

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Don Cheramie to Douglas Bayley. Subject: Berger-Ivanov (20 Jun 00). (3 pages)	06/20/2000	P1/b(1)
002. email	Amy Swarm to Douglas Bayley. Subject: Berger/Ivanov Notes. (4 pages)	06/20/2000	P1/b(1)
003. email	Dianne Grissom to Douglas Bayley. Subject: Berger-Ivanov Notes. (3 pages)	06/20/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/19/2000-06/20/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5677

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/19/2000 7:01:08 PM
FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Akers, Dale W. (STP)
Almon, Timothy C. (INTEL)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Avery, Dale R. (INTERAM)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
Banbury, Anthony N. (MULTI)
Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Bartsch, Bryan W. (STP)
Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)
Battenfield, Pat A. (AF)
Baum, Russell A. (ADMIN)
Bayley, Douglas C. (WHSR)
Bellamy, Ralph C. (RECORDS)
Bernard, Kenneth W. (HEALTH)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Blackburn, John (WHSR)
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Bolinski, Charlene C. (RECORDS)
Bowles, Ian A. (ENV)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Bresnahan, Gary E. (WHSR/STP)
Broadwick, Bonnie . (WHSR)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Bruns, Judson L. (Jay) (INTECON)

Bryan, Dave L. (STP)
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Byrne, Catherine E. (AF)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Carteret, Charles L. (STP)
Carty, John J. (STP)
Cheramie, Don E. (WHSR)
Clark, Bronya (ADMIN)
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
Cooper, Colby J. (ADMIN)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Crawford, Bernard T. (RECORDS)
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Crowder, Stevan D. (WHSR/STP)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Darnes, Victoria J. (RECORDS)
Dempsey, Nora B. (AF)
Depaepe, Michael B. (STP)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Dimel, Marsha L. (ADMIN)
Duncan, John D. (INTECON/DOS)
Dupuy, Shawn L. (STP)
Edwards, Joan K. (NONPRO)
Ehrendreich, Joel (WHSR)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Erdahl, Douglas M. (WHSR)
Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)
Ficklin, John W. (RECORDS)
Figueredo, Orlando (STP)
Fishel, Eugene (Gene) M. (RUE)
Fuchs, Joachim D. (WHSR)
Gentile, Donald J. (WHSR)
George, Christopher L. (RECORDS)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)

Goldberg, David B. (RECORDS/INTECON)
Good, Travis C. (RECORDS)
Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. (TNT)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Green, Charles A. (TNT)
Grissom, Dianne L. (WHSR)
Hale, John E. (STP)
Halperin, David E.
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hargis, Robert C. (WHSR)
Harris, Elisa D. (NONPRO)
Harris, Grant T. (AF)
Heyer, Scott C. (WHSR)
Hill, Christopher R. (SEE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Hillman, Thomas W. (STP)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Hollis, Caryn C. (INTERAM)
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Howerton, Barbara E. (INTEL)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Hunker, Jeffrey A. (TNT)
Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN)
Huso, Ravic R. (ASIA)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Jarosinski, Frank J. (WHSR)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Jordan, Kristine A. (STP)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Joshlyn, Gay L. (ADMIN)
Kale, Dora A. (NSA)
Kalka, Jean-Francois (JF) (STP)
Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR)
Keenan, Josefine (Chris) (HEALTH)
Keith, James R. (ASIA)
Keller, John P. (RECORDS)

Knepper, Charlotte (INTEL)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Langley, Janice M. (INTEL)
Laskowski, Gregory J. (WHSR)
Leary, William H. (RECORDS)
Lee, Sang Won (RECORDS)
Liberatore, Joseph W. (TNT/INTERN)
Lieberson, Donna P. (TNT)
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (ASIA)
Locke, Dwayne L. (STP)
Lowden, Michael R. (STP)
Lystra, Clark R. (WHSR)
Maertens, Thomas R. (NONPRO)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)
Marsh, Thomas S (RECORDS)
Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Maxfield, Nancy H. (EUR)
McAden, James G. (ASIA/INTERN)
McCarthy, Mary O. (INTEL)
McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)
McIntyre, Stuart H. (RECORDS)
McClean, Matthew K. (MULTI)
Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Merchant, Brian T. (RECORDS/INTEL)
Merletti, Roger D. (INTERAM)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Mitchell, Donald A. (INTEL)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Mitsler, Elaine M. (INTECON)
Miyaoka, Lester H. (STP)
Montgomery, Mark C. (TNT)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)

Muir, Morgan C. (SEE)
Munter, Cameron P. (EUR)
Mynatt, Lee (Brad) B. (WHSR)
Naplan, Steven J. (MULTI)
Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Osterhaus, Sean C. (INTECON/INTERN)
Owens, Bernard M. Jr. (TNT/INTERN)
Paliokas, John J. (ADMIN)
Patten, Wendy L. (MULTI)
Payne, Raymond H. (WHSR/STP)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pierce, Eric A. (TNT)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Pittman, Howard D. (SEE)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Porter, Pete (RECORDS)
Porterfield, Patrick C. (WHSR)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Prise, Edith M. (RECORDS)
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L. (ASIA)
Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
Reyes, David (WHSR)
Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Robinson, Jack A. (TNT)
Rogers, Elizabeth B. (WHSR)
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Roundtree, Beverly (TNT)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Russ, Judith P. (SEE)
Salvetti, Lisa M. (RECORDS)
Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Sanborn, Daniel R. K. (Records)
Sapiro, Miriam E. (SEE)
Scharfen, Jonathan R. (LEGAL)

Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Shannon, Thomas A. (INTERAM)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Sibley, Matthew W. (WHSR)
Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)
Simons, James R. (STP)
Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)
Smith, Gayle E. (AF)
Smith, Holly M. (ASIA)
Smith, James A. (INTEL)
Smith, Michael P. (RECORDS)
Smith, Peter D. R. (MULTI)
Snowden, Deniz (INTERAM)
Snyder, Julie A. (STP)
Soubers, Richard R. (RECORDS)
Spence, Matthew J. (EUR/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Sutliff, Deana R. (WHSR)
Swarm, Amy L. (WHSR)
Tabak, Lauren B. (AF/INTERN)
Tarver, J. Sean (WHSR)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Telleen, Erik K. (TNT/INTERN)
Tierney, Mary T. (Theresa) (MULTI)
Tomlinson, Sandra A. (TNT/INTERN)
Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)
Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)
vonLipse, Roderick K. (SEE)
Wallace, Joanna B. (INTERAM)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)
Weber, Anthony D. (STP)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

Widmer, Edward L. (Ted) (SPCHW)
Wilcox, Richard M. (MULTI)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Williams, Robert S. (WHSR)
Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Yarmchuk, Christina H. (WHSR)
Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.,
Tuesday June 20. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

jun20gui2000.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

June 20, 2000

RUSSIA/NIS

Russia/Gusinskiy Arrest (updated)

Russia/Debt Rescheduling

EUROPE

Montenegro/Draskovic Shooting

Deal on Milosevic

Northern Ireland/McGuinness-JBS Meeting (new)

Greece/Entry into the EMU (SBTP/new)

INTERAMERICAN

Haiti

AFRICA

Ethiopia/Eritrea

ASIA

North-South Korea Summit

North Korea Sanctions (SBTP/new)

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

Morocco State Visit (new)

Iraq/No Fly Zones

Jerusalem Embassy Act (new/PD)

TRANSNATIONAL

Cuban Boy

Geneva Protocol (SBTP/new)

Legal Conference on Cyber Security (new)

LEGISLATION

Bill on International Criminal Court

DEFENSE

ABM Treaty

NMD/Various Points (new)

RUSSIA/GUSINSKIY ARREST

June 19, 2000

BACKGROUND: Vladimir Gusinskiy was formally charged with large scale fraud under Article 159 of the Russian Criminal Code, and on July 16 he was released from jail. Gusinskiy signed an agreement not to travel in exchange for his release. Russian President Putin said that Gusinskiy should be covered by the recent amnesty for people decorated by the state for their services. Putin also reiterated his view that the media boss should not have gone to jail, but said he

has no influence over the prosecution service.

