

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	June Bartlett to Gregory Schulte. Subject: FW: [Final Version of Packages] (20 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)
002. email	Richard Saunders to Steven Black. Subject: Go Final...but read it first. (4 pages)	05/06/1999	P1/b(1)
003. email	Richard Saunders to Steven Black. Subject: Much Revised...Per Leon. (3 pages)	05/27/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
 OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/31/1999-05/27/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/31/99 6:46:32 PM

FROM Andreasen, Steven P.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT The ACDA Flag is Lowered for the Last Time ... [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Brackman, Stella S.
Kelly, Sandra L.
McCausland, Jeffrey D.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Caravelli, John M.
Edwards, Joan K.
Harris, Elisa D.
Samore, Gary S.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Barnett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Faranda, Regina D.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Tedstrom, John E.
Weiss, Andrew S.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Short AP piece, along with Holum interview today ...

^Arms agency
being absorbed by the State Department<
WASHINGTON (AP) The
government's disarmament agency is going
out of business after a
38-year run that included the negotiation
of international agreements
aimed at controlling nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will get out of business at midnight, its functions being taken over by the State Department.

John Holum, who has served as ACDA director since 1993, is due to become the first undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, once he is confirmed by the Senate. The agency was created in 1961 as an independent voice within the government on behalf of arms control. The legislation implementing the merger states that the arms control office may continue to advocate a point of view which is at odds with that of the secretary of state, Holum said at a briefing. "Something unusual is going to happen at midnight tonight, and that is a federal agency will disappear," Holum said. He said the cost savings of the merger already have been realized in the form of a 6 percent personnel cutback.

Calling the ACDA years "very productive," Holum cited the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the chemical and biological weapons conventions and the SALT and START treaties, among others. As part of the merger process, the U.S. Information Agency also will be absorbed by the State Department. The merger will take place in October.

APE- 03/31/99 11:21:00

^John
Holum Holds News Briefing On The Integration Of The Arms
Control
And Disarmament Agency Into The State Department<

MODERATOR:

Good morning. It's a special pleasure to welcome John Holum here today. Mr. Holum will be here -- is here to discuss the impending integration of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, commonly known as ACDA, and the Department of State. Mr. Holum was sworn in as director of ACDA in November of 1993, and December of 1997 added to that the position of acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs. As such, he has been the principal adviser to the president and to the secretary of state on arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament matters. This morning's briefing is on the record. Mr. Holum has a brief statement I believe, after which he will respond to your questions.

Thank you.

HOLUM: Thanks very much. It's a pleasure to be back here.

Something unusual is going to happen at midnight tonight, and that is a federal agency will disappear. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will go out of existence after a very productive 38 years, including such arms control innovations and achievements as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the decision to make it permanent, strengthen nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation tools, a partial test ban and then a permanent, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, SALT, START, INF, a whole range of confidence-building and transparency measures all over the world. ACDA also has implemented and verified those agreements where the security benefits agreed to on paper are actually realized in

weapons coming down or being averted. ACDA has a tradition and a responsibility historically for conveying, broadcasting inconvenient truth in its compliance reports to the Congress and other nonproliferation reporting.

Elapsed Time 00:01, Eastern Time 09:42

The agency has spawned several generations of arms control professionals, who are now found not only in ACDA but in the State Department, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community and elsewhere in the government as well as in the NGO community.

MORE

HOLUM: It has a remarkable core of talent that will be coming into the State Department, including negotiators, substantive and technical experts, a great deal of historical knowledge about all the treaties I referred to, legal skills, public and congressional affairs, and a variety of others.

An independent agency for arms control in 1961 and in 1995, when we fought this issue in the early '90s, was a good idea. Yet merging is -- the merger is happening by consent. Why? Essentially because Secretary Albright strongly supports this cause and so supported a merger arrangement that preserves the key values of this organization.

Elapsed Time 00:03, Eastern Time 09:44

A number of studies going back to the late '80s, early '90s, have concluded that the reason -- the primary reason for an independent arms control and disarmament agency has been independent advocacy. The perspectives that we had to offer were so important that they shouldn't be muffled

or compromised down within a single department, but rather should be brought to the table at the highest levels.

The secretary has agreed, and the president has approved, and the legislation establishes, the principle that the undersecretary for arms control and international security under the merged structure will also be a senior adviser to the president and the secretary of state on arms control and nonproliferation, and therefore will continue to be present at these meetings, advocating where appropriate an independent point of view that may disagree with that of the secretary.

Elapsed Time 00:04, Eastern Time 09:45

The undersecretary will also be able to communicate directly with the president through the secretary, when necessary.

The compliance review function has been attached to the undersecretary's office in order to preserve the integrity of its reporting.

MORE

HOLUM: Leadership on nonproliferation comes back to the State Department from the NSC, and the new bureaus will also have an enhanced role in leading the interagency process on arms control. We're also consolidating arms control functions that have grown up elsewhere, in other bureaus in the State Department, into the new bureau structure.

There will be a new associate legal adviser and a new assistant legal adviser for arms control.

The plan, as an interesting and uncomfortable side bar, is not yet final. The plan for integration was submitted to the Congress

last December, where it was to lay over 90 days before it becomes final.

Elapsed Time 00:05, Eastern Time 09:46

There are likely to be some changes in the overall plan that includes

the integration of USIA and some elements of the Agency for International

Development. But as it stands now, and I expect this will continue,

is that we'll have three bureaus, new bureaus in the Department

of State replacing the four bureaus of ACDA and one bureau in State

previously: A nonproliferation bureau, an arms control bureau, and

a political/military affairs bureau that will do traditional security-related matters.

Finally, just let me note what I think has been an exceptional

performance by ACDA's professionals during the course of this

integration negotiation and process to get ready for.

Elapsed Time 00:06, Eastern Time 09:47

There was, as you would expect in any organization, considerable unhappiness at the conclusion that ACDA would be merged into the State Department.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 10:32:00

HOLUM: At the same time, there has been unqualified support for the efforts to make it work in the most effective possible way, and I think that's due to the commitment to the mission of this agency that ACDA's professionals and all of its personnel maintain, and to their professionalism as good public servants.

With that, let me welcome your questions.

QUESTION: I'm interested in the idea of ACDA being independent.

all
these years. Has there been or have there been ACDA directors
who
have been at odds with the position of the secretary of state?

HOLUM: Yes.

QUESTION: Can you site some good examples of that?

HOLUM: There have been some very good examples that I'd rather
refer

back to previous administrations.

(LAUGHTER)

But, I guess

the original -- the original decision to support
the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty was resisted by the Department
of State in the late 1960s.

Elapsed Time 00:07, Eastern Time 09:48

The Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, it's widely known, in
the case of Pakistan's

nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and
1990s, made the case that

the president could no longer certify

that Pakistan wasn't pursuing

a nuclear weapons capability, and

that had implications under the

Pressler Amendment. That was

naturally resisted by the country relations

interests of the

Department of State. And ultimately, President

Bush agreed with the

ACDA view.

I don't want to go, for obvious

reasons, into a lot of

specifics, but I will tell you that it happens

frequently that,

during my tenure, that the Department of State

and the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agencies -- or Agency have
had different

perspectives on issues and have brought them to the
table.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 10:36:00

HOLUM: That

will change to some extent operationally, and I've

thought a lot about this. The ACDA view, the ACDA approach traditionally has been a sort of reflexive expression of an independent viewpoint. In the new structure, it will be more reflective in the sense that it has to be an important issue. It's a bigger step now for an undersecretary to take issue with the secretary. But it will still happen. It has happened on occasion when I've been dual-hatted, and I think the process works very well. The secretary is very supportive of having the arms control view at the table.

QUESTION: Are you still acting?

HOLUM: As of right now, I am ACDA director and acting undersecretary for arms control and international security.

Elapsed Time 00:09,
Eastern Time 09:50

As of midnight tonight, I'll be neither of those things. My name has been submitted for the new undersecretary position, but I would have to still be confirmed. So in the interim, I'll be a senior adviser to the secretary.

QUESTION: Do you see any change in the way that you're going to approach specific issues with this realignment, the three bureaus instead of five or whatever?

HOLUM: Well, I think the basic analytical approach and advocacy approach will be very similar to what it's been in the past. There will -- the people who have been in ACDA working these issues will be at the same table with people in State who have been working them.

Elapsed Time 00:10, Eastern Time 09:51

I've always thought the competition, the competition of ideas with

the State Department, has been less with nonproliferation experts,
in the nonproliferation -- in the political/military affairs bureau,
and more with the regional perspective. That's where the tension comes.
MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 10:43:00

HOLUM: And what I think the outcome will be is that we'll have a stronger power center for nonproliferation and arms control in the State Department, more forceful advocacy. The character -- the center of gravity will shift a bit in the Department of State, not because ACDA is a huge organization coming in, but because we're bringing new resources, new capabilities, to bear on these issues. We're bringing in reinforcements to the existing structure, and a lot more, I would suggest, really long-term, deep technical expertise.

Most of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is civil service, people who have been working on the same kinds of issues for 15, 20, 25 years. There are people in ACDA who know the operational history of every aspect of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Elapsed Time 00:11, Eastern
Time 09:52

There are experts on chemical weapons that know the chemical makeup of the compounds that are useful as chemical weapons.

And that's going to reinforce the State Department's ability to handle these issues, both internally and also in the interagency process.

Yes?

QUESTION: I wonder if you can forgive me.
With everything that's

going on in Kosovo, and your lengthy expertise on arms control issues, I wonder if you could discuss what impact, you know, what's going on in Kosovo, and whether there is success or failure, what impact that could have on arms control around the world, what message it could send to countries like North Korea or other nuclear threats to the U.S. I wonder if you could respond to that.

HOLUM: Well, it's very hard to isolate, particularly at this stage, what the long-term impact would be.

Elapsed

Time 00:12, Eastern Time 09:53

I think the horrors that are occurring in Kosovo now obviously underscore the importance of legal structures, and also informal structures, confidence-building to limit and control arms.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 10:47:00

HOLUM: We globally are behind the curve, I think, in dealing with conventional arms. There are conventional arms regimes, and Europe as the leading site of progress on conventional arms. But nonetheless, they are hard to control, and they are -- they're obviously being used to cause most of the damage that occurs worldwide.

I've

often said that we rightly pay attention to nuclear and chemical and biological weapons and missiles because they have the potential to wipe out whole cities at a time.

Elapsed Time 00:13, Eastern

Time 09:54

Well, conventional arms, as we're seeing now, are wiping out whole cities a few people at a time, so we need a great deal more

work on that.
More broadly, there may be some impact,
plus or minus, on our
efforts to negotiate international regimes
on weapons of mass
destruction, on our negotiations with Russia,
but I think it's too
early to specify what that will be. And I suspect
it will mostly be
short term rather than long term.

