

Exchange Mail

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SUBJECT BACKGROUND FOR SRB APPEARANCE [UNCLASSIFIED]
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TEXT_BODY

Justin, this is the package thus far. It is VERY LARGE, but incorporates a lot of material. I've done my best in the past hour to incorporate our latest thinking on NMD, arms control and Helms. That remains a moving target.

PJ

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

SRB4-28.doc
BACKGROUND FOR SRB APPEARANCE
WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL BOARD
April 28, 2000

Middle East Peace Process
Iraq
Iran
POTUS Trip to India and Pakistan

National Missile Defense

Russia

Kosovo
Bosnia
Northern Ireland

Non-Proliferation

China

Korea

Africa

Latin America

- * Cuba

- * Peru

- * Colombia

- * Haiti

Military Readiness

Combating Terrorism

UN Reform

Human Rights and Democracy

BUILDING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

- * Helped forge the agreements that led to the Israel-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in September 1993 and the Interim Agreement on Palestinian self-rule in September 1995. Both agreements were signed at the White House.

- * Brokered the Wye Agreement in October 1998, revitalizing the peace process after years of stagnation. As a result of the agreements, the Palestinians strengthened their steps against terror and their security cooperation with Israel. The Palestinians also agreed to formally rescind those parts of the PLO Charter that are inconsistent with their commitment to peace. The Israeli government agreed, inter alia, to withdraw from areas of the West Bank, release Palestinian detainees, allow the opening of the Gaza Industrial Estate, the Gaza seaport and safe-passage routes between Gaza and the West Bank.

- * Secured congressional approval of the "Wye package" in 1999,

providing \$1.2 billion to strengthen Israel's security and \$400 million to assist Palestinian economic development, a key to demonstrating the benefits of peace to the Palestinian people.

* Helped broker the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, signed on September 4, 1999, which built on the Wye agreement and established an ambitious timetable for permanent status negotiations with the goal of reaching a permanent status settlement by September 13th, 2000

Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty

* Helped broker the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in October 1994. Since the signing, Israel and Jordan have had full diplomatic exchange, and have begun working together on development, the environment, and security issues.

Israel-Syria Peace Talks

* Ended three years of stalemate between Syria and Israel by achieving a resumption of Israeli-Syrian peace talks. The President hosted the highest level meeting ever between Israel and Syria in December 1999 after months of behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

Israel-Lebanon Border

* Negotiated April 26, 1996 written agreement to protect civilians in Lebanon and Israel.

* Organized the creation of regional institutions designed to preserve the achievements of the peace process through long-term economic growth and prosperity. In February 2000, the United States helped spearhead the resumption of the multilateral track of the peace process with the first meeting of

the
multilateral steering group since 1995. The group announced that
meetings of the
working groups on water, environment, refugees and regional
economic development
would be held in April/May 2000.

Counter-Terrorism

- * Took decisive unilateral action and led multilateral efforts to aid Israel
against terrorists determined to undermine the peace process,
including offering
counter-terrorism assistance to Israel in 1997.

- * Co-chaired the "Summit of the Peace Makers" at Sharm el-Sheikh,
Egypt in March
1996.

- * President Clinton signed Executive Orders 12947 and 13099,
declaring a national
emergency to deal with the threat of terrorists that disrupt the Middle
East
peace process.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

The United States continues to seek a just, lasting and comprehensive
peace in
the Middle East that will ensure the security of Israel and its
neighbors. We
have a unique opportunity to reach agreements on all tracks of the
peace process
and the President is determined to do everything within his power to
achieve that
goal. At the same time, the United States will redouble its efforts to
combat
the enemies of peace who seek through acts of terror to derail the
process.

- * Framework Agreement on Permanent Status between Israelis and
Palestinians.

- * Permanent Status Agreement between Israelis and Palestinians by
September 13,
2000.

- * Peace agreement between Israel and Syria and between Israel and

Lebanon.

- * Broad normalization of relations between Israel and all of the Arab states.
- * Deepening of our security relationship with Israel.
- * Increased economic assistance to the Palestinians
- * Combat attempts by terrorist groups to undermine the peace process.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Do you think parties can reach a Framework Agreement by May?

- * Our recent discussions with two leaders and the negotiations that took place in Washington strengthen the conviction that both parties are genuinely committed to reaching an agreement, and there is a real sense of partnership.
- * No doubt issues are very difficult and will require tough decisions.
- * They are making a real effort to reach their goal and we will do everything we can to help them.

There are reports in Israel about a proposal to reach a partial agreement, and postpone resolution of Jerusalem for example. What is the U.S. view?

- * U.S. view is the same as that of the two parties: it's very important to try to reach an agreement on all issues.
- * Issues are complex and sensitive, but time will not make their resolution any easier.
- * We have a unique opportunity to strive for a comprehensive accord, that is our goal.

What do you make of Barak's apparent acknowledgment that Israel will recognize a Palestinian state at the end of the process?

* Our position has always been that we do not want to prejudge any of the permanent status issues; best way to preserve effective role in the process..

* Ultimately, of course, we are prepared to support what the parties can agree on.

What will be the nature of the U.S. role now that you will have a seat at the negotiations?

* Both Israelis and Palestinians have requested that we attend the negotiations; it is their common assessment it will help.

* We will be present when negotiations resume in the region; our goal at this point is to become more familiar with the positions of the two sides.

* When the time is right, we will be prepared to put forward our own bridging proposals.

Is there anything new on the Syrian track? Bashar has said door is not closed, and Patrick Seale has proposed compromise. What do you make of it?

* Some of these reports may indeed sound encouraging; but only real signal would be an official one.

* At this point, based on what we have heard, the gaps have not been narrowed.

* But we are not giving up and continue to believe in necessity of comprehensive peace. We will continue to be in touch with both sides.

Are you concerned about implications of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon?

* Israel has conveyed to the UN its decision to withdraw in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425.

* International community is welcoming that decision and I expect it will seek to ensure that the withdrawal proceeds peacefully and that peace be established in Lebanon. That means security for all who live in Lebanon.

* Israel is complying with UN resolution; should be no justification for continued violence.

If Israel withdraws, shouldn't Syria be asked to withdraw as well?

* We support full restoration of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Look forward to day when Lebanon will be free of all foreign presence.

* Israel has announced its decision to withdraw in compliance with UN resolutions. Focus now should be on that and ensuring it is completed peacefully

CONTAINING IRAQ AND REMOVING SADDAM HUSSEIN

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

* Helped pass UNSCR 1284, the omnibus resolution on Iraq, on December 17, 1999.
The omnibus resolution restored Security Council consensus around a robust disarmament program, additional humanitarian measures to ensure the well being of the Iraqi people within the existing oil-for-food system, and greater attention to the plight of Kuwaiti prisoners of war still unaccounted for by Iraq.

* Launched Operation Desert Fox in December 1999, a four-day air assault on Iraqi WMD, air defense and regime protection forces, that successfully degraded Iraq's conventional and non-conventional arsenal, and diminished the Iraqi threat to the region.

* Forcefully maintained no fly zones over Iraq, and ensured that coalition pilots

were able to defend themselves as necessary against constant Iraqi threats.

- * Supported the Iraqi opposition by signing Presidential Directive 99-13 on February 4, 1999, to provide non-lethal assistance to Iraqi opposition groups and signing into law the Iraq Liberation Act on October 31, 1998. Have since worked to deepen its political appeal, including supporting Iraqi leadership conferences in May 1999 and October 1999.

- * Initiated a campaign to indict Saddam Hussein as a war criminal and provided support to various groups, including the Iraqi Opposition group INDICT, working toward the same goal.

- * Responded to Iraq's seizure of Irbil in August 1996 with Operation Desert Strike and the expansion of the southern No Fly Zone from the Kuwait border to the southern suburbs of Baghdad. These actions forced Saddam to pay a strategic price for his action. It changed the strategic equation, making it more difficult for him to threaten his neighbors and easier for us to stop him if he does.

- * Co-sponsored UNSCR 986 in 1995, to allow Iraq to sell oil to purchase food and medicine to ease the suffering of its population under strict UN supervision to prevent manipulation of this program by the regime. The oil-for-food program has been consistently renewed since its initiation, making nearly \$15 billion in humanitarian assistance available to the Iraqi people.

- * Provided financial, logistical, and diplomatic aid to UNSCOM in its efforts to root out Iraqi programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

- * Responded to the threat of a renewed Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by deploying nearly 30,000 U.S. troops to the Gulf in October 1994. Additionally, worked within the UN Security Council to pass UNSCR 949 on October 15, 1994, condemning

the Iraqi deployments and demanding that Iraq withdraw its forces.

Intelligence

reports subsequently showed that Saddam's threat to Kuwait was real and that this rapid, forceful response caused him to back down.

- * Led the international effort to maintain economic sanctions against Iraq aimed at compelling Baghdad to comply with all UNSC resolutions.

- * Destroyed Baghdad intelligence headquarters in July 1993 in retaliation for Iraq's assassination plot against former President Bush.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

- * Continue to work towards an Iraqi regime that will fulfill UNSC requirements and rejoin the community of nations.

- * Ensure Iraq complies in full with the new comprehensive Security Council resolution on Iraq and strengthen international consensus to maintain pressure on Saddam Hussein.

- * Maintain sanctions against Iraq until it has fully complied with all UNSC resolutions.

- * Continue work to prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq.

- * Closely monitor Iraqi military activity to forestall aggressive moves towards neighbors in the region.

- * Maintain the No-Fly Zones in southern and northern Iraq to prevent Saddam from using air power against the Iraqi people.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Notwithstanding the fact that the Security Council passed UNSCR 1284 which provided for a "son of UNSCOM," do you have any realistic indication that Saddam

will ever let inspectors in?

* If Saddam wants to have the sanctions lifted he will have to let the inspectors back in. Otherwise, sanctions will remain in place.

* It's worth remembering that in 1995 the Council passed Resolution 986 which created the oil-for-food program, and Iraq immediately rejected it and kept on rejecting it for almost 18 months before they accepted it.

Can you stay in this posture of no inspectors and a "below the radar" air war indefinitely?

* The burden is on Saddam Hussein, not on us. If Saddam wants the sanctions lifted, he will have to allow the inspectors back in.

* Likewise, our pilots patrolling the No-Fly Zones are responding to Iraqi threats. As soon as the Iraqis stop threatening them, they will have no reason to respond.

* Sanctions will remain in place until Saddam complies. The passage of Resolution 1284 in December, makes clear that the Security Council has not changed its view that sanctions can only be lifted after Iraq complies.

It's been a year and a half since UN inspectors left. Have you concerns that you can't know whether he is reconstituting his WMD? Is there a point where you may have to assume he's got them, if this goes on for another year or more with no resolution?

* We watch Iraq very carefully for signs that Saddam is reconstituting his WMD programs.

* As we have said many times in the past, if Iraq reconstitutes its

weapons of
mass destruction programs, threatens its neighbors or US forces, or
moves against
the Kurds, we maintain a credible force in the region and are prepared
to act in
an appropriate time and place of our choosing.

What did you think of Tony Hall's statement after his recent trip to
Iraq?

* Congressman Hall's impressions seem to square with our own
assessments.

* The Iraqi people are undoubtedly suffering. There is more that the
United
Nations can do to address the malnutrition and disease that
Congressman Hall
observed. We and our colleagues in the Security Council are working
strenuously
to do our part to solve those problems.

* The provisions of Resolution 1284, which we are working with the
Council to
implement, should help. In addition, we are revising our own
methodology for
determining contract holds, and as a result we have already released
\$200 million
worth of contract holds in the last month.

* However, as Congressman Hall observed, the Iraqi regime is
deliberately
prolonging the agony of the Iraqi people. United Nations officials
have also
made this point, and it is recognized in Resolution 1284, which calls
on the
Iraqi government to cease a range of deliberately harmful practices.

* This is the one part of the problem that is not being addressed, and
we hope
that the Security Council will make this a priority.

Don't you think the suffering that Congressman Hall observed makes
the case that
the time has come to lift sanctions against Iraq?

* As we have said many times in the past, the UNSC Resolutions
make very clear
what Saddam Hussein has to do to have sanctions lifted.

* Resolution 1284 does create a mechanism by which the economic sanctions could be suspended if Iraq fulfills key disarmament tasks and appropriate financial controls are put in place. This would provide further relief for the Iraqi people, but the regime refuses to accept this resolution because it cares more about its WMD arsenal than it does about the lives of its people.

* I would note that Congressman Hall said that it would be irresponsible to lift sanctions until progress is made on eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

* Again, there is more the United Nations can do to address the Iraqi people's suffering, and we are hard at work with our Security Council partners.

* But the greatest cause of their suffering remains Saddam Hussein's cynical exploitation of their plight. The Iraqi government bears the full responsibility for its continuation.

IRAN POLICY

Are you disappointed that Iran hasn't responded positively to your decision to modify the Iran sanctions? Has your reaching out so publicly and dramatically created a conservative backlash that has undermined the reformers and created exactly the opposite of what you intend?

* Iran has undergone real and significant changes in the last two years. Our purpose here is to recognize those changes and to support the forces that brought them about.

* Our goal is to build on the changes underway in Iran. This is a step-by-step process and must proceed at a pace in keeping with our overall policy objectives.

* We have opened a door. It is up to the Iranians whether or not to engage.
Further progress in our relations will be based on a series of balance, mutual steps.

Will you be looking at a further easing of sanctions in the future, in response to Iranian actions?

* That depends on the government of Iran's behavior. This is a step-by-step process. Must be balanced and mutual. Will proceed at a pace in keeping with our overall policy objectives.

* Future changes in U.S. sanctions policy can only come as part of a reciprocal process linked to an authorized dialogue between the two governments.

* As part of that dialogue, we have long-standing concerns that we need to address with Iran - state sponsorship of terrorism; efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and opposition to the peace process.

What does this do to your policy of dual containment? It's kind of hard to argue you're containing Iran, while at the same time easing sanctions and urging dialogue?

* Sanctions on Iran remain in place. Their purpose is to deny the government of Iran resources to pursue policies that are not acceptable to the international community and to spur changes in those policies.

