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February 3, 1998

**STATEMENTS BY SEN. HELMS AND GEN. POWELL OFFER OPPORTUNITY FOR
EDITORIALS ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY**

On January 21, 1998, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms sent a letter to President Clinton outlining his priorities for the committee for the second session of the 105th Congress and stating his intentions regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear weapon test explosions. In the letter, Sen. Helms explicitly states:

"Mr. President, let me be clear: I will be prepared to schedule Committee consideration of the CTBT only after the Senate has had the opportunity to consider and vote on the Kyoto Protocol [on global warming] and the amendments to the ABM Treaty. When the Administration has submitted these treaties, and when the Senate has completed its consideration of them, then, and only then, will the Foreign Relations Committee consider the CTBT." (1)

Seven days later, during the State of the Union address, President Clinton announced the release of a statement by four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Gen. John Shalikashvili, Gen. Colin Powell, Adm. William Crowe and Gen. David Jones -- endorsing Senate ratification of the CTBT. These military leaders together have served under the last four presidents.

As the Senate reconvenes and makes pivotal decisions about the congressional schedule for 1998, editorial opinion on this historic treaty will be listened to attentively in Washington. Called "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control" by President Clinton, the Comprehensive Test Ban will not be ratified by the United States in 1998 unless Chairman Helms permits it to pass through his committee.

Since President Clinton became the first world leader to sign it in September 1996, the CTBT has been signed by 148 countries. To enter into force, it must be ratified by the 44 "nuclear-capable" countries, all of whom have signed it except for India, Pakistan and North Korea. If this is not accomplished by March, 1999 -- little more than a year away -- a special conference of nations that have ratified may be convened to consider how to expedite entry into force. Any nation, the United States included, which has not ratified by then would not be a party to those negotiations.

This advisory is an update and supplement to materials on the CTBT that we distributed last October after the President submitted the treaty to the Senate, which included a synopsis of pro and con arguments and a summary of last October's Senate hearings on the Stockpile Stewardship program and the CTBT. If you would like copies of these materials, or have any questions, please call Bill Eisenstein at (202) 466-4310.

MILITARY ENDORSEMENTS

The statement of the four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of a number of recent endorsements of the CTBT by military figures. On December 2, NATO's Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group issued a formal statement that they "fully support the goal that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should enter into force as soon as possible and, to this end, encourage all states to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay."

On February 2, Gen. Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Strategic Command (in which capacity he was commander of all American nuclear forces) and former Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) held a press conference to release a letter signed by nearly 100 international civilian and national security leaders, including former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev, calling for immediate action toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Coming a year after the Butler-organized statement on abolition signed by 61 international generals and admirals that made world headlines, this letter endorses more specific actions, including "[e]nding nuclear testing, pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." Gen. Butler and Sen. Cranston each strongly endorsed ratification of the CTBT at the event.

THE NON-PROLIFERATION BARGAIN

The 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibiting nuclear weapons states from transferring nuclear weapons to any recipient, and non-nuclear states from building or receiving nuclear weapons, was indefinitely extended by its 180 signatories in April 1995. Many of the nations that had foregone nuclear weapons acquisition under the NPT argued that the declared nuclear powers had not lived up to their obligation under Article VI of the treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race...." The nuclear weapons states promised completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in order to assure these countries that "effective measures" were being taken, and thereby win worldwide support for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Arms control experts fear that prolonged failure by the U.S. and other nuclear powers to ratify the CTBT could undermine worldwide commitment to the NPT, which has been the centerpiece of the non-proliferation strategies of both Republican and Democratic administrations since 1970.

PUBLIC OPINION

Public support for ratification of the CTBT remains very high. The Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers of Washington, D.C. recently commissioned a statewide public opinion survey on the CTBT in Colorado. In this major western state represented by two Republican senators, 77% of those polled said that the United States Senate should approve the CTBT, including 70% of Republicans and 65% of self-identified "conservatives." These numbers mirror the national results of the Coalition's poll of September, 1997, which showed 70.3% supporting Senate ratification of the CTBT, including 66.7% of "strong republicans." (2) National polls conducted since 1957, when President Eisenhower first sought a test ban, indicate that from 61 to 85 percent of the American public consistently has favored a nuclear test ban. (3)

