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001. email	Anne Witkowski to Julie Synder. Subject: Decision Paper. (23 pages)	07/11/1997	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

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FOLDER TITLE:

[06/15/1997-07/11/1997]

2006-1363-F

vz5700

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/15/97 10:38:00 PM **DECLASSIFIED**
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
FROM Andreassen, Steven P. White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/7/2019
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2006-1363-F(3)
SUBJECT Draft CTBT Kick-Off Check List [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Blinken, Antony J.
Danvers, William C.
Samore, Gary S.
CARBON_COPY Bendick, Gordon L.
Gray, Wendy E.
Kreczko, Alan J.
Leavy, David C.
TEXT_BODY

Colleagues:

Recognizing we do not (repeat, not) yet have a formal decision on whether to stage a CTBT "Kick-Off" event at Alamogordo on July 16, if we do, we have just a little over four weeks to put all the pieces together for such an event. In an effort to "scope in" what needs to be done in the event of a "green light" re Alamogordo, I've put together a first draft of a "CTBT Kick Off Check List" for your review and comment. The "Check List" includes the following:

1. A summary paper (3-plus pages) that identifies the purpose of the Alamogordo event, discusses the relevant background to ratification, and briefly summarizes each item on the CTBT Kick-Off

Checklist. If we decide to go forward with Alamogordo, and there is a decision to hold a PC or DC, this paper (and the attachments below) would serve as the basis for that meeting.

2. Tab A --

CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents (3 pages). As

described in the summary paper, we would attempt to put together a CTBT Support Group prior to the event that would include former executive branch officials (dating back to the Eisenhower

administration),
former military officials (Bob -- Could use your help here filling in the blanks from our CWC experience), former Members of Congress,
scientists and citizens. Note the list of candidates is brimming with optimism, in particular, on the Republican side. Also included is a list of likely opponents.

3. Tab B -- CTBT Senate Call List
(1 page). A first cut at those Senators we would call prior to the event (recognizing Sandy Berger has started this process already).

4. Tab
C -- CTBT Albright-Cohen-Berger Op Ed (2 pages). Tony -- this is the Op Ed you did for Tony Lake prior to the signing ceremony in September, which we decided not to place and hold for the kick off. Well, here we are...

5. Tab D -- Media Call List (1 page).
Tony -- Could really use some help, here, filling in the likely candidates
of those in the media we want to target prior to the event.

6. Tab
E -- CTBT Baseline Q/A Package (4-plus pages and growing). Most of this is drawn from already cleared q/a's done last fall. I'll update tomorrow.

If you could provide me with comments no later than COB Monday, I'll send out a revised draft to you all on Tuesday. If we get a green light on Alamogordo, we would send this paper out to Bob's IWG for review and comment, and go on from there. Even
if we don't have a POTUS event, we might still use much of this material,
if not all of it, if we submit the Treaty to the Senate on July 16.

Thanks,
Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CTBALAMO.DOC

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Kick-off Checklist
(DRAFT: 6/15/97/9:45 p.m.)

Purpose

To launch the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification effort
with a high-profile kick-off event involving the President, senior

Administration

officials, members of Congress, scientists and private citizens at the site of the world's first nuclear test on July 16, 1945 at the "Trinity" site at Alamogordo, New Mexico.

To underscore the Administration's commitment to maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, the President would also visit Sandia National Laboratory for a briefing on stockpile stewardship from the three nuclear lab directors.

Background

We expect to be ready to submit the CTBT to the Senate in the next four weeks, giving us six to nine months to achieve Senate approval before we are ready to go forward with other foreign policy issues that will crowd the Senate's calendar in the spring of 1998, including NATO enlargement, ABM/TMD demarcation, ABM multilateralization and START II extension. This approach will keep CTBT out of the 1998 campaign season and avoid conflicting with other domestic legislative priorities next spring.

Given our expectation that CTBT will require a major effort, there is a strong case for a public, high profile kick-off that quickly and decisively defines the debate on our terms and underscores the historic bipartisan roots of the Treaty, as well as its more recent bipartisan Congressional genesis.

A scheduling proposal has been [submitted][approved] to go forward with an event at the site of the world's first nuclear test on July 16, 1945 at the "Trinity" site at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Alamogordo would provide a vivid backdrop for the President to announce his was taking the final step (submitting CTBT to the Senate) to end nuclear testing for all time on the very ground where the era of nuclear testing began.

To underscore the Administration's commitment to maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing (a key issue in the ratification debate), the President would also visit Sandia lab on the same day and receive a briefing from the three nuclear lab directors on our program for stockpile stewardship. We would also arrange for the press to be briefed in detail on our stockpile stewardship program.

A difficult road. Despite our CWC (and now CFE) success, the road to Senate action on CTBT will be far from smooth:

- * Republican indifference. Whereas CWC had a modern-era Republican lineage (Reagan-Bush), CTBT does not (the 1996 Republican platform opposed CTBT). Thus, it will be difficult to surround the President with a group of Republicans who publicly support CTBT. Moreover, the same Republicans who opposed CWC (Weinberger, Cheney) are expected to oppose CTBT, perhaps joined by some of their pro-CWC Republican colleagues.

- * A focused opposition. The same determined (and now battle-hardened) opposition to CWC, led by Helms and Kyl in the Senate and Gaffney on the outside, await CTBT. Rather than being discouraged by their CWC defeat, they believe it possible to defeat CTBT on the Senate floor.

- * Difficult threshold issues. To get 67 votes, we will need to make a convincing case on two critical issues: stockpile stewardship and verification. In each case, we face an uphill battle to convince Senators we can: (a) maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing (unlike CWC, CTBT is about our weapons); and (b) that the treaty is effectively verifiable, in particular, as it applies to low-yield testing.

- * Retired architects. The principle architects of the 1992 law establishing a

testing moratorium and directing negotiation of a CTBT (Senators Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell) have retired. The heavy lifting will be left to Senators Biden, Levin and Kerrey, all of whom will need to focus time and attention on hearings within their Committees of jurisdiction before action can be taken on the Senate floor.

* Excuses for Senate delay. The Duma's failure to act on START II and CWC, along with the fact India must sign CTBT before it can enter into force, provides a rationale for the Senate to delay action until Russia and/or India acts on the Treaty.

In our favor. In addition to the positive momentum -- and experience - - gained from CWC and CFE ratification:

* Public support. Our greatest asset is the overwhelming support of the American people for the test ban. Few Senators will wish to vote against CTBT (thereby labeling themselves as advocates for nuclear testing). The challenge is to get the Treaty to the floor and frame the vote in exactly these terms, not as a referendum on stewardship or effective verification.

* Eisenhower lineage. It was President Eisenhower (a Republican) who initiated CTBT negotiations and had hoped the test ban would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country."

* CTBT safeguards. The President directed the implementation of focused programs on stockpile stewardship and CTBT monitoring and verification four years ago, reinforced by his August 1995 commitment to specific CTBT safeguards in these areas. We expect these programs to pay dividends during ratification.

* Congressional initiative. While Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell have left the Senate, the fact remains it was a bipartisan majority in both houses of Congress

that legislated an end to nuclear testing less than five years ago. In that respect, the Senate will pass judgment on its own initiative.

* It's the law. As noted, the CTBT is about "our" weapons; that said, the Administration is now precluded by law from conducting any nuclear tests, unless another state tests first. The CTBT merely codifies existing law.

* National security. Finally, the U.S. has more to gain from a global ban on nuclear testing than any other participant state (it will constrain nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states from developing more advanced nuclear weapons capabilities); the Treaty is overwhelmingly in our national security interests.

Kick-Off Checklist

* Ratification package. The Administration must complete three key elements of the CTBT ratification package prior to submitting the Treaty to the Senate: the CTBT monitoring estimate; the Section 37 report with our assessment of whether the Treaty can be effectively verified; and the Treaty's Article by Article analysis. [Note: A fourth element -- the intelligence communities Counter-Intelligence Report -- was concluded on [insert date]].

* The NFIB is scheduled to meet and approve the monitoring estimate on June 20; the Arms Control IWG will work to conclude both the Section 37 report and Article by Article analysis no later than July 3.

* CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents; (Tab A). As part of our effort to underscore the historic bipartisan roots of the Treaty, as well as its more recent bipartisan Congressional genesis, we would assemble a CTBT Support Group that includes: former executive branch officials; former military officials; former Members of Congress; scientists and citizens. Initial calls to prospective Support Group candidates (in particular, former principals) would be

made by Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen and APNSA Berger beginning the week of June 23; those who indicate they are prepared to support CTBT publicly would be invited to the Alamogordo event. Once contacted, all would receive a copy of the Treaty with background material (including September 24 Fact Sheet, September 24 Chronology, August 11, 1995 Statement by the President and August 11, 1995 CTBT Safeguards) prior to the event.

* CTBT Likely Opponents. In addition to those whose support we seek for the CTBT Support Group, we would also call former senior officials (et al) who we expect oppose CTBT and seek their commitment not to actively work against the test ban.

* CTBT Senate Call List (Tab B). We would call key members of the Senate prior to the event to inform them of our timetable and (if appropriate) invite them to the Alamogordo event.

* Kick-off Op Ed by Senior Administration Official (Tab C). Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Berger would submit an Op Ed to the NYT or Washington Post to be published on the eve of the kick off event.

* CTBT Media Call List (Tab D). Prior to the kick-off, we would contact those reporters who cover CTBT and provide them with relevant information.

* Baseline Q/A package (Tab E). The IWG has developed a "baseline" set of interagency cleared Q/A's relating to the Treaty.

Ratification Action Plan. Finally, in addition to the above activities focused on the CTBT Kick-Off event, the IWG would develop and coordinate a CTBT ratification action plan to be implemented over the next six to nine months.