* We will continue to maintain these sanctions as long as these policies remain in place. But we have made clear that we stand ready to change all of these policies as soon as Iran changes its practices in the areas of our concern.

What's your response to the crackdown on Iran's reformist press.

* Seen these reports and are following them with considerable interest.

* The Iranian people are struggling to decide how they want their government to govern. Part of this process is determining how they will ensure various freedoms, including freedom of expression.

* These are fundamental questions for the Iranian people and it may take some time for them to work out answers to these questions. We support freedom of the press around the world as an essential ingredient of democracy.

What do you make of the reports that Iran is shutting down Iraq's oil smuggling in the Gulf?

* We have seen reports to that effect but it is too soon to know whether this is a real change in policy or just a short-term move.

* In the past, we have seen the Iranians clamp down on Iraqi smuggling for brief periods, usually because the Iraqis were doing something the Iranians didn't like or because the smugglers weren't paying the tolls that the Iranians charge.

* Iran should take action. It is a member of the UN and should enforce the UNSCRs. Money from oil smuggling helps no one but Saddam Hussein. It is money taken away from the humanitarian programs in Iraq and puts it into Saddam's pockets - and Saddam uses it to pay off his cronies, sustain his military, and support terrorists like the anti-Iranin MEK.

How do you think Iran's relationship with Hizballah will change if there is an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon?

* Not going to try to predict Iranian behavior.

* It is clear how Iran should behave regardless of whether or when Israel withdraws from Lebanon: Iran should cease its support for all groups conducting terrorist operations.

* Iran rightly claims that it is the victim of terrorism. However, it is also one of the most active sponsors of terrorism. Until that changes, Iran should never be accepted by the international community, and U.S.-Iranian relations will never be "normal".

How do you justify these gestures while Iran is putting 13 Jews on trial for espionage - a charge the U.S. said is false?

* Changes we announced in no way diminish the concern of the United States for the fate of the 13 Jews arrested in Iran. Neither do they diminish our other long-standing human rights concerns in Iran, in particular the treatment of the Baha'i religious minority.

* We will continue to be outspoken on the issue of human rights in Iran.

* We have strong reservations about the ability of these individuals to receive a fair trial and we are forcefully communicating those concerns.

POTUS TRIP TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Was the President's decision to go to India and Pakistan an acknowledgement that we have given up on our nonproliferation concerns?

* No, his trip reflects the fact that South Asia is an important part of the world to which we must pay increased attention. We have numerous global issues on our agenda with India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh - including the

environment,
health, terrorism, economics and trade, and of course nonproliferation.
The
President raised all these issues publicly and privately.

* This trip was planned well before the tests but was delayed once
because of the
Indian election schedule and then by the May 1998 tests.

What progress did the President make on his trip on proliferation
concerns in the
subcontinent? Did India or Pakistan commit to signing CTBT?

* The President forcefully presented our view in public and private
that the
security of India, Pakistan, and the world would be enhanced by the
South Asian
countries' adherence to international nonproliferation norms. He
moved forward
the public debate in both countries about how to best ensure national
security
after the tests.

* We have no promise from either country that they will sign CTBT.
Both
countries have said they are "building a consensus" on signing. We
have urged
them to sign in their own national interest. In fact, they will only sign
if
they believe it to be in their own interest. We believe that it is.

Did the President's visit lessen tensions in the region? How concerned
are you
of war in the subcontinent?

* Tensions between India and Pakistan have been high since the
Kargil action last
spring and summer. Those tensions were exacerbated by the Pakistani
coup on
October 12 and the Indian Airlines hijacking in late December. So the
President
was going into a regional arena fraught with high levels of tension
even by
historical standards.

* I will not feel comfortable that there is significant improvement in
the
atmosphere until there is once again an Indo-Pakistani dialogue. And

that is
where we are putting our efforts - in trying to create the conditions for
a
revival of direct discussions between Delhi and Islamabad.

* The Indian decision to release three Kashmiri political leaders two weeks ago was a welcome one. We have urged Pakistan to respond accordingly.

What did the President accomplish on his trip? Did it justify the high cost, which has been criticized?

* There's no question that this visit, 22 years after the last Presidential trip to the region, was both productive and successful from our point of view. We have established the foundation for a solid and enduring new relationship with the second largest country in the world. We have begun to break down perceptions established during the Cold War about alignments in the region and demonstrated American concern for the promotion of democracy and progress in all the nations of the region.

* Importantly, the President has also established a personal relationship with the leaders of both India and Pakistan that will enable us to play a role in moderating tensions and re-establishing dialogue. We should not underestimate the degree of trust and confidence we have gained in the subcontinent as a result of this visit. The President's ability to ease tensions and head off war over Kargil last July was directly attributable to his relationship with then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Was the President's decision to go to Pakistan ultimately justified? Did he achieve any progress on his goals of a return to democracy and getting cooperation on Usama bin Laden?

* It was important to engage Pakistan and not to further isolate it. We have

been urging dialogue to the Indians and Pakistanis; it would have sent a very wrong signal to have ourselves disengaged from Pakistan, despite our very serious differences.

* Two days before the President's visit, General Musharraf announced a schedule for local elections. While welcome, this was clearly not sufficient. Musharraf argued that he needed time to reform the political system and pull the country out of its economic crisis, but the President pushed for a roadmap and timetable for an early return to elected government at the national level..

* The President also made very clear the threat bin Laden and his organization pose to both our countries and how seriously we take that threat. He urged Musharraf to put strong pressure on the Taliban to render bin Laden, in response to international pressure as expressed by UNSC sanctions. Musharraf has said he will go to Kandahar and talk directly to Mullah Omar. We encouraged him to do so.

DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

NMD program that meets the projected threat

* Last August, the President made a number of decisions regarding our NMD program, including for planning purposes the identification of both an initial and objective NMD architecture. Our initial architecture , for deployment beginning in 2005, would include: 100 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska; one ABM radar in Alaska; and five upgraded early warning radars. Our

objective architecture, for deployment beginning in 2010/2011, would include a second site, with additional interceptors and radars. Phasing our NMD deployment architecture makes sense from the standpoint of the projected threat. Our initial NMD deployment will be optimized against the most immediate and certain threat, North Korea; our objective architecture will be take into account more numerous and sophisticated threats, including those from the Middle East.

NMD Budget

* The Administration has spent approximately \$6.1 billion so far (FY 94-00) on NMD, and budgeted an additional \$10.3 billion in FY 01-05 to support possible deployment of the initial NMD architecture.

Cologne Joint Statement

* Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin discussions on both START III and ABM; those discussions, including U.S. proposals for modifying the ABM Treaty to accommodate a limited NMD deployment, are currently ongoing.

NMD cooperation with Russia

* We have made clear to Russia that as part of our approach, we are prepared to engage in serious cooperation on both NMD and ABM, and have identified a number of specific ideas for discussion.

ABM Treaty Demarcation and Succession

* Agreements have already been reached to establish an agreed demarcation between strategic and theater missile defense (TMD) systems that will allow for the deployment of advanced TMD, and to update the ABM Treaty to reflect the break-up of the Soviet Union.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

- * Deployment review. The President will decide as early as this summer whether to deploy a limited NMD. That decision will be based on four criteria: technical feasibility, cost, threat, and national security, including arms control considerations.
- * ABM adaptation. The U.S. will seek to achieve Russian agreement to adapt the ABM Treaty to permit deployment of a limited NMD this year.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Jesse Helms' Wednesday blasted your approach to NMD and arms control saying that he will block any attempt to approve an agreement before President Clinton leaves office. Your reaction?

- * Our policy on National Missile Defense (NMD) and arms control seeks to further reduce nuclear dangers left over from the Cold War and address new threats to our security.
- * Will continue to pursue this policy in the months ahead, for the simple reason it is in our national interest to do so.
- * Our NMD program is designed to protect all 50 states from the emerging ballistic missile threat from states like North Korea, Iran and Iraq.
- * Expect to make a decision on NMD deployment later this year, taking into account four criteria: technical feasibility, threat, cost and national security, including arms control.
- * Made clear to Russia we want to work cooperatively on the issue of missile defense and the ABM Treaty. We have also made clear our continued interest in pursuing discussions relating to further reductions in strategic arms in START

III.

* Policy to further reduce strategic nuclear arsenals, adapt the ABM Treaty and provide for a limited NMD will strengthen strategic stability; remains in our national interest.

* These discussions will continue.

* Believe the American people support a policy that seeks to further reduce nuclear dangers left over from the Cold War and address new threats to our security. Will continue to pursue this policy in the months ahead because it is in our national interest to do so.

* We are consulting closely with Congress on NMD and our discussions with Russia, and will continue to do so.

When is the President going to make his decision - this summer?

* As we have said, and as the President made clear last year, he will make a decision as early as this summer, but this year, whether to go forward with deployment of an NMD system next Spring based on the four criteria (feasibility, cost, threat, and arms control).

Jamie Rubin said on Wednesday that the U.S. won't defer this decision. What does "no deferral" mean? Is it possible he would kick this until after the election?

* "No deferral" means he will make a decision whether to go forward with deployment of a NMD system next spring -- he is not going to defer the decision on whether to go forward next spring.

What about problems with the NMD test program? Will this lead to a delay in your decision on NMD deployment?

* Expect the next flight test of our NMD program to take place at the end of June, in time to inform the Pentagon's internal review this summer and a recommendation to the President later this year.

* The President's decision on NMD deployment will take into account four criteria: the threat, technical feasibility, cost and the implications of deployment on the overall strategic environment, including arms control.

Doesn't the delay in the latest NMD flight test cast further doubt as to the technical feasibility of our NMD program?

* Not going to prejudge the results of next flight test. Obviously, we will consider the entire test series in assessing the question of technical feasibility, along with information from ground tests and simulations.

China and NATO are also raising questions about U.S. policy in this area?

* Understandable that Allies and other countries have an interest in strategic stability, arms control and nonproliferation, and the ABM Treaty is an important agreement in this area.

* Cannot ignore emerging ballistic missile threat from states that threaten international peace and security; that is why we are working hard to develop a limited NMD system. At the same time, we want to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty and proceed with further reductions in nuclear forces; that is why we are seeking to adapt, not scrap, the ABM Treaty.

SUPPORTING RUSSIA'S TRANSFORMATION

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

Strengthening U.S.-Russia Cooperation and Reducing Threats to

Americans

* Helped deactivate over 1,500 Russian nuclear warheads and the destruction of over 300 Russian missile launchers through U.S.-Russian cooperative threat reduction programs. To date, 284 ICBMs and SLBMs have been destroyed, along with 30 heavy bombers, 10 missile submarines, and 50 ICBM silos. The Clinton Administration has also cooperated with Russia to ensure successful denuclearization efforts in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as 3,300 nuclear warheads were moved to Russia and placed in storage. And today, no Russian nuclear weapons are targeted at an American city.

* Halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction from Russia through the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI). These programs have reinforced the President's nonproliferation efforts, such as in 1995 when Russia agreed to forego sales of cryogenic rocket engines to India. The Clinton Administration has also provided critical support to safeguard fissile material that was not properly stored or protected. Cooperative civilian research projects under ETRI have kept thousands of high-tech engineers and former Soviet weapons scientists from selling talents elsewhere. Collaborative projects are redirecting former Soviet chemical and biological weapons scientists toward peaceful work and supporting the dismantling of former CBW facilities and (STET) chemical weapons stockpiles.

* Promoting regional security and integration by strengthening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Newly Independent States. The Clinton Administration has also sought to promote Russia's integration with the new Europe and its participation in institutions such as the G-8. Russia withdrew its troops from the Baltic states and Central Europe. Russia reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Ukraine as part of the

landmark U.S.-Ukrainian-Russian agreement on post-Soviet de-nuclearization in 1994. For the first time since World War II, Russian and American troops serve side by side in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Russian diplomacy was critically important during the Kosovo conflict. Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, codifying a cooperative relationship with NATO, despite Russian objections to NATO enlargement.

Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Russia

* Provided strong support for Russia's successful transformation to an electoral democracy. Parliamentary elections in 1999 and 1995 and presidential elections in 1996 demonstrated Russia's new democratic system at work.

* Advocating human rights by encouraging Russia to adhere to international norms on human rights. While some disturbing signs of political extremism remain, anti-Semitism, and intolerance, today Russians enjoy the basic freedoms of speech, religion, association, travel, and the press. The Administration remains at the forefront in the fight for human rights and democracy throughout the former Soviet Union.

* Promoted legal reform and the rule of law in Russia through assistance aimed at developing an independent judiciary and is improving legal decision-making and respect for the rule of law. U.S. assistance programs promote independence of the judiciary, support for various Russian law schools, creation of legal aid clinics, law-related NGO activities, and the role of the legal bar in society.

* Strengthening free media in Russia by providing training, small grants, and technical assistance to independent TV, radio, and print media across Russia. U.S. assistance programs are helping Russians connect with the world via the

Internet.

* Cultivating civil society in Russia. Development of healthy civil society is a cornerstone of U.S. assistance efforts. Before 1989 there were no NGOs in Russia. Now there are 65,000-and growing. Since 1993, over 37,000 exchanges from Russia have been completed.

Supporting Russia's Transition from Communism to Free Markets

* Assisting Russia end Communism and dismantle its state-controlled economy.

The Soviet state once controlled economic decisions throughout Russia. Today the market largely determines prices and how resources are allocated, and the state's grip on economic activity has largely been severed. The Russian economic debate has shifted from reestablishing communism to setting priorities on fiscal policy, taxation, pension and health care reform - the core bases of market democracy.

* Fostered grassroots entrepreneurship in Russia by focusing U.S. its economic assistance on small and medium-sized businesses, which are building a new Russian economy from the bottom up. U.S. assistance for small and medium enterprises has created or sustained over 60,000 jobs and over 15,000 businesses across Russia.

In 1991, the small business sector was virtually non-existent in Russia and the NIS. Today there are upwards of 900,000 small businesses in Russia, producing 12-15% of GDP. Over 250,000 Russian entrepreneurs have received training, consulting services, or small loans through USG programs.

* Helped Russia build the infrastructure for a market economy, including creation of a securities and exchange commission and joint training program with the World Bank for bank employees of banks that promotes international standards. U.S. assistance helped the Central Bank develop commercial bank supervision procedures

that took 900 risky banks off the market, and developed training centers and lending programs for small business that could generate new economic activity.

