

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Anne Witkowsky to Robert Bell. Subject: FW: Transmittal Package to ACDA Annual Report. (7 pages)	06/11/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Jay Farrar to Anne Witkowsky. Subject: FW: Transmittal Package for ACDA Annual Report. (7 pages)	06/11/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	Anne Witkowsky to Elisa Harris and Steven Andreasen. Subject: FW: Transmittal Package for ACDA Annual Report. (7 pages)	06/15/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/03/1998-06/22/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5690

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/3/98 2:23:48 PM
FROM Blinken, Antony J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bell, Robert G.
Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

he can have mine.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bell, Robert
G.

Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 1998 12:36 PM

To: Andreasen, Steven

P.; Blinken, Antony J.

Subject: RE: CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]

Hey,

do we have a slot open in Speechwriting for this guy?!

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.

Sent: Wednesday, June

03, 1998 9:13 AM

To: Bell, Robert G.; Blinken, Antony J.

Subject: CTBT

Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Bob/Tony -- Another
sample of "what's out there..." Steve...

^Nuclear Tests Rain

Fallout on Cause of Nonproliferation<

^Walsh is a visiting scholar

at the Center for Global Security<

^Research at the Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory<

^By Jim Walsh=

^Special to the Los Angeles

Times=

Historians and theologians have long recognized a perverse logic in human affairs: Bad events can lead to good outcomes. This has been particularly true of nuclear weapons, where actions by countries to acquire or use nuclear weapons often have led to a strengthening of the international efforts to stem their spread.

China's test of a nuclear weapon in 1964 focused the attention of American and Soviet leaders and the result was the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of today's nonproliferation regime. India's peaceful nuclear test in 1974 had similar effects. Likewise, revelations about Iraq's clandestine nuclear program led countries to tighten their export laws and to changes at the International Atomic Energy Agency.

But what of the recent nuclear tests in South Asia? Will they spur the international community to do a better job on the problem of proliferation? Early indications are not encouraging.

World reaction to the nuclear tests has been negative but understated.

Major countries like England, France and Germany have issued statements denouncing the tests while at the same time making clear that they will not impose full-scale sanctions. France and Germany went so far as to thwart an EU effort to impose strong penalties on the guilty parties.

Here in the U.S., political discussions of the Indian and Pakistani tests have taken a decidedly odd turn. While arms control advocates watched passively from the sidelines, conservatives jumped on the testing issue and with a straight face, declared that the tests had proved them right: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

was
a bad idea.
The conservative senators and pundits who have trotted
out this
line have to be admired for theirchutzpah, if not their
logic. A
month ago, the two most vociferous critics of the comprehensive
test
ban were Jesse Helms and the prime minister of India. Today,
Helms
somehow manages to simultaneously condemn the Indian tests
and the
treaty banning such tests.
Who is responsible for this sad state
of affairs? Two parties
deserve special mention. The first is President
Clinton. Clinton,
like other presidents before him, ignored the
South Asian nuclear
rivalry. Now the administration is paying the
price for its
neglect.
The second group deserving criticism
consists of the arms
control community and its more flamboyant cousin,
the peace
movement. These groups have fallen on hard times as the
public's
interest in nuclear weapons has all but evaporated. Worse
still,
fickle foundations have abandoned the nuclear issue in favor
of
new, sexier topics.
But the arms control and peace groups
also have contributed to
their own irrelevance. Arms control groups
have myopically focused
on U.S. policy. Their ``Beltway mentality"
has prevented them from
seeing that arms control has fundamentally
changed, that it is an
international issue requiring the expenditure
of time and resources
in other countries.
Peace groups, known
for their youthful exuberance, have
performed no better. When France
conducted a series of nuclear
tests a few years back, these groups
responded with protests and

wine boycotts. The result: French public opinion shifted and France eventually committed itself to the test ban treaty. Now there are new tests, but where are the protests? Where are the boycotts of Indian goods? Where is the criticism of India's provocatively nationalist government? Many of these groups are no doubt embarrassed by their past endorsement of the Indian position. India had long been the darling of some peace groups because of its "Third World" critique of the U.S. nuclear policies.

This situation need not continue. Clinton could take on the ideologues in the Senate. Arms control and peace groups could start looking beyond the Beltway, and foundations might acknowledge that the problem of nuclear weapons has not gone away and that serious work on proliferation will require sustained effort for years to come. If the president and others fail this challenge, it will mark a new departure in the history of nuclear weapons. The Indian and Pakistani missteps could lead, not to a strengthening of the nonproliferation regime, but rather to its erosion and eventual collapse.

LAWP 06/03/98
02:20:00

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/3/98 8:10:59 PM
FROM Blinken, Antony J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY i think another session with SRB ASAP on strategy would be very helpful.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Wednesday, June
03, 1998 4:11 PM
To: Bell, Robert G.; Blinken, Antony J.
Subject: RE:
CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

...add to that,
"your mamma..."

-----Original Message-----

From: Bell, Robert
G.
Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 1998 3:37 PM
To: Blinken, Antony
J.
Cc: Andreasen, Steven P.
Subject: RE: CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]

No
deal - I meant a Director's slot; not an irreplaceable Senior Directors'
slot. There is a serious tactical issue here, though: at what stage
do we send someone out to lay some real lumber up against the side
of the heads of certain Republican Senate leaders. That is, when
do we supplement our "high road" approach ("I again urge the Senate
to act this year") with some pointed comments ("In stonewalling this
treaty, the Senate Republican leadership is on the wrong side of
US diplomatic and national security interests, the wrong side of
history, the wrong side of American public opinion and the wrong

side of the view of virtually the rest of the entire world.")?

-----Original

Message-----

From: Blinken, Antony J.

Sent: Wednesday, June 03,
1998 2:24 PM

To: Bell, Robert G.; Andreasen, Steven P.

Subject: RE:

CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]

he can have mine.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Bell, Robert G.

Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 1998
12:36 PM

To: Andreasen, Steven P.; Blinken, Antony J.

Subject: RE:

CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]

Hey, do we have a slot open in
Speechwriting for this guy?!

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P.

Sent: Wednesday, June 03, 1998 9:13 AM

To: Bell, Robert

G.; Blinken, Antony J.

Subject: CTBT Commentary [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Bob/Tony

-- Another sample of "what's out there..." Steve...

