

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Anne Witkowsky to Caroline Krass. Subject: FW: ACDA Annual Report. (6 pages)	10/20/1999	P1/b(1)
002. email	Anne Witkowsky to Caroline Krass. Subject: FW: ACDA Annual Report. (6 pages)	10/20/1999	P1/b(1)
003. email	Caroline Krass to Anne Witkowsky. Subject: FW: ACDA Annual Report. (7 pages)	10/21/1999	P1/b(1)
004. email	Anne Witkowsky to Stella Brackman. Subject: ACDA Report Package. (6 pages)	10/26/1999	P1/b(1)
005. email	Christopher Bolan to Richard Saunders and Todd Dennett. Subject: Bahrain Crown Prince's Visit: The VP and Jesse too, please. (3 pages)	12/07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
 OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1999-12/13/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/27/99 11:44:21 AM

FROM Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT package 6088 - Response to Lott et al on Iraq [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Dejban, Donna D. (NSA)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Matthews, Sonyia (ADMIN)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)

CARBON_COPY Darnes, Victoria J. (RECORDS)
Ficklin, John W. (RECORDS)
Good, Travis C. (RECORDS)
Kaplan, Dean M. (RECORDS)
Konrad, Elizabeth M. (RECORDS)
Marsh, Thomas S (RECORDS)
Porter, Pete (RECORDS)
Sanborn, Daniel R. K. (Records)
Starks, Tali T. (RECORDS)

TEXT_BODY Mona called with a change to the subject package which is with the President. The change is on page two so it does not interfere with the POTUS signature. At Staff Secretary's suggestion and with the knowledge of Mona, pen & ink change was provided to Staff Secretary's office and I have made the changes requested by Mona to the document.
All changes are found in the last paragraph of the second page.

As
an FYI the letter is attached here with changed area highlighted

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

6088ltr1.doc

September 28, 1999

Dear Howard:

Thank you for your letter concerning our policy toward Iraq. I share your desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power and, as I announced last December, my Administration is committed to maintaining our policy of containment as we pursue regime change in Iraq.

Assisting the external Iraqi opposition is a key element of this policy and we are pursuing various options to help the opposition establish itself as a viable political force. We are in the process of drawing down non-lethal assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act and, in fact, are moving faster to provide support than the Iraqi opposition currently is able to absorb. We also are working to unite and invigorate the opposition. In particular, we have encouraged opposition groups to consolidate under a more cohesive umbrella group and to broaden their base of support by including prominent members of the Iraqi diaspora. This assistance provides critical support to the opposition while taking into account the sensitivity of our regional allies who are not ready to support the Iraqi external opposition overtly. If you would find it useful, we can arrange a detailed briefing on the status of the Iraqi opposition and our assistance efforts.

With regard to Iraqi National Congress (INC) meetings, as Deputy Secretary Talbott's letter to the INC interim leadership made clear, we support the right of the Iraqi opposition to meet anywhere it chooses. In addition, I have stated

that an Iraqi attack on the Kurds would cross one of our red lines for the use of force. However, in the INC's letter of July 7, they asked the U.S. Government to "provide concrete security guarantees for the people and region of Iraqi Kurdistan, not only for the duration of the INC meeting, but for the long term." Given the scope of that request, the prevalence of Iraqi intelligence agents throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, the size of Iraqi ground forces in the region, and their demonstrated ability to attack Kurdish-held territory quickly and efficiently, the only way the United States could fulfill such a guarantee would be to deploy substantial numbers of ground forces to northern Iraq for the foreseeable future. Such forces would also require supply lines through Turkey. I do not believe it would be prudent to allow a meeting of the INC to serve as a trigger for committing U.S. ground forces to northern Iraq. If you disagree on this, I would welcome your views.

As part of our longer-term regime change strategy, we are exploring other means by which we can exert pressure on the regime. However, as we pursue regime change it is essential to maintain our containment policy, which has been the basis of our successful effort to constrain Iraqi aggression since the end of the Gulf War. A primary goal of this policy is preventing Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction. This policy consists of two pillars: our diplomatic efforts, both in the United Nations and with regional allies, and the credible use of force to back our diplomacy. To remain successful, preserving the support of our Gulf allies and, if feasible, the United Nations is crucial. To this end, our objective in the UN Security Council has been to devise a regime that achieves effective compliance with Iraq's WMD obligations and control of Iraq's finances, while providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.

A new robust inspection regime is the best way to thwart efforts to

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consensus around such a framework. As a result, I believe it would be a mistake
to set an arbitrary deadline for Iraq to agree to a new inspection regime. Doing
so now would leave us isolated rather than Saddam. Such an ultimatum would also
likely lead us toward unilateral military action, which would further play into
Saddam's hands.

Though I continue to believe the best way to restore a robust inspection regime
in Iraq is through the UN Security Council, we will continue to monitor Iraqi
weapons-related activities as closely as possible via other means. If we see
credible evidence that Iraq is reconstituting its WMD arsenal, I assure you the
United States would act. We have maintained a powerful force in the Gulf,
capable of inflicting heavy damage on Saddam's military and security installations, in case we must resort to force. I also am confident that if
there were evidence of significant Iraqi weapons-related activity and their
possible use, we would find allied and regional support for military action.

Change in Iraq must come from the Iraqis themselves; it cannot be imposed by the
United States. At the same time, we will do all we can to help those who want to
remove Saddam to achieve their goal. Although we may differ on how best to
pursue our shared goals, I know you are as determined as I am to see our national
interest protected. Again, thank you for writing and for sharing your views on
this matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Howard L. Berman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-0526

September 28, 1999

Dear Senator Brownback:

Thank you for your letter concerning our policy toward Iraq. I share your desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power and, as I announced last December, my Administration is committed to maintaining our policy of containment as we pursue regime change in Iraq.

Assisting the external Iraqi opposition is a key element of this policy and we are pursuing various options to help the opposition establish itself as a viable political force. We are in the process of drawing down non-lethal assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act and, in fact, are moving faster to provide support than the Iraqi opposition currently is able to absorb. We also are working to unite and invigorate the opposition. In particular, we have encouraged opposition groups to consolidate under a more cohesive umbrella group and to broaden their base of support by including prominent members of the Iraqi diaspora. This assistance provides critical support to the opposition while taking into account the sensitivity of our regional allies who are not ready to support the Iraqi external opposition overtly. If you would find it useful, we can arrange a detailed briefing on the status of the Iraqi opposition and our assistance efforts.

With regard to Iraqi National Congress (INC) meetings, as Deputy Secretary Talbott's letter to the INC interim leadership made clear, we support the right

of the Iraqi opposition to meet anywhere it chooses. In addition, I have stated that an Iraqi attack on the Kurds would cross one of our red lines for the use of force. However, in the INC's letter of July 7, they asked the U.S. Government to "provide concrete security guarantees for the people and region of Iraqi Kurdistan, not only for the duration of the INC meeting, but for the long term." Given the scope of that request, the prevalence of Iraqi intelligence agents throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, the size of Iraqi ground forces in the region, and their demonstrated ability to attack Kurdish-held territory quickly and efficiently, the only way the United States could fulfill such a guarantee would be to deploy substantial numbers of ground forces to northern Iraq for the foreseeable future. Such forces would also require supply lines through Turkey. I do not believe it would be prudent to allow a meeting of the INC to serve as a trigger for committing U.S. ground forces to northern Iraq. If you disagree on this, I would welcome your views.

