

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Steven Andreasen to Johannes Binnendijk. Subject: FW: MTP...NMD/ABM/START III. (15 pages)	06/21/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Andrew Weiss to Mark Medish. Berger-Ivanov Memcon. (5 pages)	07/09/2000	P1/b(1)
003. email	Theodore Osius to Michael Orfini. Subject: Please see footnot on page 2. (13 pages)	07/12/2000	P1/b(1)
004. email	Andrew Weiss to Steven Andreasen. Subject: RE: Update on Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). (4 pages)	12/04/2000	P1/b(1)
005. email	Elisa Harris to Steven Andreasen, Maureen Tucker, and Johannes Binnendijk. Subject: RE: Update on Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). (6 pages)	12/05/2000	P1/b(1)
006. email	Johannes Binnendijk to Steven Andreasen. Subject: RE: Revised Note to SRB on UCAVs. (4 pages)	12/08/2000	P1/b(1)
007. email	Mark Tavlarides to Johannes Binnendijk, Steven Andreasen, John Wiegmann et al. Subject: RE: Revised Note to SRB on UCAVs. (4 pages)	12/08/2000	P1/b(1)
008. email	Antony Blinken to Hoyt Yee. Subject: RE: Draft Note to SRB on UCAVs. (7 pages)	12/08/2000	P1/b(1)
009. email	Steven Andreasen to Richard Clarke and Roger Cressey. Subject: FW: UCAV Position: Answer to your Questions and Agency Agreed Position. (10 pages)	12/08/2000	P1/b(1)
010. email	Kevin Moran to Steven Andreasen. Subject: RE: UCAV Position: Answer to your Questions and Agency Agreed Position. (4 pages)	12/09/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/21/2000-01/10/2001]

2006-1363-F
vz5714

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011. email	Steven Andreasen to Roger Cressey. Subject: RE: UCAV Position: Answer to your Questions and Agency Agreed Position. (5 pages)	12/09/2000	P1/b(1)
012. email	Sean Tarver to Steven Andreasen, Richard Beardsworth, Johannes Binnendijk et al. Subject: RE: UCAV Position: Answer to your Questions and Agency Agreed Position. (8 pages)	12/10/2000	P1/b(1)
013. email	Jonathan Scharfen to Steven Andreasen, Richard Beardsworth, Johannes Binnendijk et al. Subject: Action Memorandum to the President. (6 pages)	12/11/2000	P1/b(1)

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 08/31/2000 6:53:38 PM
FROM Black, Steven K. (VP)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT May 12, 2000 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H. (VP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Memo to VP on ABM Succession.doc

May 12, 2000

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ABM SUCCESSION

FROM: LEON FUERTH

The essence of Senator Helms' argument concerning Russia's legal status (or rather, lack thereof) as ABM Treaty successor to the Soviet Union is the assertion that the ABM Treaty expired when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991; by definition, there can be no "successor states" to an expired Treaty. Moreover, Helms has asserted that in the absence of Senate advice and consent to the 1997 Memorandum of Understanding on Succession (see below), there are no recognized parties to the ABM Treaty.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union both the Bush and Clinton Administrations have made clear that the ABM Treaty is among the arms control treaties with the Former Soviet Union that remain in effect. That said, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, it was necessary to reach agreement as to which, if

any, former Soviet States -- in addition to Russia -- would continue the USSR's rights and obligations under the ABM Treaty. The negotiations on succession which began in 1993 were aimed at resolving this particular question formally and finally. On Sept 26, 1997, Secretary Albright and her Russian, Kazakstani, Ukrainian and Belarussian counterparts signed a Memorandum of Understanding on ABM Treaty succession. Article I of the 1997 MOU provides that, upon entry into force of the MOU on Succession, Russia, Kazakstan, Ukraine and Belarus will be the parties to the ABM Treaty. The 1997 ABM MOU has not yet entered into force because none of the parties, including the United States, has deposited its instrument of ratification.

While negotiating the MOU, the Administration took the position that matters of treaty succession are a prerogative of the executive branch, and that once agreed, the MOU would not require Senate advice and consent. Senator Helms did not accept this view, and at his instigation, when the Senate gave its advice and consent to the CFE Flank Document in May 1997, one of the 14 conditions the Senate imposed (Condition 9) states that the President must submit the 1997 ABM MOU to the Senate for advice and consent. The President's response to the Senate in May 1997 pointed out that it is

clearly within the President's authorities to determine the successor States to a treaty when the original Party dissolves, and to make the adjustments required to accomplish such succession, and to enter into agreements for this purpose.

The President added that

throughout our history the executive branch has made a large number of determinations concerning the succession of new States to the treaty rights and

obligations of their predecessors. The ABM Succession MOU negotiated by the United States effectuated no substantive change in the ABM Treaty requiring Senate advice and consent. Nonetheless, in light of my commitment to agree to seek Senate approval of the Demarcation Agreements associated with the ABM Treaty, I have, without prejudice to the legal principles involved, certified, consistent with Condition (9), that I will submit any agreement concluded on ABM Treaty succession to the Senate for advice and consent.

Critics of the 1997 MOU argue two points: (1) the U.S. should not do anything to "revive" a dead treaty; or (2) that it is unwise to permit the number of parties to the ABM Treaty to grow from 2 to 5, as the U.S. would then be required to gain the agreement of not only Russia -- but Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan -- to any changes to the ABM Treaty to permit a limited National Missile Defense. In addition to rejecting the argument that the Treaty has expired and making the basic case for why the ABM Treaty is still in our national interest, we have noted that our track-record in working with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in implementing important arms control treaties like START I and INF is very good (i.e., there is no reason to expect they would reject amendments to the ABM Treaty agreed to by the United States and Russia); moreover, excluding these countries from ABM might cause them to reassess their commitments under START, INF or even the NPT.

