

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Gwenyth Todd to Leonard Hawley. Subject: [Iraq Book] [See also vz5660_001] (5 pages)	11/05/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Gayle Smith to Gayle Smith. Subject: FW: [Africa] (3 pages)	01/06/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/29/1998-02/09/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5706

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Attachment Tab A Letters for Signature Tab B Incoming Correspondence 2 7266(7124) cc: Vice President Chief of Staff">

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/29/98 6:59:30 PM
FROM Gregory, Susan J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT 7266 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Sherman, David J.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY These are still in real draft form -- and I need to run the Helm's letter past a few folks before circulating. But pls take a look, particularly at the middle paragraph of the letter to Helms. THANKS

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

7266helms.doc

Dear Senator Helms:

Thank you for your letter regarding declassification and public disclosure of the FBI report on the Cambodian grenade attack and the wounding of Ron Abney.

I share your interest in providing Americans the greatest access possible to information that affects their safety, both at home and overseas. The Administration continues to work on a notification policy which would streamline the process of declassifying and releasing such information to victims and their

families.

The investigation of the attack and Mr. Abney's injury is still pending, and the report cannot therefore be released at this time. The FBI has, however,

indicated the case is nearing resolution and they plan to contact your staff to discuss their results.

Sincerely,

[Name/Title in Initial Caps]
[Title/Senate/House in Initial Caps]
[Organization/Position - Initial Caps]
[Address - Initial Caps]

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Attachment
Tab A Letters for Signature
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

2

7266(7124)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/4/98 5:28:33 PM
FROM Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: D-day and Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Todd, Gwennyth E.

CARBON_COPY Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.

TEXT_BODY Gwennyth, Typo. It's Kerrey. I dropped the e in the original, sorry.

-----Original Message-----

From: Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Sent: Wednesday, November 04, 1998 5:25 PM
To: @LEGISLAT -
Legislative Affairs; Todd, Gwennyth E.
Subject: D-day and Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]

D-day
minus +/- 24: POTUS Calls to Four Leaders (preferably before calls to foreign leaders)

Majority Leader Lott
Minority Leader Daschle
Speaker
Gingrich
Minority Leader Gephardt

D-day minus +/-06 SECSTATE/NSA/SECDEF
Calls to Chairs and Rankings of Senate and House Armed Services,
Foreign Affairs, Key Appropriations and Intelligence Committees and
Subcommittees.

Armed Services

Senators Thurmond/Warner
Senator
Levin

Representative Spence
Representative Skelton

SFRC/HIRC

Senator
Helms
Senator Biden
Representative Gilman
Representatives Hamilton/Gejdenson

(Middle
East Subcommittee)

Senator Brownback
Senator Robb

Appropriations

Senator
Stevens
Senator Byrd
Representative Livingston
Representative
Obey

(Defense/National Security Subcommittee)

*Senator Stevens
Senator
Inouye
Representative Young
Representative Murtha

(Foreign Operations)

Senator
McConnell
Senator Leahy
Representative Callahan
Representative
Pelosi

SSCI/HPSCI (Intelligence Committees)

Senator Shelby
Senator
Kerrey
Representative Goss
Representative Dicks

* means Member
is on Committee as well as Subcommittee.

D-day plus 24-48:
Principal Level Briefings for Members.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/4/98 5:34:30 PM
FROM Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: D-day and Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Todd, Gwenth E.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

That's fine. I wasn't sure how much information you needed (names and titles or just titles), and erred on the side of more so you wouldn't have to come back. good luck!

-----Original Message-----

From: Todd,
Gwenth E.
Sent: Wednesday, November 04, 1998 5:30 PM
To: Abercrombie-Winstanley,
Gina K.
Subject: RE: D-day and Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]

Chart is already
gone (needed it by 5:00) but the four leaders calls are on it already
in that timeframe. Next time the chart comes back I'll put in the
H+6 info. Thanks!

-----Original Message-----

From: Abercrombie-Winstanley,
Gina K.
Sent: Wednesday, November 04, 1998 5:25 PM
To: @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs; Todd, Gwenth E.
Subject: D-day and Iraq
[UNCLASSIFIED]

D-day minus +/- 24: POTUS Calls to Four Leaders
(preferably before calls to foreign leaders)

Majority Leader
Lott
Minority Leader Daschle
Speaker Gingrich
Minority Leader
Gephardt

D-day minus +/-06 SECSTATE/NSA/SECDEF Calls to Chairs
and Rankings of Senate and House Armed Services, Foreign Affairs,
Key Appropriations and Intelligence Committees and Subcommittees.

Armed
Services

Senators Thurmond/Warner
Senator Levin
Representative
Spence
Representative Skelton

SFRC/HIRC

Senator Helms
Senator
Biden
Representative Gilman
Representatives Hamilton/Gejdenson

(Middle
East Subcommittee)

Senator Brownback
Senator Robb

Appropriations

Senator
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Representative Livingston
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(Defense/National Security Subcommittee)

*Senator Stevens
Senator
Inouye
Representative Young
Representative Murtha

(Foreign Operations)

Senator
McConnell
Senator Leahy

Representative Callahan
Representative
Pelosi

SSCI/HPSCI (Intelligence Committees)

Senator Shelby
Senator
Kerry
Representative Goss
Representative Dicks

* means Member
is on Committee as well as Subcommittee.

D-day plus 24-48:
Principal Level Briefings for Members.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/4/98 5:45:36 PM
FROM Marty, Joseph H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: D-day and Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Todd, Gwenyth E.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY haven't been asked. it's time for radio silence, at least for a little while.

-----Original Message-----

From: Todd, Gwenyth E.
Sent: Wednesday, November 04, 1998 5:38 PM
To: Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.; Marty, Joseph H.
Subject: RE: D-day and Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]

I haven't. I think we want to keep mum in any case... Joe?

-----Original Message-----

From: Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Sent: Wednesday, November 04, 1998 5:36 PM
To: Todd, Gwenyth E.
Subject: RE: D-day and Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]

By, the by, have you or Joe been asked to provide some holding points for the folks who are going up to brief on Kosovo tomorrow?