As part of our longer-term regime change strategy, we are exploring other means by which we can exert pressure on the regime. However, as we pursue regime change it is essential to maintain our containment policy, which has been the basis of our successful effort to constrain Iraqi aggression since the end of the Gulf War. A primary goal of this policy is preventing Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction. This policy consists of two pillars: our diplomatic efforts, both in the United Nations and with regional allies, and the credible use of force to back our diplomacy. To remain successful, preserving the support of our Gulf allies and, if feasible, the United Nations is crucial. To this end, our objective in the UN Security Council has been to devise a regime that achieves effective compliance with Iraq's WMD obligations and control of Iraq's finances, while providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.

A new robust inspection regime is the best way to thwart efforts to reconstitute Iraqi's WMD arsenal, and we have focused on rebuilding a Security Council consensus around such a framework. As a result, I believe it would be a mistake to set an arbitrary deadline for Iraq to agree to a new inspection regime. Doing so now would leave us isolated rather than Saddam. Such an ultimatum would also likely lead us toward unilateral military action, which would further play into Saddam's hands.

Though I continue to believe the best way to restore a robust inspection regime in Iraq is through the UN Security Council, we will continue to monitor Iraqi weapons-related activities as closely as possible via other means. If we see credible evidence that Iraq is attempting to reconstitute its WMD arsenal, I assure you the United States would act unilaterally and with force. We have maintained a powerful force in the Gulf, capable of inflicting heavy damage on Saddam's military and security installations, in case we must resort to force. I also am confident that if there were evidence of significant Iraqi weapons-related activity and their possible use, we would find allied and regional support for military action.

Change in Iraq must come from the Iraqis themselves; it cannot be imposed by the United States. At the same time, we will do all we can to help those who want to remove Saddam to achieve their goal. Although we may differ on how best to pursue our shared goals, I know you are as determined as I am to see our national interest protected. Again, thank you for writing and for sharing your views on this matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Brownback
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1604

September 28, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter concerning our policy toward Iraq. I share your desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power and, as I announced last December, my Administration is committed to maintaining our policy of containment as we pursue regime change in Iraq.

Assisting the external Iraqi opposition is a key element of this policy and we are pursuing various options to help the opposition establish itself as a viable political force. We are in the process of drawing down non-lethal assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act and, in fact, are moving faster to provide support than the Iraqi opposition currently is able to absorb. We also are working to unite and invigorate the opposition. In particular, we have encouraged opposition groups to consolidate under a more cohesive umbrella group and to broaden their base of support by including prominent members of the Iraqi diaspora. This assistance provides critical support to the opposition while taking into account the sensitivity of our regional allies who are not ready to support the Iraqi external opposition overtly. If you would find it useful, we can arrange a detailed briefing on the status of the Iraqi opposition and our assistance efforts.

With regard to Iraqi National Congress (INC) meetings, as Deputy

Secretary

Talbott's letter to the INC interim leadership made clear, we support the right of the Iraqi opposition to meet anywhere it chooses. In addition, I have stated that an Iraqi attack on the Kurds would cross one of our red lines for the use of force. However, in the INC's letter of July 7, they asked the U.S. Government to "provide concrete security guarantees for the people and region of Iraqi Kurdistan, not only for the duration of the INC meeting, but for the long term." Given the scope of that request, the prevalence of Iraqi intelligence agents throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, the size of Iraqi ground forces in the region, and their demonstrated ability to attack Kurdish-held territory quickly and efficiently, the only way the United States could fulfill such a guarantee would be to deploy substantial numbers of ground forces to northern Iraq for the foreseeable future. Such forces would also require supply lines through Turkey. I do not believe it would be prudent to allow a meeting of the INC to serve as a trigger for committing U.S. ground forces to northern Iraq. If you disagree on this, I would welcome your views.

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achieves effective compliance with Iraq's WMD obligations and control of Iraq's finances, while providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.

A new robust inspection regime is the best way to thwart efforts to reconstitute Iraqi's WMD arsenal, and we have focused on rebuilding a Security Council consensus around such a framework. As a result, I believe it would be a mistake to set an arbitrary deadline for Iraq to agree to a new inspection regime. Doing so now would leave us isolated rather than Saddam. Such an ultimatum would also likely lead us toward unilateral military action, which would further play into Saddam's hands.

Though I continue to believe the best way to restore a robust inspection regime in Iraq is through the UN Security Council, we will continue to monitor Iraqi weapons-related activities as closely as possible via other means. If we see credible evidence that Iraq is attempting to reconstitute its WMD arsenal, I assure you the United States would act unilaterally and with force. We have maintained a powerful force in the Gulf, capable of inflicting heavy damage on Saddam's military and security installations, in case we must resort to force. I also am confident that if there were evidence of significant Iraqi weapons-related activity and their possible use, we would find allied and regional support for military action.

Change in Iraq must come from the Iraqis themselves; it cannot be imposed by the United States. At the same time, we will do all we can to help those who want to remove Saddam to achieve their goal. Although we may differ on how best to pursue our shared goals, I know you are as determined as I am to see our national interest protected. Again, thank you for writing and for sharing your views on this matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-3220

September 28, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter concerning our policy toward Iraq. I share your desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power and, as I announced last December, my Administration is committed to maintaining our policy of containment as we pursue regime change in Iraq.

Assisting the external Iraqi opposition is a key element of this policy and we are pursuing various options to help the opposition establish itself as a viable political force. We are in the process of drawing down non-lethal assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act and, in fact, are moving faster to provide support than the Iraqi opposition currently is able to absorb. We also are working to unite and invigorate the opposition. In particular, we have encouraged opposition groups to consolidate under a more cohesive umbrella group and to broaden their base of support by including prominent members of the Iraqi diaspora. This assistance provides critical support to the opposition while taking into account the sensitivity of our regional allies who are not ready to support the Iraqi external opposition overtly. If you would find it useful, we can arrange a

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views on
this matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

September 28, 1999

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter concerning our policy toward Iraq. I share
your desire
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United States. At the same time, we will do all we can to help those who want to remove Saddam to achieve their goal. Although we may differ on how best to pursue our shared goals, I know you are as determined as I am to see our national interest protected. Again, thank you for writing and for sharing your views on this matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Robert Kerrey
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2704

September 28, 1999

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your letter concerning our policy toward Iraq. I share your desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power and, as I announced last December, my Administration is committed to maintaining our policy of containment as we pursue regime change in Iraq.

Assisting the external Iraqi opposition is a key element of this policy and we are pursuing various options to help the opposition establish itself as a viable political force. We are in the process of drawing down non-lethal assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act and, in fact, are moving faster to provide support than the Iraqi opposition currently is able to absorb. We also are working to unite and invigorate the opposition. In particular, we have encouraged opposition groups to consolidate under a more cohesive umbrella group and to broaden their base of support by including prominent members of the

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0703

September 28, 1999

Dear Mr. Leader:

Thank you for your letter concerning our policy toward Iraq. I share your desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power and, as I announced last December, my Administration is committed to maintaining our policy of containment as we pursue regime change in Iraq.

Assisting the external Iraqi opposition is a key element of this policy and we are pursuing various options to help the opposition establish itself as a viable political force. We are in the process of drawing down non-lethal assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act and, in fact, are moving faster to provide support than the Iraqi opposition currently is able to absorb. We also are working to unite and invigorate the opposition. In particular, we have encouraged

opposition groups to consolidate under a more cohesive umbrella group and to broaden their base of support by including prominent members of the Iraqi diaspora. This assistance provides critical support to the opposition while taking into account the sensitivity of our regional allies who are not ready to support the Iraqi external opposition overtly. If you would find it useful, we can arrange a detailed briefing on the status of the Iraqi opposition and our assistance efforts.