Attachments

* Tab A: CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents

* Tab B: CTBT Senate Call List

* Tab C: CTBT Albright-Cohen-Berger Op Ed

* Tab D: Media Call List

* Tab E: CTBT Q/A Package

Tab A: CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents

I. SUPPORT GROUP CANDIDATES

A. Former Executive/Defense

1. Eisenhower Administration

Christian Herter
Harold Stassen

2. Kennedy/Johnson Administration

Robert McNamara
Clark Clifford
Walt Rostow
Paul Nitze
Paul Warnke
Carl Kaysen (MIT)

3. Nixon/Ford Administration

Henry Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft
Melvin Laird
Donald Rumsfeld
William Rogers
Elliot Richardson

4. Carter Administration

Cyrus Vance
Harold Brown
Zbignev Brezinski
Jim Schlesinger
Andrew Young

5. Reagan Administration

Alexander Haig Jr.
George Schultz
John Whitehead
Richard Allen
William Clarke
Robert McFarlane
Frank Carlucci
Kenneth Adelman
Roz Ridgeway
Max Kampelman
William Burns

6. Bush Administration

James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
Arnold Kanter
Robert Zoellick
Robert Kimmit

7. Clinton Administration

Warren Christopher
William Perry
Anthony Lake
John Deutch
Hazel O'Leary
Charles Curtis

B. Former Military

1. Eisenhower
General Andrew Goodpaster

2. Kennedy/Johnson

3. Nixon/Ford
Admiral Bud Zumwalt

4. Carter
General David Jones
General Lew Allen

5. Reagan
General John Vessey
Admiral William Crowe
General John Galvin

6. Bush

General Collin Powell

7. Clinton
General Lee Butler

C. Former Legislative

Senator Hatfield
Senator Exon
Senator Mitchell
Senator Kassebaum
Senator Nunn
Senator Rudman
Senator Bradley

D. Scientific

Hans Bethe (Cornell)
Glenn Seaborg (UC Berkeley)
Herb York (UC San Diego)
Sidney Drell (Stanford)
Freeman Dyson (Princeton)
Wolfgang Panofsky (Stanford)
Marshall Rosenbluth (UC San Diego)
Richard Garwin (IBM)
Henry Kendall (MIT)
Val Fitch (Princeton)
Harold Agnew (San Diego)

E. Citizens

Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
George Bush
John F. Kennedy, Jr.
Caroline Kennedy
David Eisenhower, Jr.

II. LIKELY OPPONENTS

Casper Weinberger
Jeanne Kirkpatrick
Richard Perle
Richard Cheney

Tab B: CTBT Congressional Call List

Democrats Republicans

Senator Daschle Senator Lott
Senator Biden Senator Helms
Senator Levin Senator Thurmond
Senator Kerry Senator Shelby

Senator Bingamen Senator Domenici
Senator Harkin Senator Lugar
Senator Durbin Senator McCain
Senator Reed Senator Hagel
Senator Feingold Senator Smith (Oregon)
Senator Jeffords

Tab C: Op Ed

6/15/96 2:55 p.m.

CTBT OP-ED

BY "MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, WILLIAM COHEN AND
SAMUEL BERGER"
SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Last September, at the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that have declared possession of nuclear weapons -- all followed suit, and over 140 nations of the world are now signatories. With this accord, we take a giant step toward a safer day, when no nuclear weapons will be detonated anywhere on the face of the earth.

For more than 35 years, American leaders of both parties have sought a ban on nuclear tests. Dwight Eisenhower was the first President to recognize that such a ban would put a powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapons and clear the way to a reduction of the nuclear threat. Indeed, President Eisenhower hoped that a test ban would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country,"

as historian Stephen E. Ambrose has written. But this dream was dashed by the U-2 affair of 1960 and the rise of East-West tensions.

President John Kennedy took up the cause of a test ban. In 1963, his Administration negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space -- as the first step toward a comprehensive ban. The effort to conclude that ban continued under President Carter but was interrupted by another escalation of Cold War hostility.

President Clinton restarted talks on the test ban. In July, 1993 he extended the moratorium on testing begun at the insistence of Congress the year before. Energized by this U.S. initiative, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament began work on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When negotiations reached impasse over the scope of the treaty's prohibition on testing, President Clinton broke the deadlock by announcing U.S. support for a true zero yield ban -- one that would forbid any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

The President's decision turned the corner for the treaty, giving new momentum to the negotiations and signaling to the world America's resolve to achieve a truly comprehensive test ban. Last September -- 32 months after the negotiations began -- the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. Few major international agreements have enjoyed such extraordinary support.

Indeed, few treaties have had the profound, positive impact on global security that the Comprehensive Test Ban promises. The signatures of the world's declared nuclear powers -- the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom -- along with the vast majority of nations will constrain efforts to improve existing nuclear weapons and create a formidable barrier to the

development of new generations of weapons. This quest is all the more urgent because of the efforts of rogue states and terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

For the five nuclear weapons states, there will be no way to test more advanced and more destructive devices. For states that do not possess nuclear weapons, the ban on testing will make it more difficult to develop reliable weapons and fit them for sophisticated missiles and bombers. There is no guarantee that a country determined to possess nuclear weapons will not be able to fashion a crude bomb. But the test ban makes it difficult to do more than that.

By helping prevent proliferation and future arms races, the Test Ban Treaty will increase security for the United States and the world in the 21st century. In a more stable, predictable environment prospects will improve for additional reductions in nuclear forces and further advances in nonproliferation.

The Clinton Administration recognizes, however, that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons will remain with us for years to come. That is why, as part of our national security strategy, the United States must and will retain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces. The President directed in 1993 that a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management program be implemented to help maintain our nuclear deterrent under a test ban.

Along with the Stockpile Stewardship program, President Clinton announced in August 1995 the establishment of concrete safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a test ban treaty. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments and capabilities in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories and test readiness.

Thirty-four years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the

Limited
Test Ban Treaty "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of the Cold War. Now,
with the Comprehensive Test Ban, that light grows brighter. This treaty can
bring to an end the era that began in 1945 with a mushroom cloud at Alamogordo;
it heralds a new era in which the cloud of nuclear danger can finally be lifted.

###

Tab D: Media Call List

New York Times

Matthew L. Wald

Wall Street Journal

Carla Anne Robbins

Washington Post

Jeffrey Smith

Los Angeles Times

Washington Times

Bill Gertz

Reuters

Carol Giacomo

Tab E: Q/A Package

"Scope" of the CTBT's Prohibition (Article I)

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the Treaty is not really "comprehensive" in scope and will permit further development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons through computer simulations and subcritical

experiments?

A:

* The CTBT will prohibit any nuclear explosion whether for weapons or peaceful purposes, i.e., any test that produces a nuclear explosive yield. This is a truly "comprehensive" test ban.

* The CTBT will effectively constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

* It will thus contribute effectively to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament and enhance international peace and security.

* As to concerns over so-called "subcritical" experiments not banned by the CTBT, these experiments, by their very nature, will not produce a nuclear yield. They are designed to help maintain the safety and reliability of our existing weapons and are not relevant to the development and qualitative improvement of new nuclear weapons.

Q: [Insert: ICF and Fusion Research]

A:

The Organization (Article II)

Q: [Insert: Another UN organization]

A:

Verification (Article IV)

Q: [Insert: Effective Verification]

A:

Entry into Force (Article XIV)

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the entry into force provision of the CTBT is an attempt to enforce the CTBT on India without its consent?

A:

* All countries are free to determine whether or not they will choose to sign this Treaty after its opening for signature. Nothing in the Treaty changes this basic fact.

* India had also raised concerns that the Treaty would allow imposition of sanctions against countries that did not sign if the Treaty had not entered into force after three years. The United States has assured the Indian government that the entry into force process would not involve sanctions.

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT will never enter into force?

A:

* In order for the CTBT to enter into force -- which under no circumstances can be earlier than two years after signature -- all participating member states of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with nuclear research and/or power reactors -- a total of 44 countries -- must ratify the agreement.

* Thus, we will have two years to gather the necessary ratifications. During this time, we will be engaged in close consultations with all 43 other states, whose ratifications are required for entry into force, on our view of the value of this treaty, and there would be further steps being taken in areas of interest to many states, including further steps in arms control.

* If, three years after signature, one or more of these 44 states have NOT ratified the Treaty, the Treaty provides for an annual Conference to

consider
what measures may be taken to accelerate the ratification process in
order to
facilitate the early entry into force of this treaty.

* Taken as a whole, we believe these provisions provide an effective
pathway for
the entry into force of this agreement.

* And even before entry into force, the Treaty will reinforce the
compelling
international norm against nuclear testing.

CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT should have
included a
commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific
time frame,
and that the fact that the Treaty does not include such a commitment
shows the
nuclear weapons states are "insincere" about nuclear disarmament?

A:

* Successive U.S. administrations have embraced the objective of
nuclear
disarmament as our ultimate goal.

* Last year at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the U.S.
reaffirmed its
commitment to this goal in the Conference's Statement of Principles
and
Objectives.

* Over the past five years alone, we have made substantial progress in
this area:

* The United States has withdrawn and is dismantling thousands of
nuclear
warheads that were deployed in Europe less than a decade ago.

* Under the START Treaties, the United States and Russia envisage
removing 14,000
warheads from deployed arsenals, 9,000 under START I and 5,000
more when START II
is ratified by Russia.

* The United States and Russia are now dismantling thousands of
nuclear weapons

each year.

* President's Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed at Helsinki to negotiate START III reductions to 2,000 - 2,500 once START II has entered into force.

* We have signed the relevant protocols to nuclear free zone treaties in the South Pacific and Africa.

* And, since 1993, we have supported the prompt negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

* By constraining the development and improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, the CTBT will be a sturdy foundation for the safer, more peaceful, more secure world we seek for our children and our future.

