

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Kathleen Cooper to Leonard Hawley. Subject: FW: Action Memorandum for NSC. (10 pages)	03/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/09/1998-03/20/1998]

2006-1363-F
vz5689

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/9/98 12:35:22 PM
FROM Farrar, Jay C.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: POTUS Response to Helms Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Mara,

This final version reads fine from my perspective. - Jay.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Andreasen, Steven P.

Sent: Monday, February

09, 1998 11:57 AM

To: @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @LEGAL -
Legal Advisor; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; Sandalow,
David B.

Cc: @DEFENSE

- Defense Policy

Subject: POTUS Response to Helms Letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

For

all concerned:

Attached is the final of the President's response
to the Helms letter, which I am walking across the street as we speak
as a double red dot. Plan is to plead for signature before Secretary
Albright testifies tomorrow morning.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

0584Ltr.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter to me outlining the Committee's agenda for considering treaties in 1998. I was especially pleased to know that you agree the first priority is to secure Senate advice and consent to the NATO enlargement protocols, and that you are confident that the Senate will give its approval early this Spring.

In my State of the Union address, I asked the Senate to give its advice and consent to the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty this year - a Treaty that enjoys the support of four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the current Chairman, the Joint Chiefs, and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. Last week I was briefed on the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). I am pleased to advise you that all three of the Directors of our nuclear labs - John Browne (LANL), Bruce Tarter (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) and Paul Robinson (Sandia National Laboratory) - confirmed to me their confidence in the Stockpile Stewardship Program and its ability to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.

I was, therefore, disappointed to read that the CTB is low on your list of priorities. As was the case with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) last year, I believe it is essential that the United States demonstrate leadership with regard to the crucial multilateral treaties and regimes that underpin our global non-proliferation agenda. Rather than waiting to see if others will ratify the CTB, I believe America must lead in bringing the CTB into

force. And
with regard to India and Pakistan, I think it is important that when I
travel to
the subcontinent later this year I do so with U.S. ratification in hand.

As you and Secretary Albright continue your consultations on the
order in which
we hope your Committee will take up treaties and other important
foreign policy
matters this session, I urge you to afford the CTB the very high
priority I
believe it warrants.

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 0584 MTP.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Helms on CTBT

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Senator Helms on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Background

Senator Helms has written you regarding his agenda relating to consideration of treaties during 1998. After stating that the Committee's first priority is to work with the Administration to secure Senate ratification of NATO expansion, he then states he will be prepared to schedule Committee consideration of the CTBT only after the Senate has had the opportunity to consider and vote on the Kyoto Protocol and the amendments to the ABM Treaty. The response from you notes your appreciation for Senator Helm's cooperation on NATO expansion and underscores the high priority you place on the Senate giving its advice and consent to CTBT this year.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Senator Helms at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Senator Helms

Tab B Letter from Senator Helms

2

0584

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 0584 MTB.doc

February 9, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Helms on CTBT

Senator Helms has written the President regarding his agenda relating to consideration of treaties during 1998. We have previously informed you of the contents of this letter by e-mail.

We have assigned this letter "double red dot" priority, taking into account that both Secretary Albright and Under Secretary Eizenstat will be testifying this week before the SFRC (Tuesday and Wednesday, respectively).

Concurrence by: Rudman Blinken

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Senator Helms

Tab B Letter from Senator Helms

1

0584

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/9/98 12:51:02 PM

FROM Farrar, Jay C.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(a)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 02/08/1998

DECLASSIFYON 02/08/2008

SUBJECT FW: Report to Congress/Annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Certification ~~SECRET~~

TO Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/707
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 2/7/2019
2006-1367-F(3)

Mara,

I've looked this package over - pretty benign and I think it's fine - Jay.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreassen,
Steven P.
Sent: Sunday, February 08, 1998 8:19 PM
To: @LEGISLAT
- Legislative Affairs; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @LEGAL
- Legal
Advisor
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: Report to Congress/Annual
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Certification ~~SECRET~~
Importance: High

Mara/Tony/Jamie

--

Need your concurrence on the attached package by noon Monday, if at all possible. Secretary Pena plans to announce at the National Press Club on Thursday (February 12) that the President has transmitted the annual certification of our nuclear weapons stockpile to Congress (which translates into a POTUS signature no later than Wednesday this week). We also plan a "CTBT blast fax" announcing the transmittal,

as well as the standard WH Press release that accompanies reports to Congress. [FYI -- the President's CTBT letter of transmittal said we would provide the certification and accompanying report to the appropriate committees of the Congress. At present, letters are addressed to Helms, Biden, Thurmond, Levin and Gore.]

