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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 11/13/2000 12:47:20 PM
FROM Pierce, Eric A. (TNT)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: U.S. C/D Strategy for Colombia [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY Here you go.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rosa,
Frederick M. (TNT)
Sent: Sunday, November 12, 2000 12:17 PM
To: Pierce,
Eric A. (TNT)
Subject: U.S. C/D Strategy for Colombia [UNCLASSIFIED]

Eric:
I've lost the bubble on yet another one. Do we have a copy of the subject report that we are 100% confident is the final POTUS sent to the Hill? And do we have those electrons? We need both for the future. Thanks, Fred

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5941 ONDCP Colombia Policy Strategy Report2.doc

Report on U.S. Policy and Strategy Regarding Counternarcotics Assistance
for Colombia and Neighboring Countries

I. INTRODUCTION

This report is in compliance with Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001 which states that the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,

and the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, a report on current U.S. policy and strategy regarding U.S. counternarcotics assistance for Colombia and neighboring countries. In addition to addressing the eight elements identified in Section 3202 of the Act, this report also provides background useful to understanding the reasons for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries. The report reviews the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of Goal 5 of the National Drug Control Strategy: Break Foreign and Domestic Drug Sources of Supply.

II. CONTEXT

1. Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production Data

The final 1999 coca cultivation and potential cocaine production estimates for the Andean Region released by the CIA's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) show progress in attacking the cocaine trade. Overall Andean net coca cultivation declined to 183,000 hectares in 1999, 4 percent less than the 1998 figure, and 15 percent less than in 1995. Potential global cocaine production fell to 765 metric tons, a drop of 7 percent from the 1998 figure, and an 18 percent drop since 1995. Although the overall coca cultivation trends are positive, this data confirms that there has been a major shift of coca cultivation from Peru and Bolivia to territory dominated by guerrillas and illegal mercenaries in Colombia.

ANDEAN POTENTIAL COCAINE PRODUCTION
(Metric Tons)

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Peru
460
435
325
240
175
Bolivia
240
215
200
150
70
Colombia
230
300
350
435
520
Totals
930
950
875
825
765

ANDEAN COCA CULTIVATION
(Hectares)

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Peru

115,300

94,400
 68,800
 51,000
 38,700
 Bolivia

48,600
 48,100
 45,800
 38,000
 21,800
 Colombia

50,900
 67,200
 79,500
 101,800
 122,500
 Total

214,800
 209,700
 194,100
 190,800
 183,000

2. U.S. Interests

The ongoing, multiple and inter-related crises in Colombia directly affect a broad range of U.S. national interests. Among these are: disrupting the supply of cocaine and heroin that flows into the United States, supporting democratic government and rule of law in Colombia and the region, promoting adherence to human rights norms, advancing efforts to reach a negotiated settlement to Colombia's long-running internal conflict, maintaining regional stability, and promoting legitimate trade and investment. U.S. financial, technical, and political support is essential if we hope to avoid allowing Colombia's inter-related crises to affect our nation adversely, and to undermine democracy and stability in Colombia and the region in the near term.

Rapidly expanding cocaine and heroin production in Colombia constitutes a threat to U.S. national security and the well-being of our citizens. Ninety

percent of
the cocaine entering the United States originates in or passes through
Colombia.
The cultivation of opium poppies in Colombia has expanded from
almost nothing in
1990 to some 7,500 hectares now, producing nearly 8 metric tons of
high purity
heroin -- enough to meet over half of the U.S. demand. Rising global
demand for
cocaine will continue to undermine peace and democracy in Colombia
even as our
own demand for cocaine continues to abate.

Despite an aggressive aerial drug eradication campaign, Colombian
cultivation of
coca, the raw material for cocaine, has more than tripled since 1992.
Most of
this expansion occurred in guerrilla-dominated southern Colombia
which was beyond
the reach of the government's aerial eradication campaign. The figures
for 1999
indicate that the number of hectares of coca under cultivation in
Colombia and
the amount of cocaine produced from those crops continue to increase
dramatically. Colombian coca cultivation rose 20 percent to 122,500
hectares in
1999; there was a corresponding 20 percent increase in potential
cocaine
production to 520 metric tons. Left unchecked, these increases in drug
cultivation and production in Colombia will reverse gains achieved
over the last
four years in Peru and Bolivia. Continued expansion of drug
production in
Colombia will likely result in more drugs available for shipment to the
United
States and to an expanding population of drug abusers in Europe and
Latin
America.

3. Changes in Drug Trafficking Patterns

In large part due to successful counterdrug programs in Peru and
Bolivia, the
drug production pattern in the Andean Region has changed
dramatically over the
last decade. Until recently, most coca was grown in Peru and Bolivia,
and coca
base was shipped to Colombia for processing and distribution.
Aggressive drug

crop eradication, interdiction operations, and a broad array of law enforcement programs in combination with alternative economic development programs in Peru and Bolivia have reduced coca cultivation in those countries 66 percent and 55 percent, respectively, since 1995.

Drug traffickers adapted to the problem of unreliable coca leaf supply in Peru and Bolivia by moving cultivation into areas of Colombia beyond the control of the democratically elected government, converting Colombia into the world's largest producer of coca. Domination of Colombia's vast coca growing regions by guerrilla or illegal mercenary groups has limited Colombian President Pastrana's ability to reduce drug production or enforce Colombian national law. The migration of coca leaf production and cocaine manufacturing to areas dominated by illegal armed groups in Colombia required a change in strategy, policy, and resources in order to protect our nation from being flooded with dramatically increased amounts of cocaine and heroin and avert corresponding increases in drug addiction, violence, and crime in the United States.

4. Crisis in Colombia

The immense amounts of money generated by the drug trade are fueling violence, lawlessness, and Colombia's long internal conflict. Colombia lacks the resources to dislodge organized terrorists and private armies that provide a safe haven for a drug-based economy. These illegal armed groups have a dominant presence in about half of Colombia's national territory, predominantly in remote areas where government presence has traditionally been weak.

Illegal armed groups are responsible for the overwhelming majority of the human rights violations committed in Colombia, and they are a threat to Colombia's democracy and legitimate economy. High levels of violence, kidnapping and

extortion, and attacks on infrastructure are displacing large numbers of rural inhabitants and discouraging both Colombian and foreign investment. Drug money and income from kidnapping and extortion has produced a paradoxical situation in which the guerrillas and mercenary groups are militarily strong, politically weak, and generally feared. The reluctance of the guerrillas to attempt an evolution from a military to a political force is undermining the Colombian government's good faith efforts to negotiate peace with them.

Lack of investment, insecurity, and poor economic management are among the principal reasons Colombia has entered its worst economic recession since the 1930s. Real gross domestic product is estimated to have fallen by 3.5 percent in 1999, the result of external shocks, fiscal imbalances, and a further weakening of confidence related to stepped-up activity by illegal armed groups. Unemployment increased from under 9 percent in 1995 to about 20 percent today, adding to the pool of unemployed workers who can be drawn into the illegal drug trade or into insurgent or illegal mercenary groups. The deep recession has also reduced government resources available for social and economic programs, law enforcement, and national security.

5. Plan Colombia

The Pastrana Government developed an integrated strategy, Plan Colombia, that recognizes that solving Colombia's inter-related problems will require significant action on a variety of fronts.

Plan Colombia focuses on five strategic issues:

1. The peace process.
2. The Colombian economy.
3. The counterdrug strategy.
4. The reform of the justice system and the protection of human rights.
5. Democratization and social development.

These five planks respond comprehensively to Colombia's most

severe problems. At the core is an effort to achieve peace through dialogue and address the need to strengthen democratic institutions as well as increase the capacity of the government to carry out its policy initiatives. Repairing the economy will make it easier for the Colombian people to provide for themselves and will decrease the attraction of the drug trade and other illicit activity. Breaking up the drug trade infrastructure will reduce the threat of corruption, allow for legitimate economic development, remove a principal source of economic support from the illegal armed groups, and contribute to making the negotiating table a more attractive setting than the battlefield for resolving problems. Decreasing the scale of the internal conflict will facilitate the reform of the justice system and lead to improvement in the human rights situation.

The Government of Colombia estimates that implementing Plan Colombia will cost about \$7.5 billion over the next three years, and Colombia has committed to spending \$4 billion of its own resources and international financial institution loans to execute the plan. The Pastrana government is asking the international community to provide the remaining \$3.5 billion in bilateral foreign assistance. To date, the United States, Norway, Spain, Japan, and the United Nations have pledged significant support for President Pastrana and Plan Colombia. The United States will continue to support Government of Colombia efforts to obtain more funding from the international community, especially in the areas of economic and social development. There is a European Union donors conference scheduled for March 2001 to discuss support for Colombia.

6. Human Rights and the Security Forces

President Pastrana and the military high command have demonstrated a commitment to improving the government's human rights performance and have taken a number of

important measures to that end. In 1999, President Pastrana removed from service four generals and a number of mid-level officers and NCOs accused of collaborating with paramilitaries or failing to confront them aggressively. The new military penal code, which entered into force August 12, 2000, has the potential to improve military justice while ensuring that human rights cases are tried in the civilian justice system. The new code requires that the military legal system operate outside and independent of the chain of command, and provides for the installation of professional military judges. The Colombian military is in the preliminary stages of establishing a Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps.

A reform of the military career personnel statutes, which became law on September 14, 2000, gave the Military Commander the authority to dismiss officers with fewer than 15 years of service, meaning that he now has the authority to dismiss from duty all Armed Forces personnel credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups. According to the Human Rights Report of the Colombian Ministry of Defense, 32 members of the Armed Forces were separated from service between 1998 and 1999 for presumed human rights violations. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense reported that approximately 63,000 Colombian security force members received human rights training in 1999. The U.S. State Department's annual human rights report has also documented a declining number of reported human rights violations attributed to members of the Colombian military. Nevertheless, serious problems remain. President Pastrana and the top military and police commanders are committed to ending impunity for human rights violations and eliminating links between members of the security forces and paramilitary groups.

III. U.S. POLICY

The United States seeks to combat illicit drugs and foster free-market democracies that promote the rule of law, internal peace, and human rights as well as economic and social development. U.S. support for Plan Colombia implementation will further these critical and enduring goals. While Colombia must assume the primary responsibility for addressing its urgent problems, in view of the significant implications of Colombia's crisis for our national interests at home and abroad, and in keeping with the ongoing U.S. commitment to promote democracy and human rights in Colombia, the United States is supporting implementation of the counterdrug and other critical components of Plan Colombia as a matter of national priority. Additionally, the United States has increased assistance for other countries in the region, primarily to consolidate counterdrug gains in the major Andean drug-producing countries and to ensure that successful law enforcement efforts in Colombia do not simply drive illicit drug cultivation and production into neighboring countries.

