

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to Mara Rudman. Subject: Cuba Paper. (6 pages)	03/13/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Michael Orofino to Douglas Babcock. Subject: FW: Cuba Paper. (7 pages)	06/16/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/13/1998-04/15/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5703

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/16/98 10:12:09 AM
FROM Hamel, Michael A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: VP CTBT Pitch to Enviros [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Steve - I will check into it and get back to you.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Wednesday, March
11, 1998 6:34 PM
To: Hamel, Michael A.
Cc: Bell, Robert G.; Fuerth,
Leon S.; Blinken, Antony J.; Farrar, Jay C.
Subject: VP CTBT Pitch
to Enviros [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Mike --

Rumor has
it that the Vice President routinely meets with a group representing
10 environmental groups. This is an opportunity for us to pitch
"CTBT" to what should be a sympathetic audience with a committed
group of activists -- many of whom are aware of CTBT, and the fact
that Senator Helms has linked CTBT's fate to that of their primary
interest -- Kyoto. If there is such a meeting in the near future
(i.e., in the next month), we would like to propose having the VP
use some of his time to pitch CTBT. If not, perhaps we could arrange
such a meeting to make such a pitch. If needbe, Bob and I would
be happy to sit down with you and Leon to talk this through.

Thanks.
Steve

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/27/98 4:54:07 PM

FROM Crowley, Philip J.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT PLEASE REVIEW GUIDANCE ASAP FOR JS [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Barnett, Cheryl E.
Caravelli, John M.
Cohen, Julie E.
Courtney, William H.
Fooks, Michael D.
Fort, Jane B.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Greer, Jason H.
Marty, Joseph H.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Ryu, Rexon Y.
Todd, Gwentyth E.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dobbins, James F.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Lawson, Chappell H.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Antholis, William J.
Boone, Sherman G.
Kyle, Robert D.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Odlum, Geoffrey M.
Williams, Mary C.
Albert, Ronda A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Gagnon, James M.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Bandler, Donald K.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Braden, Susan R.
Brown, Keirn C.

Butler, Lawrence E.
Covey, James P.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Bandler, Donald K.
Covey, James P.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Busby, Scott W.
Letts, Kelly J.
Malley, Robert
Naplan, Steven J.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Seaton, James B.
Witkowski, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY

Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
Hill, Roseanne M.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Widmer, Edward L.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.

Hunerwadel, Joan S.

TEXT_BODY

Jim is asking if we need to update anything for the party for the weekend. If there is anything you know has changed now, let me know and I'll build in an update for tomorrow. As we go through the weekend, stay connected with me if we need to change the guidance.

Thanks

PJ

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

potus3-26___.doc

Foreign Policy Q's and A's
Presidential Press Conference
March 26, 1998

RUSSIA
MEPP
IRAQ
IRAN
KOSOVO
NATO EXPANSION
AFRICA TRADE
GENEVA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
MEXICO
COLOMBIA
INDONESIA
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
LANDMINES

RUSSIA

Background on the Yeltsin-Kohl-Chirac discussion: Baltics and NATO did not come up in the trilateral discussions. EU membership did come up at the press conference. Kohl, with support from Chirac, said that Baltic EU membership would be looked at in the context of the so-called Copenhagen criteria

(human rights, economic and political stability) FYI -- Estonia has been extended an invitation to be among next six new EU members currently negotiating accession agreements.

Wasn't the Moscow trilateral summit a deliberate slap at the United States, taking advantage of you being in Africa?

* To the contrary, we welcome this meeting of close friends of the United States.

It's another sign of Russia's growing ties to the family of European democracies and an indication of movement towards a Europe free of rivalry.

* I am delighted that my good friends Boris Yeltsin, Helmut Kohl and Jacques

Chirac were able to take time from their schedules to meet today. I look forward to hearing from them on their discussions.

What about Yeltsin's comment that the Summit was evidence of Russian membership in a "greater Europe," on a par with the U.S.?

* We favor Russian cooperation with Europe. America's ties to Europe are exceptionally close, through NATO and many other arrangements and economic links.

The Russians claim that Chirac spoke out against Baltic membership in NATO?

Isn't this contrary to the Open Door commitment which the Alliance made at the Madrid Summit?

* I understand that the question of Baltic admission to NATO was not raised in Moscow. I want to reaffirm my own strongly held view and the confirmed policy of the Alliance: the door to membership remains open to all democracies in Europe.

* As I said when we signed the Baltic Charter in Washington in January, we are working to advance the integration of the Baltic states into the transatlantic

community.

Russia and France have been at odds with the U.S. on our approach to Iraq and Kosovo, watering down U.S. proposals for decisive action. Are you concerned that this meeting was aimed at the United States?

* We have many mutual interests and ties with these governments, but also some disagreements. This is normal.

* As Chancellor Kohl noted at his news conference, the summit was not aimed against anyone. We are in favor of contacts which foster mutually beneficial Russian links to European Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Do you have any lingering concerns about Yeltsin's abrupt dismissal of government?

* President Yeltsin exercised his constitutional prerogative as president of the Russian Federation. It's not my place to second-guess internal decisions taken by President Yeltsin as Russia's legitimately elected leader.

* We are encouraged, however, by his public reaffirmation of his commitment to reform, and that his priority in naming a new government will be to give impetus to economic reform.

* We will continue to support Russia in its transition to a market-based democracy and its integration with global and regional institutions.

Have you heard directly from President Yeltsin?

* I have sent him a message that we support his continued emphasis on economic reforms. I would expect to hear from him after I return home.

Do you still think that you and Yeltsin will meet sometime this year?

* We will see each other at the Summit of the Eight in Birmingham in May.

* After Russia ratifies START II, I will look forward to a Moscow Summit where President Yeltsin and I can review the full range of issues in our relations and give impetus to START III negotiations.

Should we be concerned that this could lead to further political infighting or postpone reform initiatives or START II ratification?

* The Russian Federation has clear constitutional guidelines for installing a new government. President Yeltsin's spokesman indicated that Yeltsin is expected to move quickly in naming a new prime minister.

* President Yeltsin has said economic reform should have more impetus, and we see this as a very positive direction.

* We will continue to work with the Russian government on all issues of mutual interest, including START II ratification that we hope to see achieved within the next few months.

Will Vice President Gore's Commission be suspended?

* As the new Russian government comes on board, we will continue to engage at a variety of levels, including to promote reform integration of Russia into global economic institutions, and a range of mutually beneficial cooperative programs.

* For five years the Vice President has ably co-chaired our joint U.S.-Russia Commission, which has strengthened concrete cooperation in areas ranging from energy to space.

* We hope that President Yeltsin will want to continue the work of the Commission which he and President Clinton began at Vancouver in 1993. We certainly want to do so.

Is the situation stable or have we seen any reaction by the military that would cause concern?

* We will continue to follow events there very closely. Russia appears completely calm, with no unusual military activity. The financial markets are behaving normally. There have been no indications of any instability whatsoever.

What's your current assessment of Yeltsin's health?

* President Yeltsin appears to be back at work. We have no particular details on his recovery from his respiratory illness.

If Kiriyenko is nominated as Prime Minister, what is your reaction? Will the Duma approve him?

* Personnel decisions are President Yeltsin's to make.

* U.S. officials have had an excellent working relationship with Kiriyenko during his tenure as deputy minister and then minister of fuels and energy. He appears to be a strong supporter of economic reform.

With all this uncertainty in Russian, isn't this a bad time to press forward with NATO enlargement?

* NATO enlargement will help stabilize Europe, which will benefit Russia.

* Russia has moved forward with NATO-Russia Council and Partnership for Peace, even in the wake of NATO's decision to enlarge in Madrid.

* Delaying now will create uncertainty, not cause it.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Are you at all optimistic that Dennis Ross will be successful in winning agreement from Netanyahu and Arafat for the U.S. proposal regarding a West Bank withdrawal?

* I won't go into specifics about our ideas on what needs to be done. Dennis Ross is going to the region to finalize those ideas with the parties. He will report back to me in the coming days.

* Needless to say, we believe we have reached a critical point where the parties need to make the hard decisions necessary to move the peace process forward.

* I have spoken to the Prime Minister twice in the past week. Secretary Albright has spoken with Chairman Arafat as well. In the dialogue that we have had in recent days and weeks, we have presented ideas that reflect our best judgment of what is necessary to move forward at a time when the peace process needs to be resumed.

Prime Minister Netanyahu appears to be publicly pressuring you to back off your proposal regarding the West Bank?

* This is not about pressuring Israel or Israel pressuring the United States. The ideas we have presented represent our best judgement about what it will take to resume the process.

* I understand from my discussions with both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat the difficult challenges that we face. But the hard decisions must be made if we are to restore confidence in the peace process.

Your proposal appears to call for a 13 percent withdrawal from the West Bank? Is that right? The Israelis have called this unacceptable?

* I'm not going to discuss specifics with you before Dennis Ross has had the opportunity to finalize our ideas with the parties.

* We can't impose anything on the parties. However, it is clearly time for the parties to make the hard decisions necessary to put the peace process back on track.

Is Dennis presenting a final U.S. plan to the Israelis and Palestinian Authority?

Is he seeking a commitment from Arafat? Will you try to isolate Netanyahu to pressure him to accept a higher withdrawal number?

* Our ideas reflect our best judgment of what is necessary to move the peace process forward, about what it will take to get the parties back to the table.

These are not proposals about the final outcome of the process but about a way to get back into negotiations. Dennis will finalize these ideas during his discussions in the region and report back to me.

* Trying to isolate one side or the other will be counterproductive. We are trying to help the parties themselves bridge the gap that has formed between them, suggest a basis on which the parties can make progress and restore some trust and confidence in the peace process. We have made no final judgment on what it will take to accomplish this.

What about Israeli allegations that the U.S. is abandoning a long-standing policy that Israel alone makes decisions relating to Israeli security?

* The United States continues to stand by Israel and its security needs. Our commitment to Israeli security is unbreakable.

* The United States has been and continues to be heavily involved in the Middle East peace process. We would like to see the process move forward. These are difficult decisions that must be made by the parties themselves if the

process is
to move forward. The United States does not intend to make these
decisions for
them.

Has the Prime Minister's vocal opposition forced you to change your
plan?

* Beginning in January, we have been engaged in a determined effort
to develop
ways to unlock the peace process. Beginning with my meetings with
Prime Minister
Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat and continuing to this point, we have
maintained a
constructive dialogue, providing our best judgement of what needs to
be done.
Clearly the parties have their own ideas as well.

* There is a great deal of uninformed speculation that there is a U.S.
plan that
we will attempt to impose on the parties. The peace process will move
forward
only when the parties themselves are prepared to make the hard
decisions
necessary to put the peace process back on track. We continue to
refine our
ideas on how to make that happen.

* The purpose of Dennis Ross's trip to the region is to continue our
dialogue
with the parties so that we can finalize our ideas on how to move the
peace
process forward. I expect Dennis to present our best judgement on
what needs to
be done to break the stalemate. We will continue to encourage the
parties that
they have to make the hard decisions necessary to move the process
forward. And
Dennis will report back to me with his recommendations regarding the
next steps.

What if he can't persuade the Israelis to accept those ideas?

* Ultimately, it's up to the parties to make the hard decisions
necessary to move
the peace process forward. We will continue to do everything we can
to help
them.

IRAQ

Chairman Butler reports that Iraqis appear extremely cooperative. Any reaction to this apparent change in Iraqi behavior?

* We are pleased to hear Chairman Butler report that the Iraqis are cooperating with UNSCOM. We hope that they will continue to follow-through on their commitments and fully comply with all United Nations resolutions.

Is this sudden change in Iraqi behavior a ploy to dupe UNSCOM? How can you really be sure that they are fully cooperating?

* The criteria for full compliance are stated explicitly in the United Nations resolutions. The burden is on Iraq to answer UNSCOM's questions about its WMD programs and to satisfy UNSCOM Chairman Butler fully about the past, present and future of its programs. Iraq should make all relevant information and all personnel available if it hopes to gain relief from sanctions. Iraq has failed to do that for seven years.

* I have full confidence in the judgements and capabilities of the UNSCOM experts to assess when Iraq has fully disclosed all of its programs to develop missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

* In the meantime, we continue to maintain a strong monitoring presence in the Gulf to pursue our options in the event of Iraqi-non-compliance.

Can the inspectors really expect to find anything? The Iraqis have known for

weeks that the inspectors would visit the Presidential sites soon? How can UNSCOM do their job?

* The UNSCOM inspection team is being led by the Deputy Chairman of UNSCOM, Charles Duelfer, an arms expert. We are confident that he and the other inspectors will conduct a thorough inspection.

* The MOU which Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz signed explicitly re-affirms no-notice, surprise inspections by UNSCOM. The inspections occurring today are a baseline survey of all buildings in the Presidential sites. No-notice inspections could occur at any time in the future.

* The purpose of the inspections is not only to discuss relevant activities and information, but also to provide a basis for permanent monitoring so that the sites cannot be used for WMD activities in the future.

