

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	William Davis to John Schmidt. Subject: FW: Frigate Briefer for Berger. (5 pages)	07/15/1997	P1/b(1)
002. email	John Prendergast to Erica Barks-Ruggles, Pat Battenfield, Shawn McCormick et al. Subject: FW: Action Memorandum to the President. (8 pages)	09/11/1997	P1/b(1)
003. email	Jordan Donald to William Wechsler. Subject: Action Memorandum to the President. (4 pages)	10/28/1997	P1/b(1)
004. email	Richard Saunders to Douglas Babcock, Christopher Bolan, Darrien Boulton et al. Subject: Redout from Jim Steinberg's NSC Senior Director's Meeting. (2 pages)	01/20/1998	P1/b(1)
005. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to James Dobbins. Cuba Paper--First Cut (8 pages)	01/26/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
 OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/15/1997-02/03/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5701

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/15/97 3:42:00 PM
FROM Rubin, Eric S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Note McCurry comments on Ahern [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Peters, Mary A.

CARBON_COPY Dowling, J. Nicholas
Feeley, John F.
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Peters, Mary A.
Schmidt, John R.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Covey, James P.
McEldowney, Nancy E.

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT MIKE0715.DOC
EXECUTIVEOFFICEOFTHEPRESIDENT

15-Jul-1997 03:24pm

TO: (See Below)

FROM: Margaret M. Suntum
Office of the Press Secretary

SUBJECT: 1997-07-15 Mike McCurry's Daily Press Briefing

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 15, 1997

PRESS BRIEFING BY
MIKE MCCURRY

The Briefing Room

1:50 P.M. EDT

MR. MCCURRY: Hi. Welcome to the White House daily press briefing
me

start with a couple of news items. I think -- we had a delay, as I'm sure you
know and as I apologize for, so you could hear from the participants in the
tobacco discussions and from Secretary Shalala and Mr. Reed. And I
understand

that they probably sufficiently addressed your questions on their
deliberations.

So I'll start with a phone call the President made today to the new Prime
Minister of Ireland, Bertie Ahern, who the President wanted to congratulate
first and foremost, for his recent election victory, but also the President
called so he could establish a personal relationship with the Prime Minister
as

he had with Prime Minister Bruton.

In Northern Ireland peace process the President has found that as we try
use

our offices to support the work done by the government of the United
Kingdom and

the government of the Republic of Ireland, it's helpful to have that personal
one-on-one contact. The President and the new Prime Minister had
exchanged

correspondence since the Prime Minister took office, June 26, but this was
good

opportunity for them to reestablish contact.

The President actually met the new Prime Minister in Dublin in 1995, so

they had made personal acquaintance before, but had a very warm chat.

clearly reviewed the current efforts by both the Irish government and by
British government to move the Northern Ireland peace talks into a more
substantive phase, ideally with the participation of Sinn Fein based on a
unequivocal cease-fire, but absent that at the moment, they reviewed what

which talks at this very critical and delicate time might move forward so

promise of peace could become real for the people of Northern Ireland.

They agreed that they would remain in contact. The President offered to continue to do everything that we can do to be helpful to the parties and Prime Minister expressed his gratitude both for the call and for the President's ongoing effort to support the peace process itself.

Q Are there any plans for Ahern to come over here and meet the President?

MR. MCCURRY: I didn't get any report that they had reviewed that, but look forward to having ongoing contact with the Taoiseach. I wouldn't rule out prospect of seeing him at some appropriate point. There is an annual occasion here, of course, when the Prime Minister is here, but given the delicacy the importance of the process at this point, I wouldn't rule out a meeting sooner than that.

Q And with the violence continuing -- a young lady died today in a hospital after being shot -- do you feel that there

will come a time when you have to draw a line in the sand and say enough, that you're not going to continue contacts with --

MR. MCCURRY: I think we've drawn that line in the sand a long time ago by saying that we hold no quarter for those who espouse violence as a way to pursue their aims and objectives, that the only pathway to the type of future that the people of Ireland desperately want is through reconciliation and through the type of peace talks that the President has done a great deal to advance, that the two governments have done a great deal to advance, and that those parties committed to peace have done a great deal to advance. We stand with those parties those individuals who are on the side of peace and are interested in peace.

we'll continue our program of active contact to try to encourage all to come to the peace table. But the requirements to sit at that table are well-known parties.

Q -- protested to the British government the use of plastic bullets in the control that's been used over the last couple of weeks. How does the White House feel about the use of plastic bullets?

MR. MCCURRY: We are not in a position to second-guess the decision have been made by the Royal Ulster Constabulary as they've had to carry out responsibilities for law enforcement, so we don't prejudge the technique they've used, we don't believe we're in a position to render judgment.

Q Mike, new subject. Weld -- is the White House looking for a different ambassadorial post for Governor Weld?

MR. MCCURRY: The White House continues to believe he would be a excellent ambassador to Mexico.

Q But is it also looking for other posts --

MR. MCCURRY: The White House continues to believe he would be a excellent ambassador to Mexico, and we --

Q What are you waiting for?

MR. MCCURRY: -- continue to understand the reality of the advise and consent process in the Senate, and we're attempting to reconcile the two.

Q How are you doing? Are you getting any closer?

MR. MCCURRY: Not as near as I can tell. (Laughter.)

Q Mike, you're not saying no to the suggestion that there might be some other post in line for him, if the Mexican --

MR. MCCURRY: Not giving up that ghost at the moment.

Q On this question of ambassadorships, why the delay in terms of getting these posts filled?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know that there's been a delay. We have 17 nominations pending in front of the Senate now, several dozen more than in the final stages of being prepared to be sent to the Hill. The process by which we clear ambassadorial appointment so we satisfy the rigorous examination that the Senate requires and that you require of people who are posted abroad is quite extensive

and it requires a great deal of work done in the case of an ambassador by State Department since they do a lot of the background work on individual nominees, and that process has been going forward. We have nominations pending, and the President's made all the decisions about posts to be filled and we got various nominations in the final process of being finalized for both announcement and for nomination.

Q What's the political stumbling block?

MR. MCCURRY: I think it's been well reported what the stumbling block is with respect to Governor Weld.

Q Did you ever finally understand exactly what Helms's problem -- what the root of it?

MR. MCCURRY: He has a number of concerns and he is Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and he can, himself, describe what those concerns are.

Q When do you think this will be resolved?

MR. MCCURRY: Eventually. (Laughter.)

Q At one time, you had the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, speaking to Senator Helms on the Weld nomination. Is there anyone else involved in speaking with him?

MR. MCCURRY: I think a number of people have been helpful in trying to have everyone understand each other better. Senator John Kerrey has been extremely helpful to the administration, others on the committee have been helpful. The Secretary of State has been helpful, but at the end of the day, the advice and consent process is the advice and consent process and we'll just have to wait what the President's parameters are within the structure of what the Constitution requires.

Q Mike, historically, friends and -- like, for example, big donors have been given ambassadorships. Does the White House still think that in these so-called charged times, that's still appropriate, or is there a different outlook?

MR. MCCURRY: There is nothing about a political contribution that one to disqualify someone from service, but neither should that be the basis for someone receiving an appointment. By and large, the bulk of the appointments that have been made by the President are career foreign service officers; most of the ones you've seen announced to this point reflect that. But there are some percentage of ambassadorial appointments that have been and most likely always been political appointees.

Q Mike, has Governor Weld indicated that he'd be interested in any other post?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't want to speculate on what he might be interested in. At the moment, he's interested in and we're interested in seeing if he can't be ambassador to Mexico.

Q Does the President think that he would make a good ambassador to Iran?

MR. MCCURRY: The President thinks that he would make an excellent ambassador.

Q At what point, though, Mike, do you give up the ghost?

MR. MCCURRY: Eventually, as I said. I'm not going to be more specific than that.

Q What is eventually?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not going to be more specific. Let's go on to something else.

Q Speaking of nominations, what's the status of the joint chief of staff position?

MR. MCCURRY: It's unfilled. (Laughter.) And General Joulwan* has gone off to a wonderful retirement and a well-deserved one, and Secretary Cohen has reported to those of your colleagues who cover him that he's nearing the final stage of a recommendation to the President.

Q He's not passed it on to the White House?

MR. MCCURRY: He's had certainly good discussions with the White House, and I believe even good discussions with the President, but he has not formally presented a recommendation at this point.

Q Do you know when he'll do that?

MR. MCCURRY: Soon.

Q This week?

Q Senator Thompson this morning said that a British citizen had offered pay \$100,000 -- had made a \$100,000 contribution to the DNC in 1995 in exchange for a meeting with an NSC official. Do you know if such a meeting took place?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, I think our Counsel's Office has been working on this question and I think if you get in contact with them they've been able to piece together some information and I think they'll be able to satisfy you.

Q What role within the White House during the campaign year did the Political Office have in passing requests on to the National Security Council for meetings with campaign donors?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, not an extensive one, as near as I can determine they certainly could pass on a recommendation and that could be considered properly by anyone. Very frequently at the White House, people will refer someone who may or may not have something interesting to say to someone else on the staff; happens as a matter of routine. I don't believe there was much extensive referral of that nature, but I imagine a lot of that will be developed during the course of hearings.

Q In the case of Eric Hotung and his wife coming in to see Sandy Berger in October of '95, who decided that was an appropriate --

MR. MCCURRY: As I just said earlier, I think if you contact our Counsel's Office they can walk through that. I'm not prepared to do that in any great length right now.

Q Former Senator Dole just returned from Bosnia. Was that conditioned at all

-
did President Clinton ask him to go to Bosnia? Did they talk beforehand about what Dole might do?

