

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Sandra Kristoff to Jeffery Bader. Subject: What's been happening in Tibet. (3 pages)	05/11/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Marilyn Scott-Perez to Jeffery Bader, Glyn Davies, Donna Dejban et al. Subject: RE: What's been happening in Tibet. (4 pages)	05/25/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[04/23/1998-07/09/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5704

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/23/98 3:06:28 PM
FROM Kristoff, Sandra J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Urgent Helms Reply [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Albert, Ronda A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Gagnon, James M.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.

TEXT_BODY

steven--without seeing the incoming can't be sure but suspect this is helms worrying about taiwan -- maybe japan. the reply could answer the complaint directly -- our consideration of tmd deployment will be based on our assessment of u.s. interests, those of our allies. improvement in relations with china will not take place at expense of our security obligations or interests. at same time, stable u.s.-china relations vital to stability of region and highly valued by our friends and allies like taiwan and japan. i don't think a generic reply will get by the front office in the run up to the china trip. give a call if you want to discuss further. sjk

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P.
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 1998 2:53 PM
To: @DEFENSE
- Defense Policy; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @ASIA - Asian

Affairs
Cc: Darnes, Victoria J.; Ficklin, John W.
Subject: Urgent
Helms Reply [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Colleagues:

Attached
is a package responding to Senator Helms' recent letter to POTUS regarding TMD in Asia, where he charges that State and Defense are

reviewing a proposal to restrict deployment of U.S. TMD in the region for fear such a move "could anger China." You will note that the response I have drafted in this regard is generic: if someone believes we should take this on more directly, feel free to suggest such a response. [FYI -- I am not familiar with any such review underway in State or Defense]. Comments requested today by 4:00, if at all possible.

Thanks. Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2540 mtb.doc

April 23, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Helms on TMD in Asia

Attached is a response from the President to a letter from Senator Helms on theater missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific region.

Concurrence by: Farrar Pritchard

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letters to Senators

Tab B Letter from Senators

1

2540

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2540mtp.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Helms on TMD in Asia

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Senator Helms regarding theater missile defense (TMD) in the Asia-Pacific region.

Background

Senator Helms and eleven Republican Senators have written you expressing concern that the Administration is reviewing whether to deploy TMD in the Asia-Pacific region in light of Chinese concerns. The response from you highlights the role of ballistic missile defense in our broader defense strategy, and restates our commitment to protect the United States, its forces abroad, and its friends and allies against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Senators

Tab B Letter from Senator Helms et al.

1

2540

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2540 ltr.doc

[Date]

Dear Senator [Helms et al]:

Thank you for your letter regarding theater missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific region.

As Secretary of Defense Cohen stated in his Annual report to me and the Congress, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the missiles that can deliver them pose a major threat to the security of the United States' forces, its allies, and friendly nations. Robust missile defense programs play a critical role in our broader strategy to prevent, reduce, deter and defend against NBC and missile threats.

The U.S. missile defense program places the highest priority on Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) and Cruise Missile Defense programs to meet today's threat. As part of broader efforts to enhance the security of U.S., allied, and coalition forces against ballistic missile strikes and to complement U.S. counterproliferation strategy, the United States is exploring opportunities for TBMD cooperation with its allies and friends. The objectives of U.S. cooperative efforts are to strengthen U.S. security relationships; enhance U.S. counterproliferation strategy; share the burden of developing and fielding defenses; enhance interoperability between U.S. forces and those of allies and

friends; and share knowledge for the mutual benefit of both the United States and its partners.

The Administration is committed to protecting the United States, its forces abroad, and its friends and allies against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them. The United States has a comprehensive strategy for countering such threats. The structure of the missile defense program meets present and possible future missile threats, provides the best technology to meet these threats, and is fiscally prudent.

I appreciate hearing your views on this matter.

Sincerely,

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/23/98 3:20:35 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Revised Helms Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Andreassen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Seaton, James B.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Albert, Ronda A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Gagnon, James M.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Colleagues --

At the suggestion of Ms. Kristoff, I've redone the POTUS response to Helms to more directly address the charge we are bending U.S. deployments out of fear of the reaction of China. Comments, please. Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

2540 ltr.doc

[Second Draft]

Dear Senator [Helms et al]:

Thank you for your letter regarding theater missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific region.

As Secretary of Defense Cohen stated in his Annual report to me and the Congress, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the missiles that can deliver them pose a major threat to the security of the United States' forces, its allies, and friendly nations. Robust missile defense programs play a critical role in our broader strategy to prevent, reduce, deter and defend against NBC and missile threats.

With respect to deployment of theater missile defense systems in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. deployments will be based on our assessment of the threat to U.S. interests and to U.S. friends and allies. Improvement in relations with China will not take place at the expense of these interests. At the same time, stable U.S.-China relations are vital to stability in the region, and are highly valued by our friends and allies like Taiwan and Japan.

I appreciate hearing your views on this matter.

Sincerely,

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/28/98 3:14:49 PM
FROM Maxfield, Nancy H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bandler, Donald K.
Braden, Susan R.
Brown, Keirn C.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Covey, James P.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY****TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**

talking points for call to helms.doc
TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO
SENATOR HELMS

* I am calling you because I am worried about the amendment that Senator Stevens is planning to table to unilaterally reduce the U.S. contribution to the NATO common-funded budgets from the current level to 20%. Quite frankly, the President and I cannot accept this amendment and I'd like to explain why.

* Throughout this entire debate you and I have been in agreement that we must do everything we can to keep NATO a strong military Alliance.

* This amendment will weaken NATO. It is nothing less than unilateral disarmament. And it will invite our European allies to do the same

and reduce
their shares.

* We are running the risk that the end result will be a militarily hollow NATO --
exactly what you and I have been working to avoid.

* I understand that Senator Stevens is worried about Asia and is concerned that
we might be diverting resources away from that part of the world. I understand
his concerns about China. That is why I am here.

* But this is not the way to address burden-sharing concerns.
Weakening NATO
will not help us in Asia. On the contrary, it will only send the signal
that we
are not prepared to live up to our international commitments. Quite
frankly, I
am worried that it makes us look irresponsible.

* My team has been working with your staff and Senator Stevens'
staff to come up
with a workable compromise that would acknowledge that our
proportional share
will go down as new members enter the Alliance.

* I'd like to urge you to reconsider your support for this amendment
and work
with me to find language that we can all live with.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/29/98 6:57:07 PM
FROM Snyder, Julie A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Scanned document [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Blinken, Antony J.
Gray, Wendy E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

scan.doc
Remarks by President William Jefferson Clinton
On Senate Approval of NATO Enlargement

A few minutes ago the Senate voted by an overwhelming margin to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. I just called Majority Leader Lott and Minority Leader Daschle to congratulate them for their bipartisan leadership and the thorough way in which the Senate addressed this important issue.

Today's vote is a milestone on the road to an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. The addition of these three democracies to NATO will expand the zone of stability in Europe and reduce the chances American men and women will ever again be called into Europe's fields of battle. The message this vote sends is clear: American support for NATO is firm, our leadership for security on both sides of the Atlantic is strong, and the foundation for an active U.S. role in the world is and can still be bipartisan.

The Senate's vote builds on the numberless acts of courage that toppled the Berlin Wall and ended the Cold War. It redeems the sacrifices made by those who

raised freedom's banner in Budapest in 1956, in Prague in 1968, and in Gdansk in 1980. It honors the rebellion of conscience begun by such heroes as Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel. The Senate's action validates the selfless investment of blood and treasure that the American people made in European freedom over the course of this troubled century.

Tonight I want to acknowledge the indispensable efforts of the many leaders from both parties who brought us to this milestone. This vote stands in the tradition of George Marshall, Dean Acheson and Arthur Vandenberg and the other giants who picked up the pieces after World War II and were present at NATO's creation. Their lesson then is our lesson tonight -- that strength lies in a foreign policy that rises above our partisan differences and is guided instead by the interests and values that unite us as Americans.

I especially want to thank Presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush, and all the others who held this office during the Cold War, from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan, upon whose shoulders tonight's victory stands. I appreciate the leadership in the Senate of the Majority and Minority Leader, of the Chairman and Ranking Democrat of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms and Senator Biden, and the Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer Group, Senator Roth. I also appreciate all those in the House of Representatives, including Speaker Gingrich, Mr. Gilman, and Mr. Hamilton, who have helped advance this effort. And I

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 5/18/98 4:05:57 PM
FROM Farrar, Jay C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: SRB paper for ICC PC [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Busby, Scott W.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Wechsler, William F.
Bobbitt, Philip C.

CARBON_COPY Schwartz, Eric P.
Baker, James E.

TEXT_BODY Legislative Affairs Input : An ICC proposal that does not contain a UNSC veto provision will be unacceptable to the Senate. At this point, such a provision is the only safeguard clearly understood by the Senate to give the US the necessary protections. If we do not obtain a Treaty with additional safeguards against unwarranted prosecutions, or investigations, the Administration will be widely criticized, for having unnecessarily placed Americans at risk. Moreover, signing a "flawed" Treaty and delaying ratification is not a particularly good option - as the Senate could exact a "measurable price" for Administration delay on submitting the Treaty for advice and consent. Senator Helms has stated his position that US personnel will not be subjected to action by an international judicial body that can prosecute US citizens, without a "failsafe" protection mechanism.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Busby, Scott W.

Sent: Monday, May 18, 1998

2:06 PM

To: Bouchard, Joseph F.; Wechsler, William F.; Bobbitt,
Philip C.; Farrar, Jay C.

Cc: Schwartz, Eric P.; Baker, James E.

Subject: SRB

paper for ICC PC [UNCLASSIFIED]

Eric and Jamie are currently working on the briefer for SRB on the ICC PC. Still too much in draft to be sent around for your concurrences but it will be shared with you before the day is out. Final draft will be sent to SRB in the morning.

Briefer

will include an attachment with the views of each relevant directorate. In the interest of having the whole memo ready by the morning, Eric has asked that each of you get to him by the end of the afternoon (5 p.m.) a summary (no more than half a page) of your directorate's views on the two major issues in the discussion paper: (1) role of UNSC and (2) how to avoid unjustified, undesirable prosecutions. You may join forces if you would like in presenting your views (i.e., sign onto the same statement).

Call us if you have questions.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/15/98 11:19:59 AM
FROM Busby, Scott W.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT International Criminal Court press guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Orfini, Michael H.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

FYI.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

ICC guidance.doc
International Criminal Court
June 15, 1998

Background: The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court will take place in Rome from June 15 to July 17. The Clinton Administration supports the creation of a strong and effective Court. We believe that countries should bring to justice those who commit genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, or turn suspects over to institutions who will, such as an impartial ICC. However, we need to design a document that reflects a variety of U.S. concerns, including the role of the Security Council, deferral to capable national legal systems, jurisdiction, elements of offenses, rules of evidence and criminal procedure. We remain hopeful that governments will resolve differences and that the conference will produce a treaty that the international community, including the United States, can embrace.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the establishment of an International Criminal

Court (ICC)?

(Note to briefer: On several occasions, most recently in Rwanda and last year before the General Assembly, President Clinton has reaffirmed his commitment to the creation of a criminal court by the end of the century.)

A: The U.S. supports the creation of a strong and effective international criminal court. We believe that such a court will advance justice on a global scale. It would serve to punish those who are guilty of the most serious international crimes - genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes - while deterring those who might commit such crimes.

Q: You say that you support the court but many have criticized the U.S. for taking positions that will limit the Court's effectiveness?

A: Founding an international criminal court is an extraordinary event, the culmination of over fifty years of work and advocacy. The Rome treaty hopefully will mark the development of a powerful instrument to safeguard international peace and security.

But we must be careful to reconcile the ideal of an ICC and the reality of the world today. We must be sure to negotiate a court that is consistent with existing efforts to maintain international peace and security and that would not become a vehicle for politicized prosecutions.

Q: What are some of your goals for the court?

A: "Complementarity": An effective ICC must ensure that national legal systems with the will and ability to prosecute will have the opportunity to do so. This principle of deferral to national legal systems is known as "complementarity" and is one of our essential goals.

However, where national systems lack the ability - as in Rwanda - or the will - as in the former Yugoslavia - to bring to justice serious violators of international standards, the ICC would fill the gap.

U.N. Security Council: A practical ICC should also recognize and reinforce the work of the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council should have the ability to refer situations of armed conflict or atrocities to the court and should be able to direct countries to cooperate with the court when necessary.

We believe the Security Council should also have the authority to review referrals to the court. The court should not be allowed to undermine the critical work of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.

Definitions of Crimes and Procedures: The ICC's statute should also provide precise and specific guidance regarding the elements of crimes, rules of evidence and rules of procedure.