* The burden is not on the inspectors to find the information - it is on Iraq to prove it has accounted for and destroyed all WMD.

Are the Iraqis still up to their old tricks by arresting one of their scientists so he can't talk with UNSCOM inspectors?

* It is not clear why Iraq arrested Nassir al-Hindawi. He was a key figure in Iraq's biological weapons program, and has spoken to UNSCOM inspectors in the past.

* If Mr. Hindawi has information about Iraq's biological weapons program, UN inspectors should have unfettered access to him so they can learn what he knows.

Is this a setback to UNSCOM's efforts to get answers from Iraq?

* You should ask UNSCOM for its views. Our position is simple. The UNSC resolutions require that Iraq provide access to any individual it wants to speak

to in order to get information on Iraq's programs.

* The burden is on Iraq to answer UNSCOM's questions about its WMD programs and to satisfy UNSCOM Chairman Butler fully about the past, present and future of its programs. Iraq should make all relevant information and all personnel available if it hopes to gain relief from sanctions. Iraq has failed to do that for seven years.

IRAN

What is the US doing to deal more effectively with Iran - is there a change in policy?

* We are seeking to encourage changes in Iranian policies and actions that threaten our interests.

* We have noted the positive changes in rhetoric from the Iranian Government and have responded to President Khatami's call for "civilizational" - people-to-people -- dialogue.

* Recent people to people exchanges, which have included academics and athletes, have gone well. We expect more such exchanges to occur.

* Such events are valuable in developing understanding between the two countries. Yet we believe that the only way to solve the policy issues that have divided the US and Iran for too long is a direct dialogue between the Governments.

* In such a dialogue, we would raise aspects of Iranian policy and practice, such as support for terrorism, attempts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction and support for violent opposition to the Middle East Peace Process. Such a dialogue would also offer Iran the opportunity to raise its issues of concern.

What about press reports that describe actions that the US is taking to improve its relations with Iran - are such reports accurate?

* We have said that we want to facilitate people to people exchanges by working with private American organizations who wish to host Iranian visitors or send groups to Iran.

* [IF ASKED: We have no master list of such exchanges, nor to we have any plans to put a USIA officer in Tehran.]

* In that context, we recently gave permission for the Iranian UN PERMREP to travel outside New York City to deliver a speech to a private American group in Los Angeles.

* We are working closely with the Congress to enhance our capability to use radio transmissions to reach the Iranian people directly. Any effort we pursue would be to offer alternative information, not to act as an antagonistic element.

Do these recent exchanges indicate a reduction in Iran's pursuit of terrorism?

* We remain concerned about Iran's support of terrorism. We are watching carefully for any credible change in this behavior.

Have recent press accounts accurately defined Secretary Albright's role in Iran policy?

* The President relies on the Secretary of State and her Department to take the lead in developing and implementing the President's foreign policy in this very sensitive and important area.

* Secretary Albright shares the President's desire for an improvement in our relations with Iran and is determined to seek that objective in a careful and

modulated manner in ways, consistent with our national interests.

There are media reports that you are trying a variety of ways to delay a decision on applying ILSA sanctions against Total and its partners. Has there been any rethinking of the U.S. position on the Total deal? What is taking so long?

* There is no change in our position. We will follow the law and apply sanctions if appropriate. We continue to study the deal and have made no decisions at this point.

* The ILSA law was designed to strengthen international cooperation to force Iran to change its behavior. And, in fact, I think we have a common understanding with our allies on what we are trying to accomplish, even if we continue to disagree in some instances on tactics.

* I would also note that, should the Total-Gazprom-Petronas consortium fall apart for any reason, given the current price of oil, this would also meet our policy objectives. There would be nothing to sanction.

KOSOVO

What's your reaction to the Contact Group meeting in Bonn?

* The Contact Group demanded an urgent start to authoritative talks between Belgrade and Kosovar Albanians, and pledged to consider further measures in four weeks if Belgrade prevents progress.

* Milosevic has taken some small steps but has so far failed to meet the requirements established by Contact Group Ministers in London on March 9.

* We are pleased that the 1996 education agreement has finally been signed, but it is long overdue and does little to bring Belgrade into compliance with

Contract Group demands. We will watch the implementation of this agreement closely.

* We warmly welcome announcement of the Kosovar Albanian advisory group, an essential step towards serious dialogue on the political status of Kosovo. But Milosevic has not yet provided a basis for the kind of talks necessary to prevent more violence.

* The Contact Group will maintain the pressure for unconditional dialogue and we are prepared to take further steps if the FRY does not comply.

What about the renewed violence in Kosovo? There is no movement by either side to negotiate a settlement.

* We are concerned about renewed clashes between Serbian security forces and armed Kosovar Albanians. The difficulties in Kosovo cannot be solved by force.

* It is critical to get a serious dialogue underway, without preconditions. Kosovar Albanian leaders have taken essential steps toward dialogue, but President Milosevic has not.

It doesn't appear that Milosevic plans to back down?

* There should be no doubt about the seriousness with which we view the situation in Kosovo. We hold Milosevic responsible for the recent violence and will make every effort to bring him to a serious and constructive approach.

* We have also made clear to President Milosevic that we will respond to actions that inflame the situation. We have a broad range of options available to us. We do not rule anything out.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Senator Lott has put off the vote on NATO enlargement until you return. Are you concerned that this will give more time for opponents of NATO expansion to find ways to block it?

* First of all, I understand that Senator Lott temporarily stopped debate on NATO expansion because of scheduling problems, not based on the merits.

* The fact is that, as was demonstrated last week, there is broad, bipartisan support for NATO expansion. We have an historic opportunity to make Europe more stable, NATO stronger and America safer. Adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will help erase the Cold War dividing line and help build an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe.

* Even as Russia goes through its political transition, we expect the strategic partnership between NATO and Russia to continue to develop.

AFRICA TRADE

Is the Administration open to changes in the Africa trade bill in the Senate as Trade Representative Barshefsky suggested?

* As I've said since arriving here, this is a new Africa, and we need fresh, innovative approaches that support democracy, prosperity, economic opportunity and increased trade. Many African countries have undertaken massive, and often difficult, political and economic reforms in the past decade. The Africa trade bill will reinforce those efforts.

* I have seen first-hand during this trip the economic promise that Africa holds for both Africans and Americans as economic partners. Increased trade and investment will be good for Africa and good for American workers.

* We'll continue to work with the leadership in the House and Senate to pass this bill as quickly as possible. That's the best way we can help Africa help itself.

GENEVA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Despite your decision last week not to sponsor a resolution criticizing the Chinese for their human rights record, Ambassador Richardson had some pretty strong words regarding China's poor track record. What makes you think that they will do better once the pressure is off in Geneva?

* China's decision to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights represents a formal commitment to the principles codified in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

* The Covenant provides a strong multilateral mechanism for the United States and other nations to examine China's human rights record. I made it clear to President Ziang that China needs to do more to respect human rights and freedom of political expression. Some progress has been made, but we will continue to speak out publicly about that record, as Ambassador Richardson did today.

Ambassador Richardson also had some things to say about some African nations. Did you raise human rights in your meetings and what did you tell them?

* A key objective of this trip is to promote democracy and human rights. I have told the leaders that I have met that the only way for Africa to develop its potential is by ensuring that basic human rights are respected, backed by the rule of law and full accountability.

* My message has been clear and consistent: relations between the United States

and governments in the region are directly linked to progress on human rights and democratization.

MEXICO - MILITARY DRUG CORRUPTION

What can you say about drug corruption in the Mexican military?
Getting worse?

Does corruption in fact make our efforts "futile"?

* There is no doubt that Mexico's law enforcement institutions, as well as the military, are under attack from the drug traffickers. We are working with Mexico to confront this threat as vigorously as possible.

* Mexico's Attorney General Jorge Madrazo has himself stated publicly that entrenched criminal elements are a major problem for Mexico's police forces.

* Our efforts not futile. President Zedillo has indicated he is committed to tackling corruption and rule of law issues head-on. He recently announced a new nationwide program against crime and corruption. We will continue to work with him as he addresses this long-term challenge.

* Mexican military is investigating its own, arresting and prosecuting where necessary those who are involved with the traffickers. Five general officers are now under arrest and in jail as a result. Our assessment is that the Mexican military is carrying out its anti-drug mission in a responsible manner.

* We also believe Mexico's Attorney General is working diligently, and making slow but steady progress against the traffickers.

* Important to remember that expanded use of the Mexican military in

counternarcotics operations was conceived by the Zedillo Administration as a temporary measure to cope with what President Zedillo has identified as Mexico's most serious national security threat, while Mexico's police forces, and in particular its counternarcotics police, are revamped, vetted, trained and professionalized.

* Military has meanwhile increased pressure on the traffickers, helped boost Mexican cocaine seizures by almost 50 percent in 1997, and eradicated more marijuana and poppy acreage than ever.

* With a \$57 billion U.S. drug market and corruption on both sides of the border, it's impossible to imagine that the Mexican military, like other Mexican institutions, will not be challenged by corruption attempts.

What about former drug czar Gutierrez Rebollo's allegations of a broad narco-conspiracy within the Mexican military? Is there a DEA report to this effect?

* Not going to comment on any alleged intelligence document. But I can say that Gutierrez Rebollo's allegations have been carefully considered by all relevant U.S. agencies. His charges are self-serving, contain significant gaps, and are therefore in many respects suspect. We believe the Mexican military is vigorously investigating, prosecuting and punishing corruption within its ranks.

[If asked] Why does DEA differ with that positive assessment?

* Not going to comment on agency positions. U.S. authorities have concluded that the Gutierrez Rebollo version of events is not supported by available intelligence data.

COLOMBIA

What can you tell us about the fate of the American citizens held hostage by the FARC guerrillas in Colombia?

* The U.S. Embassy in Bogota is still seeking confirmation of reports that up to four American citizens are being held hostage by elements of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). On March 23, during a violent road block of a major highway outside Bogota, a number of individuals were seized by the FARC.

* We are in the process of notifying their next of kin and cannot say for sure that any American citizens are held captive, but we understand the group was on a bird-watching expedition outside Bogota. Our Embassy is in close contact with Colombian authorities and the International Committee of the Red Cross, who are in contact with the FARC units believed responsible for this violent act.

[IF ASKED]

Q. Do you believe that this incident means the FARC is carrying out its recent threat to start targeting U.S. citizens and personnel in Colombia?

* We have declared the FARC a foreign terrorist organization for their history of attacks on U.S. citizens and interests in Colombia. It is unlikely that American citizens were targeted for attack in this particular operation, which directly affected hundreds of travelers on a busy holiday weekend.

Is USG assisting the Colombian Government in fighting the armed insurgency? If not, why not?

* USG has a significant program of counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Government, including the Colombian National Police and elements of the Armed

Forces engaged in supporting counternarcotics operations. Such assistance is used for counternarcotics purposes in some areas of Colombia where armed insurgents are involved in narcotrafficking activities, e.g. protection of coca fields and drug labs. In addition, we provide some professional military education to the Colombian armed forces through the International Military Education and Training program. Our assistance is carefully crafted to assure full protection with respect to human rights.

INDONESIA

Is there any chance that Suharto and his new economic team will agree to what the IMF is asking in their ongoing negotiations in Indonesia?

* There appears to be progress in the continuing negotiations between the new economic team in Indonesia and IMF officials. I am hopeful that the two sides can work through these complex issues and reach an agreement that gives Indonesians more hope for the future.

* As we have said all along, the best route to restoring financial stability and growth in Indonesia is through decisive and effective implementation of financial reforms.

* Meanwhile, as we announced earlier this week, we will send \$70 million in emergency food and medical aid to Indonesia to help alleviate the hardship suffered by the Indonesian people.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

BACKGROUND: The United States has tabled a provision to permit counties with working legal systems to defer International Criminal Court action in cases involving their own citizens, for a limited period of time. This delay would only occur if the country agreed to investigate and, if warranted, prosecute the

crime itself.

Why is the U.S. tabling a proposal that would limit the jurisdiction of the court?

* Our proposal builds on a principle that all states in the negotiations have accepted: that we should encourage national courts to prosecute war criminals, and only use the ICC when such courts fail to do so.

* It is very important that countries with developed legal systems have the first opportunity to prosecute their own nationals.

* We also want to ensure that the court does not become a forum for political attacks against the United States or our allies.

Won't this provision permit lawless states like Iraq to delay or avoid prosecutions before the court?

* No. This provision wouldn't apply, and the ICC could proceed, when it could be shown that a state lacked the ability or will to investigate its own nationals.

[Note: prosecutor would make this decision, which would need to be confirmed by ICC judges.]

What is your view of the position expressed yesterday by Senator Helms in a letter to Secretary Albright that he would adamantly oppose a treaty that did not provide the U.S. with clear veto power over any ICC action?

* I share Senator Helms' concern that the ICC not become a vehicle for political attacks on citizens of the United States or other law-abiding members of the international community.

* At the same time, we very much need an effective International Criminal Court to deter and punish those who would commit atrocities of the sort I learned about

first-hand during my stop in Rwanda. And we must be willing to work with our allies and the international community to accomplish this result.