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know the answer to that, Warren.

*Shalikashvili

They may have talked about it, because the President has encouraged Secretary Dole to remain active and to continue to be active. And I'll have to check or you may want to check at the State Department. Routinely, as a courtesy, we would have extended him a briefing if he had wanted one prior to going, so we may have had some knowledge of his trip.

Was he part of the delegation that Senator Lott was on?

Q Do you have any reaction to what he had to say at the press conference today?

MR. MCCURRY: I think we have, more or less, underscored some of the same points that the Majority Leader made today -- there needs to be much more work done to implement the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords. There are some areas in which progress has been lacking, other areas in which there has been more satisfactory progress, but the Majority Leader is right, that we all need to work much harder between now and next June to fulfill the commitments that have been made by the parties and to make sure that the parties are in a position to accept and use effectively the resources that have been extended by the international community.

Q What did the President hope to accomplish today by saying there would be dire effects, it would be a great mistake to retaliate?

MR. MCCURRY: His message was quite clear, and I don't think anyone in the message was intended for will have trouble understanding it.

Q The message was intended not only as a warning to the Serbs, but a warning to the American public that things are getting riskier in Bosnia?

MR. MCCURRY: I think it was intended for those. The question was at the prospects of reprisals for the legitimate work being done by the SFOR multinational force in Bosnia, and I think the message probably has been received by the intended audience.

Q Mike, what's the status of the decision on continuing the current policies, companies, businesses that do business in Cuba? Does he have an immediate decision on that?

MR. MCCURRY: I think you're asking what -- we're up very close to a deadline that is required under the Helms-Burton Act for extension of certain provisions under the act. That's being reviewed by the President's senior foreign policy advisors, they are finalizing a recommendation to the President.

MS. LUZZATTO: He has the recommendation.

MR. MCCURRY: He has now received that recommendation and he will on it by the deadline, July 16th.

Q And is this a definite, he gets to do this six months at a time forever and ever?

MR. MCCURRY: The act has six month reviews, specified, but for the duration of the act, I think -- I'm not sure how -- I think for the duration of the act.

Q -- the recommendation is the same as the previous one?

MR. MCCURRY: I wouldn't want to speak for the President before he makes a decision.

Q So you say he has the recommendation?

MR. MCCURRY: That's right.

Q He has the recommendation?

MR. MCCURRY: I guess he must have received it today, because --

MS. LUZZATTO: He has the recommendation as of midnight.

MR. MCCURRY: He's got the recommendation now.

Q I'm asking if the recommendation --

MR. MCCURRY: He has until midnight tonight to act upon it.

Q Tonight or tomorrow night?

MR. MCCURRY: On the 15th. If he acts on it today, we'll report it to you.

Q So can we assume that the recommendation was the same, not that the decision will be the same?

MR. MCCURRY: I think that's probably a safe recommendation, but I don't want to prejudge the announcement by the President of the decision.

Q Two questions on "Contact." Have you heard back from the producer do you have any opinion on journalists taking parts in movies?

MR. MCCURRY: No, and no. Other than the public comment that apparently has been issued by the studio.

Q Mike, we've heard from the members of Congress after they met with President. I wondered if you could give us sort of his assessment, and particularly, it seemed to me that the Republicans were very edgy when asked them about the earned income tax credit issue. They almost didn't want to refer to it, and I wondered why that was and what that was all about.

MR. MCCURRY: The President would concur with what the Republican leaders said.

It was an excellent meeting, they really got directly into the issue that are going to have to be resolved. I think Senator Don Nickles summed it up pretty well. He said in order for this to be a successful effort, it's going to have to come out being a win-win situation, meaning that the President and Democrats on the Hill on the one side and the Republican Majority in Congress are going to have to be able to point to things that they consider to be pluses in their column and I think that was a sensible observation.

So the searches for those things that both sides consider important and h

both
sides' needs can be addressed -- and there was a lot of very candid
conversation
about that that the President appreciated. There was a great deal of
conversation about the earned income tax credit. I think you know from
Vice
President's presentation last week and from what the President said how
strongly
we feel about those lower income working families that we think need that
kind of
tax relief that the President has set forth in his tax bill and there was good
discussion about that and what the tradeoffs are if you extend that type of
assistance to folks that are -- working people who are at the lower end of
income earning scale, there has to be some tradeoffs, and we acknowledged
that
that's true.

Q They talked a lot about the fact that they felt there was a lot of fraud in
that particular thing.

MR. MCCURRY: That's a point that some senators have made and the
Treasury
Department has rebutted some of that, but there is no question that the great
bulk of that benefit assists the lowest income people who are working and
struggling to make it on their own without relying on public assistance to
stay
in the work force, and the Treasury Department can tell you more about
we
believe to be instances --

Q So could you promise to crack down and they could say okay?

MR. MCCURRY: We have been working very hard to eliminate any
problems with that
program. In fact, the structure of the tax relief that we would extend in the
concept of tax proposal for working families incorporates some of the
changes
that the Treasury Department is attempting to make in the EITC program.

Q Can you describe what was said about indexing on both sides?

MR. MCCURRY: There was not a lot of discussion of that issue. I think
there
was more the question of capital gains tax relief itself, the importance that
the
Republican Majority attaches to that, their belief that that was going to
to
be part of the final structure of a tax bill. The President, in one way or
another, has acknowledged that by incorporating some aspects of capital
gains tax

relief into what he's suggested as a proposal that bridges the differences between the sides. But indexing remains something that in our view that

considerably to the size of the deficit in the out-years, even beyond the five-year window, and that's going to be a real problem for the President. He's made that pretty clear. They didn't have a real extensive discussion of this meeting.

Q But they didn't say anything about whether they would be willing to c

MR. MCCURRY: I wouldn't describe it as a session which they attempt negotiate all of these differences. I think both sides laid out what they were concerned about, what they considered to be the most important features: an overall bill, and they talked a little bit about how they will try to reconcile those differences as they move forward.

Q Just one more question on this. When Senator Lott was leaving, he said he was sure that a 20-percent capital gains tax rate, including for the top earners, would be in the final deal.

MR. MCCURRY: I'm sure that he said that. (Laughter.)

Q Is there any reason to believe from the President that that will be the c

MR. MCCURRY: I think that we would, in turn, say that we're sure that there are certain things related to education assistance, and to helping people fund 13th- and 14th-year school education relief for those with families with children, that we're sure that those things will be in the bill, too.

Q Well, let me ask you, then, a different way. Can the President imagine a tax bill that meets his criteria and the values that he talks about all the time includes a 20-percent tax cut for the top earners?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not going to try to negotiate or write a bill right now and now. I think it's clear there will be a capital gains provision in the bill, I think the President has set forth a very good, sensible idea of how he would address that to the exclusion that we've proposed on capital gains taxation and it's going to be up to those who actually write a tax bill to do it.

Q Is the President open to a modest increase in the net amount of the tax in the bill if it would allow you to get the earned income tax stacking that y

want and allow you to give them 20 percent without indexing? Would y
agree
with them to go up from 85 --

MR. MCCURRY: I don't know how you do the math on it.

MR TOIV: -- fundamental change in the budget.

Q Moving the \$85 billion up to, say \$90 billion?

MR. MCCURRY: The \$85 billion that was, several times by some of th
Republican
leaders, said was a figure that they considered very, very important, alon
with
balancing the budget by the year 2002, and I think you would have to, in
sense
-- tax relief and a firm commitment to a balanced budget by a date-certa
are
very important elements, both to the President and to the Republican
leadership.
I'm not sure how you could adjust the overall agreement in that fashion.

Q Did they talk about means testing, and if so, did they talk about how t
would be administered, which seems to be one of the big hang-ups?

MR. MCCURRY: Yes, yes.

Q Can you give us a sense of what that conversation was and what some

MR. MCCURRY: I mean, it wasn't extensive. They just talked about the
different
problems that exist with trying to create a new structure within the
Department
of Health and Human Services to collect the premium, if you're means-
testing the
premium, and the cost associated with creating some new bureaucracy v
HHS
versus the ability to provide additional premium relief if you keep it wit
the 1040 form.

Q Is the IRS -- do you think, as far as the House is concerned, the IRS is
place that would be --

MR. MCCURRY: I think within some parts of the House there's a real
problem with
that. That's going to be one of the issues that they have to work hard on.

Q -- means testing just generally --

MR. MCCURRY: On the other side of the equation, the whole concept

means
testing causes a number of our Democratic allies a great deal of concern
--
and some Republicans, right.

Q Mike, there's a provision in the House tax proposal that would render almost all graduate school scholarships taxable. Is the White House -- is that consistent with the President's view on education and expanding --

MR. MCCURRY: I'll have to look into that one. I'm not familiar with the provision.

Q What do you think about Archer's calculations in terms of counting the tobacco tax as far as off-setting, and counting the earned income tax credit as we spending rather than a tax cut?

MR. MCCURRY: We have a fundamental disagreement with that, and you've heard us before on that. We believe it is providing tax relief to those folks who are at the low end of the income earning scale who pay considerable taxes for Social Security and for Medicare already, not to be able to get the full benefit of child care credit and the earned income tax credit. Those are exactly the families that we ought to be helping in the time we're trying to move people away from welfare and public dependency and into the work, we need to reward work. And we think that benefit ought to apply to those people who are lower on the income scale.

Q One Democrat suggested that the Republicans had indicated there was some middle ground on the earned income tax credit.

MR. MCCURRY: I think they believe there is a middle ground, and certainly the White House is willing to work to see if there is such middle ground.

Q Well, what kind of middle ground are we talking about?

