings have operated by consensus. It is not yet clear whether the Amendment Conference will operate by consensus only, or whether provisions may be accepted by two-thirds majority vote if consensus cannot be achieved. Prospects for a significant agreement will be much better if decisions by two-thirds majority are permitted.

ACDA's Role

ACDA has supplied the Deputy and one other member of the CCW delegation, and originated and drafted the U.S. position on self-destructing and self-deactivating landmines.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The original convention entered into force in 1983. During the 1980s it became apparent that, while the CCW provides an essential foundation, it needs significant strengthening if it is to serve its humanitarian purpose.

Location: Geneva.

Q. MINE CONTROL PROGRAM

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The Mine Control PROGRAM will be a political agreement limiting production, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. Its purpose is to limit the total number of such mines and to reduce the ratio of long-lived mines to short-lived mines, consistent with military requirements.

Membership: This regime has not yet been formalized, either in content or membership. We are consulting with other governments to refine the terms of the regime, and to bring in as many other governments as possible. It is essential that membership have wide geographic representation, and include mine users as well as the major mine producers and exporters.

Operating Procedures: Wherever possible, the regime will build on the CCW; for example, it will use the CCW definitions, and will prohibit production, stockpiling, and export of any mines whose use is prohibited by CCW.

ACDA's Role

ACDA has played a critical part in formulation of the regime, particularly regarding definitions of short-lived mines and restrictions on long-lived mines.

Once the regime is under way, ACDA will explore the possibility of a legally binding mine control agreement.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The program has not yet been founded. It is still being formulated.

Location: The largest consultation to date has been held in Rome. Other bilateral consultations have been held in various national capitals and on the margins of the CCW Experts' meetings.

R. (CFE Treaty) JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP (JCG)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The overall mandate of the JCG is to promote the objectives of the CFE Treaty, implement its provisions, and resolve disagreements among the States Parties. Specific functions of the JCG include:

- addressing questions of compliance with or possible circumvention of the CFE Treaty;
- considering measures to enhance viability and effectiveness of the CFE Treaty;
- seeking to resolve any ambiguities and differences of interpretation that may arise in CFE Treaty implementation;
- seeking to resolve various technical questions that may arise; and
- considering matters of dispute arising out of implementation of the CFE Treaty.

Membership: All 30 CFE States Parties are entitled to representation on the JCG.

Operating Procedures: JCG has been in nearly continuous session since November 1990. Decisions of the JCG are made by consensus, which the CFE Treaty defines to mean the absence of any objection by any representative of a party to the CFE Treaty. The JCG may act on matters within its competency as set forth in the CFE Treaty; other matters require action by the Parties to the Treaty themselves, rather than the JCG.

Among the issues addressed by the JCG in 1994 were the question of limits on conventional armaments and equipment in the flank zones of Europe, the distribution of costs for JCG participants, and development of additional reduction and conversion procedures that supplement treaty provisions. Questions of how certain newly independent states are to pay for the reduction and conversion activities required of them under the Treaty were also discussed in 1994.

ACDA's Role

ACDA continues to participate in the interagency process and in deliberations of the U.S. Delegation.

Under the leadership of the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE, the senior ACDA representative on the Delegation serves as chief U.S. delegate to the CFE Joint Consultative Group.

Year of Creation: The JCG was established by the CFE Treaty in November 1990.

Location: The JCG meets in Vienna.

S. ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE), FORUM FOR SECURITY COOPERATION (FSC)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The FSC's mandate includes:

- negotiating arms control, disarmament, and confidence- and security-building measures;
- enhancing regular consultation and intensified cooperation among participating nations on security matters;
- reducing the risk of conflict;
- implementing Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs);
- annual implementation assessment meetings on CSBMs;
- providing a forum for discussion and clarification of information exchanged under agreed CSBMs; and
- preparation of seminars on military doctrine and other subjects.

Membership: All 53 member states of OSCE; Yugoslavia's participation is suspended.

Operating Procedures: The FSC structure consists of working groups, which report to the plenary on their activities; the plenary deliberates and adopts recommendations by consensus. In the arms control area in 1994, the FSC focused on the completion of a global military information exchange; development of and improvements to the Vienna Document '92; and development of a code of conduct on the politico-military aspects of security. Other areas receiving attention were defense planning, conventional arms transfers and nonproliferation, military cooperation and contacts, and regional security issues. The 1994 CSCE Budapest Summit called for FSC's work program to include the development of a framework for future arms control, with emphasis on addressing regional instability.

ACDA's Role

ACDA continues to participate in the work of the FSC both in the interagency process and as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the OSCE. This includes active participation in FSC deliberations concerning implementation issues, including working toward the formulation of a regional arms control agreement for south eastern Europe.

Year of Creation and Circumstances of Founding: The Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE) was established in 1973. The participating states of CSCE, meeting at the Helsinki Summit in 1992, created the FSC. The tasks of the FSC were expanded by CSCE Ministers in Rome in December, 1993, and again at the CSCE Budapest Summit in December 1994. At the end of 1994, its name was changed to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Location: The FSC meets in Vienna.

T. OPEN SKIES CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (OSCC)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The OSCC is the implementing body of the Treaty on Open Skies. Accordingly, the OSCC may:

- consider questions relating to compliance with the Treaty;
- seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of interpretation emerging during treaty implementation;
- consider and decide on applications for accession to the Treaty;
- agree on technical administrative procedures following accession;
- review distribution of active quotas annually; and
- propose amendments to the Treaty.

Membership: All 27 States Parties are entitled to participate in the OSCC.

Operating Procedures: The OSCC's structure consists of informal working groups which report to the plenary; the latter deliberates and decides by consensus. In 1994, the following working groups were operational: Rules and Procedures, Formats and Notifications, Flight Rules/Procedures, and Sensors (chaired by the U.S.). During the last two years, the OSCC has adopted some 20 decisions on technical issues that complement the Treaty and are an integral part of it.

ACDA's Role

ACDA's Senior Representative on the OSCE Delegation is Chief U.S. Delegate to the OSCC; he participates in all plenary sessions.

ACDA representatives participate in all working group meetings.

Year of Creation: The OSCC was established by the Treaty on Open Skies in March 1992.

Location: The OSCC meets in Vienna.

U. BILATERAL COMMITTEES ON DEFENSE CONVERSION WITH BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the bilateral committees is to further cooperative efforts to convert excess defense capacity to non-defense, commercial uses. The committees promote orderly shrinkage and reorientation to peaceful purposes of defense industrial, technological, and scientific facilities and personnel not needed for legitimate defense efforts to civil needs. The committees provide a senior channel of communications on issues related to the defense industry and experiences in defense conversion and diversification.

Membership: Bilateral (e.g., U.S.-Russia).

Operating Procedures: The committees meet periodically in the member's respective capitals or selected defense sites to pursue defense conversion projects, such as joint ventures in housing for Russian military officers and joint ventures between U.S. companies and selected NIS defense enterprises.

ACDA's Role:

The ACDA Director is a member of the bilateral committees, which are chaired by the Secretary of Defense and co-chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce.

ACDA is a member of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) tasked to support the committees' efforts.

ACDA has been tasked by the IWG to develop entrepreneurial workshops to retrain Kazakhstani nuclear weapons scientists in commercial endeavors.

ACDA's entrepreneurial workshops for Russian nuclear weapons scientists have been presented at the U.S.-Russia Committee as examples of successful defense conversion cooperation. The fourth such workshop is scheduled for Arzamas, Russia in May 1995.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The first committee was established with Russia under the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, and the others were established soon after.

Location: Capitals and defense sites of committee members.

V. U.S.-CHINA DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMISSION

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The purpose of the bilateral commission is to further cooperative efforts to convert excess defense capacity to non-defense, commercial uses. The commission promotes orderly shrinkage and reorientation to peaceful purposes of defense industrial, technological, and scientific facilities and personnel not needed for legitimate defense efforts to civil needs. The commission provides a senior channel of communications on issues related to the defense industry and experiences in defense conversion and diversification.

Membership: United States and China.

Operating Procedures: The commission meets periodically in Beijing and Washington or selected defense sites to pursue defense conversion discussions and projects.

ACDA's Role:

The ACDA Director is a member of the bilateral commission, which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense and co-chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce.

ACDA is a member of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) tasked to support the committee's efforts.

ACDA Assistant Director Michael Nacht represented the ACDA Director on Secretary Perry's delegation to the 1994 meeting in Beijing that established the Commission and began its work with Chinese officials in Beijing this fall after the U.S.-China Commission meetings.

ACDA originated a U.S. proposal at that meeting for a defense conversion project based on environmentally clean energy from coal.

In January 1994, ACDA co-led, with DoD, a site survey trip to different conversion sites in China as preparation for the first Commission meeting.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The commission was established in 1994 to promote defense conversion in China through economic and technical exchanges.

Location: Washington, Beijing, and defense sites.

W. UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (UNDC)

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly which deliberates and makes recommendations on arms control and security issues.

Recent Accomplishments: Three items were on the agenda in 1994: the process of nuclear disarmament, the role of science and technology in international security and disarmament, and international arms transfers. Deliberations were concluded on science and technology, but no consensus was reached on the final report. Deliberations on the other two issues will continue in 1995.

Membership: The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly, and as such, its membership includes all UN members.

Operating Procedures: Work in the UNDC is conducted by representatives of Member States in working groups with a number of different mandates. By tradition, the UNDC operates by consensus.

ACDA's Role

ACDA provides the primary leadership for the United States Delegation to the UNDC, and chairs the Washington backstopping for preparation and guidance to the delegation.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The current UNDC was revitalized and reformulated by the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, and is the successor to the earlier Disarmament Commission created in 1952 by merging the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

Location: The UNDC meets annually in New York in the spring, normally for a three-week period.

X. FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Jurisdiction and Purpose: The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly deals with arms control and security issues.

Recent Accomplishments: In the 1994 session, the First Committee adopted by consensus a United States-sponsored resolution with 73 other cosponsors calling for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines. The Committee also considered 48 other arms control and security resolutions on issues ranging from nuclear testing and non-proliferation to illicit arms transfers, transparency in armaments, and confidence building measures.

ACDA Director John Holum delivered the U.S. opening statement to the First Committee on October 18, 1994. His talk stressed the importance of the indefinite unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the Extension Conference scheduled for April, 1995.

Membership: The UNFC is a UN body, and as such its membership includes all UN members.

Operating Procedures: The UNFC considers resolutions submitted by members, and operates by majority voting.

ACDA's Role:

ACDA provides the primary leadership and some staff for the United States Delegation to the First Committee, and chairs the Washington backstopping efforts for preparation of guidance and instructions to the delegation.

Year and Circumstances of Founding: The UNFC is one of the seven Main UN Committees established under the UN Charter in 1945.

Location: The UNFC meets annually in the fall at UN Headquarters in New York.

VII. ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

This Report is being submitted in response to the Congressional requirement in Section 51 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, which requires as part of the ACDA Annual Report, a discussion on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements. Section 51, paragraph (1)(C) mandates an additional section not previously required, which is included in this Report. That section calls for "recommendations as to any steps that should be considered to redress any damage to United States national security and to reduce compliance problems." The U.S. planned next steps are identified under the discussion of each of the compliance questions raised. This unclassified Report, as well as the classified annex, addresses compliance by nations that are parties or signatories to arms control agreements with the United States as well as U.S. compliance.

New items of particular interest in this year's Report include START I entry into force and the Agreed Framework with North Korea intended to resolve concerns about North Korean compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Arms control developments and areas of concern are summarized in the Report and are provided in greater detail in its annexes. The following Introductory Section sets forth the broader arms control context against which the Report should be viewed.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. efforts in the arms control arena have in particular focused on: (1) encouraging Russia to reduce, as we are doing, both nuclear and conventional armaments; (2) encouraging Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to accelerate the removal of nuclear weapons from their territory; (3) multilateralizing what were bilateral U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements – principally the INF, ABM, and START I Treaties; and, (4) bringing the Newly Independent States (NIS) into already multinational and international agreements like the CFE Treaty, the NPT, CWC, and BWC. The year 1994 saw considerable progress on these efforts and was marked by such milestones as the January 14 signing of the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Ukraine and Russia, the September U.S.-Russian Summit, the November U.S.-Ukrainian Summit, and the December entry into force (EIF) of START I and Ukrainian accession to the NPT at the Budapest Summit.

Several factors indicate a Russian commitment to reduce nuclear and conventional forces. These include ratification and implementation of START I; the signing of the START II Treaty; large scale overall defense budget cuts; progress in dismantling tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; detargeting of its strategic ballistic missiles; and support for early deactivation of weapons to be reduced under START II. Weapons production in Russia over the last five years has fallen by at least 50 percent for virtually every major weapons system. Russia and the other NIS have participated in implementation of the CFE Treaty, including the commitment of large resources to fulfill the Treaty's extensive equipment reduction and verification requirements.

The terms of the START I Treaty alone mandate reduction of deployed strategic ballistic missile warheads of the former Soviet Union by 48 percent below 1990 levels, plus a 50 percent reduction in heavy ICBMs and a 42 percent reduction in the number of

accountable strategic warheads. Moreover, START I EIF has opened the way for ratification of START II, under which Russia has agreed to eliminate the most destabilizing strategic weapons (the SS-18 heavy ICBMs and all other MIRVed ICBMs). Implementation of START II will reduce the total number of strategic weapons deployed by both the United States and Russia by two-thirds from pre-START I levels.

With the growth in cooperation between the United States and Russia, our emphasis in the arms control arena has already begun to shift from a focus on strategic arms control agreements to more global arms control issues, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Russia is central to any credible global non-proliferation strategy. As a state possessing extraordinarily large capabilities and means of delivery in all areas of nuclear, chemical, and biological and toxin weapons, its cooperation is essential.

- Russia and the United States agreed on the importance of indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, and cooperated bilaterally and in the appropriate multilateral fora to achieve this goal.
- We are working closely with the Russians to negotiate a global ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
- We are pursuing with Moscow a wide array of agreements that will reduce Russia's enormous stockpile of weapons-grade nuclear material, including a shutdown agreement for its plutonium production reactors. We are also working together to combat nuclear smuggling, and are urging Russia to reverse its decision to cooperate in the nuclear field with Iran.
- On CFE, we are working with the Treaty's 29 other Parties to achieve full implementation of CFE's equipment reduction requirements by November 1995. We have secured adoption of simplified methods for equipment destruction, to make it less expensive—and faster—for states to meet CFE requirements, and further work is ongoing. Together with our Allies, we are reviewing in appropriate fora a range of Treaty implementation issues, including Russian and Ukrainian concerns about the Treaty's flank equipment limits, with a view to ensuring the Treaty's integrity for the long term.
- We are pursuing with Moscow resolution of outstanding concerns within the Wyoming MOU framework as well as agreement to provide information outside the MOU.

On a broader international level, the United States is seeking early ratification by the United States of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in order to create a global ban on chemical weapons through worldwide ratification of the Convention. In the meantime, the United States has been actively participating in preparatory work to set up the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which will formally come into being with entry into force of the CWC. Our programs for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, a task that must be completed within ten years after EIF, are progressing, while we are simultaneously working with Russia to improve its ability to comply with its own destruction obligations.

On biological weapons, following a Special Conference in September 1994, the United States is actively engaged in a multilateral effort to strengthen the Biological and Toxin

Weapons Convention (BWC). At the same time, we have been cooperating with the UK and Russia under a 1992 Joint Statement on Biological Weapons to address our continuing concerns about Russian compliance with the BWC. The United States also has serious concerns about the compliance of a number of other countries with the BWC, and these concerns are described in this Report.

With regard to the NPT, the Agreed Framework with North Korea upholds the integrity of the international nonproliferation regime and, if fully implemented, will lead ultimately to complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability.

A. SCOPE OF THE REPORT

1. U.S. COMPLIANCE

As stated above, this Report addresses United States compliance and compliance by other countries that are parties to agreements with the United States. With respect to the United States, this Report addresses questions of U.S. compliance raised by other countries since the June 1994 Report.

2. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

With regard to bilateral agreements with the former Soviet Union, this Report reflects activities through January 20, 1995. Issues addressed are related to implementation of, or compliance with, the START Treaty, the INF Treaty, the 1989 Wyoming MOU, and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement.

B. UNITED STATES ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS

1. POLICY

Effective arms control requires parties to comply fully with arms control obligations and commitments they have undertaken. Compliance with agreements freely negotiated by parties is a fundamental cornerstone of international law. The United States' approach to compliance is deeply rooted in our own legal system and fundamental principles and values. To that end, the United States is committed to adhering to the same high standard of compliance that it requires of others.

2. UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAMS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE

Our deep-seated legal tradition, a political commitment to U.S. arms control agreements that enhance our security and that of our allies and friends, and our open society create powerful incentives to comply with agreements to control nuclear and other weapons. Legal and institutional procedures to ensure compliance have been established, and they reflect the seriousness with which these obligations are taken and reinforce these underlying policies and principles. Department of Defense (DoD) compliance review groups oversee and manage DoD compliance with arms control agreements. Department of Energy (DoE)

compliance review panels and arms control coordinating committees ensure compliance with the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). Finally, Congress performs oversight functions through committee hearings and budget allocations.