IV. REGIONAL COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY

1. Key Objectives of the U.S. Counterdrug Strategy in Colombia and Neighboring Countries, with a Detailed Description of Benchmarks by Which to Measure Progress Toward Those Objectives

Objectives

The overarching objective of the U.S. counterdrug strategy is to reduce the quantity of illegal drugs flowing into the United States. The National Drug Control Strategy calls for a 20 percent reduction in the world-wide net cultivation of illicit coca by 2002 (base year 1996) and a 40 percent reduction by 2007. The goal of President Pastrana's Plan Colombia (October 1999) is to reduce Colombia's cultivation, processing, and distribution of drugs by 50 percent over six years.

In addition to directly supporting U.S. counterdrug interests in Colombia and other nations in the region, U.S. assistance will go to strengthening democratic institutions and promoting economic and social development in Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In Colombia, priorities include supporting President Pastrana's efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution to the country's long-standing civil conflict and promoting respect for human rights. To assist with the objectives of Plan Colombia and to accomplish the objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy, (including sustaining the reduction of drug-flow over time), the U.S. Government has developed a Colombia/Andean Region support package that is balanced and comprehensive. It is designed to advance the U.S. interest in a united, democratic, peaceful and prosperous hemisphere. The package supports counterdrug activities, alternative economic development, rule of law, human rights, good governance, and humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons. Specific, quantifiable objectives are currently being negotiated with the Government of Colombia. The administration will keep the Congress informed as to the outcome of these discussions.

Counterdrug Benchmarks

Benchmarks by which to measure progress toward U.S. counterdrug strategy objectives in Colombia and neighboring countries consist of evidence that regional drug production is decreasing and that the infrastructure required to manufacture, transport, and market illegal drugs is functioning less effectively. Set forth below is a list of general indicators the administration intends to use in determining whether the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia is successful; they should not be taken as negotiated objectives with the Government of Colombia.

* Decrease in cultivation of new coca and opium poppy crops. Coca hectarage has increased at the rate of about 20 percent a year for the last five years in Colombia. Poppy cultivation, which for several years had been relatively static, increased by 23 percent in 1999. Future decreases in new coca and poppy cultivation in Colombia, combined with continued control of drug production in neighboring countries, would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.

* Increased aerial eradication capability. Almost all of the new planting in Colombia has been in areas where there is limited or no eradication activity. In areas where the Government of Colombia can eradicate effectively, such as in Guaviare Department, total hectarage devoted to coca production has decreased, and attempts at new plantings have been less intensive than in areas where the government did not conduct intensive eradication. Increased ability to safely confront illegal crops in Colombia would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.

* Increase in the amount of illicit crops eradicated. An increase in the amount of crops eradicated would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy, provided the increase is not offset by new plantings.

* Stress in the drug transportation network. In Peru, the value of coca leaf decreased when Peru's trafficker air interdiction policy made it difficult to convince pilots to transport coca base from production areas to refining laboratories. Inability to sell coca leaf reduced the value of the crop and convinced many farmers to abandon coca. In Colombia, most coca product is moved by road, river, or private aircraft from production areas to

transshipment points outside of the production zone. A reduction in the price of coca leaf or base; decreased cultivation of new crops; abandonment of coca fields; or decreased number of drug flights; changes in trafficker modes and routes; abandonment or destruction of cache sites, clandestine airstrips, and drug transportation support infrastructure, such as transshipment sites on the rivers, all would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.

* Interruption of refining capacity. Future reduction in the number of cocaine laboratories through destruction or abandonment because of an inability to obtain essential or precursor chemicals would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy. Elimination of refining capacity is the strategic objective. Elimination of a large cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) laboratory is more significant than elimination of many smaller cocaine base laboratories, which can be easily replaced. Reduced purity of cocaine HCl leaving Colombia, and reduced demand and/or prices for coca leaf and base, would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.

* Kingpin incarceration. Arrest, conviction, prosecution (or extradition, as appropriate), and incarceration of more major traffickers in a prison from which they cannot continue to operate their criminal enterprises would indicate progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy. Arrest of key criminal personnel temporarily or permanently eliminates trafficker ability to manipulate large amounts of capital required for major drug shipments, removes organizational leadership, and creates uncertainty in criminal networks upstream and downstream from the arrested major trafficker. In the longer run, secure incarceration of major traffickers may serve as a deterrent to would-be

high-volume traffickers.

* Capital reduction. Increased disruption of cash flow required for illegal drug enterprises through anti-money laundering measures, asset seizures and forfeitures, and reduced ability of traffickers to control legitimate businesses would indicate progress toward the objectives of U.S. counterdrug strategy. The largest cash flow generator for drug traffickers in the Western Hemisphere and the primary money laundering conduit for Colombian drug cartels is the Black Market Peso Exchange. U.S. and Colombian law enforcement agencies have developed and implemented initiatives to combat this major source of funding for the illegal drug trade.

* Movement of drug workers and families into licit production. As an increased level of confidence in alternative employment opportunities is achieved among residents of drug-producing areas, increasingly larger numbers of people attempting to move into the legitimate economy indicates progress toward the objectives of the U.S. counterdrug strategy. Plan Colombia and the U.S. assistance package also address basic governance issues in Colombia that will be harder to quantify, such as strengthening and increasing access to the judicial system, improving prison security, and protection of human rights workers. Though we expect to see positive results in the next two to three years, this effort will require long-term commitment by the government and people of Colombia, and long-term support by the United States and the international community.

2. Actions Required of the United States to Support and Achieve Counterdrug Strategy Objectives

Implement the Colombia Initiative (including its Regional Component)

The U.S. initiative to support Colombia and the region is a \$1.3 billion assistance package carefully crafted to respond to urgent identified needs. It supplements ongoing United States Government counterdrug programs of \$330 million for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. It also builds on long-standing, significant U.S. counterdrug assistance programs that have been operating in Colombia for the last decade. The assistance package for Colombia and the region is balanced and comprehensive. It supports counterdrug activities, alternative economic development, rule of law, human rights, good governance, and humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons. The interlinked elements of the assistance package break out as follows:

- * Provide counterdrug equipment, training, and technical assistance to help the Colombian police and military increase their capability to curtail the cultivation and production of illicit drugs in Colombia, including illicit crop eradication, drug processing lab destruction, and other law enforcement activities. The assistance will also help to increase the interdiction capabilities of both the Colombian National Police and Armed Forces with respect to incoming precursors and outgoing drugs. These programs will augment the existing coca and poppy eradication and drug interdiction efforts that have been in place for years.

- * Supplement major increases in Colombian alternative economic development programs, including new job generation, to offer alternatives to small farmers and migrant workers currently cultivating and harvesting drug crops and prevent population displacement. U.S. support for alternative economic development programs is in addition to the U.S.-funded alternative development programs started in the poppy-growing regions in 1999. The package also provides emergency and longer term assistance to displaced persons.

* Strengthen governing capacity and enhance programs to support respect for human rights and promote the rule of law in Colombia. U.S.-supported programs build on existing administration of justice programs administered by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

* Support Colombia's economic recovery. The Government of Colombia needs to attract more domestic and foreign investment. The United States will provide \$1.5 million in technical assistance to initiatives related to economic recovery.

* Promote progress in Colombia's peace process. The Government of Colombia needs to create better conditions for a successful peace process. The United States will provide \$4 million to fund training for Government of Colombia negotiators and policy advisors to facilitate progress in the peace process.

* Enhance regional capacity for drug interdiction and interdiction of essential and precursor chemicals. The supplemental assistance package includes \$25 million for interdiction in Bolivia, and \$12 million for interdiction in Ecuador. Those funds augment ongoing programs and are included to maintain pressure on drug transportation routes throughout the region to prevent displacement of the drug trade.

* Support alternative development programs that build on successful efforts in Peru and Bolivia and help initiate such programs in Ecuador. Peru will receive about \$27 million in alternative development funding through the regular budget process for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001. Bolivia will receive \$14 million in FY 2000 and \$17 million in FY 2001 through the regular State Department budget. The supplemental assistance package will provide an additional \$85 million to Bolivia and \$8 million to Ecuador for alternative economic development

programs.

Support of Initial Plan Colombia Implementation in Southern Colombia

The Colombian National Police (CNP) will continue to be the primary agency responsible for drug law enforcement operations, including drug crop eradication, lab destruction, chemical and drug interdiction, and investigation and dismantling of trafficking organizations. The CNP's crop control efforts are severely limited by the danger posed to eradication aircraft and personnel by guerrillas and illegal mercenary forces. Military support is required to provide a sufficient level of security for the CNP to perform their law enforcement mission.

The U.S. assistance package will enable the Colombian Army to operate jointly with the CNP as they move into the dangerous drug production sanctuaries in southern Colombia. To achieve this, the assistance package provides funds to stand up two additional Army Counternarcotics Battalions. The first Army Counternarcotics Battalion, which was trained and equipped by the United States, became active in early 2000. The second Counternarcotics Battalion has been through human rights vetting procedures and completes training in December 2000. The third Counternarcotics Battalion will begin training in January 2001 and should become active in April 2001. The assistance package will also provide resources to increase intelligence for the Colombian Joint Task Force - South, based at Tres Esquinas, which includes fully vetted participants from all the military services and the CNP.

Drug producing sanctuaries exist in Colombia because illegal armed groups are able to take advantage of Colombia's rugged geography, lack of basic infrastructure, and poor road network, to set up areas in which they can rule by

force of arms. The emergency supplemental funding provides air mobility assets for the Counternarcotics Battalions so that they can operate and provide security for law enforcement in the vast coca-growing areas. The 13-16 (depending on configuration) UH-60 (Black Hawk), 15 UH-1N, and up to 30 (depending on configuration) refurbished UH-1H (Huey II) helicopters Congress authorized for the Army Counternarcotics Battalions will help provide the needed mobility. These aircraft join eighteen UH-1N helicopters delivered to Colombia in 1999 for this purpose.

Additional CNP Funding

The assistance package includes \$115.6 million in additional support for the Colombian National Police, to include procuring one or two UH-60 helicopters (depending on configuration) and additional spray aircraft; upgrading existing helicopters and planes; providing training, equipment, and secure communications; and building new bases and enhancing security at existing bases. This will augment the existing State Department-funded country program and air wing support (around \$80 million per year). DEA will continue to fund its critical cooperative initiatives (\$3.5 million for FY 2000) in the areas of investigations of major trafficking organizations, intelligence collection and analysis, anti-money laundering measures, chemical control, lab destruction, and interdiction of drugs in transit.

Intelligence Enhancements

The assistance package includes \$92 million to enhance the Colombian and United States Governments' ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate the intelligence necessary to support all aspects of operational planning and execution. A portion of the funding goes toward improving the Colombian Government's ability

to field effective intelligence programs in support of police and military counterdrug operations. Other funds will support Colombian and U.S. counterdrug investigative and information gathering efforts in Colombia, including those being carried out by U.S. law enforcement agencies. There is also \$30 million to procure a U.S. Army Airborne Reconnaissance Low aircraft for counterdrug intelligence collection.