^Nuclear

Tests Rain Fallout on Cause of Nonproliferation<

^Walsh is a visiting

scholar at the Center for Global Security<

^Research at the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory<

^By Jim Walsh=

^Special to the Los

Angeles Times=

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Pakistani tests have taken a decidedly odd turn. While arms control advocates watched passively from the sidelines, conservatives jumped on the testing issue and with a straight face, declared that the tests had proved them right: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a bad idea.

The conservative senators and pundits who have trotted out this line have to be admired for theirchutzpah, if not their

logic. A month ago, the two most vociferous critics of the comprehensive test ban were Jesse Helms and the prime minister of India. Today, Helms somehow manages to simultaneously condemn the Indian tests and the treaty banning such tests. Who is responsible for this sad state of affairs? Two parties deserve special mention. The first is President Clinton. Clinton, like other presidents before him, ignored the South Asian nuclear rivalry. Now the administration is paying the price for its neglect. The second group deserving criticism consists of the arms control community and its more flamboyant cousin, the peace movement. These groups have fallen on hard times as the public's interest in nuclear weapons has all but evaporated. Worse still, fickle foundations have abandoned the nuclear issue in favor of new, sexier topics. But the arms control and peace groups also have contributed to their own irrelevance. Arms control groups have myopically focused on U.S. policy. Their "Beltway mentality" has prevented them from seeing that arms control has fundamentally changed, that it is an international issue requiring the expenditure of time and resources in other countries. Peace groups, known for their youthful exuberance, have performed no better. When France conducted a series of nuclear tests a few years back, these groups responded with protests and wine boycotts. The result: French public opinion shifted and France eventually committed itself to the test ban treaty. Now there are new tests, but where are the protests?

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This situation need not continue. Clinton could take on the ideologues in the Senate. Arms control and peace groups could start looking beyond the Beltway, and foundations might acknowledge that the problem of nuclear weapons has not gone away and that serious work on proliferation will require sustained effort for years to come.

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LAWP 06/03/98
02:20:00

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/4/98 7:05:19 PM
FROM Bell, Robert G.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Latest from Helms on CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Farrar, Jay C.
Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Blinken, Antony J.
Rudman, Mara E.

TEXT_BODY

Think Steve was being a bit sarcastic. What Helms "meant to say" was: "I'm not opposed to all arms control treaties or holding hearings on any of them -- hell, I voted FOR the CFE flank agreement and held hearings on START II, CWC, CFE Flank, to name just a few, but I'll be damned if I'm going to support or hold hearings on CTB!" At least that's how I interpret his statement.

-----Original Message-----

From: Farrar,
Jay C.
Sent: Thursday, June 04, 1998 6:17 PM
To: Andreasen, Steven
P.
Cc: Bell, Robert G.; Blinken, Antony J.; Rudman, Mara E.
Subject: RE:
Latest from Helms on CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]

I applaud you optimism
Steve - you find the sliver of silver inside every cloud.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Thursday, June 04,
1998 5:14 PM
To: Bell, Robert G.; Blinken, Antony J.; Rudman, Mara
E.; Farrar, Jay C.
Subject: Latest from Helms on CTBT [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Colleagues

-- a somewhat rambling discourse by the Chairman...note he says he

is "not opposed to any treaty" and "certainly not opposed to considering them...". I think he's softening up, don't you? Steve.

^Helms

digs in heels on Test Ban Treaty ratification despite nuclear tests<

^By

The Associated Press=

Sen. Jesse Helms says he will continue to block Senate

ratification of an international test ban treaty, despite recent

nuclear tests in India and Pakistan.

Helms,

chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has refused

to hold hearings on the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since

President Clinton submitted it in September.

On Wednesday, Clinton

and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

said the recent nuclear

tests make Senate ratification of the treaty imperative.

However,

Helms, R-N.C., said he will continue to resist the president's demand

that senators take up the test-ban treaty until

Clinton sends them

several other key accords.

"I'm not opposed to any treaty,

I'm certainly not opposed to considering them, but it is hard to deal with somebody who says,

"This is my way, that's the only way

and nothing else is going to

matter," Helms said in an interview

this week with The News &

Observer of Raleigh.

"Well, something

else does matter," he said. "This is

supposed to be a tripartite

form of government, but he (Clinton)

wants to make it a kingdom."

The president signed the test-ban accord at the United Nations in

1996, making the United States the first of 149 signatory nations.

Only 13 countries have ratified it, including two nuclear

powers,
France and Britain. The treaty cannot take effect until 44
countries
have ratified it.

Nine prominent physicists and former senior
U.S. intelligence
and military officials sent a letter Tuesday to
Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott urging him to support ratification
of the treaty.

"Now more than ever, it is crucial for the United
States to
send the clearest possible message that nuclear testing
is not
legitimate and will not be tolerated by the international
community,"
they wrote.

Behind the fight over the test-ban treaty is a larger
struggle
between Clinton and GOP congressional leaders over the
future of
U.S. arms-control policy in the post-Cold War world.

Helms and other Senate Republicans want Clinton to submit
changes
to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty he negotiated last
year with
Russian President Boris Yeltsin. They also want him to
send them
an international pact to fight global warming, which he
says is
not ready.

In a letter to Clinton Jan. 21, Helms said he would
not hold
hearings on the test-ban treaty until the Senate can consider
the

ABM and global-warming pacts.

In his response to Helms
on Feb. 10, Clinton noted he had called
for Senate approval of the
test-ban treaty in his State of the
Union address. The president
explained the delay in submitting the
global-warming accord, but
did not mention Helms' objections about
the ABM treaty.

APE-

06/04/98 09:32:00

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/5/98 12:34:25 PM
FROM Witkowsky, Anne A.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT report [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Harris, Elisa D.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

3717ltr.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with the Condition (5)(C) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 ("The CFE Flank Document"), adopted by the Senate of the United States on May 14, 1997, enclosed is the Report on CFE Compliance.

The Report is provided in both a classified and unclassified version.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Washington, D.C.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 3717prs.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Report on CFE Compliance

Purpose

To transmit the Report to Congress on CFE Compliance.

Background

Attached at Tab B is the first annual Report to Congress on CFE Compliance, required by Condition (5)(C) of the May 14, 1997 Senate resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the CFE Flank Document. The Report is the first of its kind responding to a new Congressionally-established "standard" for judging compliance issues. Rather than requiring us to pass judgment on whether states are non-compliant on certain issues, this Report requires that we certify whether states are in compliance and then discuss the compliance issues concerning states that have not made the "compliant" certification "cut."