With regard to Iraqi National Congress (INC) meetings, as Deputy Secretary Talbott's letter to the INC interim leadership made clear, we support the right of the Iraqi opposition to meet anywhere it chooses. In addition, I have stated that an Iraqi attack on the Kurds would cross one of our red lines for the use of force. However, in the INC's letter of July 7, they asked the U.S. Government to "provide concrete security guarantees for the people and region of Iraqi Kurdistan, not only for the duration of the INC meeting, but for the long term." Given the scope of that request, the prevalence of Iraqi intelligence agents throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, the size of Iraqi ground forces in the region, and their demonstrated ability to attack Kurdish-held territory quickly and efficiently, the only way the United States could fulfill such a guarantee would be to deploy substantial numbers of ground forces to northern Iraq for the foreseeable future. Such forces would also require supply lines through Turkey. I do not believe it would be prudent to allow a meeting of the INC to serve as a trigger for committing U.S. ground forces to northern Iraq. If you disagree on this, I would welcome your views.

As part of our longer-term regime change strategy, we are exploring other means by which we can exert pressure on the regime. However, as we pursue regime

change it is essential to maintain our containment policy, which has been the basis of our successful effort to constrain Iraqi aggression since the end of the Gulf War. A primary goal of this policy is preventing Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction. This policy consists of two pillars: our diplomatic efforts, both in the United Nations and with regional allies, and the credible use of force to back our diplomacy. To remain successful, preserving the support of our Gulf allies and, if feasible, the United Nations is crucial. To this end, our objective in the UN Security Council has been to devise a regime that achieves effective compliance with Iraq's WMD obligations and control of Iraq's finances, while providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.

A new robust inspection regime is the best way to thwart efforts to reconstitute Iraqi's WMD arsenal, and we have focused on rebuilding a Security Council consensus around such a framework. As a result, I believe it would be a mistake to set an arbitrary deadline for Iraq to agree to a new inspection regime. Doing so now would leave us isolated rather than Saddam. Such an ultimatum would also likely lead us toward unilateral military action, which would further play into Saddam's hands.

Though I continue to believe the best way to restore a robust inspection regime in Iraq is through the UN Security Council, we will continue to monitor Iraqi weapons-related activities as closely as possible via other means. If we see credible evidence that Iraq is attempting to reconstitute its WMD arsenal, I assure you the United States would act unilaterally and with force. We have maintained a powerful force in the Gulf, capable of inflicting heavy damage on Saddam's military and security installations, in case we must resort to force. I also am confident that if there were evidence of significant Iraqi weapons-related activity and their possible use, we would find allied

and
regional support for military action.

Change in Iraq must come from the Iraqis themselves; it cannot be imposed by the United States. At the same time, we will do all we can to help those who want to remove Saddam to achieve their goal. Although we may differ on how best to pursue our shared goals, I know you are as determined as I am to see our national interest protected. Again, thank you for writing and for sharing your views on this matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-7010

September 28, 1999

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter concerning our policy toward Iraq. I share your desire to see Saddam Hussein removed from power and, as I announced last December, my Administration is committed to maintaining our policy of containment as we pursue regime change in Iraq.

Assisting the external Iraqi opposition is a key element of this policy and we are pursuing various options to help the opposition establish itself as a viable political force. We are in the process of drawing down non-lethal assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act and, in fact, are moving faster to provide

support
than the Iraqi opposition currently is able to absorb. We also are
working to
unite and invigorate the opposition. In particular, we have encouraged
opposition groups to consolidate under a more cohesive umbrella
group and to
broaden their base of support by including prominent members of the
Iraqi
diaspora.
This assistance provides critical support to the opposition while taking
into
account the sensitivity of our regional allies who are not ready to
support the
Iraqi external opposition overtly. If you would find it useful, we can
arrange a
detailed briefing on the status of the Iraqi opposition and our
assistance
efforts.

With regard to Iraqi National Congress (INC) meetings, as Deputy
Secretary
Talbot's letter to the INC interim leadership made clear, we support
the right
of the Iraqi opposition to meet anywhere it chooses. In addition, I
have stated
that an Iraqi attack on the Kurds would cross one of our red lines for
the use of
force. However, in the INC's letter of July 7, they asked the U.S.
Government to
"provide concrete security guarantees for the people and region of
Iraqi
Kurdistan, not only for the duration of the INC meeting, but for the
long term."
Given the scope of that request, the prevalence of Iraqi intelligence
agents
throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, the size of Iraqi ground forces in the
region, and
their demonstrated ability to attack Kurdish-held territory quickly and
efficiently, the only way the United States could fulfill such a
guarantee would
be to deploy substantial numbers of ground forces to northern Iraq for
the
foreseeable future. Such forces would also require supply lines
through Turkey.
I do not believe it would be prudent to allow a meeting of the INC to
serve as a
trigger for committing U.S. ground forces to northern Iraq. If you
disagree on
this, I would welcome your views.

As part of our longer-term regime change strategy, we are exploring other means by which we can exert pressure on the regime. However, as we pursue regime change it is essential to maintain our containment policy, which has been the basis of our successful effort to constrain Iraqi aggression since the end of the Gulf War. A primary goal of this policy is preventing Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction. This policy consists of two pillars: our diplomatic efforts, both in the United Nations and with regional allies, and the credible use of force to back our diplomacy. To remain successful, preserving the support of our Gulf allies and, if feasible, the United Nations is crucial. To this end, our objective in the UN Security Council has been to devise a regime that achieves effective compliance with Iraq's WMD obligations and control of Iraq's finances, while providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.

A new robust inspection regime is the best way to thwart efforts to reconstitute Iraq's WMD arsenal, and we have focused on rebuilding a Security Council consensus around such a framework. As a result, I believe it would be a mistake to set an arbitrary deadline for Iraq to agree to a new inspection regime. Doing so now would leave us isolated rather than Saddam. Such an ultimatum would also likely lead us toward unilateral military action, which would further play into Saddam's hands.

Though I continue to believe the best way to restore a robust inspection regime in Iraq is through the UN Security Council, we will continue to monitor Iraqi weapons-related activities as closely as possible via other means. If we see credible evidence that Iraq is attempting to reconstitute its WMD arsenal, I assure you the United States would act unilaterally and with force. We have maintained a powerful force in the Gulf, capable of inflicting heavy damage on

Saddam's military and security installations, in case we must resort to force. I also am confident that if there were evidence of significant Iraqi weapons-related activity and their possible use, we would find allied and regional support for military action.

Change in Iraq must come from the Iraqis themselves; it cannot be imposed by the United States. At the same time, we will do all we can to help those who want to remove Saddam to achieve their goal. Although we may differ on how best to pursue our shared goals, I know you are as determined as I am to see our national interest protected. Again, thank you for writing and for sharing your views on this matter.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0103

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/6/99 1:13:25 PM
FROM Keith, James R. (ASIA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Helms Redo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Matthews, Sonyia (ADMIN)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Please print in final. Already saved to disk as redo3 in each case.
jk

-----Original Message-----

From: Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (ASIA)

Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 1999 10:33 AM

To: Keith, James R.

(ASIA)

Subject: FW: Helms Redo [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Jim,

I

have made substantial changes to the first two files. Back to you to get clearances, etc.

Ken

-----Original Message-----

From: Keith,

James R. (ASIA)

Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 1999 10:08 AM

To: Lieberthal,

Kenneth G. (ASIA)

Subject: Helms Redo [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Package

is on your desk; I have re-drafted based on what I can decipher of JBS' comments. I will address format after you have had a look at substance. Suggest we send back after you have edited with a note that you or I stand ready to discuss (JBS wrote that he wanted to

discuss with you).