-----Original Message-----

From: Todd, Gwenyth E.
Sent: Wednesday, November 04, 1998 5:30 PM
To: Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Subject: RE: D-day and Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]

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- Legislative Affairs; Todd, Gwenth E.
Subject: D-day and Iraq
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Gephardt

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Services

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Representative
Spence
Representative Skelton

SFRC/HIRC

Senator Helms
Senator
Biden
Representative Gilman
Representatives Hamilton/Gejdenson

(Middle
East Subcommittee)

Senator Brownback

Senator Robb

Appropriations

Senator

Stevens

Senator Byrd

Representative Livingston

Representative

Obey

(Defense/National Security Subcommittee)

*Senator Stevens

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Inouye

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Representative Murtha

(Foreign Operations)

Senator

McConnell

Senator Leahy

Representative Callahan

Representative

Pelosi

SSCI/HPSCI (Intelligence Committees)

Senator Shelby

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Representative Dicks

* means Member

is on Committee as well as Subcommittee.

D-day plus 24-48:

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/20/98 11:04:50 AM
FROM Bouchard, Joseph F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Chances occurrences [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Witkowski, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

I think these more likely:

Giant comet endorses increase in defense budget ... Senator Helms narrowly misses Earth ... Saddam announces he's "found God"; endorses CTB and ABM ... Washington Post slips on bathtub; killed by cerebral concussion

Joe Bouchard

-----Original

Message-----

From: Bell, Robert G.

Sent: Friday, November 20,
1998 10:44 AM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy

Subject: Chances occurrences
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Giant comet narrowly misses Earth....Senator Helms announces he's "found God"; endorses CTB and ABM Saddam slips on bathtub; killed by cerebral concussion ... Washington Post endorses increase in defense budget.

Note: only one of these chance occurrences

actually happened today!

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/20/98 12:08:28 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Chances occurrences [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Andreassen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Witkowsky, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY I knew Helms would come around...

-----Original Message-----

From: Bell,
Robert G.
Sent: Friday, November 20, 1998 10:44 AM
To: @DEFENSE
- Defense Policy
Subject: Chances occurrences [UNCLASSIFIED]

Giant
comet narrowly misses Earth....Senator Helms announces he's "found
God"; endorses CTB and ABM Saddam slips on bathtub; killed by
cerebral concussion ... Washington Post endorses increase in defense
budget.

Note: only one of these chance occurrences actually happened
today!

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/4/99 9:22:35 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS CTBT Memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.

CARBON_COPY Kelly, Sandra L.

TEXT_BODY Robert --

As per Mona's e-mail, attached for your review and comment is a 2-page memorandum to the President requesting his approval to make a push for CTBT ratification in 1999. Once I have incorporated your comments, will seek the concurrence of:

Rudman/Farrar
Blinken
Fuerth
(via Black in OVP)
Lew (via Holstein or Morrison in OMB)

We could also try to get concurrence from Reidel, if for no other reason than to obtain his early appreciation of the affect of our Senate CTBT campaign on his and Strobe's "investment" with India and Pakistan. Your call.

Steve.

P.S. -- Hard copy, with Mona's e-mail attached, in your inbox.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT POTUS CTBT 1999.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Pushing CTBT Ratification in 1999

Purpose

To request your approval to make an all-out push in 1999 to achieve Senate approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Background

The CTBT is a legacy achievement, marking both a significant step back from the Cold War and a significant step forward in constraining nuclear proliferation. The fate of our efforts to ratify the CTBT and achieve its international entry into force (EIF) will almost certainly be decided in 1999. If the U.S. does not show leadership by ratifying, we cannot assume other key states in the "Group of 44" (i.e., those states that must ratify in order for the Treaty to enter into force) will ratify.

* In particular, India will almost certainly balk, frustrating our nine-month diplomatic effort to achieve Indian adherence to the CTBT and shore up the international non-proliferation regime in the destructive wake of India's nuclear tests.

* Russia and China are also waiting on the U.S., and it is doubtful whether Pakistan will take steps to adhere to CTBT ahead of the U.S. Senate (or India).

1998. Our effort to move the CTBT last session built on a series of "CTBT" events - including your State of the Union appeal; the endorsement by four former Chairmen of the JCS; and your trip to Los Alamos - supplemented by Administration

briefings and statements. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan provided a further - albeit unexpected and unwelcome - impetus to our appeals to the Senate.

On the "plus" side, our efforts helped establish strong public support for CTBT, fueled by global abhorrence of India's and Pakistan's tests. Recent polls show 75-80 percent of the American public favor ratification, and editorials across the country overwhelmingly support the Treaty.

Nonetheless, Senator Helms, with open support from Senator Lott, stonewalled hearings in his committee. Helms has made clear his order of priorities continues to be, first, hearings on the 1997 ABM accords (which we do not intend to submit to the Senate until Russia ratifies START II), and second, hearings on the Kyoto Treaty (which we do not intend to submit until developing states agree to some form of meaningful participation).

Game Plan for 1999. Even with the lingering uncertainty over whether Lott and Helms will eventually agree to cooperate in moving CTBT, the stakes are such that we cannot afford not to launch an all-out campaign this year to achieve Senate approval.

As a first step, I intend to announce next week in a speech on Nonproliferation at the Carnegie Center that the Administration intends to make CTBT a top foreign policy legislative priority this year, and that we will push for early Senate hearings and a vote on the Senate floor.

* In particular, I will note the importance of achieving ratification by September 1999 so that we can positively influence both Indian and Pakistani adherence and participate in the Conference of States that have ratified CTBT that is to be held as early as next October. Such a "deadline" might help light a fire under Senate Republicans who understand the connection

between CTBT,
India-Pak diplomacy and U.S. global leadership in the fight against
nuclear
proliferation.

We would also intend to feature CTBT in the State of the Union, and
follow this
up with an aggressive legislative and public affairs campaign.

Even with an all-out campaign in 1999, we may not succeed in
breaking the current
impasse with Helms and Lott without "cutting a deal" involving
CTBT and a
Republican legislative priority.

Recognizing the difficulties, the bottom line remains that CTBT
ratification
remains a "win/win" issue for us - exactly the kind of business the
U.S. public
overwhelmingly now, more than ever, wants to see its government
conducting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve our making an all-out effort to achieve advice and
consent to
CTBT in 1999.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2

0000

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/5/99 4:35:44 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT POTUS CTBT Memo [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Rudman, Mara E.
 Farrar, Jay C.
 Blinken, Antony J.
 Leavy, David C.
 Riedel, Bruce O.
 Samore, Gary S.
 Tucker, Maureen E.