Suggestions

for additional distribution welcome. Note this is the first transmittal, so there is no precedent.] Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Certification MTB.doc

February 8, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Annual Certification of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The attached report fulfills the President's commitment to provide to the Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report.

Secretary Pena plans to announce at the National Press Club on Thursday (February 12) that the President has transmitted the annual certification and accompanying report to the Congress.

Concurrence by: Rudman Blinken Baker

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letters to Congress
Tab B Certification Letter and Accompanying Report
1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 0000

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(a)

Declassify On: 2/8/2008

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Certification MTP.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Annual Certification of the Nuclear
Weapons
Stockpile

Purpose

To submit for your approval a report to Congress on the annual
certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Background

In your September 22, 1997 letter of transmittal of the Comprehensive
Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification, you
committed to provide to the Congress the annual certification of the
nuclear
weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and

accompanying
report. The attached report to Congress fulfills that commitment.

Secretary Pena plans to announce at the National Press Club on
Thursday (February
12) that you have transmitted the annual certification and
accompanying report to
Congress.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A transmitting the annual certification
and
accompanying report.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Congress

Tab B Certification Letter and Accompanying Report

2

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 0000

~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
Reason: 1.5(a) Chief of Staff
Declassify On: 2/8/2008

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Certification Letters.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Attached is a copy of the annual certification of the nuclear weapons
stockpile
by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report,
submitted
pursuant to my September 22, 1997 letter of transmittal of the
Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the advice and consent of the

Senate to
ratification.

I am pleased to note the Secretaries' conclusion that the nuclear stockpile has no safety or reliability concerns that require underground testing at this time. Problems that have arisen in the stockpile are being addressed and resolved without underground nuclear testing to ensure the stockpile remains safe and reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Secretaries obtained the advice of the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Biden:

Attached is a copy of the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report, submitted pursuant to my September 22, 1997 letter of transmittal of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification.

I am pleased to note the Secretaries' conclusion that the nuclear stockpile has no safety or reliability concerns that require underground testing at this time. Problems that have arisen in the stockpile are being addressed and resolved without underground nuclear testing to ensure the stockpile remains safe and reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Secretaries obtained the advice of the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

Attached is a copy of the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report, submitted pursuant to my September 22, 1997 letter of transmittal of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification.

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this time.
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The Honorable Al Gore
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

Attached is a copy of the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report, submitted pursuant to my September 22, 1997 letter of transmittal of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification.

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the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander
in Chief,
United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Levin:

Attached is a copy of the annual certification of the nuclear weapons
stockpile
by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report,
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The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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UNCLASSIFIED WITH
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~~SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATTACHMENT

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/9/98 1:59:28 PM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Certification Letters [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Sorry -- Here are the attached letters -- await your verdict.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Andreasen, Steven P.
Sent: Monday, February
09, 1998 1:57 PM
To: @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Cc: Bell,
Robert G.
Subject: Certification Letters [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Mara/Jay
-- Please advise: Attached are the final drafts of the annual nuclear
weapons certification letters, currently addressed to: (Senate)
-- Helms, Biden, Gore, Thurmond, and Levin; (House) -- Gingrich,
Spence, Skelton, Gilman and Hamilton. Bob asked me to ask Leg if
we should do additional letters to (Senate) Daschle and Lott, (House)
Gephardt. Also, just to confirm, Dellums is now gone, replaced by
Skelton. Thanks. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Certification Letters.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

I am pleased to note the Secretaries' conclusion that the nuclear stockpile has no safety or reliability concerns that require underground testing at this time. Problems that have arisen in the stockpile are being addressed and resolved without underground nuclear testing to ensure the stockpile remains safe and reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Secretaries obtained the advice of the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Biden:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive

Nuclear Test Ban

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United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

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The Honorable Al Gore
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Washington, D.C. 20510

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The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Levin:

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The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of