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6702 potus~helms REDO2.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter concerning my meeting with Chinese President Jiang in Auckland. That meeting was arranged months in advance as part of my regular participation in the APEC Leaders' Meeting and was not convened in any way as a response to Lee Teng-hui's July 9 statement.

My Administration's cross-Strait policy seeks to maximize the chances of peace, prosperity and security in the Taiwan Strait area by creating appropriate incentives for all parties. This continues an approach followed by every administration since the 1970's. Specifically, we have made clear our firm "one China" policy; we have insisted that any resolution of differences between the Chinese on both sides of the Strait be peaceful; and we have urged both parties to sustain cross-Strait dialogue as the only effective means of resolving peacefully the differences between Taipei and Beijing.

* * * *

I articulated all three of these principles in my meeting with President Jiang.

I am determined to uphold these principles in an even-handed and consistent manner because this approach is the best means of advancing the interests of the American people in regional peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.

As always, I am grateful for your forthright insight and advice.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6702 srb~potus REDO.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Senator Helms' Letter Concerning Your Meeting with
Chinese President
Jiang Zemin

Purpose

Respond to Helms' letter urging you to avoid tilting toward Beijing during your meeting with Jiang in Auckland.

Background

Senator Helms wrote to caution you against advancing U.S.-China relations at the expense of Taiwan. He charges that your meeting with Jiang Zemin in Auckland was "hastily arranged" to assuage the PRC's ire over Lee Teng-hui's July 9 statement

positing "special state-to-state" relations as the basis for cross-Strait dialogue. Helms alleges that the Administration is already tilting toward Beijing, and he advocates a reversal of that alleged position by warning Jiang that: any PRC use of force in the dispute with Taiwan will trigger U.S.

intervention; the Administration refrain from pressuring Taiwan to enter into negotiation with Beijing; you avoid any kind of joint statement with Jiang in Auckland; and you say nothing to Jiang on arms sales to Taiwan other than to restate the obligations of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Your response rebuts Helms' charges, explains the fundamental principles that guide our relations with the PRC and Taiwan, and indicates that you stressed these principles to Jiang during your meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Helms at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Letter to Senator Helms
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

2

6702 REDO

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 6702 jk~srb REDO.doc

October 6, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL

FROM: JAMES KEITH

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Helms' Letter Concerning POTUS'
Meeting with Chinese
President Jiang Zemin

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President covering a
response to Senator
Helms regarding the President's meeting with Chinese President Jiang
Zemin in
Auckland.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on 10 September
1999.

Concurrence by: Miles Lackey

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Response to Senator Helms
Tab B Incoming Correspondence
1

6702 REDO

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/15/99 12:51:06 PM
FROM Konrad, Elizabeth M. (RECORDS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: and THAT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Marsh, Thomas S (RECORDS)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

That would be lovely ole bloke

-----Original Message-----

From: Marsh,
Thomas S (RECORDS)
Sent: Friday, October 15, 1999 12:49 PM
To: Konrad,
Elizabeth M. (RECORDS); Sanborn, Daniel R. K. (Records); Kaplan,
Dean M. (RECORDS); Starks, Tali T. (RECORDS); Good, Travis C.
(RECORDS)
Subject: RE: and THAT [UNCLASSIFIED]

I want to hear
his British accent...

-----Original Message-----

From: Konrad,
Elizabeth M. (RECORDS)
Sent: Friday, October 15, 1999 7:14 AM
To: Marsh,
Thomas S (RECORDS); Sanborn, Daniel R. K. (Records); Kaplan, Dean
M. (RECORDS); Starks, Tali T. (RECORDS); Good, Travis C. (RECORDS)
Subject: RE:
and THAT [UNCLASSIFIED]

Very mature there Jesse - meet me at the
monkey bars at recess...

-----Original Message-----

From: Marsh,
Thomas S (RECORDS)
Sent: Thursday, October 14, 1999 8:02 PM
To: Daniel
Sanborn; Dean Kaplan; Elizabeth Konrad; Tali Starks; Travis Good
Subject: and

THAT [UNCLASSIFIED]

North Carolina Sen. Jesse Helms, Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, imitated Clinton during Wednesday's debate by acting out an imagined telephone call to British Prime Minister Tony Blair seeking a letter of support for the treaty.

``Tony, I got a problem over here, a hatful of worries, how about sending me a li'l ole letter," Helms said, pretending he was Clinton while holding an imaginary phone to his ear.

He then impersonated Blair's reply: ``Oh yes, I'll do that.

And give Monica my regards," Helms said in reference to the former White House intern at the heart of the president's impeachment case.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/18/99 2:05:28 PM
FROM Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: New Isolationism [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Halperin, David E. (SPCHW)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Halperin, David E. (SPCHW)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted) (SPCHW)
Fallin, James (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Huff, Lindsey E. (PRESS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Schaefer, Christopher S. (ADMIN/INTERN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

TEXT_BODY

Albright's in Africa, but that's not a fatal obstacle if we take the initiative. Let's raise at 5:00.

-----Original Message-----

From: Halperin,
David E. (SPCHW)
Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 2:00 PM
To: Gobush,
Matthew N. (PRESS); Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW); Leavy, David
C. (PRESS)
Cc: @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: RE:
New Isolationism [UNCLASSIFIED]

I'd say Albright should do letter
to the editor -- Burt's piece totally ignores Clinton Admin history
on treaties and the ridiculous Senate process in case of CTBT. Furthermore
CTBT will rise again

-----Original Message-----

From: Gobush,
Matthew N. (PRESS)

Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 1:58 PM
To: Malinowski,
Tomasz P. (SPCHW); Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Cc: @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters;
@PRESS - Public Affairs
Subject: RE: New Isolationism [UNCLASSIFIED]

Dave

- Tom's idea of a Treaty piece is a great one. Do you think you could pitch it? Maybe we can do a little research to compare our record against previous Administrations. I'd be willing to bet we stack up pretty well.

-----Original Message-----

From: Malinowski,
Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 1:28 PM
To: Leavy,
David C. (PRESS)
Cc: @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters; @PRESS - Public
Affairs
Subject: RE: New Isolationism [UNCLASSIFIED]

Dave:

I
totally agree with you. There's a lot of blaming the victim going on out there, which is typical in these cases. It's boring to write another story about how the treaty opponents were wrong. It's a lot more fun and sophisticated and to write one about how the good guys didn't have a strategy -- especially when you don't have to suggest an alternative.

The real question is, should we have done more over the last two years. The answer, I think, is yes as a matter of principle, but it wouldn't have made a difference in practice. There was no process in the Senate, so no one would have paid much attention to our rabble rousing, (I didn't see Jim Hoagland writing op-ed pieces off of the CTBT events we did have, for example -- he'd have said there was not sufficient hook). And arguably, had the President gotten even more prominently and personally involved in selling the Treaty early on, that would have given his enemies even more reason to defeat it.

One story line we might try to get out there in response to the ridiculous Richard Burt piece today, for example, is that this Administration has a pretty good track record building public and congressional support for treaty ratification. We got START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention done despite conservative skepticism, and we managed the NATO enlargement effort

over a period of several years to rousing success, though most of the snotty pundits thought at one point or another we'd fail. And we did all of this with Jesse Helms as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. So we know a thing or two about how to do this right. The difference here was we never got a serious process.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Leavy, David C. (PRESS)

Sent: Monday, October
18, 1999 12:29 PM

To: Rudman, Mara E. (NSA); @NSA - Natl Security
Advisor; @PRESS - Public Affairs; Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Subject: RE:

New Isolationism [UNCLASSIFIED]

Mara: i couldn't agree more.