* I believe we can achieve both of these goals.

LANDMINES

Is the U.S. willing to pledge to end the use of anti-personnel landmines on the African continent?

* Since 1992, the United States has by law prohibited itself from exporting any APLs to Africa or anywhere else in the world.

What is the United States doing to keep APLs from coming into Africa?

* We are redoubling our efforts in the Conference on Disarmament, and, as our next step there, are seeking a truly worldwide export ban. This effort will have the benefit of engaging some key landmine states that have produced and exported APLs but have not signed the Ottawa Convention.

Is the United States involved in getting rid of the millions of APLs already spread through Africa?

* We have already led the world in removing landmines and thereby saved many lives. To date, we have provided almost as much funding for demining efforts as the rest of the world combined.

* Since 1993, the United States has contributed more than \$150 million to humanitarian demining programs. Roughly one quarter of the active deminers in the world were trained and equipped by the United States.

* In Africa, since 1993, we have provided a total of about \$58 million for

demining assistance programs in Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Rwanda. In 1998 we anticipate expanding our Africa programs to include Chad and Zimbabwe.

* In 1998 the United States will contribute a total of about \$80 million to demining efforts worldwide, more than doubling our previous year's budget.

Is the United States pressuring its allies not to ratify the Ottawa Convention so it can keep its landmine stockpiles in Europe?

* No, we have not in any way sought to discourage Ottawa Convention signatories from ratifying the Convention.

* We have repeatedly conveyed to our allies that the decision to sign the Convention is one that is theirs to make and we respect that decision.

* However, our allies' signature and impending ratification of the Convention have raised a number of questions we must resolve concerning NATO military plans and interoperability.

* We are engaged in close consultations with our allies on these questions in search of mutually satisfactory solutions that are consistent with NATO's military requirements and, for those who are signatories, consistent with the Convention's provisions.

* With the exception of those for use in Korea, the only type of anti-personnel landmine (APL) that remains in our active stockpiles do not pose a long-term humanitarian hazard.

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

* In 1994, I was the first world leader to call for the global elimination of anti-personnel landmines.

* In 1996, we stopped using and began destroying the kind of anti-personnel landmines that lie in the ground for years ("long-lived"), with the sole exception of those we need in Korea.

* It is this kind of long-lived landmine -- which we are in the process of eliminating -- that plagues the African continent.

* On September 17 of last year, we set a deadline for the development of anti-personnel landmine alternatives so that by 2003 we can phase out even our self-destructing ("short-lived") mines everywhere around the world except for Korea.

* These kinds of APLs self-destruct within a very short period of time, and thus do not pose a residual humanitarian hazard after hostilities have ended. There are no known civilian casualties from these systems.

* We have also set the objective of have APL alternatives ready for

Korea by
2006.

26

13

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/27/98 5:44:13 PM
FROM Ryu, Rexon Y.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: updates [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J.

CARBON_COPY Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Greer, Jason H.
Marty, Joseph H.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Ryu, Rexon Y.
Todd, Gwentyth E.

TEXT_BODY PJ - see changes to MEPP. Have a great weekend.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Marty, Joseph H.
Sent: Friday, March 27, 1998
5:42 PM
To: Ryu, Rexon Y.
Subject: FW: updates [UNCLASSIFIED]

Minor
changes.

-----Original Message-----
From: Ryu, Rexon Y.
Sent: Friday,
March 27, 1998 5:13 PM
To: Marty, Joseph H.
Subject: updates [UNCLASSIFIED]

joe
- take a look at my MEPP changes. Anything to add from Bruce's
readout?

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT potus3-26____.doc

Foreign Policy Q's and A's
Presidential Press Conference
March 26, 1998

RUSSIA
MEPP
IRAQ
IRAN
KOSOVO
NATO EXPANSION
AFRICA TRADE
GENEVA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
MEXICO
COLOMBIA
INDONESIA
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
LANDMINES

RUSSIA

Background on the Yeltsin-Kohl-Chirac discussion: Baltics and NATO did not come up in the trilateral discussions. EU membership did come up at the press conference. Kohl, with support from Chirac, said that Baltic EU membership would be looked at in the context of the so-called Copenhagen criteria (human rights, economic and political stability) FYI -- Estonia has been extended an invitation to be among next six new EU members currently negotiating accession agreements.

Wasn't the Moscow trilateral summit a deliberate slap at the United States, taking advantage of you being in Africa?

* To the contrary, we welcome this meeting of close friends of the United States.

It's another sign of Russia's growing ties to the family of European democracies and an indication of movement towards a Europe free of rivalry.

* I am delighted that my good friends Boris Yeltsin, Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac were able to take time from their schedules to meet today. I look forward to hearing from them on their discussions.

What about Yeltsin's comment that the Summit was evidence of Russian membership in a "greater Europe," on a par with the U.S.?

* We favor Russian cooperation with Europe. America's ties to Europe are exceptionally close, through NATO and many other arrangements and economic links.

The Russians claim that Chirac spoke out against Baltic membership in NATO? Isn't this contrary to the Open Door commitment which the Alliance made at the Madrid Summit?

* I understand that the question of Baltic admission to NATO was not raised in Moscow. I want to reaffirm my own strongly held view and the confirmed policy of the Alliance: the door to membership remains open to all democracies in Europe.

* As I said when we signed the Baltic Charter in Washington in January, we are working to advance the integration of the Baltic states into the transatlantic community.

Russia and France have been at odds with the U.S. on our approach to Iraq and Kosovo, watering down U.S. proposals for decisive action. Are you concerned that this meeting was aimed at the United States?

* We have many mutual interests and ties with these governments, but also some disagreements. This is normal.

* As Chancellor Kohl noted at his news conference, the summit was not aimed against anyone. We are in favor of contacts which foster mutually beneficial Russian links to European Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Do you have any lingering concerns about Yeltsin's abrupt dismissal of government?

* President Yeltsin exercised his constitutional prerogative as president of the Russian Federation. It's not my place to second-guess internal decisions taken by President Yeltsin as Russia's legitimately elected leader.

* We are encouraged, however, by his public reaffirmation of his commitment to reform, and that his priority in naming a new government will be to give impetus to economic reform.

* We will continue to support Russia in its transition to a market-based democracy and its integration with global and regional institutions.

Have you heard directly from President Yeltsin?

* I have sent him a message that we support his continued emphasis on economic reforms. I would expect to hear from him after I return home.

Do you still think that you and Yeltsin will meet sometime this year?

* We will see each other at the Summit of the Eight in Birmingham in May.

* After Russia ratifies START II, I will look forward to a Moscow Summit where President Yeltsin and I can review the full range of issues in our relations and give impetus to START III negotiations.

Should we be concerned that this could lead to further political infighting or postpone reform initiatives or START II ratification?

* The Russian Federation has clear constitutional guidelines for installing a new government. President Yeltsin's spokesman indicated that Yeltsin is expected to move quickly in naming a new prime minister.

* President Yeltsin has said economic reform should have more impetus, and we see this as a very positive direction.

* We will continue to work with the Russian government on all issues of mutual interest, including START II ratification that we hope to see achieved within the next few months.

Will Vice President Gore's Commission be suspended?

* As the new Russian government comes on board, we will continue to engage at a variety of levels, including to promote reform integration of Russia into global economic institutions, and a range of mutually beneficial cooperative programs.

* For five years the Vice President has ably co-chaired our joint U.S.-Russia Commission, which has strengthened concrete cooperation in areas ranging from energy to space.

* We hope that President Yeltsin will want to continue the work of the Commission which he and President Clinton began at Vancouver in 1993. We certainly want to do so.

Is the situation stable or have we seen any reaction by the military that would cause concern?

* We will continue to follow events there very closely. Russia appears completely calm, with no unusual military activity. The financial markets are behaving normally. There have been no indications of any instability whatsoever.

What's your current assessment of Yeltsin's health?

* President Yeltsin appears to be back at work. We have no particular details on his recovery from his respiratory illness.

If Kiriyenko is nominated as Prime Minister, what is your reaction? Will the Duma approve him?

* Personnel decisions are President Yeltsin's to make.

* U.S. officials have had an excellent working relationship with Kiriyenko during his tenure as deputy minister and then minister of fuels and energy. He appears to be a strong supporter of economic reform.

With all this uncertainty in Russian, isn't this a bad time to press forward with NATO enlargement?

* NATO enlargement will help stabilize Europe, which will benefit Russia.

* Russia has moved forward with NATO-Russia Council and Partnership for Peace, even in the wake of NATO's decision to enlarge in Madrid.

* Delaying now will create uncertainty, not cause it.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Is there anything to report from the meetings Dennis Ross has had with Netanyahu?

The Israeli press is suggesting Netanyahu reiterated the position that no more than 9 percent will be handed over in FRDs.

* Dennis Ross has met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and expects to do so again while in the region. As we have said before, the purpose of Dennis' trip is to finalize the ideas that President Clinton has put forth.

* I will not discuss the specifics of these meetings. Needless to say, our primary concern remains moving the peace process forward. The President has put forth his ideas to bridge the gap between the two parties and he hopes that Israel and the Palestinians can make the difficult decisions necessary to move the process toward permanent status negotiations.

Are you at all optimistic that Dennis Ross will be successful in winning agreement from Netanyahu and Arafat for the U.S. proposal regarding a West Bank withdrawal?

* I won't go into specifics about our ideas on what needs to be done. Dennis Ross is in the region to finalize those ideas with the parties. He will report back to me in the coming days.

* Needless to say, we believe we have reached a critical point where the parties need to make the hard decisions necessary to move the peace process forward.

* I have spoken to the Prime Minister twice very recently. Secretary Albright has spoken with Chairman Arafat as well. In the dialogue that we have had in recent days and weeks, we have presented ideas that reflect our best judgment of what is necessary to move forward at a time when the peace process needs to be resumed.

Prime Minister Netanyahu appears to be publicly pressuring you to back off your proposal regarding the West Bank?

* This is not about pressuring Israel or Israel pressuring the United States. The ideas we have presented represent our best judgement about what it will take to resume the process.

* I understand from my discussions with both Prime Minister Netanyahu and

Chairman Arafat the difficult challenges that we face. But the hard decisions must be made if we are to restore confidence in the peace process.

Your proposal appears to call for a 13 percent withdrawal from the West Bank? Is that right? The Israelis have called this unacceptable?

* I'm not going to discuss specifics with you before Dennis Ross has had the opportunity to finalize our ideas with the parties.

* We can't impose anything on the parties. However, it is clearly time for the parties to make the hard decisions necessary to put the peace process back on track.

Is Dennis presenting a final U.S. plan to the Israelis and Palestinian Authority? Is he seeking a commitment from Arafat? Will you try to isolate Netanyahu to pressure him to accept a higher withdrawal number?

* Our ideas reflect our best judgment of what is necessary to move the peace process forward, about what it will take to get the parties back to the table. These are not proposals about the final outcome of the process but about a way to get back into negotiations. Dennis is in the region to finalize these ideas and report back to me.

* Trying to isolate one side or the other will be counterproductive. We are trying to help the parties themselves bridge the gap that has formed between them, suggest a basis on which the parties can make progress and restore some trust and confidence in the peace process. We have made no final judgment on what it will take to accomplish this.

What about Israeli allegations that the U.S. is abandoning a long-standing policy that Israel alone makes decisions relating to Israeli security?

* The United States continues to stand by Israel and its security needs. Our commitment to Israeli security is unbreakable.

* The United States has been and continues to be heavily involved in the Middle East peace process. We would like to see the process move forward. These are difficult decisions that must be made by the parties themselves if the process is to move forward. The United States does not intend to make these decisions for them.

Has the Prime Minister's vocal opposition forced you to change your plan?

* Beginning in January, we have been engaged in a determined effort to develop ways to unlock the peace process. Beginning with my meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat and continuing to this point, we have maintained a constructive dialogue, providing our best judgement of what needs to be done. Clearly the parties have their own ideas as well.

* There is a great deal of uninformed speculation that there is a U.S. plan that we will attempt to impose on the parties. The peace process will move forward only when the parties themselves are prepared to make the hard decisions necessary to put the peace process back on track. We continue to refine our ideas on how to make that happen.

* The purpose of Dennis Ross's trip to the region is to continue our dialogue with the parties so that we can finalize our ideas on how to move the peace process forward. I expect Dennis to present our best judgement on what needs to be done to break the stalemate. We will continue to encourage the parties that they have to make the hard decisions necessary to move the process forward. And Dennis will report back to me with his recommendations regarding the

next steps.

What if he can't persuade the Israelis to accept those ideas?

* Ultimately, it's up to the parties to make the hard decisions necessary to move the peace process forward. We will continue to do everything we can to help them.*

IRAQ

Chairman Butler reports that Iraqis appear extremely cooperative. Any reaction to this apparent change in Iraqi behavior?

* We are pleased to hear Chairman Butler report that the Iraqis are cooperating with UNSCOM. We hope that they will continue to follow-through on their commitments and fully comply with all United Nations resolutions.