CARBON_COPY Andreassen, Steven P.
 Bell, Robert G.
 Bouchard, Joseph F.
 Kelly, Sandra L.
 Langley, Janice M.
 Mulligan, George D.
 Peterman, David (Brian)
 Pimentel, Betsy J.
 vonLipsey, Roderick K.
 Wasserman, Elaine P.
 Witkowsky, Anne A.
 Bell, Robert G.
 Gray, Wendy E.
 Black, Steven K.
 Sutphen, Mona K.
 Hachigian, Nina L.

TEXT_BODY Colleagues --

Sandy has requested a memorandum to the President seeking his approval to make a push for CTBT ratification in 1999. Request any comments and clearance on the attached draft by noon Wednesday, January 6, as we need to move this over to Sandy no later than COB Wednesday.

Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

POTUS CTBT 1999.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Pushing CTBT Ratification in 1999

Purpose

To request your approval to mount a NAFTA-like campaign in 1999 to achieve Senate approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Background

The successful negotiation of the CTBT in 1993-1996 and its signature by 151 states since then is a legacy achievement of your Presidency, marking both a significant step back from the Cold War and a significant step forward in constraining nuclear proliferation. The Treaty cannot, however, enter into force until 44 specific countries ratify it, including the U.S., India, Pakistan, Russia and China. The fate of our efforts to: (a) secure Senate advice and consent to the CTBT; and (b) achieve the Treaty's international entry into force (EIF) will almost certainly be decided in 1999. If the U.S. does not show leadership by ratifying:

* India will almost certainly balk, frustrating our nine-month diplomatic effort to achieve Indian adherence to the CTBT and shore up the international non-proliferation regime in the destructive wake of India's nuclear tests;

* Russia and China will also hold off on ratification; and

* Pakistan will likely not take steps to adhere to CTBT ahead of either the U.S. or India.

Efforts last year. Our push to move the CTBT in 1998 built on a series of "CTBT" events - including your State of the Union appeal; the endorsement by four former Chairmen of the JCS; and your trip to Los Alamos, where all three lab directors assured you of their confidence in the stockpile stewardship program. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan provided urgency - albeit unexpected and unwelcome - to our efforts in the Senate.

On the "plus" side, our efforts helped establish strong public support for CTBT, fueled by global abhorrence of India's and Pakistan's tests. Recent polls show 75-80 percent of the American public favor ratification, and editorials across the country overwhelmingly support the Treaty.

Nonetheless, Senator Helms, with open support from Senator Lott, stonewalled hearings in his committee. Helms has repeatedly said CTBT will be held hostage to: (a) hearings on the 1997 ABM accords (which we do not intend to submit to the Senate until Russia ratifies START II), and (b) hearings on the Kyoto Treaty (which we do not intend to submit until developing states agree to some form of meaningful participation).

Game Plan for 1999. Recognizing we must assume Lott and Helms will not agree to cooperate in moving CTBT unless we are prepared to cut some sort of deal involving CTBT and a Republican legislative priority (without, of course, compromising our strong Democratic support), I believe the stakes are such that we cannot afford not to launch an all-out campaign this year to achieve Senate approval.

As a first step, I propose to announce next week in a major speech on Nonproliferation at the Carnegie Center that the Administration intends to make CTBT a top foreign policy legislative priority this year, and that we will push for early Senate hearings and a vote on the Senate floor. We would also intend to feature CTBT in your State of the Union address, and follow this up with an aggressive legislative and public affairs campaign, with full participation by all relevant Cabinet officials.

In all our representations, it will be important to emphasize the importance of achieving ratification by September 1999 so that we can positively influence both Indian and Pakistani adherence and participate in the Conference of States that have ratified CTBT that is to be held as early as next October. Unlike last year, we can fairly represent that we are facing a CTBT "deadline" of sorts (though it is not as "hard" as the deadline we faced with the CWC in our successful 1997 ratification battle). Only those states (including the U.S.) that have ratified the CTBT by October can fully participate in and vote at the crucial EIF Conference. Such a "deadline" might help light a fire under Senate Republicans who understand the connection between CTBT, India-Pak diplomacy and U.S. global leadership in the fight against nuclear proliferation.

Recognizing the difficulties, the bottom line remains that CTBT ratification remains a "win/win" issue for us - exactly the kind of business the U.S. public overwhelmingly wants to see its government conducting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve our making an all-out effort to achieve advice and consent to CTBT in 1999.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2

3

0000

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/5/99 9:00:06 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Draft Berger CTBT Memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Bob --

Attached is a draft memorandum for Sandy responding to his direction to us to "update our Cong/PA plan" in the context of moving "full speed ahead on CTBT." This is meant to "compliment" the memorandum we have drafted for Sandy to send to the President (which has now been cleared by all relevant NSC staff, and will go forward to him on Wednesday). Once I have your comments on this memo, I will send around to the usual suspects for concurrence.

Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CTBT 1999.doc

January 5, 1999: 8:45 p.m.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: CTBT: Ratification Strategy for 1999

Synopsis. The fate of our efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and achieve its international entry into force (EIF) will

almost
certainly be decided in 1999. If the U.S. does not show leadership by
ratifying,
we cannot assume other key states in the "Group of 44" (those states
that must
ratify to trigger EIF) - including India, Pakistan, Russia and China -
will
ratify.

The constants. In many respects, the arguments against and in favor of
the CTBT
have changed little over the past year:

- * Republican indifference/opposition. CTBT (unlike CWC) lacks a
modern-era
Republican lineage, complicating our efforts to secure Republican
support.

- * A focused opposition. Senator Helms, with open support from
Senator Lott (who
after India's tests termed CTBT "ineffectual and unverifiable"),
stonewalled
hearings last year in the SFRC. Gaffney's fax machine is also up and
running.

- * Difficult threshold issues. To get 67 votes, we will need to make a
convincing
case on two critical issues: stockpile stewardship and verification.
While we
have another year of successful stewardship under our belts (including
our third
annual certification by the Secretary's of Defense and Energy that the
stockpile
is safe and reliable), doubts persist as to whether we can maintain our
nuclear
deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing. Similarly, even though we
have
added funds to the FY 00 budget to shore up our CTBT monitoring
capabilities,

- some (like Lott) will charge the Treaty is not effectively verifiable.

- * Lacking a Republican champion. The only Republican Senators who
emerged as
proponents of the Treaty in 1998 were Specter and Jeffords; most
other
Republicans (including key Senators, such as McCain, Stevens,
Warner, Hagel,
Domenici, DeWine, Frist, Collins) remain - at least publicly - "on the
fence."