3. TREATY COMPLIANCE

Because of the broad scope of current arms control verification regimes and their extensive notification and data exchange requirements, the United States has committed some errors, described in the Annexes, but has acknowledged them to our treaty partners and taken steps to correct them. The United States continues to make every effort to comply scrupulously with all obligations associated with each arms control agreement to which it is a party.

4. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS OF U.S. NONCOMPLIANCE

a) The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

During 1994, some questions arose regarding U.S. compliance with the BWC, which entered into force in March 1975. U.S. officials have made clear that the United States terminated all offensive BW programs by Presidential order in November 1969, and destroyed all its BW munitions and agents as required under the BWC. The United States remains fully compliant with its BWC obligations.

b) Chemical Weapons Agreements

The United States and Russia exchanged data on CW-related activities and conducted inspections under Phase II of the Wyoming MOU. The two countries are engaged in consultations to answer questions that each has regarding the data exchanged.

C. COMPLIANCE BY SUCCESSORS TO TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BILATERALLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION

1. THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

a) Treaty Status

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987 and entered into force on June 1, 1988. Although elimination of all declared missiles under the Treaty was completed in 1991, the INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, and its extensive inspection regime will continue until May 31, 2001, to support verification of compliance with the ban on production and possession of missiles subject to the Treaty. The Parties have the right to conduct an annual quota of short-notice inspections at former INF missile facilities (currently 15 per year), and to perform continuous portal monitoring at the missile production facility at Magna, Utah, and the missile assembly plant at Votkinsk, Russia.

The INF Treaty does not have an equivalent to the Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty, which designates those states which are considered to be successor states to the Soviet Union for purposes of START treaty implementation. Nevertheless, the U.S. position is that all twelve successor states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are Parties to, and bound by, the Treaty. In addition, the October 1992 Bishkek Resolution, adopted by heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but to which the United States was not a Party, declared that its signatories were FSU successor states regarding fulfillment of INF Treaty provisions.

b) Compliance Issues at Votkinsk

The exits of two separate cargoes from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant caused U.S. inspectors at the portal to declare ambiguities. First, on December 25, 1993, Russian officials exited what Russia declared to be a training model of the RS-12M Variant 2 ICBM for silo launcher (the Russian designation for the follow-on to the SS-25 ICBM). Second, on July 18, 1994, a rail car exited Votkinsk which contained an empty, canister-like cylinder. The United States has concluded that these exits failed to comply with several provisions of the INF Treaty. While both ambiguities shared some common elements, the empty canister issue is generally regarded as having only minor significance when compared with the much more serious compliance issue raised by the RS-12M Variant 2 exit. The United States has been working with the Russian Federation through diplomatic channels and in the INF Treaty's Special Verification Commission (SVC) to achieve a negotiated solution that should preclude such compliance issues in the future.

c) Update on SS-23 Missiles in Germany and Eastern Europe

The issue of SS-23 missiles in Germany and Eastern Europe was originally reported in 1991. The United States discovered that the Soviet Union had transferred a total of 73 SS-23 missiles to the former German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. These missiles were transferred with their connecting sections, which would enable their use with nuclear warheads. While this transfer did not violate the INF Treaty since it occurred prior to Treaty signature, the United States had serious compliance concerns regarding the issue, and found that the Soviet Union had negotiated in bad faith in this regard. The nations whose military forces held the SS-23 missiles were not INF Treaty Parties, and thus were never legally liable under the Treaty. The United States has stated that, as a matter of policy, it seeks the total destruction of these missiles in order to fulfill the objectives of the INF Treaty. However, the United States stated that its most urgent concern involved the SS-23 missile connecting sections, and has successfully achieved the destruction of these portions of the missiles by Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria.

The United States is aware, however, that destruction of the missiles themselves is slowed by the concerns including environmental and financial of our German allies, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Bulgaria. Absent significant change in the status of the SS-23 issue, the United States does not intend to address this issue in future Reports but will continue its ongoing efforts to see that these missiles are destroyed.

2. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START) IMPLEMENTATION

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) was signed on July 31, 1991. The December 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of twelve independent states, four of which have strategic offensive arms located on their territory – Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The long delay between START's signature and EIF can be attributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequent need to "multilateralize" what was negotiated as a bilateral treaty.

On May 23, 1992, the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol under the terms of which these four successor states agreed to assume the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union under START. Under the Lisbon Protocol and the associated documents, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine agreed to eliminate all nuclear weapons on their territories during the seven-year START reduction period and to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) in the shortest possible time.

After the Lisbon Protocol created a multilateral regime that allowed for START's implementation, Kazakhstan ratified START in July 1992 and later acceded to the NPT as a NNWS on February 14, 1994. The Russian Parliament ratified START on November 4, 1992, but linked START entry into force to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine acceding to NPT as NNWS. Belarus ratified START on February 4, 1993 and acceded to the NPT as a NNWS on July 22, 1993. Ukraine ratified START on February 3, 1994, and following an intense political debate and change of governments, it acceded to the NPT as a NNWS on December 5, 1994. On the same day, START entered into force with the exchange of Instruments of ratification by the Presidents of the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Budapest, Hungary.

Certain portions of START and some related agreements were, by mutual agreement, observed prior to START entry-into-force (EIF). For example, in December 1990, the sides exchanged data required by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) current as of September 1, 1990. The Parties also signed an Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms that provided for exhibiting items of inspection prior to the beginning of START's baseline data inspections.

Between Treaty signature and START EIF, the Parties to START have worked through the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the Treaty's implementing body, to ensure smooth implementation of the Treaty and effective resolution of compliance issues and questions. Towards those ends, the Parties concluded over 27 JCIC agreements and 18 joint statements during the eight JCIC sessions convened prior to START EIF.

START-related issues addressed in this report fall into two categories--missed deadlines and implementation questions still under active discussion with the other START parties.

a) Missed Deadlines

In the early stages of implementing a treaty, particularly one as extensive and complicated as the START Treaty, there will naturally be some administrative and technical difficulties to be worked out. Consequently, the Parties to the START Treaty have, in some cases, missed certain deadlines. For example:

- The Treaty required the Parties to agree on a date for exchanging list of their proposed inspectors, monitors and aircrew members no later than 30 days prior to EIF. The Parties were unable to reach such agreement because of uncertainty about when EIF would take place. As of January 5, 1995, all the Parties had provided the required lists.
- None of the four New Independent States met the requirement of Article 4 of JCIC Agreement 14, to provide the United States flight routes for its inspection aircraft 30 days prior to EIF.
- Under both the START and the INF Treaties continuous monitoring activities occur at the Votkinsk missile assembly facility in Russia. With this in mind, the Parties agreed in the Twenty-Second Agreed Statement to develop procedures prior to START EIF that would avoid unnecessary overlap between the START and INF Treaty's administrative and logistical provisions. The U.S. delegations to both the JCIC and the INF Treaty's Special Verification Commission are working to overcome the U.S.-Russian difference on resolving this issue.

b) Compliance Issues under Discussion

Undeclared Silo Structures. The Soviet Union failed to declare a number of ICBM launchers in the MOU data it provided in 1991. The U.S. raised the issue of these undeclared silos with both Russia and Kazakhstan, the successor states on whose territory the undeclared silos were located, and indicated to them that these silos were accountable under START and should be listed in their MOU respective submissions unless the silos were eliminated prior to START EIF. The U.S. is seeking to resolve this matter with Russia and Kazakhstan respectively.

SS-19 ROKOT Launch. On December 24, 1994, Russia provided the U.S. a "good will" notification of their intent to launch a "Rokot space launch vehicle." Two days later, they launched the ROKOT from Leninsk, Kazakhstan placing an amateur radio operations satellite into orbit.

Russia's launch notification should have been transmitted as a START notification. In addition, after the launch, Russia should have notified a change in its MOU data. The U.S. is pursuing Russia's failure to provide the appropriate notifications.

Conduct of the SS-N-20 Technical Characteristics Exhibition. The United States has concluded that the SS-N-20 technical characteristics exhibition conducted by the Soviet Union on October 10, 1991, was done in a manner inconsistent with the United States' interpretation of the pertinent Treaty provisions. The Soviet Union did not remove the "unique launcher

component," or end cap, attached to the front end of the SS-N-20 when conducting this exhibition; consequently, the United States was unable to confirm the "length of the assembled missile without front section," as specified in Annex J to the MOU. The purpose of this measurement is to confirm missile type.

The United States believes that the Soviet demonstration of this missile during the Early Technical Characteristics Exhibition in 1991 and as re-exhibited by Russia in February 1995 were inadequate because of the failure to remove the assembled missile's "launcher component" or its dome. In exchange for the U.S. not pressing for removal of the launcher component or its dome during the February 1995 re-exhibition, Russia offered the measurement of the end-dome to end-dome of the first stage – as a "goodwill gesture." The U.S. accepted the offer in that confirmation of the first stage measurement is considered much more important than confirming the precise measurement without the launcher component. The U.S. inspection team noted the failure to remove the component, but, as instructed, did not declare an ambiguity.

D. THE WYOMING MOU AND THE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT (BDA)

The Wyoming MOU was intended to build confidence between the United States and Russia in the chemical weapons area and thus facilitate completion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC). This would be done by exchanging detailed and complete data about their respective chemical weapons programs and by testing inspection procedures.

The documents to implement Phase II of the Wyoming MOU are contained in the "Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Measures for the Preparation and Implementation of the Second Phase of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding Dated September 23, 1989," including its Annexes, signed in Moscow January 14, 1994 (the Understanding). The BDA was signed in June 1990 and requires each Party to undertake not to produce chemical weapons and to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to 5,000 agent tons. However, the BDA has not yet entered into force.

The "Protocol of Updated Provisions Relating to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons," agreed ad referendum in Geneva March 26, 1993, is central to the implementation of the BDA. However, final agreement on this document has not yet been achieved.

The Russian Federation met its obligation to participate in the Phase II implementation activities of the Understanding. However, questions remain on certain aspects of the Russian data declaration and inspections.

**E. OTHER NATIONS' (INCLUDING SUCCESSORS TO THE SOVIET UNION)
COMPLIANCE WITH MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS**

1. THE 1972 BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits development of biological warfare (BW) capabilities beyond those justifiable for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. Currently there are 135 States Parties to the Convention. As discussed in Annex III, while the United States has concerns regarding many countries' compliance, this Report only addresses those for which the evidence is most persuasive.

The issue addressed in this Report is whether the nations reviewed are complying with the obligations assumed under the 1972 BWC and are providing accurate data under agreed BWC Confidence Building Measures (CBM).

a) Russia

Previous assessments of Russian compliance have highlighted the dichotomy between what appears to be the commitment from President Yeltsin and other members of the Russian leadership in attempting to resolve BWC issues and the continued involvement of "old hands" in trilateral BW discussions and in what Russia describes as a defensive BW program.

With regard to former Soviet biological weapons related facilities, some research and production facilities are being deactivated and many have taken severe personnel and funding cuts. However, some facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce biological warfare agents. The Russian Federation's 1993 and 1994 BWC data declaration contained no new information and its 1992 declaration was incomplete and misleading in certain areas. With regard to the trilateral process that began in 1992, while there has been progress towards achieving the openness intended in the Joint Statement, the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns.

Next steps. The United States remains actively engaged in efforts to work with the Russian leadership to ensure complete termination of the illegal program and to pursue a number of measures to build confidence in Russian compliance with the BWC.

b) Iraq

To date, approximately 20 biological inspection teams have visited Iraq to assess Baghdad's past and present BW activities. UNSCOM maintains that Iraq is withholding significant documentation and information on its past program. It is unclear whether Iraq is currently maintaining an active offensive BW program. The U.S. previously assessed that as long as intrusive challenge inspections were a possibility, Iraq's BW program would probably remain dormant. If Iraq is indeed developing biological weapons, this would be a violation of Iraq's obligations under the BWC and UN resolutions. In any case, Iraq has resisted disclosing information and has deliberately deceived UNSCOM on its past program. Without a clear and accurate admission to past offensive activities on which we have supporting

information, it is impossible to have confidence in current Iraqi statements regarding their program.

Finding. The United States Government reaffirms its June 1994 judgment that after signing the BWC Iraq developed and produced biological warfare agents and weapons and that it is likely that these agents and weapons were stockpiled. Shortly after the end of the Gulf War, Iraq acceded to the BWC. Iraq has been particularly recalcitrant in providing any details of its past BW program to UNSCOM, claiming it was merely for defensive research. The United States will continue to examine this issue.

c) China

The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior to 1984 when it became a Party to the BWC.

Finding. The United States Government believes that based on available evidence, China maintained an offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s. The offensive BW program included the development, production, stockpiling or other acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents. China's CBM mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program and there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive program. The United States Government, therefore, believes that in the years after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC obligations and that it is highly probable that it remains noncompliant with these obligations.

d) Syria

Syria has signed but has not ratified the BWC.

Finding. The United States Government reaffirms its previous judgment that, based upon the evidence available to date, it is highly probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological warfare capability.

e) Iran

The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBM's.

Finding. The United States Government reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.

f) Egypt

Egypt has signed but has not ratified the BWC.

Finding. The United States believes that Egypt had developed biological warfare agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt had eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist.

g) Libya

Evidence suggests the Libyan government is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents. Such development or production would violate key provisions of the BWC. Libya has also failed to submit the data declarations stipulated in the CBM's.

Finding. Evidence indicates that Libya has the expertise to produce small quantities of biological equipment for its BW program and that the Libyan Government is seeking to move their research program into a program of weaponized BW agents.

h) Taiwan

The United States believes that Taiwan has been upgrading its biotechnology capabilities by purchasing sophisticated biotechnology equipment from the United States, Switzerland and other countries.

Finding. The evidence indicating a BW program is not sufficient to determine if Taiwan is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC.

2. THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE)

On balance, during 1994 the CFE Treaty has been implemented with continuing success. The second reduction phase came to an end on November 17, 1994. The CFE Treaty, as well as the related commitments in regard to equipment of the same types as treaty limited equipment (TLE) declared by the former USSR in naval infantry and coastal defense (NI/CD) forces, requires that each state complete at least 60 percent of its reduction liabilities in the TLE categories of Tanks, ACVs, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters by the end of the second reduction phase. Collectively, the CFE States Parties far exceeded this 60 percent obligation. Against a total aggregate declared second year's reduction liability of slightly over 28,600 TLE, the States Parties reduced over 36,000 TLE (not counting accidental destruction of TLE) by the end of the period.

On the other hand, there were some shortfalls. Ukraine satisfied its declared Treaty requirements in all TLE categories but, for several reasons (including the lack of resolution of the Black Sea Fleet issue), Ukraine did not complete the full 60% of its NI/CD liabilities by 102 tanks and 125 artillery pieces. Similarly, although the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) collectively reduced more than the full 60% of TLE in each category that the USSR would

have had to reduce under the Treaty, they did so because the three major FSU states exceeded declared liabilities for the second reduction year. When, however, the collective NI/CD second year's reduction obligations are also considered, there was a major shortfall compared to what the USSR would have had to reduce of 129 tanks and 121 artillery pieces. Responsibility for the collective NI/CD obligation was assumed by Russia and Ukraine in the Tashkent and Oslo agreements.

Other current CFE implementation issues include:

- Continued reduction obligation under declarations by some of the NIS participating in CFE, who have not declared reduction liabilities that wholly fulfill the collective obligations undertaken at the 1992 Oslo Extraordinary Conference. Russian and Ukraine have also notified decreases in their reduction liabilities that have not yet been accompanied by the corresponding additional notifications from other states required by the Treaty. Armenia notified reduction liabilities for the first time in late November 1994. However, its notified liabilities of zero were inconsistent with its own declared data and acknowledged receipt of TLE from Russia.
- The continued failure by Azerbaijan to notify any reduction liabilities, or to conduct any reductions, even though its own official and informal data notifications and information exchanges would indicate that it should have done so.
- There also have continued to be some other difficulties, including questions about the completeness and accuracy of some notifications, as well as occasional instances of local authorities taking it upon themselves to deny the full access accorded by the Treaty. A small number of states have also continued to declare for export quantities of TLE-type equipment in excess of pre-Treaty-signature practices, which, in effect, lowered their declared reduction liabilities. Finally, Russia and Ukraine have still not reached full agreement on the issue of the ownership of the TLE assets of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, complicating fulfillment of their naval-associated reduction obligation. These were addressed in last year's report. The status of these issues and other CFE issues are addressed in detail in Annex III to this report. These were addressed in last year's report.

3. THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 1992 AND 1994

In November 1994, the OSCE states adopted the Vienna Document 1994 (VD-94), which added to and built upon the obligations in VD-92. In general terms, compliance with the Vienna Document has been good. A few states failed to submit data as of January 1, 1994. In addition, there have been other – mostly minor – notification, data, and inspection problems similar to those discussed under CFE. Finally, Russian activities in Chechnya were not notified under the appropriate provisions of the Vienna Document.

4. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

This Report updates developments relevant to other nations' compliance with the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and addresses in particular developments in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya and China. Additionally, 56⁷ countries have not yet complied with their obligations under Article III of the NPT to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and put into effect a full-scope Safeguards Agreement within 18 months after joining the NPT. Some of these countries have responded positively to U.S. demarches urging that they fulfill their Article III obligations before the 1995 NPT Conference.

a) North Korea

The DPRK's efforts over the past few years to obstruct the implementation of full-scope IAEA safeguards required by Article III of the NPT and the pattern of activity at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center have fueled international concern over the DPRK's nuclear intentions. Indeed, North Korea's refusal in 1994 to permit the IAEA to conduct routine, ad-hoc, or special inspections constitutes noncompliance with its Article III obligations. Until North Korea fulfills its part of the Agreed Framework, it will not be in compliance with Article III.

Moreover, although conclusive statements cannot yet be made about the extent to which North Korea is concealing evidence that would indicate a violation of its Article II commitments, the United States believes that the DPRK's efforts to prevent the IAEA from learning about past activity raises serious questions about a potential violation of Article II. For example, the DPRK's actions in mid-1994 to deny the IAEA permission to preserve the possibility of conducting analysis on the 5 MWe reactor's fuel to determine plutonium production, combined with its previous refusal to allow special inspections at two nuclear waste sites, lead the U.S. to suspect that North Korea is attempting to hide indications that it has violated Article II.

Finding. The United States Government has determined that North Korea has yet to meet its NPT Article III obligations. Serious questions remain regarding the DPRK's intentions and a potential violation of its obligations under Article II of the NPT; however, the signing of the Agreed Framework is significant as it requires North Korea to resolve these concerns.

Next Steps. The United States plans to pursue vigorously North Korea's fulfillment of its pledges under the Agreed Framework to come into full compliance with its NPT obligations.

⁷ As of 1 November 1994 these included Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Dominica, Estonia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Niger, Panama, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The United States, with the assistance of the IAEA, will monitor the DPRK's implementation of the Agreed Framework and NPT closely and assess the degree to which North Korea's actions, including those required under the Framework, have addressed remaining concerns about its intentions and compliance with Articles II and III of the NPT.

b) Iraq

Iraq's nuclear weapons program violated Article II's requirement that Parties "not...manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not...seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Iraq's construction of secret facilities, including its construction of a facility for nuclear weapons development and assembly, contributed to its violation of Article II. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article III, which requires that safeguards be applied "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

The war and inspections have significantly set back Iraq's program to develop a nuclear weapon. Nonetheless, Iraq almost certainly intends to continue nuclear weapons related activities and to build a nuclear weapon as soon as domestic and international circumstances permit.

Finding. The United States Government has determined that Iraq violated its Safeguards Agreement when it pursued an active nuclear weapons development program and that this program violated its obligations under Article II and III of the NPT. The United States Government has further determined that Baghdad is continuing its effort to undermine the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process by withholding relevant information, and to preserve as much nuclear-related technology as possible for a renewed weapons effort.

Next Steps. The United States plans to continue to support UNSCOM/IAEA inspections in Iraq and the long-term monitoring of Iraq's nuclear program in accordance with UNSCR 687 and 715.

c) Iran

Although Iran's rudimentary program has apparently met with limited success so far, we believe Iran will not abandon its efforts to expand its nuclear capabilities with a view to supporting nuclear weapons development. Iran's highly questionable NPT nonproliferation credentials have caused most nuclear suppliers to refrain from cooperation with Tehran.

d) Libya

Tripoli's longstanding interest in acquiring nuclear weapons strongly suggest that Libya's nuclear research and procurement efforts are aimed at development of an indigenous

nuclear weapons capability and, consequently, may be inconsistent with Article II's requirement that Parties "...not manufacture... or seek any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

Finding. The United States Government has determined that Libya has demonstrated a continuing interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons but that its nuclear program has not progressed beyond the early stages of developing a nuclear weapons program.

e) China

In early 1992, China became a member of the NPT. Prior to China's NPT accession, the United States concluded that China had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives. Based on Beijing's longstanding nuclear links with Islamabad, it is unclear whether Beijing has broken off its contact with elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

Finding. The United States Government has continuing concerns regarding possible continuation of China's past nuclear weapons assistance to Pakistan and Beijing's compliance with its NPT obligations.

The United States Government considers China's nuclear assistance to Iran and Algeria consistent with Beijing's NPT obligations.

F. ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY AND BROADER SECURITY RISKS ARISING FROM COMPLIANCE ISSUES

1. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

In determining the military significance of treaty violations and compliance concerns addressed in this Report, the following factors were considered: the observed quantity of equipment, weapon systems or Treaty Limited Items (TLI) involved; the kinds of equipment, weapon systems or TLI involved; the contribution the equipment, weapon system or TLI might make to the ability to generate military force beyond existing capabilities; the extent to which effective countermeasures are or could be made available; and the overall military situation. Except for compliance concerns regarding BW and CW weapons, the military risk associated with individual treaty violations or compliance concerns addressed in this Report ranges from minor to none. In the aggregate they do not provide any significant military advantage at the strategic or theater level. With regard to chemical and biological agents, the proliferation of these weapons in contravention of treaties circumscribing their possession or use creates a significant military risk at the theater level by creating an asymmetrical environment in which U.S. forces must conduct military operations.

2. BROADER SECURITY RISKS

Arms control verification has several purposes. Among these is deterring cheating on arms control agreements. A closely related objective is detecting violations before they

become militarily significant. If the United States is unable to detect such violations, then the concern is that the United States would invite further and perhaps more disturbing action on the part of its treaty partners. Moreover, detected violations create concerns that more disturbing actions may follow and/or that the detected violation represents a "tip of the iceberg." These reasons form the basis for the U.S. judgment that no violation, regardless of military significance is acceptable. It is also for these reasons that the United States seeks to address with its treaty partners any existing compliance views which concern any failure on the part of its treaty partners to resolve expeditiously existing U.S. concerns.

Individual treaty regimes for which there are judged to be significant military or broader security risks associated are addressed below.

a) BWC Implementation

Because the military forces of the United States must be able to execute U.S. policy anywhere in the world, the continuing attempts on the part of a number of other nations to acquire an offensive biological warfare capability raise serious concerns.

From the perspective of broader security risks, proliferation of biological warfare agents is a serious concern. In part, it demonstrates a disregard for the rule of law on the part of those nations currently bound by the BWC, (and, in a broader sense, could serve to encourage others to resist efforts to restrict and reduce all weapons of mass destruction). The nature of biological weapons and their potential for use against civilians has made their acquisition particularly reprehensible.

b) NPT Implementation

As in the case of the BWC, the United States views with concern efforts on the part of certain nations to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, and on the part of other nations to circumvent or violate NPT Safeguards. These efforts create risks for U.S. and allied military forces and also presents a broader risk to our efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

G. CONCLUSION

The overall status and direction of other nations' compliance is hard to generalize this year. With regard to Russia, the Russians have complied with important provisions of arms control agreements. However, the United States continues to work with Russia to bring about full practical implementation of these commitments. With regard to other countries, we are more concerned than ever about the growing number of states that are pursuing nuclear and biological capabilities despite legal obligations to forgo such capabilities. In such cases, resolution of compliance concerns and reversal of programs are particularly difficult to achieve.

VIII. MAXIMIZING ACDA'S EFFICIENCY

A. STREAMLINING ACDA'S OPERATIONS

As arms control has evolved from a bilateral to a multilateral process, ACDA's responsibilities have increased dramatically. At the same time, our personnel and operating budgets have remained essentially static. Some of ACDA's new missions, including the negotiation of the Nuclear Fissile Material Cutoff and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties, are personnel-intensive and continue to place increasing demands on the Agency.

As a small agency operating with minimum bureaucracy, ACDA has always prided itself on its high efficiency and tooth-to-tail ratio, while constantly and aggressively evolving to meet new requirements. We recognize that in the post-Cold War world, our mission will continue to expand more rapidly than our financial resources. We must, therefore, continue to streamline our operations to produce ever more national security per dollar appropriated. The Agency's streamlining plan includes:

- a strategic plan for the next ten years, completed far ahead of Government Performance and Results Act guidelines;
- precise identification of our customers and their needs;
- updated priorities;
- increased efficiency with modern computer and communication technologies; and
- restructuring both organization and infrastructure to eliminate duplication and to better deal with crosscutting issues.

ACDA is streamlining quickly. Our ten-year strategic plan, Arms Control and U.S. National Security – The Role, Perspective and Contribution of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1994 to 2003, projects and guides ACDA's future contribution to America's national security.

This strategic plan outlines ACDA's requirements and responsibilities as the only federal government agency solely dedicated to arms control and nonproliferation. ACDA does not allow the swinging pendulum of foreign relations to determine the permissibility of weapons, technology, and material proliferation. Its unconflicted mission is to reduce the threat that the proliferation or development of new weapons or technologies to unstable nations may present.

With this in mind, ACDA re-examined its organizational, administrative, and arms control and nonproliferation policy programs to serve America's national security. ACDA has painstakingly examined its organizational structure to eliminate any wasteful duplication of duty, reviewed its personnel to ensure that its diverse staff will be able to meet the Agency's many and changing requirements, and examined its budgetary outlays which continue to remain low in relation to the Agency's duties.

The first step in streamlining was to assess the Office of the Director, which had too many units reporting to it directly. The Director was spending too much time in line management rather than leadership. The number of units reporting to the Director has been reduced, with many folded into line units that can more efficiently administer and support their activities. In other respects as well, ACDA has given more responsibility to its line offices and bureaus.

Because the distinctions between arms control vice nonproliferation and multilateral vice bilateral have blurred, ACDA has set up matrix management to deal with crosscutting issues and to avoid duplication of effort. Fissile material cutoff and nuclear smuggling are two examples of such crosscutting issues.

Each office and bureau in ACDA has also helped to determine which particular lines of business should be eliminated. These activities are no longer needed because:

- the work is essentially finished or marginalized;
- our budget cannot support the work at a sufficient productive level;
- other lines of business have become more urgent for national security.

Organizational restructuring in ACDA has reduced the number of supervisors and increased the ratio of employees to supervisors by one-third.

ACDA has also eliminated the Deputy positions in the Offices of Administration and the General Counsel to remove management layers and to place more responsibility on professional staff. We are carefully considering other deputy positions for elimination, as well.

We are now seeking to reduce the number of offices and divisions, and to fold the various commissions and their commissioners into their related ACDA bureaus. All of ACDA's bureaus will eliminate, reconfigure or consolidate at least one division. We have already merged divisions in the Office of Administration and in the Intelligence, Verification and Information Support Bureau.

Finally, ACDA has cut administrative costs \$1,710,000 for FY96 as compared to FY95. Our streamlining will eliminate 34 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) positions, many of which have already been applied to the Agency's increasing requirements in new areas.

IX. ORGANIZING ARMS CONTROL RESEARCH

The United States faces significant challenges in controlling armaments and stemming the tide of proliferation. At the same time, resources and funding for these areas will remain constrained. Pursuing these policy areas successfully while remaining within resource limits requires vigorous, creative, and coordinated research and development (R&D) programs and technology application.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Act authorizes and directs ACDA's Director to:

- (1) ensure the conduct of research, development, and other studies in the fields of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament;
- (2) make arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and grants) for the conduct of research, development, and other studies in the fields of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament by private or public institutions or persons; and
- (3) coordinate research, development and other studies in the fields of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament by or for other Government agencies in accordance with procedures established under the Act.

Historically, ACDA met these requirements through such efforts as:

- sponsorship of the Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee (ACRCC), an interagency group established by ACDA to coordinate arms control research;
- maintenance of the Arms Control Research Network (ACORN) data base of completed, ongoing and planned research;
- participation in interagency committees focussing on R&D; and
- compilation and submittal of an Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research.

Recent analyses, both independent and within the Executive Branch, have cited the need for better coordination and communication among departments and agencies performing R&D. These analyses include:

- the Non-Proliferation Program Review Committee's "Report on Non-Proliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs";
- the General Accounting Office's "Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Arms Control: Improved Coordination of Arms Control Research Needed";
- the ACDA Inspector General's "New Purposes and Priorities for Arms Control" report; the Stimson Center's "The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Restructuring for the Post Cold War Era" report;
- the report of the DCI's Nonproliferation Advisory Panel; and
- the Presidential "Coordination of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research and Development" review.

While separate programs (including ACDA's Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee, DOD's Forum on Arms Control Technology and the DCI's Community Nonproliferation Committee's Research and Development Subcommittee) existed within departments and agencies to identify existing technologies and initiate new R&D programs, there existed no single forum to integrate:

- assessment of technological capabilities;
- requirement generation;
- R&D project management;
- technology implementation; and
- policy and budget priority recommendations necessary for effective coordination of arms control and nonproliferation R&D.

One of ACDA's revitalization goals is to more fully and effectively execute our statutory responsibilities for coordination of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament R&D. To address this issue, the Director tasked ACDA to initiate a review which would result in a proposal for a mechanism that would:

- exchange information and coordinate arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament R&D;
- advise agencies on arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament R&D priorities;
- facilitate the conduct of cooperative interagency programs;
- review arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament R&D programs and identify overlaps and gaps;
- frame interagency issues and differences for decisions by adjudicating bodies;
- advise the NSC's policy Interagency Working Groups on R&D capabilities and limitations; and
- report recommendations to the National Science and Technology Council's Committee on National Security on coordination of all arms control and nonproliferation R&D programs in the President's budget submission.

The results of this ACDA review were provided to the President's National Security Advisor. At the direction of the President, the interagency:

- initiated a comprehensive examination which assessed current practices associated with the coordination of arms control and nonproliferation R&D;
- examined existing mandates and coordinating mechanisms;
- reviewed recent recommendations;
- identified coordination issues; and
- developed options and recommendations for improving the current structure.

As a result of this interagency review, the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG), under the joint chairmanship of ACDA, DOD, and DOE, with ACDA also serving as Executive Secretary, was established with a scope and charter that will empower the TWG to provide the necessary coordination of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament R&D.

Through the proceedings and recommendations of this Working Group, ACDA will be able to actively fulfill its statutory responsibilities, and the Executive Branch will be assured the ability to effectively coordinate arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament R&D by deconflicting and refining the focus of department and agency R&D programs and funding the most promising pathways to expeditious completion and implementation of resultant technologies.⁸

A. ACDA External Research

A significant component of ACDA's own research effort is its external research program, managed by an internal Research Review Board. The Board reviews research projects proposed by Bureaus and Offices and recommends a program budget structure of external research activities.

The Research Review Board looks to the external research program and selected special projects to provide support for the Agency through projects that are critical to performance of the ACDA mission, that are time sensitive, and that directly support ongoing arms control negotiating efforts. In 1994 ACDA managed a program of external research and special projects of about \$2.5M, examining strategic, chemical and conventional weapons, nonproliferation, verification, defense conversion and regional issues. Specifically:

- An external research project analyzed the potential key issues of the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, and recommended U.S. strategies and actions for ensuring that the NPT is extended indefinitely and unconditionally in 1995;
- ACDA continued support of the IAEA technical assistance database system which proved invaluable at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Access to the data has been improved and new sources of data have been added;
- An external research project explored strategic force verification methodology and assessment, and strategic and theater nuclear force analyses;
- An external research project provided assistance and support to the U.S. Representative to the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We also provided Support to CWC implementation efforts and ongoing CW Bilateral Accords with Russia;
- An external research project explored issues for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), including support for the Special Conference of the BWC and studies on BWC compliance;
- An external research project explored conventional force verification methodology and assessments and conventional force analyses, and examined other countries' perspectives on conventional arms control;
- An external research project sought to define the scope of U.S. defense conversion activities within the former Soviet Union;

⁸For details on these procedures, see ACDA's Report to Congress on Procedures Established for Effective Coordination of Research and Development on Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament.

- ACDA participated with the Department of Energy in preparing and implementing a two-week entrepreneurial training workshop at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for mid-level scientists and managers from the FSU nuclear weapons complex. It dealt with market economy fundamentals, preparation for commercial ventures, and making contacts with interested U.S. businesses. This was the latest in a series of highly successful and continually improving workshops. Contractual support was also employed to review past performance and plan for continuing improvement;
- A grant was issued to the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to hold a special conference on the NPT for parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco;
- An external research project explored North East Asian arms control issues with particular emphasis on identifying techniques that may be used to assess this, and other, regions;
- The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) was awarded a grant to study confidence building measures for the Middle East;
- ACDA provided support for the development of a Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratory. The center is working with U.S. and foreign governments to develop arms control and nonproliferation verification regimes;
- A grant was issued to the International Association of University Presidents (IAUP) to develop and distribute educational materials on arms control for foreign universities;
- ACDA used the multi-agency HYDICE experiment to explore multispectral imaging applications for arms control verification, particularly with regard to potential monitoring of START compliance, conventional forces, and chemical warfare or nuclear installations;
- Several projects addressed CTBT issues:
 - Blasting practices in the former Soviet Union were investigated to better understand the problem of discriminating low yield nuclear explosions from non-nuclear mining explosions and other commercial operations;
 - We investigated regional seismic discrimination issues for small nuclear events;
 - We provided support to the U.S. Geological Survey to identify means for using their data for CTBT verification.