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

The Senate debate over the CTBT will be closely tied to debates over the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program of the Department of Energy, the stated purpose of which is to "maintain the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing." (The U.S. Congress adopted a temporary testing moratorium in 1992 and the Clinton Administration extended it in 1993). Secretary of Energy Federico Pena testified in Senate hearings last October 29 that "there is a strong consensus [among the weapons lab directors and within DOE] that Stockpile Stewardship is the right program to address the challenges of maintaining our nuclear deterrent without underground testing." (4) In August, 1995 the JASON panel of senior defense consultants to the government concluded that "the weapons types in the enduring stockpile are safe and reliable in the context of explicit military requirements." (5) The Department of Energy's Stockpile Evaluation Program has been monitoring the nuclear arsenal through non-explosive analysis since 1958 and has discovered virtually no age-related defects in the nuclear components of warheads up to 30 years of age. (6)

In contrast, Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), a leading CTBT opponent, has argued that "testing has been essential as a vehicle for detecting possible weaknesses in weapon safety" and therefore that "as long as the United States has nuclear weapons, the need for testing will continue." (7) Similarly, a January 23 article in the *Washington Times* quoted a Helms spokesperson as saying that "Chairman Helms has been supportive of the need for nuclear testing...." (8)

Other critics point to evidence that has mounted in the last year that the DOE labs, in addition to "maintaining safety and reliability," are engaged in research on new nuclear weapons capabilities under the Stockpile Stewardship program. The B-61-11 bomb, for example, which consists of the explosive core of the B-61 gravity bomb given a new casing and fusing mechanism enabling it to penetrate the earth to reach deeply-buried targets, was constructed in the absence of testing. Many weapons scientists and senators have argued that such new applications do not contradict U.S. policy, set forth in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, that there be "no new design warhead production." Critics of these new applications, however, argue that such improvements undercut the CTBT's recognition that "the cessation of all nuclear weapons test explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons...constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation..." (9)

Sen. Pete Domenici (R-NM), whose state contains two of the three nuclear weapons labs, is in a powerful position to influence the fate of both the CTBT and Stockpile Stewardship. As an influential moderate Republican who is "leaning strongly in support of [the CTBT]," (10) he likely would bring many other Republican votes if he formalized that support. As chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, he has worked to increase funding for Stockpile Stewardship to \$4.5 billion per year (from roughly \$4 billion in FY 1997), telling an audience at Sandia National Lab last November that he is "expecting gigantic debates in Congress as we try to protect that figure...." Indeed, Congresswoman Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) is sending a letter to President Clinton on February 3 calling for cuts in the Stockpile Stewardship budget on the grounds that it will "spend enormous sums of money developing facilities that could be used to research and design new warheads rather than just for the purposes of stewarding the current arsenal."

With the political battle lines forming in Washington, editorials on the Comprehensive Test Ban will be read attentively by the Administration and members of the Senate. If you would like the text of Sen. Helms' letter, recent poll data, the statement on nuclear elimination released by Gen. Butler, or Rep. Woolsey's letter, please call Bill Eisenstein at (202) 466-4310. If you do address the CTBT on your editorial page, no matter what your opinion, please mail or fax us a copy at (202) 466-4344 to ensure that it will be distributed widely in Washington.

ENDNOTES

1) President Clinton has said that he will not submit the Kyoto Protocol on global warming to the Senate until an additional multilateral summit next November has resolved the issue of whether developing nations, including China and India, will be subject to limitations on greenhouse gas emissions. Senate Republicans have argued that the treaty would damage the American economy by encouraging industries to locate in countries that are not bound by emissions limits.

On September 26, 1997, the United States and Russia signed agreements "demarcating" the distinctions between theater and national missile defense systems under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and extending the ABM Treaty to the successor states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) of the former Soviet Union. Sen. Helms introduced into the Senate in 1996 a bill to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty. Legislation mandating a national ballistic missile defense system is a top Republican priority for 1998.

2) Both surveys were conducted by The Mellman Group of Washington, D.C. The Colorado poll surveyed 400 registered voters in Colorado on December 15-17, 1997, and has a statistical margin of error of 4.9% at the 95% level of confidence, according to standard polling practice. The national poll surveyed 800 adults on September 11-15, 1997, and has a margin of error of 3.5% at the 95% level of confidence.

3) Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers Backgrounder, "Public Support for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Remains High," September 26, 1997.

4) Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, October 29, 1997.

5) *Nuclear Testing: Summary and Conclusions*, Sidney Drell et al, JASON, the MITRE Corp., August 3, 1995.

6) *Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives*, DRAFT February 1996, U.S. Department of Energy.


7) Letter from Sen. Jon Kyl to Margaret Grannis, August 25, 1997

8) Washington Times, January 23, 1997.