* Excuses for Senate delay. The Duma's failure to ratify START II precludes our sending the START/ABM "strategic package" to the Senate for approval (a prerequisite for Helms for acting on CTBT). Continued uncertainties regarding Indian (and Pakistani) adherence to CTBT (despite the positive, albeit qualified, statement by Prime Minister's Vajpayee and Sharif at the UN in September) also provides a rationale for arguing the Senate should delay action on CTBT until further progress is made with India and Pakistan.

In our favor:

* Public support. Our greatest asset remains the overwhelming public support for the test ban. Recent polls show 75-80 percent of the American people favor ratification, and editorials across the country overwhelmingly support CTBT.

* National security. The U.S. has more to gain from CTBT than any other participant state (constraining the development of more advanced nuclear weapons by the declared nuclear powers as well as other states' nuclear capabilities); the Treaty is overwhelmingly in our national security interests.

* CTBT safeguards. The President directed the implementation of focused programs on stockpile stewardship and CTBT monitoring and verification five years ago, reinforced by his August 1995 commitment to specific CTBT safeguards in these areas, as well as the Administration's August 1997 commitment to stable funding for stockpile stewardship (at \$4.5 billion per year). We expect these programs to pay dividends during ratification.

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- * The critical role played by Republicans and Democrats, as well as Congress, in promoting the negotiation of a CTBT over the past four decades.

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Concurrences by: Rudman/ Blinken/ Leavy/ Riedel/ Samore

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Gayle Smith to Gayle Smith. Subject: FW: [Africa] (3 pages)	01/06/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/29/1998-02/09/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5706

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/7/99 1:14:34 PM
FROM Riedel, Bruce O.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Draft CTBT Game Plan for Berger [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Witkowski, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY Cooper, Kathleen H.
Greer, Jason H.
Jones, Felicia A.
Malley, Robert
Marty, Joseph H.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Todd, Gwennyth E.
Williams, Mary C.

TEXT_BODY

One suggestion in red.
-----Original Message-----
From: Andreasen,
Steven P.
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 1999 1:10 PM
To: Rudman,
Mara E.; Farrar, Jay C.; Blinken, Antony J.; Leavy, David C.; Riedel,
Bruce O.; Samore, Gary S.; Tucker, Maureen E.; Crowley, Philip J.
Cc: @DEFENSE
- Defense Policy; Bell, Robert G.; Gray, Wendy E.; Black, Steven
K.; Sutphen, Mona K.; Hachigian, Nina L.
Subject: Draft CTBT Game
Plan for Berger [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Colleagues --

As promised, attached is a draft memorandum for Sandy responding to his direction to "update our Cong/PA plan" in the context of moving "full speed ahead on CTBT." This memo is meant to compliment the memo we drafted earlier in the week for Sandy to send to the POTUS (which was sent forward yesterday). Comments/clearance requested by Noon Friday, January 8: plan is to send this forward to Berger by COB Friday.

Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT 1999.doc

January 7, 1999: 1:00 p.m.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: CTBT: Ratification Strategy for 1999

Synopsis. The fate of our efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and achieve its international entry into force (EIF) will almost certainly be decided in 1999. If the U.S. does not show leadership by ratifying, we cannot assume other key states in the "Group of 44" (those states that must ratify to trigger EIF) - including India, Pakistan, Russia and China - will ratify.

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Concurrences by: Rudman/ Blinken/ Leavy/ Riedel/ Samore

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/8/99 2:07:55 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Berger CTBT Memo -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.
Blinken, Antony J.
Gray, Wendy E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Mr. Farrar (who presumably is still on the job); Mr. Blinken (who presumably is off celebrating his new job, possibly in London or Paris or Rome or Geneva); and Ms. Rudman (who presumably is on the Hill doing her job):

Have clearances from Samore, Riedel (with the addition of one sentence), Leavy and Highsmith. Still hoping to send forward with your clearances by end of day today ...

Thanks:
Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CTBT 1999.doc

January 8, 1999: 2:00 p.m.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

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Concurrences by: Farrar/Blinken/Leavy/Riedel/Samore/Highsmith

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/19/99 3:08:01 PM

FROM Andreasen, Steven P.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Draft Defense Writers Questions [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Barnett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Weiss, Andrew S.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
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Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Witkowski, Anne A.
Greer, Jason H.

TEXT_BODY Colleagues --

Attached as per P.J.'s request are draft Defense Writers Q/A's on NMD, CTBT and START, incorporating material from Jay Greer on CTBT. Please take time for a quick look, before I send P.J. a final ...

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Defense Writers NMD, CTBT and START.doc

Defense Writers Q/A - NMD, CTBT and START

NMD

Was the President prepared to announce a decision to begin funding the first parts of a deployed NMD system in the State of the Union, and that Russian delay in ratifying START II led to a decision to delay this announcement? Why did he back off doing that?

* No, the President was not prepared to announce a decision to begin funding the "first parts" of a deployed NMD. We have not yet made a decision on whether to deploy such a system.

* We did announce earlier this month that we have decided to include funds in the Pentagon's next 6-year budget that would be necessary should we later decide to deploy a limited NMD system; however, none of these "deployment dollars" are in Fiscal Year 2000.

How mature is the technology?

* Very difficult to generalize, as there are a number of technologies involved. Moreover, it is not just a question of individual technologies, but system integration.

* But, it is fair to say that DOD continues to assess our NMD program as "high risk." We should not underestimate the challenge.

Since you have slipped fielding the system by two years, why do you think you can still make an operational decision in the summer of 2000?

* At this point in time, we expect to conclude the necessary tests to inform a decision on deployment sometime in the year 2000. If the test program slips, we might have to slip the deployment decision: but we are not assuming failure.

Do you think the threat is now there to justify the fielding of a limited NMD system? If so, then are you not committed to the fielding of a limited NMD? It is no longer a question of if, but when, right?

* Given the evolution of the threat from rogue state ballistic missile programs, we now expect a deployment decision to be based largely on issues associated with technical feasibility and affordability.

* We will not make a decision on deployment until the year 2000, at the earliest, after we have concluded a number of tests and examined various deployment architectures.

* While it is too simplistic to assert that NMD deployment is simply a question of "when, not if?", it is clear the threat is evolving in a way that gives added urgency to our NMD program.

CTBT

Will India and Pakistan sign the CTBT this year?

* During the UN General Assembly session last September, both Prime Minister Vajpayee of India and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan expressed their intention to adhere the CTBT by September of this year.