MR. MCCURRY: Again, I'm not going to write the bill here or --

Q No, but did you get a sense of what middle ground they were identifying?

MR. MCCURRY: It was hard to see how they will bridge that difference.

there

may be a way to do it, and it at least seemed the attitude was that we had to make an effort to try, and I think that was shared on all sides of the equation.

Q You were talking about trade-offs a minute ago, if you, in fact, got the money

back there where you wanted it. What are the trade-offs?

MR. MCCURRY: Trade-offs is if you give some money to some people and other people

aren't going to get money. I mean, it's pretty obvious.

Q But where do you think it would come from?

MR. MCCURRY: I can't predict right now.

Q On the child tax credit, might that middle ground be in the Senate version

-

MR. MCCURRY: No, they didn't attempt in this meeting to get into the details of

detail that your questions would suggest, so I'm not going to try to answer those questions.

Q What is the White House view of the Senate version?

Q How close do you think they are to an agreement?

MR. MCCURRY: I think they've got a ways to go. I think that everyone seems

determined to try to do it and do it quickly enough so that they can continue the

schedule that the Majority Leader has indicated, the Speaker has indicated that

certainly some of the Democrats would like to pursue, but it's going to take a

lot of hard work and they're going to have to first of all define some priorities that they can use to do that. There was some discussion about maybe defining some

smaller groups that can work on specific aspects of the tax bill. That might be

useful. Certainly, the Treasury Secretary will remain very involved in working

through with the Hill tax committees -- how you would structure a bill.

Q Mike, since today's meeting between Bruce Reed and Donna Shalala and the

tobacco industry lawyers was not a negotiating session, were there particular questions the President wanted answered about the agreement? Did he get

them
answered? And what were they?

MR. MCCURRY: My understanding is that there was good discussion & some of those points. We've got some concerns the President has expressed directly. We have some that have been raised particularly about the incentives for compliance with any proposed settlement in the form of penalties that would exist if terms of the settlement were not adhered to, and we had some specific questions about that. They had a good discussion, I think as probably Reed and Shalala indicated.

Q I'm sorry -- which means that -- you say you have concerns about it, but you also have concerns about the FDA regulations stuff. There were parts of the agreement that he didn't understand about the incentives, or you wanted the industry's understanding of how it -- what it meant or --

MR. MCCURRY: I think maybe a little bit of both of that. Some of it, I think, needed clarification because the intent was not entirely clear, and some of it we were more interested in the industry's thinking on aspects of the proposed settlement.

Q And these relate to the penalties specifically and not the FDA regulations?

MR. MCCURRY: Well, we were interested in the industry's view of the jurisdiction question as well. We asked -- the conversation, as I understand it about all those areas, but I think probably Reed and Shalala can be more helpful to you.

Q After the meeting, Bruce Reed did say that -- FDA authority issue, that might be some other areas that the administration would want to strengthen.

MR. MCCURRY: That's just -- I think just as I indicated.

Q -- penalty area, there is a question of responsibility particularly on --

MR. MCCURRY: I think there was good discussion of issues like that that

Q If I could ask one more question about that. Various news reports have made

reference to the President's comments about a black market in normal strength cigarettes if the FDA were to ban or substantially reduce the level of nic

in U.S. cigarettes. But it's my understanding that that was one of the White House concerns all along, that there not be a black market created, and that for that reason, White House officials thought it was in the best interest of the government, of the society as a whole that reducing the level of nicotine create such a black market. Is that, in fact, the case?

MR. MCCURRY: I'm not sure I understood that question in its entirety, think it sounds right. (Laughter.)

Q Are other governors coming in to talk about health care today with somebody other than the President?

MR. MCCURRY: Not that I know. I think Governor Hunt may be here the Grower's Group tomorrow, I believe.

Q OMB traditionally puts out a review about this time. Has it officially decided to delay it?

MR. MCCURRY: Not that I know. I think we are continuing to discuss issue with the Hill -- that's my understanding. May even have further discussion with them even today on that.

Q Mike, there was a story in The Washington Post today that the Kuwaitis are thinking about buying howitzers from the Chinese and that Vice President Gore sent the Kuwaitis a letter. Besides that letter, is there anything the White House is doing to try and dissuade them from buying arms from the Chinese?

MR. MCCURRY: My guess is -- if I check further -- is they're probably going to raise it at different levels within our diplomacy, particularly through our embassy. But I'd have to check into that further. I didn't see anything reported on that. Generally, we most likely have expressed some concern we do that both as an interested party and as a party that sees the value and utility of the coalition that defended Kuwait at a critical time in its history.

Q Will the administration send a representative to the congressional hearing next week on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger?

MR. MCCURRY: My guess is they probably asked for an administrative representative there. We have been most directly at the moment on that proposed merger following the deliberations the European Union is having on it that my understanding is, continue at this point. But if asked to send an administrative witness, I'm sure we would.

Q In the debate over the census and the issue of using sampling techniques who decides what sampling techniques are used and what formula translates into data?

MR. MCCURRY: I think if it were left to the Census Bureau, they have decided the way that technically they believe they can produce the most accurate census given the budget they have, I think ultimately this will be a question of appropriation and what Congress appropriates funding for, given any restrictions they place on that funding. I imagine it will be legislative language that control in the end.

Q No, I'm not saying whether you use sampling or not. I mean, which sampling technique and formula do you use? Who decides that?

MR. MCCURRY: The experts at the Census Bureau, presumably. You want to ask the Commerce Department if they can help you with that.

Okay, thank you.

END 2:19 P.M. EDT

#382-07/15

Distribution:

TO: Julie E. Mason
TO: APRIL K. MELLODY
TO: Darby Stott

TO: Margaret M. Suntum
TO: C. Patricia Cogdell
TO: Julia R. Green
TO: Lorraine McHugh
TO: Laura D. Schwartz
TO: backup@wilson.ai.mit.edu@INET
TO: wh-outbox-distr@clinton.ai.mit.edu@INET
TO: Lori E. Abrams
TO: Lori L. Anderson
TO: Brenda M. Anders
TO: Eli G. Attie
TO: Kris Balderston
TO: Karen L. Barbuschak
TO: Beverly J. Barnes
TO: Mark H. Bartholomew
TO: Todd A. Bartholow
TO: David S. Beaubaire
TO: Marsha E. Berry
TO: Antony J. Blinken
TO: Lanny A. Breuer
TO: Robin Bachman
TO: Phillip M. Caplan
TO: Laura Capps
TO: Joseph W. Cerrell
TO: Steven A. Cohen
TO: Michelle Crisci
TO: Carolyn Curiel
TO: Cutler, Lynn
TO: Suzanne E. Dale
TO: Lanny Davis
TO: Marilyn DiGiacobbe
TO: James A. Dorskind
TO: Jennifer D. Dudley
TO: Dorinda A. Salcido
TO: James T. Edmonds
TO: Anne M. Edwards
TO: Rahm Emanuel
TO: Karen E. Finney
TO: Jay K. Footlik
TO: Ben Freeland
TO: Jeremy M. Gaines
TO: Chris Gillespie
TO: Michael A. Gill
TO: Adam W. Goldberg
TO: Jason S. Goldberg
TO: Ricardo M. Gonzales
TO: Wendy E. Gray
TO: John Gribben
TO: Donald Goldberg
TO: LAWRENCE J. HAAS

TO: Richard Hayes
TO: Russell W. Horwitz
TO: Thomas D. Janenda
TO: Brian J. Johnson
TO: David T. Johnson
TO: Wayne C. Johnson
TO: Michele Jolin
TO: James M. Teague
TO: Julia R. Green
TO: David E. Kalbaugh
TO: William R. Kincaid
TO: Angus S. King
TO: Joshua A. King
TO: Nick B. Kirkhorn
TO: Catherine T. Kitchen
TO: James Kohlenberger
TO: Heidi Kukis
TO: Sara Latham
TO: G. N. Lattimore
TO: Christopher J. Lavery
TO: Anne H. Lewis
TO: Patricia F. Lewis
TO: Cynthia J. Lizik
TO: Joseph P. Lockhart
TO: Laura D. Schwartz
TO: Michael D. Malone
TO: Laura S. Marcus
TO: Doris O. Matsui
TO: Andrew Mayock
TO: Anne E. McGuire
TO: Cheryl D. Mills
TO: Julia Moffett
TO: Megan C. Moloney
TO: Kevin Moran
TO: Jonathan Murchinson
TO: Steven J. Naplan
TO: Elizabeth R. Newman
TO: Peter Orszag
TO: Carol Parmelee
TO: Sally P. Paxton
TO: Julia Payne
TO: Jonathan M. Prince
TO: Peter O'Keefe
TO: Renee C. Riley
TO: Jonathan P. Robell
TO: Charles Ruff
TO: Virginia N. Rustique
TO: Evan Ryan
TO: G. Timothy Saunders
TO: Stuart Schear

TO: Jill A. Schuker
TO: Douglas S. Sheorn
TO: David Shipley
TO: Robert M. Shireman
TO: Jake Siewert
TO: Joshua Silverman
TO: Brian D. Smith
TO: Brian D. Smith
TO: Craig T. Smith
TO: Richard Socarides
TO: Douglas B. Sosnik
TO: Todd Stern
TO: Diane A. Stumpf
TO: Mike Sullivan
TO: Jonathan Schnur
TO: Sylvia M. Mathews
TO: Lisa Jordan Tamagni
TO: Virginia M. Terzano
TO: Terri I. Tingen
TO: Barry J. Toiv
TO: Jodie R. Torkelson
TO: Serena C. Torrey
TO: June G. Turner
TO: Dag Vega
TO: Lorraine A. Voles
TO: Michael Waldman
TO: Angelina Walker
TO: Robert S. Weiner
TO: Teresa Wildman
TO: Natalie S. Wozniak
TO: glynnm@panet.us-state.gov@INET
TO: usia01@access.digex.com@INET
TO: 1=US@2=WESTERN
UNION@3=@5=ATT.COM@*ELN\62955104@MRX@EOPMRX
TO: 62955104@eln.attmail.com@INET
TO: 73030.21@compuserve.com@INET
TO: Manager Infomgt
TO: newsdesk@usnewswire.com@INET
TO: usnwire@access.digex.com@INET

??