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the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander
in Chief,
United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I
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The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Skelton:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Hamilton:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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The Honorable Lee Hamilton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/9/98 4:44:50 PM
FROM Andreassen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Letters [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Langley, Janice M.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Certification Letters.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
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Dear Senator Biden:

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The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

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The Honorable Al Gore
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

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The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Levin:

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The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:

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The Honorable Trent Lott
Republican Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

I am pleased to note the Secretaries' conclusion that the nuclear stockpile has no safety or reliability concerns that require underground testing at this time. Problems that have arisen in the stockpile are being addressed and resolved without underground nuclear testing to ensure the stockpile remains safe and reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Secretaries obtained the advice of the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle
Democratic Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt
Democratic Leader

House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Skelton:

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The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Hamilton:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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The Honorable Lee Hamilton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
5

8

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
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ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA~~
ATTACHMENT

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/2/98 6:41:03 PM

FROM McEldowney, Nancy E.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT NATO-CONGRESS [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bandler, Donald K.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Braden, Susan R.
Brown, Keim C.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Covey, James P.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
Quinn, Mary E.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Todd, Gwennyth E.
Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Widmer, Edward L.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Rudman, Mara E.
Braden, Susan R.
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Quinn, Mary E.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Opening salvos.

-----Original Message-----

From: SitRoom

Sent: Monday,

March 02, 1998 6:13 PM

To: Bandler, Donald K.; Bell, Robert G.;
Dowling, John N. (Nick); Hamel, Michael A.; McEldowney, Nancy E.;
Witkowski, Anne A.
Subject: NATO-CONGRESS

a2412

^BC-NATO-CONGRESS

1STLD (SCHEDULED)

^NATO expansion faces test in U.S. Senate

(Adds Sen. Warner interview)

By Jackie Frank

WASHINGTON

(Reuters) - NATO expansion is on track for U.S.

approval this month,

starting with the expected clearance

Tuesday in the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee of the first

new members from the former Warsaw

Pact.

Committee chairman Jesse Helms, Republican of North
Carolina,

made the expansion of the alliance to include Poland,

Hungary and

the Czech Republic his first priority for the year

and expects it

to be completed this month.

Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott

said Monday that while he

avored approval of NATO expansion to

include those former

Warsaw Pact governments, debate in the full

Senate next week

must allow lawmakers to voice their legitimate
concerns.

"I think we should pass it and do it in a reasonable
time.

But you've got to allow senators a chance to be heard on it,"
the

Mississippi Republican said at a news conference. A
two-thirds vote

is required for ratification of the treaty.

The three countries

were approved for entry into the

alliance last December. They cannot

be admitted until the

parliaments of all existing 16 NATO members

ratify the move. No

other country has yet acted on the proposed

enlargement.

But once those three are admitted, it may be more difficult for others to seek admission to the alliance. Several lawmakers and prominent Americans have called for a moratorium on further expansion.

A senior Republican on the Armed Services Committee, Sen.

John Warner, said he and about 20 others have written to Senate leaders urging that debate on NATO enlargement be put off

several months, possibly until June 1.

In a telephone interview, the Virginia lawmaker who opposes NATO expansion said

he believed the Senate needed more time to hold hearings and consider the problems of NATO expansion.

Warner, who is not on the Foreign Relations Committee,

nevertheless sees the momentum favoring passage.

But he intends

to offer an amendment that would impose a three-year moratorium

on further expansion of NATO. Warner said he has about a dozen

co-sponsors for his resolution.

What he called a "strategic pause" in new membership would begin on the formal date of entry

for Poland, Hungary and the

Czech Republic. Secretary of State Madeleine

Albright strongly

opposed such a pause, but Warner said he was not convinced by

her argument that it would send a wrong signal to new democracies.

"I feel strongly that they ought to join the European Union before

joining NATO," he said. "NATO is becoming a mini-U.N.," he said.

He holds the position that time will be needed to integrate the

three into the alliance, assess the cost and impact of the enlargement,

and see whether U.S. security interests were to thinly stretched.

France and Italy pressed unsuccessfully last year for the inclusion of Romania and Slovenia in the first round of NATO enlargement.

Russia is expected to resist membership for the once Soviet-ruled Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The uncertainty of the cost to the United States, and the debate over military burden sharing are expected to draw the most attention during the debate.