Bottom line: The Administration's position is that the ABM Treaty remains in force and that Russia obviously remains a party to the ABM Treaty. If the Senate declines to ratify the MOU on ABM succession, then there might be some ambiguity about the extent to which states other than Russia are Parties to the ABM Treaty; however, the ABM Treaty would continue in force.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/14/2000 7:40:36 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Transition vulnerabilities and opportunities [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY

-----Original Message-----

From: Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans)
(DEFENSE)
Sent: Tuesday, November 14, 2000 7:26 PM
To: Andreassen,
Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Subject: Transition vulnerabilities and opportunities
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Please Pass to Sandy from @Defense

Transition
Vulnerabilities/Potentially Sensitive Issues

1. Russian arms control initiative. This week's statement on arms control from President Putin could foreshadow an "arms control campaign" whereby the Russians seek to set the agenda and stake out the "high ground" in advance of the next Administration taking office.
2. Transmittals of Arms Control Agreements to the Senate. We will need to consider whether and when to transmit to the Senate for advice and consent the 1997 ABM (succession and demarcation) agreements and START II Protocol, as well as Protocols to two Nuclear Weapons Free Zone agreements (South Pacific and Africa) -- recognizing that no action would be expected prior to the inauguration of the next President and convening of the new Congress.
3. Decision on Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). The IWG is reviewing the issue of the implications of future testing of unmanned aerial vehicles as weapon delivery vehicles for both the INF and CFE Treaties (i.e., is a UCAV a "ground-launched

cruise missile" under the INF Treaty and thus banned? are UCAVs limited under the CFE Treaty as "combat aircraft"?). Senator Helms has recently sent a letter to the President urging no decision on this issue.

4. Anit-Personnel Landmines

5. Defense Trade

Transition Opportunities

1. Shali Report on CTBT. Shali is expected to deliver his report to the President on CTBT in mid-December. The report and its recommendations are a necessary prerequisite for any attempt to revive the Treaty by the next Administration.

2. Maritime Domain Awareness

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. email	Steven Andreasen to Richard Clarke and Roger Cressey. Subject: FW: UCAV Position: Answer to your Questions and Agency Agreed Position. (10 pages)	12/08/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/21/2000-01/10/2001]

2006-1363-F

vz5714

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. email	Kevin Moran to Steven Andreasen. Subject: RE: UCAV Position: Answer to your Questions and Agency Agreed Position. (4 pages)	12/09/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/21/2000-01/10/2001]

2006-1363-F
vz5714

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2201(3).

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. email	Steven Andreasen to Roger Cressey. Subject: RE: UCAV Position: Answer to your Questions and Agency Agreed Position. (5 pages)	12/09/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/21/2000-01/10/2001]

2006-1363-F

vz5714

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. email	Sean Tarver to Steven Andreasen, Richard Beardsworth, Johannes Binnedijk et al. Subject: RE: UCAV Position: Answer to your Questions and Agency Agreed Position. (8 pages)	12/10/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/21/2000-01/10/2001]

2006-1363-F
vz5714

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. email	Jonathan Scharfen to Steven Andreasen, Richard Beardsworth, Johannes Binnendijk et al. Subject: Action Memorandum to the President. (6 pages)	12/11/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/21/2000-01/10/2001]

2006-1363-F
vz5714

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/12/2000 12:02:53 PM
FROM Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT who is Putin [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Harrison, Hope M.(RUE)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY you also might crib from first three-four questions in this doc for good off the shelf language about how we deal with putin.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

POTUS Moscow Press Conf QAs_.doc
PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

THE SUMMIT, STATE OF RELATIONSHIP

- * Is Russia policy a failure?
- * Desperate for arms control deal
- * Relationship better since Kosovo
- * Personal impressions of Yeltsin, Putin
- * * Advice to next U.S. President*
- * Edmund Pope case

CHECHNYA

- * New documentation of Russian atrocities
- * Are they war crimes?
- * What has U.S. done to stop killing
- * Kosovo, Puerto Rico comparisons
- * "Liberate" Grozny?
- *

FREEDOMS/DEMOCRACY

- * Crackdown on media
- * Babitskiy
- * Kremlin pressure on chief rabbi, religious freedom
- * Is Putin's "vertical" plan authoritarian

ARMS CONTROL

- * Any progress on START III, ABM
- * Locking in next President
- * Helms says any deal is "DOA"
- * Are you rushing to do a deal
- * Is boost-phase better
- * Bush offering better deal, unilateral reductions

- * Rigged tests
- * Is Principles Document old-think?
- * Putin missile defense proposal
- * U.S. technology sharing
- * Give away U.S. NMD to Russia?
- * When will U.S. breach ABM Treaty
- * How will ABM breach be notified
- * Purpose of shared early warning (SEW) agreement
- * Connection between SEW and ABM/NMD

* * * * * IMF/WORLD BANK * SUPPORT, DEBT RELIEF

- * Support for continued IFI assistance
- * Debt relief
- * Are you indirectly financing war in Chechnya
- * Russian WTO accession

CORRUPTION

- * High-level corruption, misuse of aid
- * Oligarchs, impact on reform
- *

ECONOMIC POLICY

- * Putin's economic policy
- * Investment outlook
- * Optimistic about reform
- * summit strategy
- * reasons for optimism

NONPROLIFERATION, SPACE LAUNCH

- * Space launch quota
- * Russia-Iran missile problem
- * Russia-Iran nuclear cooperation, Bushehr
- * Weapons plutonium disposition agreement
- * Civil plutonium initiative
- * Russia BW activities

REGIONAL, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

- * Make G-7 into full-fledged G-8
- * Russian loans to, coziness with Milosevic
- * U.S. out of touch on Milosevic
- * * * Russian threat to bomb Afghanistan
- * N-K
- * Human rights in Baltics, NATO membership
- * Georgia-Chechnya cross-border flows
- * U.S. ambitions in the Caspian

ENVIRONMENT

- * Abolition of Russian agency for environmental protection
- * Significance of joint statement
- * EU criticism of Kyoto "hot air"
- * Limits on emissions trading

THE SUMMIT, THE U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP

When you took office, you promised to help bring democracy and prosperity to Russia. Russia today is a basket-case, President Putin has shown none of Yeltsin's democratic leanings, and the U.S. and Russia are fighting about arms control as if we're back in the 1980s. Isn't your policy a failure?

* The U.S. has core national interests at stake in success of Russia's transition toward democracy, free market, and productive engagement with the world community. Every American is safer today -- and Russians are freer than ever -- because of what's happening in Russia.