* While both commitments were somewhat qualified, we are cautiously optimistic both will sign by September.

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* We will obviously need to work closely with Senator Lott, Senator Helms, and others to ensure that this Treaty gets a fair hearing in the full Senate this year, and we intend to do that.

Will the President visit South Asia this year?

- * The President has long wanted to visit South Asia -- a region not visited by a U.S. President since the late 1970s.

- * The visit scheduled for last November was postponed due to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests last May.

- * The President hopes that sufficient progress will be made with regard to our non-proliferation agenda to permit him to visit South Asia later this year.

START

Will the Duma ratify START II? If not, will you reduce below the START I levels anyway?

- * There is no question that START II ratification, as well as START III, is in Russia's interest, as well as our own, and for this reason we think Russia may yet move forward with ratification.

- * In the context of preparing its FY 00 budget, the Administration has been carefully reviewing both the costs and the policy implications of continuing to add funds to the Defense budget to sustain the START I strategic force posture. Final decisions have not, however, been made.

- * Once the FY 00 budget is finalized and submitted to Congress in a few weeks we will consult closely with Members on this issue.

Are you willing to consider some form of unilateral de-alerting?

- * It is important to remember that both the United States and Russia have already removed thousands of warheads from systems that are being eliminated under START I, and have already committed to discuss removing thousands more from systems that will be eliminated under START II once that Treaty has been approved by the

Duma.

* We are also moving directly to address the danger of accidental or unauthorized launch through the shared early warning initiative agreed to by President's Clinton and Yeltsin this past September.

* In general, however, our preference remains to coordinate our actions in this vital area with the Russian government.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/19/99 5:11:51 PM
FROM Weiss, Andrew S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Revised Defense Writers Questions [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Barnett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Weiss, Andrew S.

TEXT_BODY One small change to START II question.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P.

Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 1999 5:09 PM

To: @PRESS -
Public Affairs

Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;
Greer, Jason H.

Subject: Revised Defense Writers Questions [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

P.J.

--

Includes comments by Bell and clearance from Greer. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Defense Writers NMD, CTBT and START.doc
Defense Writers Q/A - NMD, CTBT and START

NMD

Was the President prepared, as has been reported, to announce a decision to deploy a U.S. NMD system in the State of the Union before the latest Russian delay in ratifying START II led to a decision to can that announcement? Why did he back off doing that?

* No. The President never intended to announce a decision to deploy an NMD in the State of the Union because we have not yet made a decision on whether to deploy such a system, and will not address such a decision before the Summer of 2000.

* We did announce earlier this month that we have decided to include funds in the Pentagon's next 6-year budget that would be necessary should we later decide to deploy a limited NMD system; however, none of these "deployment dollars" are in Fiscal Year 2000.

How mature is the technology?

* Very difficult to generalize, as there are a number of technologies involved and most of the key flight tests still lie ahead. Moreover, it is not just a question of individual technologies, but system integration.

* But, it is fair to say that DOD, as well as outside experts, continue to assess our NMD program as "high risk." We should not underestimate the

challenge.

Since you have slipped fielding the system by two years to 2005, why do you think you can still make an operational decision in the summer of 2000?

* We hope to conclude the necessary tests to inform a first decision checkpoint on deployment in the summer of 2000. If the test program slips, or there are key test failures, we might have to slip the deployment decision: but we are not assuming failure.

Do you think the threat is now there to justify the fielding of a limited NMD system? If so, then are you not committed to the fielding of a limited NMD? It is no longer a question of if, but when, right?

* Given the recent evolution of the threat from rogue state ballistic missile programs, we now expect a deployment decision to be based largely on issues associated with technical feasibility and affordability.

* We will not make a decision on deployment until the year 2000, at the earliest, after we have concluded a number of tests and examined various deployment architectures.

* While it is too simplistic to assert that NMD deployment is simply a question of "when, not if?", it is clear the threat is evolving in a way that gives added urgency to our NMD program.

* However urgent the threat is assessed to be in 2000, though, it would do us no good to respond by deploying an NMD that has yet to demonstrate it will work.

CTBT

Will India and Pakistan sign the CTBT this year?

* During the UN General Assembly session last September, both Prime Minister Vajpayee of India and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan expressed

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START

Will the Duma ratify START II? If not, will you reduce below the START I levels anyway?

* There is no question that START II ratification, as well as START III, is in Russia's interest, as well as our own. Important that Yeltsin government moves promptly to secure approval by the Duma.

* In the context of preparing its FY 00 budget, the Administration has been carefully reviewing both the costs and the policy implications of

continuing to
add funds to the Defense budget to sustain the START I strategic
force posture.
Final decisions have not, however, been made.

* Once the FY 00 budget is finalized and submitted to Congress in a
few weeks we
will consult closely with Members on this issue.

Are you willing to consider some form of unilateral de-alerting?

* It is important to remember that both the United States and Russia
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President's
Clinton and Yeltsin this past September.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/19/99 5:37:21 PM
FROM Pascual, Carlos E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Revised Defense Writers Questions [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Witkowski, Anne A.
Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY Barnett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Weiss, Andrew S.

TEXT_BODY good package; on START question, should say "Russian government"
instead of "Yeltsin government"

-----Original Message-----

From: Weiss,
Andrew S.

Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 1999 5:12 PM

To: @PRESS -

Public Affairs; Andreasen, Steven P.

Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy;

@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine

Subject: FW: Revised Defense Writers Questions

[UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

One small change to START II question.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven

P.

Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 1999 5:09 PM

To: @PRESS - Public

Affairs

Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; Greer, Jason H.

Subject: Revised Defense Writers Questions [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

P.J.

--

Includes comments by Bell and clearance from Greer. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Defense Writers NMD, CTBT and START.doc
Defense Writers Q/A - NMD, CTBT and START

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deploy a limited NMD system; however, none of these "deployment
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our NMD program as "high risk." We should not underestimate the
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you can still make an operational decision in the summer of 2000?

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/19/99 8:07:40 PM

FROM Andreassen, Steven P.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Final Defense Writers [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY Andreassen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
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Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Weiss, Andrew S.
Greer, Jason H.

TEXT_BODY P.J. --

Includes comments from Russia. Over to you. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Defense Writers NMD, CTBT and START.doc
Defense Writers Q/A - NMD, CTBT and START

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/22/99 10:16:28 AM
FROM Bouchard, Joseph F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Helms Speaks ABM and "Other Treaties" [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Peterman, David (Brian)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Yup. I think when I turned LOS over to you I predicted 1999 would not be a good year for LOS. It's turning out to be even worse than I thought.