If you read my entire email you would see that I certainly did not point fingers at anybody and couldn't agree more with the monday morning quarterbacking that is going on here. what i said and i have bolded for you below on my original email is that the criticism in the new york times piece is focused on our legislative strategy not public affairs. that is in the story srb is reacting to and is not from me (in fact, i have been defending our leg efforts till i was blue in the face the last four days)

-----Original Message-----

From: Rudman,

Mara E. (NSA)

Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 12:22 PM

To: Leavy,

David C. (PRESS); @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @PRESS - Public
Affairs; Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)

Subject: RE: New Isolationism

[UNCLASSIFIED]

David--

I understand why you would want to defend against the public affairs charges, and I agree with your analysis. But I think turning around to point the finger instead at the legislative side is both unnecessary and reflects the same tendency with which you take issue here when it was directed at you....

-----Original

Message-----

From: Leavy, David C. (PRESS)

Sent: Monday, October
18, 1999 12:14 PM

To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @PRESS - Public

Affairs; Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Subject: FW: New Isolationism
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Mona: Can you please pass to Sandy:

Sandy:

In response to your note and our conversation this weekend, I agree that there should be a critique of our CTBT strategy and what went right and what didn't. Certainly, we could have done better. Anytime there is a vote as disappointing as the CTBT, more needed to be done.

But

let me take strong exception to the notion that somehow the vote was the result of the public affairs effort or somehow the public affairs effort was inadequate. In fact, Perlez focused her criticism on the political effort not public affairs.

As you know from chairing the 6:00pm strategy meeting on CTB every night, we had a strategy focusing on the regional media of our targeted list coupled with a vigorous effort in the national press. This included in the eight working days before the vote a heavy Presidential and Berger scheduling, including:

- * Presidential events every day (5 events total in 8 days including radio address)
- * White House meetings with scientists, religious leaders, NGO's.
- * 3 supportive editorials in BOTH the Post and the Times in the run-up to the vote.
- * Experts briefing for White House press corps.
- * Op-eds by Chric, Blair, Schroeder, Sid Drell, Lawrence Eagleburger, MKA
- * Supportive editorials in 22 out of the 25 markets on our targeted list.
- * All principals on Sunday Shows.
- * Cohen, Shelton, Albright testifying on the Hill.
- * Richardson press conference with Lab Directors.
- * 4 SRB interviews each with Eric Schmidt and Mary McGrory.
- * Coordination with NGO's to produce press conferences, radio interviews, airport protests etc.

In

terms of pundits, remember that you and I discussed this matter on the Thursday before Columbus day weekend and agreed that all of the

discussion would be focused on whether we would pull the treaty and the politics of the debate, not on the merits of the treaty or "what we were doing". We decided to pass.

Indeed, if you look back on why this vote turned out the way it did and the critique in the public, no one is saying we mounted an inept public affairs campaign once Lott called a vote. The criticism is entirely focused on the two years the treaty was with Senate and our legislative strategy.

The vote had little to do with public affairs, indeed, I have never seen an issue where the elite press was more universally supportive of our position. This vote was decided by the internal politics of the Senate, the President's relationship with the Congress, our political strategy to build support with individual members and Lott's political revenge for the price he paid on CWC.

Anytime there is a setback as consequential as the CTBT vote, there will be a certain amount of negative press. We have to understand that reality and that the President and White House would never come away from a story like this with 100% advantage. But we have come pretty damn close. I will be forwarding shortly an analysis of post vote press coverage to underscore this point.

But should the lesson of this vote be we should have met with pundits: no.

Could we have done more: yes. We needed to have a better answer to the charge that we had no legislative strategy the last two years to build support. I should anticipated this attack and done a better job managing that storyline.

The challenge for us in the future is to demonstrate in a vigorous way that we have an agenda, we have a strategy to implement, and that there will be progress made over the next twelve months.

It is always tempting to blame the press when something goes wrong, but I think an honest appraisal shows that we held up our end of the effort.

-----Original Message-----

From: Sutphen, Mona

K. (NSA)

Sent: Monday, October 18, 1999 9:38 AM

To: Leavy, David

C. (PRESS); Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)

Cc: @NSA - Natl Security
Advisor
Subject: RE: New Isolationism [UNCLASSIFIED]

David -

Sandy

writes: These are good ideas. We should discuss Monday. We should also spend some time critiquing our pre-vote effort. As I look back on it, I think we made some significant mistakes which now result in the general perception that, while they were craven, we were inept. We spent very little time making our case to the press/pundits or engaging the influentials. Thus, as far as they knew, we weren't very active. We should have had one or more sessions w/the "pundits" and the influentials, with substantive briefings for high impact press. They would have understood the issue better and seen us working.

-----Original Message-----

From: Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Sent: Friday,
October 15, 1999 10:42 AM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @SPEECH
- NSC Speechwriters; @PRESS - Public Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense
Policy; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs;
@RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: New
Isolationism [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

FOR SRB and JS

In
the aftermath of the CTBT vote, we have done a good job in framing the debate in terms of the "the new isolationism" that has taken hold of the Congress and Republican Party. With the assumption that there will be many opportunities and criticisms of the Clinton foreign policy over the next year we need to have a strong counter attack to go with our affirmative list of accomplishments. The "new isolationism" is that message.

By linking CTBT with UN Arrears, the 150 Account, CTR and other issues we have given ourselves a new and compelling argument. I believe this message and the choices it portends has resonance with the national press corps and with the general public and gives us a strong strategic angle for the great debate this country is going to have over the next year.

The challenge for us is
how to sustain this message and not lose the momentum of framing

CTBT and foreign policy issues more generally (and putting our critics and opponents on the defensive).

Over the next several weeks before we depart for Europe, I would suggest the following:

- * Berger
op-ed that confronts directly the new isolationism and its dangers.
- * Working
the CFR speech into a more frontal attack on this new trend.
- * Hosting
a lunch next week with several outside thinkers that influence public opinion (including David Gergen, Norm Oreinsten, Thomas Mann). This group allows for us to shape the larger conventional wisdom.
- * Working
to get some of our friendly validators to take on this theme.
- * A
Presidential event before Europe that talks about this theme (maybe Radio Address, in the veto message of Foreign Ops or the Berlin Wall Speech).
- * The other option is to have the President sit down with a group of foreign policy columnists (Friedman, Hoagland, Sieb etc) to discuss the new isolationism.
- * The other Presidential
option is not lose the thread on CTBT and have the President meet with a bipartisan group of Senators and announce a process moving forward (review of Stockpile Programs, developing new safeguards for the treaty etc). [NOTE: If we don't do anything on this score, the press will undoubtedly write in a few weeks, "Clinton not fulfilling promise to keep talking about CTBT..."]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/18/99 2:24:56 PM
FROM Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT For comments/clearance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

7551srb.doc

October 13, 1999

ACTION

EMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN

FROM: NICHOLAS KASS

SUBJECT: President's Report to Congress on Cyprus

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President transmitting his bimonthly Report to Congress on Cyprus, submitted in accordance with the International Security Assistance Act of 1978. This report covers the August - September 1999 timeframe and should be submitted as soon as possible.

Concurrences by: Chuck Allen, Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress

Tab B Report to Congress

Tab II Incoming from State

1

7551

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7551report to congress.doc
President's Bimonthly Report on Cyprus
August - September 1999

Thomas G. Weston was named on August 2 as the Special Coordinator for Cyprus. In his first week, Mr. Weston met with Cypriot Ambassador Marcoullis, Greek Ambassador Philon and Turkish Ambassador Ilkin.