* President Putin and I have spent a lot of time discussing how to build on that important foundation. We talked a lot about our priorities for the months and years ahead.

* Engagement is not a favor to Russia, but the best way to pursue our interests.

* That doesn't mean papering over differences or wishing away problems.

* It would be huge mistake simply to turn our backs on Russia or throw up our hands. I have long said that the process of building a new Russia is going to be measured in decades and generations.

Doesn't your visit show that all you care about is getting an arms control deal and aren't really focused on the problems that Russian journalists, human rights activists, and innocent Chechens are facing from the Putin government?

* Discussed full range of issues, including press freedoms, Chechnya, and other areas where we have concerns.

* Best way to engage directly with Russia's leaders and the Russian people on these issues.

* I made clear to President Putin that Russia's embrace of democracy, individual and human rights is fundamental to the success of reform and Russia's continued international integration.

* * Have a full range of issues that are important to the American people - e.g., the future of the Russian economy, our cooperation with Russia in key areas of the world such as the Balkans, and the important arms control and nonproliferation challenges we face.

* We've had productive exchanges on all these issues and have found ways to move things forward.

Almost exactly a year ago, Russian troops moved on the Pristina Airport. That was a real low point in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Do you think that things have gotten much better since then - either for the U.S.-Russian relationship or for the people of Kosovo?

* I think Boris Yeltsin was right on target when he told me at the Cologne G-8 summit last year that Kosovo was the toughest test our relationship ever faced -- and that we passed it. I am very glad that the situation has changed quite a bit since then. Our relationship is a lot better, our troops are working well together to bring peace to that very difficult place, and Russia and NATO are re-engaging.

* * It's not realistic to think that the U.S. and Russia will agree on everything, but I think it's important to keep talking and to try to bridge differences wherever possible.

You had a unique and special relationship with President Yeltsin. Will you have as close and productive a relationship with Putin? What did you mean

when you
said the U.S. can do business with President Putin? What's he like as a
person?

* President Yeltsin's lasting achievement was dismantling the
communist system
and building new political institutions under democratically elected
leaders
within a constitutional framework.

* Bilateral relationship under President Yeltsin produced enormous
gains for both
Russians and Americans. I think that history will treat him very well.
Look
forward to seeing him tomorrow.

* I'm glad to get to know President Putin better. We've met three
times in less
than a year, and I hope to see him three more times in coming months.
Putin
clearly is very bright, understands the big challenges facing Russia.

* Proud of my relationship with Yeltsin - produced real gains for U.S.
and Russia
- but ultimately not a question of personalities but of relations
between our two
countries.

* In our conversations here, we've focused on the fundamental
principles and
common interests that guide our relations. Think there's a lot of
common ground
to build prosperity and security for our citizens.

* What I've said about President Putin was based on statements he's
made about
his goals and objectives and his commitments to accelerate economic
reforms and
to respect human rights.

* As Putin has said, the real test will be the actions his government
takes --
Russian people and international community will judge him on that
basis and the
results generated by his approach to governing this vast country.

What would be your advice to the next U.S. President on working
with Russia?
What mistakes do you hope your successor avoids?

* First and foremost, we need to keep working to make our people safer. That means reducing nuclear arsenals, ensuring that weapons of mass destruction don't fall into the wrong hands, and dealing with new threats (e.g., computer crime, terrorism, transnational organized crime).

* I hope my successor is blessed with vision and patience in his dealings with Russia. Russia is only just embarking on an enormous journey. We're going to have to try to have an impact on the outcome, but our influence is largely on the margins.

* The most important fact remains that the choices and the real hard work ahead can only be dealt with by the Russian people themselves. I think it would be fundamentally mistaken to understate them or their desire to seize this opportunity for a better future. It's in all our interests that they succeed, but we need to be realistic about the challenges still ahead.

Edmund Pope, a Navy veteran, is being held on espionage charges in a Russian prison. Did you ask Putin to release him?

* I'm familiar with his case. It has been raised appropriately.

Do you agree with the Washington Post's assessment of the Vice President Binational Commission? It seems that the VP was very well-meaning, but many of the issues that the commission worked on unraveled or appear naïve in retrospect.

CHECHNYA

What did you say to Putin about Russian atrocities in Chechnya, which have been documented in such detail by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International? What difference will it make?

* I've been very disturbed by reports of killings at Aldi (all-DEE). We discussed the war in Chechnya as we have in all our meetings. Also concerned about the humanitarian situation.

* I talked to President Putin about the damage that the war is doing to Russia's stated objectives of protecting its territorial integrity and defending citizens against terrorism. The Russian military campaign is only fueling the cycle of violence.

* I made clear once again that a military solution is not viable.

* The only way to find a lasting solution is to take meaningful steps on political track. I'm obviously very concerned about humanitarian impact, refugee situation. The suffering of innocent civilians is completely unacceptable.

* I pressed President Putin to conduct transparent and impartial investigations of human rights violations and to cooperate fully with international organizations (e.g., OSCE). We've been very disappointed by Russian footdragging on this.

Why hasn't the U.S. accused Russia of war crimes?

* Gravely concerned by allegations of human rights violations by Russian forces in Chechnya. That's why we co-sponsored resolution on Chechnya at the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. That resolution outlined steps Russia should take to investigate these reports and cooperate with international human rights organizations.

* Russian actions in Chechnya raise fundamental questions under international humanitarian law that merit immediate and impartial investigation by Russian authorities.

* Thorough investigation necessary to gather sufficient evidence to prosecute any

individual for specific criminal acts. Will continue to urge the Russian Government to conduct open and transparent investigations, prosecute those responsible.

Aside from rhetoric, what steps are you taking to influence Russia's actions in Chechnya?

- * Remain convinced there can be no military solution to the conflict and that the Chechnya conflict poses a threat to the security of the entire Caucasus region. Urge Russian Government to pursue a lasting political solution through dialogue with responsible leaders.

- * The US tried to help alleviate suffering of civilians by providing more than \$10 million to international humanitarian relief organizations helping people displaced by the conflict.

- * We have also pushed for full Russian cooperation with organizations such as the OSCE. We've helped ensure that the Red Cross has access to all detainees and detention centers. I'm disappointed by the obstacles in front of the OSCE and asked President Putin to remove them.