Q: Some reports suggest that there is tension or conflict within the U.S. government on the position we should take toward the ICC. Is this true and, if so, what is the President doing about it?

A: U.S. agencies have been working very closely in the formulation of a U.S. policy toward the establishment of an ICC. Experts from the State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Justice Department are all represented on our negotiating team. The President intends to ensure that we present clear and unified positions during the Rome Conference.

Q: How do you respond to those who say that the U.S. is repeating the mistakes it made during the Landmine Conference in Ottawa?

A: The U.S. will not shrink from accountability but will not allow the ICC to

become a political forum where rogue states challenge the actions of responsible governments. The final treaty must shield countries from unnecessary and ill-intentioned political attacks against their citizens.

Q: Some nongovernmental organizations have said that they would walk away from the U.S. government if it fails to take positions in favor of an independent court. What is your reaction?

A: The idea that the world would be better off with a so-called "strong court" that does not include the United States than it would with a "weak" court with U.S. participation is unrealistic at best.

If we truly hope to promote justice on a global basis, U.S. participation is essential. The court will need the political support and resources of the U.S. Otherwise, the court is likely to be ineffective.

While we support the creation of such a court, it must be a court that tries those who commit the most heinous crimes, not those who would act courageously to detain the perpetrators.

Q: What is your response to concerns that have been raised in the Senate by Senators Helms, Ashcroft and others about such a court?

A: We understand and respect the concerns that have been expressed by Senator Helms and others. We wish to create a treaty that will ensure against unwarranted prosecutions.

Q: What is the U.S. position on whether the state of the accused should consent before an investigation or prosecution is brought?

A: We have reserved on the issue of whether state consent would be required before individual prosecutions can be brought before the ICC. We are reviewing

our position on this issue in light of our negotiations on other critical issues.

However, we firmly believe that a government that has not ratified the ICC treaty must consent before there can be any prosecution of its nationals before the court. Otherwise, you would have a situation whereby failure to ratify would subject citizens to the jurisdiction of the court. This would be a clearly unacceptable situation inconsistent with international law.

Nonetheless, we always have proposed that the Security Council be able to override a state's denial of consent. This would still permit the court to pursue cases involving rogue states.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/15/98 11:32:18 AM
FROM Orfini, Michael H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: International Criminal Court press guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Saunders, Richard M.

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY fyi

-----Original Message-----

From: Busby, Scott W.
Sent: Monday,
June 15, 1998 11:20 AM
To: Orfini, Michael H.
Subject: International
Criminal Court press guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT ICC guidance.doc
International Criminal Court
June 15, 1998

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procedure. We remain hopeful that governments will resolve differences and that the conference will produce a treaty that the international community, including the United States, can embrace.

Q: What is the U.S. position on the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC)?

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A: The U.S. supports the creation of a strong and effective international criminal court. We believe that such a court will advance justice on a global scale. It would serve to punish those who are guilty of the most serious international crimes - genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes - while deterring those who might commit such crimes.

Q: You say that you support the court but many have criticized the U.S. for taking positions that will limit the Court's effectiveness?

A: Founding an international criminal court is an extraordinary event, the culmination of over fifty years of work and advocacy. The Rome treaty hopefully will mark the development of a powerful instrument to safeguard international peace and security.

But we must be careful to reconcile the ideal of an ICC and the reality of the world today. We must be sure to negotiate a court that is consistent with existing efforts to maintain international peace and security and that would not become a vehicle for politicized prosecutions.

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A: "Complementarity": An effective ICC must ensure that national legal systems with the will and ability to prosecute will have the opportunity to do so. This principle of deferral to national legal systems is known as "complementarity" and is one of our essential goals.

However, where national systems lack the ability - as in Rwanda - or the will - as in the former Yugoslavia - to bring to justice serious violators of international standards, the ICC would fill the gap.

U.N. Security Council: A practical ICC should also recognize and reinforce the work of the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council should have the ability to refer situations of armed conflict or atrocities to the court and should be able to direct countries to cooperate with the court when necessary.

We believe the Security Council should also have the authority to review referrals to the court. The court should not be allowed to undermine the critical work of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.

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Q: How do you respond to those who say that the U.S. is repeating the mistakes it made during the Landmine Conference in Ottawa?

A: The U.S. will not shrink from accountability but will not allow the ICC to become a political forum where rogue states challenge the actions of responsible governments. The final treaty must shield countries from unnecessary and ill-intentioned political attacks against their citizens.

Q: Some nongovernmental organizations have said that they would walk away from the U.S. government if it fails to take positions in favor of an independent court. What is your reaction?

A: The idea that the world would be better off with a so-called "strong court" that does not include the United States than it would with a "weak" court with U.S. participation is unrealistic at best.

If we truly hope to promote justice on a global basis, U.S. participation is essential. The court will need the political support and resources of the U.S. Otherwise, the court is likely to be ineffective.

While we support the creation of such a court, it must be a court that tries those who commit the most heinous crimes, not those who would act courageously to detain the perpetrators.

Q: What is your response to concerns that have been raised in the Senate by Senators Helms, Ashcroft and others about such a court?

A: We understand and respect the concerns that have been expressed by Senator Helms and others. We wish to create a treaty that will ensure against unwarranted prosecutions.

Q: What is the U.S. position on whether the state of the accused should consent before an investigation or prosecution is brought?

A: We have reserved on the issue of whether state consent would be required before individual prosecutions can be brought before the ICC. We are reviewing our position on this issue in light of our negotiations on other critical issues.

However, we firmly believe that a government that has not ratified the ICC treaty must consent before there can be any prosecution of its nationals before the court. Otherwise, you would have a situation whereby failure to ratify would subject citizens to the jurisdiction of the court. This would be a clearly unacceptable situation inconsistent with international law.

Nonetheless, we always have proposed that the Security Council be able to override a state's denial of consent. This would still permit the court to pursue cases involving rogue states.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/18/98 12:21:23 PM
FROM Sapiro, Miriam E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Budig, Nyda N
Crowley, Philip J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY edits only onturkey/eu. not sure still releveant but just in case.
you shld have already rec'd new guidance on italy/cavalese and on
cyprus/f-16s. thx.tensedits

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

jun17gui_.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

June 17, 1998

Kosovo

Religious Leaders/POTUS Meeting

Russia/Kokoshin

Japan/Hashimoto

France/Jospin Visit

Lebanon/PM Hariri

Lebanon/Violence

Israel/Lebanon

Israel/Russia

Iraq/UNSCOM

MEPP

Nigeria

Eritrea/Ethiopia

Turkey/EU

Russian Financial Situation

ICC

Cuba

China/Tibet

PLA/Satellites

China Satellites

Chinese Family Planning

China/COSCO

China MFN

China Trip

Russia/Iran Missile Sanctions

START II Postponement

KOSOVO

June 17, 1998

Yeltsin-Milosevic Joint Statement on Kosovo

You obviously did not get everything you wanted out of the Yeltsin-Mil meeting yesterday. The fact that Milosevic is not willing to meet the Co Group demands, does this make NATO military action more likely?

* President Yeltsin succeeded in getting a public commitment from Mil on some key issues. It is still up to Milosevic to act on the promises he made in Moscow as well as the full set of steps as outlined by the Contact Group including the withdrawal of security forces involved in operations against civilians.

* If Milosevic does not take steps toward peace, we will have to consider a range of options at our disposal.

Do you need a UNSC resolution in order to proceed with any NATO military action?

Are you now planning to push for that, even with Russian objections?

* We are working with the UK -- and other allies and partners -- in support of a strong UN Security Council Resolution on Kosovo. It would certainly reinforce the message that the international community is out of patience.

* While such a resolution may be desirable, depending on the circumstances, it may not be necessary.

Is there a deadline to all this? Milosevic said he would do some of the things that the Contact Group wants. How much time are you going to give him before you consider other options such as military action?

* Milosevic should take immediate steps that demonstrate that he intends to meet the requirements of the Contact Group, including his promises to President Yeltsin.

* If the situation does not improve, however, we will consider our other options.

* (if pressed) No fixed timeline.

POTUS- Yeltsin

* We and Russia are both deeply concerned with the violence in Kosovo. We share the common objective of a peaceful resolution to the situation. President Clinton and President Yeltsin will discuss the issue in advance of Milosovic's visit to Moscow.

* The U.S. and Russia have a long track record of cooperation in the Balkans. It's important for us to work together to encourage Milosevic to halt the violence in Kosovo.

* (if asked about NATO air exercise) Both U.S. and NATO officials discussed the air exercise with Russia before the exercise began. We expect the Clinton-Yeltsin call to focus on broader issues.

* (if asked about the departure of Russia's military representative at SH/ Our understanding is that his return was related to routine business and today's NATO military exercise.

NATO Air Exercise DETERMINED FALCON

* We welcome NATO's decision to conduct an air exercise in the region successful exercise demonstrated both NATO's deep concern for the sta

the region as well as its ability to rapidly project allied power. Some 80 aircraft from 13 NATO nations participated in the exercise, demonstrati resolve of the international community to see an end to the violence in K

(if asked about further details, defer to DoD).

* (if asked about Russian objections) Both U.S. and NATO officials have discussed the air exercise and Kosovo with Russia. NATO has an appropriate role

to respond to instability in Europe and take appropriate measures, if needed, to deter further violence and the spread of the conflict.

Kosovo

* We are working closely with allies and other partners in NATO, UN, and the Contact

Group on measures intended to end the violence and promote a peaceful resolution.

This includes accelerated contingency planning in NATO.

* We welcome NATO's timely decision to accelerate contingency planning a

range of possible actions that could halt violent repression and expulsion from Kosovo, and support international efforts toward a political settlement.

* (if asked about decision to employ force) Although we want to be sure and

allies have made prudent preparations should the need arise, we have not made any

decisions to carry out military action. We will continue to consult with the Congress as the situation develops.

* (If asked about use of force) We and our partners have a variety of options available to us -- which I am not going to enumerate or comment upon -- we

are not ruling anything out.

* (If asked about unilateral action) We believe any action should be in a multilateral framework

* We are working with the British in support of a UN Security Council resolution that could provide a mandate for international action, should that become necessary.

* We are holding the FRY to its pledge to allow access by international observers and humanitarian organizations in Kosovo. We and our partners may be augmenting Embassy staffs to help.

* We and others in the international community are mobilizing resources to address humanitarian needs. Of the many Kosovar Albanians who have lost their homes in wake of the recent attacks

* We are calling on both sides to resume their dialogue. We are urging the parties to avoid actions -- especially the use of force -- that would undermine peaceful negotiations.

Sanctions

* When the Contact Group met in early May, we agreed to impose an asset freeze and investment ban unless President Milosevic agreed to talks and to take measures to avoid violence.

* Although Milosevic agreed to talks, it is his indiscriminate use of violence over the past several weeks that has undermined the talks. Therefore, we implemented the asset freeze and investment ban by Executive Order.

* As of 12:01 am Tuesday, June 10, the Executive Order froze the assets of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and prohibited investment by U.S. persons in the Republic of Serbia.

* It is our intent to exempt the Republic of Montenegro from these prohibitions wherever possible.

POTUS MEETING WITH U.S. RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WORLDWIDE June 17, 1998

NOTE: This meeting is being billed as "a presidential event on Administration efforts on religious freedom worldwide, including China." The Seiple announcement should not be advertised.

EVENT: On Thursday, June 18 from 9:45 to 10:45 a.m. in the Roosevelt Room, the President will be receiving a trip report from the delegation of U.S. religious leaders he sent to China in February to observe religious freedom conditions. Following his meeting with the religious leaders, the President will deliver remarks on religious freedom in China, and the world-over.

BACKGROUND: One of the outcomes of the President's October 1997 Washington summit with President Jiang was Chinese Government agreement to receive a delegation of U.S. religious leaders who would observe the state of religious freedom and engage in dialog with Chinese officials on these issues.

The President met with the three leaders on February 2 for an Oval Office sendoff.

For three weeks in February the delegation met with President Jiang and government officials and religious leaders in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing and Hong Kong. Significantly, the delegation met with imprisoned nuns in Lhasa, and delegation staff members (none of the three principals) met secretly with leaders of so-called "house churches," the underground, non-registered religious groups.

On March 18 the delegation released a report of their findings and recommendations. (Criticism of the report was negligible.) Copies of the report may be obtained by contacting the Appeal of Conscience Foundation (202-580-5800).

RELIGIOUS LEADERS: (PJ has bios on all three).

The Reverend Dr. Don Argue, Washington liaison (former President), National Association of Evangelicals.

Archbishop Theodore McCarrick, Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York.