* Supported Russia's efforts to reform its commercial legal infrastructure and develop an independent judiciary that can protect investment and enforce the sanctity of contract. The Clinton Administration launched a project to promote the rule of law and to support the drafting of a new Civil Code, a Criminal Code, bankruptcy laws, and much of the legal and regulatory framework for Russia's Securities and Exchange Commission immediately after the first Clinton-Yeltsin summit in 1993. U.S. assistance programs promote independence of the judiciary and provide training for judges in commercial law.

* Acted to make the privatization process in Russia as transparent, efficient, and viable as possible. While the privatization process was imperfect, two-thirds of Russia's property has been wrested from central government control. With U.S. assistance, Russia also developed a legal framework and process for housing privatization - over half of Russia's housing stock is now privately owned, up from 20% in 1991.

* Fighting crime and corruption in Russia by collaborating with Russian law enforcement to identify and prosecute crime groups, to combat financial crimes such as money laundering, and to set priority targets for intelligence collection and other action. U.S. law enforcement authorities teamed up with the Russian MVD in an investigation that led to the prosecution of a Russian organized crime figure and five associates operating in the United States, Europe, and Canada.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

The Clinton Administration will continue to support democratic market-oriented

transition in Russia, and integral to this challenge is targeting assistance so that democracy and prosperity becomes pervasive. The United States will:

- * Encourage deeper integration with Europe and the West.
- * Continue to encourage development of democratic practices and institutions, and the building of the rule of law and a modern legal base to fight organized crime and corruption.
- * Target technical support to help tackle state barriers to investment and growth in Russia, and foster the growth of entrepreneurship, particularly vibrant small business sectors that create jobs and promote economic security, and discourage government constraints on business.
- * Create the infrastructure of an open and competitive market economy: dismantling state controls, fighting crime and corruption, strengthening the rule of law, creating private property, and building the laws and institutions that protect investors and citizens alike.
- * Continue to press for Russian adoption of a tougher nonproliferation policy, creation of the institutional foundations to implement it, and new export control legislation that provides for criminal penalties against violators.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Do meetings this week with Ivanov this week make you confident that President will be able to get a START III/ABM deal in Moscow?

- * Meeting in Moscow will be just with Putin as new President. Will set agenda for US-Russian relations for the year.
- * The U.S.-Russia agenda is broad: includes economics, arms control,

nonproliferation and people-to-people exchanges.

* Hope recent Duma action on START II and CTBT will allow us to intensify our ongoing discussions with Russia on START III and ABM Treaty. Expect President Clinton and President-elect Putin to address this issue in Moscow. Don't expect issues will be resolved in Moscow.

Haven't the Russians "stolen a march" on the United States over the past couple of weeks with their approval of both START II and CTBT?

* This should not be viewed as a "zero sum" game. Both START II - which has already been approved by the U.S. Senate - and the CTBT are in our national interest, and the Duma/FC action brings both agreements one step closer to entry into force. This is good news for Russia, the United States and the international community.

Hasn't the United States been put in a disadvantageous position by Russia, both in terms of this week's NPT Review Conference and ongoing talks on adapting the ABM Treaty?

* No. The United States welcomes Russian action to approve START II and the CTBT. Both actions are entirely consistent with our long-standing commitment to promote disarmament and halt the spread of nuclear weapons, which are central issues in the upcoming NPT Review Conference.

* With respect to ABM, simply note that we expect Russian ratification of START II and CTBT to give added momentum to our discussions on START III and ABM that were chartered at the Cologne summit by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin last June.

Where is CTBT in terms of entry into force? What is the status of ratification in the U.S.? Do you expect the Senate to vote again on the CTBT this year?

* CTBT will not enter into force until 44 states listed in the Treaty with nuclear research and/or power reactors have deposited their instruments of ratification.

* With Russia, 30 of the 44 states have ratified (assuming Chile deposits its instrument of ratification now that the Chilean Congress has approved the Treaty).

* More broadly, 155 states have now signed the CTBT; counting Russia and Chile, a total of 57 will have ratified.

* Last October, the Senate failed to give its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty.

* Following the Senate vote, the President made clear he intends to continue the moratorium on U. S. nuclear testing, as well as continue to work for U.S. ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. President also encouraged other countries not to test, and to sign and ratify if they have not done so.

* Earlier this year, General John M. Shalikashvili agreed to serve as an adviser to the President and the Secretary as part of the Administration's effort to achieve bipartisan support for ratification of the CTBT. He is reaching out to members of the Senate and to construct a path that will bridge any differences and ultimately obtain Senate advice and consent to the Treaty.

What is your reaction to the Letter from Senator Lott and 24 other Senators advising the Administration its approach to NMD and the ABM Treaty is "flawed."

* Believe our approach to NMD and the ABM Treaty will give us the protection we need against the most immediate and certain ballistic missile threats, preserve the ABM Treaty and allow us to proceed with START III. Right

approach for the
U.S., Russia and our allies.

The Duma has tied entry into force of START II to U.S. Senate approval of the ABM Succession and Demarcation agreements. When will the Administration transmit the 1997 ABM agreements and START II Protocol to the Senate for approval?

* Before making any decisions on this, we will need to review the Russian ratification law and the related Duma resolutions, and consult with the Senate, taking into account the relationship between the September 1997 agreements and our ongoing discussions with Russia on START III and ABM.

Will the U.S. proceed with formal negotiations on START III without a Russian commitment to negotiations on ABM?

* Our intent is to proceed in parallel with START III and ABM, as agreed to by President Clinton and then-President Yeltsin at Cologne.

A START III target of 2,000-2,500 weapons still leaves both countries with a substantial nuclear force. How does this square with recent proposals by Russia to reduce down to a ceiling of 1,500?

* START III talks are proceeding on the basis of the agreements reached in Helsinki in 1997, including reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads. An agreement would represent a significant step in the direction of reducing the nuclear danger. Would substantially reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals.

Any comment on our editorial earlier this week accusing Administration of giving Russians a "free pass" on Chechnya?

* President Clinton, Secretary Albright, others actively pressing Russians to

address serious human rights questions raised by conduct of Russian military campaign. Our position has been consistent: military solution not viable, will fuel cycle of violence. Russia has right to uphold territorial integrity, combat terrorism, but indiscriminate use of force against civilians is unacceptable.

* Urge both sides to implement immediate cease-fire across Chechnya, avoid indiscriminate attacks, take meaningful steps toward political solution, ideally utilizing OSCE good offices. Want to see reestablishment of OSCE presence in region.

* International community has spoken with one voice about opposition to Russian approach to conflict. That's why we joined the EU in co-sponsoring a resolution within the UN Commission on Human Rights.

The Russian government has said at various times that there is not much difference between the action they took in Chechnya and the action that NATO undertook in Kosovo. I'm sure you reject that comparison. How are they different?

* Milosevic's assault on Kosovo was the culmination of a decade-long campaign to crush resistance to his rule and feed the flames of Serb nationalism. For years, the Kosovars resisted nonviolently; the KLA emerged only after Milosevic repeatedly refused to compromise with Kosovar moderates. Russia's actions, by contrast, were triggered by armed attacks outside Chechnya - namely incursions into Dagestan by Chechen and Islamic militants. Russia's primary motivation was to reverse its humiliating defeat in 1996.

* We should not downplay the brutality of Russia's indiscriminate attacks in Chechnya, which have had a devastating impact on innocent civilians. Using a scorched earth strategy, the Russians destroyed much of Chechnya to

"save" it.

But Russia has not tried to drive the Chechens permanently from their land. In

Kosovo, Serb attacks were in fact quite discriminate - aimed specifically at

civilians in a deliberate effort to rid Kosovo of the Kosovars, dead or alive.

The Kosovar exodus was not the byproduct of Serb military advances, but their intended result.

Why won't you call these war crimes?

* We have said that reports of Russian and rebel actions in Chechnya raise fundamental questions under international humanitarian law that merit immediate Russian investigation and access to Chechnya by international observers.

* A thorough investigation would of course be necessary to gather sufficient evidence to prosecute any individual for specific criminal acts. It is because of the seriousness of these allegations that we urge the Russian Government to investigate in an open and transparent way and, where warranted, prosecute those responsible for violations.

WINNING THE WAR AND THE PEACE IN KOSOVO

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

Achieved Victory in Kosovo/Reversed Ethnic Cleansing

* Achieved verifiable halt to all Serb military activities and the withdrawal from Kosovo of all Serb military, police and paramilitary forces.

- * Deployed KFOR, including an initial 8,000 American forces, to stabilize the province, provide security to the UNMIK administration, facilitate the return of over 900,000 refugees, and, in conjunction with the UN International Police, provide safety and security to the province's inhabitants.

- * Russian troops serve shoulder to shoulder with U.S. and other partners in KFOR. Russian troops are serving within a unified, NATO-led command structure that ensures KFOR's military effectiveness.

- * Secured the demobilization and disband of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and is assisting with efforts to reintegrate former KLA members into society through civilian employment, educational opportunities, the Kosovo Police Service and a civil emergency corps.

Now Building Democracy and Self-Government in Kosovo

- * Provided key logistical, financial and personnel support to the UNMIK civil administration in its efforts to create provisional self-governing institutions, restore law and order, and rebuild Kosovo's economy.

- * Forged agreement on the principle, backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, that the future status of Kosovo will be determined through a peaceful political process.

- * Contributed over \$150 million at the Kosovo Donors Conference in Brussels to strengthen democracy and support civil society in Kosovo. As a result of the conference, UNMIK was completely funded for 1999 and received substantial pledges of support for 2000.

- * Sponsored, along with the EU and with support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Sarajevo Summit that launched the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, a process designed to

strengthen
democracy, economic development and security throughout the entire
region.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

Although the situation in Kosovo has improved dramatically over the
past year,
significant challenges remain before the hard-won NATO victory can
be transformed
into a stable, durable peace. The Administration will continue to use
all
diplomatic, military and economic resources at its disposal to win the
peace in
Kosovo. Key tasks include:

- * Continued reconstruction of private homes and communal
properties, and the
revitalization of the Kosovo economy as a whole, including steps to
attract
significant foreign investment.
- * Strengthening the UNMIK civil administration and developing
effective
institutions for meaningful autonomy and democratic self-government
by the
Kosovar people.
- * Providing a safe and secure environment for all ethnic groups,
including the
establishment of a functioning police and judicial system as the
cornerstones of
society based on respect for the rule of law.
- * Fostering a mature and democratic political culture respectful of a
plurality
of parties, candidates and viewpoints, and tolerant of ethnic diversity
and the
rights of minorities.
- * Working with the OSCE, UN and other international organizations
to foster
political development, promote participation in the political process
and assist
the growth of a responsible, independent media.
- * Holding free and fair elections as soon as feasible.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

It's a year since the Kosovo air campaign. There's significant unrest in Kosovo.

Kosovar Albanians continue to retaliate against Serbs. Milosevic is still in control of Serbia. Other than stopping ethnic cleansing, one year later, there is little to show on the ground. Was it worth it?

* As result of NATO's resolute stand one year ago, we reversed Belgrade's policy of ethnic cleansing, compelled Serb forces to withdraw from Kosovo, allowed a NATO-led force and a UN mission to secure the peace, and paved the way for nearly a million refugees to return to their homes in safety.

* Imagine the consequences if NATO had not acted. Milosevic would have succeeded in exterminating or expelling hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians. Those who survived would have become permanent refugees, threatening the stability of the region. Progress toward building a democratic and peaceful Europe would have been reversed, and NATO's role in helping to consolidate stability in Europe would have been undermined.

* We should be proud we met our responsibilities in Kosovo. We have accomplished much in the past year: establishment of a UN civil administration for Kosovo; return of over ninety percent of refugees; 300,000 Kosovo children back in school; electric power restored to most areas; over 200 kilometers of railway back in service, and nearly 2,000 km of roads cleared of unexploded ordnance and mines. Though violence remains too frequent in Kosovo, the weekly murder rate is down by ninety percent, thousands of weapons have been confiscated and destroyed, and Kosovo Liberation Army is successfully disbanded.

* There is more to be done. KFOR, with approximately 85 percent of troops contributed by our allies, has created conditions of basic security that

will
permit civil implementation to move forward quickly. The
international community
has pledged over \$1 billion for the stabilization and economic
revitalization of
Kosovo - with our partners providing more than six times our
contribution to this
effort.

* During Allied Force, we persisted until we attained our goals. With
the
leadership of our European allies and the support of our Congress, we
will
continue to meet the challenge of building peace, democracy, and
opportunity in
Kosovo and across the Balkans.

Given the continuing unrest, will you consider adding more U.S.
troops?

* KFOR and NATO commanders on the ground have done a superb
job of moving the
right forces to the right areas to meet the challenges. Although I don't
anticipate a requirement for the U.S. contribution to exceed the
roughly 7,000
troops we have asked Congress to support, NATO continues to review
its Kosovo
requirements and KFOR's mission.

What is the situation in Mitrovica?

* The situation in Mitrovica has quieted. KFOR and UNMIK have
taken a number
of measures to end the violence, including deployment of additional
KFOR troops
and UN police assets to the city, as well as the establishment of
"confidence
zones" on both sides of the river. UNMIK is also taking longer-term
measures to
ease tensions, facilitate movement, and revitalize Mitrovica's
economy, with the
support of the international community.

* Can't discount possibility of more violence; Mitrovica is tough
problem, maybe
toughest in Kosovo. But the arrival of General Bill Nash as new
UNMIK regional
administrator demonstrates the international community's

commitment to improving
the situation in Mitrovica.

There are still reports of Kosovar Albanian extremists trying to stir up trouble in Southern Serbia. Have the U.S. and NATO warned the Albanians regarding any such operations over the Kosovo border regions?

* We have firmly and repeatedly warned all of the parties to avoid any actions that could threaten the success of NATO and UNMIK's missions in Kosovo. Maintaining peace and security along Kosovo's boundary and border regions is an essential part of our mission.

* Our warnings have been backed up with concrete action, and I believe that all parties understand our determination to maintain a safe and secure environment in Kosovo.