Q: How do you respond to the Indians charge that "partial measures" such as the CTBT not part of an overall "step by step" process have been unsuccessful and have not contributed to nuclear disarmament?

A:

* The progress we have made over the past decade in the field of nuclear disarmament speaks for itself: the INF, START I and START II Treaties, the South Pacific and African nuclear free zone treaties, along with a series of unilateral measures undertaken by the nuclear weapons states, have dramatically reduced the nuclear danger, led to the withdrawal and destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons, and have laid the groundwork for further steps, including the CTBT.

* To argue that none of these steps should have been taken without first agreeing on a timetable for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is to argue that if our ultimate goal cannot be reached today, that we should forsake concrete steps towards that goal.

* In a field as complex as that of disarmament, the formula suggested by India would be a recipe for inaction.

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT merely perpetuates a discriminatory status quo?

A:

* The CTBT is non-discriminatory, in that it bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion for all signatory states.

* The fact is that all five nuclear weapon states, along with two of the three so-called "threshold" states (Israel and Pakistan), are now willing to forgo any further nuclear tests, joining all those non-nuclear weapons states who have already given up their right to test by signing the NPT.

Q: Why won't the United States agree to an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the CD?

A:

* The United States believes the CD should now move quickly to commence negotiations on the fissile material cutoff treaty.

At the same time, we have made clear our willingness to discuss further reductions in nuclear forces bilaterally with Russia once START II has been ratified. This would seem to us to be the most appropriate -- and productive -- venue for discussing further reductions at this time.

CTBT and Stockpile Stewardship

Q: Does the CTBT mean we will lose confidence in our nuclear deterrent?

A:

* No. We can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a

CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear testing.

* The President directed the implementation of such a program almost three years ago, and it is being developed by the Department of Energy with the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* In order for the program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond.

* The Administration is committed to working with the Congress to ensure this support.

Q: Does the CTBT mean we would have no recourse if we found a major defect with one of our nuclear weapons types?

A:

* No. While we are optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be successful, the President has said that in the event that he were informed by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapons type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, he would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our "supreme national interests" withdrawal rights under the CTBT in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

* The President has said, however, that he believes that exercising this right is a decision he or any future president will not have to make. The nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable, and we are determined our stockpile stewardship program will ensure they remain so in the

absence of
nuclear testing.

CTBT and the Vienna Convention

Q: [Insert]

A:

2
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/18/97 10:13:00 AM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Latest Draft CTBT Kick Off... [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Leavy, David C.

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 2/7/2011
2006-1363-f (3)

Thanks, Dave.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CTBALAMO.DOC
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Kick-off Checklist
(DRAFT: 6/17/97/6:50 p.m.)

Purpose

To launch the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification effort with a high-profile kick-off event involving the President, senior Administration officials, members of Congress, scientists and private citizens at the site of the world's first nuclear test on July 16, 1945 at the "Trinity" site in Alamogordo, New Mexico.

To underscore the Administration's commitment to maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, the President would also visit Sandia National Laboratory for a briefing on stockpile stewardship from the three nuclear lab directors.

Background

We expect to be ready to submit the CTBT to the Senate in the next four weeks, giving us six to nine months to achieve Senate approval before we are ready to go forward with other foreign policy issues that will crowd the Senate's

calendar in the spring of 1998, including NATO enlargement, ABM/TMD demarcation, ABM multilateralization and START II extension. This approach will keep CTBT out of the 1998 campaign season and avoid conflicting with other domestic legislative priorities next spring.

Given our expectation that CTBT will require a major effort, there is a strong case for a public, high profile kick-off that quickly and decisively defines the debate on our terms and underscores the historic bipartisan roots of the Treaty, as well as its more recent bipartisan Congressional genesis.

A scheduling proposal has been [submitted][approved] to go forward with an event at the site of the world's first nuclear test on [or about] July 16, 1945 at the "Trinity" site at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Alamogordo would provide a vivid backdrop for the President to announce he is taking the final step (submitting CTBT to the Senate) to end nuclear testing for all time on the very ground where the era of nuclear testing began.

To underscore the Administration's commitment to maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing (a key issue in the ratification debate), the President would also visit Sandia lab on the same day and receive a briefing from the three nuclear lab directors on our program for stockpile stewardship. We would also arrange for the press to be briefed in detail on our stockpile stewardship program.

A difficult road. Despite our CWC (and now CFE) success, the road to Senate action on CTBT will be far from smooth:

* Republican indifference. Whereas CWC had a modern-era Republican lineage (Reagan-Bush), CTBT does not (the 1996 Republican platform opposed CTBT). Thus, it will be difficult to surround the President with a group of

Republicans who publicly support CTBT. Moreover, the same Republicans who opposed CWC (Weinberger, Cheney) are expected to oppose CTBT, perhaps joined by some of their pro-CWC Republican colleagues.

* A focused opposition. The same determined (and now battle-hardened) opposition to CWC, led by Helms and Kyl in the Senate and Gaffney on the outside, await CTBT. Rather than being discouraged by their CWC defeat, they believe it possible to defeat CTBT on the Senate floor.

* Difficult threshold issues. To get 67 votes, we will need to make a convincing case on two critical issues: stockpile stewardship and verification. In each case, we face an uphill battle to convince Senators we can: (a) maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing (unlike CWC, CTBT is about our weapons); and (b) that the treaty is effectively verifiable, in particular, as it applies to low-yield testing.

* Retired architects. The principle architects of the 1992 law establishing a testing moratorium and directing negotiation of a CTBT (Senators Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell) have retired. The heavy lifting will be left to Senators Biden, Levin and Kerrey, all of whom will need to focus time and attention on hearings within their Committees of jurisdiction before action can be taken on the Senate floor.

* Excuses for Senate delay. The Duma's failure to act on START II and CWC, along with the fact India must sign CTBT before it can enter into force, provides a rationale for the Senate to delay action until Russia and/or India acts on the Treaty.

In our favor. In addition to the positive momentum -- and experience - gained from CWC and CFE ratification:

* Public support. Our greatest asset is the overwhelming support of the American people for the test ban. Few Senators will wish to vote against CTBT (thereby labeling themselves as advocates for nuclear testing). The challenge is to get the Treaty to the floor and frame the vote in exactly these terms, not as a referendum on stewardship or effective verification.

* Eisenhower lineage. It was President Eisenhower (a Republican) who initiated CTBT negotiations and had hoped the test ban would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country."

* CTBT safeguards. The President directed the implementation of focused programs on stockpile stewardship and CTBT monitoring and verification four years ago, reinforced by his August 1995 commitment to specific CTBT safeguards in these areas. We expect these programs to pay dividends during ratification.

* Congressional initiative. While Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell have left the Senate, the fact remains it was a bipartisan majority in both houses of Congress that legislated an end to nuclear testing less than five years ago. In that respect, the Senate will pass judgment on its own initiative.

* It's the law. As noted, the CTBT is about "our" weapons; that said, the Administration is now precluded by law from conducting any nuclear tests, unless another state tests first. The CTBT merely codifies existing law.

* National security. Finally, the U.S. has more to gain from a global ban on nuclear testing than any other participant state (it will constrain nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states from developing more advanced nuclear weapons capabilities); the Treaty is overwhelmingly in our national security interests.

Kick-Off Checklist

* Ratification package. The Administration must complete three key elements of the CTBT ratification package prior to submitting the Treaty to the Senate: the CTBT monitoring estimate; the Section 37 report with our assessment of whether the Treaty can be effectively verified; and the Treaty's Article by Article analysis. [Note: A fourth element -- the intelligence community's Counter-Intelligence Report -- was concluded on [insert date]].

* The NFIB is scheduled to meet and approve the monitoring estimate on June 20; the Arms Control IWG will work to conclude both the Section 37 report and Article by Article analysis no later than July 3.

* CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents; (Tab A). As part of our effort to underscore the historic bipartisan roots of the Treaty, as well as its more recent bipartisan Congressional genesis, we would assemble a CTBT Support Group that includes: former executive branch officials; former military officials; former Members of Congress; scientists and citizens. Initial calls to prospective Support Group candidates (in particular, former principals) would be made by Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen and APNSA Berger beginning the week of June 23; those who indicate they are prepared to support CTBT publicly would be invited to the Alamogordo event. Once contacted, all would receive a copy of the Treaty with background material (including September 24 Fact Sheet, September 24 Chronology, August 11, 1995 Statement by the President and August 11, 1995 CTBT Safeguards) prior to the event.

* CTBT Likely Opponents. In addition to those whose support we seek for the CTBT Support Group, we would also call former senior officials (et al) who we expect oppose CTBT and seek their commitment not to actively work against the test ban.

* CTBT Senate Call List (Tab B). We would call key members of the Senate prior

to the event to inform them of our timetable and (if appropriate) invite them to the Alamogordo event.

* Communication's Plan for Kick Off Event. Would include the following:

1. Op/Ed by Albright-Cohen-Berger (See Tab C).
2. CTBT Support Group (plus other "influentials") briefing by APNSA Berger, others tbd.
3. Briefing for key reporters, columnists and pundits by APNSA Berger, others tbd (See Tab D).
4. Mailing of cover letter, fact sheets to editorial boards.
5. Post-event press briefing by APNSA Berger, others tbd.

* Baseline Q/A package (Tab E). The IWG has developed a "baseline" set of interagency cleared Q/A's relating to the Treaty.

Ratification Action Plan. Finally, in addition to the above activities focused on the CTBT Kick-Off event, the IWG would develop and coordinate a CTBT ratification action plan to be implemented over the next six to nine months.