Rabbi Arthur Schneier, President, Appeal of Conscience Foundation.

AUDIENCE: Approximately 40 invitees including Members of Congress (possibly), members of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom

Abroad, representatives from the American religious community and from Non-Governmental Organizations.

Event Aimed at China?

Is the timing of this event, just days before the President's departure for China, intended to send the Chinese a message? Is this event being held

back at the President's critics in the religious community who object to his visiting China, given its very poor record on religious freedom and human rights?

* Religious Freedom the world over has been an important issue for this President.

It was at his direction that attention to religious freedom abroad has been an important part of our foreign policy, and it is a subject that he has commented on repeatedly, most recently at last week's speech at the National Geographic Society.

* The delegation of religious leaders will be presenting the President with a report from their trip to China, and the President's remarks will surely address our very serious concerns about religious liberty issues there, but his remarks will address the broader issue of religious freedom worldwide.

* A diverse collection of Americans, notably including certain conservative religious Americans, recognize that this trip is in our nation's best interest and that engaging the Chinese leadership on human rights issues, including religious freedom, will best serve the interests of minority religious communities in China.

Robert Seiple

Will the President be announcing the selection of Robert Seiple as Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom?

* Secretary Albright announced in January the Administration's intention to designate a new senior-level coordinator (NOT "Ambassador") for religious freedom issues. The President may have more to say on that subject tomorrow.

Pastor Xu ("Shu") Yongze

The Delegation reportedly appealed to the Chinese leadership for the release of Pastor Xu "Shu" Yongze. Yet he remains in prison. Will the President appeal for the release of Pastor Xu in his meetings with President Jiang?

* The Administration will continue to raise the cases of specific religious prisoners, including Pastor Xu, with the Chinese and the President will be raising the cause of religious prisoners (in general) with President Jiang, will urge more systematic respect for religious freedom in China.

Underground Churches

What is your reaction to critics on Capitol Hill and in the religious community who have charged that the Delegation served as a propaganda tool for the Chinese government, particularly because they only met with "registered" clergy not with representatives from the underground churches?

* Based on what they reported to us and the report they released, the delegation presented their Chinese hosts with requests for explicit information about access to prisoners of faith. The three religious leaders did not meet with underground church representatives. However, delegation staff member meet with underground church leaders. I recommend that you speak directly to the delegation to learn more about these contacts.

Will the President be meeting with underground church leaders during his trip to China?

* It is indeed unfortunate that leaders of unregistered churches are not free to reveal themselves and to worship freely in China. As the President has said before, our relationship with China simply cannot reach its full potential as long as Chinese people are denied the fundamental right to worship where, when, and how they choose.

* The President would not do anything that might exacerbate the difficulties that underground church leaders already face in their struggle to worship as their conscience dictates. For obvious reasons, such a meeting would not serve the interests of these courageous Chinese of faith.

"Willing to be Manipulated"

Reverend Argue reportedly told journalists in Beijing that they were "willing to be manipulated" in order to open a dialogue with China. Does the President believe that the President's delegation was manipulated?

* Reverend Argue, Rabbi Schneier, and Archbishop McCarrick went to China as leaders of a private delegation to engage the Chinese leadership in a serious dialogue about religious liberty and human rights. They held many, many meetings with the Chinese leadership -- including President Jiang -- and pressed the

hosts for the pardon of specific victims of religious persecution, as well as expanded religious freedoms for all of the Chinese people.

* IF PRESSED: Reverend Argue, Rabbi Schneier, and Archbishop McCarrick were not manipulated. These are tough, sophisticated men who have devoted much of their lives to the cause of religious freedom. Chinese of faith were well served by their efforts. The suggestion that they were "manipulated" comes from I Argue's response to a tendentiously worded question, not from either the facts or the realities of their mission or their statements.

RUSSIA - KOKOSHIN VISIT

June 17, 1998

* Dr. Andrey Kokoshin, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation visited Washington on June 15-17 at the invitation of President Clinton's National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger.

* Dr. Kokoshin also met with Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Larry Summers.

* Dr. Kokoshin's discussions covered a range of topics of arms control and nonproliferation issues, including START II ratification, Iran-related proliferation matters, and recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.

* In addition, Dr. Kokoshin discussed the Russian financial situation. U.S. officials reaffirmed recent statements by President Clinton and Treasury Secretary Rubin that the U.S. would support additional conditional IFI financing for Russia, as necessary.

* Dr. Kokoshin met with several members of Congress, including House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Senators Joseph Biden, Gordon Smith, Carl Levin, and Warner, as well as Representatives Dick Gephardt, Benjamin Gilman, Lee Hammit, and Porter Goss.

* On Tuesday morning, Dr. Kokoshin met with representatives of leading American Jewish organizations, including AIPAC, NCSJ, and ADL.

JAPAN: HASHIMOTO

June 17, 1998

What did the President talk to Hashimoto about?

* The President reiterated his concern about the Asia crisis generally and the state of the Japanese economy in particular. He stressed to the Prime Minister that Japan has a critical role to play in helping to restore financial stability in Asia, by stimulating domestic growth, strengthening its financial system, deregulating and opening its markets.

* Policies to help restart Japan's economic growth are essential to reestablishing the confidence that is needed. We welcomed the Government's Japan's fiscal stimulus package and have urged rapid implementation of components. The President made clear that it is also critical for the GOJ to quickly resolve the banking system's bad debt problem and to move decisively on deregulation and opening of Japan's markets.

Did the President dispatch a mission to the region?

* The President and the Prime Minister agreed that Deputy Secretary Susan and Deputy Secretary Talbot would travel to Japan to meet with their counterparts in Tokyo. We are still developing the timing and nature of those meetings with the GOJ.

Are you concerned that the crisis in Asia may be deepening?

* Our economy is the strongest in the world, but the crisis in Asia does pose a threat to American jobs and exports. We have already seen evidence that weaknesses in economies there are having an impact here -- cutting into our ability to export goods to the region and increasing our trade deficit.

* To make sure that our economy continues on a path of steady growth, Congress must step up to the plate and make sure that the IMF is strong enough to respond to any broadening of the current crisis. We should not take risks with that that the IMF needs to help stabilize the world economy. And because the functions like an international credit union, paying our share won't cost

American taxpayers a dime.

FRANCE: JOSPIN VISIT

June 17, 1998

* President extended invitation to Jospin as part of continuous broad-based dialogue and partnership with France.

* Will be Jospin's first visit to U.S. since taking office in June 1997 -- at stay in Washington (June 17-19) will also make private visit to New York (June 19-20).

* Itinerary will include working lunch hosted by President. As first official meeting, will give two men chance to get to know each other, review agenda for transatlantic cooperation across range of political, security and trade/economic issues.

* Jospin will have separate meeting with Vice President, opportunity to discuss on environmental issues, other bilateral topics. Vice President will also host reception in Jospin's honor.

* Visit will include signing of bilateral agreement on civilian aviation -- step in facilitating civilian air traffic between U.S. and France, eliminate restrictions on services over five year transition period. Excellent example of success in vital economic sphere.

* On June 19, first meeting of Franco-American Business Council will take place in Washington -- key opportunity for leading CEO's to engage, explore opportunities for collaboration. Both Prime Minister and President will have brief appearances at Council meeting, indicate support for efforts to boost private sector collaboration.

* Jospin will also mark 80th anniversary of WWI with a visit to tomb of General Pershing, and will commemorate De Gaulle's June 18 "call of liberty" to French people during WWII.

* Overall, see visit as positive catalyst, opportunity to press forward on objectives, both for Europe and elsewhere in world. Though don't always on every issue, committed to common approaches, collaboration -- visit will be key part of that effort as we look to policy decisions over coming year.

Cohabitation

* Know there's been much press attention to cohabitation. Want to be very clear:
internal dynamics of French government for French to deal with -- not us

* Look forward to continued excellent relationship, close cooperation with Chirac and Jospin, as befits the broad partnership between U.S. and France

* President's close friendship, constant contact with Chirac continues. Take every opportunity to meet, as saw recently in Birmingham where they had private lunch together on margins of G-8 meeting.

* President has also hosted Chirac here in Washington twice (in Spring again in January 96) and in Denver for G-7 summit in June 97.

(FYI: Last French Prime Minister to visit Washington was PM Balladur in 1993 (also in a cohabitation government), and before that was PM Rocard in (not a cohabitation government)).

Air France Strikes

* Take no position on internal French labor questions.

* Unfortunate timing,

NATO

* As President laid out in Berlin speech, are looking to Washington summit April 99 to chart strategic course for alliance into next century.

* Working closely with France, other allies to prepare for summit.

* Pleased to note that French Senate voted May 20 on NATO enlargement by overwhelming majority (299-16). Though upper house still has to act (C believe strong momentum will carry through).

* Have put dispute over AFSOUTH behind us. Accept French decision to reintegrate into military structures for now, focusing on practical cooperation.

LEBANON: HARIRI MEETING

June 16, 1998

* The Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri, is currently visiting the States. This morning, he met with the President and Mr. Berger. Today, tomorrow, he will also meet with Secretary Albright and other State Department officials. (He is travelling on to New York where he will meet with SYC Annan and other UN officials).

* This is the Prime Minister's first visit to Washington since December (the Friends of Lebanon conference). They discussed the Middle East Peace Process, including the Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian tracks. We share a deep with Lebanon in reigniting progress on all three tracks. The discussions covered other regional and bilateral issues.

(Note to briefer): NSC/NESA will also send over to you the old, but still guidance on the question you are most likely to get following the meeting. What do we think of the Israeli offer to withdraw from Lebanon in accordance UNSCR 425?

LEBANON: VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH

June 16, 1998

What does the State Department make of the violence in south Lebanon reports that rockets have hit northern Israel?

* We are concerned with the recent violence in south Lebanon, and the possibility for civilian casualties on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border.

* The United States calls on all the parties to exercise restraint and to abide by the April 1996 understandings which seek to protect civilian populations in the area.

(If Asked)

* The Israel-Lebanon monitoring group, created by the April 1996 understandings, continues to demonstrate its effectiveness in resolving complaints of violence. The monitoring group ended its latest meeting just this morning.

ISRAEL/LEBANON

June 17, 1998

Anything new on the possibility of restarting Israel's negotiations with Lebanon and Syria? Hariri said there could be a deal within three months if talks to resume.

* As Secretary Albright made clear, we want negotiations to resume on all tracks, including between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon.

* We want to make progress in Arab-Israeli negotiations wherever and whenever possible.

* We had good discussions with Prime Minister Hariri on ways to restart the Israeli-Lebanon track. We will continue to work to move the process forward.

But what about the Israelis wanting to start negotiations from square one and the Lebanese and Syrians wanting to pick up from where they left off in 1996?

* As I said, we continue to work with the parties to find ways to bridge the difference in approach.

* Our focus, for the time being, is on the negotiations between Israel and Palestinians, but to achieve the comprehensive peace we seek, we want negotiations to resume on all tracks. Our consultations with Prime Minister Hariri should be seen in that context.

ISRAEL: RUSSIAN VIEWS UNSCR 425

June 16, 1998

What's your reaction to Posuvalyuk saying Russia supports implementation

UNSCR
425?

* As we have said before, we voted for Resolution 425, we support it and to see it implemented.

* We continue to believe in the importance of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including agreements between Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Syria.

What are you doing to make it happen?

* We support the idea of direct discussions between the parties involved to maintain a comprehensive peace as our goal, but encourage progress on track wherever and whenever progress is possible.

* (IF PRESSED) Clearly, Lebanon will need to make its own decisions on how to respond to the Israeli acceptance of 425. We have long believed that negotiations between Israel and Lebanon would provide a way to resolve issues that divide them and to advance Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity and the security of both countries.

IRAQ/UNSCOM: BUTLER/IRAQ TWO MONTH PLAN
June 17, 1998

What can you tell us about the two month program of action which Butler the Iraqis have agreed to follow?

Background: On June 3 and 4, Ambassador Butler provided the Council "roadmap:" an excellent briefing on what major conditions Iraq must meet for UNSCOM to report that substantial progress has been made. He met the Iraqi leadership in Baghdad this week at Iraqi urging to put notional deadlines for the necessary cooperation. Press coverage of his initial statements overstate the nearness of completing UNSCOM's mission; Butler has made clear subsequently to interlocutors that he doubts the Iraqis will be sufficiently forthcoming within the 2-4 month period laid out.

* Ambassador Butler told the Council June 3 and 4 the main items need

more disclosure by Iraq. These were broad areas involving some very large gaps in knowledge.

* None of these demands for Iraqi cooperation were new. Iraq has avoided or ignored many of these questions for a long time.