Interdiction Support

In addition to crop control efforts, the Government of Colombia needs vigorous drug interdiction operations. U.S. and Colombian analysts assess that the air transportation servicing Colombian cocaine labs and growing areas is vulnerable to interdiction. The goal is to cause a major disruption of the traffickers' ability to move their product. A successful interdiction campaign, similar to the Peruvian airbridge denial effort, is required. The nearly \$78 million in funding for Colombian air interdiction programs in the package will establish Colombia's ability to interdict drug air transit in southern Colombia, and improve upon existing capability in northern Colombia through aircraft upgrades, additional ground-based radars, and improvement of existing air bases near the drug-producing regions.

Nearly \$22 million is provided to improve Colombian riverine, maritime, and overland interdiction efforts to prevent the traffickers from moving to alternative transportation routes or methods as air transport is disrupted.

To enhance regional interdiction efforts, including detection and monitoring missions over Colombia, the assistance package includes \$116.6 million to fund construction and upgrades at the U.S. forward operating locations in Manta, Ecuador; and Aruba and Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles as well as planning

and design costs at a potential FOL in El Salvador. U.S. detection and monitoring aircraft are flying day and night missions out of Manta, Aruba and Curaçao. The package also includes \$68 million to fund radar upgrades to four U.S. Customs Airborne Early Warning Radar equipped P-3 aircraft for increased detection and monitoring missions in Colombia and throughout the region. The radar upgrade is required to ensure that scheduled missions are not lost due to the current lack of parts and technical support for the older system.

Human Rights

In accordance with U.S. law and policy, delivery of all assistance to the Colombian police and armed forces is contingent upon successful completion of a human rights screening process. No U.S. Government assistance is provided to any unit of the Colombian police or military for which there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations by its members, nor will any assistance be provided to such units, unless, as required by U.S. law and policy, the Secretary of State determines that the Government of Colombia is taking effective measures to bring those responsible for gross human rights violations to justice.

The Colombian military has improved its human rights performance in recent years.

The United States has urged the Government of Colombia to take effective steps to end abuses and impunity within its security forces and to ensure that links between members of the security forces and paramilitary groups are severed.

Other recent Administration reports have outlined progress in these areas to date. We expect the Government of Colombia will continue to make steady progress towards improved human rights performance.

Bolstering Government Capacity and Alternative Development

The Government of Colombia will need to provide improved local government services and licit economic alternatives to the illegal drug trade to

consolidate
its authority in the drug-producing regions. The assistance package
contains a
major increase in U.S. support for Colombian alternative development
programs and
funds to improve the delivery of municipal government services in the
affected
areas.

In the package, the United States commits \$228 million over the next
two years to
alternative development, enhancing good governance, judicial reform,
and human
rights protection in Colombia. The goal of the expanded alternative
development
programs in the support package is to provide assistance and possible
alternative
employment for a displaced coca labor force. Alternative development
programs
have been a key factor in recent, record-level reductions in coca
cultivation in
Peru and Bolivia. It is imperative to expand and continue efforts to
provide
licit economic opportunities in all three of the principal coca source
countries
so that there are alternatives to coca production and other illegal
activity.

Strengthening the Justice System

Colombia's ability to enforce drug control laws is weakened by poorly
functioning
courts, by untrained or inexperienced judges and prosecutors, by
threats, and by
corruption. The support package contains a significant administration
of justice
element to help Colombia strengthen its criminal justice capacity to
create
long-term counterdrug capability, enhance the rule of law, and
increase public
confidence in the justice system. The programs will support law
enforcement, the
police and prosecutor investigative capabilities, and increased prison
security.

The \$111.5 million in the assistance package for justice-related
programs
contributes to a comprehensive solution to the problems in Colombia
and to

protecting human rights and the rule of law. Many of the dramatic and inter-related challenges to the rule of law that Colombia faces stem from a culture of violence bred by a long-standing insurgency and weak governing institutions in the interior of the country. The booming illegal drug trade has spawned additional violence and corruption. U.S. assistance to justice programs includes increased training for the police, prosecutors and judges in the areas of human rights, drug trafficking, maritime and border security, corruption, kidnapping, and money laundering/asset forfeiture cases. U.S. funds will also be used for security and protection for witnesses, judges, and prosecutors in the criminal justice system; assistance for prison design and administration; support for the multilateral case initiative; and assistance for a comprehensive law enforcement response to organized financial crime in Colombia. Additionally, U.S. support for Plan Colombia will provide for procedural and legislative reforms to ensure that the judicial system functions fairly and effectively, with particular emphasis on the transition to an accusatory system, including oral trials.

Aid to the NGOs

Other initiatives related to increasing Colombia's governing capacity are U.S. assistance to international organizations and to Colombian and U.S. NGOs helping Colombians displaced by the internal conflict, as well as funding for programs designed to protect human rights workers, strengthen Colombian government and non-governmental human rights entities, and establish and train specialized units in the Colombian National Police and Prosecutor General's Office to handle human rights cases.

Economic Recovery and the Peace Process

The remaining Colombia-specific programs in the supplemental support package are designed to address inter-related issues that exacerbate or facilitate the drug trade in Colombia. The Government of Colombia needs to create better conditions for a successful peace process and needs to attract more domestic and foreign investment. The United States will provide \$1.5 million in technical assistance to initiatives related to economic recovery. The United States will also provide \$4 million to fund training for Government of Colombia negotiators and policy advisors to facilitate progress in the peace process.

3. The Role of the United States Government in the Efforts of the Government of Colombia to Respond to Illegal Drug Production in Colombia

The role of the United States Government is to assist the Government of Colombia with equipment, training, fuel, crop eradication supplies, technical expertise and information in an effort to reduce the production of drugs in Colombia and stop their transport to the United States. Colombia and the United States also cooperate on police investigations and judicial matters.

The bulk of new assistance for Colombia and the region approved by the Congress in Fiscal Year 2000 will be used for a mobility package to enable the Colombian armed forces to provide security for illegal drug crop control programs, law enforcement, and government assistance programs in the major coca-producing regions of Colombia, primarily in the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá.

4. The Role of the United States Government in the Efforts of the Government of Colombia to Deal with the Insurgency and Paramilitary Forces in Colombia

Our increased support for the Colombian National Police (CNP) and Armed Forces will continue to be focused on the common counterdrug objective. As a matter of

administration policy, we will not support Colombian counterinsurgency efforts. The United States Government will, however, provide training, equipment, and intelligence support, in accordance with existing authorities, to the Government of Colombia for force protection and for security directly related to counterdrug efforts, regardless of the source of the threat.

5. How the Strategy with Respect to Colombia Relates to and Affects the United States' Strategy in Neighboring Countries.

The U.S. strategy with respect to Colombia is based on an assessment that the drug problem is a regional one, with Colombia as the center of gravity. The U.S. Colombia Initiative has a regional component that includes \$85 million for alternative development in Bolivia and \$8 million for alternative development in Ecuador. These funds will be in addition to the substantial alternative development programs ongoing in Bolivia and Peru funded through the regular budget process. The supplemental assistance package also includes \$25 million for interdiction in Bolivia, \$12 million for interdiction in Ecuador, and \$32 million for KMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police. There is \$18 million in the package to support drug interdiction efforts in other countries in the region including Brazil, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Those funds are included to maintain pressure on drug production and transportation routes in other source and transit countries, and to maintain support for income generating alternatives, particularly in Peru and Bolivia, which have demonstrated success in reducing coca production over the last four years. This support should help ensure that drug traffickers do not simply relocate cultivation, production, and transportation to other nations as Colombia intensifies its counterdrug efforts.

6. How the Strategy with Respect to Colombia Relates to and Affects the United States' Strategy for Fulfilling Global Counternarcotics Goals

The Colombia Initiative support package is in line with the National Drug Control Strategy -- a comprehensive approach focusing on: educating children about the dangers of drug use; decreasing the addict population; breaking the cycle of drugs and crime; securing our borders; and reducing the supply of drugs. U.S. support for Colombia and the region directly supports Goal 5 of the National Drug Control Strategy: Break Foreign and Domestic Drug Sources of Supply. Pursuant to this goal, the United States seeks to: "(1) eliminate illegal drug cultivation and production; (2) destroy drug trafficking organizations; (3) interdict drug shipments; (4) encourage international cooperation; and (5) safeguard democracy and human rights." As the largest producer of cocaine in the world and the foremost supplier of heroin to the United States, Colombia must be a focal point of this global strategy.

7. A Strategy and Schedule for Providing Material, Technical, and Logistical Support to Colombia and Neighboring Countries

In the first two years of the Colombia Initiative, the U.S. strategy calls for assisting the Government of Colombia in implementing Plan Colombia in the South, coupled with increased support of: air, ground, and riverine interdiction efforts; CNP law enforcement capabilities; alternative and economic development; and programs relating to human rights, humanitarian assistance, and judicial reforms.

Specific objectives call for a southern Colombia emphasis extending over a two-year period, roughly corresponding to Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002. Successful implementation of this strategy in southern Colombia will strengthen the Government of Colombia's presence in the area and will reduce the cultivation, production, processing, and trafficking of illegal drugs. This objective will

establish the security conditions needed to implement programs in the southern

municipalities of Mocoa, Villa Garzon, Puerto Guzman, Puerto Caicedo, and Puerto

Asis. The plan will extend to cover the entire country over a six-year period.

Some of the key dates related to support the strategy implementation are:

- * September 1999 - The 1st Counter-Narcotics Battalion (CNBN) is formed, vetted, and begins training. (Completed)

- * February 2000 - The 1st CNBN begins operations in the south of Colombia (based in Tres Esquinas). (Completed)

- * August 2000 - The 2nd CNBN is formed, vetted, and begins ongoing training at Larandia.

- * December 2000 - The 2nd CNBN completes training and begins operations.

- * January 2001 - The 3rd CNBN is formed, vetted, and begins training.

- * April 2001 - The 3rd CNBN begins operations.

To support these efforts, 33 UH-1Ns (in addition to the 18 UH-1Ns currently in

Colombia), 13-16 (depending on configuration) UH-60s (Black Hawks), and up to 30

Huey IIs (depending on configuration) to support the Army CNBNs will be

operational following funding, acquisition, and placement in Colombia. These

units will all be used in implementing Plan Colombia in the southern phase of the

strategy. The package will provide one or two additional UH-60s (depending on

configuration) and nine additional Huey IIs dedicated to supporting the CNP.

The State Department expects that the additional 15 UH-1Ns can be restored and

delivered to Colombia by January 2001. Actual delivery dates will be subject to

availability of Department of Defense transport.

There are currently 10 Huey IIs for the CNP in the production pipeline from

previous funding. The current rate of production is about 2 helicopters per

month. The State Department expects that rate of production to continue for the

additional Huey IIs included in the emergency supplemental package.

Actual

delivery dates are subject to the availability of Department of Defense

transport.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has been tasked with managing the purchase of the UH-60 helicopters for the Colombian Army. They are in the process of working with the Department of State and Sikorsky Corporation on the contract. The first UH-60s should be delivered to Colombia in mid-2001, with the balance delivered by the end of the year. Current projections indicate that the necessary support infrastructure in Colombia should be in place, and that Colombia should have sufficient pilots trained to fly these additional UH-60s in time to meet this delivery schedule.