Attachments

- * Tab A: CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents
- * Tab B: CTBT Senate Call List
- * Tab C: CTBT Albright-Cohen-Berger Op Ed
- * Tab D: Key reporters, columnists and pundits
- * Tab E: CTBT Q/A Package

Tab A: CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents

I. SUPPORT GROUP CANDIDATES

A. Former Executive/Defense

1. Eisenhower Administration

Christian Herter
Harold Stassen

2. Kennedy/Johnson Administration

Robert McNamara
Clark Clifford
Walt Rostow
Paul Nitze
Paul Warnke
Carl Kaysen (MIT)

3. Nixon/Ford Administration

Henry Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft
Melvin Laird
Donald Rumsfeld
William Rogers
Elliot Richardson

4. Carter Administration

Cyrus Vance
Harold Brown
Zbignev Brezinski
Jim Schlesinger
Andrew Young

5. Reagan Administration

Alexander Haig Jr.
George Schultz
John Whitehead
Richard Allen
William Clarke
Robert McFarlane
Frank Carlucci
Kenneth Adelman
Roz Ridgeway
Max Kampelman
William Burns

6. Bush Administration

James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
Arnold Kanter
Robert Zoellick
Robert Kimmit

7. Clinton Administration

Warren Christopher
William Perry
Anthony Lake
John Deutch
Hazel O'Leary
Charles Curtis

B. Former Military

1. Eisenhower
General Andrew Goodpaster

2. Kennedy/Johnson

3. Nixon/Ford
Admiral Bud Zumwalt

4. Carter
General David Jones
General Lew Allen

5. Reagan
General John Vessey
Admiral William Crowe
General John Galvin

6. Bush
General Collin Powell

7. Clinton
General Lee Butler

C. Former Legislative

Senator Dole
Senator Hatfield
Senator Exon
Senator Mitchell
Senator Kassebaum
Senator Nunn
Senator Rudman
Senator Bradley
Senator Bentsen

D. Scientific

Hans Bethe (Cornell)
Glenn Seaborg (UC Berkeley)

Herb York (UC San Diego)
Sidney Drell (Stanford)
Freeman Dyson (Princeton)
Wolfgang Panofsky (Stanford)
Marshall Rosenbluth (UC San Diego)
Richard Garwin (IBM)
Henry Kendall (MIT)
Val Fitch (Princeton)
Harold Agnew (San Diego)

E. Citizens

Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
George Bush
John F. Kennedy, Jr.
Caroline Kennedy
David Eisenhower, Jr.

II. LIKELY OPPONENTS

Casper Weinberger
Jeanne Kirkpatrick
Richard Perle
Richard Cheney

Tab B: CTBT Congressional Call List

Democrats Republicans

Senator Daschle Senator Lott
Senator Biden Senator Helms
Senator Levin Senator Thurmond
Senator Kerry Senator Shelby

Senator Bingamen Senator Domenici
Senator Harkin Senator Lugar
Senator Durbin Senator McCain
Senator Reed Senator Hagel
Senator Feingold Senator Smith (Oregon)
Senator Jeffords

Tab C: Op Ed

6/15/96 2:55 p.m.

CTBT OP-ED

BY "MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, WILLIAM COHEN AND
SAMUEL BERGER"

SECRETARY OF STATE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Last September, at the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that have declared possession of nuclear weapons -- all followed suit, and over 140 nations of the world are now signatories. With this accord, we take a giant step toward a safer day, when no nuclear weapons will be detonated anywhere on the face of the earth.

For more than 35 years, American leaders of both parties have sought a ban on nuclear tests. Dwight Eisenhower was the first President to recognize that such a ban would put a powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapons and clear the way to a reduction of the nuclear threat. Indeed, President Eisenhower hoped that a test ban would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country," as historian Stephen E. Ambrose has written. But this dream was dashed by the U-2 affair of 1960 and the rise of East-West tensions.

President John Kennedy took up the cause of a test ban. In 1963, his Administration negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space -- as the first step toward a comprehensive ban. The effort to conclude that ban continued under President Carter but was interrupted by another escalation of Cold War hostility.

President Clinton restarted talks on the test ban. In July, 1993 he extended the moratorium on testing begun at the insistence of Congress the year before. Energized by this U.S. initiative, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament began

work on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When negotiations reached impasse over the scope of the treaty's prohibition on testing, President Clinton broke the deadlock by announcing U.S. support for a true zero yield ban -- one that would forbid any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

The President's decision turned the corner for the treaty, giving new momentum to the negotiations and signaling to the world America's resolve to achieve a truly comprehensive test ban. Last September -- 32 months after the negotiations began -- the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. Few major international agreements have enjoyed such extraordinary support.

Indeed, few treaties have had the profound, positive impact on global security that the Comprehensive Test Ban promises. The signatures of the world's declared nuclear powers -- the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom -- along with the vast majority of nations will constrain efforts to improve existing nuclear weapons and create a formidable barrier to the development of new generations of weapons. This quest is all the more urgent because of the efforts of rogue states and terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

For the five nuclear weapons states, there will be no way to test more advanced and more destructive devices. For states that do not possess nuclear weapons, the ban on testing will make it more difficult to develop reliable weapons and fit them for sophisticated missiles and bombers. There is no guarantee that a country determined to possess nuclear weapons will not be able to fashion a crude bomb. But the test ban makes it difficult to do more than that.

By helping prevent proliferation and future arms races, the Test Ban

Treaty will
increase security for the United State and the world in the 21st
century. In a
more stable, predictable environment prospects will improve for
additional
reductions in nuclear forces and further advances in nonproliferation.

The Clinton Administration recognizes, however, that the dangers
posed by nuclear
weapons will remain with us for years to come. That is why, as part of
our
national security strategy, the United States must and will retain
nuclear forces
sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to
nuclear
forces. The President directed in 1993 that a Science Based Stockpile
Stewardship and Management program be implemented to help
maintain our nuclear
deterrent under a test ban.

Along with the Stockpile Stewardship program, President Clinton
announced in
August 1995 the establishment of concrete safeguards that define the
conditions
under which the United States will enter into a test ban treaty. These
safeguards will strengthen our commitments and capabilities in the
areas of
intelligence, monitoring and verification, maintenance of our nuclear
laboratories and test readiness.

Thirty-four years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the
Limited
Test Ban Treaty "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of the Cold
War. Now,
with the Comprehensive Test Ban, that light grows brighter. This
treaty can
bring to an end the era that began in 1945 with a mushroom cloud at
Alamogordo;
it heralds a new era in which the cloud of nuclear danger can finally
be lifted.

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Tab D: Reporters, Columnists and Pundits

New York Times

Matthew L. Wald

Wall Street Journal

Carla Anne Robbins

Washington Post

Jeffrey Smith
John M. Goshko

Los Angeles Times

Washington Times

Bill Gertz

Reuters

Carol Giacomo

Tab E: Q/A Package

"Scope" of the CTBT's Prohibition (Article I)

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the Treaty is not really "comprehensive" in scope and will permit further development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons through computer simulations and subcritical experiments?

A:

* The CTBT will prohibit any nuclear explosion whether for weapons or peaceful purposes, i.e., any test that produces a nuclear explosive yield. This is a truly "comprehensive" test ban.

* The CTBT will effectively constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

* It will thus contribute effectively to the prevention of nuclear proliferation

and the process of nuclear disarmament and enhance international peace and security.

* As to concerns over so-called "subcritical" experiments not banned by the CTBT, these experiments, by their very nature, will not produce a nuclear yield. They are designed to help maintain the safety and reliability of our existing weapons and are not relevant to the development and qualitative improvement of new nuclear weapons.

Q: Could the United States test a pure fusion weapon under the CTBT?

A:

* No.

Q: Would an explosively driven, pure fusion experiment that produced a nuclear yield be prohibited by the Treaty?

A:

* Not necessarily.

Q: How would you then define the distinction between an explosively-driven, pure fusion experiment that was permitted and one that was prohibited?"

A:

* We have established a process for reviewing any such activities to ensure they remain compliant with the Treaty. That review will be guided by the following principles:

* The CTBT requires each state party not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion;

* The P-5 have agreed to an illustrative list of activities not prohibited by the CTBT. None of these activities would involve the conduct of a

nuclear explosion;

* Inertial confinement fusion (ICF) and similar experiments are included on this list; and

* In addition to the kinds of ICF experiments described in our 1975 statement to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (involving lasers and particle beams), experiments driven by hydrodynamic means, magnetic fields and other pulsed power methods are not prohibited.

* Beyond that, we have no plan, no intention and no requirement to conduct fusion research for the purpose of developing advanced new types of nuclear weapons. Indeed, as is noted in the Treaty's preamble, the CTBT will end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

The Organization (Article II)

Q: [Insert: Another UN organization]

A:

Verification (Article IV)

Q: Is the CTBT effectively verifiable?

A:

* [Insert from the Section 37 Report, when available]

Q: On August 11, 1995, the President issued a statement admitting that "our present monitoring systems will not detect with high confidence very low yield tests." For this reason, is not a "zero yield" test ban fatally flawed?

A:

* No. A zero yield test ban is overwhelmingly in the national security interests of the United States.

* While it is true that we cannot detect with high confidence very low yield tests, it is also true that [insert relevant material from monitoring estimate/Section 37 Report].

* As the President said in 1995, we are committed to pursuing a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations. Indeed, since 1993, we have spent roughly [\$__] million to enhance our capabilities to monitor a CTBT, and we plan to spend an additional [\$__] over the next [__] years in this area. So we expect to improve our monitoring capabilities across the board.

Q: [Insert re OSI "green light/30 votes provision]

A:

* [Insert]

Q: [Insert re National Technical Means (NTM)]

A:

* [Insert]

Entry into Force (Article XIV)

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the entry into force provision of the CTBT is an attempt to enforce the CTBT on India without its consent?

A:

* All countries are free to determine whether or not they will choose to sign this Treaty after its opening for signature. Nothing in the Treaty changes this basic fact.

* India had also raised concerns that the Treaty would allow imposition of sanctions against countries that did not sign if the Treaty had not entered into force after three years. The United States has assured the Indian government that the entry into force process would not involve sanctions.