Any comment on Gusinsky's release from prison?

- * Pleased that Mr. Gusinskiy has been released.

- * Know that legal proceedings getting underway tomorrow. Expect those proceedings will be closely scrutinized inside Russia and abroad. Important that Gusinsky - and all persons accused of criminal acts - be afforded due process, all protections and rights under Russian Constitution and law.

Is Gusinsky's arrest a harbinger of Russia creeping back to its totalitarian past?

- * Russian people have made great strides in overcoming worst excesses of the totalitarian past. Important to safeguard these gains and not permit any return to the tactics of intimidation.

Any comment on the formal charging of Gusinskiy with large scale fraud? Any comment on Putin's observation that Gusinskiy might be eligible for amnesty? Is the Kremlin trying to muzzle Russia's nascent free press?

- * Concerned about any steps to intimidate the press. Our Ambassador in Moscow has been in touch with senior Russian officials and Media-MOST representatives about Gusinskiy's arrest.

- * As President Clinton said Wednesday, people should not "be arrested solely because of what they say in exercising their role as members of the press. ... the United States has to take a very firm position on that."

- * President also pointed out that democracy is not "weakened by dissent even if it is unfair and sometimes even if it's false."

RUSSIA/DEBT RESCHEDULING

June 16, 2000

BACKGROUND: In 1999, the U.S. and other Paris Club creditors reached agreement to reschedule debt payments on Russia's Soviet-era debt coming due in 1999 and 2000. Each creditor committed to negotiating and signing a bilateral agreement with Russia to implement the terms of the Paris Club rescheduling. The bilateral agreement with Russia which the U.S. signed on May 26, 2000 implements the Paris Club rescheduling agreed to by all creditors in 1999. In letters to President Clinton and the Secretary, Senator Helms and Rep. Gilman have announced that they are placing a hold on our bilateral agreement with Russia to implement the terms of the 1999 Paris Club debt rescheduling. Unless these holds are lifted so the agreement can go into effect before July 1, 2000, Russia will have to make a \$155 million Lend-Lease payment that will, in effect, violate the terms of the 1999 Paris Club agreement, or lose its normal trade relations status (NTR).

Any comment on Senator Helms letter to Secretary Albright, and Rep. Gilman's piece in the Washington Post (6/16/00) objecting to a debt rescheduling agreement for Russia?

* The bilateral rescheduling agreement in question is not a new initiative. It is part of the implementation of the commitment by all Paris Club members in August 1999 to reschedule payments falling due in 1999 and 2000.

* In this connection, the U.S. has agreed to reschedule -- not forgive -- certain Russian debt payments in order to maximize prospects for repayment of the debts Russia owes us.

* For the record, note that these are Soviet-era Paris Club debts. Russia is servicing debts to the Paris Club incurred since the Russian Federation was formed.

DRASKOVIC SHOOTING IN MONTENEGRO

June 16, 2000

CONTEXT: This morning's Washington Post reports on the Thursday shooting of Serbian opposition leader Vuk Draskovic at his vacation home in Montenegro. Draskovic was reportedly slightly injured when unknown assailants shot into his apartment. According to the report, the wounds are not life threatening and he is recovering. This is the second apparent attempt on Draskovic's life; last year he narrowly escaped injury when his car was run off the road by another vehicle. It is also the second shooting of a prominent figure in Montenegro in the last few weeks. Last month, Goran Zugic, security advisor to Montenegrin President Djukanovic, was murdered by unknown assailants. The article does not accuse the Milosevic regime of responsibility, but notes that this attack follows a number of assassinations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the last few months.

What is your reaction to the attempted assassination of Serbian opposition leader Vuk Draskovic?

- * First of all we wish Mr. Draskovic a speedy recovery. We understand the wounds are not life threatening.
- * The shooting is indicative of the climate of violence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that Milosevic has fostered.
- * There have been a number of unexplained murders in Serbia over the last several months. In addition the Milosevic regime has launched a harsh crack down on the political opposition. Those who have spoken out against Milosevic have been arrested; students demanding democratic change have been beaten.
- * This latest incident should be thoroughly investigated to determine who was behind the attempted assassination, but it is clearly part and parcel of the climate of fear and violence Milosevic has created.

DEAL ON MILOSEVIC

June 19, 2000

CONTEXT: The New York Times reports this morning that the U.S. is exploring with some of its NATO allies and Russia the possibility that Milosevic be permitted to leave office with guarantees for his safety. The article acknowledges that the U.S. is not preparing any offer to Milosevic and will not make one, but speculates that the Administration would have to think hard about saying no to such a deal if one emerged. (FYI. State is adding in to their background section that it is natural there would be speculation of this kind as the signs multiply that the Milosevic regime is beginning to come to a close.)

Are you willing to entertain a solution that removes Milosevic from power without having him face trial in The Hague?

- * U.S. policy has not changed. Milosevic should be brought to justice in The Hague.

- * The news report itself makes clear that the U.S. is not preparing any deal.

Have you discussed this with other countries?

- * The U.S. has certainly discussed Milosevic and the situation in the FRY with its NATO allies and with Russia. These conversations, however, have focused on ways of bringing Milosevic to justice and democracy to Serbia.

- * Milosevic's rule has been disastrous for the Serbian people; GDP is half of what it was a decade ago, independent media is being curtailed, and the attack on opposition leader Draskovic last week is indicative of the climate of violence that Milosevic and his regime have fostered.

Would you rule it out if it were presented as a fait accompli?

- * We're not going to get into hypotheticals. We want to see Milosevic in The

Hague, not in the United States.

(if asked) Have other countries floated this idea past you?

* We have not seen any proposals along these lines from other countries.

NORTHERN IRELAND: McGUINNESS-STEINBERG MEETING
June 19, 2000

Core Points:

* McGuinness spent close to an hour updating Jim Steinberg on the peace process. Agreed on significance of normal politics now being underway in N. Ireland Assembly and Executive.