QUESTION:

Well, to go to that point, I mean, the Russians have
said they're
going to put off START, the debate on START again. So,
have they
indicated that this is, you know, another sort of
temporary delay
for a month or so, or have they just said, we're
putting it off?

HOLUM: From what I understand, they've asked -- the Duma was
preparing
to vote on START II April 2nd or in that timeframe, or
toward mid-April,
and that will not now occur. But I think the
point to underscore
is that START II remains very much in Russia's
interest, as well
as in our interest.

Elapsed Time 00:14, Eastern Time 09:55

It's the opening to negotiate START III.
MORE

FDCH

03/31/99 10:51:00

HOLUM: We need to continue this process
of reducing strategic
arms, and over time, I suspect that the Russians
will take that
same point of view. And that's why I think this is
more likely to
be a short-term rather than a long-term impact.

QUESTION: What about CFB (ph)? There was interest expressed in
trying
to bring that to closure this year as well.

HOLUM: I think there's
a pretty good prospect. Just yesterday,

in the joint consultative group, they made some considerable progress toward the final elements. I haven't reviewed the papers yet, but I think we're going to briefing fairly soon on the outcome there, not the completely adapted treaty, but the basic elements of what the adaptation will entail.

QUESTION: Let me just ask again in a way -- I think one analyst was saying, I was hearing last night, that if there's no success here in Kosovo that, you know, the North Koreans will just go forward extensively and just sort of not take U.S. and other international threats seriously. I mean, is that blown out of proportion, or do you think there's a real concern there?

Elapsed Time 00:15,

Eastern Time 09:56

HOLUM: No. I -- there are a large number of very significant obstacles in our way of -- in the way of reaching a comprehensive agreement on all the problems we have with North Korea, nuclear missiles and many others. We've just completed another round of talks on missiles.

I think the impact of Kosovo, if there is any, would be way down the scale of the difficulties we face there. The -- we just have an enormous amount of work to do with North Korea. We've made some headway, as you know, on the Kumchangni site access. And there will be a first visit to the site in May.

The discussions with the North Koreans in Pyongyang that Bob Einhorn led have been useful, another step, the fourth meeting on missile issue.

Elapsed Time 00:16, Eastern Time 09:57

But we're a long way from a settlement, from an agreement, on

those issues.

I don't think Kosovo has a significant bearing.

QUESTION: Could

you flesh that out a little bit? About the talks

just ended in Pyongyang

being useful?

HOLUM: Well, useful in the sense that we made
our views both on

possible further flight tests, and indigenous

developments of

missiles in North Korea, and on their exports of

advanced missiles

very clear.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 11:05:00

HOLUM: The discussions were candid and businesslike, as you
hear

frequently about discussions.

(LAUGHTER)

And they

plan to meet again as soon as possible. There is no
agreement coming

out of this. I wouldn't expect that there'd be

--that they'd come

home with an agreement after four rounds of

talks. But I think it's

valuable that we are discussing the missile

issue with them and

we have broken the long period when it was hard

to get this issue

on the table.

QUESTION: Can I have one last follow-up on the
merger?

Elapsed Time 00:17, Eastern Time 09:58

Senator

Helms has said he hopes this will lead to budget cuts.

How do you

think this will shake out?

HOLUM: Well, there have been budget

cuts. One of the things

that's been going since 1993-94, in part

through the inspiration of

the Hill and in part through Vice President

Gore's Reinventing

Government process, is we have done in ACDA,

and something similar

has been done in the Political and Military

Affairs Bureau, of a comprehensive review of positions, and a systematic effort to reduce overlap, to eliminate duplication.

Elapsed

Time 00:18, Eastern Time 09:59

So I think most of the savings have already been, at least in the near term, have already been wrung out of the system.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 11:08:00

HOLUM: You know, there may be further savings over time, but one of the things that we've learned in particular as we've gone through

the crosswalk, the identification of people and positions in the

new bureau structure, in the new offices, is that to a very large

extent, ACDA and State have done different things. And the Political

and Military Affairs Bureau and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

have complementary but different functions.

Speaking broadly,

for example, ACDA negotiates multilateral regimes, and the State

Department is not heavily engaged, for example, on the conference

on disarmament in Geneva. The Department of State is much more active

in what I would call the retail enforcement of those regimes, using

the test ban or the

Nonproliferation Treaty was a vehicle to persuade other countries

to comply.

Elapsed Time 00:19, Eastern Time

10:00

So the functions, broadly speaking, are different, and there

isn't a lot of duplication and overlap.

We'll continue

to be looking at potential savings. But I don't expect massive reductions

in personnel.

QUESTION: Can you quantify the savings to date?

HOLUM: In ACDA's case, our personnel dropped -- well, and I emphasize, this was in the context of missions going up -- our personnel dropped I think a total of six percent, with a great deal more work underway.

This is not a case where we're consolidating and reducing because the work is going away. And we're also not consolidating and reducing because we failed -- the agency has failed.
Elapsed Time 00:20,
Eastern Time 10:01
In some respects I think the merger is a product of ACDA's success.
MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 11:13:00

HOLUM: Because it's -- the work it does is becoming more central to our foreign policy and becoming more a part of what the State Department does. And you see that continuously in the State Department with how much of our time is devoted to things like North Korea, Iraq, Iran, the Russia-Iran relationships, the China-Iran relationship. This is really a central focus now of the administration and the work is not declining, it's growing and becoming more important.

QUESTION: Before the Russian atomic energy minister came here, as part of the trip that was supposed to involve Primakov, he gave an interview in which he said that Russia was going to decrease its involvement with Iran. I was wondering, did anything ever come out of that? And have they given you any new commitments to that effect?

Elapsed Time 00:21, Eastern Time 10:02

HOLUM: Well, I don't want to go into the specifics of our conversations. We had extensive discussions with Minister Adamov while he was here, in fact after the prime minister's plane went back to Moscow.

One thing that is very clear is that we signed the HEU agreement, that that issue, which has been pending for a long period of time, was resolved, a very important step. And we also had some very good discussions and made, I would say made considerable headway on the issue of Russia-Iran nuclear relationships. I don't have an agreement to announce, I don't have --I'm not going to talk about specifics on that.

QUESTION: You won't define what "headway" means?

HOLUM: Just further reason to believe that they are undertaking, in line with Minister Adamov's public statements, not to assist Iran's nuclear programs.

QUESTION: But not -- they've not gone far enough to lift sanctions on those entities?

HOLUM: Not yet.

Elapsed Time 00:22, Eastern Time 10:03

Anything else?

QUESTION: Thank you.

HOLUM: Thank you.

END

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/31/99 6:52:07 PM
FROM Pascual, Carlos E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: The ACDA Flag is Lowered for the Last Time ... [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

first State takes over the FRY embassy, now ACDA.....what tomorrow?

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven

P.

Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 1999 6:47 PM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense

Policy; @NONPRO - Export Controls; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine

Subject: The

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Importance: High

Short

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integration negotiation and process to get ready for.

Elapsed Time 00:06, Eastern Time 09:47
There was, as you would
expect in any organization, considerable
unhappiness at the conclusion
that ACDA would be merged into the
State Department.
MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 10:32:00

HOLUM: At the same time, there
has been unqualified support for
the efforts to make it work in
the most effective possible way, and
I think that's due to the commitment
to the mission of this agency
that ACDA's professionals and all
of its personnel maintain, and to
their professionalism as good
public servants.
With that, let me welcome your questions.

QUESTION: I'm interested in the idea of ACDA being independent
all
these years. Has there been or have there been ACDA directors
who
have been at odds with the position of the secretary of state?

HOLUM: Yes.

QUESTION: Can you site some good examples of that?

HOLUM: There have been some very good examples that I'd rather
refer

back to previous administrations.

(LAUGHTER)

But, I guess

the original -- the original decision to support

the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty was resisted by the Department

of State in the late 1960s.

Elapsed Time 00:07, Eastern Time 09:48

The Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, it's widely known, in

the case of Pakistan's

nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and

1990s, made the case that

the president could no longer certify

that Pakistan wasn't pursuing

a nuclear weapons capability, and

that had implications under the

Pressler Amendment. That was

naturally resisted by the country relations

interests of the

Department of State. And ultimately, President

Bush agreed with the

ACDA view.

I don't want to go, for obvious

reasons, into a lot of

specifics, but I will tell you that it happens

frequently that,

during my tenure, that the Department of State

and the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agencies -- or Agency have

had different

perspectives on issues and have brought them to the

table.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 10:36:00

HOLUM: That

will change to some extent operationally, and I've

thought a lot

about this. The ACDA view, the ACDA approach

traditionally has been

a sort of reflexive expression of an

independent viewpoint. In the

new structure, it will be more

reflective in the sense that it has

to be an important issue.

It's a bigger step now for an undersecretary

to take issue with

the secretary. But it will still happen. It has happened on occasion when I've been dual-hatted, and I think the process works very well. The secretary is very supportive of having the arms control view at the table.

QUESTION: Are you still acting?

HOLUM: As of right now, I am ACDA director and acting undersecretary for arms control and international security.

Elapsed Time 00:09,
Eastern Time 09:50

As of midnight tonight, I'll be neither of those things. My name has been submitted for the new undersecretary position, but I would have to still be confirmed. So in the interim, I'll be a senior adviser to the secretary.

QUESTION: Do you see any change in the way that you're going to approach specific issues with this realignment, the three bureaus instead of five or whatever?

HOLUM: Well, I think the basic analytical approach and advocacy approach will be very similar to what it's been in the past. There will -- the people who have been in ACDA working these issues will be at the same table with people in State who have been working them.

Elapsed Time 00:10, Eastern Time 09:51

I've always thought the competition, the competition of ideas with the State Department, has been less with nonproliferation experts, in the nonproliferation -- in the political/military affairs bureau, and more with the regional perspective. That's where the tension comes.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 10:43:00

HOLUM: And what I think the outcome will be is that we'll have a stronger power center for nonproliferation and arms control in the State Department, more forceful advocacy. The character -- the center of gravity will shift a bit in the Department of State, not because ACDA is a huge organization coming in, but because we're bringing new resources, new capabilities, to bear on these issues. We're bringing in reinforcements to the existing structure, and a lot more, I would suggest, really long-term, deep technical expertise. Most of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is civil service, people who have been working on the same kinds of issues for 15, 20, 25 years. There are people in ACDA who know the operational history of every aspect of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Elapsed Time 00:11, Eastern Time 09:52

There are experts on chemical weapons that know the chemical makeup of the compounds that are useful as chemical weapons. And that's going to reinforce the State Department's ability to handle these issues, both internally and also in the interagency process.

Yes?

QUESTION: I wonder if you can forgive me. With everything that's going on in Kosovo, and your lengthy expertise on arms control issues, I wonder if you could discuss what impact, you know, what's going on in Kosovo, and whether there is success or failure, what impact that could have on arms control around the world, what message it could send to countries like North Korea or other

nuclear threats to the U.S. I wonder if you could respond to that.