There are currently 47 Colombian Army officers in various stages of pilot training in the United States and Colombia. A full training schedule to ensure

adequate personnel to fly and maintain the new air assets is under development by

the Department of Defense and the Colombian military.

The assistance package includes funding to purchase nine additional spray planes

for the CNP. The Department of State is in the process of negotiating the

contract to purchase these aircraft. After the contract is let, it should take

about six months for the first plane to be produced, with a subsequent rate of

production of about one aircraft per month.

The upgrade to the U.S. Customs Service P-3 radars will be completed as soon as

possible following the procurement process. Customs estimates that the lead time

to contract for these modifications is 12 months. Estimated downtime for each

aircraft during modification is six months. Two aircraft will be modified

simultaneously, allowing all four aircraft to be modified in a 12-month period

after the contract is signed.

USAID obligated \$123.5 million of the funds appropriated for Plan Colombia on

September 29, 2000. They are prepared to move forward at the same time on

assistance to displaced persons. USAID's ongoing activities in administration of

justice and human rights will be expanded in October, when USAID will initiate activities to support anti-corruption programs. The largest single USAID-managed program, alternative development in coca-producing areas, is to be competitively bid, with a bidders' conference scheduled for October in Bogota. Meanwhile, USAID has already expanded its existing alternative development project in poppy to include the first steps in voluntary eradication of coca. The U.S. Colombia Initiative assistance package also includes \$93 million for alternative development for Bolivia and Ecuador. Additionally, there is \$87 million in the package to support increased drug interdiction activities in other countries in the region, primarily for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil. The State Department has begun obligating these monies.

8. Strategy and Schedule for Making Forward Operating Locations (FOLs)

Fully Operational, Including Cost Estimates and a Description of the Potential Capabilities for Each Proposed Location and an Explanation of How the FOL Architecture Fits into the Overall Strategy

A schedule for making each Forward Operating Location fully operational, including cost estimates, timeline of contracting, and construction with completion dates

Per Congressional instruction, the Department of Defense submitted a separate classified report on the FOLs in September of 2000.

The level of development at each FOL is a capability driven process, based on requirements tasked to the Department of Defense and other agencies for counternarcotics detection, monitoring, and tracking (DM&T) operations. The following chart outlines the current military construction (MILCON) projects to make each FOL fully operational to include costs and funding status of each project. Projects designated in the Colombia Supplemental (CO SUP) are funded and included in the Chairman Stevens and Senator Byrd Amendment

FY 2001 Military Construction Bill to the FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental for Counternarcotics Activities, Peacekeeping Operations, and other National Security Matters, dated May 9, 2000. These funds total \$116.523 million and include \$1.1 million for plan and design costs at the El Salvador FOL.

1. Project

Cost

Status

Plan and Design Aruba/Curacao/Manta
\$10.8M

Funded

Manta Runway, Taxiway, Ramp
\$38.6M

In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
Manta Vertical Construction
\$22.673M

In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
Curacao Ramp, Taxiway, Rinse Facility
\$29.5M

In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
Curacao Vertical Construction
\$14.4M

In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
Aruba Ramp/Rinse Facility
\$8.8M

In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
Aruba Hangar/Squadron Operations
\$1.45M

In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
Plan and Design El Salvador
\$1.1M

In CO Supl/MILCON Bill
El Salvador (CENTAM) Construction
\$9.87M

Unfunded

GRAND TOTAL

\$137.193M

\$9.87M (Unfunded)

The following charts provide FOL timelines for contracting and construction with completion dates for Aruba, Curaçao, and Manta. The timelines for the El Salvador FOL are still under development.

Manta Runway, Taxiway and Ramp

Activity
Completion date
Authority to presolicit
21 Mar 00
Design complete
31 Mar 00
Authority to advertise
7 Apr 00
Advertise
14 Apr 00
Pre-proposal conference
5 May 00
Receive proposals
9 Jun 00
MILCON funds
17 Aug 00
Award
25 Aug 00
Notice to proceed
TBD
Phase I & II complete
TBD
Phase III complete
TBD

Manta Vertical Construction

Activity
Completion Date
65% design review
8 Mar 00
Authority to advertise
17 Apr 00
Design complete
28 Apr 00
Advertise
12 May 00
Pre-proposal conference
25 May 00
Receive proposals
6 Jul 00
Award
TBD
Notice to proceed
TBD
50% design review
TBD

95% design review
 TBD
 Support facilities complete
 NLT 01 Nov 01
 Facilities completion
 NLT 01 Feb 02

Aruba and Curaçao Construction

Activity

Completion Date

Complete survey data
 30 Jun 00
 35% submittal
 14 Aug 00
 Authority to advertise
 Estimated 4 Oct 00
 100% submittal
 Estimated 16 Oct 00
 Receive proposals
 Estimated 30 Dec 00
 Source selection board
 Estimated 15 Jan 01
 Award
 Estimated Feb 01
 Construction complete
 Estimated Dec 02

A Description of Potential Capabilities at Each FOL

Once the military construction is complete, each FOL will have varying

capabilities to support large, medium and small aircraft. (Note: Aircraft size

is: large = E-3 AWACS and KC-135; medium = E-2, P-3, C-130 and ARL; small =

F-15, F-16 and C-550.) The Manta FOL will support all counterdrug (CD) aircraft,

to include E-3 AWACS and KC-135 operations. The Manta FOL ramp space will

support up to four large and four medium aircraft. The Aruba FOL will support

all CD medium-size and small aircraft with ramp space available for two medium

and three small aircraft. The Curaçao FOL will support all CD aircraft

to
include E-3 AWACS and KC-135 operations. The Curaçao ramp
space will support up
to two large, four medium and six small aircraft. The EL Salvador
FOL at
Comalapa will support all medium CD aircraft with ramp space for up
to four
medium aircraft.

How the FOL Architecture Fits the Overall Strategy

With the closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama, the
establishment of FOLs

in the region is critical to our ability to implement the National Drug
Control

Strategy and execute the U.S. Southern Command's Counterdrug
Campaign Plan. The

FOLs are critical components in the post-Panama theater architecture
extending

counterdrug detection and monitoring (D&M) assets' operational
reach into both

drug source and transit zones.

The FOLs are not bases. They are existing airfields, which, with some

modifications, will support the deployment of U.S. counterdrug
detection and

monitoring aircraft to provide consistent access into the region.

Agreements are

in place in Manta, Ecuador; and Aruba and Curaçao in the
Netherlands Antilles.

Another FOL agreement is awaiting approval in the Salvadoran
legislature. U.S.

detection and monitoring aircraft are currently flying day and night
missions out

of Manta, Aruba and Curaçao.

FOL sites require extensive additional modifications to support the
full range of

U.S. detection and monitoring aircraft conducting day/night all-
weather

operations. When fully operational (in Fiscal Year 2001), these FOLs
will allow

increased coverage of key Eastern Pacific and Caribbean transit zones,
and full

coverage of the southern Colombia cocaine growing areas. The U.S.
Colombia

Initiative support package provides \$116.6 million for modifying the
FOLs in the

region to enable the United States to continue its robust regional
interdiction

initiatives. In addition, the Department of Defense has assumed
responsibility

for out-year funding of these locations.

V. CONCLUSION

The current crisis in Colombia has precipitated a need for a major increase in U.S. efforts to protect its national interests in stemming the flow of illegal drugs, supporting democracy and human rights, and encouraging free economic development by supporting the counterdrug efforts of Colombia and other countries in the region. There is strong political will in Colombia and throughout the region to attack the drug trade, root out corruption, end violence, and establish peace and security within the framework of democracy and respect for human rights.

While Colombia has become the center of illegal drug production in our hemisphere, the commitment of the Government of Colombia to attacking drug production and trafficking is indisputable. The Government of Colombia is conducting a robust counterdrug effort including eradication of drug crops, lab destruction, alternative development, arrest and prosecution of drug traffickers, and disruption of their organization; and air, maritime, riverine, and land interdiction operations to seize and destroy drugs and chemicals. Hundreds of Colombian police and military personnel, judges, prosecutors, government officials, and innocent civilians have lost their lives as a result of drug trafficking and the violence it generates. Just as we share with Colombia an appreciation of the threat to national security and social well-being posed by illegal drugs, we share the responsibility to act against them. It is imperative that the United States do its fair share to fight drug production and trafficking in Colombia and throughout the region in close cooperation with our democratic allies.

2

10

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5941 POTUS memo on CO Supp Strategy Report.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER
BARRY R. McCaffrey
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Report on U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and
Neighboring
Countries

Purpose

Report to the Congress on U.S. policy and strategy regarding
counterdrug
assistance for Colombia and neighboring countries.

Background

The Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, enacted on
July 11, 2000,
states that, not later than 60 days after enactment, the President shall
submit a
report on current U.S. policy and strategy regarding our counterdrug
assistance
for Colombia and neighboring countries to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee
on International
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.

The report at Tab B, prepared by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters transmitting the report to Congress at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Transmittal Letters to the Congress

Tab B Report on U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and Neighboring Countries

2

5941

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5941 Memo for SRB on CO Supp Strategy Report.doc

September 26, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: ERIC A. PIERCE

SUBJECT: Report on U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and Neighboring Countries

Attached at Tab I is an action memorandum from you, Barry McCaffrey and Chuck Brain recommending that the President send to the Congress the attached report

dealing with current U.S. policy and strategy regarding counterdrug assistance for Colombia and neighboring countries.

The report to the Congress was due not later than September 11 (60 days after the date of enactment of the Emergency Supplemental Act). Drafting and interagency clearance of the President's report by ONDCP took longer than anticipated, hence the delay in submission.

We concur with the report as prepared by ONDCP, as do OMB, State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, AID, and DEA.

The NSC received the final text of the report (Tab II) from ONDCP on September 18.

Concurrence by: Brooke Anderson, Randy Beardsworth, Mike Hammer, Don Mitchell, Wendy Patten, Dan Shapiro, David Stockwell, Jock Scharfen

RECOMMENDATION

That you, together with Barry McCaffrey and Chuck Brain, send the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Transmittal letters to Congress

Tab B Report on U.S. Counterdrug Assistance for Colombia and Neighboring Countries

Tab II Incoming Correspondence from ONDCP

2

5941-REDO

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for counterdrug assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The enclosed report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Colombia's success in combating the threat of drugs is profoundly in the interest of the United States. A peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Colombia will result in a significant reduction of the supply of illicit drugs and help promote democracy and stability throughout the hemisphere. I am proud of the bipartisan effort that has made our Colombian initiative possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for counterdrug assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The enclosed report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Colombia's success in combating the threat of drugs is profoundly in the interest of the United States. A peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Colombia will result in a significant reduction of the supply of illicit drugs and help promote democracy and stability throughout the hemisphere. I am proud of the bipartisan effort that has made our Colombian initiative possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for counterdrug assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The enclosed report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Colombia's success in combating the threat of drugs is profoundly in the interest of the United States. A peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Colombia will result in a significant reduction of the supply of illicit drugs and help promote democracy and stability throughout the hemisphere. I am proud of the bipartisan effort that has made our Colombian initiative possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby report, pursuant to Section 3202 of the Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, on current U.S. policy and strategy for counterdrug assistance to Colombia and neighboring countries.