* McGuinness thanked the President for his 7 and 1/2 years of involvement on this issue and also for White House support

* McGuinness focused on Patten report implementation (police reform) -- U.S. posture is that we support the goal of a police service that is accepted by all sides of the community in Northern Ireland; we will monitor closely the progress of the British legislation making its way through Parliament this summer.

* Reviewed situation regarding marching season -- we urged all sides to try to work through their differences peacefully in order not to undermine recent political progress.

[If Pressed]

* No plans for Presidential travel to Ireland at this point

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Houston, Texas)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE June 19, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I congratulate Prime Minister Simitis and the Greek People on the decision today at the EU Summit in Portugal to bring Greece into the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), effective January 1, 2001. Reaching agreement to become a full member of the EMU a year before the Euro currency is introduced demonstrates Greece's remarkable economic progress in recent years. This economic success complements Greece's increasingly active political role within the EU.

Through determination and hard work, Greece succeeded in meeting all the Maastricht Treaty economic criteria. Entry into the EMU is not the end of the race, but the start of a challenging new phase of economic reform. We wish the Hellenic Republic every success as it moves ahead, and hope this will usher in a new era of increased trade and investment between our two nations.

30-30-30

HAITI
June 19, 2000

CONTEXT: On May 21 Haitians went to the polls in record numbers to cast ballots in local and legislative elections. The elections were largely peaceful. The post election period, however, has been marked with difficulties. The

Organization of American States (OAS) Observer Mission review of the tabulation process revealed a serious error in the counting method for the Senate vote. The method used by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) clearly favored a first round victory for former President Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party candidates. The Government of Haiti has so far refused to accept the OAS recommendation to recount the vote. Aristide also is unwilling to compromise and has declared the OAS recommendation an "electoral coup d'etat." The opposition parties are calling for an annulment and boycott of the second round.

On June 15 President Preval summoned the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and demanded its endorsement of the flawed May 21 elections results. CEP President Leon Manus refused to acquiesce and fearing for his safety sought refuge with the German Ambassador. On June 17 Manus and his wife transited through the Dominican Republic en route to the United States. He is currently in Boston where his daughter resides.

NSC Senior Director Arturo Valenzuela and Haiti Special Coordinator Don Steinberg are in Haiti. They will meet with President Preval, former President Aristide, and opposition party leaders to try to resolve the electoral crisis.

What can you tell us about the flight of election chief from Haiti over the weekend? Was his life in danger?

* It is our understanding that the President of Haiti's Electoral Council left Haiti on Saturday and is presently in the United States. I have no information about threats to his personal safety.

Does this mean that the elections are invalid?

* The Organization of American States observer mission's review of the election results revealed a serious error in the way the Senate vote was counted. The OAS is working with the GOH to rectify this error. It is our belief that once this problem is resolved then the elections as a whole will be validated.

[IF ASKED] Has the Administration sent a mission to Haiti to deal with the election crisis?

* NSC Senior Director Arturo Valenzuela and Haiti Special Coordinator Don Steinberg are in Haiti for high level meetings that will deal with the elections and other issues important to our bilateral relationship.

ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

June 15, 2000

BACKGROUND: The Ethiopian Prime Minister announced on Wednesday that, given formal approval by the Council of Ministers, Ethiopia officially accepts the OAU proposal for a cessation of hostilities, negotiated by the OAU in proximity talks with both parties earlier this month. Eritrea accepted the proposal on June 10. Special Envoy Tony Lake participated in the Algiers talks on behalf of the United States and at the request of the OAU, as did the EU Special Envoy. Algeria has informed us that the formal signing of the cessation agreement will be on Sunday morning, June 18. Lake will attend the signing, and the next round of negotiations, expected to begin immediately thereafter. The State Department is not/not issuing a new statement on the Ethiopian acceptance. We do plan to issue a POTUS statement timed to the actual signing.

In terms of further background, some important points to note:

The OAU has been leading the international effort to end this conflict for almost two years. The United States has been involved since the conflict began in May, 1998, and when A/S Rice led a shuttle diplomacy effort with Rwandan governments (the Ethiopians and Eritreans requested our joint involvement at the time).

For the last year, the OAU effort has been led by the Algerians (current Chair) and entailed the personal involvement of President Bouteflika as well as untiring efforts by the former Prime Minister and now Minister of Justice, Ahmed Ouyahia.

Tony Lake became involved at the request of the President in October 1998, and has since made at least 8 trips to the region and/or Algiers, including to engage in shuttle diplomacy. He was in Algiers for the round of talks leading to the cessation agreement, which ran for two weeks. He will now depart for Algiers to

attend the signing and in support of the next round of OAU-led negotiations on a comprehensive peace agreement.

The cessation agreement includes an end to hostilities, provisions for Ethiopian withdrawal, and the creation of a peacekeeping mission. The Algiers talks were led by the OAU, with the strong support of the United States and the involvement of the EU's Special Envoy (Italian Minister Serri), and were conducted by proximity between delegations led on both sides by the parties' foreign ministers.

The State Department issued a statement on June 10 welcoming Eritrea's acceptance of the OAU proposal for a cessation of hostilities agreement, expressing hope that Ethiopia would promptly accept, praising the Algerian role, and noting that given the stated commitments of both parties, the U.S. sees no justification for continued fighting. Fighting has continued, however, though we hope and expect that it will now cease.

Message: The acceptance by Eritrea and now Ethiopia of the OAU's proposal for a cessation of hostilities marks significant progress in a two year effort to peacefully resolve their conflict. This mutual acceptance is also an important step towards final resolution of the dispute. This important step means that the two parties have committed themselves to stopping the violence and killing, and that they can now get to work on resolving remaining issues peacefully and through political means.

Core Points:

- * Following a meeting of their Council of Ministers on Wednesday, Ethiopia has announced its formal acceptance of the OAU's proposal for a cessation of hostilities. With Eritrea already having accepted, this means that we have real progress in a two-year effort to resolve the conflict between these two countries.

- * This comes after two weeks of very intense negotiations in Algiers and there's more work ahead.

- * This breakthrough means that the two sides have committed themselves to stop the killing. The cessation agreement could pave the way for a final, peaceful settlement.
- * The OAU, and particularly the government of Algeria and its lead mediator, Minister Ahmed Ouyahia (WHOA-YHA-YHIA) deserve an enormous amount of credit for their persistent and dedicated efforts to end this tragic war.
- * The U.S. has been actively involved in efforts to end this conflict since May 1998 when, at the request of both governments, Assistant Secretary Rice led a shuttle diplomacy effort with a Rwandan team. We have strongly supported the OAU's involvement and each round of mediation. We have worked closely with Minister Ouyahia on an almost daily basis over the last 12 months.
- * Tony Lake was present in Algiers in support of the OAU proximity talks that led to the proposal for a cessation of hostilities, and will return to Algiers for the signing, and to support the next round of negotiations.
- * The OAU is aiming for the two parties to formally sign the cessation of hostilities agreement in Algiers this weekend, and then negotiations on the peace agreement will begin.
- * The next stage of negotiation will build on the areas of agreement reached over the past two years, including Eritrea's acceptance of the OAU's Technical Arrangements last July, and the understanding reached between Ouyahia and Lake with the Ethiopians in March. Differences remain, however, and will have to be negotiated during the next round.