Estimates have ranged from \$1.5 billion to \$125 billion over 10 years, Warner noted.

A further concern involves possible changes in the relationship with Russia resulting from bringing former Eastern Bloc nations into a formal alliance with the West. Of the former Warsaw Pact countries, only Russia has not applied for entry to NATO.

Several prominent Americans have joined in opposing the expansion.

An unusual alliance of groups on the political left and right has protested that the cost for the United States is too great.

In speeches on the Senate floor, lawmakers have questioned whether

the U.S. public would support the use of troops to defend nations

in eastern and central Europe.

Clinton administration officials

noted that this round of

NATO enlargement would add 200,000 troops to the alliance, which

they argued would make Europe more stable

and erase the

artificial lines between East and West drawn after the Second

World War.

^REUTERS

RB-- 03/02/98 17:37:00

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/2/98 8:05:51 PM
FROM Busby, Scott W.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT CEDAW letter from POTUS [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Schwartz, Eric P.
LaFleur, Vinca S.

CARBON_COPY Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
LaFleur, Vinca S.
Leavy, David C.
Widmer, Edward L.
Busby, Scott W.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Letts, Kelly J.
Malley, Robert
Naplan, Steven J.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Schwartz, Eric P.

TEXT_BODY Eric, Vinca -- Here's a first crack at a CEDAW letter. Would appreciate your comments ASAP. Plan to distribute a revised draft at planning meeting tomorrow (Tuesday) at 12:30. THanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CEDAW letter.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I write to seek your support in obtaining Senate consent to the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). As you know, CEDAW is the most comprehensive and detailed international treaty relating to the rights of women that has been developed to date. The United States actively participated in the drafting of CEDAW and signed the treaty in 1980. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of ratification in 1994, the Senate has not formally considered the treaty since that time.

The rights of women have become an issue of global importance - and one that is integral to our foreign policy. From Afghanistan to Argentina, Russia to Rwanda, we have learned that addressing the needs and problems of women is crucial to the resolution of civil conflict as well as the promotion of long-term peace, stability and economic development. However, doing so is not always easy. Many societies continue to shunt women to the shadows, limiting their opportunities for education, for work, and for full participation in public life.

I believe that the ratification of CEDAW is critical to our efforts to enhance the position of women throughout the world. 161 countries have ratified CEDAW to date. The United States is one of the few that has not. This greatly impedes our efforts to ensure that women receive the equal treatment they deserve.

As you know, the ratification of CEDAW would not require significant changes to U.S. domestic law and practice. At both state and federal levels, U.S. law already provides strong protections for women. To the extent there may be concerns about the effect of CEDAW on U.S. law, those concerns have been addressed by the small number of reservations, understandings, and declarations

upon which the State Department and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have already agreed. These include an explicit understanding that the treaty does not create an international right to an abortion.

March 11 is International Women's Day. I will be announcing at that time my Administration's firm commitment to the ratification of CEDAW during this session of Congress. I would very much like to have your support by then.

I will also announce our hope to have the full Senate act on CEDAW prior to the Sesquicentennial Celebration of the first American Women's Conference at Seneca Falls, New York in July. This event is an historic one and will involve

prominent women from around the world. I think it would be truly fitting if the United States, the host to this event, has signaled its full support for CEDAW by that time.

I look forward to working with you on this very important issue.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/3/98 11:53:04 AM
FROM LaFleur, Vinca S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Revised CEDAW letter [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Busby, Scott W.
Schwartz, Eric P.

CARBON_COPY Blinken, Antony J.
Gray, Wendy E.
Busby, Scott W.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Letts, Kelly J.
Malley, Robert
Naplan, Steven J.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rossi, Christopher R.
Schwartz, Eric P.

TEXT_BODY I think it's good; see few suggested changes. I recommend you get Mara's clearance as well.
I thought the planning meeting was at 1:30 (vice 12:30) -- am I wrong, or are there 2 distinct meetings?