Is this sudden change in Iraqi behavior a ploy to dupe UNSCOM? How can you really be sure that they are fully cooperating?

* The criteria for full compliance are stated explicitly in the United Nations resolutions. The burden is on Iraq to answer UNSCOM's questions about its WMD programs and to satisfy UNSCOM Chairman Butler fully about the past, present and future of its programs. Iraq should make all relevant information and all personnel available if it hopes to gain relief from sanctions. Iraq has failed to do that for seven years.

* I have full confidence in the judgements and capabilities of the UNSCOM experts to assess when Iraq has fully disclosed all of its programs to develop missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

* In the meantime, we continue to maintain a strong monitoring presence in the Gulf to pursue our options in the event of Iraqi-non-compliance.

Can the inspectors really expect to find anything? The Iraqis have known for weeks that the inspectors would visit the Presidential sites soon? How can UNSCOM do their job?

* The UNSCOM inspection team is being led by the Deputy Chairman of UNSCOM, Charles Duelfer, an arms expert. We are confident that he and the other inspectors will conduct a thorough inspection.

* The MOU which Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz signed explicitly re-affirms no-notice, surprise inspections by UNSCOM. The inspections occurring today are a baseline survey of all buildings in the Presidential sites. No-notice inspections could occur at any time in the future.

* The purpose of the inspections is not only to discuss relevant activities and information, but also to provide a basis for permanent monitoring so that the sites cannot be used for WMD activities in the future.

* The burden is not on the inspectors to find the information - it is on Iraq to prove it has accounted for and destroyed all WMD.

Are the Iraqis still up to their old tricks by arresting one of their scientists so he can't talk with UNSCOM inspectors?

* It is not clear why Iraq arrested Nassir al-Hindawi. He was a key figure in Iraq's biological weapons program, and has spoken to UNSCOM inspectors in the past.

* If Mr. Hindawi has information about Iraq's biological weapons program, UN inspectors should have unfettered access to him so they can learn what he knows.

Is this a setback to UNSCOM's efforts to get answers from Iraq?

* You should ask UNSCOM for its views. Our position is simple. The

UNSC

resolutions require that Iraq provide access to any individual it wants to speak to in order to get information on Iraq's programs.

* The burden is on Iraq to answer UNSCOM's questions about its WMD programs and to satisfy UNSCOM Chairman Butler fully about the past, present and future of its programs. Iraq should make all relevant information and all personnel available if it hopes to gain relief from sanctions. Iraq has failed to do that for seven years.

IRAN

What is the US doing to deal more effectively with Iran - is there a change in policy?

* We are seeking to encourage changes in Iranian policies and actions that threaten our interests.

* We have noted the positive changes in rhetoric from the Iranian Government and have responded to President Khatami's call for "civilizational" - people-to-people -- dialogue.

* Recent people to people exchanges, which have included academics and athletes, have gone well. We expect more such exchanges to occur.

* Such events are valuable in developing understanding between the two countries. Yet we believe that the only way to solve the policy issues that have divided the US and Iran for too long is a direct dialogue between the Governments.

* In such a dialogue, we would raise aspects of Iranian policy and practice, such as support for terrorism, attempts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction and support for violent opposition to the Middle East Peace Process. Such a dialogue would also offer Iran the opportunity to raise its

issues of
concern.

What about press reports that describe actions that the US is taking to improve its relations with Iran - are such reports accurate?

* We have said that we want to facilitate people to people exchanges by working with private American organizations who wish to host Iranian visitors or send groups to Iran.

* [IF ASKED: We have no master list of such exchanges, nor to we have any plans to put a USIA officer in Tehran.]

* In that context, we recently gave permission for the Iranian UN PERMREP to travel outside New York City to deliver a speech to a private American group in Los Angeles.

* We are working closely with the Congress to enhance our capability to use radio transmissions to reach the Iranian people directly. Any effort we pursue would be to offer alternative information, not to act as an antagonistic element.

Do these recent exchanges indicate a reduction in Iran's pursuit of terrorism?

* We remain concerned about Iran's support of terrorism. We are watching carefully for any credible change in this behavior.

Have recent press accounts accurately defined Secretary Albright's role in Iran policy?

* The President relies on the Secretary of State and her Department to take the lead in developing and implementing the President's foreign policy in this very sensitive and important area.

* Secretary Albright shares the President's desire for an improvement

in our
relations with Iran and is determined to seek that objective in a careful
and
modulated manner in ways, consistent with our national interests.

There are media reports that you are trying a variety of ways to delay
a decision
on applying ILSA sanctions against Total and its partners. Has there
been any
rethinking of the U.S. position on the Total deal? What is taking so
long?

* There is no change in our position. We will follow the law and
apply sanctions
if appropriate. We continue to study the deal and have made no
decisions at this
point.

* The ILSA law was designed to strengthen international cooperation
to force Iran
to change its behavior. And, in fact, I think we have a common
understanding
with our allies on what we are trying to accomplish, even if we
continue to
disagree in some instances on tactics.

* I would also note that, should the Total-Gazprom-Petronas
consortium fall apart
for any reason, given the current price of oil, this would also meet our
policy
objectives. There would be nothing to sanction.

KOSOVO

What's your reaction to the Contact Group meeting in Bonn?

* The Contact Group demanded an urgent start to authoritative talks
between
Belgrade and Kosovar Albanians, and pledged to consider further
measures in four
weeks if Belgrade prevents progress.

* Milosevic has taken some small steps but has so far failed to meet
the
requirements established by Contact Group Ministers in London on
March 9.

* We are pleased that the 1996 education agreement has finally been

signed, but
it is long overdue and does little to bring Belgrade into compliance
with
Contract Group demands. We will watch the implementation of this
agreement
closely.

* We warmly welcome announcement of the Kosovar Albanian
advisory group, an
essential step towards serious dialogue on the political status of
Kosovo. But
Milosevic has not yet provided a basis for the kind of talks necessary
to prevent
more violence.

* The Contact Group will maintain the pressure for unconditional
dialogue and we
are prepared to take further steps if the FRY does not comply.

What about the renewed violence in Kosovo? There is no movement
by either side
to negotiate a settlement.

* We are concerned about renewed clashes between Serbian security
forces and
armed Kosovar Albanians. The difficulties in Kosovo cannot be
solved by force.

* It is critical to get a serious dialogue underway, without
preconditions.
Kosovar Albanian leaders have taken essential steps toward dialogue,
but
President Milosevic has not.

It doesn't appear that Milosevic plans to back down?

* There should be no doubt about the seriousness with which we view
the situation
in Kosovo. We hold Milosevic responsible for the recent violence and
will make
every effort to bring him to a serious and constructive approach.

* We have also made clear to President Milosevic that we will
respond to actions
that inflame the situation. We have a broad range of options available
to us.
We do not rule anything out.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Senator Lott has put off the vote on NATO enlargement until you return. Are you concerned that this will give more time for opponents of NATO expansion to find ways to block it?

* First of all, I understand that Senator Lott temporarily stopped debate on NATO expansion because of scheduling problems, not based on the merits.

* The fact is that, as was demonstrated last week, there is broad, bipartisan support for NATO expansion. We have an historic opportunity to make Europe more stable, NATO stronger and America safer. Adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will help erase the Cold War dividing line and help build an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe.

* Even as Russia goes through its political transition, we expect the strategic partnership between NATO and Russia to continue to develop.

AFRICA TRADE

Is the Administration open to changes in the Africa trade bill in the Senate as Trade Representative Barshefsky suggested?

* As I've said since arriving here, this is a new Africa, and we need fresh, innovative approaches that support democracy, prosperity, economic opportunity and increased trade. Many African countries have undertaken massive, and often difficult, political and economic reforms in the past decade. The Africa trade bill will reinforce those efforts.

* I have seen first-hand during this trip the economic promise that Africa holds for both Africans and Americans as economic partners. Increased

trade and
investment will be good for Africa and good for American workers.

* We'll continue to work with the leadership in the House and Senate to pass this bill as quickly as possible. That's the best way we can help Africa help itself.

GENEVA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Despite your decision last week not to sponsor a resolution criticizing the Chinese for their human rights record, Ambassador Richardson had some pretty strong words regarding China's poor track record. What makes you think that they will do better once the pressure is off in Geneva?

* China's decision to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights represents a formal commitment to the principles codified in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

* The Covenant provides a strong multilateral mechanism for the United States and other nations to examine China's human rights record. I made it clear to President Ziang that China needs to do more to respect human rights and freedom of political expression. Some progress has been made, but we will continue to speak out publicly about that record, as Ambassador Richardson did today.

Ambassador Richardson also had some things to say about some African nations. Did you raise human rights in your meetings and what did you tell them?

* A key objective of this trip is to promote democracy and human rights. I have told the leaders that I have met that the only way for Africa to develop its potential is by ensuring that basic human rights are respected, backed by the rule of law and full accountability.

* My message has been clear and consistent: relations between the United States and governments in the region are directly linked to progress on human rights and democratization.

MEXICO - MILITARY DRUG CORRUPTION

What can you say about drug corruption in the Mexican military?
Getting worse?
Does corruption in fact make our efforts "futile"?

* There is no doubt that Mexico's law enforcement institutions, as well as the military, are under attack from the drug traffickers. We are working with Mexico to confront this threat as vigorously as possible.

* Mexico's Attorney General Jorge Madrazo has himself stated publicly that entrenched criminal elements are a major problem for Mexico's police forces.

* Our efforts not futile. President Zedillo has indicated he is committed to tackling corruption and rule of law issues head-on. He recently announced a new nationwide program against crime and corruption. We will continue to work with him as he addresses this long-term challenge.

* Mexican military is investigating its own, arresting and prosecuting where necessary those who are involved with the traffickers. Five general officers are now under arrest and in jail as a result. Our assessment is that the Mexican military is carrying out its anti-drug mission in a responsible manner.

* We also believe Mexico's Attorney General is working diligently, and making

slow but steady progress against the traffickers.

* Important to remember that expanded use of the Mexican military in counternarcotics operations was conceived by the Zedillo Administration as a temporary measure to cope with what President Zedillo has identified as Mexico's most serious national security threat, while Mexico's police forces, and in particular its counternarcotics police, are revamped, vetted, trained and professionalized.

* Military has meanwhile increased pressure on the traffickers, helped boost Mexican cocaine seizures by almost 50 percent in 1997, and eradicated more marijuana and poppy acreage than ever.

* With a \$57 billion U.S. drug market and corruption on both sides of the border, it's impossible to imagine that the Mexican military, like other Mexican institutions, will not be challenged by corruption attempts.

What about former drug czar Gutierrez Rebollo's allegations of a broad narco-conspiracy within the Mexican military? Is there a DEA report to this effect?

* Not going to comment on any alleged intelligence document. But I can say that Gutierrez Rebollo's allegations have been carefully considered by all relevant U.S. agencies. His charges are self-serving, contain significant gaps, and are therefore in many respects suspect. We believe the Mexican military is vigorously investigating, prosecuting and punishing corruption within its ranks.

[If asked] Why does DEA differ with that positive assessment?

* Not going to comment on agency positions. U.S. authorities have concluded that the Gutierrez Rebollo version of events is not supported by available

intelligence data.

COLOMBIA

What can you tell us about the fate of the American citizens held hostage by the FARC guerrillas in Colombia?

* The U.S. Embassy in Bogota is still seeking confirmation of reports that up to four American citizens are being held hostage by elements of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). On March 23, during a violent road block of a major highway outside Bogota, a number of individuals were seized by the FARC.

* We are in the process of notifying their next of kin and cannot say for sure that any American citizens are held captive, but we understand the group was on a bird-watching expedition outside Bogota. Our Embassy is in close contact with Colombian authorities and the International Committee of the Red Cross, who are in contact with the FARC units believed responsible for this violent act.

[IF ASKED]

Q. Do you believe that this incident means the FARC is carrying out its recent threat to start targeting U.S. citizens and personnel in Colombia?

* We have declared the FARC a foreign terrorist organization for their history of attacks on U.S. citizens and interests in Colombia. It is unlikely that American citizens were targeted for attack in this particular operation, which directly affected hundreds of travelers on a busy holiday weekend.

Is USG assisting the Colombian Government in fighting the armed insurgency? If not, why not?

* USG has a significant program of counternarcotics assistance to the

Colombian
Government, including the Colombian National Police and elements
of the Armed
Forces engaged in supporting counternarcotics operations. Such
assistance is
used for counternarcotics purposes in some areas of Colombia where
armed
insurgents are involved in narcotrafficking activities, e.g. protection of
coca
fields and drug labs. In addition, we provide some professional
military
education to the Colombian armed forces through the International
Military
Education and Training program. Our assistance is carefully crafted to
assure
full protection with respect to human rights.
INDONESIA

Is there any chance that Suharto and his new economic team will
agree to what the
IMF is asking in their ongoing negotiations in Indonesia?

* There appears to be progress in the continuing negotiations between
the new
economic team in Indonesia and IMF officials. I am hopeful that the
two sides
can work through these complex issues and reach an agreement that
gives
Indonesians more hope for the future.

