

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Donald Mitchell to James Smith. Subject: Sample Dox re UN. (7 pages)	06/23/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Steven Andreasen to Caroline Krass, Hal Shapiro, and Mark Tavlarides. Subject: Rpt Congress CTBT-Related Annual Certification of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile. (21 pages)	09/04/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/03/2000-09/04/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5698

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 05/03/2000 3:19:15 PM
FROM Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT For Mark T. and Steve N. [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)
McClean, Matthew K. (MULTI)
Naplan, Steven J. (MULTI)
Patten, Wendy L. (MULTI)
Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI)
Smith, Peter D. R. (MULTI)
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt) (MULTI)
Wilcox, Richard M. (MULTI)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY For comments/clearance please

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

2866 srb.doc

May 3, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN

FROM: NICHOLAS KASS

SUBJECT: President's Report to Congress on Cyprus

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President transmitting his bimonthly Report to Congress on Cyprus, submitted in accordance with the International Security Assistance Act of 1978. This report covers the February-March 2000 timeframe and should be submitted as soon as possible.

Concurrences by: Chuck Allen, Mark Tavlarides, Steven Naplan

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress
Tab B Report to Congress
Tab II Incoming from State

1

2866

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2866 Report to Congress on Cyprus.doc
President's Bimonthly Report on Cyprus
February - March 2000

As reported in the previous Bimonthly Report, UNSYG Kofi Annan resumed proximity talks on Cyprus in Geneva on January 31. UNSYG Annan and Special Advisor Alvaro de Soto continued discussions with the leaders of the two communities that began in New York in December. Special Emissary Moses, Special Coordinator Weston and U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Bandler were also in Geneva and held consultations with Mr. de Soto as well as separate meetings with both sides. On February 8, Mr. de Soto reported that following a total of 14 meetings with both parties, the process is on track and will resume on May 23 in New York.

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering traveled to Greece on February 2. He met with Prime Minister Simitis, Foreign Minister Papandreou and Defense Minister Tsohatzopoulos. Under Secretary Pickering applauded Greek and Turkish efforts to forge stronger ties and hoped they could open a way to a negotiated settlement on Cyprus.

U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Donald Bandler traveled to the Karpas region in northern Cyprus on February 23 to meet with representatives of the Greek Cypriot population and discuss their living conditions.

On February 25 Ambassador Bandler met with Cypriot President Clerides to follow up on the Geneva proximity talks. The next day, February 26, Ambassador Bandler met with Foreign Minister Kasoulides.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 2. During the question and answer session, Senator Mikulski asked Secretary Albright about the prospects for a Cyprus settlement. The Secretary assured her Senate colleague that the Administration was working hard to facilitate a comprehensive Cyprus settlement.

Ambassador Bandler met with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash on March 2 and discussed the February UN-sponsored talks.

Special Coordinator for Cyprus Thomas Weston traveled to Berlin to meet with German Cyprus Coordinator zu Rantzau and MFA Southern Europe Director Pauls on March 2. Mr. Weston then attended the March 3 bi-annual EU-Troika meeting in Brussels and met with EU Presidency Representative on Cyprus Mathias and EU Commission Southern Europe Director van der Linden. He held separate meetings with EU Commission Director General Landaburu, EU Commission Cyprus Negotiator Maurer, Belgian MFA Director General de Ruyt, Turkish Ambassador to NATO Oymen, Turkish Ambassador to the EU Akyol and Greek Ambassador to the

EU Tsilas. Mr.

Weston then joined Ambassador Alfred Moses in Cyprus on March 7.

UN Secretary-General Special Advisor on Cyprus Alvaro de Soto traveled to Cyprus

March 1-7 for meetings with Messers. Clerides and Denktash. He then traveled to

Ankara and Athens for meetings with Turkish Foreign Minister Cem and Greek

Foreign Minister Papandreou.

Special Presidential Emissary Alfred Moses and Special Cyprus Coordinator Weston

visited Cyprus from March 7-10. Ambassador Moses met with Mr. de Soto prior to

Mr. de Soto's departure from Cyprus on March 7. Ambassador Moses and Mr. Weston,

accompanied by Ambassador Bandler met, separately, with Messers. Clerides and

Denktash to help prepare for the third session of UN-sponsored Cyprus talks.

They encouraged both parties to remain flexible and make further progress in

moving toward a comprehensive settlement. During their visit, Ambassador Moses

and Mr. Weston also met with other prominent Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots,

visited Varosha and Famagusta, and traveled to the Karpas region to meet with

Greek Cypriots living there.

Ambassador Bandler met with Messrs. Clerides and Kasoulides on March 27 to

exchange views on the current UN process.

2

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2866 potus.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Cyprus

Purpose

Forward the bimonthly Presidential Report to the Congress on Cyprus.

Background

The International Security Assistance Act of 1978 requires that you submit a bimonthly report on progress made during the period toward "the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem," including any relevant reports prepared by the UN Secretary General for the Security Council. The Department of State has prepared for your approval a draft Presidential Report on Cyprus, which is at Tab B. At Tab A are transmittal letters to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The previous report covered progress during December 1999 - January 2000. The current report covers the period February - March 2000.

The United States remains actively engaged in efforts to promote negotiations, under United Nations auspices and without preconditions, to settle the Cyprus dispute.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Congress at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress

Tab B Report to Congress

2

2866

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2866 helms.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2372 (c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period February 1-March 31, 2000. The previous submission covered events during December 1999 and January 2000.

As noted in my last submission, the United Nations has held two sessions of proximity talks from December 3-14, 1999 in New York and from January 31-February 8 in Geneva. The next session of talks is scheduled to begin on May 23 in New York.

The United States, under the guidance of my Special Presidential Emissary Alfred H. Moses and Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas G. Weston, has been actively engaged in supporting the United Nations' effort to bring about a comprehensive Cyprus settlement. Ambassador Moses and this team were present during the Geneva talks and thereafter, traveled to Cyprus in early March to prepare for the May 23 talks.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Enclosure

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 2866 Hastert.doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2372 (c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period February 1-March 31,2000. The previous submission covered events during December 1999 and January 2000.

As noted in my last submission, the United Nations has held two sessions of proximity talks from December 3-14, 1999 in New York and from January 31-February 8 in Geneva. The next session of talks is scheduled to begin on May 23 in New York.

The United States, under the guidance of my Special Presidential Emissary Alfred

H. Moses and Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas G. Weston, has been actively engaged in supporting the United Nations' effort to bring about a comprehensive Cyprus settlement. Ambassador Moses and this team were present during the Geneva talks and thereafter, traveled to Cyprus in early March to prepare for the May 23 talks.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Enclosure

1

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 05/12/2000 8:20:27 AM
FROM Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Legal Status of Russian Federation as successor to USSR [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Black, Steven K. (VP)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)

TEXT_BODY Unfortunately, Helms is impressed by the heritage foundations piece.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Black, Steven K. (VP)

Sent: Friday, May 12,
2000 7:57 AM

To: Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL); Tavlarides, Mark J.
(LEGIS); Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

Cc: Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE);

@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans)
(DEFENSE); Saunders, Richard M. (VP)

Subject: RE: Legal Status
of Russian Federation as successor to USSR [UNCLASSIFIED]

Caroline:

Thank you. You have given me a very good start, and perhaps I'll finish with your input as well. However, I'm still bothered by some loose ends.

Mark: OK. I've retrieved the Heritage Foundation information and I've read it. I'm not impressed.

Anybody:

Here are some specific follow-up questions to anybody who can answer.

* Is there a Senate document (bill, amendment, report, etc) associated with Senate's advice and consent to the CFE Flank Document? What is the reference? When did it pass? Caroline's note indicates it would be May 97, but I have found NOTHING in Thomas -- I'm clearly not looking for it very intelligently. Where are the conditions located that Caroline refers to below? I have tried key words (CFE, Europe, flank, agreement and treaty) and sponsors/co-sponsors to no avail. Please give me the index/identification information I need to find what I'm looking for (the "what" might be clearer below).