HOLUM: Well, it's very hard to isolate, particularly at this stage, what the long-term impact would be.

Elapsed

Time 00:12, Eastern Time 09:53

I think the horrors that are occurring in Kosovo now obviously underscore the importance of legal structures, and also informal structures, confidence-building to limit and control arms.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 10:47:00

HOLUM: We globally are behind the curve, I think, in dealing with

conventional arms. There are conventional arms regimes, and Europe

as the leading site of progress on conventional arms. But nonetheless,

they are hard to control, and they are -- they're obviously being

used to cause most of the damage that occurs worldwide.

I've

often said that we rightly pay attention to nuclear and chemical

and biological weapons and missiles because they have the potential

to wipe out whole cities at a time.

Elapsed Time 00:13, Eastern

Time 09:54

Well, conventional arms, as we're seeing now, are wiping out

whole cities a few people at a time, so we need a great deal more

work on that.

More broadly, there may be some impact,

plus or minus, on our

efforts to negotiate international regimes

on weapons of mass

destruction, on our negotiations with Russia,

but I think it's too

early to specify what that will be. And I suspect

it will mostly be

short term rather than long term.

QUESTION:

Well, to go to that point, I mean, the Russians have said they're going to put off START, the debate on START again. So, have they indicated that this is, you know, another sort of temporary delay for a month or so, or have they just said, we're putting it off?

HOLUM: From what I understand, they've asked -- the Duma was preparing to vote on START II April 2nd or in that timeframe, or toward mid-April, and that will not now occur. But I think the point to underscore is that START II remains very much in Russia's interest, as well as in our interest.
Elapsed Time 00:14, Eastern Time 09:55

It's the opening to negotiate START III.
MORE

FDCH
03/31/99 10:51:00

HOLUM: We need to continue this process of reducing strategic arms, and over time, I suspect that the Russians will take that same point of view. And that's why I think this is more likely to be a short-term rather than a long-term impact.

QUESTION: What about CFB (ph)? There was interest expressed in trying

to bring that to closure this year as well.

HOLUM: I think there's a pretty good prospect. Just yesterday, in the joint consultative group, they made some considerable progress toward the final elements. I haven't reviewed the papers yet, but I think we're going to briefing fairly soon on the outcome there, not the completely adapted treaty, but the basic elements of what the adaptation will entail.

QUESTION: Let me just ask again in a way -- I think one analyst was saying, I was hearing last night, that if there's no success here in Kosovo that, you know, the North Koreans will just go forward extensively and just sort of not take U.S. and other international threats seriously. I mean, is that blown out of proportion, or do you think there's a real concern there?

Elapsed Time 00:15,

Eastern Time 09:56

HOLUM: No. I -- there are a large number of very significant obstacles in our way of -- in the way of reaching a comprehensive agreement on all the problems we have with North Korea, nuclear missiles and many others. We've just completed another round of talks on missiles. I think the impact of Kosovo, if there is any, would be way down the scale of the difficulties we face there. The -- we just have an enormous amount of work to do with North Korea. We've made some headway, as you know, on the Kumchangni site access. And there will be a first visit to the site in May.

The discussions with the North Koreans in Pyongyang that Bob Einhorn led have been useful, another step, the fourth meeting on missile issue.

Elapsed Time 00:16, Eastern Time 09:57

But we're

a long way from a settlement, from an agreement, on those issues.

I don't think Kosovo has a significant bearing.

QUESTION: Could you flesh that out a little bit? About the talks just ended in Pyongyang being useful?

HOLUM: Well, useful in the sense that we made our views both on possible further flight tests, and indigenous developments of

missiles in North Korea, and on their exports of
advanced missiles
very clear.
MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 11:05:00

HOLUM: The discussions were candid and businesslike, as you
hear
frequently about discussions.

(LAUGHTER)

And they
plan to meet again as soon as possible. There is no
agreement coming
out of this. I wouldn't expect that there'd be
--that they'd come
home with an agreement after four rounds of
talks. But I think it's
valuable that we are discussing the missile
issue with them and
we have broken the long period when it was hard
to get this issue
on the table.

QUESTION: Can I have one last follow-up on the
merger?

Elapsed Time 00:17, Eastern Time 09:58

Senator

Helms has said he hopes this will lead to budget cuts.
How do you
think this will shake out?

HOLUM: Well, there have been budget
cuts. One of the things
that's been going since 1993-94, in part
through the inspiration of
the Hill and in part through Vice President
Gore's Reinventing
Government process, is we have done in ACDA,
and something similar
has been done in the Political and Military
Affairs Bureau, of a
comprehensive review of positions, and a systematic
effort to
reduce overlap, to eliminate duplication.

Elapsed

Time 00:18, Eastern Time 09:59

So I think most of the savings
have already been, at least in
the near term, have already been
wrung out of the system.

MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 11:08:00

HOLUM: You know, there may be further savings over time, but one of the things that we've learned in particular as we've gone through the crosswalk, the identification of people and positions in the new bureau structure, in the new offices, is that to a very large extent, ACDA and State have done different things. And the Political and Military Affairs Bureau and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have complementary but different functions. Speaking broadly, for example, ACDA negotiates multilateral regimes, and the State Department is not heavily engaged, for example, on the conference on disarmament in Geneva. The Department of State is much more active in what I would call the retail enforcement of those regimes, using the test ban or the Nonproliferation Treaty was a vehicle to persuade other countries to comply.

Elapsed Time 00:19, Eastern Time
10:00

So the functions, broadly speaking, are different, and there isn't a lot of duplication and overlap. We'll continue to be looking at potential savings. But I don't expect massive reductions in personnel.

QUESTION: Can you quantify the savings to date?

HOLUM: In ACDA's case, our personnel dropped -- well, and I emphasize, this was in the context of missions going up -- our personnel dropped I think a total of six percent, with a great deal more work underway.

This is not a case where we're consolidating and reducing

because
the work is going away. And we're also not consolidating
and reducing
because we failed -- the agency has failed.
Elapsed Time 00:20,
Eastern Time 10:01
In some respects I think the merger is a
product of ACDA's
success.
MORE

FDCH 03/31/99 11:13:00

HOLUM: Because it's -- the work it does is becoming more central
to
our foreign policy and becoming more a part of what the State
Department
does. And you see that continuously in the State
Department with
how much of our time is devoted to things like
North Korea, Iraq,
Iran, the Russia-Iran relationships, the
China-Iran relationship.
This is really a central focus now of the
administration and the
work is not declining, it's growing and
becoming more important.

QUESTION: Before the Russian atomic energy minister came here,
as
part of the trip that was supposed to involve Primakov, he gave
an
interview in which he said that Russia was going to decrease its
involvement
with Iran. I was wondering, did anything ever come out
of that?
And have they given you any new commitments to that
effect?

Elapsed Time 00:21, Eastern Time 10:02
HOLUM: Well, I don't
want to go into the specifics of our
conversations. We had extensive
discussions with Minister Adamov
while he was here, in fact after
the prime minister's plane went
back to Moscow.
One thing that
is very clear is that we signed the HEU

agreement, that that issue,
which has been pending for a long
period of time, was resolved,
a very important step.
And we also had some very good discussions
and made, I would say
made considerable headway on the issue of
Russia-Iran nuclear
relationships. I don't have an agreement to
announce, I don't have
--I'm not going to talk about specifics on
that.

QUESTION: You won't define what "headway" means?

HOLUM: Just further reason to believe that they are undertaking,
in
line with Minister Adamov's public statements, not to assist
Iran's
nuclear programs.

QUESTION: But not -- they've not gone far
enough to lift
sanctions on those entities?

HOLUM: Not yet.

Elapsed Time 00:22, Eastern Time 10:03
Anything else?

QUESTION: Thank you.

HOLUM: Thank you.

END

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/2/99 11:43:34 AM
FROM Pascual, Carlos E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Helms Letter on ABM [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Brackman, Stella S.
Kelly, Sandra L.
McCausland, Jeffrey D.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Krass, Caroline D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Dempsey, John M. (Jack)
Lackey, Miles M.
Tavlarides, Mark J.
Williams, Mary C.
Black, Steven K.

TEXT_BODY edited para 2 because I found it hard to understand.....have
no problem with you changing my edits, but original version was not
clear to me.....suggest you find another formulation

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.

Sent: Friday, April 02,
1999 10:54 AM

To: Pascual, Carlos E.

Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy;

@LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Black, Steven
K.

Subject: RE: Helms Letter on ABM [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Carlos

-- thanks for the quick turnaround. On your suggested edits, I have no problem with your edits to paragraph 3 ... and in paragraph 2, if Caroline has "one sentence" of rationale that is "overarching," that could be helpful -- that said, only one sentence will appear a feable rebuttal to the 77-page legal memorandum attached to the Helms letter, so it still might be best to stay high, high up on the high road until State/L snaps on its chin strap and provides a detailed rebuttal ... finally, I would advise against the edits you have suggested in the last two sentences of paragraph 2 -- in my view, if the Senate rejects the ABM MOU, we might just decide to "live" with the ambiguities, as oppose to "address" them in some way ... remember, in previous letters, we have also said that "a strong case can be made that, even without the MOU, these three states are Parties to the Treaty." Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual,
Carlos E.
Sent: Friday, April 02, 1999 10:42 AM
To: Andreasen,
Steven P.
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor;
@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Black, Steven K.
Subject: FW: Helms
Letter on ABM [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Agree that we should
not put ABM and CTBT in this letter.

Agree that the letter should
take the high ground and not get into a legal debate, but it is crying
out for a sentence or two of rationale; see note in text and a couple
of other suggestions.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P.
Sent: Thursday, April 01, 1999 10:50 PM
To: Lackey,
Miles M.; Tavlirides, Mark J.; Pascual, Carlos E.; Weiss, Andrew
S.; Baker, James E.; Krass, Caroline D.
Cc: Rice, Edward A.; @DEFENSE
- Defense Policy
Subject: Helms Letter on ABM [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Colleagues

--

Attached for your review and comment is a response to Senator Helms' latest letter on the issue of the legal status of the ABM Treaty. The response draws heavily from our latest letters to Helms on the subject (December 17, 1998 and February 22, 1999) -- although I did add a new sentence to the end of the first paragraph, in effect, telling Helms that the advice and consent process begins only after we have formally transmitted the MOU to the Senate following Russian ratification of START II. Also: I gave some thought to including in the President's response a specific request to begin hearings on the CTBT, but decided that it might not be in our best interest to put both the ABM and CTBT issues in the same POTUS letter -- at least not at this stage of the game. Other views on this point are welcome. Would appreciate any comments by COB Friday, if at all possible. Thanks to all.