The Report judges that, of the 30 CFE Parties, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,

Russia, and Ukraine are not certified to be in compliance. These judgments were based mainly on previously existing compliance issues, most of which have already been discussed in other reports to Congress, including the report that ACDA is required to submit annually on all arms control treaties. This Report concludes that none of the compliance issues it identifies are militarily significant to the United States, our NATO allies, or to NATO as a whole. However, because this Report is focused on CFE alone, and requires a certification standard of compliance that some states have not met, it may draw some attention to these issues on the Hill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters of transmittal for the CFE Compliance Report at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letters of Transmittal
Tab B Report to Congress

2
UNCLASSIFIED
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~

UNCLASSIFIED
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~ 3717

UNCLASSIFIED
~~w/SECRET Attachment~~ cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 3717srb.doc

June 5, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: CFE Compliance Report

Attached is the Report on CFE Compliance for submittal to Congress pursuant to the Senate Resolution of Ratification to the CFE Flank Document. The Report was due on January 1, 1998. The memorandum for the President at Tab I recommends he forward the Report to the Congress.

Concurrence by: Newell Highsmith, Ki Fort, and Jay Farrar

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letters of Transmittal
Tab B Report to Congress
Tab II Incoming Correspondence
2

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~ 3717

UNCLASSIFIED

~~W/SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/9/98 9:29:37 AM
FROM Green, James B.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT More names for China speech [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Elkon, Nicole L.

CARBON_COPY Albert, Ronda A.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Gagnon, James M.
Green, James B.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Bartlett, L. June
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Poole, Jennifer C.
Rice, Edward A.

TEXT_BODY More names to add for attendees to China speech. This list was used for the state Dinner last October when President Jiang was in town. We assume you folks will do some weeding as needed but offer the list as a good core of China-interested persons.
Sorry, no fax numbers attached, although there are telephone numbers. Working on fax numbers for first list.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

pres china speech Guest list.doc
Proposed Guest List for Events
in Honor of Chinese President Jiang Zemin
October 29, 1997

For the White House State Dinner (October 29)
and the State Department Luncheon (October 29)

CHINESE OFFICIAL PARTY

His Excellency President Jiang Zemin

His Excellency the Ambassador LI Daoyu and Mrs. YE Zhaolie

(Others TBD)

U.S. GOVERNMENT

The White House

Vice President Albert Gore (Tipper)
The White House

The Honorable Erskine Bowles (Crandall Close Bowles)
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Mr. Leon Fuerth, National Security Adviser to the Vice President
(Lynn)
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500

The Honorable Sandy Berger (Susan)
National Security Adviser
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

The Honorable James Steinberg (Sherburne)
Deputy National Security Adviser
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Ms. Sandy Kristoff
Senior Director for Asian Affairs
The White House
Washington D.C.
456-9251

Mr. Jeffrey A. Bader (Rohini Tallala)
Director for Asian Affairs

The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
456-9251

Mr. Robert Suettinger
Director for Asian Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
456-9251

Department of State

The Honorable Madeleine Albright
Secretary of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
647-5733

The Honorable James Sasser (Mary)
United States Ambassador to the People's Republic of China
Embassy Beijing
(86) (10) 6532-3831

The Acting Chief of Protocol Ms. Mary Mel French
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
647-4543

The Honorable Thomas Pickering (Alice)
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
647-2471

The Honorable John Holum (Barbara)
Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
647-9610

The Honorable Stuart Eizenstat (Fran)
Under Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

The Honorable Stanley Roth
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

647-9596

The Honorable Susan Shirk (Mr. Samuel Popkin)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
647-9610

Mr. Howard Lange (Bach Ha)
Director of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
2201 C Street
Washington, D.C. 20520
647-6803

Other Executive Branch

The Honorable Robert Rubin (Judy)
Secretary of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20220
622-2000

The Honorable William Cohen (Janet)
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary
The Pentagon 20301-1155
(703) 545-6700

The Honorable Janet Reno
Attorney General of the United States
10th and Constitution, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
(703) 514-2000

The Honorable William Daley (Loretta)
Secretary of Commerce
14th and Pennsylvania
Washington, D.C.

The Honorable Daniel Glickman (Rhoda)
Secretary of Agriculture
14th and Independence
Washington, D.C. 20520
720-6158

The Honorable Federico Pena (Ellen)
Secretary of Energy
Forrestal Building
1000 Independence Ave, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20585
586-6210

The Honorable William Richardson (Barbara)
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
799 UN Plaza
New York, NY 10017
(212) 415-4402
Washington, D.C. 20520
The Honorable George J. Tenant (Stephanie)
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
703-482-1100

The Honorable Charlene Barshefsky (Mr. Edward Cohen)
United States Trade Representative
600 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20508
395-6890

The Honorable General John Shalikashvili (Joan)
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
9999 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20318-9999
703-697-9121

The Honorable Walter Slocumbe (Ellen Seidman)
Secretary of Defense for Policy
2000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-2000
703-697-7200

The Judiciary

The Honorable William Rehnquist
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
479-3000

The Honorable William Kennedy (Mary Davis)
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
(Justice Kennedy has visited China twice for USIS programs)

Congress

SENATE

The Honorable Jesse Helms (Dorothy)
United States Senate Chairman, Senate
SD-403 Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C. 20510
224-6342

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar (Charlene)
United States Senate Member, SFRC
SH-306
Washington, D.C. 20510
224-4814

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (Jill)
United States Senate Ranking Minority
SR-221 Member, SFRC
Washington, D.C. 20510
224-5042

The Honorable Craig Thomas (Susan)
United States Senate Chair, Subcmte. on
SD-B34 East Asian Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510
224-6441

The Honorable John Kerry (Teresa Heinz)
United States Senate Member, SFRC
SR-421 Subcmte. on East Washington, D.C. 20510 Asian Affairs
224-2742

The Honorable Diane Feinstein (Richard Blum)
United States Senate Member, SFRC
SH-331 Subcmte. on East Washington, D.C. 20510 Asian Affairs
224-3841

The Honorable Thomas Daschle (Linda)
United States Senate Minority Leader
SH-509 Hart Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
224-2321