* As we have said all along, the best route to restoring financial
stability and
growth in Indonesia is through decisive and effective implementation
of financial
reforms.

* Meanwhile, as we announced earlier this week, we will send \$70
million in
emergency food and medical aid to Indonesia to help alleviate the
hardship
suffered by the Indonesian people.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

BACKGROUND: The United States has tabled a provision to permit
countries with
working legal systems to defer International Criminal Court action in
cases
involving their own citizens, for a limited period of time. This delay

would
only occur if the country agreed to investigate and, if warranted,
prosecute the
crime itself.

Why is the U.S. tabling a proposal that would limit the jurisdiction of
the
court?

* Our proposal builds on a principle that all states in the negotiations
have
accepted: that we should encourage national courts to prosecute war
criminals,
and only use the ICC when such courts fail to do so.

* It is very important that countries with developed legal systems have
the first
opportunity to prosecute their own nationals.

* We also want to ensure that the court does not become a forum for
political
attacks against the United States or our allies.

Won't this provision permit lawless states like Iraq to delay or avoid
prosecutions before the court?

* No. This provision wouldn't apply, and the ICC could proceed,
when it could be
shown that a state lacked the ability or will to investigate its own
nationals.
[Note: prosecutor would make this decision, which would need to be
confirmed by
ICC judges.]

What is your view of the position expressed yesterday by Senator
Helms in a
letter to Secretary Albright that he would adamantly oppose a treaty
that did not
provide the U.S. with clear veto power over any ICC action?

* I share Senator Helms' concern that the ICC not become a vehicle
for political
attacks on citizens of the United States or other law-abiding members
of the
international community.

* At the same time, we very much need an effective International

Criminal Court

to deter and punish those who would commit atrocities of the sort I learned about first-hand during my stop in Rwanda. And we must be willing to work with our allies and the international community to accomplish this result.

* I believe we can achieve both of these goals.

LANDMINES

Is the U.S. willing to pledge to end the use of anti-personnel landmines on the African continent?

* Since 1992, the United States has by law prohibited itself from exporting any APLs to Africa or anywhere else in the world.

What is the United States doing to keep APLs from coming into Africa?

* We are redoubling our efforts in the Conference on Disarmament, and, as our next step there, are seeking a truly worldwide export ban. This effort will have the benefit of engaging some key landmine states that have produced and exported APLs but have not signed the Ottawa Convention.

Is the United States involved in getting rid of the millions of APLs already spread through Africa?

* We have already led the world in removing landmines and thereby saved many lives. To date, we have provided almost as much funding for demining efforts as the rest of the world combined.

* Since 1993, the United States has contributed more than \$150 million to humanitarian demining programs. Roughly one quarter of the active deminers in the world were trained and equipped by the United States.

* In Africa, since 1993, we have provided a total of about \$58 million for demining assistance programs in Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Rwanda. In 1998 we anticipate expanding our Africa programs to include Chad and Zimbabwe.

* In 1998 the United States will contribute a total of about \$80 million to demining efforts worldwide, more than doubling our previous year's budget.

Is the United States pressuring its allies not to ratify the Ottawa Convention so it can keep its landmine stockpiles in Europe?

* No, we have not in any way sought to discourage Ottawa Convention signatories from ratifying the Convention.

* We have repeatedly conveyed to our allies that the decision to sign the Convention is one that is theirs to make and we respect that decision.

* However, our allies' signature and impending ratification of the Convention have raised a number of questions we must resolve concerning NATO military plans and interoperability.

* We are engaged in close consultations with our allies on these questions in search of mutually satisfactory solutions that are consistent with NATO's military requirements and, for those who are signatories, consistent with the Convention's provisions.

* With the exception of those for use in Korea, the only type of anti-personnel landmine (APL) that remains in our active stockpiles do not pose a long-term humanitarian hazard.

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

* In 1994, I was the first world leader to call for the global elimination of anti-personnel landmines.

* In 1996, we stopped using and began destroying the kind of anti-personnel landmines that lie in the ground for years ("long-lived"), with the sole exception of those we need in Korea.

* It is this kind of long-lived landmine -- which we are in the process of eliminating -- that plagues the African continent.

* On September 17 of last year, we set a deadline for the development of anti-personnel landmine alternatives so that by 2003 we can phase out even our self-destructing ("short-lived") mines everywhere around the world except for Korea.

* These kinds of APLs self-destruct within a very short period of time, and thus do not pose a residual humanitarian hazard after hostilities have ended. There

are no known civilian casualties from these systems.

* We have also set the objective of have APL alternatives ready for Korea by 2006.

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10

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 4/15/98 5:17:31 PM

FROM Highsmith, Newell L.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Crowley, Philip J.

CARBON_COPY Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY The new China satellite material looks good, though I suggested deleting part of the older language as redundant with the new. I also made a couple of minor changes in the Radio Free Iran guidance for clarity (non-substantive).

-----Original Message-----
From: Crowley,
Philip J.
Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 1998 5:07 PM
To: @ALLNSC
- NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs
Subject: DAILY PRESS
GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]

Update by 10 a.m. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT apr15gui_.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

April 15, 1998

Paraguay/Death Penalty Case

Mexico/Failure to Convict Drug Lord

Summit of the Americas/Fast Track

Summit of the Americas

Cuba

Iraq/IAEA

China Satellite Launches

North Korea Food Aid

Northern Ireland

Russia/Kiriyenko

Cambodia/Pol Pot

Pakistan

Nigeria/Administration Policy

Radio Free Iran

PARAGUAY/DEATH PENALTY CASE

April 15, 1998

Q: Why did Secretary Albright ask the Governor of Virginia for a stay?

The Secretary asked Governor Gilmore to exercise his discretionary power to stay the execution in light of the ICJ's request for a stay while their considerations are pending.

Q: Will this be raised at the Summit?

This is not on the agenda. Of course, it could be raised in the context of a variety of private meetings.

Q: Will this be an issue at the Summit of the Americas?

It should not. Secretary Albright's letter to the Governor of Virginia makes clear that the United States seriously considered and actively responded to the request of the ICJ even though the United States had argued against that court's jurisdiction and against the indication of provisional measures. I think our summit counterparts appreciate that what the Secretary of State may or should do in response to the ICJ's request is a different question from what the judicial branch may do in enforcing federal law. In our legal system, the courts are independent from the executive and as a matter of domestic law the legal criteria for a stay were not met.

Q: The Secretary's letter suggested that foreign governments will not honor the Consular Convention if Breard is executed. Will executing Breard endanger Americans abroad?

A: The United States takes seriously its obligations under the Convention and other countries who are Party to the Convention should do likewise.

Q: Some international lawyers say the World Court's order wasn't legally binding. Why did the Secretary think she had to do what the Court asked to protect a murderer?

A: The Secretary's letter to Governor Gilmore makes her concerns clear.

Q: Aren't the World Court's orders binding? Why didn't the State Department insist that Virginia must comply?

A: An indication of provisional measures is not legally binding. We still believe it appropriate to seek to respond positively to the ICJ's request that we take measures to stay the execution.

Q: What happens to the case in the World Court? How will the U.S. defend its position, having ignored the Court's order?

A: The case will continue on the legal questions presented with regard to interpretation of the Vienna Consular Convention.

Q: Is the U.S. taking any actions to ensure that domestic violations of the Vienna Convention do not occur in the future?

A: Yes. For many years, the State Department has distributed information on the obligation of Consular notification to Federal, State and local law enforcement officials.

In recent months, the Department distributed a new brochure entitled "Consular Notification and Access" as well as a pocket card setting forth the basic requirements for notification in cases of arrest and detention of foreign nationals to Federal, state and local law enforcement officials throughout the United States.

Department representatives have also been actively meeting with such law enforcement officials to discuss their obligations under the Convention.

MEXICO/FAILURE TO CONVICT DRUG LORD April 15, 1998

Any comment on NYT article re Mexican failure to convict Rafael Munoz-Talavera despite "open and shut case"?

* Won't comment on specifics of this case. Refer you to DOJ for

questions about
U.S. role in prosecutions of Mr. Munoz.

How can you trust Mexico as a drug partner when justice system so obviously corrupt?

* Drug-related corruption is a problem in many countries. The threat of it in Mexico is serious enough for President Zedillo to have elevated it to the top of his national security agenda. Mexican Attorney General Madrazo testified before the Mexican Congress that corruption has made Mexican police in many cases more menacing than criminals.

* Strengthening the rule of law in Mexico is a major issue for that country's political system, and a preeminent public policy matter. In response to Mexican requests, we are working to be helpful with the professional development of judicial officials and institutions.

* Through our law enforcement and counternarcotics cooperation, we are building Mexico's own efforts to enhance the vetting process that underpins trusted law enforcement units working in difficult circumstances, such as on drug cases.

* The United States' \$57 billion annual appetite for drugs is a powerful motivator of corruption in Mexico. Under the leadership of ONDCP and General McCaffrey, we are taking strong steps to curb domestic demand for drugs, even as we work with Mexico and others to shut off the supply.

* Drug traffickers are violent and brutal opponents of justice and the rule of law throughout the hemisphere. Summit of the Americas in Santiago April 18-19 will feature a number of steps governments are using to address this challenge more effectively through multilateral cooperation.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS: ABSENCE OF FAST TRACK
April 15, 1998

Isn't the President going to Santiago without the one thing he wanted most, Fast Track?

* Summit of the Americas in Santiago will mark the formal launch of negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas. This represents a critical step toward realizing the President's vision of a hemisphere of free-trading liberal democracies. Fast Track authority is not required for the launch of these negotiations, but will be needed at some point in the future.

* During negotiations for both NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay Round, it was clear from the beginning that additional grants of Fast Track authority would be needed. In the end, these were obtained.

* The President will continue to work with the Congress to obtain Fast Track authority.

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHILE

Focus on the Americas. State visit to Chile and Santiago Summit are culmination of year-long, intense focus on Americas -- including state visits to Washington by Frei and Chretien in Feb. 1997; POTUS trip to Mexico, Central America and Caribbean in May 1997; and POTUS trip to Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina in Oct. 1997. Also next step in process POTUS began in Miami in 1994 with first Summit of the Americas: bringing Americas together around democracy, open markets, and cooperation against common threats.

=> POTUS determined to make most of quiet revolution in the Americas. Today, 34 of 35 nations embrace democracy and free markets. Decades of civil

war and coups
 have given way to peace and stability. 42% of all U.S. exports went to FTAA countries in 1997 and U.S. exports growing faster than to any other region.
 Result: Americas more united than ever around shared interests and values.
 Region becoming a cornerstone for U.S. security and prosperity in 21st century.

Ensuring that Democracy and Open Markets Deliver. The people of Latin America have chosen democracy and open markets. Now, for democracy and markets to endure, they must deliver for all -- i.e. need to move beyond basic building blocks of elections and market economies to "second generation" reforms in education, rule of law, health care, worker rights, anti-corruption that give everyone a chance to participate and prosper. Santiago Summit will focus on bringing these reforms to life through resources and concrete actions.

=> Providing good schools and training, so every child can succeed in global economy;
 => Reducing poverty through micro-enterprise loans, property registration, expanded access to health care, women's rights, and workers rights;
 => Strengthening the rule of law, independence of judges, professionalism of police so justice system is fair, efficient and honest.
 => Attacking corruption, so public contracts are awarded on merit, not bribes and climate more attractive for investment;
 => Bolstering freedom of press through creation of full-time hemispheric press advocate;
 => Establishing secure financial systems that permit stable growth;
 => Reaching out to all sectors of society to ensure participation in shaping the future.
 => Up to \$45 billion in IDB, WB and AID resources will be made available to support these goals over the next two years.

Pursuing Economic Integration. Miami Summit set forth vision of bringing Americas together around open markets through a Free Trade of the

Americas

Agreement by 2005. In Santiago, leaders will launch comprehensive negotiations and direct trade ministers to make concrete progress by 2000. Will establish mechanism to allow labor, environment and other civil society groups to contribute to FTAA process. Also will pursue commitments to strengthen bank regulation and market oversight to promote stability of financial markets.

Highlighting Chile's Achievements. State visit to Chile will give POTUS

opportunity to spotlight Chile's impressive achievements. Chile of today has emerged from turbulent past to become vibrant democracy, working to ensure that all its citizens share in fruits of open market economy. Success can be seen in broad-based prosperity, reduced poverty and universal access to improved educational opportunities.

SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS

April 14, 1998

Q: Why is the President going to Santiago? What does he hope to achieve at the Summit?

A:

* In December 1994, President Clinton hosted the first Summit of the Americas in Miami, to forge a new partnership among the 34 democratically-elected leaders of the hemisphere built on democratic governance, open markets, and free trade.

* Since 1994 Miami Summit, the hemisphere has come a long way in terms of deepening democracy, consolidating sweeping economic reforms, attacking poverty, and redefining the security agenda to meet emerging transnational threats .