Why has the fighting continued if the two sides now agree to cease hostilities?

- * The United States has made clear that we see no justification for continued fighting.

What does the agreement include?

- * The agreement includes provisions for the full cessation of hostilities, for Ethiopian withdrawal, and for a security zone and UN peacekeeping mission, and

provisions for demining.

What are the issues in the next phase of negotiations?

- * The most significant issues are a formal ceasefire and the formal delimitation and demarcation of their common border, mechanisms for arbitration of compensation claims, and an investigation into the origins of the conflict.
- * The next stage of negotiation will build on the areas of agreement reached over the past two years, including Eritrea's acceptance of the OAU's Technical Arrangements last July, and the understanding reached between Ouyahia and Lake with the Ethiopians in March. Differences remain, however, and will have to be negotiated during the next round.

Will the U.S. support a new peacekeeping mission as part of the agreement? How big will it be? Is it true that it includes a buffer zone?

- * The agreement does call for the creation of a security zone.
- * The particulars of a peacekeeping mission must be considered by the UN and the OAU.
- * The OAU's plans have always assumed the need for some sort of peacekeeping operation. The United States intends to consider ways we can help to consolidate and support implementation of the agreement between the two parties.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 18, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today in Algiers, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed an agreement to cease hostilities. This is a breakthrough which can, and should end the tragic conflict in the Horn of Africa. It can, and should permit these two countries to realize their potential in peace, instead of squandering it in war.

I commend the Organization of African Unity, and especially its chair Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, for leading the negotiation of this agreement. I am grateful to my envoy, former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, to Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice and to my senior advisor on African Affairs Gayle Smith for their tireless pursuit of a peaceful resolution to this conflict. The United States has supported the OAU in this effort and we will continue to do so. I have asked Tony Lake to return to Algiers to work with the OAU as we enter the next round of negotiations.

I hope this commitment by Ethiopia and Eritrea to stop the fighting also signals their commitment to build the peace. I urge them to use the next round of talks to produce a final, comprehensive, lasting agreement, so they can get on with the work of pursuing democracy and development for their people. Ethiopia and Eritrea are America's friends. If they are ready to take the next step, we and our partners in the international community will walk with them.

#

NORTH-SOUTH KOREA SUMMIT June 14, 2000

The presidents of North and South Korea met in Pyongyang for a second day of talks. What was the results of these talks? When does the President plan to finalize the lifting of sanctions that you announced last fall? Is his decision tied to a successful summit?

* We understand that President Kim Dae-jung and his counterpart General Kim

Chong-il met yesterday (June 14 Korea time) and spent more than 3 hours in talks. They have agreed in principle to a number of issues to pursue, but I would refer you to the South Korean Embassy for those details. We are very pleased with the conduct of the summit and congratulate both leaders for their bold decision to meet.

* Believe dialogue between the North and South is key to reducing tensions.

* On sanctions, as we mentioned last week in Tokyo, we have been working to change the regulations that will allow the sanctions easing measures we announced last September to become effective. The work is almost finished and the results will be announced shortly. The decision to ease sanctions was made last September and is not related to the North-South summit currently underway.

Are we satisfied that President Kim will satisfactorily address U.S. concerns about missile and nuclear issues? In light of the Summit, are we concerned that our engagement with North Korea will be put on the backburner?

* The President has complete confidence in President Kim and does not have any concerns on any of the issues of common concern we share with South Korea. What do we think of Putin going to North Korea?

* We welcome reports that Russian President Putin will visit North Korea. We all share the desire for a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula and are confident that President Putin's trip will contribute to that goal.

If pressed] Do we think he'll try to do something that will forestall the North Korean threat and thereby make NMD unnecessary?

* Can't speculate on any the specifics that might be addressed during President Putin's visit to North Korea.

Can you confirm that you will be easing sanctions on North Korea on June 19?

* The President announced his decision to ease some sanctions against the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea), administered under the Trading With the Enemy Act, Defense Production Act, and the Department of

Commerce's Export Administration Regulations in September last year.

- * He took that action in order to pursue improved overall relations with North Korea, support the Agreed Framework, and as a result of U.S.-North Korean discussions in Berlin September 7-12, 1999.

- * In Berlin, the North Koreans assured us that it will continue to refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind as both sides move toward more normal relations.

- * Since Berlin we have been working on an interagency basis to put the necessary regulatory changes in place. We are close to finishing that work and would expect that we will be able to implement the President's decision soon.

- * No comment on a specific date, that will depend on when we actually finish the necessary work. When it is finished it will be published in the Federal Register.

[If pressed for details on what the sanctions mean]

- * The easing of sanctions will allow most consumer goods to be available for export to North Korea and will allow the importation of most North Korean-origin goods into the United States. To support this easing of sanctions in the trade of goods, most personal and commercial funds transfers will be allowed between U.S. and North Korean persons. The relaxation of transportation restrictions will allow commercial air and sea transportation between the U.S. and North Korea for passengers and cargo, subject to normal regulatory requirements.

- * This easing of sanctions does not affect our counterterrorism or nonproliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibit exports of military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of U.S. assistance. Statutory restrictions, such as U.S. missile sanctions, will remain in place. Restrictions on North Korea based on multilateral arrangements also will remain in place, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Austin, Texas)

For Immediate Release June 19, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Since last September, when I announced the measures being implemented today to ease sanctions against North Korea, North Korea has maintained its moratorium on missile tests. These measures are supported by our close allies in the region and are part of the process of close coordination between the United States, Japan and North Korea recommended by former Secretary of Defense William Perry. We will continue to build on these efforts and on the recent North-South summit to achieve additional progress in addressing our common proliferation concerns.

30-30-30

MOROCCAN STATE VISIT June 19, 2000

Core Points:

- * King Mohammed VI's visit is an important opportunity for his Majesty and the President to discuss a range of bilateral, regional and international issues.

- * On the bilateral level, Morocco and the United States have been close friends from the beginning. In 1777, Morocco was the first country in the world to recognize the United States of America. In 1877, our two nations approved a treaty of peace and friendship which today remains the longest unbroken treaty of its kind in our history. Today, King Mohammed VI is engaged in a courageous effort to expand human rights and political freedoms, setting Morocco as a model for the region. The President will want to express his strong support for these

steps, including through concrete manifestations of assistance.

* On the regional level, our two nations have a strong interest in stability in North Africa. This means moving forward with better relations between the countries of the region and toward a fair solution to the Western Sahara conflict. The two leaders will exchange views on these issues.

* We also are entering a crucial moment in the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. It is the responsibility of the international community as a whole to lend its support to the difficult decisions both Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat will be called upon to make. Given Morocco's tradition of leadership on the peace process as set out by the late King Hassan, and given Morocco's enduring influence and prestige in the Moslem world, King Mohammed will have a central role to play in the weeks and months ahead.

IRAQ: NO FLY ZONES

June 16, 2000

Why does the U.S. maintain No-Fly Zones over northern and southern Iraq?