Why is it that you complain about abuses in Chechnya when the U.S. and NATO did the same thing in Kosovo? How would you react if Puerto Rico tried to secede?

- * Intervention in Kosovo was to stop a deliberate genocidal campaign of the Milosevic regime that threatened the security of region and our NATO allies.

- * Don't question Russia's right to protect territorial integrity, combat terrorism. But must also respect rule of law, human rights. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians unacceptable.

- * Deplore human rights abuses wherever they occur. Insist on

discrimination

between combatants and innocent civilians. Call for full, transparent investigation of reported abuses, violations of international norms.

What did you mean when you talked about "liberating" Grozny?

* Civilians obviously in terrible position, caught between brutal Russian military campaign and armed militants. Have consistently acknowledged that there are terrorists in Chechnya, and Russia has a right to combat terrorism. Used the word "liberate" in this context.
*

PRESS FREEDOMS/DEMOCRACY

Did you press Putin about the continued crackdown on the media?
Doesn't raid on
Media MOST make clear that freedom of press is in jeopardy?

* Am very concerned about the need to protect free and independent media in Russia. Key issue for Russian democracy. Talked to President Putin about issue at length.

* I think it's important that President Putin has said "Russia will have no future if we suppress civic freedoms and the press."

* In any free society, we can't expect to like or enjoy everything the press says or does. But the development of independent media in Russia is a singular achievement, it's something that never existed here before. It's a source of strength and vitality, must be cherished - and protected.

Did you and Putin discuss the Babitskiy case?

* [I have addressed this issue in the past.]

* * * I hope there will be a speedy and fair resolution of outstanding charges against Babitskiy in a manner consistent with Russian law and freedom of the press.

Any reaction to reports that the Kremlin is pressuring Russia's chief rabbi to resign? Did you discuss this with Putin?

* I believe that freedom of religion is a fundamental human right and a key aspect of Russia's transformation. The flowering of religious life, especially the rebirth of Jewish life and culture, in post-Communist Russia is nothing short of remarkable.

* I've seen the reports about Rabbi Shayeovich's (shah-YAY-vich's) situation, and I'm concerned. We're trying to gather the facts on the situation. Obviously, do not believe that the state should interfere in the affairs of religious organizations.

Any comment on Putin's plan to strengthen central authority at the expense of Russia's governors? Does this look like a prelude to the return of authoritarianism?

* It's responsibility of Russian people and their leaders to decide how to structure government. Know that Russian parliament is examining these proposed laws now. That's right way to handle such things.

* Believe that regional autonomy and development of strong, stable relations between central government and Russia's regions are among most important aspects of Russia's post-Communist transformation.

ARMS CONTROL

START / ABM

Was there any progress made on the central issue of ABM adaptation or START III?

* Good discussion; have agreed to intensify our discussions on both START III and

ABM. Both sides interested in further defining the basic elements of START III.

* Expect dialogue to continue at Okinawa.

* * * Aren't you locking in the next President to outmoded concepts and an ineffective system by signing this document today?

* These are not outmoded concepts, but important building blocks for managing our strategic relationship with Russia, today and in the future. Does not limit U.S. freedom to choose what we need to do for our security, but makes it more likely we find a cooperative approach to dealing with new threats.

* Next president will obviously be free to pursue whatever policies he determines to be in our national interest.

* Expect the next President will also value a stable strategic relationship with Russia.

Why should the Russians do a deal on ABM when Senator Helms says any agreement would be "dead on arrival" in the Senate?

* Think an agreement to adapt the ABM Treaty to permit a limited NMD, as well as an agreement to reduce further nuclear arsenals, would be recognized by our Senate as being in our national interest.

Why are you so intent on concluding an agreement on ABM when your presidency is almost over?

* The American people elect presidents for four-year terms, and they are expected to conduct foreign policy and act in the national interest for their entire term.

Isn't a boost-phase intercept system, such as that proposed by

President Putin, a better way to deal with the threat?

* There are some advantages to a boost-phase system, as it can intercept missiles before they dispense countermeasures.

* But we don't think such a system can be a substitute for our NMD program, which is still the fastest, most affordable, and most advanced technology for NMD.

Why should Putin negotiate with you on START and ABM when Governor Bush is offering unilateral reductions in our nuclear arsenal?

* I don't think an offer of unilateral action in this area is necessarily reassuring to anyone.

* Governor Bush's approach is basically a "do whatever you want" approach to managing strategic affairs, both on offense and defense.

* That's been tried before, and it led to an arms race that we are still trying to throttle down.

* The approach we have put forward would ensure that reductions in offense, as well as deployment of a limited NMD, would preserve stability, and enhance both sides' security.

Isn't their evidence that the tests for the current system were rigged?

* No. There have been some allegations, but I'm confident I will get an accurate assessment of the system's technical feasibility prior to making any decision on deployment.

Principles Document

"Strategic stability ... mutual deterrence" - sounds a lot like the kind of "old think" that dominated the Cold War. What's new here?

* Principles Document is forward looking - it talks squarely about new threats to our security, and the need to address these threats, including the consideration of changes to the ABM Treaty.

* At the same time, both the U.S. and Russia believe it is important to preserve the basic principles like the ABM Treaty which is key to get the deeper nuclear cuts we all seek.

* Strategic stability and mutual deterrence still matter in managing the strategic relationship between the world's two largest nuclear powers.

Missile Defense Cooperation

Did you discuss President Putin's proposals for cooperation?

* President Putin and I discussed both U.S. and Russian proposals for working together to address ballistic missile threats. Pleased that we both agree there are new threats which we need to address.

* Dialogue has been ongoing for some time. U.S. has made wide-ranging proposals to work cooperatively with Russia on the missile defense issue. Russia has also made some interesting proposals. Intend to continue that dialogue.

* Hope to be able to move forward with further steps in the future.
Signature of
Shared Early Warning agreement is a good example.

Did you discuss technology sharing with the Russians? Is Russia one of the "civilized countries" you are prepared to share technology with?