9) Preamble to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed September 24, 1996. For an extensive discussion of Stockpile Stewardship and the CTBT, see Christopher Paine and Matthew McKinzie, "End Run: The U.S. Government's Plan for Designing Nuclear Weapons and Simulating Nuclear Explosions under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington D.C., August 1997.

10) Congressional Record, July 15, 1997.

LOS ANGELES TIMES EDITORIALS



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Test Ban Treaty Held Hostage

In 1996 President Clinton became the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all nuclear weapon tests and other nuclear explosions. But the long-sought pact, which has since been signed by 147 other countries, still awaits U.S. Senate consideration. Responsibility for the holdup falls on Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who has yet to schedule hearings on the treaty. His inaction threatens to prevent the United States from having a seat at the table next year when a special conference of nations that have ratified the treaty meets to consider how the accord can be more quickly put into force. The possibility that the world's leading nuclear power will be without a voice at that important meeting is as embarrassing as it is absurd.

Helms in effect is holding the test ban treaty hostage until, as he put it in a recent letter to Clinton, "the Senate has had the opportunity to consider and vote on the Kyoto Protocol and the amendments to the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty." The Kyoto Protocol deals with global warming and includes a U.S. promise to reduce its emissions of hydrocarbon gases, which some conservatives oppose. Helms and other Republicans want to amend the ABM

treaty signed with Moscow to allow a national ballistic missile defense system to be built. The case for such an expensive and dubiously effective system has by no means been made, and the political costs of unilaterally insisting on reinterpreting a major treaty have been all but ignored by its proponents. In any case, both the ballistic missile defense system ~~issue~~ and the global warming problem are utterly unrelated to the aims of the test ban treaty.

Presidents of both parties have always recognized the urgency of limiting access to nuclear weapon technology; the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty is among the chief accomplishments of that effort. It makes no sense now to deny the United States and the rest of the world the chance to further control the spread of nuclear arms.

A few weeks ago four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who together have served Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton, endorsed Senate ratification of the test ban treaty. They recognize that its implementation would not diminish national security or the integrity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Surely their expertise ought to count for more in the Senate than the transparently ideological agenda of Jesse Helms.

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY

OPPORTUNITIES FOR EDITORIALS ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The next two weeks are a good time for editorial writers to address the critical issue of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which President Clinton submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification on September 22, calling it "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control." Despite the fact that a recent nationwide poll shows that 70.3 percent of Americans "think the U.S. Senate should approve a treaty with 140 other countries that would prohibit underground nuclear weapons explosions worldwide," (1) Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and several conservative Republicans are expected to vigorously oppose ratification, just as they attempted unsuccessfully to block ratification earlier this year of the Chemical Weapons Convention. (2)

CURRENT NEWS PEGS

Now is the last good opportunity before Senate debate begins in earnest next March to editorialize on this issue. There are several news pegs in late October for editorials on the nuclear test ban treaty:

- **Two sets of Senate hearings set to begin the week of October 27 and chaired by Sens. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) and Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) on important test ban-related issues.**

On October 27, the Senate Governmental Affairs International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee chaired by Sen. Cochran is expected to hold hearings on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, which the Clinton administration initiated in 1995 to "maintain the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing." (3) Then on October 29, the Senate Appropriations Energy and Water Development Subcommittee chaired by Sen. Domenici is slated to hold hearings on several treaty issues, including verification.

- **The recent public opinion poll, mentioned above, demonstrating overwhelming public support for ratification.** Nine of 10 such polls conducted since 1957 -- when President Eisenhower first sought a test ban -- indicate that from 61 percent to 85 percent of the American public consistently has favored a nuclear test ban.

- **The October 1 Senate hearing held by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) on the National Cancer Institute's long-awaited study summarizing the human health effects from atmospheric nuclear testing fallout in the 1950s and 1960s (testimony available upon request).**

By running editorials this month on this monumentally important issue you can perform a vital public service by beginning to educate your readers in preparation for the Senate debate and vote next spring.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The test ban treaty is widely regarded as the linchpin of 40 years of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and end the nuclear arms race. All U.S. presidents since Dwight Eisenhower, except Ronald Reagan and George Bush, have strongly supported a test ban treaty. In 1992, Congress passed legislation creating a moratorium on nuclear testing, which was reluctantly signed by President Bush and led to President Clinton's 1993 decision to extend the moratorium and pursue a new round of comprehensive test ban talks.