* Butler's trip to Baghdad was to set up a work schedule for Iraq to answer these outstanding questions. Butler and Iraq agreed that Iraq will try to work to satisfy these outstanding needs within 2-4 months.

* So IF Iraq complies fully with UNSCOM's demands and IF Iraq does so promptly, UNSCOM will be able to report progress to the Council.

* But let me remind you that this has been the situation for the last 86 months (April 1991-June 1998) since Iraq was told to fully disclose its weapons programs. This is simply another milestone; Iraq has failed to meet numerous such milestones in the past, and we aren't confident that it will meet this one.

* The 2-4 month schedule is not what's important. What's important is UNSCOM getting full disclosure from Iraq on the areas laid out to the Council.

* We and the Council will judge what Iraq offers UNSCOM based solely on this merit, not on the need to meet some arbitrary milestone. Iraq has no hope of having sanctions lifted until it fully discloses its weapons programs.

MEPP
June 17, 1998

What can you tell us about the reports of Israel demanding that the United States promise not to recognize a unilaterally declared Palestinian state in exchange for doing a second FRD?

* First, you know we do not comment on the details of our discussions with the parties.

* Our position on permanent status issues is clear: they should be resolved by the parties in negotiations.

* Both parties should avoid unilateral actions that would preempt their

negotiations, either before or after May 4, 1999.

Where do we stand in the peace process?

* We are continuing intensive consultations with both parties in the hope of closing on the set of ideas we presented to both parties, and moving ahead toward permanent status negotiations.

* (AS NEEDED): We are not setting deadlines or making predictions on how long this will take. There is a great sense of urgency about the consequences of continued impasse, which the parties ought to share. We are continuing discussions as long as we believe there is a chance of closing the gaps. If it becomes clear we will not be able to do that, we will say so.

What do you think of the Chirac-Mubarak proposal to convene a summit "Save the Peace Process"?

* We appreciate the spirit in which it was offered. The whole international community has to be concerned about the lack of progress over the last months, and the prospect of security and economic deterioration in the region if the impasse persists to the end of the interim period (May 1999).

* In order to make a positive contribution to the process, such a conference would have to be carefully prepared in terms of timing, participants, and planned outcome. Those questions need to be addressed.

* In particular, such an event should not distract the parties from the issues they are working on with us right now.

Will you be discussing the conference proposal and your negotiations with Jospin?

* We can brief the Prime Minister on the state of play in negotiations, and look forward to hearing how some of those questions about the conference proposal would be answered.

NIGERIA: POTUS CALL TO GENERAL ABUBAKAR
June 15, 1998

What can you say about the release of prisoners by the Nigerian Government?

* The Government of Nigeria yesterday announced the release of former political prisoners of State Olusegun Obasanjo and eight other prominent political prisoners.

* We welcome this as an important first step toward national reconciliation, national unity and applaud this decision by the new Nigerian leadership.

* In addition to General Obasanjo, those released include oil union leader Milton Dabibi and Frank Kokori, journalist Chris Anyanwu, human rights activist

Beko Ransome-Kuti, politicians Bola Ige and Chief Olabiyi Durojaiye, Udoh and Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, the former Sultan of Sokoto.

* We hope this important step will lead to further releases and will help Nigerians come together to work to support a credible and open transition to civilian democratic government.

Can you confirm that the President spoke with General Abubakar over the weekend?

What did he say? Did he ask for the release of any prisoners?

* President Clinton telephoned newly installed Nigerian Head of State Abdulsalam

Abubakar on Sunday, June 14. He conveyed our hopes for a credible and lasting

transition to civilian democratic government in Nigeria, as reiterated by General

Abubakar in his first address to the Nigerian people.

* The President reaffirmed our friendship with the people of Nigeria. He underscored our desire for improved bilateral relations in the context of

taking swift and significant steps toward a successful transition to a democratically elected civilian government.

* He noted the need to release political prisoners and detainees as part of a credible transition program. He did not give Abubakar a list of prisoners.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 16, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Nigerian Government Releases Prominent Political Prisoners

The Government of Nigeria has released former Head of State Olusegun Obasanjo and eight other prominent political prisoners. We welcome this as an important step toward national reconciliation and national unity and applaud this decision by the new Nigerian leadership.

In addition to General Obasanjo, those released include oil union leader Milton Dabibi and Frank Kokori, journalist Chris Anyanwu, human rights activist Boko Ransome-Kuti, politicians Bola Ige and Chief Olabiyi Durojaiye, Uwen and Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, the former Sultan of Sokoto.

We hope this action will lead to the unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees, and will help all Nigerians come together to welcome the support of a credible and open transition to civilian democratic government. The United States looks forward to improving our relationship with Nigeria and makes progress towards this goal.

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ETHIOPIA/ERITREA: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE?

June 15, 1998

What is the status of the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea? Has the U.S. brokered some sort of deal with either government?

* We understand the border area was calm over the weekend.

* In response to a proposal by the United States, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea have agreed to halt immediately the further use of air strikes and the threat of air strikes in their present conflict.

* This moratorium will continue indefinitely or until such time as either government concludes that any prospect for a peace process has come to an end and provides formal, advance notice to the United States Government that it will no longer respect this moratorium. We also thank the Government of Italy, whose diplomatic efforts have helped to secure this agreement.

* The United States welcomes this commitment by Eritrea and Ethiopia can help restore the mutual confidence necessary to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict as quickly as possible.

* The maintenance of this moratorium will limit the risk to civilians as well as to the economic, commercial and social infrastructure in both countries.

TURKEY/EU: CARDIFF RESULTS June 17, 1998

Any reaction to end of Cardiff Summit and how it treated Turkey?

* The US is a staunch supporter of EU enlargement and its important role in building a Europe that is united, peaceful and prosperous.

* We have supported Turkey's EU aspirations. We welcome Cardiff's agreement to implement a strategy to prepare Turkey for membership.

* We commend the British Presidency and EU leaders on their decision and commitment to strengthen EU-Turkey ties, which will contribute to Turkey's ability to fulfill EU membership criteria.

Greek PM Simitis told the press that President Clinton called him at 1:30 this morning, at PM Blair's urging, to urge release of the blocked Customs Union funding for Turkey.

* The President talked to Greek PM Simitis early Tuesday morning Caribbean time (which was 7:30 pm Monday EDT).

* He discussed with PM Simitis the desirability of a positive outcome at the Cardiff meeting.

(FYI only: The President did not ask Greece to release its block on the Customs Union funds.)

RUSSIAN FINANCIAL SITUATION

June 17, 1998

Background: President Yeltsin appointed Anatoliy Chubays to be Russian special representative to international financial institutions today. Press reports that Chubays will have the rank of deputy premier, although it is unclear whether he will formally be part of the government. Chubays will apparently keep his job as head of the UES electricity monopoly. Meanwhile, the Finance Ministry cancelled the auction of 6-month and 1-year T-bills today, saying that bids received were too low. The Ministry sold \$400 million in 3-year bonds. This means that the government will have to make good on redemptions of over \$1 billion in debt out of cash, probably by borrowing from the Central Bank. Ministry's unwillingness to accept the offered prices for the short-term bills probably means that it expects bond prices to rise significantly in the next week or so.

What do you think about Moscow's appointment of Anatoliy Chubays as a representative for relations with international financial institutions?

* We welcome the creation of this new post and Chubays' appointment. Chubays is a committed reformer who we know well and greatly respect. We look forward to working with him in this new capacity.

* It is important that Russia speak with one voice in its dealings with international financial institutions. This appointment comes at an opportune time since the IMF will be sending a new mission to Russia next week.

Did Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discuss Russia's financial situation in their phone call on Monday?

* Yes. President Clinton reiterated his support for additional conditional and World Bank funding, if necessary.

* He urged President Yeltsin to ensure the coordination of his government's reform efforts, push forward on boosting tax collections, and make financial information more available to investors.

* He also expressed his hope that Russia will complete its current discussions with the IMF swiftly and successfully.

If asked whether President Yeltsin asked for direct U.S. financial support?

* President Yeltsin did not ask for direct U.S. financial support.

* As you know, the IMF is working with the Russians to consider further

reforms
that could be supported by additional conditional financing.

When will the IMF announce a bailout package for Russia?

* IMF Executive Board will meet Thursday to decide on disbursement of next
\$670 million tranche of Russia's 1998 Extended Fund Facility program.

* In addition, Russia is engaged in discussions with the IMF over additional reforms that could serve as the basis for further IFI financing, if needed. said, President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Kiriyenko still have not said they see a need for a new stabilization loan.

* As President and Secretary Rubin have made clear, we support additional conditional support from IFIs in context of strong Russian reform program needed to avoid market turmoil.

If asked whether IMF is being unreasonable in its demands on Russia

* It is important that Moscow and the IMF continue their dialogue on how to restore Russia's financial health and deepen reform. The discussions that have been going on so far have produced a program that, if fully implemented, should go a long way toward achieving those objectives.

* We encourage both sides to continue their dialogue. Stronger reform measures are essential to providing the basis for additional financing, if needed.

Have we moved fast enough to help Russia?

* President Clinton acted quickly to indicate his support for additional conditional IFI financing as necessary.

* We have also consulted closely with our G-7 partners. Last week they they are prepared to consider such conditional financing as necessary and appropriate.

* At this point, additional support for Russia will have to come through IFIs. The IMF is holding exploratory discussions with Russians and we are looking to see how these discussions develop as well as monitor market developments.

* We continue to emphasize that investors look fundamentally and first at Russia to act quickly and we do as well.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

June 15, 1998

Background: The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the

Establishment of an International Criminal Court will take place in Rome from June 15 to July 17. The Clinton Administration supports the creation of a strong and effective Court. We believe that countries should bring to justice those who commit genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and hand over suspects over to institutions who will, such as an impartial ICC. However, we need to design a document that reflects a variety of U.S. concerns, including

the role of the Security Council, deferral to capable national legal systems, jurisdiction, elements of offenses, rules of evidence and criminal procedure.

We

remain hopeful that governments will resolve differences and that the conference

will produce a treaty that the international community, including the United States, can embrace.

What is the U.S. position on the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC)?

(Note to briefer: On several occasions, most recently in Rwanda and last year before the General Assembly, President Clinton has reaffirmed his commitment to the creation of a criminal court by the end of the century.)

* The U.S. supports the creation of a strong and effective international criminal court. We believe that such a court will advance justice on a global scale and would serve to punish those who are guilty of the most serious violations of international humanitarian law - genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes - while deterring those who might commit such crimes.

You say that you support the court but many have criticized the U.S. for positions that will limit the Court's effectiveness?

* Founding an international criminal court is an extraordinary event, the culmination of over fifty years of work and advocacy. The Rome treaty will hopefully mark the development of a powerful instrument to safeguard international

peace and security.

* But we must be careful to reconcile the ideal of an ICC and the reality world today. We must be sure to negotiate a court that is consistent with existing efforts to maintain international peace and security and that won't become a vehicle for politicized prosecutions.

What are some of your goals for the court?

* "Complementarity": An effective ICC must ensure that national legal systems with the will and ability to prosecute will have the opportunity to do so. The principle of deferral to national legal systems is known as "complementarity" and is one of our essential goals.

* However, where national systems lack the ability - as in Rwanda - or the ability - as in the former Yugoslavia - to bring to justice serious violators of international standards, the ICC would fill the gap.

* U.N. Security Council: A practical ICC should also recognize and reinvigorate the work of the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council should have the authority to refer situations of armed conflict or atrocities to the court and should be able to direct countries to cooperate with the court when necessary.

[Note to briefer: Our current position is that the Security Council should have the authority to review referrals to the court. That position is currently under review by the President and we would recommend that you not discuss it if at all possible.]

* Definitions of Crimes and Procedures: The ICC's statute should also provide precise and specific guidance regarding the elements of crimes, rules of evidence and rules of procedure.

Some reports suggest that there is tension or conflict within the U.S. government on the position we should take toward the ICC. Is this true and, if so, what is the President doing about it?

* U.S. agencies have been working very closely in the formulation of a policy toward the establishment of an ICC. Experts from the State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Justice Department are all represented on our negotiating team. The U.S. government will present

and
unified positions during the Rome Conference.

How do you respond to those who say that the U.S. is repeating the mistake made during the Landmine Conference in Ottawa?

* The U.S. will not shrink from accountability but will not allow the ICC to become a political forum where rogue states challenge the actions of responsible governments. The final treaty must shield countries from unnecessary and ill-intentioned political attacks against their citizens.

Some nongovernmental organizations have said that they would walk away from the U.S. government if it fails to take positions in favor of an independent court. What is your reaction?