MORE #382-07/15

- 12 -

- 13 -

MORE #382-07/15

MORE #382-07/15

- 14 -

- 15 -

- 18 -

- 17 -

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/31/97 2:44:01 PM
FROM Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Revised email to Sandy [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Kessinger, Jodi

CARBON_COPY Armstrong, Fulton T.
Hofmann, Karl W.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dobbins, James F.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Testa, Andrea P.
DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Danvers, William C.
Davis, William K.

TEXT_BODY

Jodi, Jim notes:

"Jodi, this looks fine."

-----Original Message-----

From: Kessinger,
Jodi

Sent: Thursday, July 31, 1997 2:04 PM

To: Danvers, William

C.; Dobbins, James F.

Cc: @INTERAM - Inter-American; @LEGISLAT -
Legislative Affairs; /R Records

Subject: Revised email to Sandy
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Bill - I've talked to Nancy and incorporated her changes to the talking points. Below is what she recommends emailing to Sandy. Please look it over and make any necessary changes. Once you have done that, I will send it over to Sandy in the form of an email from you and Nancy.

Jim - Will you please

take a look at this also and let us know if you have any changes.

I spoke to Rick Nuccio today about Sen. Torricelli's position on changing the status of Jorge Mas on the President's Advisory Board for Cuban Broadcasting. He said the Senator is adamantly against any such move, but that we should, nonetheless, talk with him about what alternatives (if any) he envisions that differ from the status quo. Rick also indicated that the Senator would likely try to stop all nominations if we push forward with changing the status of Mas.

Rick suggested that the Senator would be most receptive to a policy versus a political argument about making a change.

Torricelli has also written you a letter along these lines, which you should be receiving shortly.

We recommend you call Torricelli's to 1) assure him we take his views seriously by consulting with him before we make a final decision; 2) get an accurate read of just how strongly he will oppose any move to change Mas's status; and 3) assure him that if we do this we will go out of our way to ensure Mr. Mas is treated with the appropriate respect. You should underscore that we believe this move will strengthen and enhance the Martis and that the chairmanship was never intended to be a lifetime post for Mr. Mas. You should seek Torricelli's views on possible alternatives while making it clear he does not have a veto on our decision. (FYI - Senator Helms supports this move.)

The recommendation to the President is to nominate new members of the board that is a holdover from 1983. We would nominate four Democratic members and offer Lott four Republicans, one of whom we expect to be Mr. Mas Canosa. We would also appoint a new Chairman from among the four Democrats, thus replacing Mr. Mas Canosa after 14 years as Chairman. We would also recommend seeking legislation which would grant Mr. Mas Canosa an ex-officio status of -Chairman Emeritus- and perhaps some Presidential award for his service.

**SUGGESTED
TALKING POINTS FOR CONVERSATION WITH SEN. TORRICELLI:**

-- Calling
you about the President's Advisory Board for Cuban Broadcasting.

-- As you know, we are trying to strengthen the Board in order to broaden its base of support.

-- President committed to the continued success of the Martis. In order to ensure that success, we need to continue to reach out to all those who care deeply about the future of Cuba.

-- One important way of doing that is to make sure the Board remains dynamic. That means we need to bring in new members and new leadership.

-- No one wants to insult Jorge Mas, who has done an enormous amount of work on this issue. At the same time, we believe it would be a good policy decision to have him step aside as the head of the Board after 14 years in order to ensure its viability and appeal to a broader constituency.

-- We have some thoughts about how this could be handled, but I would like your views on what could be done.

-- If asked: Appointing the board is the President's prerogative and we should ensure it has a Democratic majority with a Democratic chairman.

-- If asked who would be the next chair:
We are considering Elena Diaz-Version Amos, who has strong support from Senator Helms

--If asked: We would expect Senator Lott to appoint Mr. Mas as one of the Republican members, thus ensuring his continued active participation on the board.

-- If asked:
We would like to recognize his enormous contributions to the Martis by naming him "Chairman Emeritus," however, such action would require legislation which we hope you would support.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/2/97 3:51:19 PM

FROM Langley, Janice M.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT You received a phone call from Terri Lodge. [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Witkowsky, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY re: She has reported that William Billingsley will be going to Oslo under Senator Helms' direction....Janice

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	John Prendergast to Erica Barks-Ruggles, Pat Battenfield, Shawn McCormick et al. Subject: FW: Action Memorandum to the President. (8 pages)	09/11/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/15/1997-02/03/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5701

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/19/97 10:36:33 AM
FROM Blinken, Antony J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: CTBT UN Kick Off [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Gray, Wendy E.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Wendy -- when you get a chance, would you please print out for me.

Also,
a folder labeled "Globalization" would be super.

Thanks

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven P.

Sent: Friday, September

19, 1997 10:27 AM

To: @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm

Cc: @DEFENSE

- Defense Policy

Subject: CTBT UN Kick Off [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Tony

--

Below is the "communications plan" you folks had put together for our initial roll-out paper, recognizing that scenario is significantly different than the one we are now on. I've also cannibalized what might be relevant portions from that paper, just in case they are helpful to you all today (i.e., draft Op-Ed, Support Group Candidates, Congressional Call List, and Reporters). As I mentioned, it might make sense to announce Monday at the UN we are transmitting "this week," then have an "event" where the President would sign the transmittal package later in the week, with some validators present.

Communication's
Plan for Kick Off Event (as drafted).

1. Op/Ed by Senior Administration Official (See Tab D).
2. CTBT Support Group (plus other "influentials") briefing by APNSA Berger, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary Pena, Director Tenet, others tbd.
3. Briefing for key reporters, columnists and pundits by APNSA Berger, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary Pena, Director Tenet, others tbd. (See Tab E).
4. Mailing of cover letter, fact sheets to editorial boards.
5. Post-event press briefing by APNSA Berger, Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen, Secretary Pena, Director Tenet, others tbd.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Op Ed.doc
Op Ed

6/20/97 4:35 p.m.
CTBT OP-ED
BY "SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL"
[TITLE]

Last September, at the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that have declared possession of nuclear weapons -- all followed suit, and over 140 nations of the world are now signatories. With this accord, we take a giant step toward a safer day, when no nuclear weapons will be detonated anywhere on the face of the earth.

For more than 35 years, American leaders of both parties have sought a ban on nuclear tests. Dwight Eisenhower was the first President to recognize that such a ban would put a powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapons and clear the way to a reduction of the nuclear threat. Indeed, President

Eisenhower hoped that a test ban would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country," as historian Stephen E. Ambrose has written. But this dream was dashed by the U-2 affair of 1960 and the increase in East-West tensions.

President John Kennedy took up the cause of a test ban. In 1963, his Administration negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space -- as the first step toward a comprehensive ban. The effort to conclude that ban continued under President Carter but was interrupted by another escalation of Cold War hostility.

President Clinton restarted talks on the test ban. In July 1993 he extended the moratorium on testing begun at the insistence of Congress the year before. Energized by this U.S. initiative, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament began work on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. When negotiations reached impasse over the scope of the treaty's prohibition on testing, President Clinton broke the deadlock by announcing U.S. support for a true zero yield ban -- one that would forbid any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

The President's decision turned the corner for the treaty, giving new momentum to the negotiations and signaling to the world America's resolve to achieve a truly comprehensive test ban. Last September -- 32 months after the negotiations began -- the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. Few major international agreements have enjoyed such extraordinary support.

Indeed, few treaties have had the profound, positive impact on global security that the Comprehensive Test Ban promises. The signatures of the world's declared

nuclear powers -- the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom -- along with the vast majority of nations will constrain efforts to improve existing nuclear weapons and create a formidable barrier to the development of new generations of weapons. This quest is all the more urgent because of the efforts of rogue states and terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

For the five nuclear weapon states, there will be no way to test more advanced and more destructive devices. For states that do not possess nuclear weapons, the ban on testing will make it more difficult to develop reliable weapons and fit them for sophisticated missiles and bombers. There is no guarantee that a country determined to possess nuclear weapons will not be able to fashion a crude bomb. But the test ban makes it difficult to do more than that.

By helping prevent proliferation and future arms races, the Test Ban Treaty will increase security for the United States and the world in the 21st century. In a more stable, predictable environment prospects will improve for additional reductions in nuclear forces and further advances in nonproliferation.

The Clinton Administration recognizes, however, that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons will remain with us for years to come. That is why, as part of our national security strategy, the United States must and will retain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces. The President directed in 1993 that a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program be implemented to help maintain our nuclear deterrent under a test ban.

Along with the Stockpile Stewardship program, President Clinton announced in August 1995 the establishment of concrete safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a test ban treaty. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments and capabilities in the

areas of
intelligence, monitoring and verification, maintenance of our nuclear
laboratories and test readiness.

Thirty-four years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the
Limited
Test Ban Treaty "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of the Cold
War. Now,
with the Comprehensive Test Ban, that light grows brighter. This
treaty can
bring to an end the era that began in 1945 with a mushroom cloud at
Alamogordo;
it heralds a new era in which the cloud of nuclear danger can finally
be lifted.