* Is there a Senate document (bill, amendment, report, etc) associated with authorizing/appropriating funds for US forces in Europe that was in some way associated with the CFE Flank agreement and which said something about the legal definitions of the ABM Treaty and the Succession MOU? What is the reference? When did it pass?

* What is HR 1757? Did it pass? Does it mean anything to this conversation? Is there a Senate counterpart?

* Caroline's assertion that "there was no legislation" must have a narrow, technical meaning that I don't understand, because I found HR 1757 (Gilman), which means there's something out there. Maybe it's not a relevant hit, but I just want somebody to tell me that. The author of the article below was referring to some piece of legislation, maybe incorrectly, as Caroline says, but I would like to know what the misleading reference is. Furthermore, is it true that the Duma also sees a problem with the Helms position and addressed it with a protocol? If so, where did the Duma get its information? I gotta think it was from some public legislation or utterance (you don't suppose they visited the Heritage Foundation site?)

-----Original Message-----

From: Tavlarides, Mark J.

(LEGIS)

Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 7:52 PM

To: Tavlarides,

Mark J. (LEGIS); Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL); Black, Steven K.

(VP); Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

Cc: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor;

@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans)

(DEFENSE); Saunders, Richard M. (VP)

Subject: RE: Legal Status

of Russian Federation as successor to USSR [UNCLASSIFIED]

Also,
Heritage Foundation did a study on whether treaties are legally binding under successor state to USSR. It's the gospel for helms and his ilk.

-----Original Message-----

From: Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)

Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 7:25 PM

To: Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL);

Black, Steven K. (VP); Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

Cc: @LEGAL

- Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE); Saunders, Richard M. (VP)

Subject: RE: Legal

Status of Russian Federation as successor to USSR [UNCLASSIFIED]

Let
me give you the political answer. Helms does not believe (his staff has told me on numerous occasions) that we are legally bound to treaties with Russia that were negotiated and ratified under the USSR. That is the long and short of it.

-----Original Message-----

From: Krass,

Caroline D. (LEGAL)

Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 4:43 PM

To: Black,

Steven K. (VP); Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

Cc: @LEGAL - Legal

Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE); Saunders, Richard M. (VP)

Subject: RE: Legal

Status of Russian Federation as successor to USSR [UNCLASSIFIED]

Steve:

The
background on this is somewhat intricate, and I would want to coordinate with Steve before NSC gives you a formal answer to the VP's question. However, attached is the answer to your question about what legislation the article was referring to. The article is misleading -- there was no legislation, and Helms did not insert language into the CFE Document itself. Below is a brief history:

When the Senate gave
its advice and consent to the CFE Flank Document in May 1997, one of the 14 conditions they imposed (Condition 9) was that:

"Prior

to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that he will submit for Senate advice and consent to ratification any international agreement (i) that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or (ii) that would change the geographic scope or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term "national territory" as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM Treaty."

On May 14, 1997, the President reported to the Senate, inter alia, that:

"In connection with Condition (9) ... I will submit to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification any international agreement (i) that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or (ii) that would change the geographic scope or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term "national territory" as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM Treaty."

On that date, he also explained that:

Condition (9), which requires my certification that any agreement governing ABM Treaty succession will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, is an issue of particular concern not only because it addresses a matter reserved to the President under our Constitution, but also because it is substantively unrelated to the CFE Flank Document. It is clearly within the President's authorities to determine the successor States to a treaty when the original Party dissolves, to make the adjustments required to accomplish such succession, and to enter into agreements for this purpose. Indeed, throughout our history the executive branch has made a large number of determinations concerning the succession of new States to the treaty rights and obligations of their predecessors. The ABM Succession MOU negotiated by the United States effectuated no substantive change in the ABM Treaty requiring Senate advice and consent. Nonetheless, in light of my commitment to agree to seek Senate approval of the Demarcation Agreements associated with the ABM Treaty, I have, without prejudice to the legal principles involved, certified, consistent with Condition (9), that I will submit any agreement concluded on ABM Treaty succession to the Senate advice and consent."

-----Original Message-----

From: Black, Steven

K. (VP)

Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2000 3:57 PM

To: Andreasen, Steven
P. (DEFENSE)
Cc: @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs; Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE); Saunders, Richard
M. (VP)
Subject: Legal Status of Russian Federation as successor
to USSR [UNCLASSIFIED]

The Vice President has asked the question,
"What is Sen Helms' argument regarding the legal status of Russia
as the successor to the Soviet Union as signatory to the ABM Treaty?"
I also need to provide our legal response to that argument. I already
have a two-page "discussion" of the legal status of the succession
arrangement as reflected in the Sept 97 MOU on succession.

I
have also looked around Thomas in an effort to find the legislation
referred to in the article I think piqued the VP's interest (see
below), but with only limited success. I found HR 1757 and HR 1758,
which have references to ABM succession. HR 1757 (Sec 1705) might
be relevant, but I don't know for sure.

Can anybody help out
with this question? Thank you. Steven Black

New York Times

April

29, 2000

Right's Anti-ABM Weapon: A Senate Clause On Russia

By

Elizabeth Becker

WASHINGTON, April 28 -- In their battle to scuttle
President Clinton's limited national missile defense system, Senate
conservatives have a little-noted weapon -- a clause they inserted
into another pact leaving it up to senators, and not President Clinton,
to decide whether Russia inherited the Soviet role in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty.

In all other matters, Russia has been treated as
the legal successor state to the Soviet Union, taking the Soviet
seat on the United Nations Security Council and assuming its responsibilities
in other treaties.

But Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North
Carolina and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, put language
into a separate 1997 treaty on troop deployments in Europe that allows
the Senate to decide whether Russia is a party to the ABM treaty,
and therefore whether the treaty still exists.

Two years ago he
wrote Mr. Clinton, suggesting that even the United States was no
longer a party to the ABM treaty.

"If it is unclear as a matter

of law whether Russia or any other country that emerged from the Soviet Union is today bound by the ABM treaty," he wrote, in a letter also signed by Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Republican of New York, "then it also should be unclear whether the United States is so bound."

Now, just as the Clinton administration approaches a decision on whether to deploy a national missile defense, which Russia opposes, Mr. Helms intends to take full advantage of the provision, according to a senior Congressional aide.

The administration is pressing

Russia to amend the ABM treaty to permit a limited national missile defense. Mr. Helms and his allies favor a far grander shield than the administration seeks, and are ready to scuttle the ABM treaty for it.

By raising the question of whether Russia is even a party to the treaty, these Republican senators believe they have the trump card.

"We are about enter into the culminating debate on the future of the ABM treaty," said Baker Spring, an arms expert at the Heritage Foundation who helped draft the stipulation.

Some concede that

the Senate may have outmaneuvered the administration with this clause.

"The ABM treaty is lying in suspended animation," said a State Department official.

In deciding this year whether to approve a

\$30 billion limited antimissile system for Alaska, the president will consider the effect that the system will have on arms control agreements. Since the ABM treaty prohibits any national missile system, the administration has been negotiating with the Russians since August to make necessary amendments.

At the same time, the State Department

has been unable to treat Russia as a legal partner. Even though the Soviet Union was dissolved eight years ago, Russia still does not have a full voice at the twice-yearly ABM talks in Geneva.

While

this may seem an arcane debate between the Senate and the White House, it is being viewed seriously in capitals around the world.

The

Russian Parliament, too, understands the Senate action. The lower house's ratification of Start II this month included a protocol requiring the United States to recognize Russia as the successor state.

Mr.