Joe Bouchard

-----Original Message-----

From: Peterman,
David (Brian)
Sent: Friday, January 22, 1999 10:11 AM
To: Bouchard,
Joseph F.
Subject: RE: Helms Speaks ABM and "Other Treaties" [UNCLASSIFIED]

My
first thought exactly. I just read the article, hoping there might be a different interpretation. There isn't. I'm about to call Tucker Sculley to ensure they've seen the article. I'm afraid LOS strategy for this year (Congress?) will be to maintain status quo.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Bouchard, Joseph F.
Sent: Friday, January 22,
1999 10:05 AM
To: Peterman, David (Brian)
Subject: FW: Helms Speaks
ABM and "Other Treaties" [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

You
can kiss LOS goodbye.

Joe Bouchard

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.

Sent: Friday, January 22, 1999 9:46 AM

To: Bell, Robert

G.; Rudman, Mara E.; Farrar, Jay C.; Leavy, David C.; Crowley, Philip
J.; Gobush, Matthew N.

Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy

Subject: Helms

Speaks ABM and "Other Treaties" [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Colleagues

--

In case you missed it, Senator Helms has a letter today in the Wall Street Journal, under the title "Amend the ABM Treaty? No, Scrap It." Fast forwarding to the final three paragraphs, the Senator says: (1) He is setting a June 1 "deadline" for the president to submit the ABM protocols to the Senate; (2) In the meantime, he will begin "ratification hearings" on the Treaty "shortly," so that the Committee will be ready to vote and report "the treaty" to the full Senate by June 1; (3) Not until the Administration submits the ABM protocols -- and the Kyoto treaty -- and the Senate has completed its consideration of them, will the Foreign Relations Committee turn its attention to "other treaties" on the President's agenda ("The President must submit all of them, or we will consider none of them.").

Steve

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/27/99 12:54:35 PM
FROM Lieberthal, Kenneth C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: POTUS reply to letter from Senator Helms on Taiwan
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bader, Jeffrey A.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Jeff,

Just a correction of a typo in the 3rd file. Otherwise,
looks fine.

Ken

-----Original Message-----

From: Bader,

Jeffrey A.

Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 1999 11:14 AM

To: @INTECON

- Economic Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; Baker, James E.; Lee,

Malcolm R.

Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs

Subject: POTUS reply to letter

from Senator Helms on Taiwan [UNCLASSIFIED]

Jamie, Malcolm,

Appreciate

your clearance on a letter from POTUS to Senator Helms on Taiwan's
participation in international organizations. It's been run by State,
inc. Legal Advisor's office, and Treasury. Reply due today, so
welcome

your looking at it as soon as convenient.

If you need to see the
package, Karen Heitkotter in our office has a copy and can make
available.

Thanks,

Jeff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 0231 Helmsltr.doc
Dear Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate your January 8 letter asking for more information on my administration's attitude toward Taiwan membership in international organizations.

In the Taiwan policy review my administration undertook in 1994, we concluded the United States should support Taiwan's participation in international organizations where statehood is not a requirement. We also concluded we would support appropriate ways for Taiwan's voice to be heard in organizations requiring statehood for membership where we could not support actual membership.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most important example of an organization that does not require statehood for membership and where we support Taiwan's entry. Last year, we concluded our bilateral market access agreement for Taiwan's WTO accession, and we are actively working with Taiwan to resolve outstanding multilateral issues. We believe Taiwan's accession should be judged on its own merits, without linkage to the PRC's accession. The Semiconductor Council and the Global Governmental Forum, groupings of semiconductor producers, are two other organizations not requiring statehood for membership in which we successfully supported Taiwan's active participation.

Within organizations requiring statehood for membership, we have supported appropriate participation by Taiwan. For example, we believe Taiwan should be allowed to participate as an observer in the OECD's Competition Policy and Law Committee and are working to achieve a consensus toward that end. We have sponsored U.S.-based Taiwan private sector representatives to attend

the
IMF/World Bank annual meeting in Washington. Members of a
Taiwan NGO can
participate on a delegation of an international NGO in activities of the
World
Health Organization.

We consult frequently with Taiwan about the most effective way to
facilitate
Taiwan's membership or participation in international organizations
and work with
Taiwan wherever we can be effective. Changing the charters of
organizations to
permit Taiwan's membership is not a feasible course where statehood
is a
prerequisite for membership. I do not foresee the possibility of
garnering the
necessary international support to effect such changes. We do,
however, urge the
PRC to be more receptive to Taiwan's participation in international
organizations. The state of cross-Strait relations is likely to continue
to be a
decisive factor in affecting PRC attitudes.

My Administration looks forward to continuing to work with you and
with Taiwan to
expand its participation in international organizations.

Sincerely,

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 0231 Helmsltrjbsrb.doc

January 27, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL

FROM: JEFFREY A. BADER

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Helms on Taiwan

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President covering a reply to a letter from Senator Helms on Taiwan's participation in international organizations.

Concurrence: Jamie Baker, Malcolm Lee

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Senator Helms

Tab B January 8, 1999 Letter from Senator Helms

Tab C September 16, 1998 Letter from the President to Senator Helms

Tab D July 23, 1998 Letter from Senator Helms

1

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 0231 Helmsltrsrbpotus.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Senator Helms on Taiwan
Participation in
International Organizations

Purpose

Answer a letter from Senator Helms on Taiwan participation in international organizations.

Background

You wrote a detailed letter to Senator Helms on September 16 answering a number of questions he had posed to you in a July 23 letter on our Taiwan policy (letters attached at Tabs C and D). Now Senator Helms has written again seeking greater detail on administration policy toward Taiwan's participation in international organizations.

The reply at Tab A describes our support for Taiwan membership in organizations like the WTO and Semiconductor Council where the rules of the organizations permit membership, and our support for Taiwan participation short of membership in other organizations like the OECD, IMF/World Bank, and WHO.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Senator Helms

Tab B January 8, 1999 letter from Senator Helms

Tab C September 16, 1998 letter to Senator Helms

Tab D July 23, 1998 letter from Senator Helms

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/27/99 2:40:04 PM

FROM Baker, James E.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT RE: POTUS reply to letter from Senator Helms on Taiwan [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bader, Jeffrey A.
Hammonds, D. Holly
Hendricks, Lori A.
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Lee, Malcolm R.
McNamer, Bruce
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Krass, Caroline D.
Lee, Malcolm R.