###

2

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents.doc
CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents

I. SUPPORT GROUP CANDIDATES

A. Former Executive/Defense

1. Eisenhower Administration

Christian Herter
Harold Stassen

2. Kennedy/Johnson Administration

Robert McNamara
Clark Clifford
Walt Rostow
Paul Nitze
Paul Warnke
Carl Kaysen (MIT)

3. Nixon/Ford Administration

Henry Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft

Melvin Laird
Donald Rumsfeld
William Rogers
Elliot Richardson

4. Carter Administration

Cyrus Vance
Harold Brown
Brzezinski
Jim Schlesinger
Andrew Young

5. Reagan Administration

Alexander Haig Jr.
George Schultz
John Whitehead
Richard Allen
William Clarke
Robert McFarlane
Frank Carlucci
Kenneth Adelman
Roz Ridgeway
Max Kampelman
William Burns

6. Bush Administration

James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
Arnold Kanter
Robert Zoellick
Robert Kimmit

7. Clinton Administration

Warren Christopher
William Perry
Anthony Lake
John Deutch
Hazel O'Leary
Charles Curtis

B. Former Military

1. Eisenhower
General Andrew Goodpaster

2. Kennedy/Johnson

3. Nixon/Ford

Admiral Bud Zumwalt

4. Carter
General David Jones
General Lew Allen

5. Reagan
General John Vessey
Admiral William Crowe
General John Galvin

6. Bush
General Collin Powell

7. Clinton
General Lee Butler

C. Former Legislative

Senator Dole
Senator Hatfield
Senator Exon
Senator Mitchell
Senator Kassebaum
Senator Baker
Senator Nunn
Senator Rudman
Senator Bradley
Senator Bentsen

D. Scientific

Hans Bethe (Cornell)
Glenn Seaborg (UC Berkeley)
Herb York (UC San Diego)
Sidney Drell (Stanford)
Freeman Dyson (Princeton)
Wolfgang Panofsky (Stanford)
Marshall Rosenbluth (UC San Diego)
Richard Garwin (IBM)
Henry Kendall (MIT)
Val Fitch (Princeton)
Harold Agnew (San Diego)

E. Citizens

Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
George Bush
John F. Kennedy, Jr.

Caroline Kennedy
David Eisenhower, Jr.

II. LIKELY OPPONENTS

Casper Weinberger
Jeanne Kirkpatrick
Richard Perle
Richard Cheney

3

3

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBT Congressional Call List.doc
CTBT Congressional Call List

Democrats Republicans

Senator Daschle Senator Lott
Senator Biden Senator Helms
Senator Levin Senator Thurmond
Senator Kerry Senator Shelby

Senator Bingaman Senator Domenici
Senator Harkin Senator Lugar
Senator Durbin Senator McCain
Senator Reed Senator Hagel
Senator Feingold Senator Smith (Oregon)
Senator Feinstein Senator Jeffords
Senator Boxer Senator Stevens
Senator Bryan Senator Murkowski
Senator Reid Senator Smith (NH)

1

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CTBTReporters.doc
Reporters, Columnists and Pundits

Associated Press

Barry Schwied

New York Times

Steve Myers

Tim Weiner

Tom Friedman

Wall Street Journal

Carla Anne Robbins

Washington Post

Jeffrey Smith

Tom Lippman

Los Angeles Times

Tyler Marshall

Washington Times

Warren Strobel

Reuters

Carol Giacomo

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/22/97 11:56:30 AM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: CTBT Timing [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Rubin, Eric S.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Crowley, Philip J.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Davis, William K.
McCormick, Keith P.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Seaton, James B.
Witkowski, Anne A.
Crowley, Philip J.
Johnson, David T.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

TEXT_BODY No, it is not a problem that the fact sheets have been released.
That was, indeed, the plan. The treaty itself is in the Executive Clerk's office, Room 5, OEOB. They, not ACDA, are responsible now for sending it up "today" (recognizing that the Senate will not be in session formally to receive the Treaty until tomorrow).

-----Original
Message-----
From: Rubin, Eric S.
Sent: Monday, September 22,
1997 11:43 AM
To: Bendick, Gordon L.; Crowley, Philip J.; @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @PRESS - Public
Affairs
Subject: RE: CTBT Timing [UNCLASSIFIED]

I hope it is
not a problem that the fact sheets have already been released --
because they have been

-----Original Message-----

From: Bendick,
Gordon L.
Sent: Monday, September 22, 1997 11:35 AM
To: Crowley,
Philip J.; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense
Policy; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: RE: CTBT Timing [UNCLASSIFIED]

PJ

We
cannot send the Treaty formally to the Hill today as the Senate is
not in. Our goal is to have it up to the Senate ASAP - this means
Tuesday. Hopefully ACDA will have it there tomorrow and Senator
Helms will begin the process of scheduling hearings for the CTBT
during this session. In other words, we are doing our part in getting
the Treaty to the Senate in a timely fashion, let us hope that Senator
Helms does his part in beginning the debate by scheduling hearings
this fall, in hopes that we can get the Resolution of Ratification
completed by the Senate next spring/summer.

-----Original Message-----

From: Crowley,
Philip J.
Sent: Monday, September 22, 1997 10:02 AM
To: @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @PRESS - Public
Affairs
Subject: CTBT Timing [UNCLASSIFIED]

They've dropped the
fact sheets in NY. Media are starting to call asking the literal
when today will the treaty formally go up to the Hill? Do we know?

PJ

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/2/97 3:44:57 PM
FROM Bendick, Gordon L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Urgent Prepcome Funding Package [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Seaton, James B.
Witkowski, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY Bendick, Gordon L.
Burrell, Christina L.
Davis, William K.
McCormick, Keith P.
Behring, Deanna M.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Kiernan, Gerald P.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Ward, JoAnn

TEXT_BODY

Stev

I made some corrections - not for factual change, but for readability.

Is there a way to work into your answers the amounts of money that others are paying. The two Reps are attempting to show that the U.S. is (1) paying a huge amount of money - their estimate for CTBT compliance is around \$ 900 M, and (2) the U.S. is paying a disproportionate share of the cost of the Treaty. They will also say that if the others don't ratify, the U.S. share will be even larger. Ergo, work into the answers what others are paying as well as the small amount that we pay versus the benefit that we derive (I.E., this is a good deal and a GOOD INVESTMENT)

Thanks

Gordy

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.

Sent: Thursday, October

02, 1997 12:54 PM

To: Bendick, Gordon L.; Epstein, Gerald L.

Cc: Bouchard,

Joseph F.

Subject: Urgent Prepcome Funding Package [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Gordy/Gerry

--

Please clear the attached response to the Gilman/Rogers letter on CTBT Prepcome Funding ASAP. We need to get this up to the Hill

ASAP so the issue can be worked in conference. Thanks. Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

6522Answers to Gilman.doc

Answers to Gilman/Rogers Questions

(Draft: 10/2/97/12:35 p.m.)

1. The Arms Control Interagency Working Group (IWG) chaired by the NSC staff coordinates overall policy and implementation with respect to the CTBT. IWG members include the Departments of State, Defense (OSD and JCS) and Energy, ACDA, the Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Working directly under and reporting to the IWG, an interagency "backstopping" group currently chaired by ACDA and including State, Defense, Energy, and ACIS is responsible for developing guidance on policy and technical issues for U.S. delegations. Backstopping is supported by the Verification and Monitoring Task Force (VMTF), co-chaired by ACDA and ACIS, which addresses technical issues in support of Treaty implementation.

2. The estimated cost of the construction of the complete International

Monitoring System (IMS) is \$127 million (see Appendix I for cost breakdown). IMS construction will be accomplished over the next several years, consistent with the pace established by the Preparatory Commission (Prepcom). Our goal (as stated in the Treaty) is for the verification regime to be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the CTBT at entry into force (EIF). Notwithstanding uncertainty about the date of EIF, it is in the United States' national interest to invest now in the IMS to strengthen our capability to monitor the current global testing moratorium, to ensure we have the benefit of the Treaty's monitoring capabilities at EIF and to facilitate EIF by maintaining the international community's commitment to the Treaty.

3. The sites of the sensors comprising the IMS are the results of negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD). The actual sites were proposed by expert groups for each of the four IMS monitoring technologies. These groups were composed of representatives from the states negotiating the Treaty, in which U.S. technical experts played a leading role. The network as a whole was designed to provide global coverage for CTBT monitoring, and to the extent possible, to take advantage of existing stations. In the case of seismic stations, this was considerable.

4. The CTBT was transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent on September 22, 1997.

5. Our expectation is that India, Pakistan and North Korea will conclude that their security interests are best served by joining the overwhelming international consensus in favor of the CTBT, although we cannot predict when each country will sign and ratify the Treaty. That said, the continued global moratorium on nuclear testing, the existence of an internationally supported and managed monitoring system for the CTBT and the ratification by the remaining 41 key states and others can be expected to be factors in their internal

deliberations.

6. The Treaty provides that if three years after signature (September 1990, one or more of the 44 states required for EIF have not ratified, a conference of the states that have already ratified may be convened upon the request of a majority of those states, and annually thereafter (unless otherwise decided by the conference). The conference would consider what measures may be taken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty. We cannot predict the exact date of EIF; however, the U.S. believes the IMS should be established as soon as feasible in order to ensure that at entry into force of the Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty.

7. No. There is no consideration being given to the DOD "taking over operation and funding" of the IMS. we are confident the Treaty will enter into force.