Helms said this week that he would kill the Clinton proposal for a missile defense system he considers inadequate. And he said tellingly that he would prevent "a resurrection of the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty" in order to build that system.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 05/23/2000 4:47:18 PM
FROM Marsh, Thomas S (RECORDS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Hmm... [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Goldberg, David B. (RECORDS/INTECON)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

even better

-----Original Message-----

From: Goldberg, David
B. (RECORDS/INTECON)
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 4:47 PM
To: Marsh,
Thomas S (RECORDS)
Subject: RE: Hmm... [UNCLASSIFIED]

Funny.
I was thinking of the Jesse Helms Senate Office Building Annex.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Marsh, Thomas S (RECORDS)
Sent: Tuesday, May
23, 2000 4:46 PM
To: Daniel Sanborn; David Goldberg; Sang Lee; Travis
Good
Subject: RE: Hmm... [UNCLASSIFIED]

"The Nancy Q. Reagan
Memorial Federal Building and Restaurant"

-----Original Message-----

From: Goldberg,
David B. (RECORDS/INTECON)
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 4:41 PM
To: Marsh,
Thomas S (RECORDS); Good, Travis C. (RECORDS)
Subject: Hmm...
[UNCLASSIFIED]

any comments?

-----Original Message-----

From: Lackey,
Miles M. (LEGIS)
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 4:36 PM
To: @ALLNSC
- NSC Staff
Subject: Harry Truman [UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI

The House
just passed legislation (413-0) to rename the State Department HQ
as "The Harry S Truman Federal Building."

No word on Senate
action.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 05/23/2000 5:36:53 PM
FROM Goldberg, David B. (RECORDS/INTECON)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Harry Truman [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bruns, Judson L. (Jay) (INTECON)
Duncan, John D. (INTECON/DOS)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Jay, we're lucky congress didn't name it the Jesse Helms Senate Office Building Annex.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bruns, Judson
L. (Jay) (INTECON)
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 5:14 PM
To: Lackey,
Miles M. (LEGIS); @ALLNSC - NSC Staff
Subject: RE: Harry Truman
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Hope that means that from now on, more bucks will be stopping there.

-----Original Message-----

From: Lackey,
Miles M. (LEGIS)
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2000 4:36 PM
To: @ALLNSC
- NSC Staff
Subject: Harry Truman [UNCLASSIFIED]

FYI

The House
just passed legislation (413-0) to rename the State Department HQ
as "The Harry S Truman Federal Building."

No word on Senate
action.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 05/30/2000 10:03:07 AM
FROM Akers, Dale W. (STP)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Document1 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Doc1.doc
1405 Twent~j-ninth S~reef, N.W
WashIng1~on,D.C. 2000?

Albert Gore, Jr.

Vice President of the United States

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Subject: ARM Treaty - modification or abrogation
November 17, 1999

I have been a loyal and enthusiastic supporter of yours and the President's over the years and through several campaigns (starting in 1992), not to mention also working on the campaigns of Senator Robb and Governor Glendenning. I have to say that I am so appalled by the apparent direction this Administration is taking on the possible modification or abrogation of the ARM Treaty that it very nearly outweighs the good I perceive you have accomplished and the good I expect from you in the future!

Some questions/comments:

- What is a limited ARM system, why would it work, and why won't it, necessarily, grow?
- What about an exoatmospheric blast by an enemy attempting to

penetrate the
system? How do you propose to test it system against resulting EMP,
signal
disruption, etc.? Though sophisticated, the test facilities in New
Mexico and
computer simulations can't come near to representing the real world
complications
of that environment.
-- How will a site in Alaska protect against all corners (or incomers)?
Looks to me as if a missile, from (lets say) Iraq to 1500 Pennsylvania
Ave.,
would come closer to Newfoundland than Alaska. Even if our ARM
interceptor could
hit the target at that 4,500 plus mile range with excellent reliability, its
time
to the target would be held to the speed limits imposed by a ballistic
trajectory, giving us, maybe, 4 minutes of warning and decision time
tQ intercept
the missile before it was over the US! Not a whole
lot of time!
If you really must have one of these, and it has the range to be
effective off
Newfoundland when operating from Alaska why not put it at
Malmstrom where the
original Treaty allowed it?
What if the bad guys just station some missiles on ships or barges
anchored off
our coasts? (I think the Navy or someone in DOD was looking at a
basing approach
similar to this for some of our weapons.)
-- If! were a "terrorist nation" and wanted to hit the US with a few
missile-delivered weapons, I would buy me a few surplus busses from
the Russians
(or perhaps one of their former satellites). Probably could buy them on
the
internet! I would load them with dummies (other than whatever
national security
people are pushing this limited ABM) and fire them off until the
limited ABM
system was exhausted. Gosh, if I was gonna do that, or you thought
the Alaskan
location wouldn't cover the US, you'd need a few more sites and a lot
more
interceptors wouldn't you?
-- Try a better public works project to satisfy the Senator from Alaska!

Mississippi, too?
-- I doubt you can BS the North Koreans with this system. I thought
there was
just agreement on no more missile testing by the Koreans - why mess

with the ABM Treaty until the Koreans break that agreement, unless you just like to be the first to break treaties?
- Do we need a Continental Air Defense system, too? Is that more expensive than Social Security?

I worked on the former SAFEGUARD system. It wasn't as crazy as this. Ultimately, the best argument for it was, of course, Melvin Laird's, which was to push the USSR into agreeing to the ARM Treaty. So we fought it through the Congress and got the Malmstrom site and the ARM Treaty. But SAFEGUARD might actually have made an enemy's think twice about the degree of success of an attack upon our hardened missile sites. There were tricky things such as the possible effects on incoming warheads of the (good old) exoatmospheric blast of the nuclear warhead on our Spartan interceptor missile; possible fratricide among incoming warheads as they attempted to destroy targets in a limited area quickly; a degree of uncertainty as to our detection system's ability to distinguish between warheads, dummies, and other countermeasures once they entered the atmosphere; and the possibility of upgrading the system. It is a lot easier to create that uncertainty than it is to try to pretend you can stop every warhead! The main point was that you didn't have to destroy every last warhead to make the SAFEGUARD a success. Although an enemy could be fairly certain of overwhelming it at any particular site by pouring in a large surplus of warheads, there was great uncertainty as to the number of missiles required to get through the system and knock out all of the protected hard targets, so the tradeoff wasn't too bad. Still, we traded it for the ARM Treaty! Good deal!

ON THE OTHER HAND, I reckon your limited system is subject to sabotage, disruption or destruction (as it is only in one location); and really

extremely
 "limited" as it has to take care of every reentry body (without the
 atmosphere to
 help sort out dummies and countermeasures), and is easily
 overwhelmed. THERE IS
 ANOTHER FACTOR, which became evident as we began to attempt
 to build more and
 more SAFEGUARD sites throughout the country. Americans didn't
 mind having
 offensive missiles in the neighborhood but the thought of a defensive
 system
 actually being built scared the heck out of them, because it made it
 seem
 possible that it might actually have to be used. You abrogate the ARM
 treaty,
 and enrage our allies, the Russians and the Chinese. Then, the public
 gets wise
 to the fact that our ABM won't do the job, gets cold feet or fiscally
 prudent,
 and won't let you build it. Not such a good deal!

Maybe, as a way of distancing yourself from the President (whom I
 dearly love -
 except for this) you could explain to the American public that a
 limited ARM
 system is a political hoax that won't begin to protect them from nukes.
 chemicals
 or bugs, and that this is a stupid, Republican-based idea. Promise, if
 elected,
 that you will fire the dopes who thought this up. Somehow the
 thinking that
 opposes the ARM Treaty because it restricts us reminds me of the
 good old boys
 who oppose gun control because they don't like somebody telling
 them they
 shouldn't carry a concealed weapon for self protection!