Steve

<< File: 1606mtb.doc >> <<

File: 1606 mtp.doc >> << File: 1606ltr.doc >>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/2/99 5:05:40 PM
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Scowcroft and Bumpers on CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY In said to everyone who asked that (1) I agree Helms will not be moved, at least by persuasion or logic, so it will take hardball with Lott and that means hostage taking, and (2) that when we identify a hostage we will pounce and there is no question we would reinforce with a "NAFTA-like", POTUS-led campaign. Meanwhile we need to keep steady grassroots, Hill and NGO attention/pressure with accompanying administration activities.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P.

Sent: Friday, April 02, 1999 4:39 PM

To: Bell, Robert
G.

Subject: Scowcroft and Bumpers on CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Bob

--

At yesterday's ACDA symposium, our friend Daryl Kimball asked General Scowcroft and Senator Bumpers "what can be done" to move CTBT this year. Scowcroft's answer was "if the President really made it clear that CTBT ratification was a priority for him this year, things would happen." Bumpers said, "Even if the President made that clear, unless Senator Helms has a change of heart, it is not going to happen this year, or next year." Suspect the truth, as always, is somewhere inbetween. But in any event, it touched both of the NGO hot-buttons of despair: first, that the President is not sufficiently engaged; and second, that Helms will not be moved.

Steve

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/9/99 12:31:48 AM

FROM Andreassen, Steven P.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT MEETING WITH INTERFAITH GROUP FOR THE CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Moretz, Sheila K.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Rice, Edward A.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.
Sutphen, Mona K.

CARBON_COPY Andreassen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Brackman, Stella S.
Kelly, Sandra L.
McCausland, Jeffrey D.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Krass, Caroline D.
Lackey, Miles M.
Tavlarides, Mark J.
Samore, Gary S.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Halperin, David E.
Leavy, David C.
Gobush, Matthew N.

TEXT_BODY PLEASE PASS TO SANDY IF HE PLANS TO "DROP BY" OUR FRIDAY
MEETING
WITH THE INTERFAITH GROUP ON CTBT (ROOM 208, 1:30-2:30 P.M.).
THANK
YOU.

Background

The Interfaith Group for the CTBT (a coalition of 18 denominational offices and religious groups) requested a meeting with you to discuss our CTBT ratification strategy. Given the demands on your schedule, we decided to go ahead with a meeting Friday, hosted by Bob. We have NOT promised a "Berger drop-by," but if you can break free for 5 minutes to drop in and say a few words, we think it would pay dividends with a key "NGO" group that is working hard on behalf of CTBT ratification.

The Interfaith Group is currently conducting a petition drive directed towards members of the Senate, with particular attention to those states who are considered swing votes in the ratification campaign. Participants in the meeting Friday include state coordinators of the petition drive, and representatives of national faith-based organizations working for CTBT ratification.

Suggested Points

- * I wanted to briefly stop by and express our gratitude for the work you are doing on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- * We have not lost sight of getting the CTBT ratified this year. There is still time to focus the Senate on getting this done.
- * The most important point in our favor is the tremendous public and grass roots support for ratification.
- * Your efforts in your home states are essential to convincing members of the Senate to speak with Senator Helms about the importance of this Treaty.
- * This is not going to be easy, but we look forward to the debate, and we expect to win with your help.
- * Appreciate your taking the time to brief us on your efforts today, and we look forward to working with you on this Treaty.

Note: We would not expect you to stay for a discussion, or take questions; that said, it might be hard to slip out of 208 without some interaction. In that case, you might be asked a broader set of questions about "what next" on nuclear arms control, or strategic defense. Suggested points:

* We

want to move forward with both START II and START III, but we are obviously at a difficult stage in our relationship with Russia.

As soon as we can, we will discuss with Russia how best to move forward, as well as consider other steps we can take -- like our initiative on sharing early warning data -- to reduce nuclear dangers.

* On

missile defense, we have made no decision to proceed with deployment.

We will look hard at this question next year, and proceed based on our assessment of the technology, cost, threat and arms control.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	June Bartlett to Gregory Schulte. Subject: FW: [Final Version of Packages] (20 pages)	04/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/31/1999-05/27/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/23/99 12:44:37 PM
FROM Naplan, Steven J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Rqst concur #1605 - Reply to Helms/Biden re Reorg [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Kale, Dora A.

CARBON_COPY Naplan, Steven J.

TEXT_BODY
I approve Andreasen's changes but need to discuss with Eric how we'll explain the delay in response.

-----Original Message-----

From: Kale,
Dora A.
Sent: Friday, April 23, 1999 8:52 AM
To: Naplan, Steven
J.
Cc: Kale, Dora A.
Subject: FW: Rqst concur #1605 - Reply to
Helms/Biden re Reorg [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

SN: let
me know as soon as you approve Andreasen's changes and I will do
in final! thx.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven
P.
Sent: Thursday, April 22, 1999 6:01 PM
To: Kale, Dora A.; Hill,
Roseanne M.; Naplan, Steven J.
Cc: Bell, Robert G.; Bouchard, Joseph
F.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.
Subject: FW: Rqst concur #1605 - Reply
to Helms/Biden re Reorg [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Steve

-- OK, we now know that Helms has not "agreed" to the special advisor
alternative ... I've made a change in the memos to POTUS and Berger,
but left the letter "as is." Steve

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.
Sent: Monday, April 19, 1999 7:12 PM
To: Kale, Dora
A.; Hill, Roseanne M.; Naplan, Steven J.
Cc: Bell, Robert G.; Bouchard,
Joseph F.; McCausland, Jeffrey D.
Subject: FW: Rqst concur #1605
- Reply to Helms/Biden re Reorg [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Steve

-- Regarding the attached package, I did not realize that, subsequent to sending his letter, Senator Helms "agreed to the creation of a Special Advisor for Verification and Compliance for Arms Control, as proposed by the Secretary of State." Let me just check with (a) my office (Bob? Joe? Jeff?) to see if anyone can verify, and if not, (b) State, before we pull the trigger on this. Of course, if you know this to be affirmatively true, please advise. Thanks.
Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Kale, Dora A.
Sent: Monday,
April 19, 1999 6:58 PM
To: Andreassen, Steven P.
Cc: Kale, Dora
A.; Hill, Roseanne M.; Naplan, Steven J.
Subject: FW: Rqst concur
#1605 - Reply to Helms/Biden re Reorg [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

package
for clearance. thx.

-----Original Message-----

From: Kale, Dora
A.
Sent: Thursday, April 08, 1999 12:39 PM
To: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;
@DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Cc: Kale,
Dora A.; Hill, Roseanne M.; Naplan, Steven J.
Subject: Rqst concur
#1605 - Reply to Helms/Biden re Reorg [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Thanks

for your attention.

<< File: 1605 AM POTUS.doc >> << File: 1605
AM SRB.doc >> << File: 1605 letter.doc >>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/26/99 6:39:38 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CTBT Sanity Check [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bouchard, Joseph F.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Joe --

Would appreciate a "sanity check" from you before I give this to Bob tomorrow a.m. -- if you have time.

Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CTBT Quarterly.doc
April 26, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: CTBT Ratification: Rounding the First Turn

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the Senate to approve the Treaty "now."

A muddy track. Since the State of the Union, a number of developments - domestic and foreign - have intervened to slow our ratification effort. Most notably, the impeachment trial, Kosovo and China controversies have crowded out prospects for raising the profile of CTBT, either with the public or individual Senators. In addition to these developments, a number of issues that were CTBT "variables" at the beginning of the year have come into sharper focus - in most cases, in ways that will not aid our ratification campaign. Specifically:

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- * CTBT ratification in South Asia. The fall of the Vajpayee government and the upcoming Indian elections will delay any hope of Indian (and probably Pakistani) signature well into the summer (i.e., beyond the point where it might have provided an early boost to our ratification campaign).

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Reasons to press on. Recognizing the difficulties - which have, on balance, grown over the past four months - we believe the bottom line remains that CTBT ratification remains a "win/win" issue for us: it is the right thing to do, and all evidence suggests the public will strongly support a push for ratification and that we can win on the Senate floor.

Moreover, mounting and winning a campaign for Senate approval is

more important than ever in securing Indian and Pakistani (as well as Chinese and Russian) ratification; indeed, even before the fall of the Vajpayee government, there was evidence suggesting India (and Pakistan) might hold back on signature, expecting that Senate inaction would take India off the hook.

Beyond that, securing entry into force of this Treaty would stand as an enduring achievement of this Administration, marking both a significant step back from the Cold War and a significant step forward in constraining nuclear proliferation.

What will it take to win? As we said in January, success will require a determined campaign, with the President, and agency Principals, leading the charge. But we must get started in May. If we delay ratcheting up our ratification effort past Memorial Day, we risk simply not having enough time to complete the ratification process in 1999. In addition to a strong public campaign, the key to our effort remains identifying a legislative "trade" involving CTBT and a Republican legislative priority. In the absence of such a deal, moving CTBT will be a very difficult task.

Getting back on track. In terms of specific steps, we would recommend the following in May:

- * Call to Glenn regarding National Chairman. We need to determine whether John Glenn is part of our ratification strategy; you have a memorandum with points for a call to Glenn. If Glenn says "yes," we would work with Chuck Ruff to expedite his appointment.

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Concurrences by: Lackey Leavy Riedel Samore

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/27/99 3:09:51 PM
FROM Tavlarides, Mark J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Draft CTBT Memo for Berger [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Lackey, Miles M.

CARBON_COPY Burrell, Christina L.
Lackey, Miles M.
Shapiro, Daniel B.
Tavlarides, Mark J.

TEXT_BODY You should look at this. It has a significant legislative piece.
It appears okay but it requires SRB meetings on Hill and an
investment
of time and resoruces.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 1999 10:55 AM
To: Lackey, Miles
M.; Leavy, David C.; Riedel, Bruce O.; Samore, Gary S.; Krass,
Caroline
D.; Greer, Jason H.; Tucker, Maureen E.; Halperin, David E.; Gobush,

Matthew N.; Tavlarides, Mark J.; Baker, James E.
Cc: @DEFENSE -
Defense Policy
Subject: Draft CTBT Memo for Berger [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Colleagues

--

Would appreciate any comments on the attached "status report"
on CTBT by COB Thursday, if at all possible. Will then shoot to
send this forward to Sandy on Friday.

Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CTBT Quarterly.doc
April 27, 1999/10:45 a.m.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

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Concurrences by: Lackey Leavy Riedel Samore Krass

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DATE-TIME 4/27/99 9:04:32 AM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CTBT Memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Bob --

Here's the CTBT memo I've been working on for Sandy. If you have time to take a look at it before I depart for Geneva today, I'll send it around for concurrence from relevant NSC staff before I depart. If not, we can return to this on Friday. (I'll also drop a "hard copy" in your in-box)

Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CTBT Quarterly.doc
April 27, 1999

INFORMATION

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Concurrences by: Lackey Leavy Riedel Samore

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/3/99 9:05:09 PM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Warming Up in the Bullpen ... [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Krass, Caroline D.
Lackey, Miles M.
Tavlarides, Mark J.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Brackman, Stella S.
Kelly, Sandra L.
McCausland, Jeffrey D.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.