Stretching the Research Dollar

The scope of the ACDA external research program was quite broad given its relatively small budget. ACDA projects were thinly spread across a large number of ACDA research functions, as defined in the Act, to provide a balanced body of research. Our detailed review of government-wide arms control and nonproliferation research, as described below, revealed that there are wide differences in support for arms control research, not necessarily related to priority or need. Research functions that dovetailed with the roles of other governmental institutions were relatively well funded, whereas those roles unique to ACDA received little or no support beyond the small efforts that ACDA external research could provide. ACDA has carefully spent its available funds across a wide range of activities, often participating in interagency programs to encourage needed arms control research. However, the increased emphasis on arms control and nonproliferation attending the demise of the Soviet threat and the associated world wide realignments suggests that more needs to be done;

B. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL RESEARCH

In last year's annual report, ACDA pledged to significantly improve the format of the Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research. In 1994, we have done this by characterizing completed research products according to the arms control and nonproliferation issues, the focus of the research, and the type of product. This system was also successfully applied to providing ACDA comments on the relevance of research projects, reported to Congress by the Departments of Defense and Energy, to arms control priorities. We will continue to improve and evolve this system for next year's annual research report, to increase interagency participation in planning and preparation of the report, and to improve our uniformity and completeness of data.

X. ORGANIZING AND STORING ARMS CONTROL INFORMATION

Arms control and nonproliferation information is extensive and complex; by taking full advantage of rapidly advancing technology, our management of this information becomes ever more effective and cost-effective.

Having used computers in support of arms control analyses virtually since the creation of the Agency, ACDA Computer Support now also provides administrative and operations support to all parts of the Agency, maintains arms control data bases used by other federal agencies, and – with the recent introduction of a public information bulletin board – makes pertinent arms control information available to the world academic and institutional research community. Established data bases maintained by the Agency include:

- the classified Automated Recourse to Electronic Negotiation Archives (ARENA) system, which contains over 76,000 documents, permits search of the complete text of all arms control negotiating accords, and is available to Federal agencies upon request;
- the Processor for Arms Control Treaties (PACTS) database which permits similar search of the complete texts of all arms control treaties to which the U.S. is a party;
- the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) databases of international arms sales, arms treaties, and military expenditures;
- associated economic data used to prepare the Annual Report to the Congress on WMEAT;
- the ACDA Integrated Retrieval System (AIRS) database of citations to thousands of arms control studies and reports; and
- the Arms Control Research Network (ACORN) database listing all federal arms control research projects and their recent products.

ACDA is the U.S. Government repository of data exchange among nations pursuant to arms control treaties. The Arms Control Community On-line Repository of Treaty Data (ACCORD) database/repository was established by ACDA in 1993 to automate this function. During 1994, the database was updated with the current verified data of all previous information exchanged as a result of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) Agreement. This computer-based federal repository allows exchange data, notifications, and inspection reports to be archived in a single location. To the extent possible, the information is made available in electronic form so that Federal agencies can have immediate access. The repository consists of both classified and unclassified computer databases, as well as paper copies of data. We are now adding START, Global Exchange of Military Information data, and data resulting from the Open Skies Treaty after it enters into force. We are also preparing to add data on the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We will dramatically reduce support costs by completely replacing obsolete systems including the Wang and VAX minicomputers. During 1994 we have made significant progress

toward moving to a modern configuration with sufficient flexibility to remain current and useful for the next five years. As part of this configuration, classified PC local area networks (PC LANs) have been installed at various ACDA locations in the metropolitan area.

We now have an IBM RISC and PC LAN based cable dissemination and retrieval system operational, and are providing it to ACDA personnel as their PC LANs are installed. This computer based system replaces the previous manual system for acquisition, sorting, and distribution of daily cable traffic. With cables now available in real time, action officers can respond far more quickly to events as they break.

We have established secure computer telecommunications to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to the previous Department of State connection. These new links enable ACDA, including our overseas delegations, and the Department of Defense to communicate by classified E-Mail.

ACDA's records management program is conducted in compliance with all applicable Federal laws and regulations, and in accordance with guidelines of the National Archives and Records Administration and the General Services Administration. The records management office at ACDA provides all records retirement and retrieval services for the agency, including training for administrative staff in files management and retirement procedures; handling emergency and routine records retrieval requests; processing Freedom of Information Act requests as needed by the Office of the General Counsel; issuing the ACDA electronic databases.

XI. COMMUNICATING WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Public understanding of arms control and nonproliferation is essential to its success. To help promote this understanding, ACDA offers the following products and services:

A. PUBLICATIONS

ACDA produces a wide variety of publications that explain arms control and nonproliferation developments and issues. These include:

- ACDA News, a daily compilation of articles from newspapers and periodicals concerning arms control and related issues;
- Special Edition, which highlights in-depth articles from professional journals;
- the ACDA Newsletter;
- official texts of treaties, agreements, statements, and speeches;
- fact sheets on virtually all facets of arms control and nonproliferation;
- The ACDA Annual Report, which summarizes the Agency's activities of the past year and provides basic arms control and nonproliferation reference material;
- press releases on arms control developments as they break; and
- Who's Who in ACDA, which includes biographies of key Agency officials, many of whom are available for speaking engagements or interviews.

To improve customer service, PA's Electronic Bulletin Board offers our publications on-line. Call 202-736-4436.

B. SPEAKERS

We offer a Speakers' Program for interested audiences to exchange views with ACDA experts. We seek a broad-based range of platforms for all ACDA speakers, including academic, business, civic, industrial, and congressional audiences. We welcome all requests for speakers, and will accommodate as many as schedules and resources allow.

We also organize seminars, conferences and press briefings to further educate the public and the media on arms control issues.

Our Public Affairs Office may be reached toll-free at 1-800-581-ACDA.

C. TECHNICAL REFERENCE CENTER

The ACDA Technical Reference Center maintains a specialized collection of over 5,000 volumes on arms control, nonproliferation, and related subjects. The TRC compiles a monthly Current Articles of Interest Bibliography, and publishes a semi-annual Cumulative Index of Current Articles of Interest. Also available through the TRC are information retrieval systems and inter-library loan facilities.

The Center is normally open to ACDA staff and State Department employees. Outside researchers are welcome; please call 1-800-581-ACDA to schedule an appointment.

XII. ACDA ORGANIZATION

ACDA is reorganizing, revitalizing, and streamlining to best meet both the increasing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament challenges and the tight budget environment of the mid 1990s. This chapter describes ACDA's organization as of January 1995.

A. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the Director is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Secretary of State, and other senior government officials on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament matters, and on their relationship to other aspects of overall national security policy. The Director is responsible for all ACDA operations, activities, and positions.

1. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND ADVISOR FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS (D/EX)

The Executive Secretary, on behalf of the Director, initiates and provides Agency liaison to the National Security agencies and coordinates within ACDA and with other agencies to ensure appropriate ACDA representation at interagency deliberations and international summits and timely exchange of information. The Executive Secretary advises the Director and other Agency Principals on arms control and administrative policy options, the status of policy deliberation within the Agency, and the optimum methods and procedures to implement policy decisions. The Executive Secretary also advises on the status of internal operations and activities, and implements improved approaches to streamline the Agency's productivity and to increase its effectiveness. The Executive Secretary maintains the Director's formal record of communications regarding arms control policy deliberations and decisions, and ensures the accuracy of and accountability for official communications by employing state-of-the-art computer technology (ESPRIT computer system) to image, catalog, store, retrieve, and permanently preserve arms control nonproliferation and disarmament ACDA and Interagency documents.

2. SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY COMMITTEE (D/SPAC)

The Scientific and Policy Advisory Committee, established by law in 1994, is ACDA's sole advisory body. It replaces the previous General Advisory Committee, and differs from its predecessor in being more scientifically oriented and more sharply focused on devising solutions to specific challenges.

The SPAC consists of up to 15 members appointed by the President, including a Chairman who must be confirmed by the Senate. At least 8 members of the Committee must be scientists. The Committee reports to the President, the Secretary of State, and the ACDA Director on its findings and recommendations. Consistent with ACDA's organizational streamlining, the SPAC operates out of the Advanced Projects Office, and the Director of the Advanced Projects Office also serves as Executive Director of the SPAC.

ADVANCED PROJECTS OFFICE (D/AP)

The Advanced Projects Office is ACDA's center for innovative concepts of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. It conceives and develops new avenues to all aspects of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Its projects build both on internally generated concepts and on ideas collected from government, academic, and nongovernmental sources.

This office also carries out major internal projects for the Director. In 1994, projects included preparing comprehensive recommendations for changes in ACDA priorities, and preparation of this Annual Report.

3. CHIEF SCIENCE ADVISOR

The Chief Science Advisor is the Director's special representative for matters of science and technology, and identifies promising technologies for monitoring arms control agreements.

4. PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY (OSIA)

An ACDA official serves as the Principal Deputy Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency, which is the agency charged with operational responsibility for the conduct of arms control on-site inspections.

5. SENIOR MILITARY ADVISOR (D/M)

The Senior Military Advisor serves as the principal advisor to the ACDA Director on military matters, is the principal representative of the Director to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is the liaison between ACDA and U.S. military commanders and the ACDA focal point for military-to-military contacts on agency initiatives. The Senior Military Advisor evaluates arms control and nonproliferation proposals from a military perspective, and assesses their potential contributions to the national security of the United States. When required, the Senior Military Advisor participates in senior policy-making groups to provide the military perspective on worldwide arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation matters. The Advisor commands ACDA's military detailees.

6. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

The U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, with the rank of Ambassador, leads the U.S. delegation to the CD in Geneva, the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, and, as requested, also represents the ACDA Director in other negotiations.

7. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT FOR ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT

The Special Representative, with the rank of Ambassador, led the U.S. Delegation to the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Non-Proliferation Review and Extension Conference, and in numerous consultations with foreign governments leading to the Conference.

8. U.S. COMMISSIONER OF THE US/USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC)

The U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission, with the rank of Ambassador, represents the United States in the SCC on matters related to the ABM Treaty and heads the U.S. component of the Commission.

9. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION(SVC)

The U.S. Representative to the Special Verification Commission, with the rank of Ambassador, heads the U.S. delegation to the Commission, which is the implementing body for the INF Treaty.

10. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION (JCIC)

The U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, with the rank of Ambassador, heads the U.S. delegation to the Commission, which is the implementing body for the START Treaty. Currently, the same person serves as U.S. Representative to both the SVC and the JCIC.

B. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

The Deputy Director functions as Acting Director during periods of the Director's absence. The Deputy Director, by law, is specifically responsible for the administrative management of ACDA, for intelligence-related activities, and for ACDA's Special Compartmented Intelligence Facility.

1. OFFICE OF SECURITY

The Office of Security is responsible for ACDA's security programs in Washington, DC and overseas. These programs cover the full range of security services and include physical, procedural, personnel, technical, and computer security, investigative and intelligence functions, as well as liaison with other Federal investigative agencies and offices of security. In addition, the office manages the security and accountability of all special compartmented information materials designated for use by ACDA.

2. OFFICE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity serves as the primary resource in ACDA for compliance with various laws, management directives, and guidelines applicable to Equal Opportunity. It provides leadership to the Agency's top management, bureau and office heads to carry out the continuing policy and program of nondiscrimination and affirmative action.

The Office directs and provides equal employment opportunity in the special program areas of upward mobility, affirmative employment for people with disabilities, multi-year affirmative action plan, special emphasis programs, and outreach recruitment. The Office is responsible for individual complaint counseling, investigations, and adjudication of complaints in accordance with applicable federal statutes. An on-going analysis of the Agency's workforce is conducted periodically to assess affirmative measures in order to achieve a diversified workforce.

C. MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS BUREAU (MA)

The Multilateral Affairs Bureau develops arms control policy, strategy, and tactics, and provides organizational support, delegation staffing, and Washington backstopping for multilateral arms control negotiations and related activities including the United Nations Special Commission for Iraq.

1. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY NUCLEAR POLICY DIVISION (MA/ISNP)

As part of ACDA's streamlining, the International Security and Nuclear Policy Division replaces the previous Nuclear Testing Policy Division and the previous International Security Affairs Division.

This new division is responsible for guidance for U.S. delegations to various multilateral arms control conferences and meetings, and for policy formulation and interagency backstopping for negotiations leading to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and a fissile material cut-off.

This division provides policy guidance and instructions by chairing the Washington interagency backstopping committees and staff for U.S. delegations conducting multilateral discussions or negotiations on issues including:

- negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;
- outer space arms control;
- transparency in armaments and the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms;
- negative security assurances; and
- efforts to begin negotiations for a fissile material cutoff convention.

The division provides delegation members and support for the Conference on Disarmament, the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the U.N. General Assembly First Committee, other U.N.-related disarmament fora, and the NATO Disarmament Experts' Group.

It also covers any bilateral activities, international conferences or consultations which relate to nuclear testing and existing constraints on tests, including:

- the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty;
- the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty;
- the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

2. EUROPEAN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS DIVISION (MA/ESN)

The European Security Negotiations Division prepares ACDA guidance for European security negotiations in Vienna and elsewhere. It participates in the backstopping and facilitation of treaty implementation through the Joint Consultative Group of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the Open Skies Consultative Commission. This division supports Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe efforts to increase/maintain stability in Europe, including implementation of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Forum for Security Cooperation, and by organizing and conducting the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings.

The European Security Negotiations Division provides delegation staffing for these negotiations, and consults and coordinates with allied and other foreign governments on multilateral arms control issues.

3. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POLICY DIVISION (MA/STP)

The Scientific and Technological Policy Division makes policy recommendations and provides scientific and technical support for chemical and biological arms control. This division directs interagency backstopping for CBW issues, develops and coordinates guidance, and provides delegation staffing for negotiations and meetings related to these issues, including:

- the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- the Biological Weapons Convention;
- the U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding;
- the Bilateral Destruction Agreement negotiations;
- the Trilateral Biological Weapons Agreement and other CBW negotiations.

D. STRATEGIC AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU (SEA)

The Bureau of Strategic and Eurasian Affairs is ACDA's center for nuclear arms control and disarmament with China and the nations of the former Soviet Union. This includes:

- implementation of existing strategic and theater nuclear arms control agreements (START I, START II, and INF Treaties);
- negotiation and implementation of future nuclear arms control agreements;
- implementation of the ABM Treaty;
- negotiations concerning theater and strategic ballistic missile defense;

- assessment of arms control aspects of the development of U.S. and NATO nuclear postures and policies;
- ensuring that nuclear weapons are being dismantled in an irreversible and transparent manner, and that the resulting fissile materials are safely and securely stored;
- exploration of arms control possibilities in the Eurasian region, including potential discussions with China on strategic stability;
- negotiation and implementation of agreements on the safety, security, and dismantlement (SSD) of the nuclear weapons of the FSU;
- assistance with conversion of former Soviet defense industry to civilian purpose; and
- coordinating the U.S. Government's approach to issues that overlap the SSD and START regimes.

1. STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION DIVISION (SEA/SN)

The Strategic Negotiations and Implementation Division is the ACDA center for arms control of long-range and intermediate-range weapons delivery systems. This division supports and chairs the following U.S. Government interagency committees:

- the Backstopping Committee for the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (START I Treaty implementation);
- the Special Verification Commission Support Group (INF Treaty implementation);
- the Backstopping Committee for the Bilateral Implementation Commission (START II Treaty implementation upon its entry into force).

These committees have principal responsibility within the U.S. Government for developing instructions for the JCIC, SVC, and, eventually, BIC delegations, and for diplomatic communications for delivery to the governments of the START I, START II, and INF Treaty Parties.

This division also leads ACDA participation in interagency ratification efforts for the START II Treaty through representation on the Treaty Working Group. Additionally, the Strategic Negotiations and Implementation Division assesses potential impacts on strategic arms control of new developments in technology.

2. STRATEGIC TRANSITION DIVISION (SEA/ST)

The Strategic Transition Division deals with:

- making nuclear warhead dismantlement transparent and irreversible;
- NATO nuclear weapons policy, including no first use; and
- substrategic nuclear weapons issues and Eurasian security matters.

This division provides policy input and analytical and negotiating support to:

- the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) Coordinating Group, including Nunn-Lugar matters and the Safeguards, Transparency and Irreversibility (STI) initiative;
- SSD and STI Delegation meetings with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine;
- meetings of NATO's High Level Group on nuclear policy issues.
- development and analysis of ACDA's Medium Range Missile Ban concept.

ST's responsibilities have changed dramatically over the past year. Although the Nunn-Lugar program remains a high priority of the Administration, it is now primarily in the implementation phase, much of which is being handled by the Department of Defense. With this shift in policy focus, SEA/ST's attention and efforts are now directed at ensuring, through the STI initiative, the control, dismantlement and safe storage of nuclear warheads located in Russia. This initiative is closely associated with the SSD program's fissile material storage facility. ST is also developing new ideas for controlling substrategic nuclear weapons, and leads Bureau efforts on regional security issues.

3. THEATER AND STRATEGIC DEFENSES DIVISION (SEA/D)

The Theater and Strategic Defenses Division develops, for Presidential approval, options for arms control policy, strategy, tactics, and language for the on-going negotiations in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The SCC is the implementing body of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. SEA/D also chairs the interagency SCC Backstopping Committee in support of the negotiations.