U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Donald K. Bandler arrived in Nicosia on August 20. He presented his credentials to Cypriot President Clerides on August 23 and discussed the prospects for a Cyprus settlement this fall. Ambassador Bandler underscored the United States commitment to a just and lasting solution for all Cypriots based on a bizonal, bicomunal federated settlement. Cypriot Foreign Minister Kasoulides also participated.

On August 24, Ambassador Bandler met with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash to discuss efforts to resolve the Cyprus dispute. Ambassador Bandler urged Mr. Denktash to come to negotiations this fall without preconditions.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Member Senator Lugar traveled to Athens on August 25 to meet with Foreign Minister Papandreou and Defense Minister

Tsohatzopoulos. They discussed a wide range of bilateral issues, including

Cyprus. Senator Lugar also traveled to Ankara on August 26-27 to meet with Foreign Minister Cem and Defense Minister Cakmakoglu.

On August 31, Ambassador Bandler met with Mr. Kasoulides to discuss Mr. Weston's upcoming visit and possible steps to begin Cyprus negotiations this fall.

Mr. Weston made his first trip to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey as well as other European capitals from August 27-September 10. In Nicosia on September 5-6, he met with Mr. Clerides, Mr. Kasoulides, UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Cyprus Ann Hercus and Turkish Cypriot representatives. In Athens, Mr. Weston met with the late Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis. In Ankara, he held separate meetings with Deputy Under Secretary Logoglu and Minister of State Gurel.

Ambassador Alfred H. Moses was named on September 4 as the President's Special Emissary for Cyprus.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright traveled to Istanbul on September 5 to deliver U.S. condolences for the victims of the August 17 earthquake. In a meeting with Foreign Minister Cem, Secretary Albright noted that President Clinton is deeply committed to a number of long-standing issues with Turkey, including Cyprus, which continues to be a high priority of this administration.

Mr. Denktash traveled to Washington on September 6. He met with Ambassador Moses and Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Marc Grossman on September 7. They urged Mr. Denktash to drop his preconditions and participate in negotiations under UN auspices this fall.

Ambassador Moses and Mr. Weston met with Mr. Denktash in New York on September 12

and 13 to follow up on his Washington meeting and further discuss prospects for convening talks this fall. They urged Mr. Denktash not to miss the opportunity to reach a just and lasting settlement.

National Security Council Senior Director for European Affairs Anthony Blinken traveled to Athens on September 14 and met with Defense Minister Tsohatzopoulos, the late Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis and Deputy Foreign Minister Niotis. He then traveled to Ankara on September 16 to join Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Marc Grossman for meetings with Prime Minister Ecevit, Deputy Prime Minister Bahceli, and Foreign Minister Cem.

Ambassador Bandler met with Mr. Kasoulides on September 15. They discussed Mr. Kasoulides' trip to New York for the UN General Assembly and his upcoming meetings with Secretary of State Albright.

Also on September 15, UN Special Representative Hercus briefed UN Security Council members on efforts to bring both sides to comprehensive negotiations under UN auspices this fall.

On September 21, Ambassador Bandler discussed the prospects for comprehensive negotiations under UN auspices this fall with Mr. Denktash.

Secretary Albright met September 22 with Mr. Clerides in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly. The Secretary reaffirmed the United States commitment to getting comprehensive talks under UN auspices started this fall and reaching a solution based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation.

Prior to the Secretary's meeting, Ambassador Moses and Mr. Weston also met with Mr. Clerides on September 22 in New York to discuss at length prospects for negotiations this fall.

After the Secretary's meeting, U.S. Permanent Representative Richard C.

Holbrooke, Ambassador Moses and Mr. Weston met on September 23 with Mr. Clerides to discuss ways to move forward with comprehensive negotiations.

Secretary Albright met with her Greek and Turkish counterparts, Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Cem, on September 23 in New York. The Secretary praised the recent Greek-Turkish cooperation on earthquake relief efforts and improvement in bilateral relations. She underscored the importance of resolving the Cyprus dispute and emphasized the President's determination to make progress this fall.

Ambassador Moses and Mr. Weston followed up on Secretary Albright's meetings with Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Cem in separate meetings on September 23. In both meetings, Ambassador Moses and Mr. Weston discussed ways to bring both sides to talks.

President Clinton hosted Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit for an official visit and lunch at the White House on September 28. The meeting was cordial and productive and both sides were encouraged by the discussions. They discussed a number of topics, including Cyprus. President Clinton and Prime Minister Ecevit agreed that there cannot be a solution to the Cyprus problem that would return the situation to what it was before 1974: all Cypriots must live in security. Prime Minister Ecevit supported President Clinton's idea that Special Emissary Moses and Special Coordinator Weston travel to the region to explore ways to move forward on the Cyprus issue.

7551

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7551potus.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Cyprus

Purpose

Forward the bimonthly Presidential Report to the Congress on Cyprus.

Background

The International Security Assistance Act of 1978 requires that you submit a bimonthly report on progress made during the period toward "the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem," including any relevant reports prepared by the UN Secretary General for the Security Council. The Department of State has prepared for your approval a draft Presidential Report on Cyprus, which is at Tab B. At Tab A are transmittal letters to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The previous report covered progress during June-July 1999. The current report covers the period August-September 1999.

The United States remains actively engaged in efforts to promote negotiations, under UN auspices and without preconditions, to settle the Cyprus dispute.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Congress at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress
Tab B Report to Congress

2

7551

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7551ltr to helms.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2372(c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period August 1, 1999 to September 30, 1999. The previous submission covered events during June and July 1999.

In an official working visit to the United States, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit and I had a productive meeting on September 28. We exchanged views on a number of topics, including Cyprus. I emphasized that reaching a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus dispute remains one of my highest priorities. The Prime Minister and I agreed that there cannot be a solution to the Cyprus problem that would return the situation to what it was before 1974: all Cypriots must live in security. Prime Minister Ecevit supported my idea that my Special Emissary for Cyprus Alfred H. Moses and Special Coordinator for Cyprus Thomas G. Weston travel to the region to explore ways to move forward on the Cyprus issue.

The international community mourned the death of Greek Alternate Foreign Minister

Kranidiotis. His passing is a true loss for Greece and Cyprus.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7551hastert ltr..doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 U.S.C. 2372(c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period August 1, 1999 to September 30, 1999. The previous submission covered events during June and July 1999.

In an official working visit to the United States, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit and I had a productive meeting on September 28. We exchanged views on a number of topics, including Cyprus. I emphasized that reaching a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus dispute remains one of my highest priorities. The Prime Minister and I agreed that there cannot be a solution to the Cyprus problem that would return the situation to what it was before 1974: all Cypriots must live in

security. Prime Minister Ecevit supported my idea that my Special Emissary for Cyprus Alfred H. Moses and Special Coordinator for Cyprus Thomas G. Weston travel to the region to explore ways to move forward on the Cyprus issue.

The international community mourned the death of Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis. His passing is a true loss for Greece and Cyprus.

Sincerely,

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/20/99 10:11:53 AM
FROM Payne, Raymond H. (WHSR/STP)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Carol Mosely-Lilywhite [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bryan, Dave L. (STP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

FYI

-----Original Message-----

From: Marsh, Thomas S (RECORDS)

Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 1999 9:18 AM

To: Payne, Raymond H.