8. The U.S. currently has considerable capability to monitor nuclear explosions, and that capability will undergo significant improvement over the next several years. However, the U.S. needs both its national assets and those afforded by the Treaty to monitor compliance with the CTBT. Many U.S. installed and operated sensors will be operated in conjunction with the IMS, which will complement, not duplicate, U.S. national capabilities.

9. The IMS will provide detection capabilities that the U.S. does not currently possess. The purpose of the IMS is to provide monitoring data for all Parties to the CTBT. However, the U.S., which played a large role in determining the composition of the IMS, throughout the negotiations sought a cost-effective IMS that complemented U.S. national means to the greatest extent possible. The resulting system satisfies this objective.

10. The U.S. assessed contribution to the CTBT Prepcom for calendar year 1997 is \$7 million. We expect the U.S. assessment for CY98 to be \$15-17.5 million (the CY98 budget will be approved at the Prepcom plenary December 15-19). We estimate our CY99 assessment to be \$20-25 million. These funds are to be provided by the State/ACDA budgets. We do not have precise government-wide figures for CTBT-related costs at this time. However, we will be happy to provide this information once it is available. Additionally, many of the program and personnel costs associated with global nuclear test monitoring would require funding even if the CTBT did not enter into force.

11. The U.S. has provided and will continue to provide significant in-kind contributions to the development and effective functioning of the Treaty's verification regime. In addition to the considerable contributions made by U.S. government experts during the negotiations and currently working with the Prepcom on the development of the verification regime, the major in-kind contributions are the following: (a) The Department of Defense has funded the establishment and operation of the Prototype International Data Center (in Arlington, VA). This data center will gradually cease operations as the Provisional IDC in Vienna is progressively established. It has developed software, procedures and training for data management that represent an in-kind contribution to the CTBT Organization. (b) The Department of Defense has installed seismic stations and hydroacoustic sensors over the past 20 or so years that will become part of the IMS, and has budgeted funds to install a number of other sensors that will be part of the IMS. Of the 50 primary seismic stations, the U.S. installed 18 of them in the past and expects to install 14 more, pending agreement with host states. Of the 120 auxiliary stations, the U.S. installed 14 of them in

the past
and expects to install 8 more. Of the 11 hydroacoustic stations, the
U.S. has
installed two in the past and expects to install two more. Of the 80
radionuclide stations, the U.S. has installed three in the past and
expects to
install 10 more. Installation schedules and costs are provided in
classified
documents. (c) The Department of Energy is funding considerable
research and
development in verification technologies that will be used by the
CTBT
Organization as well as by our national monitoring agencies. In
particular, the
radionuclide and infrasound sensors being developed by the DOE are
being made
commercially available, so that both our U.S. NDC and CTBTO, on
behalf of other
countries, will have a long-term reliable source of high quality
monitoring
equipment to draw on to meet the treaty monitoring requirements. The
DOE has had
an extensive seismic research program working in concert with the
U.S. mining
industry to characterize the seismic signals from legitimate mining
activities to
minimize false alarms. In addition DOE has funded software
development to help
analysts conduct meaningful detection, location, identification and
characterization analyses for all the technologies (i.e., hydroacoustic,
seismic,
infrasound and radionuclide). Other DOE research has developed
various on-site
inspection technologies and capabilities.

12. The Treaty provides for states to receive a reduction in their
annual
assessments for some of the costs of installing and upgrading IMS
sensors. The
United States intends to seek reductions for expenditures on new IMS
facilities.
A precise amount for such reductions is not yet known; however, we
will be happy
to provide this information once it is available.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6522ltr.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:;(

For both)

Thank you for your letter regarding the Administration's proposed budget amendment submitted July 17, 1997 relating to funding for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission (CTBT Prepcom).

I trust the attached response to the questions raised in your letter will facilitate Congressional support for the Administration's proposal to provide funding for the CTBT Prepcom. Your timely assistance in this important initiative would be greatly appreciated and would allow us to establish an international monitoring system for the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty.

Sincerely,

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6522mtp.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Letter from Representatives Gilman and Rogers on CTBT
Preparatory
Commission

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Representatives Gilman and Rogers on
funding for the
CTBT Preparatory Commission (Prepcom).

Background

Representatives Gilman and Rogers have written you seeking
additional information
in connection with the budget amendment submitted by the
Administration in July
relating to funding for the CTBT Prepcom in FY98.

Earlier this week, Representative Gilman and Senator Helms objected
to a
reprogramming of FY97 funds for partial payment of the U.S.
Prepcom assessment in
calendar year 1997. Failure to win approval of the FY98 budget
amendment in
conference next week would mean we are left without even partial
payment of the
cumulative U.S. Prepcom assessment in calendar year 1997 and 1998,
undermining
our effort to set up the international monitoring system for the earliest
possible entry into force of the Treaty.

The response from you transmits answers to the 12 questions posed by
Gilman and
Rogers, and urges the Representatives to approve funding for the
CTBT Prepcom.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to Representatives Gilman and Rogers.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Representatives Gilman and Rogers
Tab B Letter from Representatives Gilman and Rogers

1

6522

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6522mtb.doc

October 2, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: Letter from Representatives Gilman and Rogers on CTBT
Preparatory
Commission

Representatives Gilman and Rogers have written the President seeking additional information in connection with the budget amendment submitted by the Administration in July relating to funding for the CTBT Preparatory Commission (Prepcom). (John Holum sent you a memorandum on October 1 urging an urgent, high-level effort to win approval of the FY98 CTBT budget amendment in conference early next week (Tab II)).

The response from the President transmits answers to the 12 questions posed by Gilman and Rogers, and urges the Representatives to approve funding for the CTBT Prepcom.

Concurrence by: Bendick

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letters to Gilman and Rogers

Tab B Letter from Gilman and Rogers

Tab II Holum Memorandum

1

6522

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/28/97 10:15:41 AM
FROM Leavy, David C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT China Non-pro [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Samore, Gary S.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Gary--thanks for the scrub. We will hold the package until your chop on these.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Doc1.doc
PROLIFERATION:

Q Will you agree on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with China? How can you do so in view of their cooperation with Iran, their support for Pakistani nuclear weapons programs, and their provision of arms to Iran?

A The issue of non-proliferation is one of the core issues in the US-Sino relationship. We have been negotiating for over a year with the Chinese to try to bring about improvements in their nuclear nonproliferation practices. I believe we have made substantial progress in those negotiations. For example, China has announced the promulgation of new export controls on nuclear products consistent with international standards. It has joined the Zangger Committee which formulates lists of controlled nuclear export products. As you know they have signed CTBT, NPT, CWC and worked with us on curbing sales of ring magnets. Preventing nuclear proliferation is in the US national interest. If we are satisfied with Chinese commitments and their conformity with the requirements of our law, the President would then decide to proceed with PNC. I am not in a

position to make any announcement of such an intention today but we are actively discussing this issue and the two President's will discuss it further.

Q: What kind of assurances did you get from China that it is not selling missiles to Iran and Pakistan and generally flouting international nonproliferation norms? Senator Helms says it is premature to make this deal and Gary Bauer says you are kowtowing to the Chinese. What is your reaction?

A: First of all, we have reached an agreement on nuclear nonproliferation issues that substantially advances our interest in assuring countries do not develop nuclear weapons capabilities. The Chinese have greatly strengthened their control on nuclear exports, joined the international group cooperating in controlling nuclear exports, and halted assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. As for cooperation with Iran, we have obtained assurances about China's intentions that are consistent with our objective of assuring it does not acquire nuclear weapons capability. Our agreement is a good deal; I am confident that the Congress will understand that it contributes importantly to U.S. national security interests and uphold it. President Jiang has told me China is sensitive to the dangers of states in the Middle East and South Asia acquiring weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. I look to China to strengthen its controls further on exports of missile technologies.

Q Do you agree with the HIRC that China should be sanctioned for C-801/802 anti-ship missile sales to Iran? If not, why not?

A This is an area of concern for us and one that we have repeatedly raised with the Chinese at the highest levels. I have no doubt they understand the depth of our feelings on this issue. As part of our effort to monitor this issue, we have established an interagency process to review questions of this kind before the

President, not Congress, makes a determination.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Jordan Donald to William Wechsler. Subject: Action Memorandum to the President. (4 pages)	10/28/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/15/1997-02/03/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5701

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/6/97 12:56:00 PM
FROM Maxfield, Nancy H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: RE: Sen Helms Request for POTUS Photo-Op [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Quinn, Mary E.
Rice, Edward A.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

This is on its way over to you as package 7273. There is a note on it (from Gwentyth) that Mr. Berger wants to call Senator Helms personally to offer the photo op. Thanks.

-----Original Message-----

From: McCormick,
Keith P.

Sent: Thursday, November 06, 1997 11:40 AM

To: Davies,
Glyn T.

Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @NSA - Natl Security
Advisor; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Subject: RE:

Sen Helms Request for POTUS Photo-Op [UNCLASSIFIED]

Glyn: EUROPE

Directorate is taking action on this. They had already done SP on photo op; it's being revised now to reflect correction on identity of grand master, get a clearance from GLOBAL and include Sen Helms in group being proposed for photo op per your e-mail. They are also having intel expedite the vetting, which was why Kay had asked us to check with Helms staff on their citizenships, etc.

We'll continue to work with EUR to make sure this gets up asap

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/11/97 4:36:40 PM
FROM Braden, Susan R.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Talking Points for Romania Meeting [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Flanagan, Stephen J.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY****TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**

Doc1.doc
Meeting with Romanian Under Secretary of Defense

Issues**1. NATO Enlargement**

* Hearings have gone well so far. Senator's Helms and Biden just came out with a very favorable letter endorsing NATO enlargement following the hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee.

* Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have finished their pre-accession talks with NATO.