* We had a good discussion of the possibility for cooperation in this area. We have each made proposals, and we have asked our experts to look at this and report back to us at Okinawa.

But are you prepared to give your NMD to Russia?

* What we need to do is look at the proposals we now have on the table, and see what we can agree to pursue. I think we can agree on more initiatives, like shared early warning, that will enhance both countries security.

* *

Treaty line

When, exactly, would the U.S. cross the ABM Treaty line with construction activity on its ABM?

* We are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

If you make a decision to go forward with NMD construction later this year, won't you have to notify U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty?

* Am not going to speculate now on consequences of decision I haven't yet made.

Was the question of when the U.S. might cross the Treaty line discussed with the Russians at the summit? What was their reaction?

* We discussed this issue in general; however, I would not suggest to you they had a reaction on this point, as we have not made any determinations, or informed Russia of any conclusions.

Shared Early Warning

What is the objective of the shared early warning agreement?

* Important agreement. The first U.S.-Russian military institution. Will strengthen strategic stability by further reducing risk that ballistic missiles might be launched based on false warning of an attack.

* Will also increase mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic missile early warning systems of both sides.

Is there a linkage between implementation of shared early warning and NMD/ABM?

* No. Shared early warning is in our common interests regardless of where we go with ABM/NMD.

IMF/WORLD BANK SUPPORT, DEBT RELIEF

Will you support assistance from the IMF and World Bank for Russia?

* We support Russia's reengagement with the IMF and hope a strong, new program can be finalized and approved as early as this summer.

* Believe World Bank can play a crucial role supporting key structural reforms on Russia's agenda, including in banking, social sector and pension reform.

The Russians say they really need debt forgiveness but they're being punished because they're economy is doing better than expected, even though this debt has its origins in the Soviet era. Why won't you provide debt reduction? Will you support debt relief for Russia?

* New IMF program necessary before any consideration of debt relief possible.

* Think it is most important that Russia focus on consolidating its economic recovery and putting in place sound macro- and micro-economic policies, which will help spur economic growth and attract private investment.

* Want to do everything we can to encourage Russia on its path to recovery, growth.

Do you support resuming IMF funding to Russia as it continues its campaign in Chechnya?

* Make decisions on whether to support financing for Russia based on our national interest, including our interest in a democratic, stable Russia that is making

real progress on economic reform.

- * IMF funding should be provided only when program conditions have been met.

- * I would point out that U.S. aid is specifically targeted. Two-thirds of

bilateral assistance is aimed at reducing threat of proliferation of WMD.

Remainder is focused on promoting grassroots reform outside Moscow, humanitarian assistance for vulnerable groups.

WTO

Does the U.S. support Russia's accession to WTO?

- * We have long encouraged Russia's quest to join WTO on a sound basis. Think it's wise for Russia to accelerate its efforts, which will only reinforce the reforms.

- * Clear that WTO membership is path to prosperity in 21st century. Key to unlocking global economic opportunities.

CORRUPTION

Do you have any concrete evidence of high-level Russian corruption, siphoning off of U.S. aid? Mabatek, Yeltsin?

- * Have uncovered no evidence of systemic diversions of U.S. bilateral assistance.

- * Follow these allegations closely, but do not comment on intelligence or sensitive law enforcement issues.

- * Appropriate safeguards in place with respect to any IMF and World Bank programs going forward.

- * Urge Russians to get tough on corruption and to cooperate, in full, with investigations, no matter where evidence leads.

Haven't efforts at reform just resulted in the control of Russia's economy by

corrupt officials and oligarchs?

* I talked about this issue with Putin. Corruption is a real threat to Russia's stability, democratization and prospects for a broadly shared rise in living standards.

* Market reform and rule of law must be at heart of fight against corruption.
Need competition, transparency and enforceable legal rights.

* Corruption stems from too little reform, not too much.

* Legal reform and the battle against corruption are a central focus for US policy and our work with Russia both bilaterally and multilaterally.

* * *

* *

PUTIN'S ECONOMIC POLICY

What do you think of Putin's economic policies?

* Had a good discussion of reform agenda. Gained better understanding of priorities.

* Encouraged by early emphasis on tax reform, WTO accession, strengthening property rights and overall plans to improve investment environment, all of which are signals in the right direction. Will be judged by results.

* Key to seize the great opportunity Russia is currently enjoying thanks to favorable energy prices and push ahead.

* Encourage Russia to build on its current economic upswing and undertake reforms necessary to achieve sustainable growth that will result in improved living standards for all Russian citizens.

Do you really expect investment to flow into Russia? What about all the capital flight?

* In this global market, investors choose their destinations, and not the other way around. Key for emerging markets is to create an attractive business climate. That is only way to reverse the flow of capital.

* Believe many investors will be willing to take a fresh look at Russia, particularly once key structural reforms are coming into place.

* Pleased that Ambassador Bob Strauss will be leading a delegation of top American CEO's to Russia later this month.

*
Why are you any more optimistic now that Russia will implement real reform than in the past?

* Transition to an open market economy has been long, hard path. Russia has already accomplished a lot, including overcoming major disappointments.

* Believe Russia understands that in globalized economy reform is necessary to succeed.

* We talked at length about how to finish the job. Maintaining economic stability, building a modern, pro-growth business climate are key to boosting needed investment -- both foreign and domestic.

*
NONPROLIFERATION, COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH

Are you linking the space launch quota to Russian missile assistance to Iran?

* Our ability to cooperate with Russia in peaceful space ventures depends in part on Russia maintaining tighter controls over sensitive missile technology and preventing transfers to countries such as Iran.

* I hope we'll be in a position to consider lifting the quota later this year, depending on Russian progress in this area.

What are you doing to stop Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear and missile programs?

* I believe the Russian leadership shares our interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and missiles to Iran. However, we remain concerned that sensitive technology has been leaking out of Russia to Iran.

* Although Russia has made progress strengthening its export controls, the problem persists. We will continue our efforts to cooperate with the Russian government to strengthen its export controls and, as necessary, impose penalties against Russian companies and individuals who provide sensitive assistance to Iran.

Are you worried that Russia is helping Iran get nuclear weapons, including through their cooperation in building a nuclear reactor at Bushehr?