TEXT_BODY Colleagues --

Sometime in March, Mr. Bell accepted an invitation to take part in an NMD symposium sponsored by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, entitled "Assessing National Missile Defense: A Roundtable Review," scheduled for this Wednesday, May 5. Mr. Bell now has a conflict -- that is, he is accompanying the POTUS to Europe -- and will not be available to pitch nine, no-hit innings on NMD. As a result, I have been asked to come in from the bullpen, and pitch long-relief. The good news is, the presentation they are looking for is very similar in concept to what I did at CATO in March. So, I've made the appropriate updates (in both the presentation and q/a's), and I am now recirculating for your review and comments, if possible,

by 3:00 p.m. tomorrow.

Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Remarks for Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.doc
Remarks for Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Assessing National Missile Defense: A Roundtable Review

Understanding the Relationship Between the ABM Treaty and the
Broader U.S.
National Security Interests

(Draft: 5/03/99/8:45 p.m.)

Introduction

* Thank Institute for hosting today's event, and bringing all of us
together
today to discuss the NMD issue.

* Bob Bell was looking forward to participating in today's roundtable
discussion,
but subsequently, was asked to travel with the President to Europe this
week, so
I will do my best to fill Bob's shoes today.

* Begin by describing the core elements of the Administration's
strategic policy.
I will then turn to a brief discussion of our policy on National Missile
Defense
and the ABM Treaty, and then conclude with a discussion of the
legislation that
has now passed the Senate and House.

Strategic policy

* The Administration's strategic policy has, since 1993, included three
core
elements:

* First, the Administration has sought the advancement of nuclear
reductions
through the START process. The President has consistently
reaffirmed that
implementation of stabilizing and verifiable reductions in nuclear
forces through
the START process remains a priority objective of U.S. foreign,
security and
non-proliferation policy.

* Second, the Administration has committed to maintaining the ABM
Treaty regime.
Recognizing that Russia considers U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty

to be
integrally linked to the START process, the President has affirmed the
importance
of the ABM Treaty in maintaining strategic stability.

* Third, the Administration has committed to the development of a
limited NMD
system that would be designed primarily to counter emerging rogue
state missile
threats. This program includes a public commitment to work to amend
the ABM
Treaty if required to accommodate deployment of a limited NMD.

* These policies are not static, and indeed, have been reviewed at
various points
over the past six years, most recently last December. That said, we
believe
these core strategic objectives relating to START, the ABM Treaty
and NMD remain
sound:

* With respect to START, even though we expect Russian nuclear
forces will
decline over the next decade with or without START II/ START III,
we continue to
have a national security interest in ensuring these reductions are
governed by
Treaty regimes; that is, that the reductions are legally-binding,
predictable,
transparent, verifiable and harder to reverse.

* Moreover, we still have a clear national security interest in realizing
the
specific benefits to strategic stability afforded by the START Treaties
- in
particular, the elimination of MIRVed and Heavy ICBMs under
START II and the
hoped for gains in the areas of warheads, fissile material and non-
strategic
forces in START III.

* In the ABM area, it is clear that Russia continues to afford great
value to the
predictability provided by the ABM Treaty regime, given the
uncertainties
regarding its own strategic nuclear forces.

* This is not a new development: Russia made clear when it signed
the START I
Treaty in 1991 that U.S. compliance with, and adherence to, the ABM

Treaty was essential in order for START I to remain "effective and viable" - a position they continue to underscore.

* Finally, with respect to NMD, the Administration shares Congress's commitment to ensuring the American people are protected from rogue states with long-range missiles, should that threat be realized as we now expect it will. That protection begins with the maintenance of a strong deterrent, both conventional and nuclear.

* One point I want to make clear: the Administration has consistently rejected the view that reductions through START; preservation of the ABM Treaty; and the development, and possible deployment, of an effective, limited NMD are incompatible. They are not.

* Moreover, to dramatically "tilt" in the direction of any one of these three objectives - START, the ABM Treaty, or NMD - at the expense of the other two is, at this point in time, both unnecessary and unwise.

* That is not to say we do not perceive an urgent need to address the threat posed by rogue states; but in doing so, we must not abandon programs and policies that are eliminating thousands of nuclear weapons in the states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia.

Administration policy on NMD and ABM

* With that as a backdrop, I want to briefly discuss three important decisions taken in the past few months related to our NMD program and the ABM Treaty.

* First, informed by the report of the Rumsfeld Commission, as well as the Intelligence Community's analysis of the August 1998 DPRK flight-test of the TD-I missile, the Administration has stated that the threat posed by the development of an ICBM capable of striking the United States is, in Secretary

Cohen's words,
"growing - and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not only to our troops overseas, but also to Americans here at home."

* Second, to "keep faith" with Congress regarding our commitment to ensuring the American people are protected from rogue states with long-range missiles, the Administration has now budgeted \$10.5 billion between fiscal years 1999-2005 for the NMD program, including the funds that would be necessary during this period to deploy a limited NMD system.

* And as Secretary Cohen and General Lyles have recently made clear, we are moving forward with our NMD development program as fast as we can.

* Third, we have engaged Russia at senior levels to discuss further the evolution of our NMD program. We have told Russia that deployment of a limited NMD may, or may not, require modifications to the ABM Treaty, and that if changes were required, we would seek agreement on any needed amendments.

* It is our expectation that these discussions with Russia will intensify once the Administration makes basic decisions regarding an NMD architecture and related implications for the ABM Treaty.

Congress

* That is the "state of play" with respect to our NMD program and the ABM Treaty. Before I conclude, I want to briefly discuss the legislation that has now passed the Senate and House, and how it relates to the Administration's position on the question of "deployment."

* The Administration has made clear that it plans to address the deployment decision in the year 2000. That is not a popular stance with many, who believe that a commitment to deploy a national missile defense is required now.

* Earlier this year, Senator Cochran proposed legislation stating that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense "as soon as technologically possible."

* The Administration took the view that the Cochran bill, as drafted, was too simplistic a formula for resolving the deployment issue; instead, we identified four factors that would bear on the deployment decision:

* Threat. We will review the latest information and trends regarding the threat - in terms of countries and specific capabilities. We will ask ourselves whether the threat has developed as quickly as we now expect, and review the latest information on individual countries and capabilities.

* Technology. This is more than just whether the technology for an intercept is "possible," but whether it has been demonstrated in a rigorous series of flight tests that are planned over the next 12-15 months. This information will be crucial in assessing the operational effectiveness of any NMD.

* Cost. We think we have this "scoped in" with the President's most recent budget submission, but we will look at it again next year, taking into account the threat and technology.

* Arms Control. Finally, the Administration believes that a decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed within the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms through START.

* We have already made clear to Russia that deployment of a limited NMD that required amendments to the ABM Treaty would not be incompatible with the underlying purpose of the ABM Treaty, that is, to maintain strategic stability and enable further reductions in strategic nuclear arms.

* The ABM Treaty has been amended before, and we see no reason why it could not be amended again, if necessary, to permit deployment of an NMD effective against rogue nation missile threats.

* And we have made clear to Russia that we are prepared to negotiate any necessary amendments in good faith.

* As a result of these exchanges, the Senate, on a bipartisan basis, included in the Cochran bill two amendments that, if preserved, will allow the Legislative and Executive branches to move forward on this issue:

* First, by specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to the authorization and appropriations process, the legislation now makes clear that no decision on deployment has been made.

* Second, by putting the Senate on record as continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, the bill reaffirms that our missile defense policy must take into account our arms control objectives.

* Shortly after the Cochran bill was passed in the Senate, the House passed legislation simply declaring it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense.

* This legislation does not specify any criteria for deployment, and for this reason, the concerns the Administration noted with respect to Senator Cochran's original bill on NMD are relevant to the legislation that was passed in the House.

Conclusion

* Let me just briefly conclude by striking an "optimistic" note, that is, that a compromise may be slowly emerging on a number of points related to missile

defense, the ABM Treaty and strategic reductions:

- * First, that the threat posed by rogue state ballistic missile programs is real and growing.

- * Second, that we should move as quickly as we can to develop a limited NMD system, if possible, and, if necessary, deploy such a defense, if operationally effective and affordable, taking into account our obligations and objectives in the field of arms control.

- * And third, that we should engage Russia on any necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty, while at the same time working to bring START II into force and conclude a START III.

- * Agreement on these points won't "end" the NMD debate; but it would provide a framework to move us forward in the next two years.

If Asked Questions and Answers

What is your response to those who assert that the ABM Treaty expired with the demise of the Soviet Union? Why can't the Administration produce a "legal rebuttal" to these arguments?

- * The President has written a number of letters to members of Congress on ABM Succession over the past 16 months, and in each instance, he has made clear that the ABM Treaty has continued in force following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

- * That said, our argument regarding ABM succession is not novel, and rests on the general principle (adhered to by both the Bush and Clinton Administrations) that agreements between the United States and the USSR that were in

force at the time
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union are presumed to continue in
force as to
the former Soviet Republics. This general principle is based not only
on U.S.
past diplomatic practice, but also on principles of international law.

* Now, were we to have taken the contrary view - that is, that the
ABM Treaty was
no longer in force, or that those states with ABM assets on their
territory who
asserted a right to assume an obligation as a "successor state" under
the ABM
Treaty were not entitled to such a status - it would have jeopardized
what has
been a successful effort to remove nuclear weapons from Ukraine,
Belarus and
Kazakhstan under the START I Treaty and the NPT.

* The Memorandum of Understanding on Succession will remove any
ambiguity about
the extent to which states other than Russia are Parties to the ABM
Treaty.

Isn't it true that any NMD would by definition violate the ABM
Treaty?

* There may be issues with respect to Article I of the Treaty, which
prohibits a
"territorial" defense.

* We have not concluded our own analysis on this point, nor have we
discussed the
issue with Russia in any detail.

What is your reaction to the report issued in March by the Heritage
Foundation
recommending that the U.S. proceed with the deployment of a sea-
based NMD?

* We think the fastest, most affordable, most technologically viable
approach to
NMD is a ground-based architecture.

* The Administration will soon make public an unclassified report on
the question
of Navy Theater Wide as an NMD system.

* It will take issue with the claim that a sea-based ABM could be
available in

3-4 years at a cost of \$3-4 billion.

* Specifically, it will note that significant upgrades to the missile, kill vehicle, and/or sensors would be required from our "baseline" NTW program to give it a useful capability against various ICBM threats.

* That capability is not now budgeted: estimated costs are in the billions of dollars, depending on assumptions regarding the "threat."