The Honorable Max Baucus (Wanda)
United States Senate Ranking Minority
SH-511 Member on Envt.
Washington, D.C. 20510
224-2651

The Honorable Trent Lott (Tricia)
United States Senate Majority Leader
SR-487
Washington, D.C. 20510
224-6253

The Honorable John McCain (Cindy)
United States Senate Comm. on Armed
SR-241 Services
Washington, D.C. 20510

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Honorable Newton Gingrich (Marianne)
House of Representatives Speaker of the House
2428 RHOB
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-4501

The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt (Jane)
House of Representatives Minority Leader
1226 LHOB
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-2671

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman (Georgia)
House of Representatives Chairman, Int'l
2449 RHOB Relations Committee
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-3776

The Honorable Lee Hamilton (Nancy)
House of Representatives Ranking Minority
2314 RHOB Member, HIRC
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-5315

Representative Douglas Bereuter (Louise)
House of Representatives Chair, HIRC subcmte
2348 RHOB on East Asia
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-4806

Representative Howard L. Berman (Janis)
House of Representatives Ranking Minority
2231 RHOB Member, HIRC East Washington, D.C. 20515 Asia
Subcmte
225-4695

Representative David Dreier
House of Representatives Comm. on Rules
411 CHOB
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-2305

Representative John Edward Porter (Kathryn)
House of Representatives Comm. on
2373 RHOB Appropriations
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-4835

Representative Jim Kolbe
House of Representatives Comm. on Approp.,
205 CHOB Comm. on the Budget
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-2542

Representative Robert Matsui (Doris)
House of Representatives Comm. on Ways & 2311 RHOB Means
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-7163

Former Presidents of the United States

Former President Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter
The Carter Center
1 Copenhill
453 Freedom Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30307
404-420-5151

Former President George and Barbara Bush
P.O. Box 79798
Houston, TX 77279
713-686-1188

Former President Ronald and Nancy Reagan
Office of Ronald Reagan
11000 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90024
310-552-1980

Former Secretaries of State

Former Secretary Henry Kissinger
350 Park Ave.
New York, NY 10022

212-759-7919

Former Secretary Cyrus Vance

Former Secretary George Shultz

Former Secretary James Baker

Former Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger

Former Secretary Alexander Haig

Former Secretary Warren Christopher

Former Secretaries of Defense

Former Secretary William Perry

Former Secretary Harold Brown

Former Secretary James Schlesinger

Former National Security Advisers

The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Colin Powell

Former Ambassadors to China

Former Ambassador Leonard Woodcock

Former Ambassador and Mrs. Arthur Hummel

Former Ambassador and Mrs. James R. Lilley

Former Ambassador and Mrs. Stapleton J. Roy

Former Ambassador and Mrs. Winston Lord

Business

H.D. Cleberg (Clara)
President and CEO
Farmland Industries, Inc.
3315 North Oak Trafficway
Kansas City, MO 64116

816-459-6997

(strong supporter, fast track proponent, and instrumental in shifting
Farmland
toward an Asian-centered export strategy)

Dean Kleckner (Natalie)

President

American Farm Bureau Federation

225 Touhy Ave.

Park Ridge, IL 60068

847-685-8600

Leland Swenson (Ronda)

President

National Farmers Union

400 Virginia Ave, S.W. Ste, 710

Washington, D.C. 20024

554-1600

(Represents thousands of family farmers)

Barber Conable (Charlotte)

Chairman

National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

P.O. Box 218

10532 Alexander Road

Alexander, NY 14005

716-591-1233

(former President of the World Bank)

George M.C. Fisher (Ann)

Chairman and CEO

Eastman Kodak Company

343 State St.

Rochester, NY 14650-0229

716-724-4967

(Major current and imminently pending interests in China. Fisher is
chairman of
the U.S.-China Business Council)

Philip M. Condit (Jan)

Chairman, President, and CEO

The Boeing Company

P.O. Box 3707

M/S 10-10

Seattle, WA 98124-2207

(206) 544-7000

Maurice R. Greenberg (Corinne)

Chairman and CEO

American International Group, Inc.
70 Pine St.
New York, NY 10270
(212) 770-7711
(Major interests in China; perhaps the most China-informed and personally
China-committed American CEO)

Lewis E. Platt (Joan)
President, Chairman and CEO
Hewlett-Packard Co.
3000 Hanover St.
Palo Alto, CA 94304
(415) 857-4022
(HP was the first high-tech joint venture in China. Business is now
over \$500
million, with six joint ventures in China.)

John F. Welch, Jr. (Jane)
Chairman and CEO
General Electric Company
3135 Easton Turnpike
Fairfield, CT 06431
(203) 373-2211
(GE has numerous projects in China and is a candidate for selection in
other
large projects.)

William H. Gates, III (Melinda)
Chairman and CEO
Microsoft Corporation
1 Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-6399
(425) 882-8080
(Met Jiang personally during visit to China)

Ernest S. Micek (Sally)
CEO
Cargill, Incorporated
15615 McGinty Rd. West
Wayzata, MN 55391
(612) 742-6163
(Micek is personally interested in Jiang's visit, and Cargill has invited
him to
Minnesota. Cargill was also active in supporting renewal of MFN for
China.
Cargill's Beijing representative is President of the American Chamber
of Commerce
in Beijing.

Robert A. Kapp (Mary Catherine)

President

U.S.-China Business Council

1818 N St., NW, Ste 200

Washington, D.C. 20036

429-0340

(The Council is the major association of companies active in China).