* Most recently, Latin American countries have taken the rights steps -- however

painful -- to reinforce market confidence and insulate themselves from the effects of Asia's economic crisis. These achievements should serve as a model for other regions.

* Santiago will advance the close partnership we have established with our neighbors. It focuses on the "second-generation" reforms necessary to consolidate democracy and create opportunity for all citizens: education, judicial reform, hemispheric security and counternarcotics cooperation, economic integration, reducing poverty, micro-enterprises, the environment, and other pressing issues.

* We want to demonstrate that democracy and free markets can make a tangible difference in the lives of ordinary people.

* The main theme for the Summit will be improving education throughout the hemisphere. The leaders will agree that education is the key to prosperity and the best tool for expanding opportunity for all citizens, and with assistance offered by Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank, will commit to improving primary and secondary education, teacher training and exchanges, distance learning, curriculum reform, higher standards, and bringing technology into the classroom.

* Leaders will agree to launch negotiations to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005, with concrete progress toward that goal by 2000. This represents a critical step toward realizing the President's vision of a hemispheric community of free-trading liberal democracies.

* President Frei and President Clinton will meet to review the progress made in our bilateral relationship since Frei's visit to Washington in February, 1997 and to discuss new areas of cooperation in promoting commerce, education, and the environment. President Clinton will highlight Chile's record of economic growth

and poverty reduction as a positive example for the hemisphere.

* The President will meet with community leaders who are helping to lift people out of poverty, discuss our expanding trade ties with the business community, and make a speech to Chile's Congress about the consolidation of democracy in the hemisphere.

Q: Tell us about the launch of the FTAA -- what is it and why is it important?

A:

* At the Santiago Summit, the United States will join other countries in launching negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas. The FTAA will create to hemisphere-wide free trade zone by 2005, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.

* Launch of negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Santiago marks an important milestone in the hemisphere's progress toward more open markets and greater prosperity. It is consistent with the timeline that was established at the Miami Summit.

* We can promote free trade without compromising our social gains, including labor and environmental standards. We are committed to achieving a free trade agreement that raises the quality of life of ordinary people.

Q: Fast track authority was not approved last year. Should the Chileans still expect a trade deal with the U.S.?

A:

* A comprehensive free trade agreement with Chile remains solidly in our interest. Bilateral trade has continued to grow and last year reached over \$6.6 billion. Our workers, our consumers and our industries are profiting.

* I'm confident that the Congress will give the President the necessary

tools to
conclude these and other negotiations that will keep the American
economy
growing.

Q: How realistic are the chances of obtaining fast track authority
before the end
of this term?

A:

* The President is committed to obtaining fast track authority, and I
am
confident the Congress will grant it.

* Trade is an engine for American prosperity. I'm confident that the
Congress
will see the wisdom of giving the President the authority to knock
down trade
barriers, open markets, and create more jobs for America.

Q: With increases in bilateral trade with Chile, the number of disputes
has also
risen over grapes, salmon, wheat, and other commodities. What is the
status of
these various disputes?

A:

* Trade frictions are an inevitable part of any thriving commercial
relationship.
Overall trade relations, and bilateral relations in general, remain
strong.

* We and the Chileans are committed to resolving these disputes in
accordance
with existing laws and dispute resolution mechanisms.

Q: What is the position of the United States on the efforts both in
Chile and in
Spain to bring General Pinochet to justice for human rights violations
committed
during his tenure?

A:

* Pursuant to our mutual legal assistance treaty with Spain, the Justice
Department has been coordinating and facilitating our response to

requests from the Spanish court for assistance in its investigation. The Justice Department has made available several witnesses and has provided a number of documents in response to these requests.

* I do not want to comment on the legal or legislative processes underway in Chile regarding General Pinochet as this is an internal matter.

Q: Defending the approval of fast track legislation in February of 1997, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky said that in the absence of a full legislative mandate for the U.S. to negotiate FTAA "there is a leadership vacuum in the Americas." Does your government still hold this view? Does the U.S. see MERCOSUR leadership as a threat to American interests in the region?

A:

* This hemisphere is integrating at an accelerating pace, and it is to America's advantage that we be part of that process.

* NAFTA, Mercosur, the Andean Community, Caricom, and the Central American Common Market are all lowering barriers to internal trade and creating more efficient economies, with more prosperous consumers who are buying more foreign as well as domestic products. The result has been more trade, both among members and with the rest of the world.

* Already this hemisphere accounts for 42% of all US exports, and this proportion is continuing to grow.

* We support regional and subregional free trade arrangements when they expand overall trade, rather than divert it inward.

* As I said last fall in Brazil and Argentina, we therefore support Mercosur. It has been good for its members and good for the United States. Like NAFTA, it has

promoted efficiency, increased incomes, and expanded external as well as internal trade. It has also reduced regional tensions, increased non-economic cooperation among its members, and promoted democracy.

* We want to ensure that NAFTA, Mercosur and the other hemispheric trading arrangements remain on converging courses. This is why we have set the goal of 2005 for a free trade area of the Americas, why we are about to launch negotiations toward that goal, and why we want to make substantial progress by the end of the decade.

* Fast Track is Congresses way of reinforcing American trade diplomacy. At some point it will be necessary. The sooner we get it, the faster and more surely we will achieve our objectives.

Q: MERCOSUR and European Union leaders will meet next year to explore closer economic and trade ties. Is the growing European interest in Latin America a subject of concern for the U.S.?

A:

* No, what is of concern is that we take full advantage of the opportunities for trade and investment in the region , just as the Europeans are quite rightly doing.

* Every region in the world should have a growing interest in Latin America. Trade and foreign investment are expanding faster than anywhere else, inflation is low, and most countries have adopted the type of reforms that will guarantee long-term economic growth and stability.

Q: In light of the adverse impact that NAFTA has had on the smaller economies of the Caribbean and Central America, should these countries be given special treatment in the FTAA?

A:

* Negotiating process for FTAA will seek to create opportunities for the full participation of all countries, including the smaller economies.

* The Caribbean Basin Initiative has provided preferential access to the U.S. market for most of the Caribbean and Central American countries. It reflected their traditionally close trading relationships with us and their own economic vulnerability, which can often translate into security challenges for us. NAFTA had the effect of undercutting some of this preferential access, and I'm committed to working with the Congress to get those benefits restored.

Q: What can you tell me about the Multilateral Drug Alliance? Is this is a substitute for certification?

A:

* The objective of our certification process is to promote full cooperation in the war against drugs. The objective of the hemispheric counternarcotics alliance we seek is exactly the same.

* Drugs are a problem for every nation of this hemisphere, and our publics all recognize that.

* All of us need to and want to cooperate more effectively in eradication, interdiction, and demand reduction. We want a system in which our national planning can be made compatible and mutually reinforcing, where each of us knows what others intend, where each of us can comment on and help improve upon the plans of others, where we all commit to explicit goals, and we all can evaluate the progress we are making, individually and collectively, toward these goals.

* NATO performs such a function for its members in terms of defense

planning; the
OECD and the IMF perform such a function with respect to members'
economic
planning. We want the Inter American Commission on Drugs, of the
OAS, to develop
such a capability to support its members in the area of
counternarcotics.

* Certification applies to specific countries in different region of the
world.
The alliance we seek is hemispheric, multilateral, and open to all. One
is not a
replacement for the other.

* Certification is the law, and the Administration will continue to fully
implement it. Only Congress can change this process. There are
members of both
parties in the Congress who believe that the process can be improved,
and the
Administration remains prepared to work with the Congress to this
end.

* We believe a hemispheric alliance against drugs is an essential step
toward
successfully meeting this threat to all our societies, regardless of what
may or
may not happen to certification.

Q: Panamanian officials recently said the talks with U.S. over an
Multinational
Counternarcotics Center were at a standstill. Is this true?

A:

* Active negotiations are continuing.

* The MCC is a Panamanian proposal , which we support. It is
intended to provide
a venue and arrangement for counternarcotics cooperation, including
information-sharing, training, and other forms of collaboration.
Several nations
in the region have expressed interest in the concept.

* However these negotiations conclude, the U.S. remains committed
to
multinational cooperation on counternarcotics.

Q: Do you see arms trafficking as part of the drug challenge? What
are you doing

about it?

A:

* Problems of drug trafficking and arms trafficking are linked. Often criminals are better armed than the police. That obviously hampers all kinds of law enforcement efforts, including drug control.

* We have taken aggressive steps to control the gray market in firearms through the OAS model regulations and the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of, and Trafficking in, Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials.

* These measures will establish a much more transparent, reliable, and effective system for preventing illicit trafficking in firearms sales. Will also provide law enforcement officials with the necessary tools to combat illegal arms sales.

* Both the Convention and the model regulations are examples for the rest of the world, and we will aggressively promote them outside the hemisphere as well as within it.

* The United States is already in substantial compliance with the model regulations will be the first country to fully implement them. These regulations will ensure that no country in the hemisphere will receive weapons that its government does not explicitly authorize. I will submit the Inter-American Convention to the Senate for ratification once the Senate resumes session later this month.

Q: But what about legal sales? Don't we continue to export certain types of weapons which we ourselves have banned at home?

A:

* The Inter-American Convention is designed to control illicit arms trafficking,
not legitimate commercial sales.

* The model regulations ensure that only those weapons whose sale is specifically
and explicitly authorized by the recipient country will be sold abroad. No
country in the hemisphere will receive weapons which its government does not
specifically authorize.

Q: Last February, the U.S. waived Colombia's sanctions under decertification to -
as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it - help that country with the
never-ending wave of violence and save its democracy. How concerned is your
government with the violence in Colombia and the possibility that it could spread
to neighboring countries? Would the U.S. in any way help Colombia negotiate a
peace agreement with the guerrilla groups? Should the U.S. military play an
enhanced role in helping Colombia fight drug traffickers, guerrilla, narco-guerrilla and paramilitary groups? How?

A:

* The President's decision to grant a national interests certification will
enable us to fully engage with the Colombian government that will emerge from
this summer's elections in fighting narcotics trafficking and the violence it
spawns.

* We condemn the guerrillas and the illegal paramilitaries who are waging a
brutal war on Colombia's civilian population. We have also called on the
Colombian government to ensure that its security forces rigorously respect human
rights.

* The Leahy law and other U.S. policies forbid the American security assistance
to units that commit human rights violations. We support these restrictions and

are complying with them fully.

* Our assistance to Colombia is aimed at reducing the flow of drugs to the United States - an issue of great national interest. If there is any connection between narcotics trafficking and Colombia's insurgency, it is one created by the insurgents and traffickers, not us.

* We support efforts to end the violence in Colombia, and recognize the need for a viable peace process of the sort that has brought an end to the violence in other countries in the hemisphere.

Q: Several American citizens have recently been taken hostage in Colombia. What are the prospects for their release?

A:

* Four American bird-watchers were taken hostage by the Colombian terrorist/guerrilla group FARC at a guerrilla roadblock on March 23. One of the hostages has since escaped. Other Americans have also been kidnapped in Colombia by various groups, and some have been missing for several years. We have called upon these groups to release immediately all American citizens and others that they have taken hostage.

* FARC commanders have issued contradictory statements about when the remaining American birdwatchers will be released and whether a ransom will be demanded. We call upon the FARC to immediately release all American citizens and others that it has taken hostage.

* Our longstanding policy is not to make concessions to terrorists. This policy remains in effect.

Q: The decision by your government to lift the ban on sales of advanced weapons to Latin America last year was followed by the designation of non-NATO ally status to Argentina, which generated tensions and suspicions about

U.S.

intentions throughout the region, especially in Chile and Brazil. Can you clarify the U.S. position and tell us how you intend to approach the issue of hemispheric defense and security at the Santiago Summit?

A:

* Last year the President decided to treat a democratic and peaceful Latin America, perhaps the most democratic and peaceful region of the world, the same way we do other regions - that is, to evaluate arms sales on a case by case basis.

* U.S. is committed to helping Latin American countries modernize their military establishments in ways congruent with their defense needs and with democratic governance. This is our practice with democratic allies around the world.

* Through the Summit of the Americas process, we are promoting hemispheric defense and security in a number of ways, e.g. encouraging adoption of measures to increase military transparency and confidence-building.

* Seek to foster cooperation on the most immediate threats to hemispheric security, such as drug trafficking and terrorism.

* Also promoting democratic deepening and economic integration in the hemisphere. These contribute to peace and reduce the likelihood of international conflict.

* Committed to helping defuse and resolve existing international disputes that might flare up into violence. The ongoing talks between Ecuador and Peru are a case in point.

* U.S. named Argentina a Major Non-NATO Ally for its important contributions to international peacekeeping. We remain ready to extend this designation to others on the same basis and for the same purpose.

Q: What is the status of F-16 sales to Chile?

A:

- * The Chilean government is still reviewing the bids of U.S. and other foreign aircraft manufacturers.

- * The Administration has indicated that it will approve the sale if the Chileans choose to purchase U.S. aircraft. There is also very strong support for the sale in Congress.

- * The President has told President Frei that the United States supports Chile's force modernization and wants to sustain and deepen our security partnership.