* Moreover, it is not clear that the NMD mission would be consistent with other demands on the Navy, including anti-air and cruise missile strikes.

* Finally, we do not think such a capability could be available until late in the next decade, at the earliest.

Why did the White House distance itself from Secretary Cohen's statement that the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM Treaty if Russia did not agree to the necessary modifications?

* First, that is not what Secretary Cohen said. The Secretary made clear, as has the President, Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Berger, that it is in America's interest to maintain the ABM Treaty.

* As we have said many times before, deployment of a limited national missile defense may or may not require modifications to the Treaty. If deployment required modifications to the Treaty, we would seek agreement with ABM Treaty parties on the needed amendments, and we are prepared to negotiate any necessary amendments in good faith.

* The ABM Treaty has been amended before, and we see no reason why we should not be able to modify it again, if necessary, to permit deployment of an NMD effective against rogue nation missile threats. Didn't the President rule out the option of withdrawal from the Treaty at his March 5 news conference, giving Russia a "veto" over our NMD deployment?

* No. The President has made clear he believes any necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty should be discussed and agreed to with Russia. The same view has been articulated by Secretaries Cohen and Albright, along with National Security Advisor Berger.

* We have said that we could not and would not give Russia or any other nation a veto over our NMD requirements. It is important to recognize that our sovereign rights are fully protected by the supreme national interests clause that is an integral part of this Treaty. But neither should we issue ultimatums.

Why doesn't the Administration submit the succession and demarcation agreements on the ABM Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent? Will the Administration comply with the demand by Senator Helms to submit these agreements prior to June 1?

* The Administration has made clear that it intends to provide the MOU on Succession, along with the agreements on ABM/TMD Demarcation and the START II protocol, to the Senate for advice and consent following Russian ratification of START II. We certainly hope that can happen before June 1.

* The Senate will have an opportunity to debate, and vote, on these agreements, and we hope that will happen this year.

* [Will the administration cooperate with Senator Helms on hearings this spring?]

* To my knowledge, State has not received a request from Senator Helms to cooperate on any such hearings; if we receive such a request, we will consider it then.

Isn't it true that the President has given Russia a "veto" over U.S. NMD deployments?

* No. The President has made clear there is no reason why we should not be able to work cooperatively to amend the Treaty, if amendments are required to support deployment of a limited NMD, and we are prepared to negotiate any amendments in good faith.

Will this administration withdraw from the Treaty if Russia refuses to cooperate?

* You are way ahead of where we are at this point in time. At present, we have not identified what, if any, amendments might be required to support deployment of a limited NMD. We are not going to speculate on "hypotheticals."

* That said, we believe our sovereign rights are fully protected by the supreme national interests clause that is an integral part of the ABM Treaty.

If the Weldon-Spratt bill emerges from a Senate-House Conference and is sent to the White House, will the President veto the bill?

* The President's senior advisors have said they have serious concerns regarding this bill, for many of the same reasons that we were opposed to the original Cochran bill; I'm sure the President would give their advice great weight in making this decision.

Why does the Administration care if the Weldon-Spratt legislation were to become law? What would change?

* We are opposed to the Weldon-Spratt bill because it doesn't accurately state our policy on the question of deployment; that is important, both domestically and overseas.

* Obviously, it would be better if the Administration and Congress could work out a joint position on this question. The Cochran NMD bill, as amended and passed by the Senate, represents such a position.

Can a C-1 NMD architecture provide an effective defense of all 50 states? Where would such a defense be based?

* We are looking at this closely, but have not yet reached a final determination.

Wouldn't it be prudent to look beyond whatever ABM Treaty relief might be required for deployment of a C-1 architecture to that required for deployment of a C-2, C-3, or even "space-based" NMD architecture?

* We have not yet come to any conclusions regarding what amendments, if any, we will seek to accommodate deployment of a limited NMD, let alone our "negotiating tactics."

* At this stage, I would not rule out a negotiating process that evolved over a period of years, similar to the START-process, rather than an "all or nothing" negotiation that needed to be wrapped up in a few months.

When does the Administration expect to be in a position to make basic decisions regarding NMD architecture and negotiating strategy?

* Always hard to predict a specific date on something this complex, but we are working hard on these questions, and hope to have some preliminary answers sometime this summer.

What are the specific ABM issues the Administration is examining?

* [Note - this is the subject of the second presentation, "What ABM Treaty Provisions Need To Be Modified for an Effective NMD," by Dr. Kent Stansbury, Head of DoD's ABM Treaty Compliance Review Group.]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002. email	Richard Saunders to Steven Black. Subject: Go Final...but read it first. (4 pages)	05/06/1999	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/31/1999-05/27/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/10/99 2:23:11 PM
FROM Halperin, David E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Revised CTBT Memo for Berger [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Lackey, Miles M.
Leavy, David C.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Samore, Gary S.
Krass, Caroline D.
Greer, Jason H.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Halperin, David E.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Tavlarides, Mark J.
Baker, James E.
Camp, Donald A.

TEXT_BODY Looks good -- a couple of suggestions in text. You might want to invoke Sandy's frequent remark that we "must not let the urgent crowd out the importance," Losing CTBT would affect generations to come, etc.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.

Sent: Monday,

May 10, 1999 1:52 PM

To: Lackey, Miles M.; Leavy, David C.; Riedel, Bruce O.; Samore, Gary S.; Krass, Caroline D.; Greer, Jason H.; Tucker,

Maureen E.; Halperin, David E.; Gobush, Matthew N.; Tavlarides, Mark

J.; Baker, James E.; Camp, Donald A.

Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy

Subject: Revised

CTBT Memo for Berger [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Colleagues

--

Prior to leaving for Geneva two weeks ago, I sent around a memorandum to Sandy on CTBT for your review/comment. All but one office has cleared, and I appreciate the (almost universal) quick turnaround. Since the original draft, however, we have sharpened the text a bit, in part to reflect new developments. I have "bolded" what is "new text" from the original draft, to facilitate your review. If offices could give me their final chop no later than noon tomorrow (Tuesday), we will shoot to send this over to Sandy by COB May 11.

Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Quarterly.doc
May 10, 1999/1:35 p.m.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: CTBT Ratification

No progress has been made this year in achieving Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Moreover, the fall of the Vajpayee government has cast considerable doubt on the fate of CTBT in India and Pakistan. In the absence of U.S. movement towards ratification, both India and Pakistan will find it increasingly tempting to shelve their commitments to sign CTBT. The loss of momentum - both domestically and overseas - in bringing the CTBT into force could doom any prospects for Senate approval during the President's second term, and could well lead in time to the unraveling of the Treaty altogether.

Leaving the gate. On January 11, the President approved a

recommendation from
 you and Larry Stein for an all-out campaign to achieve Senate
 approval of the
 CTBT in 1999. On that same day, you and Bill Richardson announced
 at Carnegie
 that CTBT would be a top priority for this year. Later that month, the
 President
 said in the State of the Union that he would ask the Senate to approve
 the Treaty
 "now."

A muddy track. Since the State of the Union, a number of
 developments - domestic
 and foreign - have intervened to slow our ratification effort. Most
 recently,
 Kosovo has necessarily crowded out prospects for raising the profile
 of CTBT,
 either with the public or individual Senators. In addition to these
 developments, a number of issues that were CTBT "variables" at the
 beginning of
 the year have come into sharper focus - in most cases, in ways that
 will not aid
 our ratification campaign:

- * START II ratification in Russia. With prospects for START II
 ratification
 dimming for (at least the first half of) 1999, we do not have the option
 of
 striking a deal with Senator Helms to submit the September 1997
 ABM Succession
 and Demarcation agreements to the Senate for advice and consent in
 exchange for
 Senate action on CTBT.

- * National Missile Defense (NMD) legislation. Our inability to hold
 41
 Democratic Senators on the Cochran NMD bill precluded our holding
 this
 legislation "hostage" for a later CTBT trade.

- * CTBT ratification in South Asia. The fall of the Vajpayee
 government and the
 upcoming Indian elections will delay any hope of Indian (and possibly
 Pakistani)
 signature well into the fall (i.e., beyond the point where it might have
 provided
 an early boost to our ratification campaign).

- * New wrinkle. Finally, the controversy surrounding security at our
 national
 labs might detract from the ability of the lab directors to convince the

Senate

that they are up to the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under

CTBT. Some on the Hill may also try to redirect funding plus-ups required for stockpile stewardship to counter-intelligence and lab security.

Breaks in our favor. There have been some positive developments this year.

* CTBT Committee Formed. On January 19, the "Committee to Support the CTBT" was formed, with Paul Nitze (Chairman); former Senators Exon, Hatfield and Kassebaum; and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. On February 4, Nitze wrote Helms urging him to ratify the CTBT as soon as possible.

* NGO push. The NGO community continues to press for ratification, including a targeted, multi-state petition campaign, letters to the editor, and polling.

* Stockpile certification. In late April, the President signed letters to Congress transmitting the yearly stockpile certification signed by Cohen and Richardson. As a visible demonstration of our commitment to stewardship, the DOE conducted its sixth subcritical experiment in February.

* Other ratifications. New ratifications by Italy, South Africa, Greece and others continue (bringing the total up to 34, including 17 of the 44 required for entry into force); mention UK, France, Japan, Germany if those are all correct planning for a conference of those states that have ratified the Treaty (most likely in Vienna) continues on track for October.

Are we too far behind? We still have time for hearings and a vote on CTBT before or around the October 1999 Conference of Ratifying States (recall our CWC ratification campaign consumed approximately four months). The Treaty and supporting documentation have been on the Hill for over a year and a half, which presumably would facilitate the Senate's deliberations, once underway.

Reasons to press on. Recognizing the difficulties - which have, on balance, grown over the past four months - we believe the bottom line remains that CTBT ratification remains a "win/win" issue for us: it is the right thing to do, and evidence suggests the public will strongly support a push for ratification. Given time to prepare the groundwork, we can win on the Senate floor.

Moreover, mounting and winning a campaign for Senate approval is more important than ever in securing Indian and Pakistani (as well as Chinese and Russian) ratification; indeed, even before the fall of the Vajpayee government, there was evidence suggesting India (and Pakistan) might hold back on signature, expecting that Senate inaction would take India off the hook.

Beyond that, securing entry into force of this Treaty would stand as an enduring achievement of this Administration, marking both a significant step back from the Cold War and a significant step forward in constraining nuclear proliferation.

That said, our ratification strategy must take into account that recent developments may have raised new doubts over the merits of CTBT in the minds of some Senators, and we will need time - and effort - to muster a winning coalition on the Senate floor.

What will it take to win? As we said in January, success will require a determined campaign, with the President, and agency Principals, leading the charge. Even though we are recommending a strategy leading to a vote this Fall, we must get started soon. If we delay ratcheting up our ratification effort past Memorial Day, we risk simply not having enough time to complete the ratification process in 1999. In addition to a strong public campaign, the key to our effort remains identifying a legislative "trade" involving CTBT and a Republican legislative priority. In the absence of such a deal, moving CTBT will

be a very
difficult task.