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT will never enter into force?

A:

* In order for the CTBT to enter into force -- which under no circumstances can be earlier than two years after signature -- all participating member states of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with nuclear research and/or power reactors -- a total of 44 countries -- must ratify the agreement.

* Thus, we will have two years to gather the necessary ratifications. During this time, we will be engaged in close consultations with all 43 other states, whose ratifications are required for entry into force, on our view of the value of this treaty, and there would be further steps being taken in areas of interest to many states, including further steps in arms control.

* If, three years after signature, one or more of these 44 states have NOT ratified the Treaty, the Treaty provides for an annual Conference to consider what measures may be taken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this treaty.

* Taken as a whole, we believe these provisions provide an effective pathway for the entry into force of this agreement.

* And even before entry into force, the Treaty will reinforce the compelling international norm against nuclear testing.

CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT should have included a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time frame, and that the fact that the Treaty does not include such a commitment shows the nuclear weapons states are "insincere" about nuclear disarmament?

A:

* Successive U.S. administrations have embraced the objective of nuclear disarmament as our ultimate goal.

* Last year at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to this goal in the Conference's Statement of Principles and Objectives.

* Over the past five years alone, we have made substantial progress in this area:

* The United States has withdrawn and is dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads that were deployed in Europe less than a decade ago.

* Under the START Treaties, the United States and Russia envisage removing 14,000 warheads from deployed arsenals, 9,000 under START I and 5,000 more when START II is ratified by Russia.

* The United States and Russia are now dismantling thousands of nuclear weapons each year.

* President's Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed at Helsinki to negotiate START III reductions to 2,000 - 2,500 once START II has entered into force.

* We have signed the relevant protocols to nuclear free zone treaties in the South Pacific and Africa.

* And, since 1993, we have supported the prompt negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

* By constraining the development and improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, the CTBT will be a sturdy foundation for the safer, more peaceful, more secure world we seek for our children and our future.

Q: How do you respond to the Indians charge that "partial measures"

such as the
CTBT not part of an overall "step by step" process have been
unsuccessful and
have not contributed to nuclear disarmament?

A:

* The progress we have made over the past decade in the field of
nuclear
disarmament speaks for itself: the INF, START I and START II
Treaties, the South
Pacific and African nuclear free zone treaties, along with a series of
unilateral
measures undertaken by the nuclear weapons states, have dramatically
reduced the
nuclear danger, led to the withdrawal and destruction of thousands of
nuclear
weapons, and have laid the groundwork for further steps, including
the CTBT.

* To argue that none of these steps should have been taken without
first agreeing
on a timetable for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is to
argue that
if our ultimate goal cannot be reached today, that we should forsake
concrete
steps towards that goal.

* In a field as complex as that of disarmament, the formula suggested
by India
would be a recipe for inaction.

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT merely perpetuates
a
discriminatory status quo?

A:

* The CTBT is non-discriminatory, in that it bans any nuclear weapon
test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion for all signatory states.

* The fact is that all five nuclear weapon states, along with two of the
three
so-called "threshold" states (Israel and Pakistan), are now willing to
forgo any
further nuclear tests, joining all those non-nuclear weapons states who
have
already given up their right to test by signing the NPT.

Q: Why won't the United States agree to an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the CD?

A:

* The United States believes the CD should now move quickly to commence negotiations on the fissile material cutoff treaty.

At the same time, we have made clear our willingness to discuss further reductions in nuclear forces bilaterally with Russia once START II has been ratified. This would seem to us to be the most appropriate -- and productive -- venue for discussing further reductions at this time.

CTBT and Stockpile Stewardship

Q: Does the CTBT mean we will lose confidence in our nuclear deterrent?

A:

* No. We can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear testing.

* The President directed the implementation of such a program almost three years ago, and it is being developed by the Department of Energy with the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* In order for the program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond.

* The Administration is committed to working with the Congress to ensure this support.

Q: Does the CTBT mean we would have no recourse if we found a major defect with

one of our nuclear weapons types?

A:

* No. While we are optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be successful, the President has said that in the event that he were informed by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapons type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, he would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our "supreme national interests" withdrawal rights under the CTBT in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

* The President has said, however, that he believes that exercising this right is a decision he or any future president will not have to make. The nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable, and we are determined our stockpile stewardship program will ensure they remain so in the absence of nuclear testing.

CTBT and the Vienna Convention

Q: [Insert]

A:

2

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/19/97 3:39:00 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT CTBT [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Bass, Peter E.
Kerrick, Donald L.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 2/7/2017
206-1363-F (2)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

Don/Peter --

I understand from Peter's e-mail that "State" is requesting that "CTBT: moving forward in the Senate timing/strategy"

be added to the ABC agenda for next week.

Recognizing the enormous demands on both the President and Sandy Berger over the next four days in Denver, I think it is overwhelmingly in our interests to have the President's reaction to Sandy's memorandum prior to that meeting (Don -- I understand you told Bob last night that Sandy had signed the memo and it was on its way to the POTUS). Indeed, the ideal (and perhaps unrealistic) scenario, here, is the following: (a) President reads Berger memo today/tomorrow and marks in the margins, "On to Alamogordo!", (b) Sandy then takes Secretary Albright aside on the margins of Denver and lays out the main tenants of our strategy, and she reacts with the appropriate degree of enthusiasm, and (c) we distribute ASAP to Bob's counterparts in the interagency the "CTBT Kick-Off Checklist" we have worked this week with Blinken, Leavy, Samore and Danvers and hold an interagency meeting first thing next week to begin implementing, with three or (possibly) four weeks to make it happen.

With regard to the Checklist referred to in "c" above, this is a relatively "short" (3 plus page) paper that lays out the purpose, relevant background, and action items for the Alamogordo event. There are also a number of relevant attachments (including possible candidates for a CTBT "Support Group"; Congressional Call List; Draft Op/Ed; list of targeted reporters, columnists and

pundits; and baseline Q/A's). I attach it for your info, so that you can appreciate what needs to be done between now and July 16 (or 25).

Would appreciate any insights. Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**CTBALAMO.DOC**

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Kick-off Checklist
(DRAFT: 6/19/97/3:05 p.m.)

Purpose

To launch the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification effort with a high-profile kick-off event on July [16][25] involving the President, senior Administration officials, members of Congress, scientists and private citizens at the site of the world's first nuclear test at the "Trinity" site in Alamogordo, New Mexico.

To underscore the Administration's commitment to maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, the President would also visit Sandia National Laboratory for a briefing on stockpile stewardship from the three nuclear lab directors.

Background

We expect to be ready to submit the CTBT to the Senate in the next four weeks, giving us six to nine months to achieve Senate approval before we are ready to go forward with other foreign policy issues that will crowd the Senate's calendar in the spring of 1998, including NATO enlargement, ABM/TMD demarcation, ABM multilateralization and START II extension. This approach will keep CTBT out of the 1998 campaign season and avoid conflicting with other domestic legislative priorities next spring.

Given our expectation that CTBT will require a major effort, there is a strong case for a public, high profile kick-off that quickly and decisively defines the debate on our terms and underscores the historic bipartisan roots of the Treaty, as well as its more recent bipartisan Congressional genesis.

A scheduling proposal has been submitted approved to go forward with an event on July [16][25] at the site of the world's first nuclear test at the "Trinity" site at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Alamogordo would provide a vivid backdrop for the President to announce he is taking the final step (submitting CTBT to the Senate) to end nuclear testing for all time on the very ground where the era of nuclear testing began.

To underscore the Administration's commitment to maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing (a key issue in the ratification debate), the President would also visit Sandia lab on the same day and receive a briefing from the three nuclear lab directors on our program for stockpile stewardship. We would also arrange for the press to be briefed in detail on our stockpile stewardship program.

A difficult road. Despite our CWC (and now CFE) success, the road to Senate action on CTBT will be far from smooth:

- * Republican indifference. Whereas CWC had a modern-era Republican lineage (Reagan-Bush), CTBT does not (the 1996 Republican platform opposed CTBT). Thus, it will be difficult to surround the President with a group of Republicans who publicly support CTBT. Moreover, the same Republicans who opposed CWC (Weinberger, Cheney) are expected to oppose CTBT, perhaps joined by some of their pro-CWC Republican colleagues.

- * A focused opposition. The same determined (and now battle-

hardened) opposition to CWC, led by Helms and Kyl in the Senate and Gaffney on the outside, await CTBT. Rather than being discouraged by their CWC defeat, they believe it possible to defeat CTBT on the Senate floor.

* Difficult threshold issues. To get 67 votes, we will need to make a convincing case on two critical issues: stockpile stewardship and verification. In each case, we face an uphill battle to convince Senators we can: (a) maintain our nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing (unlike CWC, CTBT is about our weapons); and (b) that the treaty is effectively verifiable, in particular, as it applies to low-yield testing.

* Retired architects. The principle architects of the 1992 law establishing a testing moratorium and directing negotiation of a CTBT (Senators Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell) have retired. The heavy lifting will be left to Senators Biden, Levin and Kerrey, all of whom will need to focus time and attention on hearings within their Committees of jurisdiction before action can be taken on the Senate floor.

* Excuses for Senate delay. The Duma's failure to act on START II and CWC, along with the fact India must sign CTBT before it can enter into force, provides a rationale for the Senate to delay action until Russia and/or India acts on the Treaty.

In our favor. In addition to the positive momentum -- and experience -- gained from CWC and CFE ratification:

* Public support. Our greatest asset is the overwhelming support of the American people for the test ban. Few Senators will wish to vote against CTBT (thereby labeling themselves as advocates for nuclear testing). The challenge is to get the Treaty to the floor and frame the vote in exactly these terms, not as

a
referendum on stewardship or effective verification.