John Smith, Jr. (Lydia)

Chairman, President, & CEO

General Motors Corporation

100 Renaissance Center

P.O. Box 431301

Detroit, MI 48243

(313) 556-5000

(GM signed a major contract in China during the Vice President's March visit)

Cultural

Yanni (Yanni is a musician who recently performed in China)

c/o Yanni Management

9595 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 600

Beverly Hills, CA 90212

tel. (310) 288-1437

fax (310) 285-0016

(we understand that he is currently dating the actress Linda Evans)

Professor Tang Tsou

Professor Emeritus

5828 South University Avenue

Department of Political Science, Room 401

University of Chicago

Chicago, Illinois 60637

(773) 702-8050

(Professor Tsou, a Chinese-American, is the doyen of American China scholars)

Professor Doak Barnett

Harvard University

Professor Michal Oksenberg

Stanford University

Asia/Pacific Research Center

200 Encina Hall

Stanford, CA 94305

(415) 723-8192

Professor Harry Harding

Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University
2023 G Street
Washington, D.C. 20052
(202) 994-6241

Mr. I.M Pei (Eileen)
I.M.Pei and Partners
600 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 751-3122
Pei is a world-renowned Chinese-American architect who designed an
important
hotel project in Beijing that opened in 1983 to wide acclaim

Yo Yo Ma (Chinese-American cellist)
c/o ICM Artists
40 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019
tel (212) 556-6894

Cho-Liang Lin (Chinese-American violinist)
c/o ICM Artists
40 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019
tel (212) 556-5600

Maya Lin (Chinese American architect and designer of the Vietnam
Veterans
Memorial)
98 Bowery
New York, New York 10013

Michael Chang (prominent Chinese American tennis player)
c/o Advantage International
1751 Pinnacle Dr.
Suite 1500
McLean, VA 22102
(703) 905-3300

Mrs. Katherine Graham (Publisher of the Washington Post)
334-6652

Mr. Steven Spielberg (director of Empire of the Sun, set in Shanghai)
Dreamworks SKG
Universal Plaza
Bungalow 477
Universal City, CA 91608
tel (818) 733-7000

James Feinerman
600 New Jersey Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Professor of Chinese law at Georgetown University School of Law
(also active in program involving legal exchanges with China)
tel. 662-9474

Stanley Katz
President
American Council of Learned Societies (parent organization of the
Committee on
Scholarly Communication with China)
228 East 45th Street
New York, New York 10017-3398
(212) 697-1505

Robert Redford
c/o Creative Artists
9830 Wilshire Blvd.
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
310-288-4545
(Redford recently attended a film festival in Beijing)

James Robert Waller
(the author of The Bridges of Madison County, which was very
popular in China)

John Woo
c/o Irv Codron
Braverman & Codron
233 S. Beverly Dr.
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
310-272-8456
(Director of Face Off)

Dr. William Fuller (Jennifer Beckett)
President
The Asia Foundation
465 California St.
Suite 1400
San Francisco, CA 94104
(415) 982-4640 ext. 224

Ambassador Nicholas Platt (Sheila)
President
The Asia Society
725 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10021

(212) 288-6400

Dick Solomon (Anne)
U.S. Institute of Peace
1550 M St. NW, Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
457-1700

Michael Armacost
Brookings Institution

The Rev. Billy Graham (Ruth)
155 Assembly Drive
Montrete, NC 28757
(704) 669-5550

Chang-lin Tien (Spouse)
NEC Distinguished Professor of Engineering
Department of Mechanical Engineering
University of California, Berkely
6101 Etcheverry Hall #1740
Berkely, CA 94720-1740
(510) 643-3886

AFTER-DINNER ENTERTAINMENT

Mr. Alan Romberg, Deputy Director, Office of Policy and Planning,
State
Department

Mr. Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political
Military
Affairs

Mr. James R. Keith, Deputy Director, Office of Chinese and
Mongolian Affairs,
State Department

Mr. Henry A. Levine, Deputy Director and Chief for Economic
Affairs, Office of
Chinese and Mongolian Affairs, State Department

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Anne Witkowsky to Robert Bell. Subject: FW: Transmittal Package to ACDA Annual Report. (7 pages)	06/11/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/03/1998-06/22/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5690

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Jay Farrar to Anne Witkowsky. Subject: FW: Transmittal Package for ACDA Annual Report. (7 pages)	06/11/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/03/1998-06/22/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5690

RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Anne Witkowsky to Elisa Harris and Steven Andreasen. Subject: FW: Transmittal Package for ACDA Annual Report. (7 pages)	06/15/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/03/1998-06/22/1998]

2006-1363-F
vz5690

RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/18/98 6:07:34 PM

FROM Andreasen, Steven P.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Berger Rebuttal to Helms on CTBT/ABM [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Blinken, Antony J.

CARBON_COPY Gray, Wendy E.
Bell, Robert G.

TEXT_BODY Tony --

You undoubtedly saw Senator Helms's Op Ed today in the Wall Street Journal on CTBT/ABM. I think a strong case can be made for "striking back" as quickly as possible (put differently, Tora! Tora! Tora!). Moreover, we have an opportunity to "prevail" on the WSJ for "equal time" on CTBT. With this in mind, I've put together a draft rebuttal for Berger, drawing in part from the Berger CTBT Op Ed we have had in the can for nine months. Let me know what you think.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Berger CTBT Rebuttal.doc
Op Ed

6/18/98 6:00 p.m.
CTBT OP-ED
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

In a recent OP ED in the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jesse Helms argues the Senate should not take action on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), stating the Treaty is "worthless" and "meaningless" now that India and

Pakistan
have conducted nuclear tests. Senator Helms also charges the
Administration is
refusing to transmit to the Senate for advice and consent agreements
concerning
the ABM Treaty reached last fall, fearing the Senate will reject these
accords.

Let me set the record straight. First, with respect to the ABM
agreements, the
Administration has made clear we will transmit to the Senate for
advice and
consent agreements clarifying post-Soviet Union responsibilities
under the ABM
Treaty (or "succession") and the "demarcation" between national
missile defense
systems limited (not banned) under the ABM Treaty and theater
missile defense
systems permitted by the Treaty. The Administration has also made
clear it will
transmit the ABM agreements -- along with a companion protocol to
the START II
Treaty extending the deadline for destruction of weapons under
START II - only
after the Russian Duma ratifies START II.

The logic behind this position is simple: the ABM Treaty is in force,
and the
Senate has already approved START II. Before we ask the Senate to
approve a
modification to START II and the related ABM agreements, we
should insist Russia
commit itself to START II. To do otherwise runs the risk of inviting
Russia to
further delay START II ratification, pending the outcome of our own
debate in the
Senate over the START/ABM package, or to propose further
amendments to START II
with the expectation the Administration and the Senate will debate
these
amendments prior to Russia committing itself to the Treaty.

Once Russia ratifies START II, we look forward to the debate in the
Senate over
the agreements on START and ABM reached last fall in New York.
The ABM
agreements on succession and demarcation in no way impinge on
either our national
missile defense program, or our programs for theater missile defense.
Moreover,

the fact remains that further progress on START - meaning full implementation of START I and START II and the conclusion of START III - won't happen unless we adhere to the ABM Treaty. In other words, with the ABM Treaty, we can have both national and theater missile defenses, tied to current and projected threats, and reap the benefits of strategic reductions under START: without ABM, we can look forward to the same kind of unconstrained, offensive missile buildup that four Republican and two Democratic administrations have worked so hard to build down over the last quarter century.