Doesn't all this strengthen the argument for separate canton-like enclaves or the partition of Kosovo?

* We do not support the cantonization or partition of Kosovo. Stability in the Balkans requires patient, long-term democratic development rather than the formation of ever smaller, ethnically discrete entities. The international community's presence in Kosovo is not meant simply to keep the peace, but to create a framework for future interaction among diverse ethnic communities, who will live in close proximity no matter where the borders lie.

Isn't the U.S. shouldering the main burden of civil implementation in Kosovo, despite European promises to take on this responsibility?

* Our allies have been quite responsive to the challenges in Kosovo

and throughout Southeastern Europe. They agree that they should shoulder the "lions' share" of the civilian implementation and reconstruction tasks in Kosovo. We have pressed our allies and partners to do more and we will continue to do so. This effort is paying off, and the beneficiaries are the people of Kosovo and the region.

* Specifically, the Europeans have pledged more than 5 times (and disbursed more than 4 times) as much money to support UNMIK's consolidated local budget as the U.S. (Euro pledge is \$134.7m, with \$117.5m disbursed, compared to U.S. pledged and disbursed amount of \$24m). These contributions and UNMIK's improved ability to collect local revenue mean UNMIK's cash situation has stabilized. UNMIK had a record high income the week of March 27 (DM 3.8 million), and its local budget should be in the black at least through September.

* The EU alone has allocated more than \$3.1 billion in non-military program assistance to Kosovo in 1999 and 2000, an amount as much as three times the comparable US figure, with other non-EU European states also contributing additional funds. Visible reconstruction of key infrastructure must be initiated quickly, to send a message of momentum and recovery. The Europeans are getting the message that they should be far more proactive in all these efforts, but our leadership is still vital.

* EU and other police deployments continue to increase. This means the Europeans have now deployed 79 percent of their regular police pledge. Combined with their special police pledge, the Europeans have deployed 64 percent of their total police pledge. These percentages indicate a positive trend upward in the numbers of police deployed to Kosovo by the Europeans.

* We continue to press the Europeans and others to get their special

police
pledges to UNMIK deployed as well. Jordan and Pakistan have
deployed special
police over the last two weeks and Spain will be deploying special
police by May.
(The EU has special police from Italy and France on the ground in
Kosovo, but
under KFOR command.)

* EU member states have committed 63 percent of KFOR's troops,
with other
European troop contributions (NATO and non-NATO, including
Russia) bringing the
total up to 80 percent.

What about reports that the U.S. is trying to return Serbs to Kosovo
despite
UNHCR doubts about security?

* We continue to work with moderate elements in all ethnic groups in
Kosovo, as
well as with KFOR and UNMIK, to establish conditions for the return
of persons
displaced by the Kosovo crisis. Secretary Albright recently agreed
with Kosovo
Bishop Artemije to work together on the realization of a pilot project
to begin
to promote the return of Serb refugees under conditions of safety and
dignity, in
coordination with UNMIK, KFOR and others. A State Department
team just returned
from Kosovo where they were assessing what it will take for safe and
sustainable
returns to succeed.

Reaction to recent mass trials of 146 Kosovar Albanians that began in
Serbia this
week?

* NGO reports indicate that the Serbian government is detaining at
least 1400
Kosovar Albanians in violation of international human rights
standards, and in
some cases, of international humanitarian law.

* The sham proceedings of this mass trial are evidence of not only the
moral
bankruptcy of the Serbian justice system, but of the Milosevic regime

itself.

* We commend the work of NGOs in Serbia providing defense counsel for these proceedings. We have made funds available for the work of such NGOs and we continue to urge the Serbian government to render a full accounting of those detained and return them safely to their families.

Comments on Serbia sanctions policy/recent EU lifting of flight ban on Serbia?

* Sanctions are an essential and effective part of the effort to isolate the Milosevic regime and promote an early transition to democracy in Serbia. Sanctions have been very useful in isolating the Milosevic regime, which is why we aim at targeting them even more effectively.

* We supported the EU's temporary suspension of the flight ban as requested by the Serbian opposition in conjunction with steps by the EU to strengthen, expand and focus those sanctions that most effectively target the regime.

Will the oil ban be suspended next?

* We do not favor a suspension of the oil ban.

What are you doing to promote democracy in Serbia? Are Milosevic's days as Serbia's leader numbered?

* It is up to the Serbian people to determine the future of their country. But we are helping the process of democratization through support for democratic forces in Serbia, as well as through sanctions aimed at the Milosevic regime.

* Working with Congress, we have increased our assistance to

Serbia's democratic forces. (If asked: Serbia democratization assistance will increase from \$11.8 million in FY 1999 to \$25 million this year.) These funds will be used to help political party building and support pro-democracy NGOs, labor unions, and the independent media.

* These measures, together with comprehensive sanctions targeted at the regime, are aimed at isolating Milosevic and compelling him to call free and fair early elections, as the democratic forces in Serbia demand.

Milosevic is still in power - isn't that a failure of U.S. policy?

* We want democratic change in Serbia. We are doing all we can to achieve it.

* We can help by making clear the incentives, and by sharpening the choices. But ultimately, the Serb people will have to make that choice. When they do, we will respond.

* Although we want democratic change in Serbia, we cannot define our policy in southeastern Europe by who is sitting in power in Belgrade. Our goal continues to be stabilizing the region and bringing it into Europe where it belongs.

* Just as the Croatian people recently made the democratic choice to bring Croatia toward Europe, we hope the people of Yugoslavia will do the same.

Would the U.S. support a Montenegrin declaration of independence?

* We do not support independence for Montenegro. We share with President Djukanovic the goal of a prosperous and democratic Montenegro within a democratic and reformed Yugoslavia.

If Montenegro declares its independence from the FRY, or Milosevic

moves
militarily against Montenegro, will the U.S. or NATO defend
Montenegro?

* I cannot give specific responses to hypothetical situations, but we
have
repeatedly emphasized over the past year that we have an important
interest in
the security of the region, including Montenegro. While we do not
support
Montenegrin independence, we support a democratic Montenegro as a
model and a
stimulus for a democratic Yugoslavia.

What is the impact of Croatia's recent elections on the future of the
region?

* Croatia made a heroic and fateful choice in recent parliamentary and
presidential elections. Croatians chose a path leading to reform, to
democracy,
and to Europe. Credit for the success of these elections is due first to
the
Croatian people, who turned out in record level to demonstrate their
desire for a
democratic future.

* Croatia should serve as an important example of what is possible for
other
countries in the region, and most of all for Yugoslavia, when people
mobilize to
assert their democratic rights.

BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

Ended War in Bosnia

* Brokered the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 to end the bitter inter-
ethnic
conflict that decimated Bosnian society, claimed the lives of over two
hundred
thousand people, and resulted in the displacement of two million
civilians.

Returned Refugees

* Returned over 640,000 persons (refugees and displaced persons) to their homes since Dayton. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registered 43,000 minority refugee and displaced persons returns in 1999 (in fact, the actual number is likely to be higher, given that many returnees choose not to register with international organizations). The number of registered minority returns in 1999 was roughly three times more than in 1998.

Promoting Stability

- * Helped return over 325,000 troops to civilian life.
- * Under Stabilization Force (SFOR) oversight, identified and cleared more than 1,600 minefields, trained and equipped over 450 local de-miners, and destroyed almost 48,000 mines and unexploded ordinance.
- * Under U.S. leadership, established the Permanent Secretariat for the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) to coordinate activities of the armed forces in Bosnia. The Clinton Administration successfully pressed the parties to sign a major arms reductions agreement, which led to cuts in Serbian forces of 25% and Bosnian Serbs of 75%. At the Sarajevo Summit in July 1999, Bosnia's tripartite Joint Presidency announced agreement on a further 15% force reduction and military budget in each entity.

Supporting Economic Reconstruction and Recovery

- * Together with international donors, restored Bosnia's GDP to roughly 40 percent of its pre-war level (including growth by an estimated 55 percent in 1996, 35 percent in 1997 and 25 percent in 1998). Unemployment has been reduced from a post-war high of 90 percent to roughly 31 percent in early 1998,

though levels
vary widely across the country.

- * Rebuilt major portions of Bosnia's infrastructure, including the repair of over 100,000 housing units and 970 schools. The U.S. has provided almost \$1 billion in reconstruction assistance since Dayton.

- * Forged agreement on the adoption of a permanent currency, with the Konvertible Marka (KM) introduced in mid-June 1998. A uniform customs code was passed in July 1998, increasing customs revenues.

Prosecuting War Crimes

- * Actively supported the public indictment of 93 war criminals for crimes committed in Bosnia. With SFOR's assistance, 44 indictees have been taken into custody in the Hague, including Maj. Gen. Stanislav Galic (for responsibility in the shelling of Sarajevo), Radislav Krstic (for involvement in crimes in Srebrenica), and Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir Talic (both for responsibility for crimes in the Prijedor area); 30 remain at large.

Establishing Joint Institutions

- * Helped create all Dayton-mandated national institutions, including the Joint Presidency, the Council of Ministers (COM) and the Parliamentary Assembly - all of which meet regularly. A Constitutional Court has issued several significant rulings.

- * Played a key role in negotiating the November 1999 New York Declaration, under which the Joint Presidents agreed on several important measures to enhance state-level institutions.

- * Worked toward increasing freedom of movement by actively supporting the

adoption of common license plates.

- * Supported adoption of national flag, flown over Bosnian embassies and offices of the joint institutions, and new passport laws, under which old passports are no longer accepted.

Holding Elections and Fostering Democratization

- * Promoted political pluralism by providing political and financial support for free and fair municipal-level elections in 1998. Further municipal elections are scheduled for April 2000, with general elections planned for October 2000. A Draft Permanent Election Law is now under discussion.

- * Defended principles of ethnic cooperation and tolerance and protected the progress made toward implementing key measures of the Dayton Accords by removing extremists from government positions in both Federation and RS cities and denying anti-Dayton political parties the right to register for April 2000 elections. Over 38 officials have been dismissed from public office by the last two High Representatives for obstructing Dayton, including 22 in November.

Resolving Conflict

- * Supported the peaceful settlement and good faith implementation of the Brcko arbitral decision, which established joint entity and international control over one of Bosnia's most hotly contested cities. The Final Award was issued in March 1999 and an annex addressing implementation in August. Implementation of the Award is now underway.

Supporting Police and Judicial Reform

- * Fostered greater cooperation between the police services of the two entities, with police academies now up and running in both the Federation and

RS, and
minorities heavily represented in recruit classes.

* Provided key logistical and financial support to the International Police Task Force (IPTF), which has provided international oversight, training and coordination for the entity police services.

* Supported the establishment of a Human Rights Chamber, which has completed over 300 cases in support of human rights.

Promoting Free Media

* Provided assistance for the transformation of government-controlled electronic media into nonpartisan public broadcasters, including the establishment of the Independent Media Commission (IMC), a transparent radio and television licensing regime and sensible, enforceable media regulatory structures. Ethnic-based political parties no longer control Bosnia's television networks.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

The United States remains firmly committed to building a wider and more stable peace in Bosnia through full implementation of the Dayton Accords. Our support continues to be demonstrated through the approximately 4500 American troops currently participating in SFOR, representing a total military commitment of \$1.95 billion in FY 1998 and an estimated \$1.75 billion in FY 1999. The U.S. is also providing key financial support, both directly and through international organizations, to fund humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization, police training, de-mining and democratization in Bosnia. The November New York Agreement demonstrated the commitment of Bosnia's leaders to more fully implement Dayton's provisions. Although the outlines of a stable, peaceful Bosnia have taken shape, numerous tasks remain, including:

- * Striving toward complete freedom of movement and return of refugees and the internally displaced to their pre-war homes.
- * Continuing to pursue indicted war criminals and ensure that all parties cooperate fully with the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague.
- * Reducing defense levels in the region while building stable and multiethnic indigenous institutions. As public security and freedom of movement continue to improve, SFOR will reduce its strength from its current 31,000 to 19,000 by March 2000. U.S. forces will be reduced to roughly 3,800.
- * Increasing efforts to establish a pluralistic and tolerant political culture, functioning and democratically-elected institutions and respect for the rule of law. Improved cooperation from the RS under the leadership of PM Dodik in the Republika Srpska is encouraging in this regard.
- * Promoting economic reforms and combat corruption as a spur to foreign investment and growth of the Bosnian economy as a whole.

SUPPORTING THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

- * Helped broker the Good Friday Accord, signed on April 10, 1998 at Stormont. The Accord provides for an inclusive government in Northern Ireland; constitutional amendments to enshrine the principle of consent with respect to any change in the territorial status of Northern Ireland; new institutions for North/South cooperation on the island of Ireland; safeguards in the areas of human rights and equality of opportunity; decommissioning of paramilitary weapons; normalization of security arrangements; reform of the police and judicial systems; and prisoner releases. The signing of the Accord

marked the
culmination of intense U.S. diplomacy beginning with the President's
bold
decision to grant Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams a visa in August
1994, followed
by cease-fire declarations by the IRA and Loyalists, and the launching
of
all-party talks chaired by Senator George Mitchell in September 1997.

* Achieved concrete progress towards full implementation of the
Good Friday
Accord on December 2, 1999 when Great Britain devolved power to
Northern Ireland
Assembly; Northern Ireland Executive (government) was formed;
Irish Constitution
was amended with respect to Ireland's territorial claim on Northern
Ireland; and
the IRA appointed a representative to the Independent International
Commission on
Decommissioning, ending a year-long impasse on this contentious
issue.

* Increased investment in Northern Ireland. U.S. firms have invested
\$1.9
billion in Northern Ireland since 1994, with two-thirds of all first-time
investment in Northern Ireland made by American companies,
according to 1998
figures.

* Contributed \$326.7 million to the International Fund for Ireland for
development projects in Northern Ireland and the border counties of
the Republic
of Ireland that promote economic and social advance and encourage
reconciliation.

* Stimulated formation in 1999 of a joint Northern Ireland/private
sector
commitment of \$800,000 to create a micro-finance company that
gives individual
entrepreneurs, especially in disadvantaged areas, unprecedented
access to
commercial credit.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

* Support full implementation of all remaining aspects of the Good
Friday Accord

(human rights, decommissioning, security, policing and justice, and prisoners).