* The idea that the world would be better off with a so-called "strong court" that does not include the United States than it would with a "weak" court. U.S. participation is unrealistic at best.

* If we truly hope to promote justice on a global basis, U.S. participation is essential. The court will need the political support and resources of the United States. Otherwise, the court is likely to be ineffective.

* While we support the creation of such a court, it must be a court that targets those who commit the most heinous crimes, not those who would act courageously to detain the perpetrators.

What is your response to concerns that have been raised in the Senate by Senators Helms, Ashcroft and others about such a court?

* We understand and respect the concerns that have been expressed by Senators Helms and others. We wish to create a treaty that will ensure against unwarranted prosecutions.

What is the U.S. position on whether the state of the accused should consent before an investigation or prosecution is brought?

* We have reserved our position on the issue of whether state consent would be required before individual prosecutions can be brought before the ICC. We are reviewing our position on this issue in light of our negotiations on other critical issues.

* However, we firmly believe that a government that has not ratified the treaty must consent before there can be any prosecution of its nationals in the court. Otherwise, you would have a situation whereby failure to ratify would subject citizens to the jurisdiction of the court. This would be a clearly unacceptable situation inconsistent with international law.

* Nonetheless, we always have proposed that the Security Council be able to override a state's denial of consent. This would still permit the court to pursue cases involving rogue states.

CUBA: ALLOWING CUBANA AIRLINES TO OVERFLY THE U.S. June 17, 1998

Background (for briefer only): The U.S. has required Cubana Airlines to take an indirect, mostly over-water route on flights between Cuba and Canada since the 1960s, except in bad weather, primarily for national security reasons. Since 1980, the GOC has argued to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that the U.S. denies its overflight rights in violation of international civil aviation law. In 1996, Cuba invoked a rule under which the ICAO Council acts as an arbitral tribunal to hear international disputes. Since then, the ICAO Council President Kotaite has helped reach an informal resolution of the dispute which calls for the GOC to drop its complaint and agree to uphold international civil air safety principles. We approve two Cuba-Canada overland routes for Cubana. FAA will issue a route authorization letter to Cuban aviation authorities today. Cuba in turn will file a letter with ICAO withdrawing its complaint. We expect this also to occur today. The ICAO Council will formally acknowledge Cuba's withdrawal on Friday.

Note: Interested members of Congress were informed yesterday. Rep. B. Menendez immediately went to Miami Herald whose reporter wrote an unhelpful piece in the State will background a couple of other reporters today.

Why has the U.S. decided to grant Cubana Airlines permission to overfly the U.S.?

* We are rapidly approaching the deadline set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for resolving a formal complaint filed by Cuba in over our denial of direct overland routes for Cubana Airlines flights to and from Canada.

* In efforts to facilitate a resolution, the ICAO Council President has submitted proposals which both sides have accepted.

* The agreement calls for Cuba to withdraw its complaint before the ICAO, to make certain commitments on principles relating to the safety of civil aviation including those contained in ICAO resolutions.

Background (as needed)

* The U.S. agrees to two overland routes for Cubana Airlines.

* For national security reasons, the U.S. has required Cuba to follow an indirect, mostly over-water route on flights between Cuba and Canada since the 1960s, except in bad weather.

* Restrictions were altered in the 1980s to allow Cubana to overfly a path over New York on its way to Toronto and Montreal.

* For safety reasons, Cubana has always been allowed an overland route whenever weather conditions made flying over water more hazardous to the U.S.

* The Cuban Government had argued for several years at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that the U.S.-imposed routes:

-- violated international law (which prohibits discrimination based on nationality relative to overflight routes;

-- were uneconomical, because they were indirect; and

-- were less safe than overland routes.

* In 1995, ICAO actively pursued resolution of the dispute with the U.S. and Cuba.

* In 1996, Cuba filed a formal complaint with ICAO addressing this issue.

* For the past two years, the ICAO Council President has sought to facilitate a solution to this dispute.

* For its part, the U.S. reexamined the security rationale for the Cuban routes to determine what under current circumstances would best meet U.S. security concerns.

* This review of our security concerns, which led to the original decision regarding the Cuban routings in the 1960s and 1980s, led U.S. experts to determine that the inland routes we are providing the Cubans meet national security concerns better than the routes they are now flying which bring closer to and often over much of the East Coast of the United States.

* We have also reached the agreement out of respect for international civil aviation law which generally prohibits discrimination based on nationality in granting overflight rights.

* U.S. aircraft have been overflying Cuba for over a decade. These new routes to Central and South America save U.S. carriers in excess of \$150 million each year and keep our airlines competitive.

The U.S. has long denied Cubana Airlines permission to overfly the U.S. This reversal signals a change in U.S. policy. Is the U.S. warming to Cuba?

* The decision to grant Cubana Airlines new overflight routes in no way signals a change in U.S. policy nor a change in U.S. relations with Cuba.

* The decision was part of a dispute resolution process carried out under the auspices of the ICAO.

* The U.S. did not negotiate directly with Cuba in resolving this issue, nor we make any bilateral agreements with Cuba. We did make certain commitments to the ICAO, consistent with our pre-existing international obligations.

* U.S. policy towards Cuba remains the same. Our overall goal is to promote peaceful, democratic change in Cuba. There are four essential elements in accomplishing this:

- pressure on the regime for change through the embargo and Liberty
- support for the Cuban people;
- multilateral efforts to promote democratic change; and
- arrangements to maintain migration in safe, legal, and orderly channels.

What are the terms of the agreement on overflights reached by Dr. Kota

* The resolution of the dispute reached with the help of ICAO Council President calls for Cuba to withdraw its complaint before the ICAO and to uphold applicable principles of international civil aviation law and ICAO resolutions.

* The U.S. agreed to authorize Cubana Airlines to use certain Cuba-Can overland routes and to provide normal air navigation services on those r

When will Cubana Airlines begin to overfly the U.S?

* The FAA will authorize Cubana to begin overflying on June 19.

* Don't forget that Cubana has already been overflying most of the East of the U.S. whenever bad weather made flying over water more hazardous

* Also, Cubana has been allowed to regularly overfly certain areas of th since the 1980s.

* U.S. air carriers have been able to overfly Cuba for many years.

Has the USG forgotten about the February 1996 shootdowns? Why is C being allowed to overfly the U.S. when the Cuban Government hasn't apologized for its actions?

* We continue to deplore the tragic events of February 24, 1996 when two U.S.-registered civilian aircraft were shot down in international airspace killing four people.

* The international community also strongly deplored the Cuban Government's unlawful actions in a resolution at the ICAO.

* As part of this arrangement, the Cuban Government has agreed to uphold international civil aviation principles contained in the 1944 Chicago Convention and in ICAO resolutions, including that of June 1996.

* This is an important step forward. For the first time since the shootdown, the Cuban Government has agreed to abide by international law respecting the safety of civilian aircraft.

Is the decision to let Cubana overfly the U.S. in any way connected to the Administration's reinstatement of direct passenger charter flights? Isn't it

just one more step toward normalizing relations?

- * Allowing Cubana to overfly the U.S. and resuming direct passenger flights are in no way connected.

- * The decision to allow overflights was part of a long dispute resolution process initiated at the ICAO two years ago.

- * The resumption of direct passenger charter flights was one of several measures announced by the President on March 20 to help support the Cuban people through increased people to people contacts.

- * Our position towards the Cuban Government remains unchanged. We maintain economic pressure as a way to promote peaceful, systemic, democratic change.

- * At the same time, we want to help strengthen Cuban civil society by increasing information flows, humanitarian assistance, and people to people contacts.

CHINA/TIBET

June 15, 1998

What is the U.S. position on Tibet? What will the President say to Jiang on the subject when he visits China?

- * The United States strongly supports the protection of Tibet's unique cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage. We believe resumption of the dialogue between Beijing and the Dalai Lama's representatives is an essential step to achieve these goals and to assure greater protection of human rights in Tibet. We consider Tibet a part of China.

- * I fully expect the President will raise the subject of Tibet with President Jiang during his visit.

- * (if pressed on what he will say) I do not see utility in announcing precisely what the President will say before the President says it.

PLA USE OF U.S.-SUPPLIED COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES June 12, 1998

- * I'm not going to confirm or deny whether the Chinese military is using U.S.-manufactured communications satellites for internal military communications.
- * Of course, as a technical matter, the satellites can be used by any sector of Chinese society, including the PLA.
- * In licensing these satellites, we take into consideration the possibility that they could be used by the PLA.
- * As a matter of general policy, we would not license a commercial satellite to the PLA itself because of our broad restrictions on exporting any communications technology to the PLA, but we do not consider potential PLA use of the satellites to pose a national security concern.
- * It is quite common for military organizations to use civilian communications satellites for internal military communications. This is not a national security concern.
- * As a consequence, there are no restrictions in the satellite licenses issued by the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations to China or any other country that prohibit military use of the satellites.
- * Because these are civilian communications satellites, they don't offer the same technical and security features of military communications satellites. We would not license export of military communications satellites to China.
- * As a consequence, military organizations, including the PLA, would gain no particular security advantage from using civilian communications satellites for their communications.

CHINA SATELLITES June 9, 1998

Did licensing the launch of U.S. commercial satellites by China result in the transfer of technology that threatens U.S. security?

- * None of the satellite licenses or waivers authorizes the transfer of sensitive

missile technology to China. All are for commercial satellites. The licenses are subject to careful inter-agency scrutiny by the Department of Defense, Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of Commerce and are subject to strict controls and safeguards.

Isn't it true that the waiver granted to Loral this February was granted over the opposition of Justice and compromised U.S. national security?

* Not true. The President did not "overrule" or "ignore" anyone's views, and granting the license compromised U.S. national security.

* When the State Department recommended a waiver for a Loral satellite in 1998, it noted that an investigation of Loral was under way. We therefore took an additional step of asking Justice for its views on the request. Justice raised concerns about the potential impact of the waiver on its ability to persuade a jury to convict Loral in the event that the incident is found to warrant prosecution.

* The President weighed the Justice Department's views carefully against factors which supported a waiver. The State Department recommended that the waiver would be in the national interest, and State and the Department of Defense found that the license contained the safeguards necessary to protect the national security. The licensing request was for a commercial satellite export, not for the type of activity for which Loral was being investigated. The State Department has a long-standing practice of not presumptively barring from a license companies under investigation as opposed to indictment. In balancing all these factors, we decided to approve the waiver.

* The process was transparent and open. Agencies responsible for our national security reviewed and supported the request, we took the additional step of asking Justice for its views. These considerations were reflected in a memorandum for my decision.

But didn't the President overrule Secretary Christopher when he opposed the 1996 transfer of licensing jurisdiction for commercial satellites to the Commerce Department?

* The President did not. The State Department initially opposed the transfer of jurisdiction to the Commerce Department. However, we then took specific steps to deal with its concerns. These additional safeguards resulted in State supporting the transfer of jurisdiction to the Commerce Department for commercial

communications satellites. Secretary Christopher confirmed this in Sun
Los
Angeles Times.

* Under the approach adopted, Defense, State and ACDA review all
commercial
satellite license applications to ensure they are consistent with national
security. If any agency disagrees with a proposed license, it can block th
license and put the issue into a dispute resolution process that can ultima
rise to me.

How do you respond to allegations that Loral's campaign contributions
influenced
your decision to grant it export waivers and also influenced your decisio
transfer licensing jurisdiction from State to Commerce?

* There is absolutely no connection between any campaign contribution
U.S.
foreign policy. There is no evidence of such a connection. It simply did
occur.

* The Loral waiver was prepared by State and supported by ACDA and
as in our
national interest. The President followed their recommendation.

* The policy of licensing U.S. commercial satellites to be launched by C
rockets is bipartisan and pre-dates my Administration. It was instituted b
President Reagan and further implemented by the Bush Administration.
Bush
Administration approved three waivers over three years for nine U.S. sa
to be launched from China; the President has approved ten waivers over
years
covering eleven satellite programs.

* Every waiver the President approved was based on a recommendation
the
State Department or the Commerce Department. Each license under the
waivers
was approved after careful interagency review that including State, Defe
and
ACDA. And the process begins from the bottom-up, with a company ma
request
for a license to the relevant agency which then seeks approval from the
agencies. Only then will a recommendation come to the President.

But it appears that the President's decision on the February licensing req
Loral was based on political pressure from one of his largest campaign c

* Loral's request for a prompt response to its 1998 licensing request had effect on the President's decision or any impact on national security.

* American companies that need U.S. government approvals for business transactions should be able to expect a prompt response, especially if they are operating under a specific deadline. They are not entitled to a positive response, but they do deserve a timely one.