* Eisenhower lineage. It was President Eisenhower (a Republican) who initiated CTBT negotiations and had hoped the test ban would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country."

* CTBT safeguards. The President directed the implementation of focused programs on stockpile stewardship and CTBT monitoring and verification four years ago, reinforced by his August 1995 commitment to specific CTBT safeguards in these areas. We expect these programs to pay dividends during ratification.

* Congressional initiative. While Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell have left the Senate, the fact remains it was a bipartisan majority in both houses of Congress that legislated an end to nuclear testing less than five years ago. In that respect, the Senate will pass judgment on its own initiative.

* It's the law. As noted, the CTBT is about "our" weapons; that said, the Administration is now precluded by law from conducting any nuclear tests, unless another state tests first. The CTBT merely codifies existing law.

* National security. Finally, the U.S. has more to gain from a global ban on nuclear testing than any other participant state (it will constrain nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states from developing more advanced nuclear weapons capabilities); the Treaty is overwhelmingly in our national security interests.

Kick-Off Checklist

* Ratification package. The Administration must complete three key elements of the CTBT ratification package prior to submitting the Treaty to the Senate: the CTBT monitoring estimate; the Section 37 report with our assessment of whether the Treaty can be effectively verified; and the Treaty's Article by Article

analysis. A fourth element -- the intelligence community's report on CTBT Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures -- was concluded in April.

* The NFIB is scheduled to meet and approve the monitoring estimate on June 20; the Arms Control IWG will work to conclude both the Section 37 report and Article by Article analysis no later than July 3.

* CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents; (Tab A). As part of our effort to underscore the historic bipartisan roots of the Treaty, as well as its more recent bipartisan Congressional genesis, we would assemble a CTBT Support Group that includes: former executive branch officials; former military officials; former Members of Congress; scientists and citizens. Initial calls to prospective Support Group candidates (in particular, former principals) would be made by Secretary Albright, Secretary Cohen and APNSA Berger beginning the week of June 30; those who indicate they are prepared to support CTBT publicly would be invited to the Alamogordo event. Once contacted, all would receive a copy of the Treaty with background material (including September 24 Fact Sheet, September 24 Chronology, August 11, 1995 Statement by the President and August 11, 1995 CTBT Safeguards) prior to the event.

* CTBT Likely Opponents. In addition to those whose support we seek for the CTBT Support Group, we would also call former senior officials (et al) who we expect oppose CTBT and seek their commitment not to actively work against the test ban.

* CTBT Senate Call List (Tab B). We would call key members of the Senate prior to the event to inform them of our timetable and (if appropriate) invite them to the Alamogordo event.

* Communication's Plan for Kick Off Event. Would include the

following:

1. Op/Ed by APNSA Berger (See Tab C).
2. CTBT Support Group (plus other "influentials") briefing by APNSA Berger, others tbd.
3. Briefing for key reporters, columnists and pundits by APNSA Berger, others tbd (See Tab D).
4. Mailing of cover letter, fact sheets to editorial boards.
5. Post-event press briefing by APNSA Berger, others tbd.

* Baseline Q/A package (Tab E). The IWG has developed a "baseline" set of interagency cleared Q/A's relating to the Treaty.

Ratification Action Plan. Finally, in addition to the above activities focused on the CTBT Kick-Off event, the IWG would develop and coordinate a CTBT ratification action plan to be implemented over the next six to nine months.

Attachments

- * Tab A: CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents
- * Tab B: CTBT Senate Call List
- * Tab C: CTBT Berger Op Ed
- * Tab D: Key reporters, columnists and pundits
- * Tab E: CTBT Q/A Package

Tab A: CTBT Support Group Candidates and Likely Opponents

I. SUPPORT GROUP CANDIDATES

A. Former Executive/Defense

1. Eisenhower Administration

Christian Herter
Harold Stassen

2. Kennedy/Johnson Administration

Robert McNamara
Clark Clifford
Walt Rostow
Paul Nitze
Paul Warnke
Carl Kaysen (MIT)

3. Nixon/Ford Administration

Henry Kissinger
Brent Scowcroft
Melvin Laird
Donald Rumsfeld
William Rogers
Elliot Richardson

4. Carter Administration

Cyrus Vance
Harold Brown
Zbignev Brzezinski
Jim Schlesinger
Andrew Young

5. Reagan Administration

Alexander Haig Jr.
George Schultz
John Whitehead
Richard Allen
William Clarke
Robert McFarlane
Frank Carlucci
Kenneth Adelman
Roz Ridgeway
Max Kampelman
William Burns

6. Bush Administration

James Baker III
Lawrence Eagleburger
Arnold Kanter
Robert Zoellick
Robert Kimmit

7. Clinton Administration

Warren Christopher
William Perry
Anthony Lake
John Deutch

Hazel O'Leary
Charles Curtis

B. Former Military

1. Eisenhower
General Andrew Goodpaster

2. Kennedy/Johnson

3. Nixon/Ford
Admiral Bud Zumwalt

4. Carter
General David Jones
General Lew Allen

5. Reagan
General John Vessey
Admiral William Crowe
General John Galvin

6. Bush
General Collin Powell

7. Clinton
General Lee Butler

C. Former Legislative

Senator Dole
Senator Hatfield
Senator Exon
Senator Mitchell
Senator Kassebaum
Senator Nunn
Senator Rudman
Senator Bradley
Senator Bentsen

D. Scientific

Hans Bethe (Cornell)
Glenn Seaborg (UC Berkeley)
Herb York (UC San Diego)
Sidney Drell (Stanford)
Freeman Dyson (Princeton)
Wolfgang Panofsky (Stanford)
Marshall Rosenbluth (UC San Diego)

Richard Garwin (IBM)
Henry Kendall (MIT)
Val Fitch (Princeton)
Harold Agnew (San Diego)

E. Citizens

Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
George Bush
John F. Kennedy, Jr.
Caroline Kennedy
David Eisenhower, Jr.

II. LIKELY OPPONENTS

Casper Weinberger
Jeanne Kirkpatrick
Richard Perle
Richard Cheney

Tab B: CTBT Congressional Call List

Democrats Republicans

Senator Daschle Senator Lott
Senator Biden Senator Helms
Senator Levin Senator Thurmond
Senator Kerry Senator Shelby

Senator Bingamen Senator Domenici
Senator Harkin Senator Lugar
Senator Durbin Senator McCain
Senator Reed Senator Hagel
Senator Feingold Senator Smith (Oregon)
Senator Jeffords

Tab C: Op Ed

6/18/97 7:50 p.m.
CTBT OP-ED
BY "SAMUEL BERGER"
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

Last September, at the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that have declared possession of nuclear weapons -- all followed suit, and over 140 nations of the world are now signatories. With this accord, we take a giant step toward a safer day, when no nuclear weapons will be detonated anywhere on the face of the earth.

For more than 35 years, American leaders of both parties have sought a ban on nuclear tests. Dwight Eisenhower was the first President to recognize that such a ban would put a powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapons and clear the way to a reduction of the nuclear threat. Indeed, President Eisenhower hoped that a test ban would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country," as historian Stephen E. Ambrose has written. But this dream was dashed by the U-2 affair of 1960 and the rise of East-West tensions.

President John Kennedy took up the cause of a test ban. In 1963, his Administration negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in space -- as the first step toward a comprehensive ban. The effort to conclude that ban continued under President Carter but was interrupted by another escalation of Cold War hostility.

President Clinton restarted talks on the test ban. In July, 1993 he extended the moratorium on testing begun at the insistence of Congress the year before. Energized by this U.S. initiative, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament began work on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When negotiations reached impasse over the scope of the treaty's prohibition on testing, President Clinton broke the deadlock by announcing U.S. support for a true zero yield ban -- one that would forbid any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear

explosion.

The President's decision turned the corner for the treaty, giving new momentum to the negotiations and signaling to the world America's resolve to achieve a truly comprehensive test ban. Last September -- 32 months after the negotiations began -- the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. Few major international agreements have enjoyed such extraordinary support.

Indeed, few treaties have had the profound, positive impact on global security that the Comprehensive Test Ban promises. The signatures of the world's declared nuclear powers -- the United States, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom -- along with the vast majority of nations will constrain efforts to improve existing nuclear weapons and create a formidable barrier to the development of new generations of weapons. This quest is all the more urgent because of the efforts of rogue states and terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

For the five nuclear weapons states, there will be no way to test more advanced and more destructive devices. For states that do not possess nuclear weapons, the ban on testing will make it more difficult to develop reliable weapons and fit them for sophisticated missiles and bombers. There is no guarantee that a country determined to possess nuclear weapons will not be able to fashion a crude bomb. But the test ban makes it difficult to do more than that.

By helping prevent proliferation and future arms races, the Test Ban Treaty will increase security for the United State and the world in the 21st century. In a more stable, predictable environment prospects will improve for additional reductions in nuclear forces and further advances in nonproliferation.

The Clinton Administration recognizes, however, that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons will remain with us for years to come. That is why, as part of our national security strategy, the United States must and will retain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces. The President directed in 1993 that a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management program be implemented to help maintain our nuclear deterrent under a test ban.

Along with the Stockpile Stewardship program, President Clinton announced in August 1995 the establishment of concrete safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a test ban treaty. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments and capabilities in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories and test readiness.

Thirty-four years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of the Cold War. Now, with the Comprehensive Test Ban, that light grows brighter. This treaty can bring to an end the era that began in 1945 with a mushroom cloud at Alamogordo; it heralds a new era in which the cloud of nuclear danger can finally be lifted.

###

Tab D: Reporters, Columnists and Pundits

Associated Press

Barry Schwied

New York Times

Steve Myers

Tim Weiner

Tom Friedman

Wall Street Journal

Carla Anne Robbins

Washington Post

Jeffrey Smith
Tom Lippman

Los Angeles Times

Tyler Marshall

Washington Times

Warren Strobel

Reuters

Carol Giacomo

Tab E: Q/A Package

"Scope" of the CTBT's Prohibition; Activities Not Prohibited (Article I)

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the Treaty is not really "comprehensive" in scope and will permit further development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons through computer simulations and subcritical experiments?