-----Original
Message-----
From: Busby, Scott W.
Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 1998
11:03 AM
To: LaFleur, Vinca S.; Schwartz, Eric P.
Subject: Revised
CEDAW letter [UNCLASSIFIED]

Revised CEDAW letter. Disregard
last version.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT CEDAW letter.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I write to seek your support in obtaining Senate consent to the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). As you know, CEDAW is the most comprehensive and detailed international treaty developed to date relating to the rights of women. The United States actively participated in the drafting of CEDAW and signed the treaty in 1980. Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of ratification in 1994, the Senate has not formally considered the treaty since that time.

The rights of women have become an issue of global importance - and one that is integral to our foreign policy. From Afghanistan to Argentina, Russia to Rwanda, we have learned that addressing the needs and problems of women is crucial to the resolution of civil conflict as well as the promotion of long-term peace, stability and economic development. However, doing so is not always easy. Many societies continue to shunt women to the shadows, limiting their opportunities for education, for work, and for full participation in public life. CEDAW would help to ameliorate these inequities.

I believe that the ratification of CEDAW is critical to our efforts to enhance the position of women throughout the world. 161 countries have ratified CEDAW to date. The United States is one of the few that has not. This greatly impairs our moral authority and impedes our efforts to ensure that women receive the equal treatment they deserve.

As you know, the ratification of CEDAW would not require significant changes to

U.S. law. At both state and federal levels, our law already provides strong protections for women. To the extent there may be concerns about provisions in CEDAW, they have been addressed by the small number of reservations, understandings, and declarations upon which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the State Department have already agreed. These include an explicit understanding that the treaty does not create an international right to [an - do you need this word?] abortion.

On March 11, International Women's Day, I will announce that I intend to make the ratification of CEDAW a top priority during this session of Congress. I would very much like to have your support by then.

I will also announce our Administration's wish to have the full Senate act on CEDAW prior to the Sesquicentennial Celebration of the first American Women's Rights Conference at Seneca Falls, New York in July. This historic event will involve prominent women and men from around the world who are dedicated to the promotion of women's rights. It would be a truly fitting homage to this important chapter in our history if the United States could announce its ratification of CEDAW by that time.

I look forward to working with you on this very important issue.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/9/98 5:23:14 PM
FROM Evans, Peter O.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Memo to tashev [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Elkind, Jonathan H.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

Location: g:/Documents/Cherno10/Logistics/Offline meal participants
list.doc

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Offline meal participants lists.doc

March 9, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR DMITRIY Y. TASCHEV

FROM: JON ELKIND

SUBJECT: PARTICIPANTS LISTS - Wednesday breakfast and
lunch

This is to inform you of our proposed list of U.S. participants for the
08:15

Wednesday 11 March working breakfast, and the 13:00 lunch with
members of the
U.S. Congress on the same day.

ATTENDANCE:

08:30 Working Breakfast

Vice President

Leon Fuerth

13:00 Congressional Lunch

Vice President

Leon Fuerth

Senator Jesse Helms

Senator Joseph Biden

Representative Gilman

Representative Hamilton

Representative Richard Gephardt

If you have any questions or concerns, please call me (202-456-9519).

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Kathleen Cooper to Leonard Hawley. Subject: FW: Action Memorandum for NSC. (10 pages)	03/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Jesse Helms])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/09/1998-03/20/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5689

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/19/98 10:43:22 AM
FROM Burrell, Christina L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: Please and thank you clear on the attached ASAP for Miriam Sapiro
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Farrar, Jay C.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Can one of you clear this? EXECSEC wants it. Thanks.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Marshall, Betty A.
Sent: Thursday, March 19,
1998 8:04 AM
To: Rudman, Mara E.; Rossi, Christopher R.
Cc: Burrell,
Christina L.
Subject: Please and thank you clear on the attached
ASAP for Miriam Sapiro [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1815berger.DOC

March 17, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER

FROM: MIRIAM SAPIRO

SUBJECT: President's Report to Congress on Cyprus

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President transmitting his bimonthly Report to Congress on Cyprus, submitted in accordance with the International Security Assistance Act of 1978. This report covers the December 1997 - January 1998 timeframe and should be submitted as soon as possible.

Concurrence by: James Baker, Chris Rossi, Mara Rudman

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress
Tab B Report to Congress
Tab II Incoming from State

1

1815

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1815ng.doc

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 USC 2373(c)), I submit to

you this
report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus
question covering
the period December 1, 1997 to January 31, 1998. The previous
submission covered
events during October to November 1997.