* General assessment of their capabilities was good. Think the process taught us all how important it is to have an overall defense plan for becoming interoperable with NATO as well as a Western-style personnel system. It also justified previous claims that training and the ability to communicate are more important to achieving interoperability than equipment.

2. Bilateral Defense Agenda

* Possibly strongest part of our growing bilateral relationship due to the Warsaw Initiative, the yearly Bilateral Working Group meetings, and Romania's very active participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace as well as

IFOR/SFOR.

* Think we agree Romania needs to focus on the development of its personnel system, to include the creation of a NCO corps and the deployment of western-trained officers to positions where they can use their newly developed skills.

* While military education generally good, need to include broader issues of military strategy, doctrine and tactics with the goal of developing a maneuver warfare capability.

* Increased training, focus on logistics and transport also important to getting beyond deployment of army in static garrisons.

* Also need to develop cadre of trained civilian defense experts to make concept of civilian control of the military meaningful.

3. Economic reform

* Know this isn't your area, but having a strong, market oriented economy key to achieving goal of ultimate NATO membership.

* Need to stick with the reforms in the face of the approaching winter and growing public unrest.

1

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/16/98 3:55:44 PM
FROM Piccone, Theodore J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: McCurry memo OAS.doc [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO DeLaurentis, Jeffrey J.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dobbins, James F.
Hofmann, Karl W.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Piccone, Theodore J.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY I've added some thoughts...

-----Original Message-----

From: Hofmann,
Karl W.
Sent: Friday, January 16, 1998 2:49 PM
To: @INTERAM -
Inter-American
Subject: McCurry memo OAS.doc [UNCLASSIFIED]

Anybody
got any substance to add to this dog?

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

McCurry memo OAS.doc
January 16, 1998

TO: Michael McCurry
FROM: Karl Hofmann, NSC/Inter-American
SUBJECT: Courtesy Call by OAS Spokesman Santiago Canton
(January 20)

OAS SecGen Gaviria (whose current term runs through 1999)
continues to
distinguish himself as a reformer, looking to enhance relevance of
OAS generally

and specifically to build institutional expertise in narcotics, democracy and human rights, trade, and other hemispheric topics. Gaviria is keen to have OAS assume principal coordinating role for Summits of the Americas, on the assumption that there will be a 3rd, following the upcoming Santiago Summit. Our position is that the OAS should play a more active role in coordinating future Summits, but we want the ad hoc Summit Implementation Review Group to take the lead in monitoring progress and formulating future agendas.

Gaviria's reform instincts have made the OAS relatively safe among multilateral institutions with Senator Helms. The U.S. pays roughly 60% of the OAS operating budget, and provides 70% of voluntary funding that goes for such activities as the OAS/UN human rights monitoring mission in Haiti.

President's recent visit to the OAS, in the company of President Zedillo to sign firearms trafficking convention, is the latest indication of our interest in and support for the institution.

The OAS is celebrating its 50th anniversary in March and expects to bring in a number of luminaries, including Nobel prize winners, to discuss the future of the organization. This will be a good opportunity for us to work together to project the image of the OAS as a modernizing multilateral institution responding to current challenges. In that regard, we hope the Santiago Summit will result in the establishment of a blue ribbon commission that will make recommendations on further reforms that could be made to adapt the organization to the 21st century.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	Richard Saunders to Douglas Babcock, Christopher Bolan, Darrien Boulton et al. Subject: Redout from Jim Steinberg's NSC Senior Director's Meeting. (2 pages)	01/20/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/15/1997-02/03/1998]

2006-1363-F
vz5701

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	Jeffery DeLaurentis to James Dobbins. Cuba Paper--First Cut (8 pages)	01/26/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/15/1997-02/03/1998]

2006-1363-F
vz5701

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/3/98 7:09:10 PM
FROM Amiri, Rukhsana N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Riedel, Bruce O.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Bruce are you looking for this?

-----Original Message-----

From: Crowley,
Philip J.

Sent: Tuesday, February 03, 1998 5:03 PM

To: @ALLNSC

- NSC Staff; @VP - VP Natl Security Affairs

Subject: DAILY PRESS
GUIDANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]

Please provide any updates to @PRESS by
10 a.m. tomorrow.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

feb3guide.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

February 3, 1998

Iraq

Clinton-Yeltsin Call

Anthrax Vaccine

Nuclear Weapons

Cuba/Food and Medicine

IRAQ
February 3, 1998

GENERAL MESSAGE POINTS

- * Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.
- * No decision has been made concerning the use of force, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out.
- * Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:
- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

NEW QUESTIONS

Will the Saudis allow you to base/bomb?

- * Will not comment on specific countries or operational details, but believe we will have the cooperation we need to use our forces if necessary.

Some are saying we won't take any action during the Olympic games - has this been a factor in the discussions?

- * We don't have any timelines or deadlines. We'll take the steps we need to protect our interests and achieve our objectives.

Kofi Annan has said he would engage in personal diplomacy, travel to the region, etc. to avoid the "devastation" of a military strike - what is your reaction to this? What is your view of the Russian initiative yesterday? About French and Turkish efforts at diplomacy?

- * There are, and have been, a number of initiatives. I don't want to comment about any specific diplomatic efforts.

* But let's be clear here - there is nothing to negotiate, no half measures and no compromise. Saddam must fully comply with UN resolutions and give UNSCOM inspectors unfettered access to all sites, period!

* The purpose of diplomacy should be for achieving full compliance by Saddam Hussein. Given Saddam's history of misleading and concealing at every opportunity, we are understandably skeptical.

Do you think a Senate "all necessary means" resolution would be helpful? Is it necessary before a use of force?

* We welcome expressions of support from Congress.

* We are in close consultation with members of Congress - today Secretary Cohen, General Shelton, Under Secretary Pickering and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger are going to meet with key legislators on the Hill.

(if pushed)

* We believe the President has the authority under the Constitution and the laws of the U.S. to undertake all operations under consideration.

Is it appropriate for members of Congress to travel to Baghdad?

* This is a judgment individual members have to make.

* But let's be clear here - what is necessary is that the UNSCOM inspectors have unfettered access to all sites. There is nothing to negotiate.

* The purpose of diplomacy is to achieve full compliance by Saddam Hussein.

Have we changed our policy to bomb Iraq, as is reported by Newsday?

* The PDD issued in November, 1997 (PDD 60) did not change longstanding US policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

* On the contrary, it reaffirmed the US negative security assurance

that has been
US policy since 1978.

* It is not now, nor has it ever been, US policy to use nuclear weapons to take
out chemical/biological storage facilities.

* If any country were foolish enough to attack the US, our allies, or our forces
with chemical/biological weapons, our response would be swift, firm and
overwhelming.

* Beyond that, we do not discuss military options.

* What would we do if Iraq used WMD against the US?

* Our response would be swift, firm and overwhelming.

RESOLUTION 986/OIL FOR FOOD/SANCTIONS POLICY

SecGen Annan is proposing an increase in Iraqi oil sales to \$5.2 -
more than
twice the current limit. Do you support this degree of expansion of
986?

* We are generally prepared to support an expansion.

* We will look very closely at the specific details of Secretary
General's
recommendations to make sure that the Iraqi people get the food and
medicine they
need.

* The U.S. understands that the Iraqi people are suffering under the
Saddam
Hussein regime and his expenditures on lavish palaces and military
resources. We
do not wish to see Iraqi people sick and hungry because Saddam
Hussein sees food
and medicine as his lowest priorities. The President, our government,
and the
U.S. people have no quarrel with the Iraqi people and we will look to
support
efforts to give them the food and medicine that Saddam Hussein
denies them.

* UN sanctions ALWAYS permitted Iraq to purchase food and
medicine. U.S.

proposed the original oil-for-food deal and fought for it for five years, against Iraqi opposition. We proposed 986 to do the same thing. Have consistently said we'd like to find ways to make it work better..

* Saddam opposed 986 and its predecessor. He's the one using people as political pawn and devoting his nation's resources not to caring for Iraqis but to build WMD and lavish palaces. The Secretary General's report clearly states that Iraq is responsible for the delays in implementing 986 up to this point.

ISRAEL/MEPP

Israel has asked the US to give it warning if we strike Iraq - will we do this?

* Won't get into details of possible military operations.

Has the US asked Israel to fore swear retaliation in the event of an Iraqi strike against Israel?

* I won't discuss hypotheticals.

Isn't Netanyahu's position/stalemate in peace process harming your ability to assemble a coalition.

* We pursue peace process because its in the interest of the US, Israel, the Palestinians and Israel's neighbors. Stalemate in peace process something we're trying to overcome/but doesn't diminish the danger to the region posed by Saddam's pursuit of WMD or our resolve to deny him the capacity to threaten his neighbors.

DIPLOMACY

Isn't the diplomatic string running out/Are there any other options left/What is the purpose of the Albright trip?

* The President has made clear that Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of

the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.

* No decision has been made concerning the use of force,. The window is closing -- but it is not yet shut. Ambassador Butler has made clear that under the current circumstances he cannot carry out his mandate. That is unacceptable.

* Secretary Albright has been meeting with counterparts from the UK, France and Russia and with our friends in the region. Ambassador Richardson will also be consulting with other members of the Security Council in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Secretary Cohen is traveling to the region this week. They will explain our views of the situation and discuss next steps.

* The President is also discussing the situation with key world leaders. He has spoken to Blair, Chirac, Chretien and Kohl. PM Blair will be coming to Washington this week on a long-planned state visit.

What diplomatic options are left? Do you plan to introduce/support another resolution in the Council? Would you consider additional sanctions? What are you waiting for?