Getting back on track. In terms of specific steps, we would
recommend the
following in May:

* Call to Glenn regarding National Chairman. We need to determine
whether John
Glenn is part of our ratification strategy; you have a memorandum
with points for
a call to Glenn. If Glenn says "yes," we would work with Chuck Ruff
to expedite
his appointment.

* Meeting with key Democrats. After prior consultations with staff,
we would
arrange a meeting between you and Daschle, Biden, Levin and Kerrey
(Minority
Leader plus ranking Democrats on SFRC, SASC, and SSCI), to
discuss legislative
strategy, underscoring the need to identify possible "trades" and/or
legislative
hostages involving CTBT. Once identified, we would attempt to
leverage an
Administration concession for a commitment from the Majority
Leader that CTBT
would be discharged from SFRC this Fall in time for a vote this year.

* Rose Garden event. If Glenn agrees to be our CTBT "National
Chairman," we will
propose a "Rose Garden event" during the later half of May/first half
of June.
In the event Glenn declines, our fallback would be an event with
Nobel Laureates
who have signed a letter to the President (yet to be delivered)
endorsing
ratification.

Concurrences by: Lackey Leavy Riedel Samore Krass

4

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/12/99 4:41:29 PM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Third Time's the Charm [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Lackey, Miles M.
Tavlarides, Mark J.
Krass, Caroline D.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Leavy, David C.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Brackman, Stella S.
Kelly, Sandra L.
McCausland, Jeffrey D.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.

TEXT_BODY Colleagues --

This Friday (May 14), I'll be pinch-hitting again for Mr. Bell at the Congressional Breakfast Seminar sponsored by the National Defense University (I'm sure there will come a day when someone's paying me \$10,000 per speech, but for now, I want to assure the lawyers that I'm doing this out of the goodness of my heart). Subject of the seminar series (which runs over a three-month period) is "Missile Defense, Proliferation, Arms Control and Defense Policy."

My remarks will focus on "Balancing Missile Defense, Arms Control and Deterrence." Using my previous remarks at CATO/IFPA as a baseline, I've added some additional thoughts and musings (which are "bolded" in the attached remarks). Only one change in the q/a's. Would appreciate any comments no later than 3:00 p.m. on Thursday.

Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Remarks for 1999 Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series.doc
Remarks for 1999 Congressional Breakfast Seminar Series

Missile Defense, Proliferation, Arms Control and Defense Policy

"Balancing Missile Defense, Arms Control and Deterrence"

(Draft: 5/12/99/4:35 p.m.)

Introduction

* Thank NDU for hosting today's breakfast, and bringing all of us together to discuss the topic of missile defense, arms control and deterrence.

* Bob Bell regrets that he was not able to join you this morning, as he has in previous years. I will do my best today to fill Bob's shoes.

* Begin by describing the core elements of the Administration's strategic policy.
I will then turn to a brief discussion of our policy on National Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, and then conclude with a discussion of the missile defense legislation that has now passed the Senate and the House.

Strategic policy

* The Administration's strategic policy has, since 1993, included three core elements:

* First, the Administration has sought the advancement of nuclear reductions through the START process. The President has consistently reaffirmed that implementation of stabilizing and verifiable reductions in nuclear forces through the START process - including START I, START II and START III - remains a priority objective of U.S. foreign, security and non-proliferation policy.

* At the same time, the President has made clear that the United States must, for

the foreseeable future, maintain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile.

* Second, the Administration has committed to maintaining the ABM Treaty regime. Recognizing that Russia considers U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty to be integrally linked to the START process, the President has affirmed the importance of the ABM Treaty in maintaining strategic stability and realizing the benefits of reductions in strategic nuclear forces through START.

* Third, the Administration has committed to the development of a limited NMD system that would be designed primarily to counter emerging rogue state missile threats. This program includes a public commitment to work to amend the ABM Treaty if required to accommodate deployment of a limited NMD.

* These policies are not static, and indeed, have been reviewed at various points over the past six years, most recently last December. That said, we believe these core strategic objectives relating to START, the ABM Treaty and NMD remain sound:

* With respect to START, even though we expect Russian nuclear forces will decline over the next decade with or without START II/ START III, we continue to have a national security interest in ensuring these reductions are governed by Treaty regimes; that is, that the reductions are legally-binding, predictable, transparent, verifiable and harder to reverse.

* Moreover, we still have a clear national security interest in realizing the specific benefits to strategic stability afforded by the START Treaties - in particular, the elimination of MIRVed and Heavy ICBMs under START I and START II and the hoped for gains in the areas of warheads, fissile material and non-strategic forces in START III.

* In addition, the START I Treaty played a vital role in securing the removal of approximately 3,000 nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan during the President's first term. START I is the only Treaty in force today mandating verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear forces, and is overwhelmingly in our national security interest to maintain.

* With regard to our own nuclear forces, they continue to play an important role in deterring aggression and coercion against the United States, its forces and allies.

* For this reason, the United States continues to maintain a triad of strategic forces, as well as non-strategic forces, and to provide for the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile through the Department of Energy's stockpile stewardship program, in close coordination with the Department of Defense.

* In the ABM area, it is clear that Russia continues to afford great value to the predictability provided by the ABM Treaty regime, given the uncertainties regarding its own strategic nuclear forces.

* This is not a new development: Russia made clear when it signed the START I Treaty in 1991 that U.S. compliance with, and adherence to, the ABM Treaty was essential in order for START I to remain "effective and viable" - a position they continue to underscore today.

* While we have taken issue with this "linkage" by Russia, and more recently, the view that any changes to the ABM Treaty would undermine the START process, we agree that the ABM Treaty continues to play an important role in maintaining strategic stability between the world's two largest nuclear powers.

* That said, we have made clear to Russia that the ABM Treaty

should, if necessary, be adjusted to reflect changes in our national security environment. Such a process was not only envisioned but incorporated into the Treaty when it was concluded in 1972.

* In this context, our initial focus in 1993 was to ensure the ABM Treaty did not stand in the way of the development and deployment of increasingly capable theater missile defense systems to address the "here and now" threat posed by the proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

* That was the rationale behind the negotiations on "demarcation" between strategic and theater missile defense systems, which concluded in 1997 with the signing of two agreed statements in New York.

* These agreements - along with a Memorandum of Understanding on ABM Succession and a Protocol relating to the START II Treaty - will be provided to the Senate for approval following Russian ratification of START II.

* Finally, with respect to NMD, the Administration shares Congress's commitment to ensuring the American people are protected from rogue states with long-range missiles, should that threat be realized as we now expect it will. That protection begins with the maintenance of a strong deterrent, both conventional and nuclear.

* One point I want to make clear: the Administration has consistently rejected the view that reductions through START; preservation of the ABM Treaty; and the development, and possible deployment, of an effective, limited NMD are incompatible. They are not.

* We do not accept the premise that nuclear deterrence or the START process - despite the difficulties in bringing START II into force - should be abandoned as "dead" or no longer relevant to our security calculus.

* Nor do we accept the premise that the ABM Treaty has outlived its time, or that it cannot be adjusted to accommodate deployment of a limited NMD system.

* And we certainly have not concluded that any deployment of strategic defenses would undermine the ABM Treaty and START, and thus, must be ruled out.

* What we do believe is that to dramatically "tilt" in the direction of any one of these three objectives - START, the ABM Treaty, or NMD - at the expense of the other two is, at this point in time, both unnecessary and unwise.

* We have time to square this circle, and we intend to do so.

* That is not to say we do not perceive an urgent need to address the threat poised by rogue states; but in doing so, we must not abandon programs and policies that are eliminating thousands of nuclear weapons in the states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia.

Administration policy on NMD and ABM

* With that as a backdrop, I want to briefly discuss three important decisions taken in the past few months related to our NMD program and the ABM Treaty.

* First, informed by the report of the Rumsfeld Commission, as well as the Intelligence Community's analysis of the August 1998 DPRK flight-test of the TD-I missile, the Administration has stated that the threat posed by the development of an ICBM capable of striking the United States is, in Secretary Cohen's words, "growing - and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not only to our troops overseas, but also to Americans here at home."

* Second, to "keep faith" with Congress regarding our commitment to ensuring the American people are protected from rogue states with long-range missiles, the Administration has now budgeted \$10.5 billion between fiscal years

1999-2005 for the NMD program, including the funds that would be necessary during this period to deploy a limited NMD system.

* And as Secretary Cohen and General Lyles have recently made clear, we are moving forward with our NMD development program as fast as we can.

* Third, we have engaged Russia at senior levels to discuss further the evolution of our NMD program. We have told Russia that deployment of a limited NMD may, or may not, require modifications to the ABM Treaty, and that if changes were required, we would seek agreement on any needed amendments.

* It is our expectation that these discussions with Russia will intensify once the Administration has a clearer understanding of the desired NMD architecture and related implications for the ABM Treaty.

* I do not want to give you the impression that a future U.S. proposal to clarify, or amend, the Treaty to accommodate the deployment of a limited NMD will lead to an "easy" negotiation.

* Russian rhetoric on this point has been quite negative since the Administration announced in January that it was adding funds to our five-year Defense plan that would cover deployment of a limited NMD.

* But the Russians also understand that if they reject out of hand any U.S. proposals to clarify or amend the ABM Treaty, pressure would continue to build for the U.S. to consider the option of simply withdrawing from the Treaty altogether.

* For this reason, we believe Russia will have an incentive to respond constructively to any U.S. proposals, and that an agreement could be reached.

* We have already made clear to Russia that deployment of a limited NMD that

required amendments to the ABM Treaty would not be incompatible with the underlying purpose of the ABM Treaty, that is, to maintain strategic stability and enable further reductions in strategic nuclear arms.

* The ABM Treaty has been amended before, and we see no reason why it could not be amended again, if necessary, to permit deployment of an NMD effective against rogue nation missile threats.

* And we have made clear to Russia that we are prepared to negotiate any necessary amendments in good faith.

Congress

* That is the "state of play" with respect to our NMD program and the ABM Treaty. Before I conclude my remarks and take your questions, I want to briefly discuss the missile defense legislation that has now passed the Senate and House, and how it relates to the Administration's policy on the question of "deployment."

* The Administration has made clear that it plans to address the deployment decision in the year 2000. Earlier this year, Senator Cochran proposed legislation stating that it is the policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense "as soon as technologically possible."

* The Administration took the view that the Cochran bill, as drafted, was not the right formula for resolving the deployment issue; instead, we identified four factors that would bear on the deployment decision:

* Threat. We will review the latest information and trends regarding the threat - in terms of countries and specific capabilities. We will ask ourselves whether the threat has developed as quickly as we now expect, and review the latest information on individual countries and capabilities.