* Coalition aircraft enforce the No-Fly Zones to prevent the Iraqi regime from using air power against its civilian population - which they did with great brutality to crush popular resistance to the regime in the years after the Gulf War.

What is the legal basis for the No-Fly Zones?

* Coalition aircraft enforce the No-Fly Zones pursuant to UNSC Resolution 688 which demands that Iraq cease the repression of its people.

Are the No-Fly Zones serving any purpose?

* Yes. Before the NFZs were established Iraqi aircraft often attacked civilian targets. The NFZs now prevent them from doing so.

Why are you bombing in the No-Fly Zones?

- * Since Operation Desert Fox, Saddam has ordered his air defense forces to try to shoot down one of our planes enforcing the No-Fly Zones.

- * When Iraqi forces threaten our aircraft our pilots defend themselves.

- * These skirmishes could end tomorrow if Iraq stopped shooting at Coalition aircraft.

What about these stories of civilian casualties?

- * Coalition pilots enforcing the No-Fly Zones take extraordinary measures to avoid civilian casualties. Our pilots never initiate attacks - they only respond to Iraqi threats. Targets are carefully chosen so as to minimize the possibility of civilian casualties. Precision-guided munitions and other weapons specifically designed to minimize collateral damage are used to achieve the maximum possible accuracy once the targets are chosen.

- * On the other hand, the Iraqi regime goes to great lengths to cause civilian casualties. They position air defense equipment near civilian-inhabited areas and then fire at our aircraft to try to increase the probability of civilian casualties.

- * The Iraqis also exaggerate the civilian casualties caused by our responses, and often blame our responses for casualties caused by their own forces.

- * For example: On May 17, 2000 Iraqi officials accused Coalition aircraft of causing the civilian casualties near An Najaf (reported in the Post story). No Coalition aircraft expended any ordnance that day. Any casualties on that day could only have been caused by Iraqi fire.

- * On many other occasions when Iraq has asserted the existence of civilian casualties in populated areas, we were able to track precisely each dropped in response to Iraqi provocations and determine with certainty that all munitions hit valid military targets.

- * For example: On May 29, the Iraqis claim that civilian casualties were caused

by ordnance dropped by Coalition aircraft against targets near Bashiqah. We know that all munitions dropped in response to Iraqi threats on this day landed in the immediate vicinity of valid military targets. Any casualties on that day could only have been caused by Iraqi fire.

(If Presed)

* I would refer you to the Pentagon for additional details.

JERUSALEM EMBASSY ACT
June 19, 2000

Core Points:

- * Six-month renewal of waiver.
- * Should not prejudge issues that are related to final status negotiations.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Houston, Texas)

For Immediate Release June 19, 2000

June 16, 2000

Presidential Determination
No. _____ 2000-24 _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Suspension of Limitations Under the Jerusalem Embassy Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 7(a) of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-45) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that it is necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States to suspend for a period of 6 months the limitations set forth in sections 3(b) and 7(b) of the Act.

You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress, accompanied by a report in accordance with section 7(a) of the Act, and to publish the determination in the Federal Register.

This suspension shall take effect after transmission of this determination and report to the Congress.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

#

CUBAN BOY
June 15, 2000

CONTEXT: Yesterday, the Miami relatives of Elian Gonzalez announced their intention to ask the full 11th Circuit court of appeals to review the decision issued two weeks ago by a three-judge panel of that court. In that decision, the court ruled that the INS had acted within the bounds of its discretion in determining that Elian's father has sole legal authority to speak for his son in immigration matters. The petition for rehearing must be filed by today.

What's your reaction to the decision by Elian's Miami relatives to seek rehearing of the appeals court ruling by the full court?

* This is, of course, part of our legal process. What is most important is that Elian has been reunited with his father.

What do you make of their legal arguments in their petition?

* Justice will be reviewing the petition once it is filed. I would direct you to the Justice Department for more information.

Isn't it time for Elian and his family to go to home to Cuba?

* We are pleased that Elian has been reunited with his father and hopeful that the legal proceedings will be resolved soon.

When will injunction on Elian's family returning to Cuba be lifted?

* We refer you to the Justice Department on that issue.

GENEVA PROTOCOL

June 16, 2000

Who hasn't joined the Geneva Protocol or the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions? What is the Administration doing to deal with this problem?

* Today, some seventy-five years after it was first opened for signature, 145 countries are parties to the Geneva Protocol, which outlaws the use in war of chemical and biological weapons.

* The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention has 143 parties and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention has 135 parties. These agreements build upon the Geneva Protocol by extending the ban on use to include development, production and possession.

* We believe that it is in the national security interest of all countries to join these three agreements, which together create an absolute ban on all offensive chemical and biological weapons activities.

* Many countries of proliferation concern have joined these important nonproliferation agreements.

* We continue to urge all countries to do so, particularly those countries in regions such as the Middle East that are underrepresented in these agreements.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 17, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Seventy-five years ago today, June 17, 1925, the international community took a major step toward protecting the world from the dangers of weapons of mass destruction by concluding the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In the aftermath of the terrible casualties caused by poison gas in World War I, the Geneva Protocol banned the use in war of chemical and biological weapons.

More recently, the international community has worked to build on this achievement. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) banned the development, production and possession of biological and toxin weapons, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) did the same for chemical weapons. Today, 135 countries are parties to the CWC, and 143 are parties to the BWC. The United States has ratified both agreements, and our commitment to them has enjoyed strong bipartisan support.

Today, one of the greatest threats to American and global security is the danger that adversary nations or terrorist groups will obtain and use chemical or biological weapons. The international agreements we have reached banning these weapons are a critical component of our effort to protect against this threat.

In my 1998 State of the Union address, I called on the international community to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention with a new international inspection system to help detect and deter cheating. Significant progress has been made in Geneva at the Ad Hoc Group of BWC States Parties toward achieving this goal. We urge all participants in this process to work toward the earliest possible conclusion of a BWC Protocol that will further strengthen international security.

On this 75th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol, I call on the countries of the world who have not yet done so to join the Geneva Protocol, CWC and BWC. I call on all parties to strictly adhere to these agreements and to work to strengthen them. It is more urgent than ever that, true to the words of the Geneva Protocol, their prohibitions "shall be universally accepted.... binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations."

#

LEGAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER SECURITY June 19, 2000

BACKGROUND: On June 21 the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), in cooperation with The Virginia Bar Association, The College of William and Mary, and the Justice Department's National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) will host a legal conference to explore ways of enhancing Internet security and protecting US cyber systems.

The NSC helped to organize this event.

What is the purpose of this conference?

* The conference is intended to encourage all parts of the Virginia legal community - law schools, leading practitioners, judges, and legislators - to systematically begin addressing the legal issues raised by growing threats to information systems security, and the need for increased cyber-security.

* While there have been other legal discussions about cyber-security, this conference is the first intended to bring together all facets of the Virginia legal community to address these issues.

Why is the conference focused on Virginia?

* This conference is intended to be a pilot for other state legal communities to follow. Representatives from the ABA and other state legal associations will be attending. Other states have expressed interest in organizing similar events.

How does this relate to the President's cyber-security meeting earlier this year?