This division provides a senior member and at least one adviser to the SCC negotiations and to the five-year review conferences of the ABM Treaty. In addition, this division participates in discussions with other countries related to ballistic missile defense issues.

SEA/D provides analysis and support to the ACDA Director on all issues concerning ballistic missile defenses and the ABM Treaty.

4. DEFENSE CONVERSION DIVISION (SEA/DC)

The Defense Conversion Division is responsible for development, negotiation, and implementation of defense industry conversion policies and programs, principally with states of the former Soviet Union and China. Particular attention has been given to the development of entrepreneurial training workshops for FSU nuclear weapons scientists and managers. This division is ACDA's center for participation in bilateral Commissions on Defense Industry Conversion between the United States and Russia, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.

E. INTELLIGENCE, VERIFICATION, AND INFORMATION SUPPORT BUREAU (IVI)

This bureau develops verification policy, compliance assessment, and intelligence analysis. It:

- provides research and technical analysis to other ACDA bureaus;
- coordinates and integrates agency-wide perspectives on substantive compliance, verification, and implementation issues;
- compiles, maintains and analyzes all relevant arms control and nonproliferation data in support of agency requirements for compliance assessment and adjudication;
- establishes, manages, and maintains all information systems within the agency;
- monitors and assures the availability of U.S. technical systems to implement existing treaties;
- coordinates arms control and nonproliferation research;
- provides the definitive repository for negotiating records and electronic treaty texts; and
- analyzes economic aspects of arms control and national security.

1. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE DIVISION (IVI/VC)

The Verification and Compliance Division provides analytical and technical expertise in five principal areas:

- developing measures and techniques for verification of arms control agreements under negotiation;
- implementation of verification measures incorporated in arms control agreements now in force;
- assessment of the compliance of other countries with arms control agreements;
- presentation of verification-related issues to other U.S. Government agencies, Congress and the public; and
- coordination of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament research and development.

The Verification and Compliance Division participation in the development and assessment of verification methods includes preparing papers for the interagency community to address U.S. verification capabilities and requirements. The division provides experts to participate in trial inspection exercises and actual inspections, offers "lessons learned" from U.S. experience in implementing previous agreements, and coordinates with the On-Site Inspection Agency on logistics. The division drafts, with interagency coordination, the President's annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements which is included in this report for the first time, as well as the formal reports, required by Section 37 of the ACDA Act, evaluating U.S. ability to verify the provisions of specific agreements.

2. INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DIVISION (IVI/VR)

The Intelligence Resources Division:

- provides current intelligence to the Director and his senior staff on a daily basis;
- represents ACDA to the United States Intelligence Community;
- participates in Intelligence Community production committees and other bodies, providing an interface between the intelligence producer and the policy-making consumer;
- states ACDA's formal requirements for intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting;
- acts as repository and distribution agent for Intelligence Community information on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament; and
- ensures that ACDA is aware of all intelligence data relevant to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

3. INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIVISION (IVI/IRA)

The Intelligence Research and Analysis Division:

- provides in-depth intelligence support and analysis for the Director and Bureaus;
- conducts focused research into arms control and proliferation issues;
- prepares intelligence briefs and reports; and
- requests specialized reporting and analysis from the Intelligence Community.

The division is staffed by four analysts and a supervisor detailed from the Intelligence Community.

4. OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OFFICE (IVI/OI)

The Office of Operations Analysis and Information Management provides research support for arms control and proliferation issues, and is responsible for computer support to the Agency. OI provides four major services:

- Produces quantitative analytical studies in support of ACDA bureaus and offices, develops computer software for the Agency, supports ACDA's role as the government coordinator of arms control research, and prepares the Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research;
- Supports defense conversion, transparency in armaments, and economic aid analysis, and is responsible for preparing the Annual Report to Congress on World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT);
- Develops information management systems for the Agency and the Government arms control community, and maintains the federally mandated Arms Control Community On-Line Repository of Treaty Data (ACCORD) database, a computerized repository of data exchanged under arms control treaties and the official Government archives for treaty data; operates the Agency Records Management Program; and,
- Provides computer operations support for all ACDA sites, including those overseas.

F. NONPROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL BUREAU (NP)

ACDA's Bureau of Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control develops and implements policies in support of:

- nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile delivery systems;
- controls on international transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technology;
- efficient and effective export controls for U.S. products;
- commercial space policy issues; and
- regional arms control initiatives designed to reduce tension, promote or maintain peace, and remove incentives for arms races or development of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.

1. INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AFFAIRS DIVISION (NP/INA)

This division provides advice, assessments, and policy recommendations on the international relations aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, including:

- the Treaty of Tlatelolco and other nuclear weapon free zones;
- the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- cooperation among nuclear supplier countries, especially multilateral export controls, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee;
- U.S. agreements for civil nuclear cooperation;
- regional arms control approaches to reducing incentives for proliferation;
- preparing the unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement that is required by law for each proposed agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation;
- providing the President with ACDA views on U.S. nuclear export control issues.

2. NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY EXTENSION DIVISION (NP/NPT)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Division is responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing U.S. Government strategy related to all NPT matters, including the preparations for the extension of the Treaty at the 1995 NPT Conference. This division:

- provided advice, assessments, and policy recommendations to the U.S. Government on all aspects of the NPT;
- initiated or participated extensively in NPT diplomacy with other Treaty parties;
- monitored international and multilateral developments relating to the NPT; and
- lead NPT-related meetings and conferences promulgating U.S. Government views on the NPT.

The division works closely with the INA and NST Divisions in the NP Bureau on a number of related issues, including export control initiatives, security assurances, safeguards issues, and U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation with NPT parties.

3. NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION (NP/NST)

This division:

- provides technical advice and policy recommendations on nuclear proliferation issues including the IAEA safeguards system, nuclear fuel cycle, and the technological aspects of nuclear nonproliferation;
- develops safeguards concepts;
- monitors and seeks to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system;
- holds bilateral consultations on these matters with experts abroad;
- develops safeguards and other technical concepts related to the Administration's nuclear nonproliferation initiatives;
- participates in guiding the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance for IAEA Safeguards and recruiting/training of U.S. nationals for service at the IAEA;
- makes recommendations on new safeguards agreements, and on U.S. assistance to IAEA technical cooperation efforts;
- monitors and helps guide the IAEA's program of technical assistance;
- assesses the safeguards and nonproliferation implications of emerging technologies; and
- assists in the implementation of nonproliferation initiatives, including spent fuel storage.

4. WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY CONTROL DIVISION (WTC)

The Weapons and Technology Control Division deals with the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, missile delivery systems, conventional armaments, and dual-use technology transfer, and with regional arms control of these capabilities. This division:

- is ACDA's center for missile, chemical, and biological weapons nonproliferation efforts including the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group;
- assesses the arms control implications of proposed arms and technology transfers;
- represents ACDA in the preparation of the Administration's annual security assistance programs;
- develops policy initiatives in related areas including advanced weapons and space launch vehicle technology controls;
- develops and supports regional security and arms control initiatives;
- represents ACDA in arms, dual-use technology transfer, and export control policy development; and
- provides the ACDA member of the National Disclosure Policy Committee, which reviews the release of classified technical information to foreign governments for support of U.S. weapons systems.

G. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

The Office of the General Counsel is responsible for all matters of domestic and international law relevant to the work of the agency. The Office is particularly involved in the drafting and negotiating of arms control treaties and agreements, and their ratification, implementation, interpretation, review, and revision. An attorney from the Office serves as the Legal Adviser to each U.S. delegation led by ACDA or led by any other U.S. Government agency. ACDA attorneys have most recently played a significant role in negotiations on:

- Comprehensive Test Ban;
- Safety, Security, and Dismantlement;
- Chemical Weapons;
- Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with EURATOM.

ACDA attorneys also serve as Legal Adviser to U.S. delegations to conferences reviewing existing arms control agreements, including the Special Conference to the Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 Experts Group Meetings to prepare for the review conference of the convention on conventional weapons, and to U.S. delegations at sessions of several implementing commissions, including the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (START implementation), the Joint Consultative Group (CFE implementation), the Standing Consultative Commission (ABM implementation), the Special Verification Commission (INF implementation), the Bilateral Consultative Commission (TTBT implementation), the Open Skies Consultative Commission (Open Skies Implementation), and the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (preparation for CWC implementation). The Office is also responsible for all legal aspects of the nonproliferation responsibilities of the Agency. During the past year, attorneys from the Office played a central role in preparations for the 1995 review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, ratification of the Open Skies Treaty, and submission of the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

In addition, the Office of the General Counsel handles all legal matters relating to arms control policy formulation and ACDA legislative programs, including the drafting, application and interpretation of such legislation. The Office carries out liaison as required with the Legislative Reference Division of the Office of Management and Budget. As counsel to the Director, the Office handles all legal aspects of Agency policies and operations in the areas of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), contracts, procurement, and fiscal and other administrative matters.

H. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)

The Office of Public Affairs fulfills ACDA's legislated mandate for the "dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament."

In 1994, The Office of Public Affairs streamlined its organization by eliminating two divisions to meet the guidelines of the National Performance Review. Nevertheless, ACDA

Public Affairs remains committed to providing the highest quality information to all of its customers. We welcome suggestions as we continuously strive to improve our products and services.

1. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PUBLICATIONS

PA produces a range of materials⁹, including brochures, fact sheets, press releases, compendiums of treaties and agreements, historical documents, and the ACDA Newsletter.

PA fills thousands of information requests each year. Responding to steadily increasing demand, we have established a toll free number (1- 800-581-ACDA) for publications requests, and an Electronic Bulletin Board (202-736-4436).

Under the aegis of the National Security Council, the Public Diplomacy Interagency Working Group coordinates public diplomacy activities and drafts and produces public diplomacy materials. The Working Group is chaired by the ACDA Director of Public Affairs.

2. PUBLIC AND MEDIA LIAISON

PA manages and implements a comprehensive Speakers' Program, coordinating senior Agency officials' engagements with academic, business, non-governmental, and congressional audiences on arms control issues.

Technical Reference Center

The Technical Reference Center is an integral part of the Office of Public Affairs, maintaining for circulation and reference a collection of books, periodicals, and documents on arms control, nonproliferation and related subjects.

I. OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)

The ACDA Office of Congressional Affairs is the center for the Executive Branch's efforts in support of ratification of arms control treaties and agreements. It responds to Congressional interest in arms control by arranging briefings, seminars, and consultations between ACDA officials and legislators or their staffs. It coordinates Congressional travel to negotiating fora, and accompanies legislators and staffs on travel. It advises the Director of the legislative and policy implications of all arms control issues and proposals. The office coordinates responses to Congressional inquiries and appearances of ACDA officials before Congressional committees. In addition, OCA routinely distributes informational material on arms control issues to legislators and their staffs.

⁹For a list of publications, see Appendix B.

J. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

The Office of Administration provides full administrative support to ACDA and all of its components, including the negotiating staffs in Geneva, Switzerland; Vienna, Austria; and The Hague, The Netherlands.

1. PERSONNEL AND GENERAL SERVICES DIVISION

This division manages the ACDA human resources program and serves as the Agency's liaison with the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, the General Services Administration, the Department of Labor, and other agencies concerned with personnel and employment related issues. The division provides support services including the receipt and distribution of mail and other communications, requisitioning of administrative supplies and services, space and property management, and physical safety and emergency planning.

2. CONTRACTS DIVISION

This division is responsible for all matters concerning acquisition planning, solicitation of offers. It handles negotiation, award, administration, close-out or termination, and settlement of all Agency contracts, reimbursable agreements, grants, purchase orders and delivery orders.

The division receives all unsolicited proposals and invoices/vouchers.

3. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT DIVISION

This division is responsible for the overall financial management of the Agency and serves as the Agency's liaison with congressional committees, the Office of Management and Budget, and with other agencies concerned with financial management. This includes the preparation, formulation, presentation, and execution of ACDA's budget, accounting, and travel management, and all fiscal support and payroll responsibilities.

4. GENEVA ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT DIVISION

This division provides the full range of administrative support services to various arms control delegations conducting meetings and conferences in Geneva, Switzerland and other overseas locations. This support includes personnel, procurement, travel, space, communications and other support services.

XIII. FELLOWSHIPS

A. WILLIAMS C. FOSTER FELLOWS VISITING SCHOLARS PROGRAM

This ACDA program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament was established by Congress in 1983. The purpose of the program is "to give specialists in the physical sciences and other disciplines relevant to ACDA's activities an opportunity for active participation in the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament activities of the Agency and to gain, for the Agency, the perspective and expertise such persons can offer." In honor of the first director of ACDA, William C. Foster, these visiting scholars are known as William C. Foster Fellows.

Candidates for the Fellowship, who must be tenured or tenure-track faculty members at a U.S. college or university, are chosen by a board chaired by the current ACDA director and composed of all former directors of the Agency. ACDA began this program by competitively seeking up to six visiting scholars for the 1984-85 academic year, and this process has continued each subsequent year, with the number increasing to seven visiting scholars in the past year. Since 1984, 25 fellows have served at ACDA. Appointments are made for a full year in one of ACDA's four bureaus.

Fellows chosen for the 1994-95 year are:

Robert J. Hargrove, Ph.D., Mercer University, Department of Chemistry; assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence, Verification and Information Support;

Allan S. Krass, Ph.D., Amherst College, School of Natural Science; assigned to the Bureau of Nonproliferation Policy and Regional Arms Control;

Peter Purdue, Ph.D., Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Operations Research; assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence, Verification and Information Support;

William Roggenthen, Ph.D., South Dakota School of Mines and Technology, Department of Geology and Geological Engineering; assigned to the Bureau of Multilateral Affairs;

Karl W. Ryavec, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, Department of Political Science; assigned to the Bureau of Strategic and Eurasian Affairs;

Alvin Saperstein, Ph.D., Wayne State University, Department of Physics; assigned to the Bureau of Strategic and Eurasian Affairs;

Shelton L. Williams, Ph.D., Austin College, Department of International Education; assigned to the Bureau of Nonproliferation Policy and Regional Arms Control.

B. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY DOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Hubert H. Humphrey Doctoral Fellowships in Arms Control and Disarmament, designed to encourage specialized training and research in arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament, are sponsored by ACDA as a part of its legislatively-mandated responsibilities for the conduct, support and coordination of arms control research. Named in honor of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, a strong arms control advocate, these grants provide tuition assistance and stipends to advanced graduate students completing dissertations on arms control related topics. Candidates for the J.D. degree are also eligible for Humphrey Fellowships during their third year of study. Candidate applications, including abstracts of Ph.D. dissertation or J.D. thesis topics, are reviewed by a panel of academic consultants and by a selection committee. Fellows receive a stipend of up to \$5,000 plus a maximum of \$3,400 to defray the cost of tuition and fees. Seventeen rounds of competition have been held since the inception of the program in 1979, and 78 awards have been made to date.

The following students received Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Awards for the 1994-95 academic year:

Peter J. Ekberg, Columbia Law School

Thesis Title: "The Law of Landmines: Less Bang for More Buck"

Douglas C. Foyle, Duke University

Dissertation Title: "The Domestic Sources in International Behavior: The Influence of Public Opinion on American Foreign Policy Decision Making"

Piper A. Hodson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Dissertation Title: "Framing Proliferation: Insights from Prospect Theory"

Shane J. Maddock, University of Connecticut

Dissertation Title: "The American and Soviet Quest for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945-1970"

Catherine H. Tinsley, Northwestern University

Dissertation Title: "Cross-Cultural Differences in Cognitive Structure and their Impact on Dispute Resolution"

APPENDIX A: ARMS CONTROL AND RELATED TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS MEASURES

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty)

Requires parties to the Treaty not to conduct nuclear weapon tests, or any other nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, beyond atmospheric limits including outer space, or underwater. Signed August 5, 1963; entered into force October 10, 1963.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Obligates Latin American Parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Signed February 14, 1967; entered into force April 22, 1968.

Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America

Calls on nations outside the Treaty zone to apply its denuclearization provisions to the territories in the zone "for which de jure or de facto they are internationally responsible." Signed May 26, 1977; ratified by the United States November 19, 1981.

Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Obligates nuclear-weapon states to respect the denuclearized status of the zone; not to contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the Parties; and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American Parties. Signed April 1, 1968; ratified by the United States May 8, 1971.

Agreement of 17 February 1989 Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Establishes acceptance by the U.S. of full-scope safeguards for its territories in the Treaty area. Signed February 17, 1989; entered into force April 6, 1989.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty)

Designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Signed July 1, 1968; entered into force March 5, 1970.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Designed to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear material. Signed March 3, 1980; entered into force February 8, 1987.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (and Protocol Thereto)

Provides for the application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in designated nuclear facilities in the United States. Signed November 18, 1977; entered into force December 9, 1980.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Arms Control Treaty)

Prohibits nations from using the seabed as a new environment for military installations, including those capable of launching nuclear weapons. Signed February 11, 1971; entered into force May 18, 1972.

Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("Accident Measures" Agreement)

Requires cooperation to reduce the risk that an accidental or unauthorized action might trigger nuclear disaster. Signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971.

Common Understanding Related to Articles 2 and 5 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971 (June 14, 1985)

Clarifies the meaning of "unexplained nuclear incidents" found in Article 5 of the Agreement on Measures and other terms found in Article 2.