With respect to CTBT, the United States has an urgent interest in doing all it can to bring the CTBT into force at the earliest possible date, for the simple reason it is in our national security interest to do everything within our power to preclude states such as India and Pakistan from further developing their nuclear capability through more tests. As Secretary Albright said so eloquently at the University of Minnesota last week in encouraging the Senate to approve CTBT for America, "...if we want others to refrain from nuclear tests, and we do; others want us to promise the same; and we should. On this critical issue, at this perilous time, our leadership should be unambiguous, decisive and strong."

The CTBT is profoundly in America's interests. The Treaty's ban on all nuclear explosions will constrain the nuclear powers from developing new generations of nuclear weapons -- and make a costly, dangerous and destabilizing arms race less likely. It also will constrain states such as India and Pakistan from developing more advanced, more sophisticated weapons, ones that can be optimized for weapon delivery and be even more destabilizing in a South Asia context. To use Senator Helms' analogy, while the horses may have run through the stable door, we have

every interest in keeping them in the corral. Moreover, our 1995 commitment to secure the CTBT was essential to obtaining the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which is a great success and needs to be preserved.

Few major international agreements have enjoyed as much widespread support as the CTBT. Two years ago, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. A few days later, at the General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the CTBT. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that have declared possession of nuclear weapons -- followed suit, and the UK and France have now ratified the Treaty. In all, 149 nations are now signatories.

The CTBT also enjoys the support of the Secretary of Defense and our nation's military - including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs and the head of Strategic Command - and the Treaty has been endorsed by four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, William Crowe, and David Jones.

Conceived by President Eisenhower, advanced by President Kennedy and signed by President Clinton, the Comprehensive Test Ban reflects a long legacy of bipartisan commitment to arms control. Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which banned all atmospheric testing -- "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of the Cold War. Now, the Cold War is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. By putting the Comprehensive Test Ban into force, we can make every American more secure.

###

2

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/21/98 8:31:42 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Revised Berger CTBT Rebuttal [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Blinken, Antony J.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

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??
??
??

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreassen, Steven P.

Sent: Friday, June 19,

1998 10:11 AM

To: Blinken, Antony J.

Cc: Gray, Wendy E.; Bell,

Robert G.

Subject: Revised Berger CTBT Rebuttal [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Tony

--

I have made a few edits to the piece I sent you last night
-- but I think this is close. Please perfect. And remember the

advice of the Tobacco consultant: strike while the iron's hot!

Thanks.
Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Berger CTBT Rebuttal.doc
Op Ed

6/19/98 10:10 a.m.

CTBT OP-ED

BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In a recent OP ED in the Wall Street Journal, Senator Jesse Helms argues the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is "worthless" now that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear tests, comparing it to "closing the stable door after the horses have galloped away." Senator Helms also charges the Administration is refusing to transmit to the Senate for advice and consent agreements concerning the ABM Treaty reached last fall, fearing the Senate will reject these accords.

Let me set the record straight. First, with respect to the ABM agreements, the Administration has made clear we will transmit to the Senate for its approval agreements clarifying post-Soviet Union responsibilities under the ABM Treaty (or "succession") and the "demarcation" between national missile defense systems limited (not banned) under the ABM Treaty and permitted theater missile defense systems. The Administration has also made clear it will transmit the ABM agreements -- along with a companion protocol to the START II Treaty extending the deadline for destruction of weapons under START II - only after the Russian Duma ratifies START II.

The logic behind this position is simple: the ABM Treaty is in force, and the Senate has already approved START II. Before we ask the Senate to approve a modification to START II and the related ABM agreements, we should insist Russia

commit itself to START II. To do otherwise risks inviting Russia to further delay START II ratification, pending the outcome of our own debate in the Senate over the START/ABM package, or to propose further amendments to START II with the expectation the Administration and the Senate will debate these amendments prior to Russia committing itself to the Treaty.

Once Russia ratifies START II, we look forward to a prompt debate in the Senate over the agreements on START and ABM reached last fall in New York, and working with Senator Helms to expedite this process. The ABM agreements on succession and demarcation in no way impinge on either our national or theater missile defense programs. Moreover, the fact remains that further progress on START - meaning full implementation of START I and START II and the conclusion of START III - will not happen unless we adhere to the ABM Treaty. In other words, with the ABM Treaty, we can have both national and theater missile defenses, tied to current and projected threats, and reap the benefits of strategic reductions under START: without the ABM Treaty, we can look forward to the same kind of unconstrained, offensive missile buildup that four Republican and two Democratic administrations have worked so hard to build down over the last quarter century.

With respect to CTBT (signed in 1996 - over a year before the START/ABM accords, but still pending its first hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee), the United States has an urgent interest in doing all it can to bring the CTBT into force at the earliest possible date, for the simple reason it is in our national security interest to do everything within our power to preclude states such as India and Pakistan from further developing their nuclear capability through more tests. As Secretary Albright said so eloquently at the University of Minnesota last week in encouraging the Senate to approve CTBT for America, "...if we want others to refrain from nuclear tests, and we do; others want us to promise the same; and we should. On this critical issue, at this perilous time, our leadership should be unambiguous, decisive and strong."

The CTBT is profoundly in America's interests. The Treaty's ban on all nuclear explosions will constrain the nuclear powers from developing new generations of nuclear weapons -- and make a costly, dangerous and destabilizing arms race less likely. It also will constrain states such as India and Pakistan from developing more advanced, more sophisticated weapons, ones that can be optimized for weapon delivery and be even more destabilizing in a South Asia context. To use Senator

Helms' analogy, while the horses may have run through the stable door, we have every interest in keeping them in the corral. Moreover, our 1995 commitment to secure the CTBT was essential to obtaining the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which is a great success and needs to be preserved.

Few major international agreements have enjoyed as much widespread support as the CTBT. Two years ago, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. A few days later, at the General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the CTBT. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that have declared possession of nuclear weapons -- followed suit, and the UK and France have now ratified the Treaty. In all, 149 nations are now signatories.