With the President's leadership in this topic, the Federal Government has been working to build a close partnership with the private sector and to create a national agenda for protecting critical information systems. In January the President released Version 1.0 of The National Plan for Information Systems Protection. This conference is one facet of that larger agenda, as was the President's February meeting with executives of leading Internet firms.

BILL ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

June 15, 2000

CONTEXT: A bill is expected to be introduced today in Congress that would bar all US cooperation with the ICC, including arrests, extradition, intelligence sharing and financial and technical assistance, unless the Senate ratifies the treaty that establishes the ICC. The bill would prohibit military aid to any country that has ratified the treaty, with exceptions only for NATO and a few key US allies. It would also require that the ICC grant immunity to US personnel in order for them to participate in any UN peacekeeping mission. The bill will be introduced by Helms and Warner in the Senate and by DeLay and Spence in the House. Ninety-seven countries have signed the treaty; 12 have ratified to date.

What is your comment on the GOP bill that would bar U.S. cooperation with the ICC unless the Senate ratifies the Treaty establishing the Court?

* The U.S. is actively pursuing the very objective that is of such concern to Members of Congress: We are seeking to ensure that personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces are not subject to surrender to the Court while the U.S. is a non-party to the Rome Treaty.

* A. U.S. delegation is currently pressing this objective at the UN Preparatory Commission negotiations in New York. These negotiations, the latest in a series convened on the ICC, last through June 30.

* We would be concerned about any legislation that could impose non-cooperation with the ICC, especially if the Preparatory Commission adopts provisions that address our fundamental concerns about the Treaty, which our delegation to the Commission is actively striving to achieve.

* Provided we reach agreement on the non-surrender of U.S. military personnel while the U.S. is not a party to the Treaty, we envision that there will be circumstances in our national interest where we would want to seize the opportunity to lend appropriate support to the International Criminal Court.

What is the substance of the U.S. proposal regarding the ICC?

* The U.S. proposal for the ICC would allow the Court to request the surrender of a non-party national acting under the overall direction of his state and whose action is acknowledged by such state, only if the non-party state consents to such surrender or under certain other conditions.

* Our proposal does not amend the Treaty. Our proposal would be part of an international agreement between the United Nations and the Court that is required by the Rome Treaty. It pertains only to procedures of the Court.

What does the international community gain if the U.S. proposal is accepted?

* If our proposal is adopted, and if a bill such as the one being introduced in Congress today does not pass, we would be able to become a "good neighbor" to the Court. That means a lot of the support we provide to the existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals could be made available to the ICC, even though the U.S. would not be a party to the Treaty. That support will be critical if

the ICC is to be an effective court.

* (If asked:) Such support could include enforcement (including apprehension of suspects), information-sharing, witness relocation, expert personnel, voluntary financial contributions, and diplomatic support.

ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION

June 15, 2000

CONTEXT: The NYT is reporting that Administration lawyers have advised President Clinton that he could begin work on an ABM radar in Alaska without violating the ABM Treaty.

BACKGROUND ONLY: Administration lawyers have advised senior policy makers that a continuum of options are legally available, but policymakers, including the President, have not made a "determination" regarding which option to adopt.

Core points

* We have not made a determination as to when work on an ABM radar in Alaska would violate the ABM Treaty. We do not need to confront this issue at this time.

* The Treaty itself does not provide a definition of what constitutes "breach," so it is prudent for us to examine what the possible interpretations might be.

* There are a range of interpretations available; but no decision has been made.

Did the White House request a legal review on NMD implications for ABM treaty?

* Everyone who is working on this issue agrees this analysis is necessary to inform a decision on NMD deployment; and we have been looking at this for some time.

* Indeed, we are looking at all of the relevant factors within the four criteria we have outlined -- technical feasibility, cost, the threat, and national security, including the implications for arms control and various treaties.

When, exactly, would the U.S. cross the ABM Treaty line with construction activity on its ABM?

* We are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

Was the question of when the U.S. might cross the Treaty line discussed with Russia at the summit? What was their reaction?

* We have had preliminary discussions on this issue; however, I would not suggest to you they had a reaction on this point, as we have not made any determinations, or informed Russia of any conclusions.

Isn't it a moot point what our legal interpretation is if the Russians reject it? Wouldn't Russia's rejection mean the U.S. would be in breach of the Treaty?

* Underscore again we have not made any determinations, or informed Russia of any conclusions.

* Our focus is to continue to work with Russia to adapt the ABM Treaty to allow for the deployment of a limited NMD.

* Not going to speculate on "what ifs."

Has the President been briefed on this analysis by the lawyers?

* Not going to comment on who has been briefed; as I said, we are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

If the President decides to go forward with NMD construction later this year, won't he have to notify U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty?

* We are examining what options would be available to the President, should this question arise. We have not made any determination on this point.

NMD: VARIOUS POINTS

June 19, 2000

Core Points:

* Emerging threat. Prudent to explore appropriate response

* Can and if possible should be done consistent with adapted ABM treaty. Treaty provides for adjustments

* Working with Russians who acknowledge threat but disagree over response.

* Decision later this year whether to move forward next spring

* Four criteria (threat, cost, technology, overall security including arms control)

* Prepared to share appropriate technology with Allies and Russia

* Welch Report

* Valuable contribution which provides independent assessment

* Key findings

* Important progress in the last year

* The program is technically feasible to meet the Phase I requirement (up to a dozen or two warheads with simple decoys), but further attention is needed to the

problem of discriminating decoys from real warheads for Phase II.

- * Meeting the schedule remains high risk, but Welch does not recommend changing the schedule at this point

- * Perry, Shali, etc/Boost phase:

- * Open-minded about boost phase approach-but technically not available by 2005 when threat projected to emerge

- * Could be valuable supplement to our architecture; prepared to discuss with Russians and others; our negotiations with Russians to permit our Phase 1 would not preclude further agreed amendments to accommodate this approach.

- * Reinterpretation of ABM Breach

- * No decision yet on deployment

- * Treaty does not define what constitutes breach/range of interpretations possible

- * Only prudent that lawyers review possible interpretations

- * Legal consideration/treaty interpretation one of many factors that President will take into account (feasibility, cost, threat, overall security including arms control

- * Hill arguments in favor of postponing decision and deferring negotiations with Russians

- * Have been pursuing NMD development program for a number of years

- * President's responsibility is to do what he believes is necessary and appropriate for our security

- * Will consult closely with Congress, but ultimately President must decide what is appropriate

- * No decision yet

- * Korean Summit/undercuts need/urgency for NMD

- * Welcome summit - important and historic; hope it leads to real reduction of

tensions on Korean Peninsula

- * Appreciate KDJ raising nuclear and missile issue, important to reducing regional tensions
- * Too early to say what changes summit will bring in terms of DPRK behavior; will watch closely
- * Missile testing moratorium also an important step; that's why we lifted some sanctions; but some aspects of program continue
- * Hope that missile talks will lead to real end to DPRK missile program (indigenous and exports)

* Postol/Decoys

- * Pentagon reviewing allegations, but appears that at least some of the charges based on incomplete understanding of test program
- * Program accepts need to discriminate decoys (although this is more a factor for Phase II than Phase I)
- * Welch panel noted important progress and accepted basic approach, while cautioning that schedule should reflect actual technical progress, not artificial deadlines, and urged further attention to the problem of decoys.