Nukes

- The system probably won't work and it won't be effective against
 even a
 relatively simple missile attack employing a few decoys or optimum
 launch sites.
- Why bother with missiles anyway?
- One can hide very substantial weapons aboard ships and sail them it
 into, or
 near, New York and Los Angeles and maybe even Gulf~ort?
- (Remember: we are dealing
 with nut cases who think it's a good idea to launch a nuclear attack on
 the US.
 They probably would have a few martyrs to set the things off, in

addition to the
martyrs at home!)
-- Maybe one of the drug cartels could smuggle in a few weapons for
a price.
Probably greater reliability than a "terrorist state" missile! (Same
martyrs set
them off!)
1

/

Chemicals

- Is a missile really the best, cheapest or easiest way to effectively
disseminate nerve gas or whatever chemical weapon you like best.
Last I heard VX
was pretty flammable; is a reentry vehicle the best way to deliver it?
What about
aircraft, even a few crop dusters or fire trucks, manned by volunteers
with some
good excess Russian chemical protective suits, or how about
substituting the
stuff for the insecticide NYC is spraying over the city, or just some
nuts on our
metros. Maybe a little demolition job near the Blue Plains chlorine
storage area
during a good SE blow or at similar facilities in Los Angeles? (I think
the
Internet is showing me several chlorine storage areas a few miles from
the LA
Convention Center? I want to leave them be so I haven't checked
further.)

Bugs

- Why not spend about \$380 for envelopes and 33-cent stamps and
mail anthrax (or
anthrax and ebola - or whatever) to spread, simultaneously, nasty
germs to a
thousand points in the US? The Postal Service is pretty reliable these
days,
certainly more reliable than "terrorist state" missiles, and cheaper!
Maybe just
inject some ducks with a really good flu virus?

The greatest failure (amid a lot of successes my Republican friends
said would
never happen) of this Administration appears to be the effects of its
national
security policies on our relations with the Russians and lately the
Chinese.

(Having served at the US Mission, I was for NATO expansion. I love NATO.)

However, it appears that the negative effect on Russia may have more than offset

its positive effect on Eastern Europe, too bad - but why keep making mistakes

with the Russians?) Even if you build this stupid system, and inevitably expand

it, the bad guys can still get us, and it may lead them to explore other surer

and sneakier delivery methods. It will certainly upset the Russians and the

Chinese who will retain, no matter what, the ability to destroy this country. It

will undercut all arms control efforts with those countries and worldwide (even

dumber and more destructive than the Senate's vote on the test ban).

Sincerely

Robert C. Nicholas, III

PS. Sorry about the tone of this letter, but it does express my exasperation!

European Molecular Biology Laboratory
Europäisches Laboratorium für Molekularbiologie
Laboratoire Européen de Biologie Moléculaire

Dr. Thomas Dandekar

To
Mr. Al Gore
The Vice President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Re: Year 2000 Problem and
Strategic disarmament

Dear Mr. Vice President,

your efforts for disarmament are very noteworthy, in particular in the area of

strategic weapons (for instance regarding the negotiations for START3).

This involves further complicated, time consuming negotiations but the impact on

relations with Russia and strategic safety for the US and Europe is already now

quite substantial and noticeable.

However, I would like to point your attention to a problem of particular concern

just now, at the turn of the century:

The year 2000 problem regarding computers for and automatic control of strategic

nuclear weapons, in particular missiles. It would be most unfortunate if by a Y2K

problem accidentally one of this most disastrous weapons is triggered or even

explodes with potential even wider nuclear escalation caused just by a computer

mistake.

I strongly pledge that you take every measure to prevent such a terrible scenario

happening and kindly ask you and your office to actively engage in negotiations

with all concerned Russian parties, in particular the Russian military, as such a

mistake is in fact much more probable from their side with their much older and

less perfect electronic systems.

Thank you very much, please protect the States and Europe also from such

unfortunate accidents,

Sincerely yours

This letter represents only a private opinion of the writer and is no official

statement of the EMBL

STATEMENT OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN PARTICIPANTS
FDL-AP YOUTH LEADERS WORKSHOP

The delegates of Southeast Asia to the 4th Young Leaders Workshop

sponsored by
the Forum Democratic Leaders in the Asia-Pacific and the Friedrich
Naumann
Foundation on August 15 -19, 1999 Seoul, Korea, hereby:

AFFIRM the universality and indivisibility of human rights as
enshrined in the
Universal Declaration Human Right and the rights of students and
youths to
political participation.

REJECT the 'Asian Values' argument that human rights and
democracy are
incompatible with either economic growth or Asian traditions.

CALL FOR the abolition of National Security laws and other laws
which inhibit
youth political participation and democratic process; the broader
parliamentary
representation of marginalized sectors of society; the release of all
political
prisoners, particularly youth activists, including Mm Ko Naing of
Burma, Budim
Sudjatmiko of Indonesia, Lim Guan Eng of Malaysia.

CALL FOR social justice programs to address the problems suffered
by victims of
development aggression; the protection of cultural and land rights of
indigenous
peoples through enactment and just enforcement environmental laws;
the
transparency and accountability in the work of political parties, NGOs
and other
civil society organizations as well as in government and businesses;

CALL FOR the cessation of restrictions upon Press freedom through
security laws
and commercial manipulation; the serious efforts to stop police and
security forces
from committing human rights violations and the establishment of
independent human
rights commissions in all Asean countries, which work educate the
population
about their rights, investigate human rights violations and initiate
prosecution
violators when appropriate.

CALL FOR Asean to abandon its "non-interference policy in order to
seriously and
determinedly promote respect for human rights and democratization

across the
Southeast Asian region.

SIGNED:

Minister of Interior

September 15, 1999
Jerusalem

Mr~ Albert Gore
Vice-President
United States of America

I)ear Mr. Vice-President,

i\lthough there have been quite a number of changes in the world and in Israel since we were last in touch, many of the issues that we discussed over the past few years are as pertinent today as they were then. I remember well your keen understanding of the strategic goals and problems in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and specifically with their eastern neighbors. It is in view of your deep interest in these issues, that I take the liberty to write to you today.

Last week, I met with Mr. Tokayev - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Mr. Utemuratov - Chief of Staff to the President of

Kazakhstan, who were on an informal visit to Israel.

As you well know, Kazakhstan is becoming of increasing strategic importance in its region. With its vast natural resources, relatively free economic borders and progressive openness to Western influence, Kazakhstan's position as a partner and as a bulwark to regional fundamentalist influence is crucial. Despite objective difficulties, Kazakhstan has made efforts over the past few years to become increasingly connected to the West.

Yet, the recent leakage of weapons from Kazakhstan to North Korea has seriously undermined these efforts, and has brought a wave of negative attention to Kazakhstan.

Even with my limited knowledge of the ins and outs of the Kazakh government system, I was quite certain that this leakage of weapons was aided, or initiated, with the direct involvement of high-ranking officials in the Kazakh government and within its security services. In my two-hour long meeting with the Kazakh dignitaries, there was no effort on their part to disabuse me of my intuitive understanding. They informed me that this event is viewed with deepest concern among the Kazakh leadership; two government ministers, including the Minister of Defense, were

replaced, a top official of the security services (rank of General) was arrested, and a number of other people in the security services were fired.

In their words, they would be willing to do virtually anything to try to regain their former status, and to prove that they are indeed determined to prevent any recurrences of incidents such as the leakage of weapons to North Korea.

I stressed to my Kazakh guests that, in my opinion, the best, and perhaps only,

way for the Kazakh leadership to prove this determination is through cooperating fully and intensely with the West, and in particular with the United States, in investigating the leakage that occurred, and creating a framework for future cooperation. This, I told them, could serve as indication to the earnestness of their resolve.

Mr. Vice-President - though, of course, I am gravely concerned with the leakage of weapons to North Korea, I believe that this event may also serve as an unplanned, but unique opportunity. I believe that this event offers the West - and first and foremost the United States - an opportunity to put Kazakhstan "to the test"; to see if indeed this country wishes to turn its face Westward, and to cooperate fully in the numerous regional issues of strategic importance, to which Kazakhstan is inevitably linked. My feeling is that they are ready to be put to the test.

If this test is successful, and if indeed the Kazakh leadership will prove its determination not merely in words but in actions, I am certain that Kazakhstan can serve as a far more important stabilizing force in the region than it is to date. This, of course, would be of great importance to the West, and especially to Israel.