* Provide continued political and economic support for the new institutions involving Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Where does the N. Ireland peace process stand?

* [On the record] As President Clinton has told Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, he is prepared to help advance the peace process in any way he can as the governments and the parties work toward finding a way to resolve the current impasse and implement all aspects of the Good Friday Accord. He reaffirmed that message as recently as his April 20 phone call with Blair.

* [On background] The British and Irish governments, following the Easter break, are working to finalize a package of measures that would, we hope, enable the political institutions that were suspended in February to be restored, and progress to resume toward full implementation of all aspects of the Good Friday Accord. Both sides -- republicans and unionists -- will need to compromise for a solution to be found. President Clinton is prepared to help in any way he can, including by travelling to Northern Ireland if this would be useful.

Peter Mandelson told Jim Hoagland the White House should use its "chits" with the IRA to push for arms decommissioning -- is the President going to press Gerry Adams on this?

* [On background] Frankly, the Hoagland piece missed the point, which is that if White House pressure could have achieved IRA decommissioning, this would have happened long ago. We are using our influence to try to achieve all aspects of the Good Friday Accord, including decommissioning. Anyone who has worked this

issue -- and that especially includes the British -- knows that public pressure, setting deadlines and trying to put the IRA in a box is going to backfire. The net effect would be to split the IRA and put the ceasefire at risk. We are going to continue working with the British and Irish governments and the parties to build trust between them so that the arms issue, along with the other issues, can be resolved in a way that all parties can accept.

LEADING THE WAY IN NONPROLIFERATION

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

Nuclear Weapons

* Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union: The Administration's most important accomplishment in nuclear security was obtaining the agreement by Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to allow the removal of all nuclear weapons from their soil and to forswear such weapons forever. This was the first time in history countries in possession of nuclear weapons agreed to give up them up.

* Freezing North Korea's Nuclear Program: To obtain a freeze in North Korea's nuclear program, the President authorized participation in the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which froze North Korea's plutonium production, put the program under international monitoring and mandated the dismantlement of Pyongyang's plutonium production facilities.

* Extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The President played a critical role in 1995 in securing the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty -- the cornerstone of our efforts to control nuclear proliferation. Under this Administration's leadership, 29 additional

countries have joined the NPT.

* **Strengthening Security of Nuclear Materials:** The Clinton Administration has inaugurated unprecedented, broad-ranging programs at over 100 sites in Russia and the Newly Independent States to strengthen the security and accounting of nuclear materials and weapons and to prevent their theft or diversion.

* **Safeguarding Weapons-Grade Uranium:** Since President Clinton took office, the U.S. has purchased 500 metric tons of weapons-grade, highly-enriched uranium from Russia for dilution to safer, low-enriched uranium (which is used in commercial power reactors). The President also authorized "Operation Sapphire," in which the U.S. quietly acquired and airlifted out of Kazakhstan nearly 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium which was vulnerable to diversion or theft.

* **Controlling Nuclear Materials:** The U.S. has promoted broader international participation in both the NPT Exporters' (Zangger) Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which together work to control equipment and materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons. Since 1993, nine additional countries have joined the Zangger Committee, while eight countries joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

* **Engaging China:** Through this Administration's efforts, China joined the Zangger Committee, pledged to cease all assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and cut off nuclear cooperation with Iran.

* **Ending Nuclear Testing:** The Administration led the international effort to conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Although the Senate voted on October 13, 1999, not to consent to ratify the Treaty, its importance to global security is clear and would become evident, was the Senate to permit a full and thoughtful debate of the Treaty's merits.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

* **Banning Chemical Weapons:** President Clinton has been a global leader in promoting the Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force in 1997. The Administration has led international efforts to secure universal adherence to and compliance with this ban on poison gas. Today, 128 countries are members of the CWC.

* **Eliminating CBW Capabilities:** Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, this Administration has worked to dismantle former Soviet chemical weapons production facilities in Russia and Uzbekistan and a former Soviet biological weapons production facility in Kazakhstan. It has also pressed for U.S. and international assistance to help eliminate the large chemical weapons stockpile Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union.

* **Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapon-Related Material:** The Clinton Administration successfully promoted the membership of Argentina, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Iceland, Slovakia, Romania, Poland and South Korea in the Australia Group, which controls chemical and biological weapon-related material.

* **Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:** The U.S. has been an active player in international efforts to conclude a legally-binding protocol to strengthen compliance with the 1972 treaty outlawing biological weapons.

Conventional Weapons and Missiles

* **Stemming Missile Proliferation:** The Clinton Administration has strengthened the guidelines and expanded the membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), adding Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, Poland, Iceland, Turkey, the Czech

Republic, South Africa, Russia and Ukraine to its rolls. We have also secured China's commitment not to transfer ground-to-ground MTCR-class missiles and to abide by the original MTCR guidelines.

* Controlling Munitions and Dual-Use Technologies: President Clinton led international efforts to create the 33 member Wassenaar Agreement, which seeks to promote the responsible transfers of conventional arms and related technology and to increase transparency of such exports. Through U.S. leadership in Wassenaar, which began operations in April 1996, we have been able to limit the flow of arms and sensitive technologies to Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and other countries.

* Promoting Strong National Export Controls: Since 1993, President Clinton's programs have provided legal and technical advice and support to countries in the former Soviet Union for the development and maintenance of effective dual-use and munitions export controls, monitoring of border crossing points and training of customs and enforcement officials.

Regional Security

* Redirecting FSU Weapon Scientists: The President's threat reduction initiatives have resulted in programs to employ over 30,000 former Soviet weapons scientists on over 1,000 peaceful research projects under the multinational Science Centers and other nonproliferation assistance programs.

* Containing Iran and Iraq: The Administration has led the fight to prevent Iraq from resuming its nuclear, chemical, biological weapons programs and its missile development programs. President Clinton has also pressed Russia and other potential suppliers not to assist Iranian and Iraqi efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

* Promoting Stability in South Asia: The U.S. is pressing both India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to forego destabilizing nuclear and missile activities.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

* Conclude Biological Weapons Convention Protocol: The United States will press to complete negotiations in Geneva on a Protocol of data declarations and on-site activities to strengthen compliance with the BWC.

* Obtain Wassenaar Arrangement agreement for increased reporting on arms and dual-use transfers, guidelines for sales of man portable air defense systems and additional restraint on arms exports to regions of instability; negotiate Congressionally mandated "International Arms Sales Code of Conduct".

PROMOTING PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

Strengthening Security

* The U.S. has strengthened its security relationship with the ROK (South Korea), including the forward deployment of 37,000 U.S. troops -- one of the important ways in which we contribute to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. President Clinton has reaffirmed our commitment to the U.S.-ROK security treaty, one of five bilateral defense alliances that form the cornerstone of American engagement in the Asia Pacific.

* President Clinton and former President Kim Young-sam initiated the Four Party Talks in April 1996 to reduce tensions on the Peninsula and replace the Armistice agreement with a permanent peace regime.

* A Trilateral Oversight and Coordination Group (TCOG), including the U.S., ROK, and Japan, was launched in 1999 to ensure closer coordination of policy toward North Korea with our two principal allies in Northeast Asia.

Preventing Weapons Proliferation

* In October 1994, we reached agreement on a framework with North Korea to freeze and eventually dismantle North Korea's plutonium-capable nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon. An international consortium (KEDO) oversees this process.

* North Korea continues to maintain the "freeze" of its declared nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon as required by the October 1994 Agreed Framework; canning of spent fuel is virtually complete.

* The U.S. and DPRK have held four rounds of bilateral missile talks since April 1996, in which the U.S. has pressed for an end to the DPRK's possession and export of missiles.

Encouraging Dialogue with North Korea

* North Korea Policy Coordinator William Perry completed, with extensive consultation with the ROK and Japan, a comprehensive policy review and recommended that, while maintaining a strong deterrent capability, the U.S. embark on a path of increased contact with North Korea, aimed at addressing U.S. concerns about North Korean nuclear and missile programs.

* Bilateral talks have yielded a North Korean pledge in September 1999 to refrain from long-range missile testing while discussions to improve U.S.-North Korea relations continue.

* We reached agreement with North Korea on addressing concerns that an underground facility at Kumchang-ni was nuclear related. A U.S.

team of experts
visited the site in May 1999, and determined the site was not intended
for nuclear
purposes. A second visit is planned for May 2000.

* Efforts to advance our goal of the fullest possible accounting for
POW/MIAs
from the Korean War have been underway since 1996. Twelve joint
recovery
operations with North Korea have been completed with 42 sets of
remains
recovered.

Providing Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea

* U.S. aid has been a critical factor in stemming a humanitarian
tragedy in North
Korea. In 1998 and 1999, U.S. aid pledged to North Korea bilaterally
and through
the World Food Program totaled 1.1 million tons, comprising more
than 80 percent
of the aid the international community sent there through multilateral
efforts.

* Since 1995, the United States has eased sanctions governing
humanitarian
donations, commercial sales of goods to meet basic human needs,
telecommunications
, importation of magnesite, and financial transactions.

Promoting South Korea's Economic Progress

* South Korea's economy has shown a remarkable recovery from the
financial crisis
of late 1997. The U.S. has supported President Kim's initial structural
reforms
and has closely consulted with ROK authorities throughout the crisis.

* South Korea successfully joined the OECD (Organization of
Economic Cooperation
and Development) in 1996 and has been actively liberalizing its
economy according
to the obligations of that membership.

* President Kim Dae-jung's administration has improved financial
oversight of
critical sectors of the Korean economy and helped to remove a
number of

investment barriers.

* We signed a Social Security Agreement with the Republic of Korea, which will eliminate duplicate social security contributions and fill in gaps in social security protection for people who have worked in both countries.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

* Follow through on North Korea Policy Coordinator William Perry's proposals for improving U.S.-DPRK relations, including the launch of parallel negotiations to address U.S. concerns about North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

* Continue to encourage North-South dialogue, which is essential to achieving a lasting peace on the Peninsula.

* Work to improve market access for U.S. products as our economic relationship with Korea continues to grow.

* Seek reform of ROK trade regulations in several key industries, including autos, telecommunications, and pharmaceuticals, creating new jobs at home.

ENGAGING CHINA TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT UNITED STATES INTERESTS

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

Strengthening Security and Nonproliferation

Taiwan:

* Maintained a consistent policy based on three pillars: A "one China" policy, an abiding commitment to the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences, and support for dialogue between the people on both sides of the Strait. This policy has played a critical role in maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait.

- * Dispatched naval forces to the area around Taiwan in 1996 to counter PRC efforts to influence Taiwan's domestic elections through provocative military exercises, clearly signaling to the PRC the grave consequences of use of force against Taiwan.

- * Fully met our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide sufficient defensive military capability to Taiwan. In economic and other areas, maintained robust unofficial ties with Taiwan.

North Korea:

- * Worked with China bilaterally and through the Four Party process to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula resulting, in concert with other American initiatives, in the DPRK's suspension of long-range missile tests and a continuation of talks between the U.S. and the DPRK aimed at improving relations.

South Asia:

- * Coordinated closely with China to formulate and implement the UN Security Council's efforts to manage proliferation problems on the Indian subcontinent.

- * Worked with China in convincing Pakistan to end its incursion over the Line of Control, helping to defuse the Kargil crisis in July 1999.

Nonproliferation:

- * China's agreement in May 1996 to halt all assistance to non-safeguarded nuclear programs strengthened China's nuclear export control system and addressed concerns regarding Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan.

* China's agreement to halt , in September 1997, China's nuclear cooperation with Iran. This stopped existing Chinese-Iranian nuclear cooperation (except for two minor projects), and China has adhered to its pledges not to provide new nuclear assistance to Iran.

* Secured China's commitment at June 1998 Summit to further strengthen its export control regime for dual-use chemicals and related production equipment and technology to ensure they are not used for production of chemical weapons. China also announced it had expanded its list of chemical precursors that it controls.

* Also at June 1998 Summit, elicited China's commitment to "actively study membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime" building on 1994 Joint Statement whereby China committed to halting exports of MTCR-class ground to ground missiles.

* Elicited 1997 interim directive and control list governing nuclear related dual-use exports and Chinese membership in NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee).

* Paved way for President's transmission of certifications for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to Congress in 1998, permitting U.S. companies to compete in China's nuclear power market and provide energy and environmentally-friendly technology to fill China's growing energy demand..

* Worked successfully to secure China's signature on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 (with ratification in 1997) and on the Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.

Expanding Trade

U.S. Exports:

* Concluded a WTO accession agreement in November 1999 that will open Chinese markets to American goods and services in a fair and transparent manner. Upon China's accession, the expanded export opportunities will directly benefit American farmers, businesses and workers as China lowers its tariffs and reduces its barriers to an unprecedented degree. China's membership in the WTO will also promote the rule of law and open Chinese society to foreign ideas, models, and individuals.

* Signed in November 1999 the U.S.-China Agricultural Cooperation agreement, which lifted long-standing unscientific Chinese prohibitions on the export of U.S. citrus, grain, beef and poultry to China.

* Expanded U.S. exports to China in 1998 by nearly 12%. At \$14.3 billion, China is the fastest growing export market for American goods and services.

* Promoted trade with the result that China is the United States' fourth largest trading partner; exports to China support more than 170,000 American jobs.

* Signed in April 1999 an aviation agreement which will double the number of flights between the two countries, authorize a new U.S. carrier to begin services, and remove all restrictions on U.S. gateway departure cities for U.S. airlines.

* Signed an Export Control End-Use Visit Arrangement in June 1998 permitting U.S. officials to visit end-users in China of U.S. products and technology. Through the end of 1999 U.S. officials had conducted a total of 50 visits: 49 post-shipment verifications and 1 pre-license check.

* Secured in 1998 a tough and enforceable textile and apparel agreement that builds on the 1995 agreement and establishes orderly conditions for textile and apparel imports.

- * Concluded far-reaching bilateral intellectual property agreement in 1995 and a follow-up report in 1996 that established a framework for ensuring protection of U.S. intellectual property rights and a mechanism for ongoing consultations.