* Technology. This is more than just whether the technology for an intercept is

"possible," but whether it has been demonstrated in a rigorous series of flight tests that are planned over the next 12-15 months. This information will be crucial in assessing the operational effectiveness of any NMD.

* Cost. We think we have this "scoped in" with the President's most recent budget submission, but we will look at it again next year, taking into account the threat and technology.

* Arms Control. Finally, the Administration believes that a decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed within the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms through START.

* The Senate heard the Administration out on these four points, and on a bipartisan basis, included in the Cochran bill two amendments that, if preserved, will allow the Legislative and Executive branches to move forward on this issue:

* First, the bill now specifies that any NMD deployment must be subject to the authorization and appropriations process, where, beginning in the year 2000, we will address the question of if, when, and what to deploy.

* Second, the bill puts the Senate on record as continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, reaffirming that our missile defense policy cannot be divorced from our arms control objectives.

* The last time I spoke on this issue, I was asked whether these amendments were really that significant, or, were simply "face-saving" measures designed to avoid an administration veto.

* It is certainly true that, with these changes, the President will not veto the Cochran NMD legislation.

* But I think it would be a mistake to simply dismiss these changes as

"face-saving."

* There is no question that the Cochran legislation, as amended, represents a step forward on the path to NMD deployment. But it is also clear that other steps are required.

* The first amendment underscores this point: without a subsequent authorization or appropriation, we cannot answer the question of "if, when, and what" to deploy. Simply put, a deployment decision will involve future decisions and legislation.

* Moreover, it is clear from the second amendment that many Senators believe that NMD deployment must take into account "arms control" considerations. That is certainly the Administration's view.

* That said, whatever one may conclude about the changes to the Cochran NMD bill, it is clear that the Cochran bill, as amended, is the one clear path to NMD legislation this year.

* In this regard, I would simply note that the legislation passed in the House does not specify any criteria for deployment, and for this reason, the concerns the Administration noted with respect to Senator Cochran's original bill on NMD are relevant to the legislation that was passed in the House.

* How these two bills will be reconciled and presented to the White House remains to be seen.

Conclusion

* That said, I want to conclude by striking a slightly "optimistic" note, that is, that a consensus may be slowly emerging on a number of points related to missile defense, the ABM Treaty and strategic reductions:

* First, that the threat posed by rogue state ballistic missile programs is real

and growing.

* Second, that we should move as quickly as we can to develop a limited NMD system, if possible.

* And third, that we should engage Russia on any necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty, while at the same time working to bring START II into force and conclude a START III.

* Now, even if a workable consensus between the Administration and Congress can be achieved on these three points, it would not "end" the NMD debate.

* In particular, the details over what kind of NMD to deploy, and what Treaty clarifications or amendments to seek, will provide fertile ground for an ongoing dialogue between the Executive and Legislative branches of government.

* But a consensus relating to the threat, the urgency of developing a workable NMD, and the need for discussions with Russia would provide a framework to move us forward in the next two years.

If Asked Questions and Answers

What is your response to those who assert that the ABM Treaty expired with the demise of the Soviet Union? Why can't the Administration produce a "legal rebuttal" to these arguments?

* The President has written a number of letters to members of Congress on ABM Succession over the past 16 months, and in each instance, he has made clear that the ABM Treaty has continued in force following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

* That said, our argument regarding ABM succession is not novel, and rests on the general principle (adhered to by both the Bush and Clinton Administrations) that agreements between the United States and the USSR that were in force at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union are presumed to continue in force as to the former Soviet Republics. This general principle is based not only on U.S. past diplomatic practice, but also on principles of international law.

* Now, were we to have taken the contrary view - that is, that the ABM Treaty was no longer in force, or that those states with ABM assets on their territory who asserted a right to assume an obligation as a "successor state" under the ABM Treaty were not entitled to such a status - it would have jeopardized what has been a successful effort to remove nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan under the START I Treaty and the NPT.

* The Memorandum of Understanding on Succession will remove any ambiguity about the extent to which states other than Russia are Parties to the ABM Treaty.

Isn't it true that any NMD would by definition violate the ABM Treaty?

* There may be issues with respect to Article I of the Treaty, which prohibits a "territorial" defense.

* We have not concluded our own analysis on this point, nor have we discussed the issue with Russia in any detail.

What is your reaction to the report issued in March by the Heritage Foundation recommending that the U.S. proceed with the deployment of a sea-based NMD?

* We think the fastest, most affordable, most technologically viable approach to NMD is a ground-based architecture.

* The Administration will soon make public an unclassified report on the question of Navy Theater Wide as an NMD system.

* It will take issue with the claim that a sea-based ABM could be available in 3-4 years at a cost of \$3-4 billion.

* Specifically, it will note that significant upgrades to the missile, kill vehicle, and/or sensors would be required from our "baseline" NTW program to give it a useful capability against various ICBM threats.

* That capability is not now budgeted: estimated costs are in the billions of dollars, depending on assumptions regarding the "threat."

* Moreover, it is not clear that the NMD mission would be consistent with other demands on the Navy, including anti-air and cruise missile strikes.

* Finally, we do not think such a capability could be available until late in the next decade, at the earliest.

Why did the White House distance itself from Secretary Cohen's statement that the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM Treaty if Russia did not agree to the necessary modifications?

* First, that is not what Secretary Cohen said. The Secretary made clear, as has the President, Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Berger, that it is in America's interest to maintain the ABM Treaty.

* As we have said many times before, deployment of a limited national missile defense may or may not require modifications to the Treaty. If deployment required modifications to the Treaty, we would seek agreement with ABM Treaty parties on the needed amendments, and we are prepared to negotiate any necessary amendments in good faith.

* The ABM Treaty has been amended before, and we see no reason why we should not be able to modify it again, if necessary, to permit deployment of an NMD

effective against rogue nation missile threats.

Didn't the President rule out the option of withdrawal from the Treaty at his

March 5 news conference, giving Russia a "veto" over our NMD deployment?

* No. The President has made clear he believes any necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty should be discussed and agreed to with Russia. The same view has been articulated by Secretaries Cohen and Albright, along with National Security Advisor Berger.

* We have said that we could not and would not give Russia or any other nation a veto over our NMD requirements. It is important to recognize that our sovereign rights are fully protected by the supreme national interests clause that is an integral part of this Treaty. But neither should we issue ultimatums.

Why doesn't the Administration submit the succession and demarcation agreements on the ABM Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent? Will the Administration comply with the demand by Senator Helms to submit these agreements prior to June 1?

* The Administration has made clear that it intends to provide the MOU on Succession, along with the agreements on ABM/TMD Demarcation and the START II protocol, to the Senate for advice and consent following Russian ratification of START II. We certainly hoped that could happen before June 1.

* The Senate will have an opportunity to debate, and vote, on these agreements, and we hope that will happen this year.

* [Will the administration cooperate with Senator Helms on hearings this spring?]

* To my knowledge, State has not received a request from Senator Helms to cooperate on any such hearings; if we receive such a request, we will consider it then.

Isn't it true that the President has given Russia a "veto" over U.S. NMD deployments?

* No. The President has made clear there is no reason why we should not be able to work cooperatively to amend the Treaty, if amendments are required to support deployment of a limited NMD, and we are prepared to negotiate any amendments in good faith.

Will this administration withdraw from the Treaty if Russia refuses to cooperate?

* You are way ahead of where we are at this point in time. At present, we have not identified what, if any, amendments might be required to support deployment of a limited NMD. We are not going to speculate on "hypotheticals."

* That said, we believe our sovereign rights are fully protected by the supreme national interests clause that is an integral part of the ABM Treaty.

If the Weldon-Spratt bill emerges from a Senate-House Conference and is sent to the White House, will the President veto the bill?

* The President's senior advisors have said they have serious concerns regarding this bill, for many of the same reasons that we were opposed to the original Cochran bill; I'm sure the President would give their advice great weight in making this decision.

Why does the Administration care if the Weldon-Spratt legislation were to become law? What would change?

* We are opposed to the Weldon-Spratt bill because it doesn't accurately state our policy on the question of deployment; that is important, both domestically and overseas.

* Obviously, it would be better if the Administration and Congress

could work out
a joint position on this question. The Cochran NMD bill, as amended
and passed
by the Senate, represents such a position.

Can a C-1 NMD architecture provide an effective defense of all 50
states? Where
would such a defense be based?

* We are looking at this closely, but have not yet reached a final
determination.

Wouldn't it be prudent to look beyond whatever ABM Treaty relief
might be
required for deployment of a C-1 architecture to that required for
deployment of
a C-2, C-3, or even "space-based" NMD architecture?

* We have not yet come to any conclusions regarding what
amendments, if any, we
will seek to accommodate deployment of a limited NMD, let alone
our "negotiating
tactics."

* At this stage, I would not rule out a negotiating process that evolved
over a
period of years, similar to the START-process, rather than an "all or
nothing"
negotiation that needed to be wrapped up in a few months.

When does the Administration expect to be in a position to make basic
decisions
regarding NMD architecture and negotiating strategy?

* Always hard to predict a specific date on something this complex,
but we are
working hard on these questions, and hope to have some preliminary
answers
sometime this summer.

What are the specific ABM Treaty issues the Administration is
examining?

* For example, we are looking at issues associated with the number of
possible
deployment sites and interceptors (Article III), ABM early warning
radars
(Article III and the 1978 Agreed Statement), what defines a defense of

the
territory or a base for such a defense (Article I), and systems based on
"other
physical principles" (Agreed Statement D).

How will the evolving China espionage story affect the
Administration's NMD
policy and program?

* Our program is designed primarily to counter emerging, rogue state
threats.

While it will have some capability against accidental or unauthorized
launches
from Russia or China, our NMD program is not designed to address a
deliberate,
large-scale attack by these two states.

* For the foreseeable future, we will continue to rely on our nuclear
deterrent
to provide protection against such attacks.

But wouldn't a C-3 NMD architecture provide the capability to largely
negate
China's nuclear deterrent, providing an incentive for China to expand
its nuclear
capabilities, with the aid of U.S. technology?

* It is not our judgment that China would necessarily expand its
nuclear forces
to counter a limited U.S. NMD system that is clearly designed to
address rogue
state missile threats.

But doesn't it now make sense to deploy a defense against China?

* Continue to believe that our NMD program should be designed to
deal with the
threat posed by rogue states.

* We will continue to maintain overwhelming nuclear deterrent forces
to deal with
"traditional" threats.

Isn't it time to conclude that the START process has stopped, and thus
the
relevance of the ABM Treaty to strategic reductions is now in
question?

* No. First, it is clear the ABM Treaty continues to be relevant to the
successful implementation of the START I Treaty.

* Second, although we have had a number of disappointments related to START II ratification in Russia, we believe ratification is still possible, and in our national interest to pursue.

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