The enclosed report sets forth the rationale for expanded support to Colombia and neighboring countries and highlights the comprehensive initiatives now underway in the Andean region in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

Colombia's success in combating the threat of drugs is profoundly in the interest of the United States. A peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Colombia will result in a significant reduction of the supply of illicit drugs and help promote democracy and stability throughout the hemisphere. I am proud of the bipartisan effort that has made our Colombian initiative possible.

Sincerely,

The Honorable C.W. "Bill" Young
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0910

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1

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1

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/04/2000 2:46:22 PM
FROM Russ, Judith P. (SEE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Package 7260 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Biden.doc

Dear Senator Biden:

As required by Section 1213 of Public Law 106-398, the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act, I transmit herewith a six-month periodic report on the contributions of European nations and organizations to the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Byrd.doc

Dear Senator Byrd:

As required by Section 1213 of Public Law 106-398, the FY 2001
Defense
Authorization Act, I transmit herewith a six-month periodic report on
the
contributions of European nations and organizations to the
peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

7260 DP to GS to SRB Kosovo Peacekeeping Rpt.doc

November 30, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL E. BERGER

THROUGH: GREGORY L. SCHULTE

FROM: THOMAS C. GREENWOOD

SUBJECT: Semiannual Report to Congress on Kosovo Burdensharing

At Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he submit the attached report to Congress (Tab A) documenting European Burdensharing contributions to Kosovo as required by Public Law 106-398, the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act. The first report, due December 1, must provide information on

commitments and pledges as well as the amount of assistance that has been provided by the European Commission, European Union, and European member nations of NATO between July 1999 and October 2000 in the following five categories: reconstruction assistance, humanitarian assistance, assistance to the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (UNMIK), international police, and military commitments.

Although there is no direct legislative linkage between the new Kosovo peacekeeping report and previous burden sharing goals proposed by the Kasich Amendment, it is likely Congress will apply a "Kasich barometer" to the President's semiannual report. Accordingly, the following chart is provided for comparison purposes:

Category	Semi-Annual Report	Old Kasich Requirement
Reconstruction EC/EU/NATO:	63.6%	50%
Humanitarian EC/EU/NATO:	92.3%	85%
UNMIK Budget EC/EU/NATO:	80.3%	85%

Police EC/EU/NATO: 80% 90%

(NOTE: NATO figures do not include U.S. contribution)

As noted above, reconstruction and humanitarian pledges surpass Kasich standards.

The two categories where the President's report falls short of Kasich are the UNMIK budget and international police. The main reason we do not meet the 85% Kasich requirement in UNMIK budget is that European Commission pledges have fallen short of actual donations. These donations are expected to rise over the next few months, enabling this category to reflect improvement in the President's

June 2001 report.

In the area of international police, Germany has pledged 420 regular police but they have only deployed 316 officers to Kosovo. Germany's shortfall of 104 coupled with Poland's shortfall of 95 is the primary reason the Kasich standard of 90% for international police has not been achieved. State continues to engage both Germany and Poland on this issue, encouraging them to make good on their pledge.

These shortfalls notwithstanding, the President's report indicates that US allies

are shouldering their fair share of the burden with regard to Kosovo peacekeeping

operations.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on November 28, 2000.

Concurrence by: Tony Banbury, Lee Wolowsky, Mark Talvarides, Jonathan Scharfen, Randy Beardsworth

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Report to Congress
Tab B Transmittal letters
Tab C Incoming correspondence
2

7260

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Gejdenson.doc

Dear Representative Gejdenson:

As required by Section 1213 of Public Law 106-398, the FY 2001
Defense
Authorization Act, I transmit herewith a six-month periodic report on
the
contributions of European nations and organizations to the
peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Gilman.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As required by Section 1213 of Public Law 106-398, the FY 2001
Defense
Authorization Act, I transmit herewith a six-month periodic report on
the
contributions of European nations and organizations to the
peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Helms.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As required by Section 1213 of Public Law 106-398, the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act, I transmit herewith a six-month periodic report on the contributions of European nations and organizations to the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Kosovo rpt ANNEX.doc
***The European Parliament is expected to add 40 million euros to the EC commitment before the close of 2000.
Figures represent 1999 and 2000 with the exception of Greece reporting 2000 only.
Pledges were made in local currencies. Exchange rates used on conversion to Dollar is that of Nov. 1999 Donors Conf.
Greece, Portugal figure represents 2000 only

Table V

Nations Contributing Personnel To Operation Joint Guardian

NATO European Union Other

Belgium

Austria

Argentina

Canada

Belgium

Azerbaijan

Czech Republic

Denmark

Bulgaria

Denmark

Finland

Estonia

France

France

Georgia

Germany

Germany

Jordan

Greece

Greece

Latvia

Hungary

Ireland

Lithuania

Iceland

Italy

Morocco

Italy

Luxembourg

Romania

Luxembourg

The Netherlands

Russia

The Netherlands

Portugal

Slovakia

Norway

Spain

Slovenia
Poland
Sweden
Switzerland
Portugal
United Kingdom
United Arab Emirates
Spain

Ukraine
Turkey

United Kingdom

United States

TABLE VI

Table VI

Total KFOR Levels

8/99
9/99
10/99
11/99
12/99
1/00
2/00
3/00
4/00
5/00
6/00
7/00
8/00

9/00
10/00
11/00
Total
44800
48100
49400
48700
49400
44400
44900
45700
45800
46200
46400
43900
43600
44900
45400
45600
NATO
40500
42200
43000
41400
40600
37200
37500
38000
37900
38400
38600
36100
35700
37000
37300
37800
EU
31100
33700
33200
30100
27800
28400
28900
28500
28800
29000
28000
28200

27700
28600
29100
29800
US
7100
7400
7500
7600
10200
6100
6000
6700
6100
6300
8500
6200
6300
6400
6300
6000
Other
4300
5900
6400
7300
8800
7200
7400
7700
7900
7800
7800
7800
7900
7900
8100
7800

1. Includes Forces in FYROM, Greece, Albania, and KFOR HQ.

Force Levels In Kosovo

8/99
9/99
10/99
11/99
12/99

1/00
2/00
3/00
4/00
5/00
6/00
7/00
8/00
9/00
10/00
11/00
Total
37900
40100
41800
41500
42000
37300
37700
38000
39200
40100
41000
38500
38000
39400
39900
40300
NATO
33600
34500
35700
34300
33400
30100
30400
30300
31400
32400
33300
30800
30100
31600
31900
32500
EU
26000
26200
27400
25200

23200
22700
22900
23000
23400
27900
23800
23800
23000
24100
24800
27700
US
5700
6200
6400
6400
8100
5300
5400
5300
5500
5600
7700
5600
5600
5800
5700
5400
Other
4300
5600
6100
7200
8600
7200
7300
7700
7800
7700
7700
7700
7900
7800
8000
7800

Draft: EUR/EEA: MJanis Semiannual Report on Kosovo
Peacekeeping (as required in
FY2001 Defense Authorization Bill H.R. 5408, Section 1213),
11/15/00 7-0660

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Semiannual Report on Kosovo Peacekeeping
December 1, 2000

Introduction

The following report describes the contributions of European nations and organizations to the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo as required in Section 1213 of the FY2001 Defense Authorization Bill, H.R. 5408. This is the first of a

semiannual reporting requirement to six specified congressional committees. It covers donor contributions reported between July 1999 and October 2000. All contributions are shown in U.S. dollars.

The report reviews the commitments and contractual obligations of foreign assistance made by the European Commission, the 15 individual member states of the European Union and the European member nations of the North

Atlantic Treaty

Organization.¹ Switzerland's contributions are also included.

Although it is

not technically a member of the European Union or of NATO, it is an important

donor for the region. Foreign assistance contributions are subdivided into the

following categories: reconstruction assistance; humanitarian assistance;

assistance to the Kosovo Consolidated Budget; contributions and deployments to

the United Nations international police force for Kosovo; and contributions and

deployment of military personnel for peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. United

States assistance to Kosovo is presented as a point of comparison and reference

is made to the contributions of other non-European bilateral donors and

multilateral agencies. The final section of the report assesses the commitments

and responsibilities undertaken by the United Nations and the Organization for

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and reviews the European Union's

assistance record. A schedule of remaining tasks is discussed.

International donors and organizations formally pledged assistance to Kosovo in

two donors' conferences convened in July and November 1999. The figures

described in this report reflect the base commitments announced at these

conferences. Since many governments added to their pledges as needs arose, an

effort has been made to include all additional commitments and contractual

obligations made up to October 2000 and reported by various sources including the

World Bank and donor governments.² Gathering comparable information of this kind

is a difficult technical task. In some cases, and particularly as regards humanitarian assistance, the latest data available was that gathered by the World

Bank and reported in June 2000. As a result, the United States Government

believes that many of the contracted figures under this heading are

now higher
than what is currently reported.

For the purposes of this report, commitments of foreign assistance to Kosovo mean

intended assistance levels made known to the international community or the

United States Government by donor governments. Contracted aid is defined by the individual donor but comes closest to the U.S. Government concept of

"obligation." Disbursed aid reflects funds that have been spent from the perspective of the donor's budget.

Section I - Donor Commitments and Disbursements

A) Reconstruction Assistance (See Table I)

Four multilateral agencies and twenty-six bilateral donors have made pledges of reconstruction assistance to Kosovo since the July 1999 donors' conference.

European states and organizations are the primary donors of reconstruction assistance, having committed in aggregate over \$825 million. The European Union plays a key role as the largest multilateral donor and the leader of Pillar IV, the economic reconstruction arm of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Comparisons of reconstruction assistance are complicated in that bilateral and multilateral donors tend to consider a variety of different activities as belonging within this category. The United States follows a strict interpretation of "reconstruction" as including only large-scale infrastructure activities such as rebuilding war-damaged facilities. The European donors, on the other hand, tend to add both smaller scale repairs as well as economic reform

activities into the reconstruction category.

Assistance by Donor:

European Commission Assistance

The European Commission, the European Union's multilateral conduit of assistance,

is the largest single donor of reconstruction aid. As of October 2000 the

Commission had contracted \$271.9 million, nearly 75 percent of its \$363.9 million

commitment. Community-level assistance is implemented through the European

Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). EAR has concentrated largely on mine clearance,

housing and public infrastructure restoration and repair. Specifically, it has

delivered construction materials to rehabilitate 3,500 houses. It has begun

bridge repair and road patching projects and has rehabilitated the Kosovo Polje

rail line, the center of Kosovo's rail network.

Bilateral Assistance (EU Member States/European-NATO Member Nations/United States)

Pledges of reconstruction assistance to Kosovo from the bilateral European member

states totaled \$372.38 million. Each member state of the European Union also

committed reconstruction assistance as a bilateral donor, with the exception of

Luxembourg which did not pledge and Belgium which has not reported its pledge.