International efforts on the Cyprus issue slowed during this period in
anticipation of the February 1998 Cypriot Presidential election. It was,

however, an active period for developments that affect Cyprus,
including those in
the area of EU-Turkish relations. Turkey perceived the Luxembourg
EU Summit as a
setback to its goal of closer integration with Europe. When I met
Prime Minister
Yilmaz here in December, I urged him to remain focused on Turkey's
long-term
interest in Europe.

There were negative developments on the island. On December 27,
the Turkish
Cypriots indefinitely suspended bicomunal contacts between Greek
and Turkish
Cypriots. In January, the Greek Cypriot National Guard assumed
control of the
Paphos airbase, which has been upgraded to serve as a base for fighter
aircraft.
We reiterated to the Greek Cypriots our concerns about proceeding
with the
purchase of the S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, which present a serious
obstacle to
achieving a settlement based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the House of
Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1815JH.DOC

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Public Law 95-384 (22 USC 2373(c)), I submit to you this report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question covering the period December 1, 1997 to January 31, 1998. The previous submission covered events during October to November 1997.

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We reiterated to the Greek Cypriots our concerns about proceeding with the purchase of the S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, which present a serious obstacle to achieving a settlement based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
1

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1815PRE.DOC

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Cyprus

Purpose

Forward the bimonthly Presidential Report to the Congress on Cyprus.

Background

The International Security Assistance Act of 1978 requires that you submit a bimonthly report on progress made during the period toward "the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem," including any relevant reports prepared by the UN Secretary General for the Security Council. The Department of State has prepared for your approval a draft Presidential Report on

Cyprus, which
is at Tab B. At Tab A are transmittal letters to the Speaker of the
House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations.

The previous report covered progress during October to November
1997. The
current report covers the period December 1, 1997 to January 31,
1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Congress at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Transmittal Letters to Congress
Tab B Report to Congress
1

2

1815

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 1815Rpt to Congress re Cyprus.doc
PRESIDENT'S BIMONTHLY REPORT ON CYPRUS

On December 2, UN Secretary-General (SYG) Special Advisor for
Cyprus Diego
Cordovez briefed the Security Council on his trip to the region in
November. Mr.
Cordovez noted that negotiations were suspended until after the
Cypriot
Presidential election in February 1998, but that preparations were
underway for
the resumption of talks after that time. He also welcomed the
coordination with
his office by the various special representatives for Cyprus, including
the "very
useful sustained effort" by U.S. Special Presidential Emissary for
Cyprus Richard
C. Holbrooke.

European Union (EU) Commissioner Hans van den Broek visited Cyprus during December 2-3 and met with President Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. He reviewed Cyprus' EU accession course and EU-Turkish relations. Mr. van den Broek emphasized the need for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to be flexible and creative in seeking ways to field a joint delegation for EU accession negotiations.

In a December 4 meeting in Washington, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem discussed a range of issues in anticipation of the December 19 visit by Prime Minister Yilmaz, including Turkish-EU relations, Aegean tensions and the Cyprus dispute.

In preparation for the UK's assumption of the EU presidency in January, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Political Director Jeremy Greenstock met with Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas J. Miller, among other U.S. officials, on December 4 to exchange views on Cyprus.

On December 8, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Cyprus Chief Michael Menning oversaw the transfer of funds for the expansion of telephone connections between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. As a result of increasing the number of telephone lines from three to twenty, callers on both sides of the cease-fire lines will be able to direct dial telephone numbers in the other zone without operator assistance. The U.S. funded the upgrade through a bicomunal assistance program administered by UNHCR.

In addition, on December 8, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan released the semi-annual report on United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) activities for the period of June 6 to the end of November. The report noted that tensions on the island remained high during the previous six months, but were lower than the preceding six-month period. The report regretted

that the UNFICYP measures to reduce tensions along the cease-fire lines had still not been agreed upon after more than a year of negotiations. The report cited several positive developments, including the July 31 agreement between Messrs. Clerides and Denktash to exchange information on missing persons and the two leaders' September meeting to discuss security issues. The report also highlighted the unprecedented level of bicomunal activities between the two communities. A copy of the report is attached.

On December 12, the UN Secretary-General released the report on the UN "Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus." The report reviewed UN diplomatic activity since December 1996 to promote a settlement. A copy of the report is attached.