I look forward to hearing from you on this matter.

Meanwhile, on behalf of myself and Avital, I wish you and Tipper a good year and the best of everything.

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46204-2797
FRANK O'BANNON Jul 14 1999
GOVERNOR

The Vice President
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Mr. Vice President:

As your Administration begins to develop the Fiscal Year 2001
Department of
Defense (DOD) Budget, I would like to take this time to express my
support for
inclusion of the necessary funding for procurement of the C-130J
aircraft. This
is an issue of both national and local importance to me.

As you may know, the C-130 has been the workhorse of the military's
tactical
airlift fleet, serving as the only tactical short-range cargo plane of the
Army,
Air Force and Marines. It was used extensively during the recent
NATO campaign in
the Balkans. However, more than half of the current fleet of combat
delivery
C-130's are 30 years old or older. Although this may be a testament to
the value
of the aircraft, it also raises serious concerns about maintenance of the
fleet
in the near future and its impact on the readiness of our forces to meet
airlift
requirements. It is my understanding that the new C-130J model has a
number of
significant improvements in range and operational capabilities than
the current
model, making the C-130J not only more efficient but also more cost
effective,
with lower maintenance and operations costs.

The C-130 plays an even larger role for my home state of Indiana.
Rolls-Royce
Allison in Indianapolis, which manufactures the AE2 100 turboprop
engines used
in the C-130, employs over 5000 Hoosiers and is the third largest

employer in
Indianapolis. The continued production of the C-130J is critical to
their
livelihood.

The Air Force has plans to purchase the aircraft beginning in FY
2002, and the
Marine Corps
plans to purchase the aircraft beginning in FY 2003. However, in
order to avoid a
temporary production
shut down and loss of continuity in the workforce, it is imperative that
funding
be included in the FY
2001 budget for the accelerated procurement of the C-130J. If U.S.
orders are
not pulled forward to FY
2001, the production line will experience a "gap" which could result
in an
immediate loss of jobs in
Indiana and other states which manufacture the C-130J.

Given the increased operational tempo under which our military has
been recently
operating, the aging fleet of the tactical airlift aircraft, and the pending
loss
of skilled workforce, I believe that inclusion in the FY 2001 defense
budget of
funding for the C-130J is all the more urgent.

Thank you for your consideration.

UNION OF
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS
July 23, 1999

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
INITIALS: VL DATE: 3/5/2014

Leon Fuerth
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Fax: 456-9500

Dear Mr. Fuerth:

I am writing you to thank you for your work on behalf of the various
cooperative
nuclear and security programs, and to request once again that you
direct your

attention to two problems as you prepare for the upcoming meeting between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Stepashin. My concerns resemble those expressed in a group letter sent to you on March 12, 1999 that focussed on both the MPC&A implementation agreement and nuclear material consolidation and conversion. Over the course of time, these issues have in fact become more pressing.

MPC&A implementation Agreement. I am aware that the MPC&A implementation agreement will be discussed at the meeting between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister. The problems of taxation and liability have postponed conclusion of this agreement for a year now, despite the wishes of both sides to get on with the important work in progress and begin new initiatives, such as material consolidation. Minatom requires closure on this very soon, since everyone from Minister Adamov on down have come under considerable criticism from the FSB for allowing new work (categorized as existing work by DOE and Minatom in order to move forward) to begin without an agreement. In fact, the pressure from the FSB is such that no new contracts are being signed in the nuclear cities. We must not allow the FSB to have a legal basis for vetoing projects.

This said, we have considerable difficulties on our own side. DoD and State have insisted that the MPC&A agreement be placed under the already-concluded CTR agreement. This seems odd, since PDD-41 assigns responsibility for the MPC&A program to DOE. Be that as it may, we are now requiring Duma review for the MPC&A agreement, and tying the political fortunes of the MPC&A program to those of the CTR program. Even though the Yeltsin administration seems happy to kick the can down the road and take their chances with the Duma later on, this in reality places the materials protection effort at considerable risk to the political vagaries of US.-Russian security relations, and will continue to do so after

Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton have completed their terms.

To be sure, the best route would have been to model the MPC&A agreement on the plutonium disposition agreement that requires no Duma oversight. However, the Russian side is hard pressed to agree since, as in the United States, the legislature plays a predominant role in the area of taxation. The next best answer would be an NCI-like agreement that allows Duma jurisdiction

but does not require Duma ratification. However, now that we seem stuck with a CTR-MPC&A agreement, the bottom line is that some agreement must be concluded in order to move forward. This all means that Vice President must urge Mr. Stepashin to personally intervene with the appropriate Russian ministries if an agreement is to be concluded next week.

Nuclear Material Consolidation and Conversion. There have been some important strides in nuclear material consolidation since our last letter. A model project underway at the Luch facility holds out considerable promise. By paying a set sum for LEU product, the initiative now underway creates the incentive for Russian site managers to provide their highly enriched, weapons-usable uranium for downblending. Consolidation reduces the risk of theft by eliminating HEU. This in turn reduces the operating and sustainability costs for MPC&A upgrades, thereby allowing increased protection of Russian nuclear materials at lower long-term costs. Transfers of I-IEU to the Luch facility for downblending have already taken place, and a very transparent process of material blenddown is anticipated.

Every indication remains that other Russian site managers and many Minatom officials are now amenable to a widespread consolidation and

downblending
campaign that could convert tons of Russian HEU to LEU per year.
However,
approval from the Russian government itself will be required if this
campaign is
to successfully include both Minatom ~ non-Minatom sites. We hope
that Vice
President Gore will take the opportunity to praise the Russian
government for
progress in this area, and to urge Prime Minister Stepashin to assure
its
continued success in the form of an intra-governmental agreement that
allows all
facilities housing HEU to participate.

The common theme to the above two areas of concern is that the
Russian government
is so disorganized that the United States must work doubly hard to
engineer
solutions that fit both sides' requirements. However, the asymmetries
in the
relationship make it difficult for some bureaucratic actors to
understand the
importance of accommodating our Russian partners. For example,
U.S. negotiators
would never think of concluding an agreement involving taxation
without involving
the U.S. Congress. Similarly, it is doubtful that U.S. negotiators would
approve
an agreement involving defense nuclear materials-related agreement
without
involving the DoD and the DoE. In both instances, inter- and
intragovernmental
agreements are required, respectively, that allow the already
substantial
progress to continue.

I hope that you will do your utmost to see that the progress and
potential of the
MPC&A program is not cut short by bureaucratic and legislative
obstacles that I
have described.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives

16 February 1999

The Vice President of the United States
United States Senate
WASHINGTON DC 20510

Dear Mr Vice President,

We are writing to you in connection with a recommendation made in a report by the Australian Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in June 1998. The Committee considered and supported Australian ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Australia deposited its instruments of ratification with the Secretary General of the United Nations on 9 July 1998.

In addition to its statement of support for CTBT ratification by Australia, the Committee recommended that:

Once the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Bill 1998 is enacted, the Presiding Officers write jointly to the President of the United States' Senate to acquaint that Chamber with the views of the Australian Parliament, as expressed in the Act, and urge them to take all steps to facilitate and expedite ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by the United States of America.

CTBT ratification would constitute the single strongest gesture the U.S. could make in the short term in support of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime - including in response to the nuclear tests in May last year by India and Pakistan - and the most important incentive for others to likewise ratify the

Treaty.

The U.S. Administration is no doubt aware that Article XIV of the CTBT provides for the holding of a Conference from three years after the opening for signature of the Treaty (September 1999) to discuss ways of facilitating the entry into force of the Treaty. The U.S. is one of the forty-four countries listed in the CTBT whose ratifications are required for the Treaty to enter into force. While the modalities of convening the Article XIV Conference have not yet been decided, the

CTBT reserves a special decision-making role for the states which have ratified the Treaty - a fact which Australia kept in mind in pushing ahead with our own ratification process.