Q: Your decision to relax the embargo against Cuba, after the Pope's visit to that country, was certainly welcomed by the leaders you will meet in Santiago. Should that be taken as a sign of a new U.S. willingness to adopt a more effective strategy of constructive engagement with Cuba?

A:

- * Measures the President announced on March 20 were in response to the Pope's visit and have not been made in response to the Cuban government.

- * They are meant to build on the success of the visit, support the development of civil society in Cuba, expand the role of the Catholic Church, and ultimately help prepare the Cuban people for a peaceful transition to democracy.

- * We have not relaxed the embargo against Cuba. The essential elements of U.S. policy remain valid and in place.

- * We will continue to pursue policies that help the Cuban people without strengthening the regime, in keeping with a bipartisan U.S. policy over the last forty years.

Q: Does the Administration plan to take additional steps with respect to Cuba?

A:

* Secretary Albright with the Congress to seek a bipartisan approach to the transfer of food to Cuba. Nothing additional is being considered.

* We will, of course, continue to look for ways to strengthen Cuban civil society and to support the Cuban people without strengthening the regime.

Q: Aren't you are out of step with the rest of the hemisphere. Some want Cuba to rejoin the OAS; others are clamoring to visit, upgrade relations. The Dominican Republic opened a new consulate in Havana just last week. Aren't we isolated?

A:

* We agree on the goals, not necessarily on how to get there. I believe it is a mistake to normalize relations with President Castro or his regime unless and until he shows willingness to introduce democratic reforms.

* We should work together to promote democracy in the only country which does not yet enjoy it.

* Message of the Summit should be that democracy, free markets, globalization and economic integration offer the hope of a better life for all our peoples.

* Without meaningful change along these lines, Cuban participation in our hemispheric community is not appropriate.

Q: What about China, a country with a deplorable human rights record? You even dropped the resolution criticizing China at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva? You engage with China, why not Cuba?

A:

* China is a dynamic society. We believe our engagement will help channel these

fast-moving developments in a constructive direction that enhances human rights.

* Cuba, in contrast, is in a time warp. It is, as Madeleine Albright has pointed out, the last dictatorship in a hemisphere of democracies.

* In each case, whether it is China, Cuba, or any other country, our policy is guided by how best we believe we can promote our objectives and interests. Our goal of support for democracy and human rights is the same, but our approach will vary with circumstances.

Q: Aren't the Administration's policies driven by hard liners in the Congress and in the Cuban-American community and not by foreign policy concerns?

A:

* In the wake of the Pope's visit, there is a growing recognition that we need to prepare the way for a peaceful transition to democracy by finding ways to strengthen Cuban civil society.

* We looked for ways to sustain the space created by the Pope's visit and want to continue to reach out directly to the Cuban people while sustaining pressure on the Cuban government for democratic reform.

Q: What do you think of Prime Minister Chretien going to Cuba?

A:

* The President knows that Prime Minister Chretien wants to use his visit to promote progress toward democracy, and we wish him well. We do not believe it is productive to normalize relations with Cuba, however, or do anything which enhances the legitimacy of the Cuban regime as long as that regime denies the Cuban people their basic human rights.

Q: As the leaders prepare to meet in Santiago and reaffirm the rule of democracy in the Americas, democracy is at risk in Paraguay. How should leaders deal with this situation during the Summit?

A:

* In 1996, we worked closely with Paraguay's MERCOSUR allies to preserve democratic government. We are doing so again today.

* Our commitment to protect and promote democracy remains strong. The Washington Protocol, which entered into force last year, provides for the suspension from the OAS of member-states whose system of government is changed in an unconstitutional manner.

* U.S. law mandates the cut-off of bilateral assistance in the event of a democratic government being overthrown. U.S. policy, as well as the policy of many other Summit governments, opposes assistance from international financial institutions to undemocratic regimes in the hemisphere.

* Taken together, these measures impose substantial costs on subverting constitutional democracy.

Q: Several Latin American presidents have sought to change the constitution of their countries to allow themselves to run for a second and even a third mandate. Does this kind of maneuvering affect the institutionalization of democracy in the region?

A:

* We have our own debates on term limits, and we have amended our own Constitution in this respect.

* It would not be appropriate for me to comment on specific circumstances in any one country. That is for the leaders and the people of each country to determine.

* What is essential is respect for democratic processes and constitutional procedure.

Q: Social issues, especially education, will be high on the Summit agenda. The importance of the subject is obvious. Less obvious is what the countries of the Americas can do together to advance an issue that is essentially a domestic one. What are your goals for the Santiago meeting in this area?

A:

* Education reform is fundamental for implementing our common vision of building a community of free market democracies that was first articulated in Miami. We can work together on a variety of fronts by sharing best practices and building common values.

* Such efforts will enable us to build mutually reinforcing economies. The global economy needs citizens with advanced skill sets. Fundamental goal of my Administration.

* Education also allows all our citizens to keep better informed and to participate in public life - the essence of democracy.

Q: Do you favor the institutionalization of the summit process in the Americas, with periodic meetings of leaders? If so, what would be the role of the OAS? Should a new bureaucracy be created to run the process, as former senior officials of various countries have recently suggested?

A:

* Look forward to discussions at the Summit on issues of follow-up. Clearly, we are interested in continuing to build hemispheric institutions that advance economic integration and the consolidation of democracy.

* The OAS is central to the process. However, as we move closer to the new

millennium we should attend to reviewing our institutions to make sure they are responsive and relevant to our new and growing agenda.

Q: Many analysts say that corruption and the lack of transparency remain serious problems in the hemisphere and constitute obstacles to investment in many countries. This issue is very much alive in Argentina. Do you share the opinions of the analysts concerned? What can the countries of the hemisphere do collectively about it?

A:

* Corruption is everyone's problem. Fighting corruption is essential if we are to consolidate democratic gains and promote economic growth in the Americas.

* The Summit initiative emphasizes the importance of ratifying the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, which entered into force in March 1997. I have recently submitted the Convention to the Senate for ratification in the United States.

* This Convention is the first such convention of its kind in the world and represents a truly remarkable achievement.

* Summit governments are pursuing initiatives designed to strengthen and professionalize the administration of justice. These include the establishment of a judicial studies center and other international training programs, such as the International Law Enforcement Academy.

* The Summit is also supporting investigation of corruption through the funding of a Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and other measures designed to invigorate civil society and promote and protect investigative journalism.

Q: The governments of the Americas have decided to create a position of a Special

Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression in the Human Rights Commission of the Organization of American States. As far as the U.S. is concerned, what is the role of the Rapporteur?

A:

* We welcome the decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to establish a Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and we will support strongly the Rapporteur's vital work.

* The Commission will shortly select a full-time professional as Rapporteur (its first such full-time position ever). The Rapporteur will enjoy a broad mandate: preparing annual and thematic reports on the state of freedom of expression in the Americas and serving an "early warning" function by bringing to the Commission's attention matters involving threats to freedom of expression.

Q: By creating a Special Rapporteur, isn't the OAS singling out freedom of expression and privileging it over other rights?

A:

* Inter-American Commission felt that freedom of expression deserved special attention because it underlies so many other rights.

* Decision comes at the appropriate time, when hemisphere's increasingly assertive media is coming under attack.

Q: Latin America has survived the recent Asian financial turmoil, though not without costs. The repercussions of a new wave of instability in Asia could wipe out much of the economic gains achieved in the region in the recent past and compromise crucial efforts in social policy. Considering the current situation in Japan, what are the chances of the Asian financial crises reigniting? How do the President and other leaders intend to address this in Santiago?

A:

* Key lesson of Asian crisis is the importance of sound economic policies and clean, efficient financial institutions. Latin American countries took the right steps and deserve credit for their bold reforms.

* Must persevere in our efforts to ensure that financial instability does not affect the countries of the hemisphere. Last December, our Finance Ministers completed the initial steps in this joint effort by pledging to work together to ensure sound macroeconomic policies, strong financial systems and transparent economic and financial data.

* Convinced that Latin America is ahead in this process. The Summit will help sustain this momentum.

Q: Last week, Paraguay sued the United States in the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Paraguay is asking the Court to delay the execution of Angel Breard, a Paraguayan national convicted of murder in Arlington, Virginia. What will the U.S. do?

A:

* The ICJ order has been provided to the State of Virginia. The Department of Justice and Department of State are exploring the matter, including the issue of the legal effects of the ICJ request that the United States take this provisional measure.

* This is a pending judicial matter on which I do not want to speculate.

Q: What can you tell me about the Multilateral Drug Alliance? Is this is a substitute for certification?

A:

* Drugs are a problem for every nation of this hemisphere, and our publics all recognize that.

* All of us need to and want to cooperate more effectively in eradication, interdiction, and demand reduction. We want a system in which our national planning can be made compatible and mutually reinforcing, where each of us knows what others intend, where each of us can comment on and help improve upon the plans of others, where we all commit to explicit goals, and we all can evaluate the progress we are making, individually and collectively, toward these goals.

* NATO performs such a function for its members in terms of defense planning; the OECD and the IMF perform such a function with respect to members' economic planning. We want the Inter American Commission on Drugs, of the OAS, to develop such a capability to support its members in the area of counternarcotics.

* The Administration will continue to fully implement certification. Only Congress can change this process. There are members of both parties in the Congress who believe that the process can be improved, and the Administration remains prepared to work with the Congress to this end.

* Certification is the law, it is global in scope, and it applies only to a limited number of countries. The alliance we seek is hemispheric, multilateral, and open to all.

* We believe a hemispheric alliance against drugs is an essential step toward successfully meeting this threat to all our societies, regardless of what may or may not happen to certification.

CUBA
April 14, 1998

Background: (For the briefer only) On March 20, the President

announced several measures on behalf of Cuban people in response to the Pope's visit to Cuba. These included: (1) simplifying and expediting the sale of medicines and medical supplies consistent with existing law; (2) restoring direct humanitarian charter flights; and (3) developing new licensing arrangements to restore authorization for remittances. He also announced a willingness to work on a bipartisan basis with the Congress to fashion a new approach to the transfer of food for the Cuban people. The Los Angeles Times reported today that President Clinton told Dr. Peter Bourne, chairman of the American Association for World Health, that he supports legislation to exempt food and medicine from the U.S. embargo against Cuba.

According to today's Miami Herald, an American priest based in Cuba is charging that the Cuban government is forcing him to leave as a warning to the Catholic Church in the wake of the Pope's visit. The Herald story states that the GOC has insisted he be transferred from his parish in Santa Clara to Havana and that his visa will not be renewed when it expires in February 1999. The Church has not yet commented on the story. Neither the Church nor Father Sullivan have requested U.S. government assistance or intervention. For the moment, this remains an internal Church matter.

Q: Does the President support legislation exempting food and medicine from the U.S. embargo against Cuba?

A:

* As you know, on March 20, the President announced a series of measures to strengthen our support for the Cuban people in response to the Pope's visit.

* The measures were designed to build on the success of the visit,

support the development of civil society in Cuba, expand religious freedoms, and ultimately help prepare the Cuban people for a peaceful transition to democracy.

* The President also asked Secretary Albright to work with the Congress to seek a bipartisan approach to the transfer of food to Cuba. That effort will get underway when Congress returns from recess.

* The starting point are pending bills before Congress by Torres/Leach and Dodd/Warner and a proposal being developed by Senator Helms to facilitate humanitarian assistance to Cuba. There is also the trip report from Senator Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committee staff who visited Cuba during the Papal visit, which among other things, calls for increased humanitarian donations for needy Cubans.

* Based on these various initiatives, the Administration is seeking to work with the Congress to fashion a new bipartisan approach to the transfer of food.

* We will continue to pursue policies that help the Cuban people without strengthening the regime, in keeping with a bipartisan U.S. policy over the last 40 years.

Q: What about the sale of medicines?

A:

* The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 permits the export of medicine, medical supplies and equipment to Cuba by American companies and their subsidiaries, provided appropriate end-use monitoring arrangements are in place.

* On March 20, the President directed the Departments of Treasury, Commerce and State to simplify and expedite procedures for medical sales, while maintaining adequate measures to verify against inappropriate diversions. These new

procedures will be announced shortly.

U.S. Priest Reportedly Forced to Leave Cuba

Q: What about the charge that Father Patrick Sullivan, a U.S. citizen serving as a priest in Cuba, is being forced to leave by Cuban government authorities?

A:

* We have seen the press reports on this, but do not have all the details and can not comment on the specifics.

* Naturally, we support the expansion of religious freedom and would regret any move by the GOC to restrict it.

* (If asked) As an American citizen, Father Sullivan, would, of course, have access to the services of our U.S. Interests Section in Havana.

IRAQ/IAEA
April 14, 1998

Q: What is your reaction to the IAEA's report regarding Iraq?

Background: The IAEA released publicly its six-month report to the UNSC on Iraq's nuclear weapons program April 10. It states that over the last six months, the IAEA has uncovered "no indications of prohibited equipment, material, or of conduct of prohibited activities." It makes no issue over still-unanswered questions. The IAEA briefs the UNSC April 23, and the sanctions review is April 27..