CARBON_COPY Arvizu, Alexander A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Heitkotter, Karen R.
Lieberthal, Kenneth C.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.

TEXT_BODY I clear. Note typo (double words) in 2d para. of POTUS memo. Support for x 2.

-----Original Message-----
From: Bader, Jeffrey A.

Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 1999 11:14 AM
To: @INTECON - Economic
Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; Baker, James E.; Lee, Malcolm R.
Cc: @ASIA
- Asian Affairs
Subject: POTUS reply to letter from Senator Helms
on Taiwan [UNCLASSIFIED]

Jamie, Malcolm,

Appreciate your clearance

on a letter from POTUS to Senator Helms on Taiwan's participation in international organizations. It's been run by State, inc. Legal Advisor's office, and Treasury. Reply due today, so welcome your looking at it as soon as convenient.

If you need to see the package,
Karen Heitkotter in our office has a copy and can make available.

Thanks,

Jeff

<< File: 0231 Helmsltr.doc >> << File: 0231 Helmsltrjbsrb.doc >>
<< File: 0231 Helmsltrsrbspotus.doc >>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/27/99 8:40:13 PM
FROM Lackey, Miles M.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: POTUS reply to letter from Senator Helms on Taiwan [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bader, Jeffrey A.
Hammonds, D. Holly
Hendricks, Lori A.
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Lee, Malcolm R.
McNamer, Bruce
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Rudman, Mara E.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Lackey, Miles M.
Rudman, Mara E.
Tavlarides, Mark J.

CARBON_COPY Arvizu, Alexander A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Heitkotter, Karen R.
Lieberthal, Kenneth C.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.

TEXT_BODY clear for legislat -- replace Mara's name with mine on clearance
line please.
thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: Bader,
Jeffrey A.
Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 1999 5:51 PM
To: @INTECON
- Economic Affairs; Rudman, Mara E.; Lee, Malcolm R.; @LEGISLAT -
Legislative Affairs
Cc: @ASIA - Asian Affairs
Subject: FW: POTUS
reply to letter from Senator Helms on Taiwan [UNCLASSIFIED]

Mara,

Malcolm,

Minor change in letter to Helms (last sentence of para 3), and corrected oversight of failing to list Legislative on concurrence line of memo to SRB (see versions immediately below). Welcome your clearances.

Thanks,

Jeff

<< File: 0231 Helmsltr.doc >>

<< File: 0231 Helmsltrjbsrb.doc >> << File: 0231 Helmsltrsrbspotus.doc >>

-----Original Message-----

From: Bader, Jeffrey A.

Sent: Wednesday,

January 27, 1999 11:14 AM

To: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @LEGAL

- Legal Advisor; Baker, James E.; Lee, Malcolm R.

Cc: @ASIA - Asian

Affairs

Subject: POTUS reply to letter from Senator Helms on Taiwan
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Jamie, Malcolm,

Appreciate your clearance on a letter from POTUS to Senator Helms on Taiwan's participation in international organizations. It's been run by State, inc. Legal Advisor's office, and Treasury. Reply due today, so welcome your looking at it as soon as convenient.

If you need to see the package,
Karen Heitkotter in our office has a copy and can make available.

Thanks,

Jeff

<< File: 0231 Helmsltr.doc >> << File: 0231 Helmsltrjbsrb.doc >>

<< File: 0231 Helmsltrsrbspotus.doc >>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/3/99 9:01:21 PM
FROM Sutphen, Mona K.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: NMD, ABM and CTBT Points for Berger-Biden Mtg. [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Lackey, Miles M.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

i'll get these into the package tomorrow. m

-----Original Message-----

From: Lackey,
Miles M.

Sent: Wednesday, February 03, 1999 8:52 PM

To: Sutphen,
Mona K.

Subject: FW: NMD, ABM and CTBT Points for Berger-Biden Mtg.
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

hope this is not too late. It's
one paper for both issues on your list.

NMD, ABM and CTBT

Background

As per your discussion with Daschle et al Wednesday evening, we have prepared a letter for you to Warner and Levin in advance of Thursday's SFRC mark-up of the Cochran bill. For purposes of this meeting, we would recommend you simply give Biden a copy of the letter and take him through it.

With respect to CTBT, Senator Biden has stated that CTBT is a top foreign policy goal for this session. Unfortunately, Senator Helms has already dug himself in against any action on CTBT prior to Senate consideration of the ABM accords and Kyoto protocol -- neither of which we are likely to submit to the Senate this year (unless the Duma unexpectedly acts on START II). A key objective for your meeting is to get Biden's sense as to how best to proceed in light of Helms' refusal to schedule CTBT hearings.

Points to be Made

NMD/ABM

- * Appreciate

your strong support on Cochran. We will work hard between now and a vote on the Senate floor to hold 41 Democrats. My letter to Warner and Levin today is a key part of that effort. [Hand over letter.]

- * We are working hard within the Administration to identify what the real choices are for NMD deployment, and what that means for the ABM Treaty. We want to keep in close touch with you on these issues.

- * We have not made any determinations on what amendments may be required. That will probably require a few more months of analysis.

- * If we do get into ABM amendment negotiations with Russia this summer, your help in generating Congressional support for this effort will be crucial, especially in light of Senator Helms' boast that negotiations will not take place "on his watch."

- * Do

you think we have a chance of securing bipartisan support for negotiations? What advice would you give us in terms of generating such support?

CTBT

- * The President has approved an all-out effort to get CTBT ratified this year. Glad to hear that you mentioned CTBT as one of your top priorities. We will want to work closely with you and your staff to get this done.

- * Disappointing -- but not unexpected -- that Senator Helms has already taken a hard line, demanding the ABM agreements and Kyoto prior to any consideration of CTBT.

- * Given we do not want a debate on the ABM accords to precede START II ratification in Russia, and that START II's fate is highly uncertain, I suspect we will need to work with Senate Democrats to identify possible "trades" and/or "hostages" that involve CTBT and a Republican legislative priority.

- * Do you share our view there is little chance of changing Jesse's mind on scheduling CTBT hearings

in the absence of our submitting the ABM accords?

* What is your advice as to how to procede, given the current impasse? Do you believe Secretary Albright should engage Senator Helms now? What are the legislative priorities you believe the Republicans might be prepared to "deal" on in exchange for a vote on CTBT before September?