Successive Australian Governments have long given their strong support to a permanent cessation of nuclear weapons testing, and to a CTBT. It is for this reason that Australia played such an active role, over many years, in the achievement of that goal: in sponsoring United Nations resolutions, in brokering the mandate for the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in 1994, in contributing model treaty texts and technical expertise to the negotiations and, finally, in taking the CTBT direct to the United Nations General Assembly for adoption - by an overwhelming majority of the international community - on 10 September 1996.

Australia was the fifteenth country to ratify the CTBT, and is one of the forty-four countries whose ratifications are necessary for the CTBT to enter into force. At the time of writing (February 1999), 27 countries have ratified and many more are set to do so in the near future. The UK and France took the lead amongst the nuclear weapon states in ratifying together on 9 April

1998 and the Australian Foreign Minister welcomed this as an example to all countries.

Driving our call to you is our belief in the importance of the CTBT as a global security and non-proliferation instrument. As a committed ally of the United States, Australia understands that the question of whether the CTBT serves US security interests is a very important one, and that the obligations of the Treaty merit close scrutiny. We urge the United States Senate to take all steps to facilitate and expedite ratification of the CTBT. Only with the participation of the United States of America can the CTBT succeed in contributing to a more stable global security environment.

We have written in similar terms to Senator Strom Thurmond in his capacity as President pro tempore of the US Senate. We have also written in similar terms to the Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms.

cc: POTUS, SECSTATE, SECDEF, Samuel Berger~iFuerth, Donna Brazile

Todd Peny

PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Donald Mitchell to James Smith. Subject: Sample Dox re UN. (7 pages)	06/23/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/03/2000-09/04/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5698

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/29/2000 4:34:24 PM
FROM Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT russia debt - helms [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Medish, Mark C. (RUE)

CARBON_COPY
TEXT_BODY
TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT russia debt - helms2 _____.doc

Dear Chairman Helms:

I write in response to your June 14 letter, in which you expressed disagreement with our May 26 notification of a bilateral debt agreement with Russia. As you know, this agreement will implement an August 1999 decision by Paris Club members to reschedule Russian debt falling due in the years 1999-2000.

As much as you and our Administration share a common opposition to Russia's brutal conduct of the war in Chechnya and a common commitment to isolating the Milosevic regime, we do not agree that implementation of last year's debt rescheduling should be linked to changes in Russian policy in those areas. I believe that proceeding with the rescheduling is in the best interests of the United States for several reasons.

First, the United States and other Paris Club creditors enter into rescheduling

agreements for one overriding reason: to maximize the chances of getting loans repaid. This purpose has governed U.S. participation in the Paris Club for decades. Last August, based on an assessment of Russia's economic program and financial need, we joined with other Paris Club creditors in a temporary rescheduling of Russia's Soviet-era debt. Multilateral rescheduling of Russia's near-term debt payments was the best way to enhance the prospects that Russia will repay its debt to the United States, albeit over a longer period of time.

Second, the Administration is not persuaded that , had we not agreed to reschedule Russia's debt, Russia would have scaled back its operations in Chechnya, or changed its policy toward the Balkans. Third, refusing to implement last year's Paris Club debt rescheduling agreement would have other adverse implications for the United States. For example, Russia's failure to reschedule would damage America's credibility in Paris Club deliberations, thereby reducing our ability to deal with important debt problems in a wide range of countries of great importance to the United States.

Mr. Chairman, although I regret the need to move forward on this matter without your support, the consequences of the alternative are not tenable, as described above. The Administration has thus decided to proceed with the debt rescheduling. We would be happy to brief you or your staff further on this particular rescheduling or, more broadly, on the general objectives that this and previous Administrations have pursued through the Paris Club.

I recognize that you believe the Administration has not done enough to discourage Russia from pursuing policies with which we disagree, including those cited in your letter. In fact, we have been sharply critical of the Russia's conduct of the war in Chechnya and led our allies in holding Moscow accountable for its actions, most recently by co-sponsoring a resolution on

Chechnya and the
UN Human Right Commission. I and others in the administration
have also pressed
the Russian leadership over its support for the Milosevic regime.
When NATO
Foreign Ministers joined me in criticizing Moscow for hosting FRY
Defense
Minister Ojdanic, an indicted war criminal, Russian Foreign Minister
Ivanov
admitted publicly that it was a mistake. We have also pressed the
Russian
leadership to cut off any support to the Milosevic regime, including
trade
credits. This issue has a long and complex history and we are still
establishing
the facts surrounding Moscow's implementation of its 1997 bilateral
agreement
with Belgrade. Recently, however, the Russian government informed
us that it has
denied a Serbian request for fuel credits worth \$32 million.

Mr. Chairman, clearly we still have much work to do with Moscow on
these
contentious issues. But I can offer you my personal assurance that the
Clinton
administration will continue to press for change in Russian policies
toward
Chechnya and Serbia. I hope that your disagreement about tactics and
methods of
bringing about this change will not overshadow our shared goals or
otherwise
impede our ability to work together on the many foreign policy issues
of
importance to this country.

Sincerely,

Madeleine K. Albright
Secretary of State

EB/IFD:Jbay
H:Tlynn
H:Mguest
S/NIS:Pquanrud
Treas:CLowery

- 2 -

The Honorable
Jesse Helms, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/21/2000 11:22:57 AM

FROM Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: Package # 1961 - Annual Report to Congress on Peacekeeping [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
 Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
 Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
 Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN)
 Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
 Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
 Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

FYI - What Clerk's office really wanted was individual ltrs to the chairmen of the appropriate committees. It went to Clerk's office as a Message to Congress. I've talked with Tony and sent him right format to use.

-----Original Message-----

From: Millison,
 Cathy L. (EXSEC)
 Sent: Thursday, July 20, 2000 11:54 AM
 To: Good,
 Travis C. (RECORDS); @MULTILAT - Multilateral and
 Humanitarian
 Affairs
 Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WWD - West Wing Desk
 Subject: RE:
 Package # 1961 - Annual Report to Congress on Peacekeeping
 [UNCLASSIFIED]

Please
 use this version when preparing the additional letters.

-----Original
 Message-----

From: Good, Travis C. (RECORDS)

Sent: Thursday,
July 20, 2000 11:49 AM
To: @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian
Affairs
Cc: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary; @WWD - West Wing Desk
Subject: Package
1961 - Annual Report to Congress on Peacekeeping
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Per
the WH Executive Clerk's Office, they have requested additional
letters
to be prepared in order to satisfy the submission requirements for
this report. The report must be dispatched to the Chairmen of the
Foreign Relations, Appropriations and Armed Services Committees in
the Senate as well as the Chairmen of the International Relations,
Appropriations, and Armed Services Committees in the House. They
have received one letter and are awaiting for the additional letters
to be prepared before it will be dispatched to the Hill.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1961.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to transmit herewith the 1999 Annual Report to Congress
on
Peacekeeping required by section 4 of the United Nations
Participation Act (P.L.
79-264), as amended.

United Nations and other peacekeeping operations helped us protect
our interests
before they were directly threatened, and ensured that other nations
shared with
us the risks and costs of maintaining international stability.

I look forward to working with you to ensure that peacekeeping
remains a viable

option for dealing with international conflicts.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

1

2

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/25/2000 10:48:17 AM

FROM Edwards, Joan K. (NONPRO)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT 4773ltr.doc;4773a.doc;4773b.doc;4773 labels.doc [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Edwards, Joan K. (NONPRO)
Harris, Elisa D. (NONPRO)
Maertens, Thomas R. (NONPRO)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Elisa and Maureen this is the new Semi-annual report memos -- I updated the latest version which was a later one than what I sent out yesterday. I am still waiting for the disk to come over from State with the report on it.