A: We are impressed by the progress IAEA has made in rooting out and eliminating Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

The IAEA has battled Iraqi lying, concealment, and obfuscation over seven years

to push the Iraqis to provide a complete, verifiable accounting of its nuclear program.

We don't believe we have a complete and verifiable accounting yet . We still have serious concerns about gaps in weapons design, uranium enrichment, and Iraq's procurement mechanism.

Until such gaps are closed , it is premature to move the nuclear file from inspection phase into a monitoring phase. We will ensure that our UNSC colleagues know our views.

CHINA SATELLITE LAUNCHES April 15, 1998

Did the President issue a waiver for the launch of a US commercial satellite by China because a senior officer of the company involved was a major contributor?

-- On Feb. 18, the President issued a national interest waiver to permit the launch of a U.S. commercial communications satellite by China. This waiver decision was based solely on consideration of U.S. national interests.

-- Any suggestion that campaign contributions were a factor is nonsense.

-- This is the latest in a series of such waivers under a policy dating back to Reagan Administration.

Won't this waiver undermine a Justice Department investigation of prior export violations by this company?

-- Of course, I cannot comment on activities of the Justice Department.

-- I would just say that, in deciding whether the waiver was in the national interest, the views of all agencies were carefully weighed, along with

other factors, such as U.S. practice over the last few years and the availability of a wide range of sanctions to deal with any company that is determined to have violated our export control laws.

Won't this waiver further assist China in developing its missile capabilities?

-- No.

-- The terms of all such licenses include stringent safeguards against the unauthorized transfer of the U.S.-origin goods and technologies related to satellite launches.

-- We have closely scrutinized this license and taken measures to ensure that no technology is transferred other than what is authorized in the license.

-- We are confident the procedures in place for this waiver will guard against unauthorized transfers.

Q: Is the Administration promoting business interests at the expense of U.S. national security by allowing U.S. companies to launch satellites on Chinese rockets?

A: No.

Under President Reagan, the U.S. established the policy of permitting U.S. commercial satellites to be launched from China. This policy has continued under Presidents Bush and Clinton.

However, the USG has maintained a very strict policy, including safeguards, to prevent the unauthorized transfer of sensitive missile technology to China.

For example, the U.S.-China Agreement on Satellite Technology Safeguards specifically precludes U.S. companies from providing assistance to China with

respect to the design, development, operation, maintenance, modification or repair of launch vehicles.

Q: Was the Administration's decision to transfer licensing jurisdiction or waive sanctions a favor to domestic supporters in the aerospace industry?

A: No.

The Administration's decisions have been based on national interest. We are seeking to promote legitimate commercial activity, such as civilian satellite launches, while safeguarding our national security interest.

Promoting commercial space activity with China is part of our broader engagement policy, which includes creating a stronger basis for U.S.-Chinese cooperation on missile nonproliferation issues.

When China violates U.S. laws, we have imposed sanctions, as we did in 1993.

The basis for the waiver of these sanctions in 1994 was additional Chinese nonproliferation commitments.

NORTH KOREA: FOOD AID April 14, 1998

Background: Washington Times carried a story April 13 that attributes to the French Humanitarian group, Doctors without Borders, an assessment that army and government officials were stealing international relief supplies and only a bare minimum was getting through to the sick and dying.

Additional FYI: China pledged 100,000 tons of food aid and 20,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea. South Korea has pledged 50,000 tons of food through the WFP and is engaged in direct talks with the North over possible fertilizer

donations.

Q: What is the latest on U.S. food aid to North Korea?

A: The United States pledged 200,000 tons of food aid to North Korea in response to the UN WFP appeal for the year beginning April 1. 125,000 tons of food aid will be distributed through the WFP, while 75,000 tons will be distributed by American Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) through a work-for-food program designed to rehabilitate agricultural land destroyed by recent natural disasters in North Korea. On April 3, the first shipment of 22,000 tons of corn and rice arrived in North Korea and will be distributed through the WFP monitoring program. Additional shipments of food aid will be sent throughout the year.

Q: Is international food aid being stolen by the government (as Doctors Without Borders contend)?

A: We have no evidence that the food aid we contribute through the WFP has been diverted. Last October a USG needs assessment team visited North Korea and examined the food distribution and monitoring system. They went to previously unvisited areas and held extensive discussions with North Korean Officials and saw no evidence of diversion or significant problems with the monitoring system.

NORTHERN IRELAND

April 13, 1998

Q: Friday the President declined to say whether he was going to visit Northern Ireland. This weekend Tony Blair said he invited the President to visit. Do you have any plans today?

A: The President will be talking to Prime Minister Blair and Prime Minister Ahern regarding the usefulness of visiting Northern Ireland later this spring. They have a lot of work to do to get ready for referendums and subsequently elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly; we want to be helpful and not complicate their efforts.

Q: What do you think the chances are for the referendums to pass next month?

A: This is a question for the voters of Ireland and Northern Ireland who go to the polls on May 22. I would note that this agreement comes out of an inclusive process that involved eight parties representing a broad spectrum of opinion from both communities.

We want to reassure the people there that they can count on the United States to continue to support their efforts to make peace work and build a better future.

Q: How about reports that you have a package of \$100 million to offer Northern Ireland to help solidify the peace?

A: As the President said on Friday, the answer is no. No financial package was sought as an incentive for the peace agreement, nor did we offer one. As you know, this administration was the first to request an appropriation for the International Fund for Ireland. This year that amounts to almost \$20 million, and we have a similar request for the next fiscal year. The IFI does important economic development and cross-community work in Northern Ireland and Ireland's border counties. I do believe, however, that the main impact of Friday's agreement is that the people of Northern Ireland can now unlock the full benefit of trade and investment that already exists with the United States. I am certain that even more will flow in response to peace as it takes roots.

To enhance prospects for that, the President named Jim Lyons last fall to succeed George Mitchell as his Special Advisor for economic initiatives for Ireland. Jim Lyons, the NSC, the Commerce Department, the State Department and other agencies are working together to identify additional initiatives to help make this precious peace a reality.

Q: Are you worried that renewed violence could derail the agreement?

A: As the President said on Friday, in the days to come there may be those who will try to undermine this great achievement -- not only with words but perhaps also with violence. All the parties and all the rest of us must stand shoulder to shoulder to defy any such appeals.

RUSSIA: DUMA REJECTS KIRIYENKO FOR PRIME MINISTER April 13, 1998

Background: The Russian Duma rejected April 10 Yeltsin's choice for Prime Minister, Sergei Kiriyenko. The tally was 143 in favor and 186 against, with 5 abstentions. Kiriyenko had support from the center, including the Our Home Is Russia party, but failed to get the 226 votes necessary for approval, largely because of opposition from the Communists and Yabloko factions. Yeltsin immediately resubmitted Kiriyenko's name to the Duma, which means that a second vote will occur by this Friday, April 17.

The April 10 vote follows Yeltsin's March 23 firing of the entire cabinet, including PM Chernomyrdin, because the government had failed to improve the economy. Kiriyenko has been serving as acting Prime Minister since then. Communist leader Zyuganov has vowed to oppose any candidate Yeltsin submits "as long as the government continues on its current course," and claims Yeltsin cannot renominate the same candidate. (However, most observers accept that the

Constitution permits renomination three times.)

If a nominee is not approved by the third try, the constitution requires President Yeltsin to dissolve parliament and hold new elections within three months.

Q: What is your reaction to the Duma vote in Moscow?

A: We understand that the Russian Duma has rejected President Yeltsin's nominee for Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko, by a vote of 186 to 143. Yeltsin has already resubmitted Kiriyenko's nomination for a second vote and announced that Kiriyenko will continue to serve as Acting Prime Minister in the interim.

Q: What do we know about Kiriyenko?

A: Kiriyenko is a 35-year-old former Fuels and Energy Minister. Before joining the Russian government, he founded a commercial bank in Nizhniy Novgorod and had also headed an oil refinery.

Kiriyenko participated in the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation here in Washington earlier this month. U.S. officials have worked well with him in his capacity as Energy Minister.

Q: Will Kiriyenko eventually be approved by the Duma?

A: According to the Russian Constitution, Yeltsin can resubmit Kiriyenko's name (or the name of another candidate) twice more. If the Duma fails to approve a nominee in three tries, the Duma must be dissolved and new parliamentary elections held within three months. Outcome obviously up to the Duma and Russian government.

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to the government changes in Moscow? Will our policy toward Russia change?

A: The U.S. has worked productively with President Yeltsin's government in support of Russia's transition to democracy and a market economy and its integration into the world economy. We will continue that work. Our policy is one of support for Russia's integration with global and regional institutions.

As we have often said, U.S. policy toward Russia is based on our national interests, not personalities. We will continue to work with the Russian government and Russian leaders in pursuit of those interests.

CAMBODIA/POL POT
April 9, 1998

Q: Would the U.S. support bringing Pol Pot and others to an international tribunal?

A: Our position on this issue is well known. We believe Pol Pot and other senior KR leaders should be held to account for the atrocities that took place in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979, and we would support international efforts to bring that about.

Q: But what are you prepared to do to bring that about?

A: We have discussed this issue with many governments over the past several months and years, and have made it clear we are prepared to support - and work to implement -- any of a variety of options, should Pol Pot and others become accessible to the international community.

[Note to briefer: Such options could include an international tribunal, trial in a third country or, ultimately, trial where the crimes took place.]

Q: Any comment on reports that you are prepared to effect Pol Pot's departure

from Thailand, should he enter that country, or to detain Pol Pot in U.S. custody?

A: Not prepared to comment on hypothetical situations or about diplomatic contacts we may or may not have had on this issue.

Q: Has the President issued the directive on detention of Pol Pot that is referred to in the NY Times piece.

A: Not prepared to comment on what internal guidance may or may not have been issued on this issue.

IF ASKED (AND ONLY IF ASKED):

Q: Would the U.S. lead or participate in any operation within Cambodia to arrest Pol Pot?

A: Not prepared to comment.

PAKISTAN
April 8, 1998

Q: When Ambassador Richardson visits India and Pakistan this week, what will he tell them regarding missiles, given the Pakistani test of the Ghauri missile and reported Indian deployment of the Prithvi?

A: Ambassador Richardson's trip to South Asia has been in preparation for some time; it is not a reaction to last weekend's missile test.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have long been issues on our agendas with both Pakistan and India.

Ambassador Richardson will raise these issues in both countries.

With regard to the recent missile test, we have called for both India and

Pakistan to exercise restraint.

IF ASKED:

Q: What is the U.S. response to reports that India has deployed the Prithvi missile?

A: Although India has the Prithvi missile, we do not believe that it has in fact deployed this system.

NIGERIA/ADMINISTRATION POLICY April 15, 1998

Q: Is the Administration split on Nigeria policy? How can you reconcile views expressed by the President, Rev. Jackson, Secretary Albright and Assistant Secretary Rice?

A:

-- No, there is no split in the Administration on our policy objectives or on the principles we stand for.

-- We are encouraging reform and democratic principles in Nigeria and we hope for a free and fair process to elect a credible civilian government.

-- As the President stated very clearly during his trip, our objective is a return to true civilian democratic rule in Nigeria.

-- True civilian democratic rule means a credible process that includes free political activity, release of political prisoners, freedom of the press, and free, fair and transparent elections. The current transition process appears to be flawed and failing.

-- It is not sufficient for a military ruler simply to remove his uniform and

declare himself a civilian. The process itself has to have integrity and not be manipulated.

-- We have consistently urged the Government of Nigeria to honor its own commitment to make a genuine transition to civilian democratic rule.

RADIO FREE IRAN April 15, 1998

Background: Story leads w/ "Clinton administration, under pressure from Congress, has agreed to create a Persian-language radio service to beam anti-government propaganda into Iran." The basic problem with this lead is the statement that we "agreed" -- fact is we were unable to convince Congress to change the position it had taken in the appropriations act in the fall. We "agreed" only in the sense that the President signed the bill into law. Bottom line: Administration continues to pursue some accommodation on the Hill to our view that entity should not be called "Radio Free Iran" and that entity should not be based in Prague, understanding that proponents want it based outside U.S. We pushed hard but with no luck to get Congress to accept that some of the funds should initially go to augmenting existing VOA Farsi-language service.

* Congress mandated in report language in P.L. 105-119 (appropriations act for Commerce, State, Justice) that in the international broadcasting operations account, \$4M must go to the development of a Farsi-language surrogate broadcasting service to Iran.

* Administration supports increased Farsi-language broadcasting to the region.

* Administration view is that such increased Farsi-language broadcasting is best done through VOA.

* We do not believe it is necessary to create a separate entity to carry out these broadcasts, and we have not supported creation of a "Radio Free Iran." We still do not support these proposals.

* We have consulted closely with Congress and with the international broadcasting services to work out a plan that satisfies our concerns. We will continue to pursue with Congress a solution that accommodates our view that the entity should not be called "Radio Free Iran" and that the entity should not be based in Prague.