* Putin and I discussed this issue today. We have been very clear for quite a long time about our concerns about the risks created by Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation. Unfortunately, that problem is getting worse.

* I don't believe that any country, including Russia, wants to see an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. That would pose an enormous threat, not only to our allies in the region, especially Israel, but to our forces there as well.

How can you be sure that the scientists you're supporting through Nunn-Lugar programs aren't engaged in BW activities?

* Under our assistance programs, we are engaging in peaceful scientific research with former Soviet BW scientists. These programs have given us unprecedented access to the civilian part of the former Soviet BW program.

* Our interaction and access enhance our confidence that these institutes are no

longer engaged in offensive BW work. We have strict auditing and oversight procedures in place to ensure that U.S. funds are used for intended purposes.

* * * * *

REGIONAL, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Will the U.S. support abolishing the G-7 and making Russia a full member of the G-8?

* The G-8 is a premier global political body precisely because Russia is part of it. The G-8 addresses a range of important issues facing the international community (e.g., crossborder financial crime, infectious disease, terrorism).

* The G-7 as a grouping of the largest economies and financial actors has been a key instrument in coping with global financial crises. Believe it continues to serve a useful purpose.

The Russians seem to be cozying up to Milosevic. They've hosted an indicted war criminal, FRY Defense Minister Ojdanic, and announced new loans to Serbia. How can you tolerate this and how can you support IMF loans to a country that behaves this way?

* I was dismayed by reports that an indicted war criminal was received by Russian Government last month. We expressed our concerns immediately to the Russians about the serious problems this visit created. I raised with Putin. Appropriate that they've apologized for the incident and pledged this won't happen again.

* We've been talking extensively with the Russians about the exact nature of the loans that may have been extended or are under consideration. This is very serious matter. I think it's important that Russia avoid steps that would reduce international isolation of Milosevic regime.

* Russia as a democracy has an interest in helping Serbian people enjoy the freedom of democracy. Hope we can work together toward this goal.

* Make decisions on IMF assistance to Russia based on our national interest, including our interest in a Russia that is making progress toward economic reform.

* * *

Why aren't you dealing with Milosevic? After all, he's still the elected leader of Yugoslavia and despite all your ill will toward him, it's obvious he isn't going anywhere.

* We want good relations with Serbia. So long as Serbia is run by an indicted war criminal, that's not going to be possible. We have a common interest with Russia in having Serbia turn the page, begin a new democratic phase.

* * *

* * Did you discuss Russian threat to bomb Afghanistan over Taleban and UBL aid to Chechen rebels?

* We've talked a lot to Russians about this issue and have urged them not to take counterproductive actions. For their part, the Russians have assured us they are not planning any such action.

*

Russian officials have been complaining Georgia is serving as a base for Chechen rebels attacking Russian forces. Are you concerned? What are you doing?

* The international community is actively involved in this issue through an OSCE border monitoring mission aimed at ensuring there are no flows across the border.

* Georgia's independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty are very important to the U.S., security of entire Caucasus region. Have long expressed

our concern about danger of spillover of conflict in neighboring Chechnya.

* Have been encouraged by President Putin's statements about respect for Georgia's territorial integrity. Important that Russia and Georgia continue to work together to ensure border is secure.

* * *

What are you and President Putin doing to achieve a solution to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh?

* We have been working together on this issue for a long time. We have seen some positive developments over past year, including direct discussions between Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian.

* President Putin and I agreed to stay actively involved in promoting a settlement. He will be seeing both Presidents soon. I saw Aliyev recently in Washington. I will see Kocharian this month.

Russian citizens are having their human rights abused in the Baltics - why aren't you speaking up about this and why are you pressing to bring these countries into NATO?

* I know that this issue is very sensitive to people in Russia. But the Baltic countries have made progress integrating ethnic Russians into their societies but that process obviously is not yet complete.

* The independence of the Baltics is very important. Strong cooperation between Russia and its closest neighbors is good for Russia, good for its neighbors, good for stability in region.

* On the NATO issue, a more stable Europe is good for everybody - we should not have any new dividing lines. NATO membership is open to any and all European democracies that express interest and would contribute to the security

of the
Alliance. The Balts have expressed interest. We haven't made any
decisions.

How do you evaluate your interaction with Russia on Caspian energy
issues and
manage Moscow's ambitions there? How do you respond to the
charges that the US
is pursuing a "sphere of influence" in the Caspian region at Russia's
expense?

* U.S. not pursuing sphere of influence in Caspian region. Russia and
U.S. both
benefit from the emergence of thriving, prosperous independence
countries in the
Caspian region. Promoting economic development is best way to
ensure long-run
stability and stem ethnic tensions and extremism in the Caspian
region.

* Development of the energy sector is key to economic prospects for
most of these
countries. We see this as a win-win opportunity, for Russia, the U.S,
and the
countries themselves.

* We favor multiple export pipelines. These are commercially driven
projects.
U.S. and Russian companies are competing with others for stakes.

ENVIRONMENT

Any comment on Putin's decree abolishing Russia's State Committee
on Environment?
Did you raise with Putin?

* Have had constructive cooperation with Russians on the
environment for more
than 25 years including climate change and ozone depletion.
Environmental
matters very important in Russia, given huge scale of Soviet-era
environmental
damage.

* Pleased that we agreed on cooperation on climate change. Russia
will give
appropriate pricing to environment.

* Part of effective environmental protection is having effective institutions - both intelligent regulation and an active, independent non-governmental environmental community. Applaud the work of Russian environmental organizations.

If pressed -- Did you raise with Putin?

* We have been expressing concerns with the Russian government.

What is the significance of the joint statement on climate?

* The statement highlights our attention to this critical global environmental challenge and our common agenda moving forward.

* It illustrates our shared vision that countries can achieve robust economic growth while protecting the environment and taking action to combat climate change.

* We're also going to cooperate with Russia in the measurement and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions, the development of market-based tools for managing those emissions, and the identification of specific opportunities to further reduce or sequester those emissions.

* The statement reaffirms our belief that it would be counterproductive to our environmental goals to limit the Kyoto mechanisms by placing quantitative restrictions on their use. It reaffirms the importance of developing rigorous and transparent rules and guidelines for the Kyoto Protocol's flexibility mechanisms, including international emissions trading and "joint implementation" projects.