- * Since 1994, have resolved investment-related disputes through the annual Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade chaired by U.S. Secretary of Commerce and China's Trade Minister and expanded discussions on commercial law and arbitration issues.

- * Since 1994, have encouraged China's constructive role in securing APEC's commitment to achieve zero-for-zero tariff reductions in several key areas and free trade and investment in the Asia Pacific Region by 2020.

Advancing Human Rights and Promoting International Organizations

Human and Political Rights:

- * Secured China's signature of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in October 1998 and October 1997. Urging China's immediate ratification and implementation of both covenants.

- * Negotiated the release abroad on medical parole in November 1997 of prominent dissident Wei Jingsheng, imprisoned since 1979 and in April 1998 of student leader Wang Dan, imprisoned since 1989. Secured the early release on medical parole from prison of the Bishop Zeng Jingmu in May 1998.

- * In accordance with International Religious Freedom Act, designated China in 1998 as one of several countries worldwide that are particularly severe violators of religious freedom, establishing a mechanism to work toward improved treatment of all religious in China.

- * Elicited President Jiang's agreement at the October 1997 summit to receive a delegation of U.S. religious leaders in February of 1998. Delegation traveled throughout China, including Tibet.

Rule of Law:

- * Placed a senior Department of Justice prosecutor in China for three months to introduce counterparts to the U.S. prosecutorial system and learn firsthand about developments in Chinese criminal law and jurisprudence.

Other Human Rights Initiatives Undertaken with Strong Administration Support:

- * The Aspen Institute and other private foundations helped organize and fund a U.S.-China Symposium on the Legal Protection of Human Rights in December 1998, where senior U.S. and PRC government officials, scholars and human rights experts discussed criminal law and procedure, religious freedom and administrative law.

- * The Administrative Law Advisory Committee, comprised of top U.S. experts in administrative law, worked closely with China's Administrative Law Research Group to provide detailed comments on and analyses of drafts of proposed legislation being considered by the National People's Congress, on various aspects of commercial and administrative law.

Fostering Cooperation on Global Issues

Environment/Energy

- * Following China's action on non-proliferation, signed and sent to Congress in January 1998 the certifications required to implement the Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, ending the 12-year ban on the export of significant equipment for civilian nuclear power plants to China.

- * Created the Energy and Environment Cooperation Initiative during President

Jiang's 1997 visit to focus our efforts at the intersection of energy and environmental science, technology and trade.

- * Initiated U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development in Beijing in March

1997, co-chaired by the Vice President and China's Premier, to expand cooperation

and dialogue on sustainable development and protection of the global environment.

The Forum's second session was held in Washington in April 1999 and third

session in Honolulu in January 2000. These meetings have led to numerous

agreements and initiatives aimed at reducing sulfur dioxide emissions, making

clean US environmental and energy technologies available to China, and expanding

cooperation on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency.

Law Enforcement

- * Negotiated a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement to facilitate cooperation in

pursuing criminal investigations with a nexus in both countries.

Agreement text

balances law enforcement utility with strong protections against its use in

pursuing political or cultural repression.

- * Concluded a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement in April 1998 to assist

cooperation in Customs enforcement and a joint project between the U.S., China

and the American business community to establish a Model Port Project in Shanghai

in April 1999.

- * Established a Joint Liaison Group Subcommittee on Law Enforcement in October

1997, complemented by training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in

Bangkok, leading to greater cooperation on counternarcotics, alien smuggling,

intellectual property protection, and crimes at sea. (Expected) The JLG will

hold its third session in January 2000.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

- * Further integrate China into international security and economic institutions, expand dialogue with China, and obtain Chinese cooperation in significant preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations.
- * Maintain long-standing "one China" policy, under which the U.S. develops and broadens its official relationship with Beijing while maintaining its historically strong but unofficial ties with the people of Taiwan and maintaining overall stability in the Taiwan Strait.
- * Advance the Chinese government's respect for internationally recognized human rights and the promotion of religious tolerance.
- * Vigorously enforce our trade agreements and expand market access for U.S. products, services and investment.
- * Achieve full benefits to U.S. workers and farmers subsequent of China's entry to the WTO's rules-based multilateral trading system by verifying Chinese market opening, trade barrier reduction and regulatory reform.
- * Enforce U.S. nonproliferation statutes and ensure China's actions match international standards aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
- * Support constructive dialogue between the Chinese leadership and the Dalai Lama, with the intent of helping to preserve the cultural, linguistic and religious heritage of Tibet.
- * Accelerate cooperation in clean energy development and environmental protection, and build on dialogue aimed at addressing climate change.
- * Encourage the expansion of rule of law in business and society.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

PNTR

Will you get the votes to pass PNTR?

* The economic reasons for PNTR are clear cut. Our markets already are open to China; the agreement we reached to bring China into the WTO doesn't require that we open them further in any way. What it does is to open China's markets to our workers, our farmers, our businesses. That means more jobs, growth, and exports for Americans. China will join the WTO regardless of what we decide to do. The decision before Congress is whether the United States will receive the same trade benefits from China as will our trade competitors.

* The national security implications are even more far-reaching. Bringing China into the WTO will entwine China in the global economy, increasing its interdependence with the rest of the world. It will bring the information revolution -- with the knowledge and freedom of thought that entails - - to millions of people in China in ways its government cannot possibly control.

* It will help reduce tensions across the Taiwan Strait by increasing trade and investment, thus increasing both mutual understanding and the costs of disruptive conflict. No surprise that Taiwan's President-elect Chen strongly supports China's membership in the WTO, and wants us to grant PNTR. Granting PNTR will also signal to all of Asia that the US and China can manage their relations well. The leaders in every Asian capital hope for that outcome because every one of them knows that this is core to future Asian stability and prosperity.

* I am also concerned about what a vote against PNTR would do to our national security. Because economic case is so strong, Chinese will potentially see rejection as a strategic decision by the United States to turn from

cooperation
to confrontation, to deal with China as an adversary. That could put
both sides
on a trajectory toward a situation in future years in which we confront
each
other bilaterally, regionally, and globally. The costs of such a
diplomatic
failure would prove enormous for all concerned.

* PNTR rejection could also undercut reform-minded leaders who
signed agreement
with us, and strengthen the hand of hard liners who want to resist
economic
reform, strengthen China's military-industrial complex, and take a
tough stand
toward the United States on every issue from Taiwan to
nonproliferation. General
Colin Powell understands these issues well, and I welcome the
support he so
strongly expressed yesterday for a "yes" vote on PNTR.

* We will spare no effort in the coming days and weeks to make sure
that the
Congress and the American people understand what the stakes are.
And I am
confident that when the debate is over and the votes are cast, the
Congress will
do what is right -- both for our prosperity and our security.

TSEA

Administration position on TSEA?

* Administration strongly opposes Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.

* Taiwan's security a top priority for this Administration, but the Act
would
decrease Taiwan's security and put at risk the stability of the region.

* Unofficial relationship with Taiwan very strong under the Taiwan
Relations Act,
which is an effective mechanism for ensuring robust unofficial ties
with Taiwan.

* Now is time to encourage both Taiwan and PRC to take advantage
of fresh start
with new leadership in Taiwan. Have been urging both sides to
resume dialogue

and avoid actions that risk conflict or increase tension.

* TSEA threatens these efforts by formalizing a military-to-military relationship, and would significantly increase risk of confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. Its passage would be unnecessary and provocative.

* Therefore, the Departments of Defense and State and the National Security Council have indicated they would recommend to the President that he veto this bill.

Human Rights Resolution

You've had this policy of engagement towards China. And yet, there does not seem to be anything to show in the way of progress on human rights. On top of that, the U.S. resolution on human rights conditions in China was defeated in Geneva? How does that complicate perceptions regarding China when it comes to supporting PNTR?

* You're right, despite our strong efforts to focus the international spotlight on China's human rights situation, the Chinese prevented the UN Commission on Human Rights from voting on the question of human rights in China. We were disappointed, as we believe that the UN Commission on Human Rights is the right venue for a discussion of these very matters.

* There have been very serious human rights abuses that have occurred in China over the last year, including the PRC's intensified crackdown on the China Democracy Party, the Falun Gong, unregistered church leaders, and in Tibet.

* We will continue to speak out on human rights abuses in China through our annual country reports on Human Rights and Religious Freedom and other venues (including the UN) as appropriate. As we have clearly stated in the past, our relationship with China will never reach its full potential until there is

significant progress in the areas of human rights conditions in China.

* PNTR is a key part of our engagement with China. Congress should vote for PNTR because it is in America's economic and national security interests. It will create jobs in America and open markets in China. At the same time, it will accelerate the creation of a rules-based society in China.

* PNTR is good for the US, and, in the long run, will encourage greater openness and rule of law in China.

* We will continue to engage with China and work for improvement in its human rights situation.

Taiwan Arms Sales

Congress criticized you on your decision not to provide Taiwan with the Aegis destroyers they were looking for, calling your decisions inadequate. You were in China right before this decision was announced and the Chinese presumably told you in no uncertain terms how they felt about this. Did that influence you in any way?

* No. First of all, I didn't go to Beijing to consult with the Chinese about Taiwan arms sales. The Chinese views on this are very well known. The on-going process that we have in place to meet the responsibilities of the Taiwan Relations Act are based solely on our assessment of what Taiwan needs.

* This is a very robust package that provides several new systems to Taiwan. It also provides upgrades of existing systems. It provides more training. It will help Taiwan more effectively use equipment they already have.

* There was a strong interagency consensus behind the package put forward by the Pentagon. The President and his national security team accepted the Pentagon's

recommendations.

* The package contains new equipment that had been discussed with Taiwan in previous years and was included now based on our assessment of Taiwan's capabilities and needs.

* These decisions are underpinned by a variety of detailed studies that have been undertaken by the Pentagon. Some are finished. Others are still on-going and will take time to complete.

Can you clarify whether the Aegis destroyers were denied or deferred. And, if deferred, when will they come up again for consideration?

* Without getting into specifics, the Pentagon has a detailed study underway to assess Taiwan's naval defense requirements, including anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities. This would include an evaluation of Taiwan's comprehensive naval defense needs.

* Decisions regarding additional maritime capabilities were deferred pending completion of this study.

What about radar? Is the PAVE PAWS included or not?

* First of all, last year, we decided that we would help Taiwan upgrade its early warning radar. Since then, we have been working with Taiwan on what form those upgrades should take.

* Without commenting on specific systems, there are some things we will do in the near term to increase the range and capability of Taiwan's radar. We will continue to discuss details regarding long-term improvements. Regarding long-term options, we have not ruled any specific system in or out. This is an area that requires more work in terms of how to best improve Taiwan's

capabilities.

SOLIDIFYING OUR PARTNERSHIP WITH AFRICA

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

- * Launched the LIFE initiative (Leadership and Investment in Fighting and Epidemic), an enhanced global AIDS effort, in 1999. Of the \$225 million in our FY2000 budget for global AIDS prevention and care, two thirds will go to Africa.
- * Committed the USG to a concerted effort to accelerate the development and delivery of vaccines for malaria, TB, AIDS and other diseases disproportionately affecting the developing world (through the multi-faceted Millennium Initiative announced in the State of the Union, January 27, 2000).
- * Announced a new cooperative effort to help poor countries gain access to affordable medicines (WTO meeting, Seattle, December 1, 1999). This approach will ensure that the application of US trade law related to intellectual property remain sufficiently flexible to respond to legitimate public health crises.
- * Forgave bilateral debt of \$500 million from African nations, freeing governments to invest those resources in health, education and other development priorities. The U.S. also forged an agreement among G-8 industrialized countries to provide additional debt relief by expanding HIPC, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.
- * Implemented a new, comprehensive trade policy aimed at developing a partnership with Africa that will foster economic growth and development and facilitate Africa's integration into the global economy. The legislative

cornerstone of this policy is the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in July of 1999 and by the U.S. Senate in November of 1999. The Administration is seeking final passage in early 2000.

* The President's historic trip to Africa in March of 1998, the longest overseas journey of his presidency, increased American awareness of change in Africa and promoted a new partnership between the people of the United States and the people of Africa.

* Under the President's leadership, cabinet-level engagement with Africa has been unprecedented, with most members of the cabinet visiting Africa at least once, and new initiatives for Africa developed by the Departments of State, Commerce, Transportation, Agriculture, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, and also by the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Export-Import Bank, the Trade Development Agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the U.S. Trade Representative.

* Demonstrating the importance of a strong U.S.-Africa partnership, in March of 1999 the United States hosted the U.S.-Africa Ministerial, the largest meeting ever held between African Ministers and American Cabinet members, which resulted in a blueprint for expanded economic engagement in the next century.

* Appointed Rosa Whitaker as the first-ever Assistant U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) for Africa, with broad responsibilities for coordinating our trade policy. USTR has signed bilateral investment treaties, and trade and investment framework agreements, with several African countries.

* Created the Africa Food Security Initiative, which strengthens, expands and supports national and regional agricultural technology development. There are

currently ongoing programs in agricultural production, food utilization, nutrition and income-generation in Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda.

- * Initiated programs to enhance and facilitate two-way agribusiness and agri-trade relations between the U.S. and Africa.

- * The Ex-Im Bank, OPIC and TDA have all expanding programming in Africa. Open in only 13 countries at the time of the President's trip to Africa in 1998, the Ex-Im Bank now has programs in 32 African countries, and is supporting \$600 million in exports to sub-Saharan Africa.

- * Currently developing an initiative through the Department of Commerce to help build up Africa's commercial infrastructure by promoting increased U.S. trade and investment in Africa; leading electronic commerce and technology initiatives to strengthen ties; implementing training programs of technical assistance and education; and spearheading sustainable development initiatives to protect Africa's resources and environment.

- * Launched the Safe Skies Initiative to promote sustainable improvements in aviation safety and security across Africa, leading to increased air linkages between Africa and the U.S.

- * Energized the Administration through the visit of the late Commerce Secretary Ron Brown to South Africa in 1993 to take bold steps regarding a new relationship with Africa.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

- * With final passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, the Administration hopes to continue to expand trade and investment opportunities for both American and African businesses.