29

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Don Cheramie to Douglas Bayley. Subject: Berger-Ivanov (20 Jun 00). (3 pages)	06/20/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/19/2000-06/20/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5677

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Amy Swarm to Douglas Bayley. Subject: Berger/Ivanov Notes. (4 pages)	06/20/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/19/2000-06/20/2000]

2006-1363-F

vz5677

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Dianne Grissom to Douglas Bayley. Subject: Berger-Ivanov Notes. (3 pages)	06/20/2000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/19/2000-06/20/2000]

2006-1363-F
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/20/2000 7:07:22 PM

FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO

Akers, Dale W. (STP)
Almon, Timothy C. (INTEL)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
Banbury, Anthony N. (MULTI)
Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Bartsch, Bryan W. (STP)
Bash, Brooks L. (EXSEC)
Battenfield, Pat A. (AF)
Baum, Russell A. (ADMIN)
Bayley, Douglas C. (WHSR)
Bellamy, Ralph C. (RECORDS)
Bernard, Kenneth W. (HEALTH)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Blackburn, John (WHSR)
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Bolinski, Charlene C. (RECORDS)
Bolton, Edward L. Jr. (DEFENSE)
Bowles, Ian A. (ENV)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Bresnahan, Gary E. (WHSR/STP)
Broadwick, Bonnie . (WHSR)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Bruns, Judson L. (Jay) (INTECON)

Bryan, Dave L. (STP)
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Byrne, Catherine E. (AF)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Carteret, Charles L. (STP)
Carty, John J. (STP)
Cheramie, Don E. (WHSR)
Clark, Bronya (ADMIN)
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
Cooper, Colby J. (ADMIN)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Crawford, Bernard T. (RECORDS)
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Crowder, Stevan D. (WHSR/STP)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Dames, Victoria J. (RECORDS)
Dempsey, Nora B. (AF)
Depaepe, Michael B. (STP)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Dimel, Marsha L. (ADMIN)
Duncan, John D. (INTECON/DOS)
Dupuy, Shawn L. (STP)
Edwards, Joan K. (NONPRO)
Ehrendreich, Joel (WHSR)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Erdahl, Douglas M. (WHSR)
Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)
Ficklin, John W. (RECORDS)
Figueredo, Orlando (STP)
Fishel, Eugene (Gene) M. (RUE)
Fuchs, Joachim D. (WHSR)
Gentile, Donald J. (WHSR)
George, Christopher L. (RECORDS)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)

Goldberg, David B. (RECORDS/INTECON)
Good, Travis C. (RECORDS)
Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. (TNT)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Green, Charles A. (TNT)
Grissom, Dianne L. (WHSR)
Hale, John E. (STP)
Halperin, David E.
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hargis, Robert C. (WHSR)
Harris, Elisa D. (NONPRO)
Harris, Grant T. (AF)
Heyer, Scott C. (WHSR)
Hill, Christopher R. (SEE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Hillman, Thomas W. (STP)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Hollis, Caryn C. (INTERAM)
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Howerton, Barbara E. (INTEL)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Hunker, Jeffrey A. (TNT)
Hurwitz, Marc I. (ADMIN)
Huso, Ravic R. (ASIA)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Jarosinski, Frank J. (WHSR)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Jordan, Kristine A. (STP)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Joshlyn, Gay L. (ADMIN)
Kale, Dora A. (NSA)
Kalka, Jean-Francois (JF) (STP)
Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR)
Keenan, Josefine (Chris) (HEALTH)
Keith, James R. (ASIA)
Keller, John P. (RECORDS)

Knepper, Charlotte (INTEL)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Kurtz, Paul B. (TNT)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Langley, Janice M. (INTEL)
Laskowski, Gregory J. (WHSR)
Leary, William H. (RECORDS)
Lee, Sang Won (RECORDS)
Liberatore, Joseph W. (TNT/INTERN)
Lieberson, Donna P. (TNT)
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (ASIA)
Locke, Dwayne L. (STP)
Lowden, Michael R. (STP)
Lystra, Clark R. (WHSR)
Maertens, Thomas R. (NONPRO)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)
Marsh, Thomas S (RECORDS)
Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN)
Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Maxfield, Nancy H. (EUR)
McAden, James G. (ASIA/INTERN)
McCarthy, Mary O. (INTEL)
McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)
McIntyre, Stuart H. (RECORDS)
Mclean, Matthew K. (MULTI)
Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Merchant, Brian T. (RECORDS/INTEL)
Merletti, Roger D. (INTERAM)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Mitchell, Donald A. (INTEL)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Mitsler, Elaine M. (INTECON)
Miyaoka, Lester H. (STP)
Montgomery, Mark C. (TNT)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)

Muir, Morgan C. (SEE)
Munter, Cameron P. (EUR)
Mynatt, Lee (Brad) B. (WHSR)
Naplan, Steven J. (MULTI)
Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Osterhaus, Sean C. (INTECON/INTERN)
Owens, Bernard M. Jr. (TNT/INTERN)
Paliokas, John J. (ADMIN)
Patten, Wendy L. (MULTI)
Payne, Raymond H. (WHSR/STP)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pierce, Eric A. (TNT)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Pittman, Howard D. (SEE)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Porter, Pete (RECORDS)
Porterfield, Patrick C. (WHSR)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Prise, Edith M. (RECORDS)
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L. (ASIA)
Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
Reyes, David (WHSR)
Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Robinson, Jack A. (TNT)
Rogers, Elizabeth B. (WHSR)
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
Rosshirt, Thomas M. (SPCHW)
Roundtree, Beverly (TNT)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Russ, Judith P. (SEE)
Salvetti, Lisa M. (RECORDS)
Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Sanborn, Daniel R. K. (Records)
Sapiro, Miriam E. (SEE)
Scharfen, Jonathan R. (LEGAL)

Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Shannon, Thomas A. (INTERAM)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Siberell, Justin H. (NSA)
Sibley, Matthew W. (WHSR)
Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)
Simons, James R. (STP)
Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)
Smith, Gayle E. (AF)
Smith, Holly M. (ASIA)
Smith, James A. (INTEL)
Smith, Michael P. (RECORDS)
Smith, Peter D. R. (MULTI)
Snowden, Deniz (INTERAM)
Snyder, Julie A. (STP)
Soubers, Richard R. (RECORDS)
Spence, Matthew J. (EUR/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Sutliff, Deana R. (WHSR)
Swarm, Amy L. (WHSR)
Tabak, Lauren B. (AF/INTERN)
Tarver, J. Sean (WHSR)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Telleen, Erik K. (TNT/INTERN)
Tierney, Mary T. (Theresa) (MULTI)
Tomlinson, Sandra A. (TNT/INTERN)
Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)
Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)
vonLipsey, Roderick K. (SEE)
Wallace, Joanna B. (INTERAM)
Walldorff, Rebecca L. (LEGIS)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)
Weber, Anthony D. (STP)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

Widmer, Edward L. (Ted) (SPCHW)
Wilcox, Richard M. (MULTI)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Williams, Robert S. (WHSR)
Witkowski, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Wolosky, Lee S. (TNT)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Yarmchuk, Christina H. (WHSR)
Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)

CARBON_COPY

Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Beardsley, Tyler S. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H. (VP)
Fuerth, Leon S. (VP)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Roberts, Michael W. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Woolston, Ann E. (VP)
Efros, Laura L. (OSTP)
Epstein, Gerald L. (OSTP)
Hane, Gerald J. (OSTP)
Pina, Ricardo (OSTP)
Rinaldi, Steven M. (OSTP)
Teplitz, Vigdor L. (OSTP)
Ward, JoAnn (OSTP)

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.