Environmentalists and the EU charge that Russia is getting a free ride. Its greenhouse gas emissions are down, yes, but that's largely attributable

to the overall economic downturn, not good environmental policy. Why should Russia be able to sell these "hot air" credits? Doesn't this undermine the integrity of the Kyoto agreement?

* The decline in Russian emissions since 1990 is attributable to a variety of causes, including sound energy and environmental policy decisions -- such as an increased reliance on clean burning natural gas over particularly dirty forms of coal -- as well as Russia's overall economic performance.

* All of these factors went into setting Russia's overall emissions target under the Kyoto Protocol. Russia's target, like our own, was approved by the international community in 1997.

* The Kyoto market mechanisms, including emissions trading, help promote cost effective emission reductions, ensuring that each dollar or ruble spent produces the maximum environmental benefit.

* Limiting Russia's use of the Kyoto mechanisms would be neither fair nor justified if one wants to strengthen the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol.

Why shouldn't the international community place limits on "emissions trading?" Isn't the United States seeking to buy fake emissions credits anyway instead of taking action to address climate change at home?

* The United States intends fully to achieve a substantial portion of emission reductions at home. At the same time, limiting access to the Kyoto mechanisms would be unwise.

* The Kyoto market mechanisms, including emissions trading, help promote cost effective emission reductions, ensuring that each dollar or ruble spent produces

the maximum environmental benefit.

* We should not force U.S. companies to reduce emissions in a costly manner if they can do so at half the price abroad.

* A reduction abroad has the same environmental benefit as a reduction at home.

*

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/10/01 6:12:35 PM
FROM Cruise, Daniel L. (PRESS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT srb points [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY
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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SRBPOINTSNT.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS PRESS GUIDANCE
FOR NYT EDITORIAL BOARD AND CFR SPEECH
January 11, 2001

South Korea/Nogun-Ri

North Korea Trip

USS Cole

Helms/UN Arrears

MEPP

ICTY/Plavsic

Depleted Uranium Ammunition

SOUTH KOREA: NOGUN-RI

* We deeply regret that innocent Korean civilians lost their lives at Nogun-Ri. We can't remove the sadness, but we hope to help the healing process by constructing a monument at Nogun-Ri and by establishing a scholarship fund in honor of the innocent Korean civilians who died in the war.

* We also need to remember the many sacrifices of our veterans, and the positive legacies of the war: a democratic Republic of Korea, a strong U.S.-South Korean alliance, and close bonds of friendship between our two peoples.

NORTH KOREA TRIP

* We worked hard to get a missile agreement that would have been the basis for a Presidential visit. We wanted to inform the next administration before committing to anything, since its support would have been crucial for the success of any agreement. The delay in election results worked against us, though, and in the end, the President decided there was not enough time to do it properly.

* Some media accounts purporting to reveal the contents of the deal have been grossly inaccurate. I can assure you that the deal was potentially remarkable--one that would have been considered unimaginable just months before. We want to preserve the best possible environment for the next Administration to deal with North Korea, however, so I won't go into detail.

* Our strategy was never missiles only, or missiles instead of conventional arms reductions or at the expense of North-South progress. We worked to build a sustainable process that would allow us over time to deal with all areas of concern. There is a lot to be said for building such a process first on a sound missile agreement.

USS COLE: CROUCH-GEHMAN COMMISSION REPORT

BACKGROUND: The Crouch-Gehman Commission report was released January 9. It is the first of three reports expected to be released regarding the attack on the USS Cole. The report outlines 30 findings with recommendations that are all designed to enhance the safety of U.S. forces overseas, particularly while in-transit between two theaters of operations. The report did not assess blame for the terrorist attack but instead focused on measures that might prevent future attacks on U.S. forces traveling through areas of known terrorist activity.

Have you seen the report and what are your comments with regard to it?

* Yes, we have seen the report. There are a number of findings and recommendations made in the report. We will be reviewing these with the Department and relevant agencies.

The report only mentions the name of the USS Cole once and

provides no new information regarding the culpability of those in charge. Why not?

* The charter of the commission was to look specifically at how to enhance the protection of U.S. forces in transit since this was the most pressing question. They have done what they were asked to do.

When will we hear anything with regard to the investigation of the ship and the actions of the crew?

* The second investigation, an internal Navy investigation has not completed its cycle of reviews. It is with the Chief of Naval Operations at this time.

* It would be inappropriate to comment on that investigation until the findings have completed all levels of internal review.

* I would refer you to the Pentagon for comment when it becomes available.

We understand that some of the recommendations imply more should be spent on intelligence and force protection yet no changes are recommended for the rules of engagement (ROE) by which troops will respond to threats. Any comment?

* There are a number of findings and recommendations made in the report - 30 in all. We will be reviewing these with the Department and relevant agencies. Some may require an assessment of resources but this will require an interagency review. I would refer you to the Pentagon with respect to the question regarding rules of engagement.

HELMS/UN ARREARS

BACKGROUND: Yesterday following Richard Holbrooke's testimony to the SFRC, Senator Helms indicated that the SFRC would release the next payment of U.S. arrears to the UN. This payment of \$582 million was conditioned on the UN General Assembly accepting limits on U.S. contributions of 22% on the regular UN budget and 25% on peacekeeping. While the General Assembly approved the 22% regular budget cap, it only authorized a decrease U.S. contributions to peacekeeping from 30% to 27% (to be reduced to 25% over five years). Therefore, unless Congress creates new legislation to override the 1994 Kassebaum amendment capping U.S. contributions to peacekeeping at 25%, we will continue to accrue new arrears at the UN (the difference between the 27% the UN bills us and the 25% we pay).

* We are very pleased that Senator Helms, Senator Biden, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have indicated their willingness to release the next payment of arrears authorized under the Helms-Biden legislation. This payment of \$582 million would allow the UN to pay the bulk of funds owed to other countries for troop contributions to peacekeeping.

* This move would build on the fine work by Ambassador Holbrooke at the United Nations and go along way to putting the U.S.-UN relationship back on track.