* Implementing debt relief programs for countries qualifying under HIPC, the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Background: The Zimbabwe crisis is rooted in sharp economic decline, an increasing lack of confidence in the government, corruption, an unpopular war in the Congo and the fact that Mugabe's government is, for the first time in 20 years, at risk of political defeat in upcoming parliamentary elections. Unresolved since independence - an agreement on the land issue was reached in a 1998 conference including Zimbabwe, Britain and other donor countries, but hopes were dashed when land went to party insiders, or to small farmers who were not also provided with the means to farm their new land. Black war veterans were particularly angry - not at ZANU, which they fought for - but at the white farmers and the British, because the land they had been promised at independence had not materialized. Concerns about corruption and slow implementation caused donors to step back from the land reform program in recent months, but we believe that the 1998 agreement remains viable and could provide the basis for resolution.

Six months ago, former Mugabe comrade and trade union leader Morgan Tsvangarai formed an opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which quickly gained support - presenting, for the first time, real opposition to Mugabe's 20-year hold on power. Surprisingly, voters defeated a February constitutional referendum that called for the expropriation of white commercial farms, in part because the referendum also increased Mugabe's

powers. Mugabe accepted defeat, but then launched a concerted effort to encourage illegal occupations by black war veterans and, at the same time, crack down on his opposition. The government refused to implement two High Court rulings that it take measures to end the occupations before they became violent; now it appears that the government will not and perhaps cannot end them. In the last two weeks, at least 7 MDC members have been killed, along with two white farmers. We believe the violence could continue through to the 'end game,' - parliamentary elections now scheduled for May.

Mugabe met with regional leaders (Mbeki, Chissano, Nujoma, Museveni) in Victoria Falls on April 21. While they supported his contention that Britain must provide the funds for land compensation, they privately pressed him to end the violence and respect the rule of law. Relations between Zimbabwe and Britain have declined sharply, with Mugabe blasting "Blair's gay cabinet" and calling the Labor Party a colonial enemy of the people, and the British making statements calling for the return to the rule of law but, unfortunately, frequently in provocative and very patronizing terms. The Zimbabweans and British will hold high-level meetings in London on April 27.

Policy. The U.S. position is that land is a legitimate issue, but must be resolved within the context of rule of law. We also believe that the underlying economic and political issues must be addressed if the crisis is to be resolved, and are making clear our view that the parliamentary elections must be free and fair (unlikely) and should not be flawed by violence and intimidation (also unlikely). While we want to make these positions clear in public, we do not/not want to point the finger too directly at Mugabe, or apply pressures that would undoubtedly cause him to escalate the crisis while putting us in the same

"imperialist" camp as the UK. Our next steps will be predicated on the outcome of the UK-Zimbabwe meetings in London today (not for public consumption).

What is your position on the latest developments in Zimbabwe?

* We've made clear to the government our strong view that the land issue must be resolved within the context of rule of law, and that they must take steps to end the violence. We have also made clear that the upcoming parliamentary elections, now scheduled for May, must be free and fair, and not marred by violence.

* Obviously, we condemn the violence that has led to the deaths of opposition members and white farmers.

* (If asked) We strongly support the very important meeting taking place today in London between high-level British and Zimbabwean officials, and hope that they can reach agreement on how to address the land issue within the context of rule of law.

* We're exploring options for how the United States can most effectively help to defuse the crisis.

Doesn't the fact that southern African leaders have endorsed Mugabe's position strengthen his hand?

* We're in regular contact with a number of African leaders about this crisis, and I assure you that they are deeply concerned about the impact of instability in Zimbabwe on their own countries.

* After their summit last week, southern African leaders did come out in agreement with Mugabe's position that the land issue must be resolved, and that the British bear some responsibility. They have also made clear - as Mozambican

President Chissano has also said to the press - that resolution must be within the context of rule of law.

PROMOTING PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

By promoting equitable and sustainable development within the Western Hemisphere, President Clinton has strengthened stability and promoted democracy, the expansion of economic opportunity, and the social and environmental concerns of Latin America. Under the President's leadership, the United States has become a catalyst for peace and cooperation, laying the groundwork for a new era of hemispheric relations characterized by greater integration and genuine partnerships. Our shared political values and a common commitment to open markets unite the region and prepare us to meet the challenges of the next century.

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

- * Hosted the first Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994, which led to the adoption of a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action that promotes hemispheric cooperation on the full spectrum of political, economic, security and social issues we face. A second Summit was held in Santiago, Chile in 1998 and accelerated implementation of the Plan of Action.

- * Led a bipartisan coalition to win approval and implement the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), creating American jobs, reducing trade barriers, safeguarding the integrity of our financial institutions, and protecting the safety of our workforce and the health of our environment.

- * Launched the negotiations for the FTAA at the First Summit in 1994 and

established a completion date of 2005.

- * Marshaled international support for the Mexican economy following the peso crisis of 1995, and for the Brazilian economy after the Asian economic crisis spurred a downturn in 1998-1999.

- * Completed the implementation of the 1978 Panama Canal treaties, guaranteeing a seamless and secure transfer of control of the Canal to Panama.

- * Promoted free and fair elections throughout the hemisphere, including Venezuela, Guatemala, Haiti, Ecuador, Paraguay, Suriname, and the Dominican Republic, by offering support to both the electoral process and the presence of international observation delegations.

- * Engaged the Colombian Government to help refine its comprehensive, integrated strategy for dealing with surging coca production, an economic recession, and negotiations to end its long civil conflict.

- * Worked with other regional governments in order to halt the 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador, monitor the disputed border area through the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP), and broker a definitive solution to the longstanding territorial dispute.

- * Assembled a 30 nation multinational force that restored to power Haiti's democratically elected government.

- * In concert with an international "group of friends," helped negotiate an end to the thirty-year Guatemalan Civil War, while providing financial support for the peace process.

- * Rallied the hemisphere to stop an April 1996 coup attempt in Paraguay and supported the democratic government and responded quickly in 1999 to assassination of Vice President Argana and the subsequent civil disturbances to

bolster democratic government.

- * Likewise, rallied the hemisphere to roll back the January 2000 coup in Ecuador and help restore constitutional order through the accession of the Vice President.

- * United hemisphere's major democracies to protect democratic initiatives under stress in Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay, Ecuador, and Haiti.

- * In order to support the Cuban people in their struggle for democracy and a higher standard of living, implemented the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) designed to pressure the Cuban regime to enact meaningful political and economic reform through tough economic sanctions.

- * Provided technical and financial assistance to judicial reform efforts intended to promote a just, efficient and modern legal system in Latin America; promoted establishment of the regional Judicial Studies Center to act as a research center and information clearinghouse on judicial reform.

- * Negotiated and signed the Inter-America Convention Against Corruption, a path-breaking agreement that sets new international standards by committing signatories to cooperate in investigating, prosecuting, and eliminating corrupt business practices. Also negotiated and signed OAS conventions on firearms and transparency in arms acquisition.

- * Responded to Hurricane Mitch devastation in Central America with emergency relief assistance, and then, working with the Congress, provided \$759 million in reconstruction aid.

- * Worked with the Bolivian government to ensure the success of the 1996 Sustainable Development Summit in Santa Cruz. Vice- President Gore led the U.S. delegation.

- * Dramatically reduced drug cultivation and processing in Bolivia and Peru.

- * Improved interdiction through multilateral air, sea, and land efforts - highlighted by the establishment of Forward Operating Locations for U.S. counter-drug aircraft in Ecuador and the Dutch Antilles.

- * Expanded regional anti-money laundering efforts and precursor chemical activities, while actively pursuing the extradition of drug traffickers and other organized crime figures.

- * Launched the OAS Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism to gain more multilateral cooperation in the counter-drug struggle.

- * With the First Lady's leadership, held the Vital Voices of the Americas conference in Uruguay in 1998-in order to promote the participation of women the political and economic sectors of Latin America. Additional conferences were held in the Caribbean, Brazil, Guatemala, and Bolivia.

- * Developed a new era in hemispheric security relations through military-to-military consultations and the Defense Ministerials of the Americas.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

- * Provide continued political support and material assistance to Colombia and its peace process.

- * Engage with the newly-elected government in Guatemala and work towards the realization of the Peace Accords.

- * Meet disaster assistance needs in Venezuela to address the serious humanitarian situation and bolster an important political reform process.

- * Continue to support Hurricane Mitch recovery efforts in Central America.

- * Win approval for Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) enhancement

legislation to
promote economic prosperity in Central America and the Caribbean.

* Work toward FTAA.

* Support the democratic electoral process in Haiti and foster
development of
institutional capacity.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Cuba Policy

Why don't our arguments about China-WTO apply to Cuba?

* The fundamental difference is that one can do business with China
without doing
business with the Chinese state. China has a real and growing private
sector.

It has a real labor market: foreign companies and joint ventures can
hire and
pay workers directly; employees can negotiate directly for their
employment. It
has a real, if constrained, civil society -- with over a million non-profit
and
social organizations and an explosion of print and broadcast media.

* China's entry into the WTO will empower its private sector, which
will be the
primary beneficiary of increased foreign investment. It will weaken
China's
state enterprises, which depend on high tariffs for survival, and thus
undermine
the communist party's already diminishing hold over its labor force.
Our
arguments for the WTO deal and PNTR, therefore, are not based on
blind faith that
trade always leads to freedom, but on our analysis of conditions in
China today
and of the changes already taking place there.

* In Cuba, conditions are completely different. Cuba has not reformed its economy as China has. Cuba's private sector is virtually non-existent - limited to a few small family restaurants, craft shops, and small garden plots. Most foreign investors are in joint ventures with the Cuban state. Even in cases where a business is mostly foreign-owned (as many hotels are), workers are hired not by the foreign company but by the Cuban government. The company pays its employees' salaries to the government, which pockets the hard currency and pays the workers in Cuban money.

* Therefore, it is not possible to do business with Cuba without empowering and enriching the Cuban government. And there is no private sector to benefit from participation in the global economy.

Where are we with our Cuba policy? For once, it appears that the United States and Castro agree on something. Does that provide an opening to review our Cuba policy in light of Elian?

* The President is committed to a policy that promotes peaceful democratic transition in Cuba. The Elian Gonzalez matter is not related to our overall Cuba policy - it is an immigration case that is being addressed by the appropriate authorities and the courts.

* Our policy includes the continuation of the embargo, the implementation of the Helms-Burton Act, and effective diplomacy (as seen in the Geneva UNHRC vote this week) to maximize the pressure on the Cuban government to undertake political and economic change that Cuban people yearn for.

* At same time, we will continue our policy of reaching out to the Cuban people, without strengthening the Cuban government. Some of the humanitarian measures we have implemented include restoration of direct flights from New York and Los Angeles as well as Miami, expansion of remittances, and more

people-to-people
exchanges.

* We will continue these humanitarian measures to demonstrate our concern for the Cuban people and our interest in building bonds between our citizens. These measures are also designed to help the Cuban people to build an independent civil society and to prepare for the democratic future that they so richly deserve

What role did foreign policy toward Cuba play in the government's actions in this case?

* The handling of this case was in no way driven by U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. As the President and others have said, this has been about the judgement of Justice and the INS that a six-year old boy should be reunited with his father.

* The President has indicated he supports the INS decision that Elian is too young to make life-altering decision for himself, and that his father has sole legal authority to speak for him in immigration matters.

* Now that Elian is back in his father's care, we will await a ruling by the federal court of appeals on the asylum law issues raised.

Peruvian Election

Do you think U.S. pressure made the difference?

* We have worked closely with the international community to stress the importance of free, fair, and transparent elections in Peru. What matters is that the Peruvian people have confidence in their electoral process.

* The OAS mission, led by Eduardo Stein, did a very important and professional job of identifying concerns about electoral conditions and offering specific suggestions for improving the process.

* I believe that the OAS mission played a vital role in improving the electoral conditions.
I don't think it's helpful at this stage to speculate on whether or not we played a decisive role in the first-round outcome.

What do we foresee happening in the second round?

* Recent polls show the two candidates [Fujimori and Toledo] running neck-and-neck, but electoral trends over the next five weeks could break decisively one way or the other.

* Let me stress that we are neutral about who wins. Our concerns are with the process, not the outcome. I am confident that we can work with whichever candidate the Peruvian people pick in a free, fair, and transparent process.

* Initial comments by the GOP indicate its commitment to a free and fair second round. The international community will remain interested and vigilant, but I can't say at this point how much or little progress will be made in establishing free and fair electoral conditions.

How far are you willing to go to pressure fairness in the second round?

* We will again join the international community, led by the OAS mission, in stressing the importance of free, fair, and transparent elections. The bottom line remains that the electoral process must have credibility with the Peruvian people.

But, how would you react if Fujimori steals it after all?

* As you know, the President on Tuesday signed SJR43. That resolution indicates how we would react to an electoral process that clearly falls short of being free and fair [i.e., reassess our broader political, economic, and military relations with Peru].

Colombia

What is going to happen with your \$1.6 billion request for Plan Colombia?

* I remain optimistic that Congress will approve the package. There is wide support for helping Colombia.

* The biggest issue at the moment appears to be one of timing and the right legislative vehicle, rather the substance of supporting Plan Colombia.

Do you truly think we can make a dent with this counter-drug effort?

* Certainly. The impressive successes of regional counter-drug efforts in Peru and Bolivia show what can be done with an integrated strategy. Even when one factors in the increase in coca production in Colombia, total potential cocaine production has been reduced 18 percent over the past five years, according to CIA estimates.

* The problem is that to make further gains against cocaine and Colombian heroin -- and to avoid future setbacks -- we need to help the GOC beef up its counter-drug capabilities. The will is certainly there with President Pastrana, but the GOC needs our support to train and equip Army CD battalions, improve the mobility of their Army and police CD units, and enhance the GOC's drug interdiction capabilities.

What about human rights concerns?

* A central goal of our Colombia initiative is to promote and protect human rights.

* In accordance with U.S. law, as embodied in the Leahy Amendment, all assistance to the Colombian armed forces is contingent upon human rights screening.