A:

* The CTBT will prohibit any nuclear explosion whether for weapons or peaceful purposes. This is a truly "comprehensive" test ban.

* The CTBT will effectively constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

* It will thus contribute effectively to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament and enhance international peace and

security.

* As to concerns over so-called "subcritical" experiments not banned by the CTBT, these experiments, by their very nature, will not produce a nuclear yield. They are designed to help maintain the safety and reliability of our existing weapons and are not relevant to the development and qualitative improvement of new nuclear weapons.

Q: Could the United States test a pure fusion weapon under the CTBT?

A:

* No.

Q: Would an explosively driven, pure fusion experiment that produced a nuclear yield be prohibited by the Treaty?

A:

* Not necessarily.

Q: How would you then define the distinction between an explosively-driven, pure fusion experiment that was permitted and one that was prohibited?"

A:

* We have established a process for reviewing any such activities to ensure they remain compliant with the Treaty. That review will be guided by the following principles:

* The CTBT requires each state party not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion;

* The P-5 have agreed to an illustrative list of activities not prohibited by the CTBT. None of these activities would involve the conduct of a nuclear explosion;

* Inertial confinement fusion (ICF) and similar experiments are included on this list; and

* In addition to the kinds of ICF experiments described in our 1975 statement to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (involving lasers and particle beams), experiments driven by hydrodynamic means, magnetic fields and other pulsed power methods are not prohibited.

* Beyond that, we have no plan, no intention and no requirement to conduct fusion research for the purpose of developing advanced new types of nuclear weapons. Indeed, as is noted in the Treaty's preamble, the CTBT will end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

The Organization (Article II)

Q: [Insert: Another UN organization]

A:

Verification (Article IV)

Q: Is the CTBT effectively verifiable?

A:

* [Insert from the Section 37 Report, when available]

Q: On August 11, 1995, the President issued a statement admitting that "our present monitoring systems will not detect with high confidence very low yield tests." For this reason, is not a "zero yield" test ban fatally flawed?

A:

* No. A zero yield test ban is overwhelmingly in the national security interests of the United States.

* While it is true that we cannot detect with high confidence very low yield

tests, it is also true that [insert relevant material from monitoring estimate/Section 37 Report].

* As the President said in 1995, we are committed to pursuing a comprehensive research and development program to improve our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations. Indeed, since 1993, we have spent roughly [\$__] million to enhance our capabilities to monitor a CTBT, and we plan to spend an additional [\$__] over the next six years in this area.

* With the program we are now implementing, we expect to make significant incremental increases in our monitoring capability, particularly in areas of higher interest, prior to 2003.

Q: [Insert re OSI "green light/30 votes provision]

A:

* [Insert]

Q: [Insert re National Technical Means (NTM)]

A:

* [Insert]

Entry into Force (Article XIV)

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the entry into force provision of the CTBT is an attempt to enforce the CTBT on India without its consent?

A:

* All countries are free to determine whether or not they will choose to sign this Treaty after its opening for signature. Nothing in the Treaty changes this basic fact.

* India had also raised concerns that the Treaty would allow imposition of sanctions against countries that did not sign if the Treaty had not entered into force after three years. The United States has assured the Indian

government
that the entry into force process would not involve sanctions.

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT will never enter into force?

A:

* In order for the CTBT to enter into force -- which under no circumstances can be earlier than two years after signature -- all participating member states of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with nuclear research and/or power reactors -- a total of 44 countries -- must ratify the agreement.

* Thus, we will have two years to gather the necessary ratifications. During this time, we will be engaged in close consultations with all 43 other states, whose ratifications are required for entry into force, on our view of the value of this treaty, and there would be further steps being taken in areas of interest to many states, including further steps in arms control.

* If, three years after signature, one or more of these 44 states have NOT ratified the Treaty, the Treaty provides for an annual Conference to consider what measures may be taken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this treaty.

* Taken as a whole, we believe these provisions provide an effective pathway for the entry into force of this agreement.

* And even before entry into force, the Treaty will reinforce the compelling international norm against nuclear testing.

CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT should have included a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time frame, and that the fact that the Treaty does not include such a commitment shows the

nuclear weapons states are "insincere" about nuclear disarmament?

A:

* Successive U.S. administrations have embraced the objective of nuclear disarmament as our ultimate goal.

* Last year at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to this goal in the Conference's Statement of Principles and Objectives.

* Over the past five years alone, we have made substantial progress in this area:

* The United States has withdrawn and is dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads that were deployed in Europe less than a decade ago.

* Under the START Treaties, the United States and Russia envisage removing 14,000 warheads from deployed arsenals, 9,000 under START I and 5,000 more when START II is ratified by Russia.

* The United States and Russia are now dismantling thousands of nuclear weapons each year.

* President's Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed at Helsinki to negotiate START III reductions to 2,000 - 2,500 once START II has entered into force.

* We have signed the relevant protocols to nuclear free zone treaties in the South Pacific and Africa.

* And, since 1993, we have supported the prompt negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

* By constraining the development and improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, the CTBT will be a sturdy foundation for the safer, more peaceful, more secure world we seek for our children and our future.

Q: How do you respond to the Indians charge that "partial measures" such as the CTBT not part of an overall "step by step" process have been unsuccessful and have not contributed to nuclear disarmament?

A:

* The progress we have made over the past decade in the field of nuclear disarmament speaks for itself: the INF, START I and START II Treaties, the South Pacific and African nuclear free zone treaties, along with a series of unilateral measures undertaken by the nuclear weapons states, have dramatically reduced the nuclear danger, led to the withdrawal and destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons, and have laid the groundwork for further steps, including the CTBT.

* To argue that none of these steps should have been taken without first agreeing on a timetable for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is to argue that if our ultimate goal cannot be reached today, that we should forsake concrete steps towards that goal.

* In a field as complex as that of disarmament, the formula suggested by India would be a recipe for inaction.

Q: How do you respond to criticism that the CTBT merely perpetuates a discriminatory status quo?

A:

* The CTBT is non-discriminatory, in that it bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion for all signatory states.

* The fact is that all five nuclear weapon states, along with two of the three so-called "threshold" states (Israel and Pakistan), are now willing to forgo any further nuclear tests, joining all those non-nuclear weapons states who have

already given up their right to test by signing the NPT.

Q: Why won't the United States agree to an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the CD?

A:

* The United States believes the CD should now move quickly to commence negotiations on the fissile material cutoff treaty.

At the same time, we have made clear our willingness to discuss further reductions in nuclear forces bilaterally with Russia once START II has been ratified. This would seem to us to be the most appropriate -- and productive -- venue for discussing further reductions at this time.

CTBT and Stockpile Stewardship

Q: Does the CTBT mean we will lose confidence in our nuclear deterrent?

A:

* No. We can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program without nuclear testing.

* The President directed the implementation of such a program almost three years ago, and it is being developed by the Department of Energy with the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* In order for the program to succeed, both the Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and beyond.

* The Administration is committed to working with the Congress to ensure this support.

Q: Does the CTBT mean we would have no recourse if we found a major defect with one of our nuclear weapons types?

A:

* No. While we are optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be successful, the President has said that in the event that he were informed by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapons type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, he would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our "supreme national interests" withdrawal rights under the CTBT in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.

* The President has said, however, that he believes that exercising this right is a decision he or any future president will not have to make. The nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable, and we are determined our stockpile stewardship program will ensure they remain so in the absence of nuclear testing.

CTBT and the Vienna Convention

Q: [Insert]

A:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 7/2/97 4:15:00 PM
FROM Leavy, David C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Updated Misc. Q/As for Roundtable [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Gray, Wendy E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Wendy--Can we substitute this section of the Q&A for POTUS. The other NATO/European ones for SRB last night are still good. Thanks!

From:
Rubin, Eric S.
To: Leavy, David C.
CC: @PLANNING - Strat Plan &
Comm; @PRESS - Public Affairs; /R, Records at A1
Subject: Updated
Misc. Q/As for Roundtable [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Wednesday, July 02,
1997 09:47 AM

The attached miscellaneous press Q/As for the POTUS roundtable package have been updated to include three new Q/As at the end. Please sub this for the Q/As we sent last night. The NATO and Euro Q/As are OK as-is.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

LEAVY2.DOC
Miscellaneous Foreign Policy Press Q's and A's

KHOBAR

Where are we one year after the Khobar bombing?

* We share the grief of the families of the 19 airmen who died a year ago.

* Since then, we've made every possible effort to bring those responsible to justice

* We'll continue to give this top priority. Just as we have in other terrorist cases, we'll take all the time we need for a thorough investigation. Because this is an ongoing criminal investigation, I cannot comment on the details of our current activities.

Saturday's Washington Post reported that Sayegh implicated a high-ranking Iranian intelligence officer in planning attacks on U.S. and other facilities. If Iran or those under Iranian influence prove responsible, will we react militarily?

* This is an ongoing criminal matter, so I'm not going to comment. And I don't want to say what action we may or may not take in a hypothetical situation.

Have U.S. forces in the region been put on increased alert during the anniversary period?

* USCENTCOM continues to monitor and enhance force protection to minimize any risk to our forces.

EXPORT CONTROLS/SUPERCOMPUTERS

Your administration just announced it will tighten the rules on sales of supercomputers to entities that secretly produce nuclear weapons. Isn't this too little, too late?

* Of course not. We have to make sure that U.S. technology doesn't help foreign nuclear weapons programs. Even when proliferation has already taken place, limiting the flow of technology can limit further development.