The CTBT also enjoys the support of the Secretary of Defense and our nation's military - including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs and the head of Strategic Command - and the Treaty has been endorsed by four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, William Crowe, and David Jones) and our nuclear lab directors. Most important, the Treaty enjoys the support of over 70-percent of the American public.

Conceived by President Eisenhower, advanced by President Kennedy and signed by President Clinton, the Comprehensive Test Ban reflects a long legacy of bipartisan commitment to arms control. Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which banned all atmospheric testing -- "a shaft of light cut into the darkness" of the Cold War. Now, the Cold War is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. By putting the Comprehensive Test Ban into force, we can make every American more secure. Having sat in the Senate's "in box" for almost two years, there is simply no good reason for the Senate to delay any longer consideration of this historic accord.

###

2

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/22/98 5:26:28 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Berger CTBT Op Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Widmer, Edward L.

CARBON_COPY Andreassen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Witkowsky, Anne A.

TEXT_BODY Dave -- Thanks for the hard work on draft one. Attached is a coordinated
"Bell/Andreassen" mark up of your mark up. Look forward to seeing the next mark up to your mark up of our mark up to your mark up.
Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Berger CTBT OP ED REVISO.doc
6/22 5:25 pm
CTBT OP-ED
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

Senator Jesse Helms recently argued on this page [if not for WSJ: in the Wall Street Journal] that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is "worthless" now that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear explosions. He

compared the treaty to "closing the stable door after the horses have galloped away." He also charged that the Clinton Administration refuses to transmit for advice and consent three U.S.-Russian agreements reached last fall concerning the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty because it fears Senate rejection. Senator Helms is wrong about both Treaties. First, with respect to the ABM agreements, we have made clear we will send them to the Senate. These accords clarify the obligations of Russia and other countries in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union and establish principles to distinguish between defenses against long-range missiles, which are limited under the ABM Treaty, and defenses against shorter-range missiles, which are not. We will also transmit for ratification a separate agreement extending the deadline for final destruction of long-range nuclear missiles and bombers under the START II Treaty, to meet Russian budgetary concerns about destruction costs and U.S. concerns regarding early deactivation of those same systems.

But it makes no sense to ratify these accords until after the Russian Duma ratifies START II, which our Senate has already approved. Before we ask our Senate to approve a modification of the START II Treaty and the ABM accords, we should insist Russia commit itself to START II. To do otherwise risks inviting Russia to further delay START II ratification, pending the outcome of our own debate over the START/ABM package.

Once Russia ratifies START II, we look forward to working with Senator Helms to achieve prompt Senate ratification of the four START/ABM agreements. The ABM accords are particularly important. They do not in any respect impinge on our ongoing programs with respect to defenses against long-range or shorter-range missiles. They do create a framework for effective implementation of

the ABM Treaty, taking into account emerging threats to our national security. And further progress on START - meaning full implementation of START I and START II and the achievement of even deeper cuts in nuclear weapons under START III - will not happen unless we adhere to the ABM Treaty. Without that treaty, we could expect a return to an unconstrained nuclear missile buildup -- precisely what four Republican and two Democratic administrations have worked so hard to prevent over the last quarter century.

Just as important as the START/ABM framework on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms is the effort to constrain the development of new nuclear weapons around the world by means of the CTBT, which would bar all nations from any further testing of nuclear explosives. The Treaty was submitted to the Senate in 1997, at a time when the Senator was, at our request, concentrating on winning Senate approval of the NATO enlargement protocols. But that fight was won this spring, and yet Senator Helms' Foreign Relations Committee still has taken no action on CTBT. The unfortunate events in South Asia show that it is more urgent than ever to bring this critical agreement into effect.

The United States has a strong interest in bringing the CTBT into force at the earliest possible date, because we must do everything within our power to preclude India and Pakistan, as well as other countries, from further developing their nuclear capability through more tests. As Secretary of State Albright said at the University of Minnesota last week in encouraging the Senate to approve CTBT for America, "If we want others to refrain from nuclear tests -- and we do -- others want us to promise the same -- and we should."

Our 1995 commitment to secure the CTBT was essential to obtaining the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,

which is a great success and needs to be preserved. The CTBT's ban on nuclear explosions will constrain the nuclear powers from developing new generations of weapons -- and make a costly and dangerous arms race less likely. It can constrain India and Pakistan and others from developing more sophisticated weapons, optimized for regional warfare. And it will strengthen our capabilities to monitor for nuclear explosions - a requirement that exists with or without CTBT - through the creation of a worldwide network of sensors and a system of on-site inspection. To borrow Senator Helms' analogy, while the horses may have run through the stable door, we have every interest in keeping them in the corral.

Few major international agreements have enjoyed as much widespread support as the CTBT. Two years ago, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly, 158-3, to adopt the Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya opposing. A few days later, at the General Assembly, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom -- the other states that had declared possession of nuclear weapons -- followed suit, and the UK and France have now ratified the Treaty. In all, 149 nations are now signatories.

The CTBT enjoys the support of all six members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs - John Shalikashvili, Colin Powell, William Crowe, and David Jones -- and the directors of our national nuclear weapons laboratories. It also has the support of over 70 percent of the American public.

Conceived by President Eisenhower, the Comprehensive Test Ban reflects a long legacy of bipartisan commitment to using arms control to protect our national security. Thirty years ago, President Kennedy called the completion of

the
Limited Test Ban Treaty -- which banned all above-ground nuclear
tests -- "a
shaft of light cut into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the
Cold War
is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. By putting the
Comprehensive Test Ban into force, we can make every American
more secure. The
time to act is now.
Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/22/98 6:37:39 PM
FROM Halperin, David E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Berger CTBT Op Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreasen, Steven P.
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Widmer, Edward L.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Witkowski, Anne A.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Steve -- great. A few tiny tweaks for you to consider -- and then run with it.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.

Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998 6:27 PM

To: @DEFENSE - Defense

Policy; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm

Subject: FW: Berger CTBT Op Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Dave -- A few changes. Back to you. I think we are "there" (although it pains me to delete the reference to the University of Minnesota...)].

-----Original Message-----

From: Halperin, David E.

Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998 5:50 PM
To: @DEFENSE - Defense
Policy; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm
Subject: FW: Berger CTBT Op
Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Over to Steve and Bob again.
My remarks may seem a tad barbed -- but meant in the spirit of
buildig
a better future for our children.