Interim Agreement Between the U.S.A and USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I Interim Agreement)

Freezes existing aggregate levels of American and Soviet strategic nuclear missile launchers and submarines until an agreement on more comprehensive measures can be reached. Signed May 26, 1972; entered into force October 3, 1972.

Treaty Between the U.S.A and USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)

Provides that the two Parties may each have only two ABM system deployment areas, so restricted and so located that they could not provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for one. Signed May 26, 1972; entered into force October 3, 1972.

Protocol Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Limits each Party to a single ABM system deployment area. Signed July 3, 1974; entered into force May 24, 1976.

Protocol on Procedures Governing the Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3, 1974)

Implements the ABM Treaty by establishing procedures for the replacement and dismantling or destruction of ABM systems.

Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 (October 28, 1976), (Including the Integral Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5)

Implements the ABM Treaty by establishing procedures for the replacement, dismantling, or destruction of operational ABM systems and the exchange of ABM system deployment areas.

Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (November 1, 1978) (Including the Integral Commissioners' Identical Conformed Statements Read at the Signing of the Agreed Statement)

Defines test ranges within the meaning of Article IV of the ABM Treaty on the basis of the presence of ABM components for testing, identifies the current test ranges for each side, and sets forth procedures of notifying the other Party when a new test range is established. The Agreed Statement also specifies criteria for applying the term "tested in an ABM mode" as used in the ABM Treaty to ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Finally, the Agreed Statement specifies that the ABM Treaty permits air defense radars located at ABM test ranges to carry out air defense functions, but to avoid ambiguous situations or misunderstandings, provides that the sides will refrain from concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM system components co-located at the same test range, and that air defense radars utilized as instrumentation equipment will not be used to make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles.

Common Understanding Related to Paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (June 6, 1985)

Specifies the criteria for concurrent operation of ABM components and air defense system components.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War

Commits the two nations to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons an "objective of their policies." Signed and entered into force on June 22, 1973.

Treaty Between the U.S.A and USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty)

Prohibits underground nuclear weapon tests of more than 150 kilotons. Signed July 3, 1974; entered into force December 11, 1990.

Treaty Between the U.S.A and USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful

Purposes (PNE Treaty)

Governs all underground nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside U.S. and Soviet weapon test sites specified under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and limits any individual nuclear explosion to 150 kilotons. Signed May 28, 1976; entered into force December 11, 1990.

Treaty Between the U.S. and USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II Treaty)

Replaces the SALT I Interim Agreement (which expired in October 1977) with one, lasting through 1985, having broader scope and more detailed constraints on U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms. Signed June 18, 1979; the Treaty was never ratified.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Establishes a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in each nation's capital as well as a special facsimile communications link between the Centers to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Signed and entered into force September 15, 1987.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)

Establishes an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to eliminate and ban all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range capability of between 300 and 3,400 miles (500 and 5,500 kms). Signed December 8, 1987; entered into force June 1, 1988.

Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Term, "Weapons Delivery Vehicle." The Exchange of Notes Was Done in Geneva May 11-12, 1988.

Defines "weapon delivery vehicle" used in Article II of the Treaty. Made part of the Treaty by the U.S. Senate and the exchange of notes upon entry into force of the INF Treaty. Entered into force June 1, 1988.

Agreed Minute of May 12, 1988

Adds a number of understandings, chiefly concerning the conduct of inspections. Made part of the Treaty by the Senate and the exchange of notes upon entry into force of the INF Treaty. Entered into force June 1, 1988.

Agreed Statement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Establishes rules concerning the application of Treaty inspection procedures at the U.S. continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, Russia. Signed and entered into force December 8, 1988.

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Procedures for the Operation of the Special Verification Commission

Establishes procedures for the operation of the Commission established by Article XIII of the INF Treaty. Signed and entered into force December 20, 1988.

Agreed Statement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Establishes rules concerning application of Treaty inspection procedures in connection with the INF Treaty at the USSR's continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, Utah. Signed and entered into force June 9, 1989.

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

Contains implementation arrangements, lists of inspection equipment and procedures for its use. Signed and entered into force December 21, 1989.

Amendment I to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 21, 1989

Contains a technical description of the system for measuring the length and diameter of the second stage of the SS-25 missile and procedures for its use to implement paragraph 14 (c) of Section IX of the INF Treaty's Inspection Protocol. Signed and entered into force April 4, 1991.

Amendment II to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 21, 1989

Permits U.S. and USSR inspectors conducting INF inspections to use personal dosimeters for the purpose of personal health monitoring. Signed and entered into force April 4, 1991.

Amendment III to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 21, 1989

Establishes principles and procedures for settlement of INF Treaty expenses related to the conduct of inspections pursuant to the Treaty. Signed and entered into force December 11, 1991.

Amendment IV to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 21, 1989

Establishes procedures for updating diplomatic clearance numbers and flight routes for INF inspection airplanes. Signed and entered into force December 11, 1991.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles

Obligates each Party to notify the other no less than 24 hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any planned launch of an ICBM or SLBM. Signed and entered into force May 31, 1988.

Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Provides for additional verification provisions. Signed on June 1, 1990 and entered into force on December 11, 1990.

Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Provides for additional verification provisions. Signed June 1, 1990. Entered into force December 1, 1990.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)

Establishes significantly reduced limits for intercontinental ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and warheads; submarine launched ballistic missile launchers and warheads; and heavy bombers and their armaments including long-range nuclear air launched cruise missiles. Signed July 31, 1991; Senate consented to ratification October 1, 1992; has not yet entered into force.

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Lisbon START Protocol)

Enables implementation of the START Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The protocol constitutes an amendment to and is an integral part of the START Treaty and provides for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to succeed to the Soviet Union's obligations under the Treaty. Also, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine commit themselves to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states in the shortest possible time. In accompanying letters they commit themselves to eliminate all nuclear weapons from their territory within seven years. Signed May 23, 1992. The U.S. Senate consented to ratification October 1, 1992; Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia have ratified, with Belarus and Kazakhstan and Ukraine acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Joint Statement on Korean Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Calls for full implementation by Russia and the United States of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; dated June 17, 1992.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and Prevention of Weapons Proliferation

Establishes an agreement by the United States to assist the Russian Federation in destroying its nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; to provide safe and secure transportation and storage of such weapons in connection with their destruction; and to establish additional verifiable measures against the proliferation of such weapons. Signed and entered into force June 17, 1992.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Resulting from the Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons in Russia

Establishes an agreement by the parties to convert as soon as practicable highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons into low enriched uranium (LEU) for fuel in commercial nuclear reactors, and to establish appropriate measures to fulfill the non-proliferation, physical security, material accounting and control, and environmental requirements with respect to HEU and LEU subject to the agreement. Signed and entered into force on February 18, 1993.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Belarus Concerning Emergency Response and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Establishes an agreement by the United States to assist the Republic of Belarus in responding to emergencies related to removing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems from Belarus for destruction and in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Signed and took effect October 22, 1992.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)

Calls for the United States of America and the Russian Federation further to reduce strategic offensive arms by eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs (including all "heavy" ICBMs) and reducing the overall total of warheads for each side to between 3000 and 3500. Signed January 3, 1993; will enter into force following ratification by the U.S. and Russia and entry into force of the START I Treaty of 1991.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ukraine concerning assistance to Ukraine in the elimination of strategic nuclear arms, and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Establishes an agreement by the United States to assist Ukraine in the elimination of strategic nuclear arms located in Ukraine; assist and cooperate in the establishment of measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, to include the technology and expertise related to such weapons; and the expansion of emergency response capabilities in connection of the removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine for destruction and the

elimination of strategic nuclear arms. Signed on October 25, 1993; will take effect when both Parties exchange diplomatic notes confirming the completion by each Party of all applicable procedures required for the entry into force of this agreement. (The United States provided such a note to Ukraine on December 4, 1993; as of December 14, the U.S. was awaiting Ukraine's response.)

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning the destruction of Silo Launchers of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Emergency Response, and the Prevention of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Establishes an agreement by the United States to assist the Republic of Kazakhstan in the destruction of ICBM silo launchers, and other activities related to the destruction of strategic offensive arms located in Kazakhstan; to assist in the establishment of verifiable measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, to include the technology, expertise and materials related to such weapons; to expand emergency response capabilities in connection with the removal of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan for destruction; and to provide other assistance related to the destruction of strategic offensive arms located in Kazakhstan. Signed and entered into force on December 13, 1993.

II. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MEASURES

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (The Geneva Protocol)

Restates the prohibition of the 1919 Versailles and 1922 Washington Treaties against the use of poisonous gases, and adds a ban on bacteriological warfare. Signed June 17, 1925; entered into force February 8, 1928.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention)

Establishes an agreement by the parties to the Convention not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as related weapons and means of delivery. Signed April 10, 1972; entered into force March 26, 1975.

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Provides for early data exchange and visits designed to facilitate the negotiation, signature and ratification of a global ban on chemical weapons. Signed and entered into force September 23, 1989.

US-USSR Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement

Calls for the destruction of the vast bulk of the U.S. and Soviet declared chemical weapons stockpiles, with on-site inspection to determine that destruction has taken place. Signed June 1, 1990; it has not yet entered into force.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC)

Establishes an agreement drafted by the 39 nations of the Conference on Disarmament to ban chemical weapons worldwide. Forwarded to the United Nations on September 7, 1992 and endorsed by consensus, with 145 co-sponsors, on November 30, 1992. The CWC was opened for signature in Paris January 13, 1993. It will enter into force 180 days after deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but no earlier than two years after its opening for signature.

III. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MEASURES

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Reduces and sets ceilings from the Atlantic to the Urals on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating large scale offensive operations. Signed by the 34 NATO and Warsaw Pact states November 19, 1990; applied provisionally July 17, 1992; entered into force November 9, 1992.

Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Oslo Final Document)

Enables implementation of the CFE Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Notes the May 15, 1992 Agreement in Tashkent among the states successors of the USSR on the principles and procedures for implementing the CFE Treaty. Signed and entered into force June 5, 1992.

Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1A)

Establishes national limits on the personnel strength of CFE states-Parties' conventional armed forces in the Atlantic to the Urals area. Signed July 10, 1992; entered into force July 17, 1992.

IV. MISSILE AND SPACE WEAPON MEASURES

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Establishes an agreement by the parties to the Treaty not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the Moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Signed January 27, 1967; entered into force October 10, 1967.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

A multilateral political agreement between the United States and its G-7 (Economic Summit) allies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and Japan) to control the export of missile-related technologies. Announced on April 16, 1987.

V. REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

The Antarctic Treaty

Internationalizes and demilitarizes the Antarctic Continent and provides for its cooperative exploration and future use. Signed December 1, 1959; entered into force June 23, 1961.

See also Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), signed February 14, 1967 (and related protocols and agreements), under section I, Controlling Nuclear Weapons.

Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Helsinki Final Act)

Establishes an agreement among the U.S., Soviet Union and 33 other nations to provide notification of major military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops, and other confidence-building measures. Signed and entered into force August 1, 1975.

Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm Document)

Contains a set of six concrete and mutually complementary CSBMs, including mandatory ground or aerial inspection of military activities, that improved upon those contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Adopted September 19, 1986; entered into force January 1, 1987.

Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (2 Plus 4 Treaty)

Reunifies East and West Germany and places limits on location of military forces. Signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic September 12, 1990; entered into force October 3, 1990.

Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Incorporates Stockholm Document of 1986. Adds measures related to transparency about military forces and activities, improved communications and contacts, and verification. Adopted November 17, 1990; entered into force January 1, 1991.

See also Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), signed November 19, 1990, page 23, under section on Controlling Conventional Weapons.

Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Incorporates the Vienna Document 1990. Added further measures related to transparency regarding military forces and activities, and constraints on military activities. Expands the zone of application for CSBMs to include the territory of USSR successor states which were beyond the traditional zone in Europe (i.e., all of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, ▶

Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). Adopted March 4, 1992; entered into force May 1, 1992.

Treaty on Open Skies

Commits member nations in Eurasia and North America to open their airspace, on a reciprocal basis, permitting the overflight of their territory by unarmed observation aircraft in order to strengthen confidence and transparency with respect to their military activities. Signed and applied provisionally March 24, 1992; ratified by the United States November 2, 1993; has not yet entered into force.

VI. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs)

Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of A Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line" Agreement)

Assures quick and reliable communications between the heads of governments of the nuclear superpowers. Signed and entered into force June 20, 1963.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the U.S.-USSR Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line" Modernization Agreement)

Establishes two satellite communications circuits, with multiple terminals in each country. Signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the Direct Communications Link

Adds a facsimile transmission capability to the "Hot Line." Signed and entered into force July 17, 1984.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Modifying the Memorandum of Understanding of June 20, 1963 Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link

Further improves the Direct Communications Link by integrating advanced facsimile capabilities. Notes exchanged and entered into force June 24, 1988.

See also, "Accidents Measures" Agreement, signed September 30, 1971, and subsequent Common Understanding (June 14, 1985), in section I, Controlling Weapons.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Provides for cooperation to reduce the risk of naval conflict due to accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication. Signed and entered into force May 25, 1972.

See also Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War (signed and entered into force on June 23, 1973), in section I, Controlling Nuclear Weapons; Agreement Between the United States of

America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, signed September 15, 1987; and, Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (signed May 31, 1988), under section I, Controlling Nuclear Weapons.

Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities

Establishes cooperative procedures to prevent and resolve peacetime incidents between the armed forces of the U.S. and USSR. Signed June 12, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.

Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises

Establishes a confidence-building measure requiring notification of major strategic exercises which include heavy bomber aircraft. Signed September 23, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.

See also, Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), adopted November 17, 1990, in section on Regional Arms Control; Vienna Document 1992, adopted March 4, 1992 in section on Regional Arms Control; and, Treaty on Open Skies, signed March 24, 1992, under Regional Arms Control.

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

Prohibits the hostile use of certain environmental modification techniques having widespread, long lasting and severe effects. Signed May 18, 1977; entered into force October 5, 1978.

Joint Russian-American Declaration on Defense Conversion

Establishes a declaration by the United States and the Russian Federation of their intention to devote priority to cooperation in advancing defense conversion. Dated June 17, 1992.

Memorandum on Cooperation in the Field of Defense Conversion

Reaffirms the commitment of the United States and the Russian Federation to cooperate in defense conversion and identify six examples of mutually beneficial cooperative activities. Dated December 16, 1993.

APPENDIX B: ACDA PUBLICATIONS

The following publications may be obtained free of charge from:

Office of Public Affairs
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
320 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20451.
fax (202) 647-6928.

For further information, call Wanda Cooper at 1-800-581-ACDA

ARTICLES/NEWS ITEMS

ACDA News (Daily compilation of news items)
ACDA News Roundup (Chronology of media reports on a single issue)
ACDA News Special Edition (Bi-weekly compilation of journal articles)
Current Articles of Interest (Bibliography of articles published monthly)

ACDA/ARMS CONTROL

ACDA Legislation Pending in Congress
ACDA's Mission
Acronyms: Glossary of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Acronyms
Arms Control and ACDA in the Post Cold War World (FACT SHEET, June 1993)
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (1990 edition)
Chronology of Arms Control and Related Treaties and Agreements Including Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, and Measures Related to Transparency, Non-Proliferation and Defense Conversion, When Signed and When Entered Into Force (FACT SHEET, December 20, 1993)
Confirmation Hearing for Director Designate of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, October 28, 1993)
John D. Holum, Director of Arms Control Agency to Hold Press Breakfast (PRESS RELEASE, January 20, 1995)
John D. Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to Speak at Carnegie Endowment (PRESS RELEASE, January 12, 1995)
Letter from President Clinton to John D. Holum on His Swearing In as Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (OFFICIAL TEXT, December 16, 1993)
Mr. Giovanni Snidle, Bureau of Nonproliferation Policy and Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Awarded the 1993 Arthur S. Flemming Award (PRESS RELEASE, May 12, 1994)
New Director of ACDA Sees Greater Role for Revitalized Agency (PRESS RELEASE, December 14, 1993)
Office of Information Management Selected as One of Computerworld's Best Places to Work (PRESS RELEASE, December 8, 1994)

Opening Statement by Senator Pell on the Nomination of John D. Holum to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 28, 1993)

President Affirms ACDA's Vital Role (PRESS RELEASE, April 4, 1994)

President Approves ACDA Revitalization (PRESS RELEASE, May 2, 1994)

President Clinton Names Stanley Riveles to Standing Consultative Commission (PRESS RELEASE, December 9, 1994)

President Clinton Names Three Assistant Directors to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, April 29, 1994)

President Names Holum to Head ACDA (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 6, 1993)

Ralph Earle II Sworn In as Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, August 29, 1994)

Report to Congress on Arms Control and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1992 (June 22, 1993)

Report to Congress on Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1993 (August 25, 1994)

Senate Confirms Assistant Director for the Multilateral Affairs Bureau U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, October 7, 1994)

Senate Confirms Five Senior Appointees for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, July 18, 1994)

Senate Confirms John Holum as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, November 22, 1993)

Statement by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (OFFICIAL TEXT, August 12, 1994)

Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies on the Review of the Future Role of ACDA (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 17, 1993)

Statement of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies (OFFICIAL TEXT, February 10, 1994)

Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 28, 1994)

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Annual Report to the Congress 1994

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 30th Anniversary (PRESS RELEASE, September 20, 1991)

ADDRESSES, SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS

Address by Dr. Edward J. Lacey, Acting Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Implementation, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Fall Meeting of the Biological and Biotechnology Section of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Baltimore, Maryland (September 29, 1992)

Address by Michael D. Rosenthal, Division Chief for International Nuclear Affairs Nonproliferation Policy Bureau, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the American Nuclear Society, San Diego, California (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 21, 1993)

Address by Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Sixth UN Meeting on Peace and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific Region, Kathmandu, Nepal (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 31, 1994)

Address of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the National Security Breakfast Seminars Co-Sponsored by the American Defense Preparedness Association and the National Defense University Foundation (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 16, 1994)

Address of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in a Panel on the Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations Sponsored by the United Nations NGO Committee on Disarmament (OFFICIAL TEXT, April 2, 1994)

Address of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to a Conference on "Bombs, Carrots, and Sticks," Sponsored by the Fourth Freedom Forum and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and Hosted by the University of Notre Dame (OFFICIAL TEXT, April 8, 1994)

Address of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to a Seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention Sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 31, 1994)

Address of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Center for National Security Negotiations, Wilton Park Conference, United Kingdom (OFFICIAL TEXT, April 25, 1994)

Address to the Seventh Multinational Conference on Theater Missile Defense by Dr. Stanley Riveles, Acting Commissioner U.S. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 21, 1994)

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament: "Non-Proliferation: Points of View of Latin America and the Caribbean," Address to a Seminar Sponsored by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) in Cancun, Mexico (ARMS CONTROL TEXT, January 12, 1995)

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament: "The Prospects for NPT Extension," Speech Before the Arms Control Association Annual Meeting (ARMS CONTROL TEXT, January 18, 1995)

Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Treaties and Agreements: An Update - Presented by Mr. Alfred Lieberman, Chief, Operations Analysis and Information Management Office, Bureau of Intelligence, Verification and Information Management, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, MORS Symposium, Colorado Springs, Colorado (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 6-9, 1994)

Conference on Disarmament: U.S. Plenary Speech by Ambassador Stephen Ledogar (OFFICIAL TEXT, July 23, 1992)

Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Speaks at Opening of Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (PRESS RELEASE, January 25, 1994)

"The Extension of the NPT," Statement by Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the American Bar Association and Center for National Security Law Conference on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, D.C. (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 10, 1994)

The Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: "The Most Important Year in the History of Arms Control: No Time for U.S. Retreat," Remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (ARMS CONTROL TEXT, January 18, 1995)

The Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: "Verification in the Arms Control Implementation Era," Remarks to a Conference on Arms Control and Verification Sponsored by The John Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist University (ARMS CONTROL TEXT, November 18, 1994)

Joint Statement by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 16, 1994)

Joint Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America (New York, June 11, 1993) (FACT SHEET, June 22, 1993)

Joint Statement on CFE (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 1, 1990)

Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 1, 1990)

Joint Statement on Issues of Export Controls and Policy in the Area of Transfers of Conventional Weapons and Dual-Use Technologies (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 16, 1994)

Joint Statement on Nonproliferation (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 4, 1990)

Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 1, 1990)

Joint Statement on the U.S.-Russian Commission on Conversion of Defense Industry (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 11, 1993)

Message from the President to the Conference on Disarmament (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 25, 1994)

"1995 NPT Extension Conference," Statement by Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the U.S.-Japan Study Group on "Nonproliferation and Arms Control After the Cold War" (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 18, 1994)

"The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): A Twenty-Five Year Success Story," Statement by Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the International Conference on the Renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Sponsored by Fondazione "Alcide de Gasperi," Rome, Italy (OFFICIAL TEXT, July 2-3, 1994)

Remarks by Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger Upon Signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, Paris, France (January 13, 1993)

Remarks by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, India (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 1, 1994)

Remarks by the President to CSCE Conference, Helsinki (July 9, 1992)

Remarks of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at a Press Conference, Geneva, Switzerland (OFFICIAL TEXT, August 4, 1994)

Remarks of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to a Conference Co-Sponsored by the Center for National Security Law and the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 10, 1994)

Remarks of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to a Conference on NPT Review and Extension at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (OFFICIAL TEXT, July 19, 1994)

Remarks of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Des Moines Chapter of the Council on Foreign Relations (OFFICIAL TEXT, July 20, 1994)

"Some Personal Observations on Proliferation in the 1990s," Keynote Address by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the AFCEA Seminar on Mobilizing the U.S. Counterproliferation Effort—May 24-25, 1993 (PRESS RELEASE, June 7, 1993)

"Some Reflections on Transparency," Remarks of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before a Symposium on Openness and Secrecy in the Nuclear Age, Sponsored by the National Press Club (OFFICIAL TEXT, May 19, 1994)

Speech by Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Committee on Disarmament's Annual Disarmament Symposium, New York (OFFICIAL TEXT, April 21, 1994)

Speech by Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Conference on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation, Bariloche, Argentina (OFFICIAL TEXT, April 19, 1994)

Speech by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the Arms Control Association Annual Dinner, December 13, 1993 (OFFICIAL TEXT, December 13, 1993)

Speech by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland, January 25, 1994 (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 25, 1994)

Statement by John D. Holum, Director Designate U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 28, 1993)

Statement by Mr. Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Second Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 21, 1994)

Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (FACT SHEET, July 10, 1992)

Statement by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III at the Signing of the START Protocol—Lisbon, Portugal (May 23, 1992)

Statement by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland (OFFICIAL TEXT, August 4, 1994)

Statement by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the First Committee of the 49th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in General Debate (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 18, 1994)

Statement by the President Concerning Talks Between the U.S. and North Korea in New York on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 11, 1993)

Statement by the President on the Chemical Weapons Convention (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 13, 1993)

Statement by the President on the New Chemical Weapons Initiative (OFFICIAL TEXT, May 13, 1991)

Statement by the Press Secretary, Lehman Paper - Concluding the Chemical Weapons Convention (FACT SHEET, August 13, 1992)

Statement by the Press Secretary on Extending the Moratorium on Nuclear Testing (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 15, 1994)

Statement by the Press Secretary on Senate's Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the CFE Treaty (November 25, 1991)

Statement by the Press Secretary on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 24, 1993)

Statement by the Press Secretary on the Open Skies Treaty (PRESS RELEASE, August 7, 1993)

Statement by the Press Secretary on the U.S. Instrument of Ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 3, 1993)

Statement by the Press Secretary on U.S. Support for the Chemical Weapons Convention Completed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (FACT SHEET, August 13, 1992)

Statement by the Press Secretary Report on Progress at Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations (PRESS RELEASE, September 22, 1994)

Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (OFFICIAL TEXT, April 5, 1993)

Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 11, 1993)

Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Statement for the Record (OFFICIAL TEXT, May 18, 1993)

Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the First Committee of the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in General Debate (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 19, 1993)

Statement for the Record by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on "A Revitalized ACDA in the Post-Cold War Era," Before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 23, 1994)

Statement of Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Third Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (OFFICIAL TEXT, September 13, 1994)

Statement of Norman A. Wulf, Acting Assistant Director Bureau of Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate (OFFICIAL TEXT, February 24, 1994)

Statement of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 10, 1994)

Statement of the Honorable John D. Holum, Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 22, 1994)

Statement on Intelligence Support to Arms Control Policy by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Deputy Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (OFFICIAL TEXT, August 4, 1994)

Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, Moscow, January 14, 1994 (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 16, 1994)

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (FACT SHEET, May 25, 1994)

Defense and Space Talks (ISSUES BRIEF, November 10, 1988)

Five Agreements Between the U.S. and the Former Soviet Union within the Standing Consultative Commission Now Declassified and Released to the Public (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 1993)

Forty-Eighth Session of the Standing Consultative Commission Opens in Geneva (PRESS RELEASE, October 11, 1994)

Fourth Review of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Conducted in Geneva, Switzerland (PRESS RELEASE, October 1, 1993)

Joint Communique: Fourth Review of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 1, 1993)

Soviet Violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: The Kraysnoyarsk Radar (ISSUES BRIEF, August 24, 1988)

Thule and Fylingdales Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radars and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (ISSUES BRIEF, August 24, 1988)

Traditional Interpretation of Antiballistic Missile Treaty Endorsed by Clinton Administration (PRESS RELEASE, July 14, 1993)

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System (OFFICIAL TEXT)

The U.S. and Russia Declassify Five Agreements from the Standing Consultative Commission (FACT SHEET, January 1993)

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- The Biological Weapons Convention (FACT SHEET, August 18, 1993)
- The Biological Weapons Convention Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (FACT SHEET, November 23, 1993)
- Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference 1991 (ISSUES BRIEF, March 27, 1991)
- Biological Weapons Convention: The Special Conference and Beyond (FACT SHEET, August 9, 1994)
- Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (FACT SHEET, September 17, 1992)
- Executive Order 12735: Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 16, 1990)
- Final Document: Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Geneva, 9-27 September 1991)
- Joint U.S./UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons, (Statement by Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State, September 14, 1992)
- Parties and Signatories of the Biological Weapons Convention as of February 2, 1994 (FACT SHEET, May 27, 1994)
- Statement by the President: Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (The White House, May 22, 1990)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- Administration Opens Ratification Drive for Chemical Weapons Convention (PRESS RELEASE, March 23, 1994)
- Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 1, 1990)
- Arms Control Issues Briefs from the Wyoming Ministerial (ISSUES BRIEF, September 23, 1989)
- The Australia Group (FACT SHEET, April 20, 1993)
- The Australia Group (OCCASIONAL PAPER, May 18, 1993)
- Australia Group Export Controls on Materials Used in the Manufacture of Chemical and Biological Weapons Control List of Dual-Use Chemicals: Commercial and Military Application (FACT SHEET, October 25, 1993)
- Australia Group List of Dual-Use Chemicals for Export Control: Commercial and Military Application (FACT SHEET, May 20, 1993)
- Australia Group Meeting, Australian Embassy, Paris 7-10 December 1992 (PRESS RELEASE, December 1992)
- Australia Group Meeting, Australian Embassy, Paris 2-10 June 1993 (FACT SHEET, July 28, 1993)
- Australia Group Meeting, Australian Embassy, Paris 6-9 December 1993 (FACT SHEET, January 7, 1994)
- Australia Group Meeting, Australian Embassy, Paris 16-19 May 1994 (FACT SHEET, June 16, 1994)

Chemical Weapons Arms Control Chronology of Key Events: 1925-1989 (ISSUES BRIEF, April 1, 1992)

The Chemical Weapons Convention (FACT SHEET, January 5, 1993)

Chemical Weapons Convention (FACT SHEET, November 24, 1993)

Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties (OCCASIONAL PAPER, January 5, 1993)

Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories/Ratifiers (FACT SHEET, updated regularly)

Chemical Weapons Convention Update for Industry, Vol. 1 (September 1993)

Chemical Weapons Convention Update for Industry, Vol. 2 (November 1993)

Chemical Weapons Convention Update for Industry, Vol. 3 (February 1994)

Chemical Weapons Convention Update for Industry, Vol. 4 (June 1994)

Chemical Weapons Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (FACT SHEET, August 13, 1992)

Chemical Weapons Negotiations: Conference on Disarmament (ISSUES BRIEF, September 20, 1989)

Chemical Weapons (CW) Proliferation (ISSUES BRIEF, September 20, 1989)

Chronology of Events Leading to the Signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (FACT SHEET, January 5, 1993)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (October 1993)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 30, 1992)

Executive Order 12735 Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 16, 1990)

Fact Sheet on Chemical Weapons Initiative (FACT SHEET, May 13, 1991)

First Anniversary of the Signing Ceremony for Chemical Weapons Convention (PRESS RELEASE, January 10, 1994)

France to Host Signing Ceremony for Chemical Weapons Convention (PRESS RELEASE, January 5, 1993)

Industry Representatives Meet with Government Experts to Discuss Effects on Industry of the Chemical Weapons Convention (PRESS RELEASE, October 13, 1993)

Joint Statement of the Wyoming Ministerial (OFFICIAL TEXT, September 23, 1989)

Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement on Chemical Weapons (OFFICIAL TEXT, February 10, 1990)

Member and Observer States of the Conference on Disarmament (FACT SHEET, May 13, 1991)

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Chemical Weapons (OFFICIAL TEXT, September 23, 1989)

Negotiations on Chemical Weapons (ISSUES BRIEF, May 13, 1988)

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (FACT SHEET, March 5, 1993)

Questions and Answers on Industry Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (October 1994)

Ratification and Adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (ISSUES BRIEF, September 28, 1993)

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament on its Work During the Period 30 September 91 to 20 January 92

U.S. Efforts to Ban and Destroy Chemical Weapons (ISSUES BRIEF, May 22, 1990)

U.S. Export Control Laws Relating to Chemical Weapons (ISSUES BRIEF, September 20, 1989)

U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding on Chemical Weapons (FACT SHEET, August 1, 1994)

U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding on Chemical Weapons (ISSUES BRIEF, September 23, 1989)

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement (FACT SHEET, June 1, 1990)

White House Fact Sheet on Chemical Weapons Issues (June 17, 1992)

The White House Office of the Press Secretary - To the Senate of the United States: Transmittal of the CWC (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 23, 1993)

The White House Office of the Press Secretary - To the Senate of the United States: Submission of an Environmental Impact Review (EIR) of the Chemical Weapons Convention (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 1, 1994)

COMPLIANCE

Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements (June 23, 1994)

Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements (June 24, 1992)

Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements and the President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 14, 1993)

Annual Report of the President on Non-Compliance (OFFICIAL TEXT, February 23, 1990)

President's Annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 7, 1991)

Report on Soviet Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (OFFICIAL TEXT, December 24, 1991)

Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance, Pursuant to Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification (March 31, 1993)

Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements (March 30, 1992)

Supplemental Report on SS-23 Missiles in Europe (September 18, 1991)

CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

Charter of Paris for a New Europe (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 21, 1990)

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Budapest Review Conference 1994 - Security/Arms Control Issues (FACT SHEET, October 14, 1994)

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Budapest Summit, Statement by John D. Holum, Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, December 1, 1994)

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Forum for Security Cooperation (FACT SHEET, January 7, 1994)

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APPENDIX C: ARMS CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABACC	Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (Argentina and Brazil)
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACEP	Advisory Committee on Export Policy
ACIS	Arms Control Impact Statements
ACIS	Arms Control Intelligence Staff
ACME	Arms Control in the Middle East
ACRCC	Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee
ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
ACV	Armored Combat Vehicle
AEM	Arsenal Exchange Model
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AFAP	Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles
AFSATCOM	Air Force Satellite Communications System
AFTAC	Air Force Technical Applications Center
AG	Australia Group
AHC	Ad Hoc Committee
AIFV	Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle
ALASAT	Air-Launched Anti-Satellite [weapon]
ALBM	Air-Launched Ballistic Missile
ALCM	Air-Launched Cruise Missile
AMRAAM	Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
AND	Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
APAG	Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARM	Anti-Radiation Missile
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASAT	Anti-Satellite [weapon]
ASBM	Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASM	Air-to-Surface Missile
ASROC	Anti-Submarine Rocket
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATBM	Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
ATF	Advanced Tactical Fighter
ATH	Above-the-Horizon
ATM	Anti-Tactical Missile
ATTU	Atlantic To The Urals
AWACS	Airborne [early] Warning and Control System
BCC	Bilateral Consultative Commission
BIC	Bilateral Implementation Commission
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense

BMDO	Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
BMEWS	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
BMLNA	Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
BWG	Backstopping Working Group
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
CANDU	Canadian Deutrium [reactor]
CASC	Central American Security Commission
CAT	Conventional Arms Transfers
CBM	Confidence-Building Measures
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
CC	Consultative Committee
CCD	Charge Couple Device
CCE	Consultative Committee of Experts
CCF	COCOM Cooperation Forum [see COCOM]
CCL	Continuous Communications Link
CCW	Convention on Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDE	[Stockholm Conference on] Confidence- [and Security-Building Measures and] Disarmament in Europe
CEE	Central and East Europe
CEMA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CEP	Circular Error Probable
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [Treaty]
CFE IA	Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of CFE
CGS	CONUS Ground Station [see CONUS]
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CLS	Capsule Launch System
CNAD	Council of National Armaments Directors
CNPC	Community Nonproliferation Committee
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
COMSAT	Communications Satellite
CONUS	Continental United States
COPUOS	Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
CORRTEX	Continuous Reflectometry for Radius Versus Time Experiment
CPC	Conflict Prevention Center
CPD	Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
CTB	Comprehensive Test Ban
CUSHIE	[see CCW]
CW	Chemical Weapons/Warfare
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention

D&S	[see DST]
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DC	Defense Conversion
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCL	Direct Communications Link [see MOLINK]
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSAT	Defense Satellite
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DSP	Defense Support Program
DSS	Designated Seismic Station
DST	Defense and Space Talks [see D&S]
DTSA	Defense Technology Security Administration
DTWG	Defense Trade Working Group
EAA	Export Administration Act
EAR	Export Administration Regulations
EARB	Export Administration Review Board
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECASS	Export Control Automated Support System
EDAC	Economic Defense Advisory Committee
EIF	Entry Into Force
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMP	Electro-Magnetic Pulse
EMT	Equivalent Megatonnage
ENMOD	Environmental Modification Convention
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EPCI	Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FCCSET	Federal Coordinating Committee on Science, Engineering and Technology
FEWS	Follow-on Early Warning System
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FROD	Functionally Related Observable Difference
FSA	Freedom Support Act
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
FSE	Forum on Security in Europe
FSS	Full-Scope Safeguards
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FYDP	Five-Year Defense Program
GAC	General Advisory Committee
GC	General Conference [of the IAEA, q.v.]
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council

GGCL	Government-to-Government Communications Link
GLBM	Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile
GLCM	Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
GODOS	Group Of Democratically Oriented States
GPALS	Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
GPS	Global Positioning System [MAUSTAR, q.v.]
GPS	Global Protection System
GSE	[Ad Hoc] Group of Scientific Experts
HAC	House Appropriations Committee
HACOG	House Arms Control Observer Group
HACV	Heavy Armament Combat Vehicle
HEU	Highly-Enriched Uranium
HFUM	Helsinki Follow-up Meeting
HIRC	House International Relations Committee
HLG	High Level Group
HLTF	High Level Task Force
HLWG	High Level Working Group
HOG	House Observer Group
HNSC	House National Security Committee
HSIC	High Speed Integrated Circuits
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IC	Intelligence Community
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICF	Inertial Confinement Fusion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEA	International Energy Agency
IEPG	Independent European Program Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFR	Initial Fast Reactor
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [Treaty]
INTLO	International Nuclear Technical Liaison Office
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IR	Infrared
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
ISCA	Office of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs
ISTC	International Science and Technology Center
JACADS	Johnson Atoll Chemical Agents Disposal System
JAEIC	Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
JCC	Joint Consultative Commission
JCG	Joint Consultative Group
JCIC	Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPMG	Joint Politico-Military Group

JSCNOET	Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear and Other Energy Technologies
JVE	Joint Verification Experiment
JWC	Joint Warning Center
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LASCAR	Large Scale Reprocessing Plants
LEU	Low-Enriched Uranium
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LOW	Launch on Warning
LOTW	Launch on Tactical Warning
LPAR	Large Phased-Array Radar
LRINF	Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
LRNA	Long Range Nuclear ALCMs [see ALCM]
LTBT	Limited Test Ban Treaty [also known as PTBT, q.v.]
LUA	Launch Under Attack
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAPI	Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry [of the Russian Federation; now MINATOM]
MARC	MTCR Annex Review Committee [see MTCR]
MARV	Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle
MC&A	Materials Control and Accountability
MCWG	Munitions Control Working Group
MILSTAR	Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System
MINATOM	Ministry of Atomic Energy [of the Russian Federation]
MIRV	Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOLINK	U.S.-Soviet hotline [see DCL]
MOU	Memorandum Of Understanding
MOX	Mixed Oxides [of plutonium and uranium]
MRV	Multiple Reentry Vehicle
MTAG	Missile Trade Analysis Group
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
MTEC	Missile Technology Export Committee
MWC	Missile Warning Center
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAG	National Advisory Groups
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear/Biological/Chemical [weaponry]
NCA	National Command Authority
NCND	Neither Confirm Nor Deny
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDPC	National Disclosure Policy Committee
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency

NEVWG	Nuclear Export Violations Working Group
NFROD	Non-Functionally Related Observable Difference
NFU	No First Use
NFZ	Nuclear-Free Zone
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIC	New(Iy) Industrial(ized -izing) Countries
NIM	National Intelligence Means
NIS	New(Iy) Independent States [of the former Soviet Union]
NNA	Neutral and Non-Aligned [States]
NNPA	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon state
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense [Command]
NPAS	Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement
NPC	Nonproliferation Center
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Non-Proliferation [of Nuclear Weapons] Treaty
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NMICC	National Military Intelligence Collection Center
NMIPC	National Military Intelligence Production Center
NMISC	National Military Intelligence Support Center
NRRC	Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
NRS	Nuclear Reactor Safety
NSA	National Security Agency
NSA	Negative Security Assurances
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSPC	National Space Council
NSPD	National Space Policy Directive
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
NST	Nuclear and Space Talks
NTB	Nuclear Test Ban
NTI	National Trial Inspections
NTM	National Technical Means
NTT	Nuclear Testing Talks
NUDET	Nuclear Detonation
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon free Zone
NWS	Nuclear Weapon state
NWSS	Nuclear Weapons Storage Site
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OIMM	Objective Information on Military Matters
OOV	Object of Verification
OPANAL	Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the *

	Caribbean
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OS	Open Skies
OSCC	Open Skies Consultative Commission
OSI	On-Site Inspection
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
OTH	Over-The-Horizon
PAL	Permissive Action Link
PAR	Perimeter Acquisition Radar
PARCS	Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System
PCC	Policy Coordinating Committee
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PDM	Presidential Decision Memorandum
PNET	Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
PNW	Prevention of Nuclear War
POE	Point Of Entry
POTAS	Program for Technical Assistance to [IAEA] Safeguards
PPCM	Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring
PRD	Presidential Review Directive
PREPCOM	Preparatory Committee
PRM	Presidential Review Memorandum
PSA	Positive Security Assurances
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty [also known as Limited Test Ban Treaty, or LTBT]
PTS	Provisional Technical Secretariat
PUNE	Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
RDE	Radar Detection Equipment
RECOVER	Remote Continual Verification
REM	Roentgen Equivalent Man
RERTR	Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactor
REVCON	Review Conference
RPV	Remotely Piloted Vehicle
RV	Reentry Vehicle
RW	Radiological Weapons
SACOG	Senate Arms Control Observer Group
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SAPRWG	Security Assistance Program Review Working Group
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SAROS	SAR for Open Skies [see SAR]
SAWG	Safeguards Agreement Working Group
SBT	Seabed [Arms Control] Treaty
SCC	Standing Consultative Commission
SCVC	Special Committee on Verification and Compliance
SDIO	Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SFRC	Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SIDAC	Socialist International Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operations Plan
SLBM	Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM	Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SLV	Space Launch Vehicle
SMS	Stage Measuring System
SNDV	Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SNEC	Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination
SNF	Short-Range Nuclear Forces
SNL	Sandia National Laboratory
SNM	Special Nuclear Materials
SOG	Senate Observer Group
SPECOM	[UN] Special Commission
SPNFZ	South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
SRAM	Short-Range Attack Missile
SRINF	Shorter-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
SRM	Shorter-Range Missile
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
SSBN	Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear [submarine]
SSC	Superconducting Super Collider
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SSD	Safety, Security, and Dismantlement [of nuclear weapons]
SSI	Suspect Site Inspection
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSN	Sub-Surface Nuclear [submarine]
SSOD	Special Session on Disarmament
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STCU	Science and Technology Center in Ukraine
STIC	Scientific and Technological Intelligence Committee
STOF	Short Time of Flight
SVC	Special Verification Commission
SWG	Supercomputer Working Group
TACF	Technical Assistance & Cooperation Fund
TEM	Technical Experts Meeting
TERCOM	Terrain Contour Matching System
THAAD	Theater High-Altitude Area Defense
TIA	Transparency In Armaments
TIP	Treaty Implementation Panel
TLE	Treaty-Limited Equipment
TNF	Theater Nuclear Forces
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRANSEAVERT	Transport by Sea Verification
TSCC	Technical Support Coordinating Committee
TTBT	Threshold Test-Ban Treaty
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFC	United Nations [General Assembly] First Committee
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNSCOM	UN Special Commission
VCC	Verification Coordinating Committee
VLS	Vertical Launch System
VSM	Verification and Stability Measures
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMEAT	World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
WP	Warsaw Pact
WSSIC	Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
WTTAG	Weapons Technology Trade Analysis Group
ZC	Zangger Committee

APPENDIX D: TABLE OF PARTICIPANTS AND SIGNATORIES

	Antarctic Treaty	Limited Test Ban Treaty	Outer Space Treaty	Latin America Nuclear Free Zone	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	Seabed Arms Control Treaty	Geneva Protocol	Biological Weapons Convention	Environmental Modification Convention	CSCE (CSBMs)	CFE Treaty	Chemical Weapons Convention
Agreement Opened for Signature	12/01/59	08/05/67	01/27/67	02/14/67	07/01/68	02/11/71	06/17/25	04/10/72	05/18/77	03/04/92(1)	11/19/90	04/10/81
Agreement Entered Into Force	06/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	04/22/68	03/05/70	05/18/72	02/08/28	03/26/75	10/05/78	05/01/92(1)	11/09/92	12/2/83
Afghanistan		P	P		P	P	P	P	P			S
Albania					P		P	P		P		
Algeria		S	P			P			P			
Angola							P					
Antigua & Barbuda		P	P	P	P	P	P		P			
Argentina	P	P	P	S		P	P	P	P			S
Armenia					P			P		P	P	
Australia	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P			P
Austria	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P		P
Azerbaijan					P					P	P	
Bahamas, The		P	P	P	P	P	P(2)	P				
Bahrain					P	P		P	P			
Bangladesh		P	P		P		P	P	P			
Barbados			P	P	P		P	P				
Belarus		P	P		P	P		P	P	P	P	P
Belgium	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	S

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Agreement Entered Into Force	06/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	04/22/68	03/05/70	05/18/72	02/08/28	03/26/75	10/05/78	05/01/92(1)	11/09/92	12/02/83
Belize				S	P		P(2)	P				
Benin		P	P		P	P	P	P	P			P
Bhutan		P			P		P	P				
Bolivia		P	S	P	P	S	P	P	S			
Bosnia					P					P		P
Botswana		P	S		P	P	P(2)	P				
Brazil	P	P	P	P		P	P	P	P			
Brunei			P(2)		P	P(2)		P	P(2)			
Bulgaria	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Burkina Faso		S	P		P		P	P				
Burundi		S	S		P	S		S				
Cambodia					P		P	P				
Cameroon		S	S		P	S	P					
Canada	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Cape Verde		P			P	P	P	P	P			
Central African Republic		P	S		P	P	P	S				

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Chad		P			P							
Chile	P	P	P	P			P	P	P			
China	P		P	P(4)	P	P	P	P				P
Colombia	P	P	S	P	P	S		P				
Comoros							P					
Congo					P	P		P				
Costa Rica		P		P	P	S		P				
Cote d'Ivoire		P			P	P	P	S				
Croatia		P			P	P		P		P		P
Cuba	P		P			P	P	P	P			P
Cyprus		P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P		P
Czech Republic, The	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Denmark	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Djibouti							P					
Dominica			P(2)	S	P	P(2)	P(2)	P(2)	P(2)			
Dominican Republic		P	P	P	P	P	P	P				

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Agreement Entered Into Force	06/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	04/22/68	03/05/70	05/18/72	02/08/28	03/26/75	10/05/78	05/01/92(1)	11/09/92	12/02/83
Ecuador	P	P	P	P	P		P	P				P
Egypt		P	P		P		P	S	P			S
El Salvador		P	P	P	P		S	P				
Equatorial Guinea					P	S	P	P				
Estonia					P		P	P		P		
Ethiopia		S	S		P	P	P	P	S			
Fiji		P	P		P		P	P				
Finland	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P		P
France	P		P	P(4)	P		P	P		P	P	P
Gabon		P			P			S				
Gambia		P	S		P	S	P	P				
Georgia					P					P	P	
Germany	P	P	P		P(5)	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Ghana		P	S		P	P	P	P	P			
Greece	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Grenada			P(2)	P	P	P(2)	P	P				

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Guatemala	P	P		P	P	S	P	P	P			P
Guinea					P	S						
Guinea-Bissau			P		P	P	P	P				
Guyana			S		P	P	P(2)	S				
Haiti		S	S	P	P			S				
Holy See			S		P		P		S	P		
Honduras		P	S	P	P	S		P				
Hungary	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Iceland		P	P		P	P	P	P	S	P	P	S
India	P	P	P			P	P	P	P			P
Indonesia		P	S		P		P	P				
Iran		P	S		P	P	P	P	S			
Iraq		P	P		P	P	P	P	S			
Ireland		P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P		P
Israel												P
Italy	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Jamaica		P	P	P	P	P	P	P				

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Agreement Entered Into Force	06/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	04/22/68	03/05/70	06/18/72	02/08/28	03/26/75	10/05/78	05/01/92(1)	11/09/92	12/02/83
Japan	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P			P
Jordan		P	S		P	P	P	P				
Kazakhstan					P					P	P	
Kenya		P	P		P		P	P				
Kiribati					P		P					
Korea, South	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P			
Korea, North	P			P	P	P	P	P				
Kuwait		P	P		P		P	P	P			
Kyrgyzstan					P					P		
Laos		P	P		P	P	P	P	P			P
Latvia					P	P	P			P		P
Lebanon		P	P		P	S	P	P	S			
Lesotho			S		P	P	P	P				
Liberia		P			P	S	P	S	S			
Libya		P	P		P		P	P				

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Liechtenstein					P	P	P	P		P		P
Lithuania					P		P			P		
Luxembourg		P	S		P	P	P	P	S	P	P	S
Madagascar		P	P		P	S	P					
Malawi		P			P		P					
Malaysia		P	S		P	P	P	P				
Maldives					P		P	P				
Mali			P		P	S	P					
Malta		P			P	P	P	P		P		
Mauritania		P			P							
Mauritius		P			P	P	P	P	P			
Mexico		P	P	P	P	P	P	P				P
Moldova					P					P	P	
Monaco							P					
Mongolia		P	P		P	P	P	P	P			P
Morocco		P	P		P	P	P		S	P		S

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Agreement Entered Into Force	06/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	04/22/68	03/05/70	05/18/72	02/08/28	03/26/75	10/05/78	05/01/92(1)	11/09/92	12/02/83
Mozambique					P							
Namibia					P							
Nauru					P							
Nepal		P	P		P	P	P					
Netherlands	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
New Zealand	P	P	P		P	P	P	P				P
Nicaragua		P	S	P	P	P	P	P				S
Niger		P	P		P	P	P	P	P			P
Nigeria		P	P		P		P	P				S
Norway	P	P			P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Oman								P				
Pakistan		P					P	P				P
Panama		P		P	P	P		P				
Papua New Guinea	P	P			P		P	P				
Paraguay				P	P	S	P	P				
Peru	P	P	P	P	P		P	P				

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Agreement Entered Into Force	06/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	04/22/68	03/05/70	05/18/72	02/08/78	03/26/75	10/05/78	05/01/92(1)	11/09/92	12/02/83
Philippines		P	S		P		P	P				S
Poland	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Portugal		S			P	P	P	P	S	P	P	S
Qatar					P	P	P	P				
Romania	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	S
Russian Federation	P	P	P	P(4)	P(7)	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Rwanda		P	S		P	P	P	P				
St. Kitts and Nevis			P(2)		P(2)	P(2)	P(2)	P	P(2)			
St. Lucia			P(2)	S	P	P(2)	P	P	P(2)			
St. Vincent and the Grenadines				P	P	P(2)	P(2)		P(2)			
San Marino		P	P		P			P		P		
Sao Tome and Principe					P	P		P	P			
Saudi Arabia			P		P	P	P	P				
Senegal		P			P	S		P				
Seychelles		P	P		P	P	P(2)	P				
Sierra Leone		P	P		P	S	P	P	S			S

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Agreement Entered Into Force	06/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	04/22/68	03/05/70	05/18/72	02/08/28	03/26/75	10/05/78	05/01/92(1)	11/09/92	12/02/83
Singapore		P	P		P	P	PC2	P				
Slovakia								P		P	P	P
Slovenia		P			P	P		P		P		P
Solomon Islands			PC2		P	PC2	PC2	PC2	P			
Somalia		S	S		P			S				
South Africa	P	P	P		P	P	P	P				
Spain	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Sri Lanka		P	P		P		P	P	P			
Sudan		P			P	S	P					S
Suriname				P	P		PC2	P				
Swaziland		P	PC2		P	P	PC2	P				
Sweden	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P		P
Switzerland	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P		P
Syria		P	P		P		P	S	S			
Tajikistan										P		
Tanzania		P			P	S	P	S				

	Antarctic Treaty	United Test Ban Treaty	Outer Space Treaty	Latin America Nuclear Free Zone	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	Seabed Arms Control Treaty	Geneva Protocol	Biological Weapons Convention	Environmental Modification Convention	CSCE (CSBMs)	CFE Treaty	Chemical Weapons Convention
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Thailand		P	P		P		P	P				
Togo		P	P		P	P	P	P				S
Tonga		P	P		P		P	P				
Trinidad and Tobago		P	S	P	P		P					
Tunisia		P	P		P	P	P	P	P			P
Taiwan		P(13)	P(13)		P(14)	P(13)	P(13)	P(13)				
Turkey		P	P		P	P	P	P	S	P	P	S
Turkmenistan					P					P		
Tuvalu					P		P(2)					
Uganda		P	P		P		P	P	S			
Ukraine	P	P	P			P		P	P	P	P	P
United Arab Emirates		P						S				
United Kingdom	P	P	P	P(4)(8)	P(9)	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
United States	P	P	P	P(4)(8)	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Uruguay	P	P	P	P	P	S	P	P	P			
Uzbekistan					P				P	P		

[illegible]