The United Kingdom is Europe's largest bilateral donor to Kosovo and is moving

quickly, having contracted 93 percent of its over \$90 million commitment.

Switzerland and Germany offered the next highest commitments respectively.

However Denmark and the Netherlands have made the second and third highest

contractual obligations.

NATO members the Czech Republic, Poland, Norway, and Turkey also committed

reconstruction assistance to the sum of \$39.4 million. Norway is the only one of

these states which has begun to contract these funds.

Six European member states have contracted over 50 percent of their committed funds. France assigned the highest proportion, at 98 percent, of its pledge.

The three smallest economies in the European Union -- Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have not contracted any portion of their pledge to date.

As mandated by U.S. law, the United States has not contributed assistance to reconstruction efforts defined as large scale rebuilding of infrastructure.

However, U.S. support for local, small-scale revitalization and economic recovery

programs has been significant. For example, USAID has backed basic water, electricity, social and transport service delivery, as well as enterprise development activities. U.S. commitments to economic reform and community services totaled \$37.2 million in FY 2000.³

Other Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance

Other donors contributing to reconstruction in Kosovo include Canada, Japan, the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Collectively these donors have pledged over \$130 million and contracted \$112.26 million.

Finally, multilateral donors and international organizations including the United

Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank also finance reconstruction

projects. These two agencies have committed approximately \$18 million.

Analysis

The Europeans have taken responsibility for financing the greatest share of reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Kosovo. This can be seen both in

the scale of their bilateral and Union-level commitments and obligations as well as in the scope of activities they have spearheaded throughout the

region.

The extent of burdensharing among the European states is also noteworthy. Two of

the EU's largest states, Germany and the UK, have undertaken relatively high commitments. The contributions of the smaller states also serve as particularly noteworthy indications of a greater European commitment to sharing the aid burden

in Kosovo. Historically generous with foreign assistance, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries have made strong pledges in Kosovo as well.

The Europeans' record on fulfilling their commitments and implementing reconstruction projects was called into question earlier this year. The press reported on slow progress in housing construction and other vital areas. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright addressed this concern with the European Foreign Ministers. Since that time an effort has been made to expedite the European Commission's procedural steps for contracting aid. In a study produced this summer by The European Parliament's Ad Hoc Delegation to Kosovo, the Delegation noted that disbursement of Community funds made available for reconstruction projects has "created an especially positive political impact on civil society in Kosovo and has lent credibility as to the commitment of the Europeans to see Kosovo through its transition."⁴

B) Humanitarian Assistance (See Table II)

Twenty-eight bilateral donors and five international organizations report contributions of humanitarian assistance to Kosovo. The European nations and organizations have committed a total of \$1,123.79 million in this category of assistance which includes disaster relief operations such as direct feeding, shelter, health and hygiene, and water sanitation. They have

contracted 92 percent of their combined commitment as of June 2000.

Assistance by Donor:

European Commission Assistance

The European Commission is the second largest contributor of humanitarian assistance having committed \$403 million as of October 2000. The Commission channels humanitarian assistance through its European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). ECHO financed refugee camps in the countries surrounding Kosovo and then directed assistance to support internally displaced Kosovars. The Humanitarian Office lists among its specific achievements the provision of emergency shelter to over 22,500 families and emergency rehabilitation of 159 schools.

Bilateral Assistance (EU Member States/European-NATO Member Nations/United States)

Each of the EU member states also offered bilateral humanitarian assistance with the exception of Portugal from which information has not been made available.

Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark made the highest three commitments of humanitarian assistance and have contracted the highest amounts in comparison to the other European states. Germany, the top European bilateral donor, has disbursed \$169 million of a \$180 million commitment.

European-NATO members contributing humanitarian assistance included the Czech

Republic, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey. Collectively these states committed \$107.28 million and have contracted 80 percent of that figure.

Eight European bilateral donors have contracted 100 percent of their commitments.

All but two of the EU and European-NATO states have contracted over 50 percent of their committed contributions. Greece is the only bilateral donor yet to

report a contractual obligation against its pledge.

In comparison, the United States is the leading bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance. As of this writing, the United States has contracted \$537.50 million. Some of this funding has been directed through USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) in partnership with American or Kosovar

non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These NGOs established emergency programs

to provide temporary shelter, health care, psychosocial interventions, access to safe water, and support for tolerance building.

Other Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance
Australia, Canada, Japan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Thailand also committed humanitarian assistance in the 1999 donors' conferences. According to the World Bank, the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) spent \$18 million on targeted relief programs as of June 30, 2000. Other multilateral agencies surveyed, the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and

the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have also provided substantial

humanitarian support with voluntary contributions from European governments, the United States, and other states. Specifically, the UN estimates that the WFP has

provided food aid to 600,000 people in Kosovo. UNHCR and IOM are credited with organizing the return to Kosovo of 170,000 refugees, registering 235,000 internally displaced persons from Kosovo, and providing shelter repair and roofing kits to 700,000 people.

Analysis

The international donor community acted swiftly and generously to manage essential and life saving relief assistance in Kosovo. As with reconstruction assistance, the role of the European nations and organizations was and continues to be paramount. The majority of committed funds have been contracted. Donor coordination of humanitarian assistance has been significant and can be credited with alleviating emergency conditions in the region.

C) Assistance to Kosovo Consolidated Budget (See Table III)

More than 18 bilateral donors and three multilateral agencies have committed funds to the Kosovo Consolidated Budget. As of October 2000 the European nations

and organizations had contributed \$149.35 million in budget support. This total represents contributions made via the UN Trust Fund and subsequently through general and designated grants to UNMIK.

UNMIK's Central Fiscal Authority (CFA) develops and executes Kosovo's consolidated budget and ensures that funds are allocated, committed, and paid in accordance with high standards of financial management. As part of its functions, the CFA publishes a monthly fiscal monitoring report. It has developed instructions for procurement of goods and services and harmonized these

with international standards and has set the regulations for domestic tax revenue

collection.

Assistance by Donor.

European Commission Assistance

The European Commission is the largest contributor to UNMIK having committed \$75 million and disbursed \$55 million, 73 percent of its pledge. Of the disbursed figure some of the Community funds were earmarked for water

sanitation,
winterization, and heating repairs, and fuel purchases, in addition to
general
budget support.

Bilateral Assistance (EU Member States/European-NATO Member
Nations/United
States)

Eleven of the fifteen member states of the European Union provide
bilateral
support to the Kosovo budget. The Netherlands, Germany, and the
UK were the top
three bilateral European donors with commitments of \$24, \$18 and
\$11 million
respectively. All but two European donors have disbursed over 50
percent of
their initial pledges and the majority has disbursed 100 percent.

European-NATO members the Czech Republic, Norway, and Poland
contributed to the
sum of \$2.36 million. All three states have disbursed 100 percent of
their
commitments.

The European nations' bilateral support has addressed a wide variety
of
developmental needs. For example, a portion of the UK contribution
was
designated for the Pristina University Hospital and Mitrovica
courthouse;
Norway's budgetary contribution was used for temporary shelter; and
Switzerland
designated that funds be used to enhance social welfare.

The United States committed \$31.6 million and disbursed \$29.6
million of that
amount. This figure includes general undesignated budget support and
designated
grants for civil registration, the Kosovo Protection Corps, and a
financial
viability assessment and environmental remediation of the Trepca
mine complex.

Other Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance

Other UN members, notably Canada and Japan, have made strong
contributions to
Kosovo's consolidated budget, as has the World Bank and the
International
Commission for Missing Persons.

Analysis

Again in this category, the Europeans have shown a serious commitment to support the Consolidated Budget and thereby to promote democratic institution building in

Kosovo. International foreign assistance is filling a difficult gap between expenditure and revenue during Kosovo's 2000 budget. It covered the costs of power and salaries for the civil service, and it addressed sectoral priorities in

health and education, among others.

Kosovo's Central Fiscal Authority has made considerable progress in self-financing since 1999. In recent fiscal reports, the CFA projects a smaller deficit which will need to be covered by external assistance in FY2001.

Section II - International Police and Military

A) United Nations International Police Force (See Table IV)

In June 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Police. UNMIK police officers are armed and have executive authority. They are authorized to enforce laws and make arrests. The two main priorities of the UNMIK Police mandate are providing interim public security and law enforcement in Kosovo and helping field train the

new Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to assume permanent responsibility for these functions. The authorized strength of the UNMIK Police is 4,718, which includes 1,125 special police. Special Police units have additional capabilities to deal with unusual problems such as civil disorder and are strategically deployed to assist regular UNMIK police if needed.

Unlike other categories of assistance, the European Commission does

not play a role in contributing to the International Police Force in Kosovo. However, pledges made by the member states of the European Union and additional European members of NATO as of October 2000 constituted over 30 percent of total donor pledges for the regular police force and 24 percent for the special police force.

In total, the Europeans have pledged 1,112 regular police and 230 special police

to the force. Germany has made the highest pledge and deployed the most men. Currently, there are approximately 314 German police in Kosovo. The United Kingdom and Turkey have contingents of over 100 regular officers. Spain and Poland each have deployed over 100 special police. With few exceptions, the Europeans have deployed the full amount of their pledged officers. Luxembourg is

the only EU Member State that did not pledge officers to the force.

In comparison, the United States has pledged 605 officers and deployed 576 regular police officers, 95 percent of its pledge. Twenty-nine other UN member nations from Argentina to Zimbabwe have deployed both regular and special police officers to Kosovo's international police force with India and Jordan serving as the largest donors.

Analysis

As in other categories, the European states have shouldered a substantial share of the contribution to civil security in Kosovo. The European states have made close to half of the total pledges of all donors for regular officers and nearly one-third of the special police officers.

B) Military Commitments (See Tables V, VI, and VII)

Since its inception immediately following the end of Operation ALLIED FORCE, the

NATO-led KFOR has included troops from alliance members as well as from numerous other countries. Initially, approximately 45,000 troops from seventeen NATO countries and four non-NATO nations provided troops. Force levels reached a peak

of nearly 50,000 troops in October 1999. Today in Kosovo, 39 different countries

contribute personnel to twenty-nine Battalion-sized equivalent units. The overall force level has remained relatively stable for the last six months, fluctuating between 44,000 and 46,000 depending on troop/unit rotation and replacement schedules. It should be noted that approximately 15 percent of KFOR is stationed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece and Albania, as well as KFOR headquarters in Pristina, Kosovo.

A more detailed breakout of KFOR make-up reveals that NATO nations, including the

United States, contributed 94 percent of the forces immediately following the conclusion of Operation ALLIED FORCE. As more nations began participating in Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, NATO contributions were gradually reduced to their current state of 82 percent of the forces. A similar breakout for European Union

nations shows a 70 percent contribution at the end of the bombing campaign. This

also has gradually reduced to its current state of 64 percent.

By comparison, the United States' contribution of troops was 7,100 initially, with spikes as high as 10,100 in December 1999, and 8,500 in June 2000, which were troop rotation periods. However, troop rotations notwithstanding, for the period of June - November 2000, United States contributions ranged between 6,000 and 6,400 troops, or approximately 13-14 percent of KFOR troop levels.