(WHSR/STP); Daniel Sanborn; Dean Kaplan; Elizabeth Konrad; Tali Starks; Travis Good

Subject: Carol Mosely-Lilywhite [UNCLASSIFIED]

Helms

says race has nothing to former senator's nomination

U.S.

Sen. Jesse Helms says race has nothing to do with why he is wary

of President Clinton's nomination of former Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun

as ambassador to New Zealand.

Moseley-Braun, the only black woman ever to serve in the Senate, tangled with the North Carolina

Republican during her one term in Congress.

Black lawmakers and

civil rights leaders say opposition by the firebrand conservative

is linked to her skin color, an accusation Helms denied Tuesday.

"I don't like her," Helms told The News & Observer of Raleigh in

an interview. "I didn't admire her as a senator, but I would not have

liked her if she was lily-white. Race has nothing to do with it."

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Anne Witkowsky to Caroline Krass. Subject: FW: ACDA Annual Report. (6 pages)	10/20/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1999-12/13/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Anne Witkowsky to Caroline Krass. Subject: FW: ACDA Annual Report. (6 pages)	10/20/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1999-12/13/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5695

RESTRICTION CODES

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Caroline Krass to Anne Witkowsky. Subject: FW: ACDA Annual Report. (7 pages)	10/21/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1999-12/13/1999]

2006-1363-F
vz5695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	Anne Witkowsky to Stella Brackman. Subject: ACDA Report Package. (6 pages)	10/26/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1999-12/13/1999]

2006-1363-F
vz5695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	Christopher Bolan to Richard Saunders and Todd Dennett. Subject: Bahrain Crown Prince's Visit: The VP and Jesse too, please. (3 pages)	12/07/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/27/1999-12/13/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5695

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/9/99 3:25:35 PM
FROM Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: CFE: Response to Helms/Lott -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)

CARBON_COPY Andreassen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Bouchard, Joseph F. (DEFENSE)
Brackman, Stella S. (DEFENSE)
Kelly, Sandra L. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Mulligan, George D. (DEFENSE)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Crawford, Bernard T. (EUR/INTERN)
Gordon, Philip H. (EUR)
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR)
Maxfield, Nancy H. (EUR)
Munter, Cameron P. (EUR)
Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
Sapiro, Miriam E. (SEE)
Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
Dunn, John A. (RUE/INTERN)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Kaufman, Stuart J. (RUE)
Loring, Pamela (RUE)
Pascual, Carlos E. (RUE)
Segal, Jack D. (NONPRO)
Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

TEXT_BODY

Anne, Tony Blinken clears for EUR with a few small changes (in track changes below). thanks. Dick.

-----Original Message-----

From: Norland,
Richard B. (EUR)
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 1999 6:17 PM
To: Blinken,
Antony J. (EUR)
Cc: Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Subject: FW: CFE:
Response to Helms/Lott -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Tony,
this looks good to me, especially with Carlos' changes -- but since you were at Istanbul, would you like to have a look before I clear?
Dick.

-----Original Message-----

From: Pascual, Carlos E. (RUE)

Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 1999 6:01 PM
To: Witkowsky, Anne
A. (DEFENSE)
Cc: @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy;
@LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs;
@EUROPE
- European Affairs
Subject: FW: CFE: Response to Helms/Lott --
[UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Minor comments

-----Original
Message-----

From: Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Sent: Wednesday,
December 08, 1999 4:48 PM
To: @EUROPE - European Affairs; @RUSSIA
- Russia/Ukraine; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT -
Legislative
Affairs
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: CFE: Response to
Helms/Lott -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Carlos/Caroline/Dick/Mark

Revised
version of CFE letter (again) with agency comments (finally). Cover
memos, also below.

Clearance by 10:30 am tomorrow would be
appreciated, if possible. Since letter is already long (it grew
from one page-plus to two pages-plus, urge restraint on additional
text.)

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CFE Helms 2.doc

Dear Senator Helms:

Thank you for your letter(s)[plural for Helms] concerning Chechnya,
the recent
summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in
Istanbul and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE).

I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus
and
Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with
CFE Treaty
flank limits. We are continuing our comprehensive effort to seek an
end to the
tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my meeting with President Yeltsin in
Istanbul
and in my public remarks I stressed that there can be no purely
military solution
to the conflict in Chechnya. I have tried to impress upon the Russians
that they
must take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through
direct
talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a
third-party
such as the OSCE.

At the Istanbul summit, OSCE members, including the Russian
Federation, signed a

new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. Moreover, in the summit declaration, all OSCE participating states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. We expect Russia to abide by those statements. As a result of the summit, we are taking steps to promote such a dialogue, including the upcoming visit to the North Caucasus by OSCE Chairman-in-Office Vollebaek.

It is in this context that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally-based ceilings. This adjustment, for example, will eliminate the outdated requirement for our new NATO allies to coordinate their equipment limits with Russia and other former Warsaw Pact countries. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European nations, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, a priority identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of non-NATO nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia.

Among the most important outcomes of the OSCE summit were, in fact, CFE-related agreements that U.S. negotiators facilitated on the withdrawals of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova -- addressing one of your key concerns. These agreements are reflected in the CFE Final Act, a document associated

with the
Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE summit Declaration.
Concerning Georgia, it
was agreed that Treaty Limited Equipment will be substantially
reduced by
December 31, 2000, and two Russian bases there will be closed by
July 1, 2001.
With respect to Moldova, it was agreed that all Russian Treaty
Limited Equipment
will be withdrawn by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be
removed by
the end of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made very effective use
of the
Istanbul summit to secure these bilateral agreements with Russia. We
fully
supported that strategy by directly engaging senior Russian leadership
in
Istanbul as part of our effort to secure a successful CFE outcome.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very
serious concern,
though it does not rise to Condition (4) of the Flank Document
Resolution of
Advice and Consent to Ratification, that is, a violation that threatens
U.S.
national security interests. We have pressed the Russians repeatedly
on our
concerns and the Russian leadership has affirmed that they will
comply with
agreed flank levels as soon as possible. It is essential that we have
confidence
there will be real compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE
Adaptation
Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the Agreement to the
Senate for
advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact
been reduced
to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree that entry
into
force of an adapted Treaty can only be envisaged in the context of
compliance by
States Parties with its limits. In this way, as part of our broader
diplomatic
approach, we continue to send a clear message to Russia to reduce its
forces on
its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with
the
Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907prs.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: CFE: Letters from Senators Helms, Lott, et al

Purpose

To respond to letters from Senators Helms, Lott and ten other
Senators on CFE
Treaty adaptation.

Background

You received a letter from Senator Helms and a second letter from
Helms, Lott and
ten other Senators counseling against conclusion/signature of the
adapted CFE
Treaty. Their main concerns with respect to CFE were the presence of
Russian
forces in Moldova and Georgia without consent, and Russia's

violation of the flank limits. The letter from the group of Senators also expressed concern that the OSCE summit "directly address" Russia's military actions in Chechnya.

In your response you detail your efforts to encourage Russia toward a political dialogue on Chechnya, and the Chechnya-related results of the OSCE summit, including Russia's agreement to a visit to the region by the OSCE Chairman-in-office. You also outline why it was in the US and NATO interest to sign the CFE Adaptation Agreement at Istanbul, and the important outcomes we facilitated on the Georgian and Moldovan withdrawal agreements that address one of the key Senate concerns. On the question of the flank limits, you reiterate the importance of compliance, and explain that you will only submit the adapted Treaty for advice and consent to ratification when Russia reduces its forces to agreed flank levels.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed reply at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Reply

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

2

8907

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

December 8, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS BINNENDIJK

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: CFE: Letters from Senators Helms, Lott, et al

Attached at Tab I is a proposed reply to a letter from Senator Helms and a second letter from Helms, Lott and ten other Senators counseling against signature of the adapted CFE Treaty. Recommend that you forward the memorandum for the President with the proposed response at Tab I.