* In the case of the 1998 Loral request, our staff was aware of a deadline and the important commercial implications and tried to be responsive. But the decision whether or not to grant the waiver was based on the judgments of the agencies involved in reviewing the license and recommending the waiver. In fact, the President's decision came after the deadlines identified by the company had passed, because we took the time to make an informed, judicious decision.

What about the McDonnell-Douglas case -- didn't they transfer sophisticated machine tools to China that were diverted to a facility that produces military aircraft and missiles?

* In fact, the McDonnell Douglas case is a good example of our export control system working just the way we designed it, with national security as its touchstone. In September 1994, the Administration approved the export of machine tools to China

by McDonnell Douglas of machine tools, to make parts for civilian aircraft built in China.

The licenses were approved after careful interagency review, including by the Departments of Defense, State, Energy and the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency.

* To prevent the equipment from being diverted from its intended use, the reviewing agencies added stringent conditions to the licenses. These included quarterly inspection reports by MD to monitor the equipment and detect unauthorized use. In preparing its first report in March 1995, the company discovered that the machine tools had been moved without authorization to an

aircraft production facility in Nanchang that produces both civilian and

aircraft. Only one of the machines in Nanchang -- a large hydraulic tool -- was uncrated, but it had not been rendered operational.

* MD promptly informed Commerce and Defense. Commerce immediately began to work

with MD and the Chinese government to secure the equipment. All the

tools were secured and returned to an authorized location monitored by the

where they remain today.

* Commerce Department investigators developed sufficient evidence to the case to the Department of Justice for a criminal investigation. The investigation is under the leadership of the Department of Justice, with participation of Commerce and Customs enforcement agents. The matter was the subject of a detailed report to Congress in November 1996 by the United States General Accounting Office.

Where there's smoke, there's fire: in the last couple of weeks, there have been multiple stories citing numerous cases of our export control system being sieve under the President's watch -- China satellites, McDonnell Douglas Supercomputers, furnaces to China. Hasn't the system gotten more lax, is

this a result of Ron Brown "dollar diplomacy" trumping national security interests?

* Just the opposite. If anything, we've made the export control system stronger both in terms of protecting our national security and making the license process more efficient and effective.

* In 1995, by Executive Order, the President expanded the right of Defense, State, Energy and ACDA to fully take part in the licensing process. Previously these agencies reviewed only certain dual-use applications (i.e. licenses for commercial technology that could have a military application). As a result of the EO, they now have the right to review every dual-use application.

* At the same time, we continued a process begun under the Bush Administration and supported by both parties in both houses of Congress to move essential commercial license applications to the Commerce Department, which has tighter deadlines and greater transparency -- but also stringent national security controls, including the obligation to secure the approval of Defense, State, Energy and ACDA on dual-use applications. If any of these agencies object to the license, they can block it and put the issue into a dispute resolution process that ultimately rises to me.

* This move reflected the reality that the Cold war was over and that our companies were being disadvantaged in their competition with foreign companies, which do not face the same export control restrictions. I would also point out that our national security benefits from the ability of our high tech firms to export around the world. These companies give our military its informational technological edge, but need the profits they generate from exports to fund R&D.

* As to the cases you cite -- several of which were exhaustively reported months and even years ago -- we should let the facts catch up with the emotional and erroneous charges that have been made.

CHINESE FAMILY PLANNING PRACTICES

June 10, 1998

Background: ABC News featured a report last night on forced sterilization and abortion in China. A woman who headed up the population control office in the town asserted that forced sterilization and abortion were used against women who failed to comply with birth control standards.

Is the U.S. aware of the use of coercive practices by the Chinese government in the implementation of its family planning program?

* The Government Of China officially prohibits the use of force to compel people to submit to abortion and sterilization. Nevertheless, we are aware that poor supervision of local officials who are under intense pressure to meet family planning targets can result in instances of abuse, including forced abortion and sterilization. Family planning policies in China vary widely between provinces and regions. Fertility in China is 2.4 births per woman, indicating that the one-child policy is not enforced on all Chinese couples.

What is the U.S. reaction to the report on Nightline last night?

* We are troubled by the report and will look into the matter further.

* We have stressed repeatedly with the Government of China our concerns about those elements of China's family planning program that are inconsistent with internationally agreed upon principles of non-coercion and voluntarism in population control, including the practices of forced sterilization and abortion. The issue will be addressed again during the upcoming visit.

* We are convinced that Chinese birth rates can be stabilized without coercion through voluntary family planning and reproductive health services, maternal and child health services, basic education for girls, fighting discrimination against women, and promoting economic development.

women and generally respecting human rights. We have urged the Chinese government to further embrace the comprehensive approach to population development agreed to at the U.N. conference in Cairo.

* We have also sought to provide protection to persons who are the victims of coercive family control practices and flee China. In 1996, the President signed into law immigration provisions that make clear that persons who have experienced forced abortion or sterilization or have reasonable fears of such practice be eligible for asylum in the United States.

What is the U.S. position on the activities of the U.N. population program (UNFPA) in China?

* The U.S. does not contribute any funds to UNFPA's work in China. As required by law, U.S. contributions to UNFPA are kept in a separate account so that cannot be used for the China program. In addition, U.S. law requires the Department to subtract the value of UNFPA's 1998 expenditures for China from the U.S. annual contribution of \$25 million to UNFPA. Thus, as UNFPA plans to spend \$5 million in China in 1998, our contribution to UNFPA this year was \$20 million.

* The new program, as designed by UNFPA, reflects the principles of voluntarism and non-coercion which the international community has been asking China to adopt. UNFPA early this year stated that the Chinese Government has agreed that birth quotas and targets will be suspended or removed in the 32 program counties. UNFPA will only disperse funds upon the removal or suspension of the quotas and targets, and will undertake extensive monitoring and evaluation of its activities in China. We will be watching closely to verify whether these commitments are fully implemented.

CHINA: COSCO
June 10, 1998

Background for the Briefer ONLY: On 26 May, the Navy signed a Reconciliation Decision

(ROD) regarding the transfer of the BRAC-closed Long Beach Naval C property to the city of Long Beach. Although not the final step (the Navy must co a "Lease in Furtherance of Conveyance" or LIFOC), the ROD is the princ step towards handing-over this property.

On 27 May, Mayor O'Neill wrote the President requesting a waiver for a lease to COSCO.

Mayor Beverly O'Neill wrote the President requesting he waive the prohibition contained in , section 2826 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-98,

which prohibits the transfer or lease of property at the closed Long Beach Naval Station to the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO). Per the statute,

President cannot exercise the waiver authority until he has received separate reports from the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the FBI on national security implications of a conveyance to COSCO and determined that appropriate action has been taken to address any national security risk identified in the reports. Although the statute called for the reports not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of the Act (November 18, 1997), only the FBI report

has been submitted. If the President were to exercise this waiver authority, it would go into effect 30 days after the President notifies Congress regarding his determinations under the Act. Anxious over pending FY-99 amendment to the House and Senate) that would deny the President waiver authority for such a lease,

Mayor seeks quick action from the White House.

We understand that the DOD report is awaiting General Counsel review and signature by the Secretary. The FBI report was released by the Justice Department on June 4th.

In order to exercise this waiver authority, the President must first determine that "(A) appropriate action has been taken to address any increased national security risk identified [in the reports from DoD and FBI] . . . ; and (B) that the conveyance would not adversely affect national security or significantly increase the counter-intelligence burden on the intelligence community."

Why is the White House involved with COSCO and the City of Long Beach?

* The prohibition contained in section 2826 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-98 requires a Presidential waiver in order to allow a conveyance (by sale, lease, or other method) of any portion of the closed

complex to COSCO.

Will the President grant a waiver to COSCO?

* Mayor Beverly O'Neil of Long Beach has written to the President to request that he exercise his waiver authority under section 2826 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY-98 to allow the lease of a portion of the closed Long Beach Naval complex to the China Ocean Shipping Company, COSCO.

Under the statute, the President's consideration of a waiver cannot be undertaken until he receives required reports from both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the FBI on the national security implications of a COSCO lease. To date, the FBI report has been received by the President.

* [IF PRESSED] The Defense Department is in the process of reviewing the report's contents to ensure that they fully assess the national security implications of COSCO's past and present operations. It is expected shortly.

CHINA MFN
June 4, 1998

Why renew MFN?

* MFN is critical to our ability to engage China. U.S. interests are best served by a secure, stable and open China. The manner in which we engage China will help determine whether it becomes more open, or whether it becomes more isolated and unpredictable.

* This vote must be about how best to promote U.S. interests. Extending MFN to China the same normal trade treatment we give to virtually every nation on earth will help further integrate China - and promote the interests of the American people.

Revoking MFN would rupture our relationship and jeopardize our political and economic security.

Why is engagement important?

The stakes are enormous, as demonstrated by regional events of the last

months. China has the potential to assist or obstruct U.S. objectives. Engagement is producing tangible results:

- * China condemned India's nuclear testing and urged restraint in Pakistan is hosting a P5 meeting in Geneva later this week to address South Asian concerns. China's role critical to preventing arms race and lessening conflict.

- * China has responded responsibly to Asia's financial turmoil. China has maintained the value of its currency, despite pressures to devalue -- which would likely set off a new round of competitive devaluation in the region, destabilizing its fragile stability.

- * China continues to play a constructive role in easing tensions and moving peace talks forward on the Korean Peninsula.

- * China and Taiwan have resumed cross strait contacts, and will resume senior level later this year. Tensions at lowest in three years, no threatened military exercises.

What steps has China taken toward international cooperation and adoption of international norms of behavior?

China's adherence to international norms advances the interests of the American people.

- * On nonproliferation, China has joined us in the NPT, CTBT, and CWI regimes, committed to no new nuclear assistance to Iran, joined a major international nuclear suppliers group, the Zangger Committee, and put into place comprehensive nuclear export controls.

- * We have a strong bilateral program to combat alien smuggling, narcot trafficking and terrorism., and are working with China to meet environmental challenges.

- * Negotiations continue on China's acceptance of WTO standards that are critical to greater access for U.S. goods and services. MFN extension supports our efforts to draw China more fully into the global economy and builds cooperation in important areas.

What are the economic stakes of MFN?

- * An estimated 170,000 U.S. jobs depend on exports to China. Those exports have more than tripled over the past decade, to \$12.8 billion., and China is now fifth largest trading partner.
- * Revocation would derail the talks on China's entry into the WTO, under which China would reduce its trade barriers substantially, creating new export opportunities for U.S. companies and workers.
- * Revocation would invite retaliation against U.S. exporters and investors. Revocation would also hurt U.S. consumers, who could pay upwards of billion dollars more in a single year because of higher tariffs on such products as shoes and clothing.

Doesn't MFN undercut movement on human rights?

- * Engagement does not mean endorsement. The Administration has consistently pressed its human rights concerns with China, including President Clinton's direct statements to the world at the October summit, in the presence of China's President.
- * Our strategy is showing results. China has released dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan; signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and committed to signing the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- * Normal trade and continued economic engagement continues the process of opening China, exposing Chinese to our politics, ideas, economy and personal freedoms. Revoking normal trade status will diminish these ties and play into the hands of those in China who want less openness.

Doesn't MFN undercut religious freedom?

- * Revocation would also set back the cause of expanding religious freedoms in China. China has received our religious leaders' delegation, expanding the dialogue on this key issue.
- * Revoking MFN would close doors to U.S. religious groups and others who seek to

promote religious freedom in China through educational, cultural and other exchanges. It would also make it more difficult to pursue the cases of imprisoned religious leaders.

Is MFN important to Hong Kong and Taiwan?

* Hong Kong is the gateway of trade between the U.S. and China. Because of this close linkage, revocation of MFN for China would seriously weaken the role of Hong Kong by slashing its trade, eliminating tens of thousands of jobs, slowing economic growth and income sharply. That's why Hong Kong leaders across the political spectrum favor renewal of MFN for China.

Note: Reason for above changes is that we don't want to suggest that treating Hong Kong as Hong Kong would be subject to disapproval action by the Congress as regards China's MFN status. Hong Kong in its own right is a WTO member not subject to Title IV of the Trade Act and Jackson-Vanik.

* Although revocation of MFN for China would not directly affect our trade with Taiwan, it would damage Taiwan's economy, with \$20-30 billion invested in the mainland. Taiwan's economic viability is in the interest of the American people.

WHY CONTINUATION OF NORMAL TRADE STATUS FOR CHINA SERVES THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

ENGAGEMENT: President Clinton's policy of engagement with China is expanding our cooperation in areas important to the national interest - stability in Asia, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, combating international crime and drug trafficking, protecting the environment and expanding our

beneficial trade. It also provides us with an effective means to deal forthrightly with our differences, notably human rights. The manner in which we engage China will help determine whether it becomes an increasingly more productive partner for America, or whether it becomes more isolated and unpredictable. The President's strategy is showing results and we need to stay the course. This vote must be about how best to promote U.S. interests.