4773ltr.doc;4773a.doc;4773b.doc;4773 labels.doc

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4773ltr.doc

Dear Joe:

I transmit herewith the semi-annual report required under the heading "International Organizations and Programs" in Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1996 (P.L. 104-107), relating to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802

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1

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4773a.doc

July 25, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

FROM: GARY SAMORE

SUBJECT: Semi-Annual Report on North Korea

The attached memo to the President recommends that he approve the semi-annual unclassified report to Congress on various matters concerning North Korean compliance with the Agreed Framework.

The report has been cleared by the relevant agencies, and it is not controversial.

Concurrence by: Jack Pritchard; Caroline Krass; Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo to the President.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letters to Congress
Tab B Report on North Korea
1

4773

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4773b.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Semi-Annual Report to Congress on North Korea

Purpose

To approve and transmit to Congress the semi-annual report on North Korea.

Background

Title IV of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-107), enacted February 14, 1996, requires you to report to Congress every six months on North Korean compliance with the Agreed Framework, including North Korean observance of the nuclear freeze and U.S. efforts to encourage North-South dialogue. The attached report, which covers the period

from February 2000 to August 2000, is routine and is not expected to generate any controversy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached transmittal letters at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress
Tab B Report to Congress

1

4773

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4773 labels.doc

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
221 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-0802

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
United States Senate
311 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-4801

The Honorable Sonny Callahan
House of Representatives
2418 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-0101

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson
House of Representatives
1401 Longworth House Office Building

Washington, D.C. 20515-0702

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
House of Representatives
2449 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

The Honorable Jesse Helms
United States Senate
403 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy
United States Senate
433 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-4502

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
United States Senate
361A Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-1702

The Honorable David R. Obey
House of Representatives
2462 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4907

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
House of Representatives
2457 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-0508

The Honorable Ted Stevens
United States Senate
522 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-0201

The Honorable C.W. Young
House of Representatives
2407 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-0910

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 07/27/2000 12:06:56 PM

FROM Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Report to Congress on Cyprus [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Scharfen, Jonathan R. (LEGAL)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)
Banbury, Anthony N. (MULTI)
Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)
McClean, Matthew K. (MULTI)
Naplan, Steven J. (MULTI)
Patten, Wendy L. (MULTI)
Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI)
Smith, Peter D. R. (MULTI)
Tierney, Mary "Theresa" T. (MULTI)
Wilcox, Richard M. (MULTI)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Looking for comments/clearance please. Legal: Will put hard copy with incoming in 379.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

4741 helms ltr..doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2372 (c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period April 1-May 31, 2000. The previous submission covered events during February and March 2000.

Following President Clerides' surgery in early May, the United Nations rescheduled the recommencement of Cyprus talks for July 5 in Geneva. Despite this delay, U.S. officials remained actively engaged in efforts to bring about a comprehensive Cyprus settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright underscored the United States' commitment to a Cyprus solution with her counterparts in early May.

Special Presidential Emissary Alfred H. Moses, Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas G. Weston, and U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Donald K. Bandler reinforced these messages with The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership and urged all parties to support positive movement in the United Nations-sponsored talks.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4741 ltr. to Hastert.doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2372 (c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period April 1-May 31, 2000. The previous submission covered events during February and March 2000.

Following President Clerides' surgery in early May, the United Nations rescheduled the recommencement of Cyprus talks for July 5 in Geneva. Despite this delay, U.S. officials remained actively engaged in efforts to bring about a comprehensive Cyprus settlement based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright underscored the United States' commitment to a Cyprus solution with her counterparts in early May.

Special Presidential Emissary Alfred H. Moses, Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas G. Weston, and U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Donald K. Bandler reinforced these messages with The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership and urged all parties to support positive movement in the United Nations-sponsored talks.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4741 report.doc

President's Bimonthly Report on Cyprus
April-May 2000

The Metropolitan Museum of Art opened the new Cypriot Galleries on April 5. Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides attended an opening dinner for the exhibit on April 4 in New York. Special Presidential Emissary Alfred H. Moses, Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas G. Weston, and U.S. Ambassador Donald K. Bandler also attended. The U.S. officials met the Cypriot President on April 5 to discuss the ongoing Cyprus talks, held under the auspices of the United Nations. Ambassadors Moses, Weston, and Bandler reiterated the United States' commitment to a Cyprus solution.

Ambassadors Moses and Weston met with European Union Commissioner for Enlargement Guenter Verheugen on April 5 in Washington to discuss Cyprus.

Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas G. Weston testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 11. In his remarks, he noted that the United States continues to work hard to ensure that the United Nations-sponsored Cyprus talks "move the parties toward a just and durable settlement that addresses the legitimate concerns of both sides."

Special Presidential Emissary Alfred H. Moses traveled to Turkey from April 11-13. Accompanied by U.S. Ambassador Mark Parris, he met with President Suleyman Demirel, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, Minister of Foreign Affairs Under Secretary Faruk Logoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs Deputy Under Secretary Yigit Alpogan, and State Minister Sukru Sina Gurel. In all his meetings, Ambassador Moses urged the Turkish side to remain flexible during talks and underscored the need for all parties to work toward a just and lasting settlement.

On April 25, Ambassador Bandler met with Mr. Clerides to discuss the ongoing Cyprus talks. The Ambassador emphasized that the talks should be serious and meaningful, and that the United States was determined to help make them productive.

Also on April 25, Ambassador Bandler met with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to discuss the ongoing Cyprus talks. The Ambassador highlighted the United States' desire for positive movement in the talks, and urged Mr. Denktash to engage fully.

On April 27, Ambassador Bandler met with Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides. The Ambassador emphasized the United States' commitment to the settlement process.

On May 2, the East-West Institute in New York honored Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou with the Statesman of the Year Award for "courageous leadership and personal efforts to bring about change in relations between their countries." Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright attended and praised her counterparts for improving Greek-Turkish relations. Prior to the dinner, the Secretary held separate meetings with each Minister and hosted a trilateral meeting with both her counterparts. She noted that

"the
United States will do everything to help our dear friends and allies to
sustain
their extraordinary momentum and to encourage essential new steps
towards a
comprehensive settlement on Cyprus."

Ambassadors Moses and Weston, accompanied by U.S. Ambassador
to Greece Nicholas
Burns, met with Foreign Minister Papandreou on May 3 in
Washington to follow up
on Secretary Albright's meeting with the Foreign Minister.

On May 4, the Turkish Cypriots announced a series of measures
easing restrictions
on Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north. These measures
include:
the reduction of the crossing fee from fifteen pounds sterling to a one
pound
sterling "administrative fee," longer stays by family members visiting
the north,
permission to marry someone from outside and bring the new spouse
to live in the
north, and the permission for military-age male students to visit
relatives in
the north.

On May 5, Mr. Clerides underwent surgery to have intestinal polyps
removed.
Ambassador Bandler visited Mr. Clerides on
May 9. On May 11, the United Nations announced the postponement
of the May 23
Cyprus talks, giving Mr. Clerides time to recover.

On May 8, Ambassador Bandler met with Mr. Denktash to discuss the
prospects for a
settlement and underscored the United States' commitment to a just
and lasting
settlement for all Cypriots.

Secretary Albright hosted a dinner in honor of Greek Orthodox
Archbishop
Demetrios on May 12. In her remarks, the Secretary noted that Cyprus
has been
"divided for far too long" and that "the status quo was unacceptable."

On May 17, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan announced
that he would
reconvene the ongoing Cyprus talks in Geneva on
July 5.

United Nations Secretary-General Annan issued on May 26 the semi-annual report on the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the period of December 1999-June 2000. A copy of the report is attached.

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2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4741 srb.doc

July 27, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN

FROM: NICHOLAS KASS

SUBJECT: President's Report to Congress on Cyprus

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President transmitting his bimonthly Report to Congress on Cyprus, submitted in accordance with the International Security Assistance Act of 1978. This report covers the April-May 2000 timeframe and should be submitted as soon as possible.