We note that these letters were sent prior to the Istanbul summit; since then we have heard that SFRC staff is generally satisfied with the overall CFE adaptation outcome, though they may give us a difficult time on the President's withholding the Agreement from the Senate until the Russians return to adapted Treaty flank levels. We believe the latter issue to be related somehow to CTBT and the question of Senate prerogatives concerning a Treaty that has been signed but not ratified; we will learn more when we brief the staff on CFE adaptation, December 10.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on November 4th and 10th .

Concurrence by: Carlos Pascual, Caroline Krass, Dick Norland, and Mark Tavlarides

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Proposed Reply

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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8907

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/13/1999 5:49:30 PM
FROM Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CFE letter (AGAIN!!!) -- [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Like a bad penny....

Caroline:

Hans asked for some changes
and I wanted to be sure they were ok with you. See esp SRB memo,
last para.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

CFE Helms 2.doc

Dear Senator Helms:

Thank you for your letter(s)[plural for Helms] concerning Chechnya,
the recent
summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in
Istanbul and the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE).

I share your concerns about the grave situation in the North Caucasus
and
Russia's military actions there, including Russia's noncompliance with
CFE Treaty
flank limits. We are continuing our comprehensive effort to seek an
end to the
tragic conflict in Chechnya. In my meeting with President Yeltsin in
Istanbul

and in my public remarks I stressed that there can be no purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. I have tried to impress upon the Russians that they must take meaningful steps toward a political solution, either through direct talks with responsible Chechen leaders or with the assistance of a third-party such as the OSCE.

At the Istanbul summit, OSCE members, including the Russian Federation, signed a new Charter for European Security that recognizes European security in the 21st century increasingly depends on building security within societies as well as security between states. Moreover, in the summit declaration, all OSCE participating states recognized that a political solution to the Chechnya conflict is essential and that the OSCE can contribute to achieving that goal. We expect Russia to abide by those statements. As a result of the summit, we are taking steps to promote such a dialogue, including the upcoming visit to the North Caucasus by OSCE Chairman-in-Office Vollebaek.

It is in this context in that I joined the other 29 CFE Parties in signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement. The adapted Treaty is in the interest of the United States and NATO and it was essential to lock in the commitment of other nations to its terms. The adapted Treaty will replace obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits with nationally-based ceilings. This adjustment, for example, will eliminate the outdated requirement for our new NATO allies to coordinate their equipment limits with Russia and other former Warsaw Pact countries. The Agreement will provide for enhanced transparency of military forces, through increased information and more inspections. It will open the Treaty to accession by other European nations, including the Baltic nations and Slovenia, an objective identified by the Senate. And, it will strengthen the requirements for host nation consent to

the presence of foreign forces, which speaks directly to the interests of a number of non-NATO nations, including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia.

Among the most important outcomes of the OSCE summit were, in fact, CFE-related commitments that U.S. negotiators facilitated on the withdrawals of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova -- addressing one of your key concerns. These commitments are reflected in the CFE Final Act, a document associated with the Adaptation Agreement, and in the OSCE summit Declaration. Concerning Georgia, it was agreed that Treaty Limited Equipment will be substantially reduced by December 31, 2000, and two Russian bases there will be closed by July 1, 2001. Georgia and Russia committed to complete negotiations regarding the status of remaining Russian bases and facilities during the year 2000. With respect to Moldova, it was agreed that all Russian Treaty Limited Equipment will be withdrawn and/or destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian forces will be withdrawn by the end of 2002. Both Georgia and Moldova made effective use of the Istanbul summit to secure these commitments from Russia. We fully supported that strategy by directly engaging senior Russian leadership as part of our effort to achieve a successful CFE outcome.

Russia's noncompliance with CFE flank limits is a matter of very serious concern. We have pressed the Russians repeatedly on this point and the Russian leadership has affirmed that they will comply with agreed flank levels as soon as possible. It is essential that we have confidence there will be real compliance. That is why, upon signing the CFE Adaptation Agreement, I made clear that I will only submit the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification when Russian forces have in fact been reduced to the levels set forth in the adapted Treaty. Our Allies agree that entry into force of an adapted Treaty can

only be
envisaged in the context of compliance by States Parties with its
limits. In
this way, as part of our broader diplomatic approach, we continue to
send a clear
message to Russia to reduce its forces on its southern flank.

Again, thank you for writing. We will continue to consult closely with
the
Senate on these important CFE matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907prs.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: CFE: Letters from Senators Helms, Lott, et al

Purpose

To respond to letters from Senator Helms, Lott and ten other Senators
on CFE
Treaty adaptation.

Background

You received a letter from Senator Helms and a second letter from Helms, Lott and ten other Senators counseling against conclusion/signature of the adapted CFE Treaty. Their main concerns with respect to CFE were the presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia without consent, and Russia's violation of the flank limits. The letter from the group of Senators also expressed concern that the OSCE summit "directly address" Russia's military actions in Chechnya.

In your response you detail your efforts to encourage Russia toward a political dialogue on Chechnya, and the Chechnya-related results of the OSCE summit, including Russia's agreement to a visit to the region by the OSCE Chairman-in-office. You also outline why it was in the US and NATO interest to sign the CFE Adaptation Agreement at Istanbul, and the important outcomes we facilitated on the Georgian and Moldovan withdrawal agreements that address one of the key Senate concerns. On the question of the flank limits, you reiterate the importance of compliance, and explain that you will only submit the adapted Treaty for Senate advice and consent to ratification when Russia reduces its forces to agreed flank levels.

Since the summit we have had a staff-level briefing for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at which some lingering reservations about signature were voiced, but the main message was praise for our CFE accomplishments at Istanbul, in particular the Russian commitments to withdraw completely from Moldova and to partially withdraw from Georgia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed reply at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab A Proposed Reply
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

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8907

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 8907srb.doc

December 13, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS BINNENDIJK

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: CFE: Letters from Senators Helms, Lott, et al

Attached at Tab I is a proposed reply to a November 4 letter from Senator Helms and a November 10 letter from Helms, Lott and ten other Senators counseling against early conclusion/signature of the adapted CFE Treaty. Recommend that you forward the memorandum for the President with the proposed response at Tab I.

We note that these letters were sent prior to the Istanbul summit. In contrast to their tone, at a December 10 briefing for SFRC staff, Senator Helms' staff warmly praised our CFE accomplishments at Istanbul, pointing in particular to the Russian commitment to withdraw from Moldova and to partially

withdraw from Georgia. Other staff there continued to voice mild reservations about POTUS signature, but most seemed to generally accept our arguments in favor of signing.

We also note that in his November 4 letter, Senator Helms complains that the White House has yet to "fulfill its obligations" pursuant to the CFE Flank Document Resolution of Ratification, Condition (4), concerning a situation in which the President determines that a Party has violated the Treaty in a manner which "threatens U.S. national security interests." These "obligations" include, for example, sanctions against the violating Party. Agencies agree that the Russian violation is a matter of very serious concern, but does not rise to the level articulated in Condition (4). We did not think it productive to get into a debate on this point, however, and have chosen not to state a position; rather the letter articulates our general concern and lays out the steps we have taken in response.

The NSC received the incoming correspondence on November 4th and 10th .

Concurrence by: Carlos Pascual, Caroline Krass, Dick Norland, and Mark Tavlarides

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