Extending to China the same normal trade treatment we give to virtually any nation on earth will help further integrate China - and promote the interests of the American people. Revoking MFN would rupture our relationship with the rest of the world and jeopardize our political and economic security.

ENORMOUS STAKES: The stakes are enormous, as demonstrated by the events of

the last six months. China has the potential to advance U.S. objectives. Engagement is producing tangible results:

- * China condemned both India and Pakistan's nuclear testing and urged restraint, and is hosting a P-5 meeting in Geneva later this week to address South Asian security concerns. China's role critical to preventing arms race and lessening chance of conflict.
- * China has played a constructive role in responding to the Asian financial crisis, in part by maintaining its exchange rate, thereby decreasing pressure for competitive devaluation in the region.
- * China continues to play a constructive role in peace talks and easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
- * China has resumed cross-Straits contacts with Taiwan, and will resume

senior levels later this year. Tensions at lowest level in three years, with threatening military exercises.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: China's adherence to international law advances the

interests of the American people. On nonproliferation, China has joined the NPT, CTBT, CWC, and BWC regimes, committed to no new nuclear weapons assistance to

Iran, joined a major international nuclear suppliers group, the Zangger Committee, and put into place comprehensive nuclear export controls. V

a strong bilateral program to combat alien smuggling, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and are working with China to meet environmental challenges. Extension supports our efforts to subject China to the same international disciplines as other major powers and builds cooperation.

JOBS: An estimated 170,000 U.S. jobs depend on exports to China. The exports

have more than tripled over the past decade, to \$12.8 billion, and China is our fifth largest trading partner. Revocation would derail the talks on China's entry into the WTO, under which China would reduce its trade barriers substantially, creating new export opportunities for U.S. companies and workers.

Revocation would invite retaliation against U.S. exporters and investors. Revocation would also hurt U.S. consumers, who could pay upwards of billions of dollars more in a single year because of higher tariffs on such products as shoes and clothing.

HUMAN RIGHTS: Engagement does not mean endorsement. The Administration has consistently pressed its human rights concerns with China, including President Clinton's direct statements to the world at the October summit, in the presence of China's President. Our approach is showing results. China has released dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan, signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and committed to signing the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Normal trade and continued economic engagement continue the process of opening China, exposing Chinese to our political economy and personal freedoms. Revoking normal trade status will diminish these ties and play into the hands of those in China who want less openness.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: Revocation would also set back the cause of religious freedom in China. Over the past year, China has received our religious leaders' delegation, expanding the dialogue on this key issue. Revoking MFN will close doors to U.S. religious groups and others that seek to promote religious freedom in China through educational, cultural and other exchanges. It would also make it more difficult to pursue the cases of imprisoned religious leaders.

HONG KONG AND TAIWAN: Hong Kong is the gateway of trade between the U.S. and China. Revocation of MFN for China would weaken the Hong Kong economy by slashing its trade, eliminating tens of thousands of jobs, cutting economic growth and income sharply. Hong Kong leaders across the political spectrum favor renewal of MFN for China. Revocation would damage Taiwan's economy. \$20-30 billion invested in the mainland. Taiwan's economic viability is in the interest of the American people.

CHINA TRIP

June 9, 1998

During the President's upcoming trip to Hong Kong, is he going to meet top vote-getter Martin Lee?

* The President strongly supports Hong Kong's democratic development and preservation of its way of life and fundamental freedoms. We welcome

Legislative Council elections whose outcome demonstrates Hong Kong's people's desire for more democracy, not less. During his brief visit to Hong Kong, President plans to meet with democratically elected representatives of Hong Kong's political parties, including Martin Lee's Democratic Party. This will demonstrate the President's personal commitment to the democratic process in Hong Kong.

* The President looks forward to private discussions with Martin Lee.

* (if pressed) The exact form of the meeting is still under discussion. The President's visit to Hong Kong is still five weeks away, and many events on the trip naturally are not yet in final form.

Will the President attend arrival ceremonies in Tiananmen Square and is Sandy Berger going to China next week to negotiate concessions from the Chinese in exchange for such a ceremony?

* During warm weather months, it is Chinese practice to hold arrival ceremonies in front of the Great Hall of the People adjacent to Tiananmen Square. The arrival ceremonies for other heads of state who have visited China since including Major, Yeltsin, Hashimoto, and Chirac and Netanyahu, have been held there.

* The President's strong views about what happened at Tiananmen in 1989 are well-known and a matter of public record. He has made clear in the past that he will continue to make clear our view that the break-up of the demonstrations and the consequent killing of many innocent civilians, was unacceptable and a grave mistake by the Chinese leaders.

* One should not confuse form with substance. This President has pushed aggressively on human rights issues with the Chinese and has gotten results such as the release of prominent dissidents Wei Jingsheng and Wang Dan and a Chinese statement of intention to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He will continue to press for progress on human rights during his trip to China and is convinced that engagement at his level is a very important way to encourage such progress.

* As for Sandy Berger's trip to Beijing, this has long been under discussion.

Berger held several rounds of talks with Chinese leaders in preparing for Zemin's visit last October. His visit (leaving Washington May 31 for talk June 2) next week will serve a similar purpose, namely to discuss the overall planning for the President's visit.

* [IF PRESSED on whether he'll discuss Tiananmen] I'm not going to go into details on what Berger will discuss. He'll discuss a broad range of matters relating to the President's visit.

With Congressional opposition becoming more vocal, is the President still going to China?

* The President absolutely will go to China later this month. He will go to China because it is in the U.S. national interest to continue our successful policy of engagement which has produced results in the areas of nonproliferation, human rights, rule of law, and international trade. It is through constructive dialogue--including visits of heads of state--that we can achieve our goals on these issues.

RUSSIA: IRAN MISSILE SANCTIONS June 12, 1998

Is the President going to veto the Iran missile sanctions bill? Won't the bill cripple U.S.-Russian space cooperation?

* Congress has passed this legislation. Our position remains that senior advisors recommend a veto.

* We remain concerned that the bill sets a very low standard for imposing sanctions and does not include the kind of waiver we've seen in similar legislation. And it comes at a time when we're working cooperatively with the Russian Federation to address our concerns about technology transfers and proliferation, especially as they relate to Iran.

* Bill's inflexibility handcuffs the President's conduct of foreign policy.

* The bill could have a serious impact on important U.S.-Russian space cooperation activities. But remind you that the bill is targeted at foreign entities that engage in activities with Iran's missile program.

* Not clear yet how many entities that would be affected by the legislation working on U.S.-Russia space cooperation. It's also hard to come up with an exact dollar figure for the bill's impact on U.S.-Russian space cooperation.

START II POSTPONEMENT

June 10, 1998

What is your reaction to today's reports from Moscow that the Duma has to postpone next week's June 16 hearing on START II ratification?

* We are disappointed by this development, as it will delay efforts by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to bring START II into force and get on with formal negotiations on START III, which is in both our interests.

[If asked]: What does this mean for the possibility of a Clinton-Yeltsin summit?

* We have set no date for a summit as yet.

[If pressed]

* As I said previously, we have not ruled out holding a summit prior to START II ratification.

* As I also noted, the work that President Clinton and President Yeltsin do clearly will proceed in a much more fruitful environment if START II has been ratified.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/18/98 8:45:51 PM

FROM Blinken, Antony J.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT RE: Berger Rebuttal to Helms on CTBT/ABM [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Gray, Wendy E.
Bell, Robert G.

TEXT_BODY agree -- we will try to work this ASAP tomorrow.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Thursday, June 18,
1998 6:08 PM
To: Blinken, Antony J.
Cc: Gray, Wendy E.; Bell, Robert
G.
Subject: Berger Rebuttal to Helms on CTBT/ABM [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Tony
--

You undoubtedly saw Senator Helms's Op Ed today in the Wall Street Journal on CTBT/ABM. I think a strong case can be made for "striking back" as quickly as possible (put differently, Tora! Tora! Tora!). Moreover, we have an opportunity to "prevail" on the WSJ for "equal time" on CTBT. With this in mind, I've put together a draft rebuttal for Berger, drawing in part from the Berger CTBT Op Ed we have had in the can for nine months. Let me know what you think.

<< File: Berger CTBT Rebuttal.doc >>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/21/98 11:15:39 PM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CTBT - ABM/NMD Deal [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY
Bob --

On Thursday, the Wall Street Journal printed an OP-ED by Senator Helms on CTBT and ABM. The good news is that Senator Helms has, in effect, walked into the "trap" we were hoping to set two months ago (April 20) when we outlined for Sandy a strategy for linking CTBT in a package with ABM and START. The bad news: the Duma's delay in ratifying START II means we are not in a position to "trade" our hostage (the START/ABM package) for CTBT. That said, continuing the conversation we had last Wednesday evening, I believe there may be other "trades" in the area of ABM/NMD that might be made in July that could break loose CTBT hearings and (possibly) a vote on the Senate floor. Here are the candidates:

1. Support Senator Helms' Hearings on ABM. In his June 18 OP-ED, Senator Helms states "I intend to begin Foreign Relations Committee consideration of the ABM Protocols shortly and to have a full Senate vote on them before Congress adjourns this year." Presumably, the Administration is not obligated to cooperate with Senator Helms in this endeavor (i.e., provide Administration witnesses, etc). However, perhaps we can cut a deal with Helms to the effect that if he agrees to hold all necessary hearings on CTBT (we might even add mark up and a floor vote, at least as an in-going position), we will agree to provide witnesses and support his hearings on ABM. In doing so, we would maintain our position that we would NOT agree to formally transmit the ABM/START package -- or, support a vote on the Senate floor on ABM -- until after the Duma has ratified START II.

2. Support a debate and vote on the Cochran Bill. Democrats were able to frustrate a debate over Senator Cochran's "American Missile Protection Act of 1998" by one vote in early May (the bill states "It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States

against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate))). In exchange for SFRC hearings and a floor vote on CTBT, we could agree to allow a debate and vote on Senator Cochran's Missile Protection Act this year. Under this option, we would not make any commitments as to whether or not the President would sign the bill if passed in the Senate (and House). We would simply agree not to obstruct a debate and vote on the Senate floor.

3. Support

a debate and vote on the Cochran Bill, and agree the President will sign the measure. This option goes one step further in that -- in exchange for hearings and a floor vote on CTBT this year, we would agree to sign the Cochran Missile Protection Act. Dancing with the devil you say? Well, consider this: the bill simply states what our "policy" is with respect to NMD deployment -- with no dates, no architecture, and no funds. Moreover, with some creative interpretation, we could argue in a signing statement that any assessment of "as soon as technologically possible" and "effective" must take into account an assessment of the "threat" -- consistent with our current policy. In short, while we would drop the "3+3" moniker in signing on to Cochran, the same "caveats" (i.e., threat assessment, effectiveness, etc.) could be applied in signing on to Cochran, in the form of a signing statement.

Those are the three basic options as I see them (note that I don't include in my list agreeing to "leap frog" the Duma and submit the ABM/START package to the Senate for a vote this fall, on the grounds this would almost certainly delay, if not kill, any chance of the Duma acting on START II this year, if not ever). I am working on the text of a memo that we could consider giving to Sandy after the China trip outlining the options, along with the "pros and cons" of each (for example, how these "trades" might affect: prospects for START II ratification in the Duma this fall; prospects for Senate advice and consent to CTBT; Senate Democrats; and the "missile defense" dynamic). I do think, however, that the Republicans will be hard pressed not to "cut a deal" on CTBT if we can come up with the appropriate "quid pro quo" on ABM/NMD, given what both Helms and Lott have said on the subject in the wake of India's (and Pakistan's) nuclear tests. In short, there is an opportunity here to think outside the box.

Steve

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/2/98 4:46:31 PM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Draft Read Ahead for Berger/CTBT Mtg [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Kelly, Sandra L.

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Thursday,
July 02, 1998 4:44 PM
To: Bell, Robert G.; Rudman, Mara E.; Farrar,
Jay C.; Blinken, Antony J.
Subject: Draft Read Ahead for Berger/CTBT
Mtg [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Colleagues -- We are scheduled to meet with Sandy at 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday, July 8, to review the bidding on CTBT. Solicit your comments on the following draft "read-ahead" requested by the FO that I propose to send forward COB Tuesday (July 7). Enjoy the holiday. Thanks. Steve.

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY
PRIOR TO WEDNESDAY'S 4:00 MEETING. THANK YOU.