Concurrences by: Jock Scharfen, Mark Tavlarides, Steven Naplan

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress

Tab B Report to Congress

Tab II Incoming from State

1

4741

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 4741potus.doc**ACTION****MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT****THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK****FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN****SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Cyprus****Purpose**

Forward the bimonthly Presidential Report to the Congress on Cyprus.

Background

The International Security Assistance Act of 1978 requires that you submit a bimonthly report on progress made during the period toward "the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem," including any relevant reports prepared by the UN Secretary General for the Security Council. The Department of State has prepared for your approval a draft Presidential Report on Cyprus, which is at Tab B. At Tab A are transmittal letters to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The previous report covered progress during February-March 2000. The current report covers the period April-May 2000.

The United States remains actively engaged in efforts to promote negotiations, under United Nations auspices and without preconditions, to settle the Cyprus dispute.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Congress at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress

Tab B Report to Congress

2

2

4741

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 08/14/2000 12:07:50 PM
FROM Maxfield, Nancy H. (EUR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Report to Congress on Cyprus [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Scharfen, Jonathan R. (LEGAL)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Attached is the Memos to Berger, POTUS, transmittal letters and Report to Congress on Cyprus for your comments/Concurrence. Many thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

5087Cyprus rpt to congress.doc
President's Bimonthly Report on Cyprus
June-July 2000

U.S. Ambassador Donald K. Bandler met with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash on June 2 and again on June 8 to discuss the status of the ongoing United Nations-sponsored Cyprus talks. Ambassador Bandler urged Mr. Denktash to maintain momentum in the settlement process.

On June 7, Ambassador Bandler met with Cypriot President Clerides to discuss the July 5 proximity talks in Geneva. Ambassador Bandler reiterated the

United States' commitment to a Cyprus solution.

On June 14, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1303 which renewed the United Nations Peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six-month period ending on December 15. A copy of the resolution is attached.

UN Secretary-General Special Advisor on Cyprus Alvaro de Soto traveled to Cyprus on June 16. Mr. de Soto met with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to discuss the talks. He then traveled to Turkey and Greece for further consultations.

Ambassador Bandler met with Denktash on June 17 to discuss prospects for a Cyprus settlement. The Ambassador underlined the United States' determination to reach a just and lasting settlement for all Cypriots.

Special Presidential Envoy Alfred H. Moses and Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas G. Weston met with EU Secretary-General and High Representative Solana in New York on June 23. They discussed the status of talks and agreed to continue US-EU cooperation on Cyprus.

Ambassadors Moses and Weston visited Cyprus from June 26-27. Accompanied by Ambassador Bandler, they met separately with Clerides and Denktash to help prepare for the July 5 session of UN-sponsored Cyprus talks. They encouraged both parties to remain flexible and make further progress in moving toward a comprehensive settlement. Ambassadors Moses and Weston then traveled to Turkey on June 28 where, accompanied by Ambassador Parris, they met with MFA Under Secretary Logoglu. Ambassador Weston traveled to Athens on June 30 to meet with Ambassador Sandis and other Greek MFA officials.

Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs James Dobbins and National Security Council Senior Director Antony Blinken visited Greece and

Turkey from
July 3-8. In Ankara, Acting Assistant Secretary Dobbins and Director Blinken,
accompanied by Ambassador Parris, met with MFA Under Secretary Logoglu and Deputy
Under Secretary Alpogan. In Athens they met with Foreign Minister Papandreou and
MFA Secretary General Savvaides.

On July 5, proximity talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders
resumed in Geneva under the good offices of the UN Secretary-General. UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and subsequently his Special Advisor on Cyprus
Alvaro de Soto, presided over a series of separate meetings with Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot leaders. United States Special Presidential Emissary Moses,
Special Cyprus Coordinator Weston and Ambassador Bandler were in Geneva during
the UN-sponsored talks to provide diplomatic support for the UN's efforts. U.S.
officials held a series of separate meetings with Clerides and Denktash, and with
officials from Greece and Turkey. After a short break on July 12, discussions
resumed on July 24 and are expected to last through August 5.

Ambassador Bandler met with Cypriot Foreign Minister Kasoulides on July 14 to
exchange views on the talks.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in a July 20 letter to the Security Council,
noted the establishment of a Turkish Cypriot Security Forces (TCSF) checkpoint in
Strovilia. He characterized the checkpoint as a change in "the military status
quo in the area" that "severely restricted" UNFICYP's freedom of movement. UN
Secretary-General Annan observed that UNFICYP protested against these measures
and has continued to seek for "the status quo ante to be restored in Strovilia,"
and expressed concern about certain measures Turkish Cypriot authorities had
imposed on UNFICYP in June, especially the "closure of all crossings of the
Turkish Forces cease-fire line, except the one in Nicosia." A copy of

this
letter is attached.

On July 21, the G-8 leaders meeting in Okinawa, Japan issued a statement on Cyprus that commends the "UN Secretary General for convening proximity talks between the parties to the Cyprus dispute to prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement." It also calls upon the parties "to intensify the negotiations" in order to "reach a just and lasting settlement that protects the fundamental interests of both parties in an undivided Cyprus giving full consideration to relevant Security Council resolutions."

Acting Assistant Secretary Dobbins visited Cyprus on July 21. He met separately with Messrs. Clerides and Denktash and reviewed UN efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5087 potus.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
CHARLES M. BRAIN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Cyprus

Purpose

Forward the bimonthly Presidential Report to the Congress on Cyprus.

Background

The International Security Assistance Act of 1978 requires that you submit a

bimonthly report on progress made during the period toward "the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem," including any relevant reports prepared by the UN Secretary General for the Security Council. The Department of State has prepared for your approval a draft Presidential Report on Cyprus, which is at Tab B. At Tab A are transmittal letters to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The previous report covered progress during February-March 2000. The current report covers the period April-May 2000.

The United States remains actively engaged in efforts to promote negotiations, under United Nations auspices and without preconditions, to settle the Cyprus dispute.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Congress at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress
Tab B Report to Congress
Tab C Report of the Secretary-General
Tab D UNSCR 1303

2

2

5087

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 5087 srb.doc

August 10, 2000

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: RICHARD NORLAND, ACTING

FROM: NICHOLAS KASS

SUBJECT: President's Report to Congress on Cyprus

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President transmitting his bimonthly Report to Congress on Cyprus, submitted in accordance with the International Security Assistance Act of 1978. This report covers the June-July 2000 timeframe and should be submitted as soon as possible.

Concurrences by: Jock Scharfen, Mark Tavlarides, Steven Naplan

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress

Tab B Report to Congress

Tab C Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus

Tab D UNSCR 1303

Tab II Incoming from State

1

5087

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Section 13 (b) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2373 (c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period June 1-July 31, 2000. The previous submission covered events during April and May 2000.

The United Nations resumed its efforts to bring about comprehensive negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Geneva on July 5.

These proximity talks which began in December 1999 in New York are continuing.

But, as my colleagues at the G-8 summit in Okinawa agreed, the two parties need to intensify negotiations in order to bring about a just and lasting settlement.

The United States remains committed to the United Nations process and efforts to bring about a solution based upon a bizonal, bicomunal federation.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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2

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with Section 13 (b) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2373 (c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period June 1-July 31, 2000. The previous submission covered events during April and May 2000.

The United Nations resumed its efforts to bring about comprehensive negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Geneva on July 5.

These proximity talks which began in December 1999 in New York are continuing.

But, as my colleagues at the G-8 summit in Okinawa agreed, the two parties need to intensify negotiations in order to bring about a just and lasting settlement.

The United States remains committed to the United Nations process and efforts to bring about a solution based upon a bizonal, bicomunal federation.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

1

2

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Steven Andreasen to Caroline Krass, Hal Shapiro, and Mark Tavlarides. Subject: Rpt Congress CTBT-Related Annual Certification of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile. (21 pages)	09/04/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/03/2000-09/04/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5698

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]