Analysis

The European Union member states and European members of NATO continue to provide

a preponderance of military personnel involved in Kosovo peacekeeping operations.

As noted EU and NATO contributions remain consistently high.

Section III -

Commitments and Responsibilities by Organization:

The European Union, OSCE, and UN

(See Table VIII)

European Union

As has been described in previous sections, the European Union has made a series of commitments of community-level assistance to support reconstruction, humanitarian activities, and the consolidated budget. The Union's total budget for Kosovo is \$842.90 million. \$709.60 million of this figure has been

contracted. The EU has been the most proactive in contracting humanitarian support and it has made the greatest commitment relative to other donors of reconstruction assistance.

The EU can count several achievements as the leader of Pillar IV of UNMIK. It has had some success in jump-starting the rural economy and creating an environment conducive to private sector expansion in urban areas. The EU has placed a great deal of emphasis on rehabilitating the infrastructure needed for economic recovery including the telecommunications, energy, and transport systems, and in restoring and improving the delivery of social services.⁵

In general, the EU's assistance has mitigated the state of emergency in Kosovo following the crisis. This fundamental first step was handled quite effectively given the challenges of the post-conflict environment and the operating structure

of the Union. Several medium-range tasks remain, not the least of which includes

planning and priority setting for longer-term development. Housing and energy support also remain critical areas which the EU will need to address during the winter months. For example, 43,000 damaged or destroyed houses will require reconstruction in 2001.

United Nations

The UN has budgeted \$267.57 million for mission operations in Kosovo in 2000. To

date it has received \$99.9 million in member contributions towards this total.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 established the UN Interim Administration in

Kosovo (UNMIK) as the provisional governing administration. The resolution confers UNMIK with legislative and executive authority and extends to it the role

of administering the judiciary. UNMIK is organized into four pillars of accountability. UNHCR led Pillar I, the emergency relief effort, which

officially ended in July 2000. UNHCR continues small-scale humanitarian assistance efforts and, along with the OSCE, remains focused on the protection of

ethnic minorities.

The UN also leads Pillar II which is responsible for issues of civil administration. Each month UNMIK publishes a status report listing achievements

made in its capacity as the leader of Pillar II. These reports have highlighted the following activities: ensuring that no Kosovar went without food and minimal

warm, dry shelter during the winter of 1999; establishment of the Kosovo-UNMIK

Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) as a framework to engage Kosovars

in the process of administering the province; demilitarization of the Kosovo

Liberation Army; creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a

civilian
 emergency service organization; appointment of over 344 Kosovar
 judges and 61
 prosecutors to the new independent multi-ethnic judiciary; re-opening
 of all
 district and municipal courts and appointment of seven international
 judges and
 three prosecutors to hear emergency cases; oversight of waste
 collection and
 other service delivery; rehabilitation of the power and water systems
 and
 development of a strategy to ensure continuous power through the
 winter months;
 appointment of an Ombudsperson for Kosovo; establishing a customs
 regime;
 initiating collection of taxes; significant reduction in the crime rate;
 the
 founding of a Criminal Intelligence Unit -- as well as a center to
 handle
 anti-trafficking and prostitution issues; and initiation of the
 rehabilitation of

the Trepca mining complex.⁶

The UN has performed a difficult task in Kosovo. It should be
 commended for
 setting up appropriate banking and budgetary institutions and for its
 steps to
 reform the trade and tax regime. Progress in the formidable task of
 solidifying
 democratic institutions and transferring administrative responsibilities
 to
 autonomous political bodies was helped along with the October 28
 elections.
 Following these elections 30 municipal assemblies were established
 and given
 responsibility for managing many administrative tasks including the
 management of

education, health care, water supply, and ultimately, tax collection.

UNMIK must still complete several major tasks including advancing
 arrangements
 for self-government under UNSCR 1244, completing the field training
 program for
 the Kosovo Police Service, establishing a functioning judicial system,
 and
 enabling the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

UNMIK has begun work on drafting interim governing regulations in

preparation for

province-wide elections in 2001. Police field training is expected to conclude in June 2001. As regards the judicial system, UNMIK seeks to hire three more judges and two more prosecutors and the criminal code and penal system remain in the development phases. Finally, while almost 900,000 displaced Kosovar Albanians have returned to Kosovo, there are over 200,000 ethnic minorities displaced from Kosovo, some of whom will seek to return to their homes in the next year.

OSCE Mission in Kosovo

The Organization of Security and Cooperation for Europe's (OSCE) Mission in Kosovo was established in July 1999 with its key task to develop democratic structures and foster a vibrant civil society in Kosovo. The OSCE is the leader of UNMIK Pillar III charged with institution building, democratization and human rights, minorities, and missing persons. The Mission plays a lead role in election organization and supervision. Its budget for 2000 is \$86.726 million. States are assessed OSCE dues based on the Copenhagen Scale of Assessments. For 2000, the European Union member states contributed 66.7 percent of the OSCE-Kosovo budget.

The OSCE reports making great strides in its mandate. Specifically, in terms of institution building it has helped to rebuild the organizational capacity of Kosovo's political parties. It has established ten Political Party Service

Centers which provide basic infrastructure and communications facilities to all parties. The OSCE also founded the Institute for Civil Administration to train civil servants in registration, personnel management, and public administration.

The Mission established and runs the very successful Kosovo Police Service

School. The OSCE established the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) school where new KPS recruits receive classroom training. Over 2,500 cadets of many ethnicities have graduated from the eight-week basic recruit course and another 83 have been trained as supervisors. The United States provides approximately 53 instructors as well as the school's director. The remaining 135 instructors are provided by 21 other OSCE member states.

As concerns its mandate to promote democracy, the OSCE has launched Citizens Forums in four municipalities. It has spearheaded voter registration and elections operations and published over 14,000 copies of a Political Party Guide so as to introduce the parties in the October municipal elections. Additionally,

it organized special needs voters program to reach the homebound and elderly on election day. To promote freedom of the press and information, OSCE has worked closely with UNMIK to develop a code to license and register broadcasters. Finally, in the area of human rights, the OSCE has sponsored forums on minority concerns in an effort to foster dialogue condemning inter-ethnic violence. It has also begun a human rights officer-training program.⁷

As is the case for the EU with reconstruction activities, the OSCE has entered the medium-term phase of solidifying fledgling institutions. The Mission will play an important supervisory role in 2001 elections. It will also face the continuing task of optimizing the security conditions of Kosovar Serbs, Roma, and

other minority groups in Kosovo.

Kosovo faces a variety of challenges to rebuild its infrastructure, set its economy on a growth trajectory, and improve the living standards of its people. This report's main conclusion is that the European donors have made progress in

carrying out reconstruction, humanitarian, budget, and security assistance. The donors have supported an ambitious set of overarching goals in Kosovo. There are

positive signs that progress has been made and anticipation that tensions will continue to lessen. Donor support will remain indispensable, especially as regards guaranteeing security and peaceful coexistence. Continued attention and commitments of assistance where funding gaps occur will be crucial for continued medium- and long-term development in Kosovo. Given new developments in the FRY, it is especially important that all donors now reaffirm their commitment to Kosovo with flexible and well-planned aid packages.

1 EU Member States include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and

the United Kingdom.

European NATO member nations include The Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and Turkey.

2 See Progress Made in Committing, Contracting, and Spending Donor Pledges to

Kosovo, Office for South East Europe, European Commission/The World Bank, June

30, 2000.

3 See SEED Budget Allocation for Kosovo, 2000, Office of East European

Assistance, U.S. Department of State.

4 The European Parliament Ad Hoc Delegation to Kosovo Report from the

Co-Chairpersons Mrs. Doris Pack and Mr. Terence Wynn, June 6, 2000.

5 The European Commission and the World Bank, Toward Stability and Prosperity: A

Program for Reconstruction and Recovery in Kosovo, November 1999.

6 UNMIK website. www.unmik.org

7 OSCE website. www.osce.org

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Levin.doc

Dear Senator Levin:

As required by Section 1213 of Public Law 106-398, the FY 2001
Defense
Authorization Act, I transmit herewith a six-month periodic report on
the
contributions of European nations and organizations to the
peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Obey.doc

Dear Representative Obey:

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Defense
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contributions of European nations and organizations to the
peacekeeping
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Sincerely,

The Honorable David R. Obey
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Skelton.doc

Dear Representative Skelton:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Spence.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Semiannual Kosovo Burdensharing Report to Congress

Purpose

To submit report to Congress on Kosovo Burdensharing.

Background

The FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act requires you submit a semiannual report to the Congress documenting Kosovo burdensharing contributions. The first report is

attached at Tab A and outlines commitments and pledges as well as the amount of assistance that has been provided by the European Commission, European Union, and

European member nations of NATO between July 1999 and October 2000 in the following five categories: reconstruction assistance, humanitarian assistance, assistance to the Kosovo Consolidated Budget (UNMIK),

international police, and
military commitments.

The report concludes that the Europeans have carried a significant
portion of the

aid-sharing burden in the region including approximately 64 percent
of
reconstruction costs, 92 percent of humanitarian assistance, 80 percent
of
international police and 80 percent of for the UNMIK budget. There is
no direct
legislative linkage between the new Kosovo report and previous
burdensharing
requirements proposed by Representative Kasich. However, these
amounts either
surpass or closely approach the requirements in Mr. Kasich's proposal.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to Congress transmitting the report at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Report to Congress

Tab B Transmittal letters

Tab C Incoming correspondence

2

2

7260

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Stevens.doc

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Warner.doc

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contributions of European nations and organizations to the
peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo.

Sincerely,

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7260 Young.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable C. W. Young
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001. email	Roseanne Hill to Richard Beardsworth. Subject: Action 7393. (9 pages)	12/08/2000	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/13/2000-01/11/2001]

2006-1363-F

vz5699

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/28/2000 5:35:17 PM
FROM Goldberg, David B. (INTECON)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT #7298 - Rpt to Congress on WIPO Treaties [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Duncan, John D. (INTECON)

CARBON_COPY Mitsler, Elaine M. (INTECON)

TEXT_BODY John --
Attached for your review is a package transmitting the annual report to Congress on the status of two World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties. I have placed the harcopy package on your desk.

There are a couple of problems with the report itself, unfortunately. For whatever reason, last year's report was not cleared by State EB and L before it got to the White House and had to be sent over there for substantial revision (I put the redline version of last year's report in the package folder). When I asked USPTO if they had cleared this year's report with State, they didn't seem to know and the POC in State EB (Michael Smith, 647-2291) had not seen it. I'm waiting to hear back from USPTO (Mike Keplinger 703-305-9300) on this and for USPTO to send an electronic version of the report -- they have your contact information. You can tell by comparing this year's report to last year's redline version that we'll (you'll) probably have to make very similar changes.

Anyway, I also put last year's package in the folder for comparison (boy, I'll bet you're going to miss being able to look at prior packages for guidance!) -- you'll notice I've tried to scale back the memos considerably.
David

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7298 - SRB Memo - WIPO.doc

December 28, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
GENE SPERLING

THROUGH: JOHN D. DUNCAN, JR.