* The Pastrana Administration is committed to improving Colombia's human rights record. Our annual human rights report has documented a steadily declining number of reported human rights violations by the Colombian military. President Pastrana has stated repeatedly that he will not tolerate collaboration, by commission or omission, between security force members and paramilitaries. He has backed this up with direct action, removing from service last year four generals and numerous mid-level officers for links to the paramilitaries or for failure to confront them aggressively.

* Pastrana recognizes that he needs to do more to address this problem. We are committed to helping him correct the conditions that breed human rights abuses in Colombia, whether by paramilitaries, guerrillas, drug traffickers, or elements of the security forces.

* Our initiative would fund training for human rights NGOs, government investigators, and prosecutors, including a specialized human rights task force. We are actively promoting and assisting the development of a national human rights policy. We also support enhanced security protection for human rights monitors in Colombia.

Are we going to get sucked into deeper military involvement?

* No. Our support to the Colombian military is aimed specifically at reducing the supply of illicit drugs. This is a goal shared by the entire international

community.

* Our military assistance will be limited to training vetted counter-drug units through the temporary assignment of carefully picked U.S. military trainers, and providing intelligence and logistics support directly related to the counter-drug mission, including force protection. We do not believe that a purely military solution is workable for Colombia.

* The U.S. military presence will be minimal, monitored, and transparent. We will keep the U.S. "footprint" on the ground as small and well-protected as possible, consistent with the mission. U.S. military personnel will not be deploying out into the jungle along with police and Colombian Army to conduct the lab destruction and other law enforcement operations.

* We understand that Colombia's multiple problems can only be solved by the Colombians themselves. The U.S. role can only be one of support for Colombia's own efforts. President Pastrana has the will and commitment to address Colombia's problems. He deserves our support in meeting these challenges.

Is there any hope for a negotiated peace in Colombia?

* Yes. As President Clinton has stated clearly, our policy is to support President Pastrana's efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the country's longstanding civil conflict. We fully recognize that progress in resolving Colombia's civil conflict would make sustained progress much easier on all other fronts -- reducing drug supply, protecting human rights, and promoting democracy and economic development.

* We believe strongly that our assistance will help Colombia reinvigorate its economy, enhance its governing capability, discourage human rights abuses, and

reduce the money available to guerrillas and paramilitaries from involvement in drug trafficking. As such, the plan represents the best chance to promote real progress in the peace process.

* Our package will also provide support to help train government negotiators and advisors on managing conflict and negotiations. Training will draw on the lessons learned in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Central America. The training will include the techniques for reintegrating ex-combatants into civil society.

* Of course, we expect the peace process to continue to be marked by breakthroughs and setbacks. It may take many years.

* Pastrana and his team have set the peace table with a generous scope for negotiations. I would like to see the FARC and ELN sit down at that table and partake in a serious search for peace. I can't vouch yet for their sincerity, but many successful peace processes around the world have resulted from talks that one or both sides initially approached with a hidden agenda.

What about the GOC's plans to create another "demilitarized zone" -- this time for the ELN?

* The United States is not a direct party to the negotiating process - and we don't have any details yet on this reported agreement. The GOC must be free to make its own decisions on what will best yield progress on the peace process. We welcome developments that help move Colombia towards peace and national reconciliation.

Haiti

Do we think the elections will take place in June? What are we doing to ensure that they occur and that the process is fair? Are we applying the Peru

model as
the Post suggested last Friday?

* We are cautiously optimistic that the long awaited local and legislative elections will be held on May 21 and the run-offs on June 25 as recently announced by President Preval. The U.S. and the international community pressed hard to ensure that a date was set.

* We realize that these dates will not permit the parliament to be seated on June 12 as specified in the Constitution. President Preval has announced that the Parliament will be called into ordinary session with full authority after the run-offs are finalized.

* The Administration has committed resources to facilitate the electoral process (nearly \$20 million) and stand ready to provide additional electoral support, both for the continuation of AID assistance to the electoral council and security equipment for the Haitian National Police. We are urging the Congress not to lose its confidence in these elections. If we remain true to our commitments, Haiti will emerge from these troubled times with a fully functioning parliament.

* Elections monitors and observers are key to ensuring transparent and non-violent elections. The Organization of American States has a proven record in performing this important function. We encourage its active participation in the oversight of Haiti's electoral contests

* The United States will provide a strong observer presence during the period leading up to the elections and a Congressional delegation will be on the ground during the polling. CARICOM, the European Community, and Canada will also send robust missions. Observers are essential to ensuring that the elections themselves remain transparent and non-violent.

* We have been emphatic in our message and support for Haiti

holding these vital elections; they must be free, fair and non-violent. Political violence and the instability it fosters undermines the true spirit of the Haitian people and what they strive for, a true democracy.

STRENGTHENING MILITARY READINESS

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

- * Protected the readiness and quality of our armed forces by adding back a total of almost \$50 billion to strengthen the readiness, modernization and quality of life of our Armed Forces.
- * Through executive decisions which raised the level of defense resources planned for U.S. military spending in fiscal years 1994, 1995 and 1996-formed the Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) at DoD in 1995 to evaluate readiness, oversee related activities, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on readiness policy matters. The SROC helps identify the most critical readiness concerns so that resources can be focused on their improvement.
- * In 1997, retained \$31 billion available from inflation savings in the defense budget across fiscal years 1997 to 2002 in order to provide more resources for readiness and modernization than previous budgets would have allowed.
- * Through bipartisan work with the Congress, won support for the following key readiness items in the budgets and supplementals.
- * A \$1.85 billion fiscal year 1998 emergency supplemental for operations in Bosnia and Southwest Asia.
- * A \$1 billion FY 98 readiness reprogramming.

- * \$1.9 billion in fiscal year 1999 emergency spending for Bosnia.
- * \$1.1 billion in fiscal year 1999 in emergency spending as a readiness supplemental.
- * \$5.1 billion in fiscal year 1999 for emergency spending for Kosovo and Southwest Asia.
- * A fiscal year 2000 budget that increased military pay (by 4.8% in the Authorization bill he signed) and increased the 20 year retirement benefit from 40% (the "redux" level enacted for personnel who joined the military after August 1, 1986) to 50% of average base pay over the last three years of service (known as "high three").
- * A fiscal year 2000 budget increase of \$12.6 billion for defense readiness and modernization through a combination of new spending and budgetary savings.
- * An increase of \$112 Billion above the fiscal year 1999 planning levels to be enacted over the period of fiscal years 2000 through 2005 for personnel, readiness, modernization and facilities accounts.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

- * Ensure the fiscal year 2000 and 2001 defense budgets contain adequate funding in personnel, readiness, modernization, and other high priority defense requirements.
- * Enact the \$112 billion increase across fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, through a combination of new spending and budgetary savings, for readiness, modernization, and other high priority defense requirements.
- * Continue to urge Congress to authorize two additional BRAC rounds and to enact

procurement legislation to provide additional savings for funding military readiness and modernization.

* Continue to ensure that employment of the U.S. Armed Forces in support of the President's strategy of engagement does not negatively impact their overall readiness. For example, we will continue to rely regional partners to take up the primary burden in peace operations, as we did in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.

COMBATING TERRORISM

A RECORD OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

* Our strategy combines strengthened law enforcement and intelligence efforts, vigorous diplomacy and, as was demonstrated in August 1998, military force when necessary.

* In cooperation with other governments, we target terrorist finances, break up support cells disrupt training and bring suspects to justice.

* Since 1993, a dozen wanted terrorist fugitives have been apprehended overseas and turned over to the United States to answer for their crimes. Included in this group are the conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing, the attack on the CIA headquarters and a terrorist responsible for an attack on a Pan Am flight almost 15 years ago. We never forget, we never give up - and no previous Administration's record comes close on this score

* Three Presidential directives (39, 62, 63) to bring government agencies together at a senior level to counter terrorism.

* A single, coherent budget process for anti-/counterterrorism; the appointment

of the first National Coordinator for counter-terrorism to keep the U.S. effort on track.

* Signed into law the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996), which banned fund-raising in the United States for designated terrorist

organizations, allowed for rapid deportation without the release of classified information and made it easier to bar terrorists from entry into the United States. Under this law, the Secretary of State has formally designated 30 foreign terrorist organizations, making it illegal for U.S. citizens and institutions to provide funds or other material support to these groups.

* Since 1993, the Administration has raised FBI's counter-terrorism budget by 283 percent. The number of FBI agents assigned to counter-terrorism has risen 2 1/2 fold.

* We have undertaken a comprehensive approach to improving the security of our embassies, including security enhancements at all posts, along with more local guard coverage and upgraded communications.

* We have made counter-terrorism central to our diplomacy. We have accelerated negotiations on extradition and multi legal assistance treaties. We have made a major effort to press all UN member-states to sign conventions that require them to prosecute or extradite terrorists to countries where they are wanted. An impressive record of international cooperation - efforts in the P-8 to harmonize legislation on terrorist offences, cooperate in R&D and create data bases on terrorism.

* We are leading the efforts to bring Usama Bin Ladin to justice, including sanctioning the Taliban for their continued harboring of Bin Ladin and his terrorist network.

* We undertook the largest counter-terrorism operation in U.S. history

to ensure
a peaceful Millennium celebration.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

* Continue diplomatic, law enforcement and intelligence efforts to bring Bin Ladin to justice and eliminate the global Al-Qa'ida terrorist network.

* Work with Israel and the international community to press Iran to cease its support for terrorism aimed at disrupting the Middle East peace process.

* Lead the international community's effort to eliminate the terrorist safe haven created by the Taleban in Afghanistan.

* Ratify the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Fundraising and strengthen our laws to combat terrorist fundraising in the United States.

* Improve our border security with Canada through cooperative programs on immigration, law enforcement and intelligence.

* Improve our law enforcement tools to combat the terrorist presence in the United States.

UNITED NATIONS REFORM

Core Points:

* Committed to making the UN more effective, and to support of UN as indispensable institution.

* When President appointed Dick Holbrooke as UN Ambassador, signalled endorsement of continued strong U.S. leadership in New York.

* We worked hard to pass Helms-Biden legislation to fund UN arrears last year -- legislation is far from perfect, but it offers prospect of payment of nearly a billion dollars in arrears.

* As peacekeeping requirements increased, we worked hard to convince Congress to nearly triple U.S. FY 2000 funding -- to \$500 million -- for UN peacekeeping operations over the amount initially requested for this year.

* Have strongly supported, and engaged in efforts to enhance, peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Congo, Sierra Leone, the Balkans.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

You say you are committed to the UN, but the Congress is holding up about \$200 million in payments for current operations. What are you doing to address this issue?

* Releasing those holds is a major priority.

* Secretary Albright and Ambassador Holbrooke have been actively involved in trying to persuade Members, and the effort continues.

* We are trying to make the case that these peacekeeping operations are cost effective, as our support leverages the involvement of the international

community -- outside of the Balkans, very few U.S. troops are involved in any of these operations, and even in the Balkans, U.S. troops represent a distinct minority.

Many say that Helms-Biden is fatally flawed, and that greater Presidential leadership could have resulted in a better bill.

* In fact, the bill that emerged was, at our urging, different from the original Helms-Biden legislation -- we were able to secure removal of provisions that were simply unachievable and to ensure sufficient flexibility to make the legislation workable. [If pressed on examples: the bill sets a 20% target for U.S. general assessments, which is not likely to be realized this year, but it has waiver provisions that could enable us to make payments even if we don't get

to 20%.]

* Again, there is much about Helms-Biden that we don't like, but we cannot effectively and successfully engage the UN without the support of Congress -- and there was no way we would have obtained such support in the absence of the Helms-Biden conditionality.

You say you are committed to enhancing the capacity of the UN to address humanitarian contingencies. But if there were another Rwanda, what is the likelihood that the international community would do anything more than they did (or didn't do) in 1994?

* First, we are working to address conflicts before the killings begin or escalate -- that, for example, is why we are deeply involved in efforts to promote negotiation and dialogue in Africa -- in places like Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Congo, and Burundi.

* Second, we are working to develop and support the efforts of regional actors to respond to situations of conflict -- whether it is through our support of the African Crisis Response Initiative -- where we have helped to train thousands of African troops -- or through our critical and timely support for the Australian peace enforcement operation in East Timor -- where we provided intelligence, communication and strategic lift, among other things.

* Third, we are working hard to better anticipate and plan for such crises, and to consider in advance our options -- including the option, if necessary, of using military force to stop mass genocide.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

Core Points

* From the first days of the Administration, when the President assembled an international coalition to restore the elected government of Haiti, to last year, when we acted to end mass killings in the Balkans, human rights have been central to our foreign policy objectives.

* We devote about \$700 million per year to democracy assistance and human rights programs around the world.

* We led the efforts to establish war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and provide over \$30 million annually to support their work.

* We led the international effort to create the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and we have strongly supported that office.

* Just this year, we've helped to secure adoption of three landmark conventions dealing with childrens' rights, including children in armed conflict, child labor and sexual exploitation of children.

* We are also leading international efforts to combat trafficking in women and children (through funding international programs, working with Congress on legislation, and enhancing law enforcement efforts in the United States).

* President has also strongly supported efforts to combat religious intolerance, and created first-ever Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad; also supported and signed the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

If you are so committed to human rights, why haven't you signed the Treaty establishing an International Criminal Court.

* Although we have strongly supported an appropriately structured

ICC, we have
fundamental concerns about the ICC Treaty.

* In particular, we cannot accept a Treaty that purports to assert
criminal
jurisdiction over U.S. nationals when the United States is not even a
party to
that Treaty.

* In other words, even though we are not a Treaty state, this Court
could sit in
judgment on the actions of U.S. military forces engaged in life-saving
humanitarian assistance activities overseas.

* We don't think that people of the United States would be willing to
support
such a proposition.

But if you sign and ratify the Treaty, don't you solve the problem of
lack of
U.S. consent?

* The United States should have the option of assessing the
effectiveness of this
Court, over time, before making any decision whatsoever about
whether U.S.
nationals ought to be subject to its jurisdiction.

* The present Treaty does not provide that option -- it says we are
subject to
Court jurisdiction whether or not we choose to join the Treaty.

* We are however, discussing with other governments ways that
supplemental
documents connected to the Treaty might address our concerns, and
we remain
hopeful that we can ultimately support this Treaty -- however, we
cannot do so
under current circumstances.