On September 24, 1996, negotiations on the treaty were completed and opened for signature. Although the treaty has been signed by the leaders of 146 nations, including President Clinton -- who was the first world leader to sign -- it will not go into effect until it is ratified by the 44 "nuclear-capable" nations designated in the treaty. The Russian Duma has not yet ratified the treaty. Only eight countries have ratified to date, although many are expected to do so in 1998. (4) International attention is now focused on whether the U.S. Senate will ratify the treaty after it debates the matter next spring.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND COUNTER ARGUMENTS

Please see the attached summary of arguments and counter arguments. In brief:

Treaty proponents say the test ban treaty would:

- Help end the arms race by impeding the development of new nuclear weapons designs;
- Curb nuclear weapons proliferation by preventing states from carrying out the tests required to field a modern nuclear arsenal;
- Protect the environment by ending underground tests, which have vented radioactive gases into the atmosphere; and
- Save U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars needed to test nuclear weapons.

Treaty opponents say the test ban would:

- Not be verifiable at low-yields;
- Undermine the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal;
- Not stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and
- Be of limited utility in view of the refusal of "rogue states" to sign the treaty.

If you do run an editorial, please fax (202-466-4344) or mail us a copy. If you need any other additional information, please call Elliott Negin or Bill Eisenstein at (202) 466-4310. Attached is an overview of the anticipated arguments against the treaty and the anticipated responses to those arguments.

ENDNOTES

1. The poll -- released on September 26 and conducted September 11-15 by the Mellman Group for the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers -- surveyed 800 adults throughout the United States. Only 12.5 percent indicated they disapproved of Senate ratification, while 17.2 percent indicated they "don't know." The poll indicates strong support for the CTBT among all demographic and political groups, including persons identifying themselves as "strong Republicans" (66.7 percent) and people with a member of the military in their household (71 percent). The survey's margin of error is plus or minus 3.5 percent.
2. Despite strong public support and a long history of bipartisan leadership calling for a test ban, the Republican Party opposed it in its August 1996 convention platform. The GOP platform maintained that deterring "rogue states" from using weapons of mass destruction "will require the continuing maintenance and development of nuclear weapons and their periodic testing."
3. Many arms control advocates believe the \$4.5 billion-per-year program is unnecessarily costly and may provide a "back door" method for perpetuating the nuclear arms race. Many key Senate Republicans (including Domenici) consider it to be necessary for the maintenance of the nuclear arsenal. Two of three U.S. nuclear research laboratories participating in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, Los Alamos and Sandia, are located in New Mexico, Domenici's home state.
4. Israel, Mexico, Estonia, Ukraine, Croatia, Peru, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia have ratified the treaty thus far. Three of the 44 countries with nuclear weapons or reactors -- India, Pakistan and North Korea -- have not yet signed the treaty. Until the treaty enters into force, all signatory nations are legally bound under international law to abide by the intent and purpose of the treaty not to conduct nuclear test explosions. However, the verification and on-site inspections systems will not become operative until the treaty enters into force.

ATTACHMENT TO NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY EDITORIAL ADVISORY

(ANTICIPATED PRO AND CON ARGUMENTS)

The following is a brief summary of arguments presented by opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the responses of treaty advocates:

1. **Verification:** President Clinton's letter dated September 22, 1997, transmitting the treaty to the Senate noted that "our National Intelligence Means, together with the treaty's verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively verifiable."

Opponents of the test ban treaty maintain that a complete ban cannot be adequately verified for low yield tests. Treaty advocates note that without the treaty, the United States would be far less capable of detecting and deterring nuclear test ban violations. They emphasize that the ban would establish a far-reaching verification regime that includes a global network of seismic, hydro-acoustic, infra-sound and radio-nuclide monitoring stations and procedures for on-site inspection of test sites to deter and detect violations. This system would be augmented by various nations' intelligence-gathering technologies. They also note that the prototype treaty monitoring and verification system now in place was able to detect and analyze the recent reports of a suspected Russian nuclear test.

While nuclear explosions at very low yields are difficult to detect by seismic measures alone, treaty advocates note that the purpose of verification systems is to *deter* countries from testing. They point to estimates by experts that even low level nuclear tests would be verifiable at least 90 percent to 95 percent of the time, meaning that a violator would run approximately a 90 percent to 95 percent risk of detection by other means, including satellite imagery, which would then lead to on-site inspections. In any event, they note that low-yield clandestine tests would contribute negligible technical knowledge that would not threaten American or international security.