The December 12-13 EU Summit in Luxembourg, in its statement of conclusions, confirmed the EU's intention to begin accession negotiations in spring 1998 with Cyprus and five Central European applicants for EU membership and placed five other Central European countries on a pre-accession track. The EU also invited Cyprus, Turkey and the other ten aspirant countries to attend a European Conference in London on March 12.

Turkey reacted with disappointment to the EU Summit results because it was set apart from other applicants for EU membership. In a December 14 statement, the Government of Turkey reaffirmed its intention to maintain its existing relations with the EU through its Association and Customs Union agreements, but stated that it would no longer engage in political dialogue with the EU (inter alia) on the Cyprus issue.

Turkish Cypriot authorities issued a December 14 statement critical of the EU decision to proceed with EU accession negotiations with Cyprus. They reiterated

that EU accession should not take place before a Cyprus settlement and that a settlement must be based on recognition of a Turkish-Cypriot state.

During his December 16 press conference, President Clinton reiterated his commitment to achieving stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and a Cyprus settlement. The President stated: "To allow the potential that Greece and Turkey both have for future economic growth and cooperation, for political cooperation, for security cooperation to be broken on the rocks of their differences over Cyprus and other territorial differences in the Aegean is, in my view, a grave error." With regard to the Cyprus issue he said: "I want a resolution of the Cyprus issue very badly. You have evidence of that when I asked Mr. Holbrooke to head our efforts to try to resolve it..."

Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz visited the United States during December 17-21.

In Washington, he met with the President, the Vice President, Secretary Albright and other U.S. officials. In his December 19 meeting with Prime Minister Yilmaz,

President Clinton noted Turkey's cooperation with international efforts to find a

solution to the Cyprus problem based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation. The

President also encouraged continued efforts to reduce tensions and improve

communications between Greece and Turkey, and he reiterated the importance of

Turkey's integration with Europe and the West. The Prime Minister also met with

Ambassadors Holbrooke and Miller on December 17 in New York to exchange views on the Cyprus issue.

On December 23, the UN Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1146 extending

the UNFICYP mandate for an additional six months. The resolution noted the

continuing high tensions along the cease-fire lines and called for (inter alia) a

commitment by the leaders of the two communities to resumption of the UN

settlement negotiations and encouragement by authorities on both sides for bicommunal contacts. It also noted that one party had agreed to accept proposed UNFICYP measures to reduce tensions along the cease-fire lines and called for early agreement on the measures.

On Christmas Day, 700 Greek Cypriot children and grandchildren living in the south visited relatives in the Karpass region of northern Cyprus. They stayed through the New Year holiday.

Turkish Cypriot authorities announced an indefinite suspension of bicommunal contacts on December 27 pending an evaluation of the implications of the EU Summit in Luxembourg. U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Kenneth Brill met with Turkish Cypriot leaders to emphasize the importance of bicommunal activities for the settlement process and urged them to reverse this decision.

On January 5, 1998, UK Special Representative to Cyprus Sir David Hannay separately met with Deputy National Security Adviser James B. Steinberg, Senior Director for Europe Donald K. Bandler an Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Marc Grossman and Ambassadors Holbrooke and Miller to exchange views on next steps on Cyprus following the February Cypriot election. They also reviewed the impact of the December EU Summit results on EU-Turkish relations and prospects for a Cyprus settlement. On January 7 and 8, Ambassador Brill met separately with Foreign Minister Kasoulides and Mr. Denktash to review the upcoming visit by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Congressional delegation and to brief them on Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz's December visit to the United States. Ambassador Brill underscored the President's commitment to reaching a bizonal, bicommunal settlement on Cyprus. Ambassador Brill urged Mr. Denktash to lift the suspension of bicommunal

contacts.

Ambassador Miller traveled to Greece and Turkey during January 15-20. In Ankara, he met with Turkish Foreign Minister Cem and State Secretary Sukru Gurel. In Athens on January 19, Ambassador Miller met with Greek Foreign Minister Panalos, Deputy Foreign Minister Kranidiotis, and MFA Secretary General Philon. In both capitals, Ambassador Miller solicited Greek and Turkish thinking on the settlement process in Cyprus and discussed U.S. plans following the Cypriot elections in February.