-----Original Message-----
From: Andreassen,
Steven P.
Sent: Monday, June 22, 1998 5:26 PM
To: @PLANNING -
Strat Plan & Comm
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: Berger
CTBT Op Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Dave -- Thanks for
the hard work on draft one. Attached is a coordinated
"Bell/Andreassen"
mark up of your mark up. Look forward to seeing the next mark up
to your mark up of our mark up to your mark up. Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Berger CTBT OP ED REVISIO.doc
6/22 6:40 pm
CTBT OP-ED
BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

Senator Jesse Helms recently argued on this page [if not for WSJ: in
the Wall
Street Journal] [I'm assuming this is for WSJ so you can delete
previous
bracketed remark and this one] that the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) is
"worthless" now that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear
explosions. He
compared the treaty to "closing the stable door after the horses have
galloped
away." He also charged that the Clinton Administration refuses to
transmit for

advice and consent three U.S.-Russian agreements reached last fall concerning the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty because it fears Senate rejection.

Senator Helms is wrong about both Treaties. The dangerous developments in South

Asia show it is more critical than ever to move forward on nuclear arms control.

So it is important to set the record straight.

First, with respect to the three ABM agreements, we have made clear we will send them to the Senate. These accords clarify the obligations of Russia and other countries in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union and establish principles to distinguish between defenses against long-range missiles, which are limited under the ABM Treaty, and defenses against shorter-range missiles, which are not.

We will also transmit for ratification a fourth agreement that will extend the deadline for final destruction of long-range nuclear missiles and bombers under the START II Treaty to meet Russian budgetary concerns about destruction costs, while still requiring these missiles and bombers to be deactivated on roughly the original schedule.

But it makes no sense to ratify these accords until after the Russian Duma ratifies START II, which our Senate has already approved. Before we ask our

Senate to approve a modification of the START II Treaty and the ABM accords, we should insist Russia commit itself to START II. To do otherwise risks inviting the Duma to further delay ratification.

Once Russia ratifies START II, we look forward to working with Senator Helms to achieve prompt Senate ratification of the four START/ABM agreements. The ABM accords are particularly important. They do not in any respect impinge on our ongoing programs with respect to defenses against long-range or shorter-range missiles. They do create a framework for effective continued implementation of the ABM Treaty, taking into account emerging threats to our national

security.

And further progress on START - meaning full implementation of START I and START II and the achievement of even deeper cuts in nuclear weapons under START III - will not happen unless we adhere to the ABM Treaty. Without that treaty, we could expect a return to an unconstrained nuclear missile buildup -- precisely what four Republican and two Democratic administrations have worked so hard to prevent over the last quarter century.

Just as important as the START/ABM framework on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms is the effort to constrain the development of new nuclear weapons around the world by means of the CTBT, which would bar all nations from any further testing of nuclear explosives. The Administration submitted the Treaty in 1997, at a time when the Senate was, at our request, focused on ratifying the agreement to add Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO. But that effort was successfully concluded this spring, and yet Senator Helms' Foreign Relations Committee still has taken no action on CTBT.

The United States has a strong interest in bringing the CTBT into force at the earliest possible date, because we must do everything within our power to prevent India and Pakistan, as well as other countries, from further developing their nuclear capability through more tests. As Secretary of State Albright said last week, "If we want others to refrain from nuclear tests -- and we do -- others want us to promise the same -- and we should."

The CTBT's ban on nuclear explosions will constrain the nuclear powers from developing new generations of weapons -- and make a costly and dangerous arms race less likely. It can constrain India and Pakistan and others from developing more sophisticated weapons, optimized for regional warfare. And it will strengthen our capabilities to monitor for nuclear explosions - a

requirement
that exists with or without CTBT - through the creation of a
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of sensors and a system of on-site inspection. To borrow Senator
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while some horses may have run through the stable door, we have
every interest in
keeping them in the corral.

Few major international agreements have enjoyed as much
widespread support as the
CTBT. Two years ago, the United Nations General Assembly voted
overwhelmingly,
158-3, to adopt the Treaty, with only India, Bhutan and Libya
opposing. A few
days later, at the General Assembly, President Clinton was the first
world leader
to sign the treaty. Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom --
the other
states that had declared possession of nuclear weapons -- followed
suit, and the
UK and France have now ratified the Treaty. In all, 149 nations are
now
signatories.

The CTBT enjoys the support of all six members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff,
four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs - John Shalikashvili, Colin
Powell,
William Crowe, and David Jones -- and the directors of our national
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American
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Conceived by President Eisenhower, the Comprehensive Test Ban
reflects a long
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tests -- "a
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Comprehensive Test Ban into force, we can make every American
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lead is

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Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/22/98 6:53:48 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Final Staff Draft/Berger Op Ed [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Andreassen, Steven P.
 Bell, Robert G.
 Bouchard, Joseph F.
 Kelly, Sandra L.
 Langley, Janice M.
 Mulligan, George D.
 vonLipsey, Roderick K.
 Witkowsky, Anne A.
 @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
 Blinken, Antony J.
 Gobush, Matthew N.
 Gray, Wendy E.
 Halperin, David E.
 LaFleur, Vinca S.
 Leavy, David C.
 Widmer, Edward L.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Dave --

Thanks again for the quick turnaround. The attached is a "clean" copy of the "final" Defense/ Planning draft of the Berger CTBT Op Ed. You advised me to now "run with it," and I am prepared to do so; however, past experience would have Mr. Blinken forward across the street for Sandy's approval (I think). Let me know how you and Tony want to now proceed.

Steve

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Ber Op Ed Final Staff Draft.doc
 6/22 6:50 pm
 CTBT: THE TIME TO LEAD IS NOW
 BY SAMUEL R. BERGER

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Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT) is "worthless" now that India and Pakistan have conducted nuclear explosions. He compared the treaty to "closing the stable door after the horses have galloped away." He also charged that the Clinton Administration refuses to transmit for advice and consent three U.S.-Russian agreements reached last fall concerning the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty because it fears Senate rejection. Senator Helms is wrong about both Treaties. The dangerous developments in South Asia show it is more critical than ever to move forward on nuclear arms control. So it is important to set the record straight.

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shaft of light cut into the darkness" of global confrontation. Now, the Cold War is over, but the dark cloud of nuclear danger remains. By putting the Comprehensive Test Ban into force, we can make every American more secure. The agreement has sat in the Senate's "in box" for too long. The time to lead is now.

Samuel R. Berger is Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

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