IF ASKED: With the 25% cap on peacekeeping payments, won't the U.S. continue to accrue new arrears?

* While the rate at which new arrears will accrue will significantly decline, as long as the cap is in place, we will incur new arrears for peacekeeping.

* We believe it is in the best interests of the United States not to continue to accrue new arrears and would like to encourage Congress to remove legislated cap.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Why has Dennis Ross again delayed his trip? When is he going now?

* Dennis Ross initially delayed his trip by one day due for scheduling reasons. Yasser Arafat is in Tunis today for a meeting of Arab foreign ministers.

* He has now put the trip on hold given the security meetings that are happening at various levels in the region now. You'll recall that CIA Director George Tenet traveled this weekend to Cairo to meet with security officials from both sides to improve the situation on the ground.

* At this point, he still plans to travel to the region. No revised date is set.

Does that mean that the security situation has not improved enough for the two sides to negotiate even some kind of Presidential statement or declaration of principles?

* We have said repeatedly that it would be difficult to imagine reaching an agreement, much less returning to serious negotiations, without seeing a reduction in the violence.

* Last week, Chairman Arafat pledged to resume security cooperation with Israel directed against terrorist acts and take other steps. We

continue to work with both sides to implement those steps.

Well, is this yet another reflection that the peace process is essentially dead and that the President has given up making further progress before he leaves office?

* Dennis has put his departure on hold, but don't take this decision too far. Whether and when Dennis travels to the region will be based on the President's judgement of helping the parties close the gaps that remain.

* As the President said on Sunday, he remains committed to work with both sides to make as much progress as he can before he leaves office. He has talked to both Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat about both security issues and negotiations in the past two days. He's determined to do all he can to help them in the time remaining.

ICTY: TRAVEL OF BILJANA PLAVSIC TO THE HAGUE

BACKGROUND: Biljana Plavsic, a close ally of wartime leader Radovan Karadzic and president of the Republika Srpska from 1996 to 1998, yesterday flew to The Hague where she presented herself today to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Mrs. Plavsic is under a formerly sealed indictment, issued in April 2000 and publicly disclosed by the ICTY today, for genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and customs of war, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in Bosnia in 1991 and 1992. Mrs. Plavsic is now in the ICTY's custody, and an initial appearance before a Trial Chamber is expected to take place on January 11. The ICTY indictment alleges that Plavsic committed the crimes along with Momcilo Krajisnik, who is also currently in the Tribunal's custody after being detained by SFOR. ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte intends to try Plavsic and Krajisnik jointly thereafter.

The United States, in close consultation with the ICTY, helped to arrange Mrs. Plavsic's voluntary surrender and provided the aircraft; however, we prefer to keep the U.S. role low key and to credit NATO with providing the aircraft. The US worked closely with Plavsic when she was elected president of the Republic Srpska and sought to break ties to Karadzic and Milosevic. Today's Washington Post reports: "Administration officials repeatedly defended their alliance with her on the grounds that she was the best in a bad lot of Bosnian Serb politicians."

* We welcome the decision of Mrs. Plavsic to present herself to the ICTY to cooperate with their prosecution of war crimes in Bosnia

* By helping to underscore the legitimacy of the court and its role, we

hope that it will encourage others - in Bosnia and in Belgrade - to cooperate as well.

Has Plavsic negotiated some type of deal with the ICTY? Will she provide evidence against others?

* Ask the ICTY.

Who provided transportation?

* NATO provided an aircraft to The Hague in coordination with the ICTY.

Did the United States play any role?

* We have consistently encouraged cooperation with the ICTY. We hope that Mrs. Plavsic's action sets an example for others.

Wasn't Plavsic helpful with Dayton implementation during her Presidency? Why did the US work with a war criminal?

* From 1996-1998, the U.S. dealt with Plavsic in her capacity as elected President of the Republic of Srpska. During that period she demonstrated greater cooperation with some goals of Dayton implementation than many of her Bosnian Serb nationalist colleagues. In particular, she broke ties with both Karadzic and Milosevic.

* The ICTY did not issue the sealed indictment of Plavsic until after her presidency had ended.

* In appearing before the ICTY today, Plavsic took the right step. We call on all other indictees to follow her example and turn themselves in to the tribunal.

What about other Bosnian war criminals?

* Under the Dayton Peace Accords, it remains the obligation of governments in the region - including the new government being formed in the Republika Srpska -- to transfer indicted war criminals to The Hague.

* In addition, SFOR will continue to apprehend those war criminals who do not surrender voluntarily and the U.S. State Department continues to offer rewards of up to \$5 million for information leading to their apprehension.

USE OF DEPLETED URANIUM BY U.S. FORCES IN THE

BALKANS

BACKGROUND: Italy has recently called for consultations at NATO on possible links between depleted uranium (DU) munitions used by U.S. forces in Bosnia and Kosovo and cancer. EC President Prodi and other Europeans have also raised questions about harmful effects of DU munitions. DU is incorporated into shell casings and other munitions to increase density and ability to penetrate armor. The U.S. military used DU munitions in Bosnia during 94-95, in Kosovo during Allied Force, and in Iraq during Desert Storm.

Is exposure to depleted uranium munitions used by U.S. forces in Bosnia and Kosovo causing cancer, "Balkans Syndrome" or other illnesses among NATO peacekeepers?

* The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs have sponsored numerous studies and extensively reviewed other studies on the effects of DU. To date we have not found an association between DU and any harmful health effects on our soldiers that have known exposure to DU. Research on this topic continues. You should refer to DoD for details.

Is NATO investigating this issue?

* Numerous government and independent studies have already been conducted on the subject and none have shown that DU is harmful to our soldiers.

* Allies have reviewed the matter in detail this week and taken steps to ensure government and public access to all the facts, including through establishment of an alliance clearinghouse for scientific information on depleted uranium.

* U.S. and allies have cooperated with UN Environmental Program's recent study on DU in Kosovo [FYI: report expected in March.] and are prepared to cooperate with any further studies by responsible international organizations.

Will U.S. support moratorium on DU use?

* As NATO SYG Robertson said in press conference 10 January, there is no evidence to suggest there are health risks from DU, so there is no reason to suspend its use.