On January 13, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities announced an agreement on closer diplomatic cooperation between the Turkish Ministry and Turkish Cypriot authorities.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs James Gadsden traveled to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus from January 7-14. In Ankara on January 9, Mr. Gadsden met with Turkish MFA Deputy Under Secretary Batu. Mr. Gadsden traveled to Athens on January 11 and met with Alternate Foreign Minister Papandreou, Deputy Foreign Minister Kranidiotis and Deputy Defense Minister Apostolakis. In both Ankara and Athens, Mr. Gadsden discussed the region and exchanged views on Aegean tensions and Cyprus. In Nicosia on January 13, Mr. Gadsden met with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives to discuss prospects for settlement talks. He reiterated U.S. support for a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution.

U.S. Representative John Porter led a delegation from the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus during January 14-19. Representatives Hoyer, Cardin and Slaughter also participated in the delegation. In its January 15-16 visit to Cyprus, the delegation met with

Messrs. Clerides and Denktash, UN and UNFICYP officials including UN COM Feissel, religious leaders, and a cross-section of Cypriots involved in bicommunal activities.

Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives met on January 23 in the presence of UN Chief of Mission in Cyprus Feissel to exchange information on approximately 600 missing persons from both communities, pursuant to the July 31, 1997, Clerides-Denktash agreement.

On January 24, contractors completed work on the Paphos air base, and the base was "unofficially" handed over to the Greek Cypriot National Guard. On January 31, Turkey formally protested the upgrading of the Paphos air base to the UN Security Council.

Ambassador Miller traveled to Brussels on January 26 to participate in U.S.-EU Troika discussions of Cyprus, chaired by the UK Presidency and including representatives from Austria, Luxembourg and the EU Commission. Meeting participants reviewed the UN settlement process, the S-300 missile issue, Aegean tensions, and EU-Turkish relations. While in Brussels, Ambassador Miller also met separately with a number of EU officials, including EU Council Secretariat Director General Brian Crowe, EU Political Director Burghardt and Swedish Special Cyprus Representative Faltman.

On January 31, in celebration of the Moslem holiday marking the end of Ramadan, about 1300 Turkish Cypriots were allowed to cross the UN-controlled "green line" without incident to visit the Hala Sultan Tekke Mosque near Larnaca. The mosque was built in memory of Um Haram, an aunt of the Prophet Mohammed and is considered to be among the holiest Islamic shrines.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/20/98 8:24:46 AM
FROM Langley, Janice M.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Certification example - w/report [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Bouchard, Joseph F.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Here is an example that Steve did -- Janice

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Certification Letters.doc

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

I am pleased to note the Secretaries' conclusion that the nuclear stockpile has no safety or reliability concerns that require underground testing at this time. Problems that have arisen in the stockpile are being addressed and resolved

without underground nuclear testing to ensure the stockpile remains safe and reliable. In reaching this conclusion, the Secretaries obtained the advice of the Directors of the National Weapons Laboratories, the Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Biden:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

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United States Strategic Command, and the Nuclear Weapons Council.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Al Gore
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
President Pro Tempore
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Levin:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Trent Lott
Republican Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Leader:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle
Democratic Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Leader:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt
Democratic Leader

House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Skelton:

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Chairman
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Representative Hamilton:

In my September 22, 1997 letter transmitting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, I announced that I would provide to the appropriate committees of Congress the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. Attached is a copy of that certification and report.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Lee Hamilton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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E.O. 13526 05/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September
By ✓ NARA, Date 2/7/2014
2004-1363-F

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

SUBJECT: Report to Congress on Annual Certification of the Nuclear
Weapons
Stockpile

Purpose

To submit for your approval a report to Congress on the annual
certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Background

In your September 22, 1997 letter of transmittal of the Comprehensive
Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification, you
stated that you would provide to the appropriate committees of
Congress the

annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and accompanying report. The attached report to Congress fulfills that commitment.

Secretary Pena plans to announce at the National Press Club on Thursday (February 12) that you have transmitted the annual certification and accompanying report to Congress.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A transmitting the annual certification and accompanying report.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Congress

Tab B Certification Letter and Accompanying Report

1

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 0954

~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President

Reason: 1.5(a) Chief of Staff

Declassify On: 2/8/2008