* The international community has spoken clearly and unanimously that Saddam must respect the Security Council Resolutions and allow the inspectors to do their work unimpeded. We are now focusing on the discussions that Secretary Albright will be conducting in the coming days. We have no plans to introduce a resolution. We believe existing Council resolutions give us all the authority we need to take whatever action we deem necessary.

While Vedrine appears to be no longer ruling out the use of force, Primakov is still emphasizing Russian insistence that diplomatic methods be applied - are you encouraged by your progress with the French, discouraged by

apparent lack of
progress with the Russians?

* Reference to Albright's successful meeting w/Vedrine and also
reference meeting
w/Primakov

* We all share the same objective: to thwart Iraq's efforts to develop
WMD or
threaten its neighbors. The international community is united in its
view that it
Saddam must give the inspectors the access they need to do the job.
As the
President said, we are determined that he not be free to develop
weapons of mass
destruction unhindered.

* Vedrine's and Primakov's statements should speak for themselves.

* Skeptical that more additional diplomatic efforts will work. But
while window
closing, not yet closed.

Do you support another Primakov mission to negotiate with Saddam?

* Posuvalyuk has been in Baghdad - what is important is that Saddam
gets the
clear and unequivocal message that he must comply with Security
Council
Resolutions and allow the inspectors the access they need.

Do you have a deadline?

* No deadline, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out.
Sec
Albright, Amb Richardson, and Secretary Cohen are discussing next
steps with
Security Council members and friends in the region this week.

MILITARY PLANNING/USE OF FORCE

What will be purpose of the use of force/what targets/how can you
eliminate WMD
through a bombing campaign/won't the use of force simply guarantee
that the
inspectors are thrown out and Saddam will have won?

* No decision has been made with respect to the use of force, but the
President

has made clear that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop and use WMD.

* Not going to comment on the possibility or nature of military targets. Can say however that whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

* UNSCOM inspectors have achieved remarkable results; have always said that the best outcome is for the inspectors to be able to carry out their work. But as a practical matter, Saddam has now put their mission to an end. Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD, by restoring the inspectors or whatever other steps may be necessary if the inspectors cannot carry out their work.

* Meanwhile, we will insist that sanctions remain so long as he refuses to comply; sanctions are important tool in depriving him of the resources to develop and use WMD and threaten his neighbors.

* Should the use of force be necessary, our objective would be to diminish substantially Iraq's WMD capability and its ability to project force and threaten its neighbors.

What are you planning to do after a military strike has taken place, assuming one does?

* We don't discuss the specifics of our military operations and planning, but let me be clear on our objective - Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop WMD

* Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise, will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

Many prominent foreign policy experts have called on you to change your policy from one of containment to one of getting rid of Saddam/can you ever be confident you've gotten rid of WMD while Saddam is still there?

* Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD and threaten his neighbors; we have said that we look forward to the day when Iraq has new leadership that would allow it join the family of nations. Desert Storm demonstrates that it would take hundreds of thousands of ground troops to remove the current leadership by force; our current policy - preventing Saddam from threatening the region -- serves the objectives and interests of the US, our friends and the international community at an acceptable level of risk.

Is the Administration in synch/ is the Pentagon out ahead on the use of force?

* The President's advisors - civilian and military - are in firm agreement/meeting daily to guide the work. Meeting regularly with the President and Vice

President.

Isn't Saddam tying the hands of military planners by placing women and children in or near likely targets and forcing you to choose between key targets and inflicting heavy "collateral damage" that world community would not accept?

* Not going to comment on any possible targets. We don't telegraph our punches.

* But Saddam's use of "human shields" is further proof of his utter contempt and disregard for his own people.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Butler allegations/BW warheads on missiles.

* Not going to comment/leave it to Butler to characterize UNSCOM's

findings.

Phyllis Oakley and others say that we really don't know the nature of Iraq's WMD capability - how can we draw up military options without this information?

* That's why it is so important for UNSCOM to be able to do its job unfettered.

MISCELLANEOUS

What do you make of Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Said El-Sahaf's statement that Iraq is considering asking the International Court of Justice to complain about U.S. military threats?

* The International Court of Justice only has jurisdiction to hear a suit by one government against another where both sides have in some manner consented to have the court hear a case. The United States has not consented to ICJ jurisdiction here.

* This is just another attempt to divert attention from the real issue, with is Iraq's duty to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction and to comply immediately with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

* The United States has a lot of respect for the International Court of Justice, but this is not an appropriate case to go to the Court.

What will be purpose of the use of force/what targets/how can you eliminate WMD through a bombing campaign/won't the use of force simply guarantee that the inspectors are thrown out and Saddam will have won?

* No decision has been made with respect to the use of force, but the President has made clear that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop and use WMD.

* Not going to comment on the possibility or nature of military targets. Can say

however that whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

* UNSCOM inspectors have achieved remarkable results; have always said that the best outcome is for the inspectors to be able to carry out their work. But as a practical matter, Saddam has now put their mission to an end. Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD, by restoring the inspectors or whatever other steps may be necessary if the inspectors cannot carry out their work.

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- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

CLINTON-YELTSIN CALL
February 2, 1998

* President Clinton called President Yeltsin today. The leaders spoke by phone from 9:31 am to 9:51 am EST.

* The Presidents primarily discussed the serious situation regarding Iraq's non-compliance with UNSC mandates.

* President Clinton stressed the need for unity among UNSC members, agreed with Yeltsin on the desirability of a diplomatic solution, but said Saddam's continued defiance and refusal to allow adequate UNSCOM inspections were unacceptable.

* The two leaders agreed to stay in close touch on this issue.

ANTHRAX VACCINE

February 3, 1998

Background: Today's New York Times reports that Government scientists are debating whether the current anthrax vaccine will work. This story is based on a misleading Los Alamos National Laboratory press release which states that "a mixture of [anthrax] strains used as a weapon might overcome vaccines against anthrax..." This statement is unsupported by any data in any Los Alamos studies or any other publication, and it explicitly does not apply to the licensed vaccine to be given to U.S. troops.

Los Alamos was apprised by DoD that its original press release was misleading, and the Laboratory issued a new version of the press release that revises the misleading statement. The Times story quoted the revised language as well as the original language, but it still left the impression that there are questions on this point. As far as we know, the Laboratory has not formally announced that its earlier version of the press release was incorrect, other than by issuing a revised version.

Q: This morning's New York Times states that a mixture of anthrax strains might overcome an anthrax vaccine. Why are we giving our troops a vaccine that might not work against such a mixture?

A: The statement that a mixture of strains might overcome vaccines against anthrax is not supported by any scientific data in any study or publication. There is no reason to believe that the licensed anthrax vaccine we will be giving our troops will fail to protect them against a combination of anthrax strains.

Let me refer you to the Department of Defense for details.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

February 3, 1998

What is your reaction to the "Statement on nuclear weapons by international civilian leaders calling for further steps on nuclear disarmament" released by Lee Butler, the former head of U.S. Strategic Command?

* Pleased the group endorsed the CTB. That goal, together with reducing the threat of nuclear weapons destruction and limiting their dangerous spread, have been and remain at the top of the Administration's national security agenda.

* Over the past five years, we have accomplished a great deal: the detargeting of U.S. and Russian missiles; the entry into force of the START I Treaty; the complete denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; the indefinite extension of the NPT; Senate ratification of the START II Treaty; and the signing and submission of the CTB.

* We are working with the Russian government to achieve Russian ratification of START II, immediately after which we are committed to negotiate further

reductions in START III. Together with prior unilateral measures, these agreements will result in over 3,700 U.S. strategic nuclear warheads that were once deployed on a Cold War "alert" status being removed - an 80% reduction.

* With regard to eliminating nuclear weapons altogether, the President stated in his speech to the UN in 1996 that this should be our goal before the 21st Century is out.

* While continuing our efforts to improve strategic stability and reduce nuclear arsenals, we must retain our nuclear deterrent as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

* While we differ over some of the specific recommendations made in the Statement, we are committed to a deliberate process to further reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear dangers.

CUBA
February 3, 1998

**HUMANITARIAN RELIEF INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED BY THE
CUBAN AMERICAN NATIONAL
FOUNDATION**

Context

On January 29, the Cuban American National Foundation issued a statement

outlining a humanitarian relief initiative for Cuba. Senator Helms endorsed the initiative the same day. Helms' office has drafted legislation based on the CANF initiative ("Cuban Assistance and Relief (CARE) Act 1998") that has not been announced. The draft legislation would authorize delivery of donated medicine and food as well as PL-480 food aid with certain conditions, but keep the embargo in tact. In a Feb. 2 speech, Castro rejected the CANF/Helms initiative, citing the "humiliating conditions" that would be imposed to receive such aid. The Administration has not developed a position on the CANF initiative nor on the draft legislation. There are other legislative initiatives and one headed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to lift restrictions on food and medicine to Cuba. We have not developed positions on any of these measures. Following the Pope's visit, we want to stress U.S. government interest in reaching out to the Cuban people and strengthening civil society

What is the Administration's view of the Cuba humanitarian relief initiative announced yesterday by the Cuban American Foundation and endorsed by Senator Helms?

* We have seen the statement issued by the Cuban American Foundation outlining an initiative to provide greater humanitarian assistance directly to the Cuban people.

* We have also seen a statement from Senator Helms endorsing this proposal.

* We prefer to withhold any further comment on the proposal until we see further details.

* The U.S. continues to believe that maintaining pressure on the Cuban government through our embargo is fundamental to encouraging fundamental, systemic change.

* At the same time, strengthening Cuban civil society through increased information flows and humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people is a key factor in our ongoing efforts to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.