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/9/99 2:29:39 PM
FROM Wasserman, Elaine P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Legislative Priorities [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.

CARBON_COPY Kelly, Sandra L.

TEXT_BODY

Attached are the staff's contributions to above subject for your review in the following order: Rod, Brian, Anne and Steve

Bob -- for your review, paragraphs on: (1) Development of Missile Defense Systems, (2) advice and consent for CTBT. Follows the Rice formula, i.e., "describe the priority, explain why it is important, and why it is on the list (i.e., what are the legislative issues)."
Steve

Development of Missile Defense Systems. The Administration's FY 2000-2006 budget requests [_.] billion dollars for both theater and strategic missile defense. The issue of National Missile Defense (NMD) may be the most visible and contentious defense policy issue during this legislative session, where Congressional Republicans in both the Senate and House are pressing legislation that would state it is U.S. policy to deploy an NMD system (as opposed to the Administration's approach, which defers to the year 2000 a decision on deployment while at the same time including funding for possible deployment in the FYDP). Congress may also attempt to "reprioritize"

funding within both theater and national missile defense programs in ways we would find objectionable.

Advice and consent
for CTB. On January 11, the President approved a Berger-Stein recommendation to make "an all-out effort to achieve advice and consent to CTBT in 1999," and in the SOU, asked the Senate to approve the Treaty now. The CTBT is a cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime

and underpins our efforts to reduce tensions in South Asia following last year's nuclear tests by India and Pakistan; it is also a legacy

achievement of this President. Helms has indicated he will not hold hearings on CTBT until the Administration submits and the Senate has acted on the 1997 ABM agreements (which we will not do unless the Duma ratifies START II), while Biden has said CTBT is his highest legislative priority. Intensive Administration effort required to move Treaty before September.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Priority_.doc
Priority

Defense Spending Increase

Importance

The President's FY2000 budget submitted to Congress on 1 February provides an increase of over \$12 billion for defense readiness and modernization through a combination of new spending and budgetary savings. It is the start of a six-year effort that will represent the first long-term sustained increase in defense spending in a decade, and amounts to approximately \$112 Billion across the FYDP.

The President remains committed to military readiness, and in his first Radio Address of 1999 he stated that, "We want our Armed Forces to remain ready to deploy rapidly in any crisis, and that is what this effort will assure, by funding joint exercises, flight training, badly needed spare parts, and recruiting for critical positions. We want our forces to remain the best equipped in the world into the next century, and that is what this effort will assure, by paying for the next generation of ships, planes, and weapons systems. It will also enable our military to play its part in meeting emerging threats to our security such as terrorism and proliferation."

The President's budget submission represents a prudent approach to military spending increases that balances overall budgetary priorities with national defense and military readiness.

Legislative Issues

We should encourage the Congress to support the President's defense spending plan, limit unnecessary procurement add-ons, and approve an additional two rounds of Base Closure.

Priority

Improve Military Pay and Benefits

Importance

The President's FY2000 Budget Proposal includes a military pay raise of 4.4 percent, the largest since 1982; a major proposal for restructuring the pay system to reward performance; and the reinstatement of military retirement benefits that were taken away over a decade ago. This package equates to an additional \$20 Billion in personnel compensation initiatives compared to the original FY2000 budget planning guidance.

During the State of the Union Address, the POTUS said that, "America's defenders today still stand ready at a moment's notice to go where comforts are few and dangers are many, to do what needs to be done as no one else can. They always come through for America. We must come through for them." He has done so by proposing FY2000 personnel program initiatives that not only do this, but ensure the long-term solvency of Social Security and Medicare trust funds, protecting the retirement incomes of all Americans, including those in the Armed Forces.

Legislative Issues

The Senate has proposed a competing plan in S. 4, "The Soldiers, Sailors and Airman Bill of Rights Act of 1999." However, S. 4 would spend \$10.8 billion over the next 6 years in excess of the Balanced Budget Agreement caps and the President's Budget proposal. This constitutes a potential drain on other defense programs, by undermining the Administration budget proposal's balance of critical readiness needs, weapons modernization and a military compensation plan that is generous, appropriate and provides the right balance of improvements and enhancements.

Priority

Two Additional Rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)

Importance

The April 1998 "Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure" states that BRAC savings are critical to meeting the DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review strategy. The first four BRAC rounds will save the Defense Department approximately \$25 Billion dollars by the year 2003, with an annual recurring savings of over \$5 Billion every year thereafter. Two additional rounds of BRAC could save the Defense Department more than \$20 Billion between the years 2008 and 2015 and \$3 Billion per year thereafter. Each year delay, then, costs the U.S. taxpayer billions of dollars in support of unnecessary and expensive base infrastructure.

The BRAC process is a proven, effective and fair tool for reducing excess capacity and making the difficult decisions that impact the Congress and local communities. In fact, both the Defense Department and the General Accounting Office have shown that the impact of base closure on local communities is far less disruptive - and the economic recovery much better - than even the BRAC commission's projections during base closure testimony.

Legislative Issues

We should seek to develop Senate support for two additional rounds of BRAC.

3

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

LOS Priority.doc
Legislative Priorities - Law of the Sea

Priority

Obtain Senate advice and consent to accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and ratification of the agreement on Part XI by November 1999. Not to interfere with ratification of CTBT, Biological Weapons Protocol, Kyoto, or CFE adaptation.

Importance

PDD-36 set ratification as the Administration's top ocean policy priority. In his National Oceans Conference speech on June 12, 1998, POTUS stated, "This year, during this legislative session, the United States Senate should, and must, confirm its leadership role by making America a part of the community of nations already party to the Convention on the Law of the Sea." Senator Helms refused to hold SFRC hearings on the Convention and it remains unratified.

Legislative Issues

Despite aggressive encouragement from the Administration and bipartisan support in the Senate, Senator Helms remains the major obstacle to ratification. To achieve the President's objectives, we should continue our carefully measured campaign on the Senate, coordinated by the Sub-Group on Ocean Policy, to ratify the Convention without jeopardizing ratification of higher priority treaties.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Priority2.doc
Priority

Conclude Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty adaptation by the November, 1999 OSCE summit.

Importance

Signature of a successfully adapted CFE treaty would be a centerpiece of the 1999 OSCE summit and fulfill goal POTUS established last fall.

Legislative Issues

Need to develop Senate support for the adapted treaty as it nears completion, so that we have a foundation for successful ratification in the year 2000.