* At the same time, the growth and spread of high technology, such as computers, make absolute controls impossible. The list we published is designed to let U.S. exporters know about the particular "end-users" that concern us without interfering with our legitimate commercial transactions with these countries.

Why does your administration oppose amendments to the Defense Authorization bill that would legislate these kinds of export controls?

* My 1995 decision to streamline computer export controls was based on an assessment of technological trends and national security concerns. In particular, we focused controls on high-powered computers to end-users of concern. Overall, this new system has worked well. It has helped increase U.S. computer exports for peaceful purposes, while blocking exports to proliferation programs.

* Of course, no export control system is perfect. We are already responding to the small number of problems that have been detected. Legal investigations are underway. We have raised the issue with foreign governments at very senior levels. We are taking administrative measures to tighten controls, such as the recently published list of entities.

* Additional controls as proposed by some in Congress are unnecessary and could upset the balance in our current policy, which makes sure we are defending both our national security interests and economic competitiveness.

Today's Wall Street Journal says Secretary Albright complained to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian about China's diversion of a Sun Microsystems supercomputer to a military facility -- a clear violation of our export laws. Could you comment?

* This is being investigated by the Commerce Department. We have already raised our concerns with the Chinese government. We are taking appropriate steps to deal with this issue.

NORTHERN IRELAND

What do you think of statement Blair made in Parliament last Wednesday on Northern Ireland?

* I welcome it. It's a courageous and straightforward effort to get this process going.

* The talks must go forward, ideally with Sinn Fein, on the basis of an unequivocal cease-fire.

What do you think of the joint Anglo-Irish strategy on decommissioning?

* It's a thorny issue. The proposal follows one that Senator Mitchell made that would have made decommissioning parallel progress in the talks.

Is there hope for the peace process with violence escalating, marching season approaching?

* We have to appeal to the fair-minded, peace-loving people of Northern Ireland not to be pushed into senseless confrontation.

Is Senator Mitchell going to remain as mediator if there is no progress?

* Senator Mitchell has said he will stay on as talks chairman until either a result is achieved or he becomes convinced that no progress is possible.

MIDDLE EAST

It looks like you've decided to step back from active engagement in the peace process. Correct?

* Not at all. We work at this every day.

* And we won't stop pressing, because the alternative to a genuine peace process is genuine turmoil.

BOSNIA

What is the Administration's position on the Buyer-Skelton Amendment for date certain withdrawal from Bosnia?

* I would veto such a bill.

* Any amendment requiring a date certain - with no regard for the situation on the ground - would call into question our commitment to implementation.

* We have no plans to extend the SFOR mission past June 1998. Our focus needs to be on the hard work to be done in the next year.

When are you going to do something about war criminals in Bosnia?

* We've taken first steps with the convictions in both Germany and The Hague and the delivery of another war criminal to the Tribunal.

* I won't be satisfied until all indicted war criminals stand trial, and we continue to press the parties to turn them over.

* We're looking at a number of ways we can help the Tribunal.

What is your reaction to the arrest of the war criminal in Eastern Slavonia?

* Congratulate the International Tribunal and UNTAES on successful apprehension of Slavko Dokmanovic. Fully support the Tribunal's work to bring indicted war criminals to justice. Cooperation with the Tribunal by all the parties is a cornerstone of Dayton.

What is your reaction to the detaining of President Plavsic of the Srpska Republic and her assertions that Karadzic is still in control?

* Special Representative Gelbard and his team are in Bosnia now and have met with Plavsic, Krajisnik and other to stress our concerns over their serious non-compliance with Dayton regarding the need to restructure and reform the police forces along democratic lines.

* And we are obviously concerned with reports that Karadzic is playing a role in governing Republika Srpska. This is in clear violation of the agreement reached with the RS last year.

* He was removed from office and remains banned from any public or political role. We are continuing to monitor the situation and will insist that Republika Srpska live up to their agreement. We will not be satisfied until he is brought to justice in the Hague.

IRAQ-UN RESOLUTION

What action do you plan to take on the latest Iraqi blocking of weapons inspectors?

* We take this very seriously.

* The Iraqis are absolutely obligated to cooperate fully with inspections.

* Obviously, the Security Council's strong resolution condemning Iraqi obstructionism -- which passed unanimously -- shows we have powerful support.

CHINA/HONG KONG

Q: Could you comment on the reversion of Hong Kong?

* It's an historic occasion, one that took place under the agreement made by China and Britain thirteen years ago. That very public agreement assures that Hong Kong will be able to continue its basic way of life. We'll be actively engaged in ensuring that China carries out its commitments.

Q: Were you concerned about the arrival of 4,000 troops and the use of armored vehicles?

* We're interested in China's formal commitments, but we're also interested in the signals it sends -- so such a visible deployment may not have been the best approach.

* But remember, this transition is an ongoing process -- it didn't begin and end July 1. We'll have to evaluate it over the course of many months.

Q. Albright did not attend the opening session of the new legislative council, but the US Consul General did; does this send a mixed signal to Hong Kong and Beijing?

* I think Secy Albright's non-attendance (PM Blair also did not attend) sent a strong political signal -- that we expect the basic civil liberties of the people of Hong Kong to be respected.

* The Secretary has met with Foreign Minister Qian and with Chief Executive C.H. Tung and discussed this issue with them.

* We welcome both their commitment to open and fair elections by next May, and Jiang's statement of reassurance.

LANDMINES

Why are you opposing a global ban?

* I'm deeply committed to a comprehensive, global ban on landmines. And we've taken important steps in that direction.

* In the last several days, we've have seen positive signs of progress at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. These first steps are just a start, but important.

* This is the best forum because it includes the majority of landmine producing countries.

* We're also consulting with the Canadians to ensure that the Ottawa Process is complementary.

Do you oppose Senator Leahy's legislation?

* We share the same goal. He's made a tremendous contribution.

* But we differ on approach. I think the best way to reach a global ban is through a negotiation in which key countries -- those that are part of

the
problem -- are contributing to its solution.

GULF WAR ILLNESS

What is your reaction to the recent GAO report criticizing the government's Gulf War Illness research efforts? Do you have confidence in the PAC? In the Pentagon?

* I won't be satisfied until we have all the answers and all the facts available.
If the GAO report indicates that any shift in emphasis or any additional research is needed, then we'll make the decision to do that.

KANSI

What is your reaction to the return and arrest of the suspect in the 1993 CIA shootings?

* I'm proud of the FBI, CIA, and the Departments of State, Justice and Defense for their extraordinary and courageous work.

* Their success demonstrates that we are determined to do what is necessary to track down terrorists and bring them to justice.

* We won't relent in the pursuit of those who use violence against Americans to advance their goals -- no matter how long it takes, no matter where they hide.

CAMBODIA -- POL POT

Are you supporting efforts to extradite Pol Pot to Canada?

* First, Pol Pot is not in the hands of the Cambodian government, and the situation remains unclear there.

* Having said that, we strongly support the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act to bring to justice those who committed such heinous crimes.

Have you encouraged the UN, the Canadian Government or other countries to take

steps to bring Pol Pot out of Cambodia?

* We'll be working with others to make sure international justice is carried out.

* We're in touch with several countries about the possibility of their taking temporary custody of Pol Pot, if needed. And we're prepared to look at possible options with the UN.

* But this process is still in a very early stage.

KOREAS/FOUR-PARTY TALKS

Are you pleased that North Korea has agreed to join the U.S. and South Korea for talks on August 5 in New York?

* Yes. I think these talks can reduce tensions and build confidence on the Peninsula and, ultimately, lead to a formal end to the Korean War.

* So it's an historic opportunity. An agreement could bring lasting peace and stability to the region.

* And it's important that China will play an active role. This is an example of the value of our broad engagement with Beijing.

JOHN HUANG

Rep. Solomon has written to you alleging that John Huang leaked information that led to the death of a CIA informant. Your response?

* The Department of Justice is looking at this. And the White House is cooperating fully with them.

* You know I don't comment on alleged intelligence activities and I am not going to start now.

TENET

Is there anything in George Tenet's financial background that might make you

reconsider his nomination?

* Absolutely not. When I nominated him I was fully aware of the complicated issues regarding his stock holdings and considered them when I made my decision.

* This issue was thoroughly explored by the Senate during Mr. Tenet's previous confirmation hearings in 1995.

* Nothing in these circumstances reflects negatively on Mr. Tenet. He should be confirmed by the Senate and will be a superb DCI.

CHINA: JIANG COMMENTS

What is your comment on the reported statement by PRC President Jiang that China will now turn its attention from Hong Kong to reuniting Macao and then Taiwan with the mainland?

* China has long had the goal of reuniting all Chinese territories, namely Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

* Our position on Hong Kong is clear: we expect China to adhere to the "one country, two systems" principle.

* Macao, currently a Portuguese colony, will revert to China in 1999.

* We have long regarded the question of Taiwan as a matter for the two sides to resolve. Our strong interest is that the resolution be peaceful.

GOVERNOR WELD

Any comment on Senator Helms' continuing opposition to your nomination of Governor Weld and Senator Kerry's concerns that the nomination may be in trouble?

* I've said before that I think Governor Weld would make an excellent Ambassador to Mexico.

* I can think of no one better qualified, and I hope to nominate him soon. He

has strong bipartisan support.

* We will work hard in support of this nomination.

CIA PROLIFERATION REPORT

According to an unclassified CIA report to Congress, Russia and China are the premier suppliers of proliferation-related technology around the world. How can you claim that your policy of engagement is working?

* It's true that strengthening the export control systems of Russia and China is essential.

* The CIA report lists a number of areas where we have continuing concerns about exports from China and Russia.

* But it is important to mention areas of progress as well.

* For example, we have substantially helped to strengthen controls over nuclear materials and equipment in both China and Russia.

* Our success in these areas shows that we can expect further progress if we continue working with Moscow and Beijing to deal with the areas that still concern us.

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