FROM: DAVID B. GOLDBERG

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Two World Intellectual Property
Organization
Treaties

Attached is a memorandum to the President forwarding for his
approval an annual
report to Congress on the status of the World Intellectual Property
Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms
Treaty.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on November 29,
2000.

Our transmittal of the report was delayed pending input and clearance
from the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the State Department.

Concurrence by: Mary DeRosa, Dan Shapiro, Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress

Tab B Report to Congress on the Status of the World Intellectual
Property

Organization Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms
Treaty

Tab C Memorandum from Secretary Mineta

7298

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7298 - POTUS Memo - WIPO.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL R. BERGER
GENE SPERLING
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Report to the Congress on Two World Intellectual
Property Organization
(WIPO) Treaties

Purpose

Forward an annual report to Congress on the status of the World
Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the
Performances and Phonograms
Treaty.

Background

The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms
Treaty were
designed to provide intellectual property protection in electronic
commerce for
copyrighted works, performances, and sound recordings. The Senate's
resolution
of ratification for the two WIPO treaties requires you to submit
annually a
report on the international ratification status, implementation, and
enforcement
of the treaties.

While some 50 countries have become signatories of the two treaties
since their
approval by WIPO in 1996, only a fraction have actually ratified or
acceded to
them and only six have enacted the necessary domestic legislation to
implement

the treaties. The U.S. government and private industry have also raised concerns about the lack of enforcement measures taken by several ratifying countries.

As detailed in the attached report, the Administration has used bilateral discussions, trade agreements, consultations with private industry, and the Special 301 review process to increase the number of countries ratifying and enforcing the WIPO treaties.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the transmittal letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress

Tab B Report to Congress on the Status of the World Intellectual Property

Organization Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty

Tab C Memorandum from Secretary Mineta

2

2

7298

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7298 - POTUS Ltrs - WIPO.doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

As required by the second proviso of the text of the resolution of

ratification
of the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and
the World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, passed by
the Senate on October 21, 1998, I transmit herewith to the Committee
on Foreign
Relations the annual report on the status of the ratification of those
treaties
and related matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As required by the second proviso of the text of the resolution of
ratification
of the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and
the World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, passed by
the Senate on October 21, 1998, I transmit herewith to the Committee
on Foreign
Relations the annual report on the status of the ratification of those
treaties
and related matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/2/01 10:33:33 AM
FROM Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: #6953: POTUS Letter to Sen. Helms re Sikorsky Helos
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
Maxfield, Nancy H. (EUR)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

did this go forward? thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: DeRosa,
Mary B. (LEGAL)
Sent: Tuesday, December 26, 2000 2:59 PM
To: Kass,
Nicholas S. (EUR)
Cc: @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Blinken,
Antony J. (EUR); Quinn, Mary E. (EUR); @DEFENSE - Defense
Policy;
@LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: FW: #6953: POTUS Letter to Sen.
Helms re Sikorsky Helos [UNCLASSIFIED]

Clear for Legal.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR)
Sent: Wednesday, December
20, 2000 1:49 PM
To: Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS); Binnendijk, Johannes
A. (Hans) (DEFENSE); DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Cc: @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor;
Blinken,
Antony J. (EUR); Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
Subject: #6953: POTUS Letter
to Sen. Helms re Sikorsky Helos [UNCLASSIFIED]

Pls clear by COB
tomorrow (Thursday, 21 Dec), if possible. Thanks

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/14/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 11/7/2016
2006-1363-1(3)

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6953 SRB.doc

December 20, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY J. BLINKEN

FROM: NICHOLAS S. KASS

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Helms Concerning Turkey

Senator Helms wrote to the President on November 6 urging him to intervene personally to prevent "yet another effort to impose a de facto embargo on U.S. defense cooperation with Turkey" -- specifically, an attempt in Congress to "derail" the sale of eight (8) Sikorsky transport helicopters to the Turkish Government. He was referring obliquely to an informal hold that had been placed on the sale by Senators Biden and Sarbanes.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on November 8, 2000. Shortly after receiving the letter, we learned that Senators Biden and Sarbanes were already inclined to drop their objections, which were largely related to Turkish unwillingness to press hard for a resolution on Cyprus. Working with the Department of State, we succeeded in convincing the Senators in mid-December to lift their hold on the Sikorskys. Notification of the sale was sent to the Hill on December 15.

Concurrence: Mark Tavlarides, Hans Binnendijk, Mary DeRosa

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President attached at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Proposed Response to Senator Helms

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6953

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6953 POTUS.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator Helms Concerning Turkey

Purpose

Respond to Senator Helms.

Background

Senator Helms wrote recently urging you to intervene personally to prevent "yet another effort to impose a de facto embargo on U.S. defense cooperation with Turkey" -- specifically, an attempt in Congress to "derail" the sale of eight (8) Sikorsky CH-53 transport helicopters to Turkey. He was referring obliquely to an informal hold that had been placed on the sale by Senators Biden and Sarbanes.

The situation has been resolved. As a result of our efforts and those of the Department of State, by mid-December both senators had dropped their objections, which were largely related to Turkish unwillingness to press hard for a resolution on Cyprus. (According to the Department, Senator Biden did so through a letter to Madeleine, in which he also indicated that the legislative battle over arms sales to Turkey will recommence next year. Senator Sarbanes quietly dropped his objection to the Sikorsky sale, but privately cautioned the Department to avoid characterizing his decision in any way.) Notification of the sale was sent to the Hill on December 15.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Helms

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6953

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6953 ltr.doc

Dear Senator Helms:

Thank you for your recent letter regarding the sale of U.S. Sikorsky transport helicopters to Turkey. I am pleased that we submitted our notification of the sale to Congress on December 15, following discussions between senior Administration officials and key figures on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

As always, I greatly appreciate your strong support for our security relationship with Turkey, a key NATO ally. Like you, I am convinced that our strategic partnership with Turkey will become even more important as we head into the 21st century.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee
on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6225

1

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/11/01 5:51:19 PM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Helms on ABM/ICC/NATO/Cuba/Taiwan ... [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO

Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Beardsworth, Richard R. (Randy) (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bolton, Edward L. Jr. (DEFENSE)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)
Metzinger, Erin M. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Countryman, Mary Ellen (PRESS)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Cruise, Daniel L. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (INTERAM)
Mitchell, Donald A. (NSCCOMM)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Countryman, Mary Ellen (PRESS)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Cruise, Daniel L. (PRESS)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Mitchell, Donald A. (NSCCOMM)
Pisar, Leah F. (NSCCOMM)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
DeVine, Stephen (Legal)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Scharfen, Jonathan R. (LEGAL)
Wiegmann, John B. "Brad" (LEGAL)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Banbury, Anthony "Tony" N. (MULTI)
McClean, Matthew K. (MULTI)
Naplan, Steven J. (MULTI)
Patten, Wendy L. (MULTI)
Peterson-Becker, Augustine "Gusti" (ADMIN)
Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI)
Shea, Dorothy C. (MULTILAT)
Smith, Peter D. R. (MULTI)

Tierney, Mary "Theresa" T. (MULTI)
 Wilcox, Richard M. (MULTI)
 Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
 Crawford, Bernard T. (RECORDS)
 Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR)
 Maxfield, Nancy H. (EUR)
 Munter, Cameron P. (EUR)
 Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
 Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
 Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
 Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
 Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
 Fishel, Eugene (Gene) M. (RUE)
 Harrison, Hope M. (RUE)
 Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
 Metzger, Mary I. (RUE)
 Strickland, Christopher J. (RUE/INTERN)
 Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
 Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
 Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
 Christy, Gene B. (ASIA)
 Jarrett, Kenneth H. (ASIA)
 Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (ASIA)
 Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L. (ASIA)
 Smith, Holly M. (ASIA)
 Tighe, Mary P. (ASIA)
 Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
 Hammer, Michael A. (INTERAM)
 Hanley, Timothy P. (INTERAM/INTERN)
 Hollis, Caryn C. (INTERAM)
 Mattingly, Amanda C. (INTERAM/Intern)
 McIlhenny, William W. (INTERAM)
 Merletti, Roger D. (INTERAM)
 Snowden, Deniz (INTERAM)
 Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)
 Wallace, Joanna B. (INTERAM)
 Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

a5184
 ^BC-USA-CONGRESS-HELMS
 ^Helms says U.S. not bound by ABM
 Treaty
 By Tabassum Zakaria
 WASHINGTON, Jan 11 (Reuters)
 - The influential chairman of
 the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
 Committee said on Thursday that the
 United States was not bound

by an arms control treaty that Russia has said would be violated if a missile defense were deployed to protect the United States and its allies.

Sen. Jesse Helms, who will be going into his seventh year as head of the committee, said the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) expired when the Soviet Union dissolved and should not be an impediment to a U.S. missile shield.

"The United States is no longer bound by the ABM Treaty -- that treaty expired when our treaty partner the Soviet Union ceased to exist," said Helms, a North Carolina Republican. "Personally, I do not think that a new ABM Treaty can be negotiated with Russia that would permit the kind of defenses that America needs and must have," he said in a speech at The American Enterprise Institute.

President Bill Clinton deferred a decision on whether to deploy a national missile defense system to President-elect George W. Bush, who takes office on Jan. 20. Russia and China have opposed a U.S. national missile defense, saying it could lead to a renewed arms race. Donald Rumsfeld, Bush's choice for defense secretary, said at his confirmation hearing on Thursday the United States must develop defenses against missile attack. But he refrained from setting any date for deployment. Helms said his top priority would be to undo Clinton's endorsement of a treaty to create the first permanent global court for trying alleged war criminals. Some Republicans are concerned such a court could lead to

a foreign country putting members of the U.S. military on trial.

"I will make reversing this decision and protecting America's fighting men and women from the jurisdiction of this international kangaroo court my single highest priority in the new Congress," Helms said. Bush's team has criticized the treaty as flawed and said that Bush would not send it to the Senate for ratification in its current form.

The International Criminal Court would be set up in the Netherlands to try individuals accused of mass murders, war crimes and other gross human rights violations. The tribunal would not come into force until 60 countries ratify the treaty, and so far almost half that number have done so.

Helms said he intended to work with the Bush administration to ensure that the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia would be invited to join NATO, an expansion that Russia opposes.

"We must show Russia's leaders an open path to good relations, while at the same time closing off their avenues to destructive behavior,"

Helms said. He said he hoped more action would be taken to undermine foreign leaders such as Cuban President Fidel Castro and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

"We must have a new Iraq policy, and such a policy must be based on a clear understanding of this salient fact: Nothing will change in Iraq until Saddam Hussein is removed from power," Helms said. He advocated a new U.S. policy on Cuba, saying debate over whether to lift the economic embargo against the communist-ruled island was likely

to end with a Bush White House which supports keeping it.

Helms

said the types of policies that undermined communism in Poland could

also be applied to Cuba.

On Taiwan, Helms said the island's

self-defense capabilities

were not keeping up with China's military

modernization and it was "imperativ

e that we act quickly to reverse

the decline."

RB-- 01/11/01 17:16:55