2. **Reliability of nuclear stockpile:** Opponents say a ban will undermine the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal. Proponents of the treaty point out that there is now broad agreement among nuclear scientists that the United States can maintain the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile under a "zero-yield" test ban. A 1995 report by a panel of independent nuclear weapons experts from JASON, an organization of university-based scientists, endorsed this view.

Past nuclear tests were used primarily to develop and "certify" new warhead designs. Currently there are no orders for new kinds of warheads. The Department of Energy has conducted a small number of "stockpile confidence" tests on each of the warhead designs in the U.S. arsenal to check their performance. The high success rate of these tests indicates that once a warhead has undergone sufficient pre-deployment testing, nuclear tests are no longer needed to ensure its performance. Additionally, stockpiled weapons are subjected to rigorous nonexplosive tests to check for problems that could result from aging. Finally, all warheads remaining in the U.S. arsenal after the year 2000 have modern safety features that prevent inadvertent detonation.

3. Nuclear proliferation: Opponents maintain the test ban will not stop proliferation. Arms control advocates argue that it will at the least make it much more difficult for new and aspiring nuclear nations to create sophisticated weapons that can be delivered by ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the declared nuclear weapons states' promise to uphold a test ban was a crucial factor in winning worldwide support for the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in April 1995.

4. Reluctant signatories: Finally, opponents worry that some nations, such as India and Pakistan, will not sign the test ban treaty. The treaty will not go into effect until it is ratified by the 44 nuclear-capable states specified in the treaty. Proponents of the treaty argue that if countries such as the United States do not take the lead in the international community by ratifying early on, countries such as India will never feel pressure to sign and other countries will not ratify.

Furthermore, treaty supporters note that if the United States does not ratify the treaty in 1998, it will be unable to participate in the conference authorized by the treaty to take place in 1999 to explore ways to expedite entering the treaty into force. They also say that even if India does not sign, it would find it difficult to conduct nuclear tests, given the nearly universal international support for a test ban. Moreover, even if the test ban does not enter into force for several years, there already is a *de facto* ban on testing. For the countries that have signed, there is a *de jure* ban on testing under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which requires each signatory to respect the treaty requirements even though it has not entered into force.

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EDITORIALS

Ban All Nuclear Tests

Banning all nuclear tests should not be controversial. After all, polls show overwhelming public support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which President Clinton signed last year and sent to the Senate last month.

But the Republican-dominated Senate is marching to a different drummer. When Senate debate on the treaty begins later this month, count on Jesse Helms of North Carolina, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and many of his colleagues to fight vigorously against ratification. These senators rarely see an international treaty they like. They would rather have America connected with the world mostly through its military prowess.

All presidents since Dwight D. Eisenhower, with the exception of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, have supported a comprehensive test ban treaty. Even Mr. Bush signed legislation approving a moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing.

The treaty before the Senate has been signed by the leaders of 146 nations. Mr. Clinton was the first head of government to do so. But it will go into effect only after ratification by 44 "nuclear-capable" nations.

One thing is certain: The world will not be a safer place if the Senate rejects the treaty.

Opponents of ratification claim that the treaty would not stop the nuclear proliferation. It would be impossible to verify a total ban of testing, they also contend. And, they assert, the reliability of nuclear stockpiles could not be assured without testing. Their concerns are legitimate, but also refutable.

■ **Proliferation** may be impossible to stop, but

the treaty would make it much more difficult for governments aspiring to develop nuclear capability to do so. They would be faced with a formidable task of building, undetected, sophisticated weapons that can be delivered by ballistic missiles.

■ **Verification** of small, "low-yield" nuclear explosions would be difficult but not impossible. Experts estimate that those tests are verifiable 95 percent of the time, meaning that violators would run a great risk of being caught and punished. As for the 5 percent or so of tests that might escape detection, they would contribute little to technical knowledge. Mr. Clinton is convinced that America has the means to make the comprehensive nuclear test ban effectively verifiable.

■ **Reliability** and safety of existing nuclear stockpiles can be maintained under the treaty, according to a wide spectrum of scientists. Tests on warheads and missiles are already being conducted successfully — without nuclear detonations.

Scarcely anyone would argue that discouraging the development of new nuclear weapons and curbing nuclear proliferation would be harmful to peace and stability. Underground tests have cost U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars and have vented radiocative gases into the atmosphere.

The proposed comprehensive test ban would complement existing treaties banning testing in the air, on the ground and over water. All that remains is to ban the tests underground. A de facto international ban on underground testing has been in force for several years without harm to U.S. security. The treaty would make the ban permanent.

There is little to lose and much to gain from ratifying the treaty.