A brief assessment
of where we are and checklist for Wednesday's meeting on CTBT.

State of play. Our objective has been to schedule hearings and a floor vote this year on CTBT. While the Indian and Pakistani tests have strengthened public support for the test ban (recent polls show 75-85 percent favor ratification), they have also complicated the ratification dynamic within the Republican caucus: Senator Lott used the tests to publicly tag the Treaty as "ineffectual and unverifiable," and Senator Helms still refuses to schedule hearings -- at least not without a reciprocal commitment by the Administration to support Senate consideration of the ABM protocols this year. Democrats, however, have rallied behind CTBT: Daschle has stated publicly that

Senate Democrats will attempt to force the CTBT issue and move the Treaty this year. NGO's are engaged in a campaign to keep CTBT visible and to press for hearings.

Objectives for July. We need to use the next month to determine whether and how we can still move the CTBT through the Senate this fall, and failing that, lay the groundwork for persuading Senators Lott and Helms to schedule hearings before the Senate adjourns so as to facilitate early approval of the Treaty in 1999. With this in mind, our proposed itinerary for the month calls for: (a) touching base with the Democratic Senate leadership and moderate Republicans; (b) keeping the CTBT issue "visible" with the general public, and (c) considering a variant of our earlier "CTBT/ABM" linkage.

Legislative. We have previously proposed the following three meetings for your consideration:

* Meeting

with Daschle. If you were not able to reach Daschle prior to your departure for China, recommend we try and schedule a meeting or call to ascertain what he has in mind in terms of a mechanism for "forcing" Senate consideration of the Treaty this year.

* Meeting with

Brownback/Robb. Inviting these two Senators over to discuss their recent trip to India and Pakistan would provide an opportunity to discuss with Brownback -- a key Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee -- how we might move the Treaty.

* Meeting/meetings

with other "swing" Republicans. As previously suggested, we would also recommend a meeting (or meetings) with a core group of "swing" Republicans, including: McCain, Stevens, Hagel, Warner, Domenici, DeWine, Frist and Collins.

Public Affairs. Keeping CTBT

visible plays to our greatest strength: the overwhelming support of the American people for the Test Ban. An aggressive public diplomacy campaign also supports our private engagement with Senators. With the media "afterglow" following the Indian and Pakistani tests now fading, we will need to work harder to keep CTBT in the public eye.

* Nobel Laureates Event. Our best opportunity for a "high profile" event involving senior administration officials is to schedule something around the endorsement of over 30 Nobel Laureates. This could be done at an event hosted by the Secretary of State involving other key Cabinet heads and validators (such as the four former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

* Berger Op Ed. Editorials

across the country are running overwhelmingly in favor of ratification, and we have held our own in the post-India/Pak "Opinion" war (the Exon-Hatfield-Mitchell and Drell Op-Eds, among others). You have a draft Op-Ed responding to Senator Helm's recent attack in the WSJ. We can hopefully make the case for "equal time."

* "Small"

Bell/Berger NGO meeting. Hosted by Bob with a Berger "drop by," designed to maintain a high level of enthusiasm and commitment among our key supporters.

Strategy. In his June 18 OP-ED, Senator Helms states "I intend to begin Foreign Relations Committee consideration of the ABM Protocols shortly and to have a full Senate vote on them before Congress adjourns this year." The Duma's failure to ratify START II by the July recess means we will not have the option of transmitting the ABM protocols to the Senate this summer in exchange for Senate hearings and votes on both CTBT and ABM this year. That said, if needed, we might be able to augment Senator Daschle's efforts to "take a hostage" with a "carrot" -- that is, cut a deal with Helms to the effect that if he agrees to hold all necessary hearings on CTBT (we might even add mark up and a floor vote, at least as an in-going position), we will agree to provide witnesses and support his hearings this fall on ABM. In doing so, we would maintain our position that we would NOT agree to formally transmit the ABM/START package -- or, support a vote on the Senate floor on ABM -- until after the Duma has ratified START II.

Within the Administration.

Secretary Albright has been a vocal proponent of Senate ratification since the Indian/Pakistani tests. You might want to use the next ABC to discuss whether now is the time for the Secretary to privately discuss CTBT with Helms and Biden. You might also consider a discussion of CTBT at an upcoming Foreign Policy Team Meeting.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/8/98 1:35:36 PM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Read Ahead for Berger/CTBT Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

"Bell-only Addendum" to my CTBT read-ahead:

Bob -- The imminent release of the Rumsfeld Commission Report makes it more likely that a linkage will develop between CTBT -- this year, or next year -- and ABM. As we have discussed, this linkage presents both opportunity and peril, depending on how adeptly we play the "linkage" card.

In our "read-ahead" for Sandy, we reference the possibility of augmenting whatever "hostage" Daschle might have with an ABM "carrot" -- that is, we would agree to support (through witnesses and testimony) hearings this fall on the ABM agreements (we would still hold back on formal transmittal and a Senate vote pending Duma action on START II) in exchange for Senate hearings and a vote on CTBT. This could be sold by Albright as a "significant" concession to Helms, and might be sufficient to get Helms to move forward with at least hearings on CTBT (and ABM) this fall.

That said, our agreeing to support hearings on ABM may not have sufficient distance to get us on the putting green with Lott (in terms of scheduling floor action on CTBT). For that to happen, we may have to throw into the mix a "deal" that involves the Cochran bill (unless Daschle has a really juicy hostage up there).

As you know, I believe there are two options here if the "hostage/ABM hearings" strategy needs to be augmented: (1) agree to support a debate and vote on the Senate floor on Cochran, or (2) more risky, support a debate and vote on the Cochran bill, and agree the President will sign the measure in exchange for CTBT.

Setting aside the merits of either of these two approaches, you might want to indicate to Sandy tomorrow that: (a) the linkage dynamic between CTBT and

ABM may develop independent of whatever tac we take, and (b) in addition to agreeing to support ABM hearings, we are thinking through two other more "radical" approaches in the spirit of "out of the box" thinking. We could then send Sandy a "think piece" to provoke a further discussion with him. One consideration: after next week's Rumsfeld report, Lott may be able to get a one-vote switch allowing debate on the Cochran bill independent of any "deal" with us. Thus, if we want to trade, we may have to move quickly.

Steve

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.

Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 1998 12:10 PM

To: @DEFENSE

- Defense Policy; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @PLANNING - Strat
Plan & Comm; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Subject: Read Ahead for

Berger/CTBT Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

PLEASE PASS

TO SANDY PRIOR TO THURSDAY'S 1:15-1:45 CTBT MEETING. THANK
YOU.

A

brief assessment of where we are and checklist for Thursday's meeting
on CTBT.

State of play. Our objective has been to schedule hearings and a floor vote this year on CTBT. While the Indian and Pakistani tests have strengthened public support for the test ban (recent polls show 75-85 percent favor ratification), they have also complicated the ratification dynamic within the Republican caucus: Senator Lott used the tests to publicly tag the Treaty as "unverifiable and ineffectual," and Senator Helms still refuses to schedule hearings -- at least not without a reciprocal commitment by the Administration to support Senate consideration of the ABM protocols this year. Democrats, however, have rallied behind CTBT: Daschle has stated publicly that Senate Democrats will attempt to force the CTBT issue and move the Treaty this year. NGO's are engaged in a campaign to keep CTBT visible and to press for hearings.

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July. We need to use the next month to determine whether and how we can still move the CTBT through the Senate this fall, and failing that, lay the groundwork for persuading Senators Lott and Helms to schedule hearings before the Senate adjourns so as to facilitate

early approval of the Treaty in 1999. With this in mind, our proposed itinerary for the month calls for: (a) touching base with the Democratic Senate leadership and moderate Republicans; (b) keeping the CTBT issue "visible" with the general public, and (c) considering a variant of our earlier "CTBT/ABM" linkage.

Legislative. We have previously proposed the following three meetings for your consideration:

- * Meeting with Daschle. If you were not able to reach Daschle prior to your departure for China, recommend we try and schedule a meeting or call to ascertain what he has in mind in terms of a mechanism for "forcing" Senate consideration of the Treaty this year.

- * Meeting with Brownback/Robb. Inviting these two Senators over to discuss their recent trip to India and Pakistan would provide an opportunity to discuss with Brownback -- a key Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee -- how we might move the Treaty.

- * Meeting/meetings with other "swing" Republicans. As previously suggested, we would also recommend a meeting (or meetings) with a core group of "swing" Republicans, including: McCain, Stevens, Hagel, Warner, Domenici, DeWine, Frist and Collins.

Public Affairs. Keeping CTBT visible plays to our greatest strength: the overwhelming support of the American people for the Test Ban. An aggressive public diplomacy campaign also supports our private engagement with Senators. With the media "afterglow" following the Indian and Pakistani tests now fading, we will need to work harder to keep CTBT in the public eye.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/9/98 7:08:31 PM
FROM Farrar, Jay C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Read Ahead for Berger/CTBT Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.

TEXT_BODY

Steve,

I have done some calling over the past two days on CTBT - especially to the offices of the "swing Republicans" you listed below. I hate to tell you this, but the news is all negative - not one staffer I spoke with indicated their boss would be willing to take on Helms on this issue - although I haven't spoken with Steven's folks, yet. Also, Warner is not/not a supporter of CTBT in any way, shape, or form.

So, I don't mean to discourage you, but I also want you and Bob to have the "real" information that Members' staffers are conveying to me. There is a very real reluctance to take on Helms on CTBT - he's apparently laid down a marker, and no one wants to cross him.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven
P.

Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 1998 12:10 PM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense

Policy; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Subject: Read Ahead for Berger/CTBT Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

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Within the Administration.

Secretary Albright has been a vocal proponent of Senate ratification since the Indian/Pakistani tests. You might want to use the next ABC to discuss whether now is the time for the Secretary to privately discuss CTBT with Helms and Biden. You might also consider a discussion of CTBT at an upcoming Foreign Policy Team Meeting.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/9/98 7:21:23 PM
FROM Farrar, Jay C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Read Ahead for Berger/CTBT Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

I like and respect your resilience and your tenacity!

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.

Sent: Thursday, July 09,
1998 7:19 PM

To: Farrar, Jay C.

Cc: @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs;
Bell, Robert G.

Subject: RE: Read Ahead for Berger/CTBT Meeting
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Jay -- I'm not surprised. We
are not discouraged. This will be tough. That's why we get paid
the big bucks. Steve.

-----Original Message-----

From: Farrar,

Jay C.

Sent: Thursday, July 09, 1998 7:09 PM

To: Andreasen, Steven
P.

Cc: @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs

Subject: RE: Read Ahead
for Berger/CTBT Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Steve,

I
have done some calling over the past two days on CTBT - especially
to the offices of the "swing Republicans" you listed below. I hate
to tell you this, but the news is all negative - not one staffer

I spoke with indicated their boss would be willing to take on Helms on this issue - although I haven't spoken with Steven's folks, yet. Also, Warner is not/not a supporter of CTBT in any way, shape, or form.

So, I don't mean to discourage you, but I also want you and Bob to have the "real" information that Members' staffers are conveying to me. There is a very real reluctance to take on Helms on CTBT - he's apparently laid down a marker, and no one wants to cross him.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven
P.

Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 1998 12:10 PM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense

Policy; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @NSA - Natl Security Advisor

Subject: Read Ahead for Berger/CTBT

Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY

PRIOR TO THURSDAY'S 1:15-1:45 CTBT MEETING. THANK YOU.

A brief
assessment of where we are and checklist for Thursday's meeting on
CTBT.

State of play. Our objective has been to schedule hearings and a floor vote this year on CTBT. While the Indian and Pakistani tests have strengthened public support for the test ban (recent polls show 75-85 percent favor ratification), they have also complicated the ratification dynamic within the Republican caucus: Senator Lott used the tests to publicly tag the Treaty as "unverifiable and ineffectual," and Senator Helms still refuses to schedule hearings -- at least not without a reciprocal commitment by the Administration to support Senate consideration of the ABM protocols this year. Democrats, however, have rallied behind CTBT: Daschle has stated publicly that Senate Democrats will attempt to force the CTBT issue and move the Treaty this year. NGO's are engaged in a campaign to keep CTBT visible and to press for hearings.

Objectives for

July. We need to use the next month to determine whether and how we can still move the CTBT through the Senate this fall, and failing that, lay the groundwork for persuading Senators Lott and Helms to schedule hearings before the Senate adjourns so as to facilitate early approval of the Treaty in 1999. With this in mind, our proposed itinerary for the month calls for: (a) touching base with the Democratic

Senate leadership and moderate Republicans; (b) keeping the CTBT issue "visible" with the general public, and (c) considering a variant of our earlier "CTBT/ABM" linkage.

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