Wednesday, June 21. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

jun21gui2000.doc

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

June 21, 2000

RUSSIA/NIS

Russia/Gusinskiy Arrest

Russia/Debt Rescheduling

Russia/Money Laundering

EUROPE

Deal on Milosevic

SBTP on EU Summit at Feira (new)

INTERAMERICAN

Haiti

Cuban Migration Talks

ASIA

North Korea Sanctions

Taiwan/President Chen's Statements

SBTPS Meeting with the Dalai Lama (new)

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

Morocco State Visit

Jerusalem Embassy Act

Lebanon

Syria

TRANSNATIONAL

Legal Conference on Cyber Security

LEGISLATION

Bill on International Criminal Court

NONPROLIFERATION

US Support for Russian BW Scientists (new)

DEFENSE

NMD/Various Points

RUSSIA/GUSINSKIY ARREST

June 19, 2000

BACKGROUND: Vladimir Gusinskiy was formally charged with large scale fraud under Article 159 of the Russian Criminal Code, and on July 16 he was released from jail. Gusinskiy signed an agreement not to travel in exchange for his release. Russian President Putin said that Gusinskiy should be covered by the recent amnesty for people decorated by the state for their services. Putin also reiterated his view that the media boss should not have gone to jail, but said he has no influence over the prosecution service.

Any comment on Gusinsky's release from prison?

- * Pleased that Mr. Gusinskiy has been released.

- * Know that legal proceedings getting underway tomorrow. Expect those proceedings will be closely scrutinized inside Russia and abroad. Important that Gusinsky - and all persons accused of criminal acts - be afforded due process, all protections and rights under Russian Constitution and law.

Is Gusinsky's arrest a harbinger of Russia creeping back to its totalitarian past?

- * Russian people have made great strides in overcoming worst excesses of the totalitarian past. Important to safeguard these gains and not permit any return to the tactics of intimidation.

Any comment on the formal charging of Gusinskiy with large scale fraud? Any comment on Putin's observation that Gusinskiy might be eligible for amnesty? Is the Kremlin trying to muzzle Russia's nascent free press?

- * Concerned about any steps to intimidate the press. Our Ambassador in Moscow

has been in touch with senior Russian officials and Media-MOST representatives about Gusinskiy's arrest.

* As President Clinton said Wednesday, people should not "be arrested solely because of what they say in exercising their role as members of the press. ... the United States has to take a very firm position on that."

* President also pointed out that democracy is not "weakened by dissent even if it is unfair and sometimes even if it's false."

RUSSIA/DEBT RESCHEDULING

June 16, 2000

BACKGROUND: In 1999, the U.S. and other Paris Club creditors reached agreement to reschedule debt payments on Russia's Soviet-era debt coming due in 1999 and 2000. Each creditor committed to negotiating and signing a bilateral agreement with Russia to implement the terms of the Paris Club rescheduling. The bilateral agreement with Russia which the U.S. signed on May 26, 2000 implements the Paris Club rescheduling agreed to by all creditors in 1999. In letters to President Clinton and the Secretary, Senator Helms and Rep. Gilman have announced that they are placing a hold on our bilateral agreement with Russia to implement the terms of the 1999 Paris Club debt rescheduling. Unless these holds are lifted so the agreement can go into effect before July 1, 2000, Russia will have to make a \$155 million Lend-Lease payment that will, in effect, violate the terms of the 1999 Paris Club agreement, or lose its normal trade relations status (NTR).

Any comment on Senator Helms letter to Secretary Albright, and Rep. Gilman's piece in the Washington Post (06/16/2000) objecting to a debt rescheduling agreement for Russia?

* The bilateral rescheduling agreement in question is not a new initiative. It

is part of the implementation of the commitment by all Paris Club members in August 1999 to reschedule payments falling due in 1999 and 2000.

* In this connection, the U.S. has agreed to reschedule -- not forgive -- certain Russian debt payments in order to maximize prospects for repayment of the debts Russia owes us.

* For the record, note that these are Soviet-era Paris Club debts. Russia is servicing debts to the Paris Club incurred since the Russian Federation was formed.

RUSSIA: MONEY LAUNDERING

June 20, 2000

BACKGROUND: USAToday (6/20), citing unnamed US official, reports that the Russians are not cooperating with the federal probe into large-scale money laundering at the Bank of New York and that the investigation is "stymied". The newspaper further reports that the Russian government is refusing to hand over to US and Swiss investigators documents that detail possible money laundering by Kremlin officials.

Comment on the USAToday article?

* Don't comment on specifics of ongoing investigations

* Understand that some assistance has been rendered; refer you to DOJ

* Are looking at ways to better facilitate and improve law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Russia.

* Have repeatedly raised, at high levels, concerns regarding money laundering and corruption, and have asked Russian government to take appropriate steps

DEAL ON MILOSEVIC

June 19, 2000

CONTEXT: The New York Times reports this morning that the U.S. is exploring with some of its NATO allies and Russia the possibility that Milosevic be permitted to leave office with guarantees for his safety. The article acknowledges that the U.S. is not preparing any offer to Milosevic and will not make one, but speculates that the Administration would have to think hard about saying no to such a deal if one emerged. (FYI. State is adding in to their background section that it is natural there would be speculation of this kind as the signs multiply that the Milosevic regime is beginning to come to a close.)

Are you willing to entertain a solution that removes Milosevic from power without having him face trial in The Hague?

* U.S. policy has not changed. Milosevic should be brought to justice in The Hague.

* The news report itself makes clear that the U.S. is not preparing any deal.

Have you discussed this with other countries?

* The U.S. has certainly discussed Milosevic and the situation in the FRY with its NATO allies and with Russia. These conversations, however, have focused on ways of bringing Milosevic to justice and democracy to Serbia.

* Milosevic's rule has been disastrous for the Serbian people; GDP is half of what it was a decade ago, independent media is being curtailed, and the attack on opposition leader Draskovic last week is indicative of the climate of violence that Milosevic and his regime have fostered.

Would you rule it out if it were presented as a fait accompli?

* We're not going to get into hypotheticals. We want to see Milosevic in The Hague, not in the United States.

(if asked) Have other countries floated this idea past you?

* We have not seen any proposals along these lines from other countries.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 20, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I welcome the progress the European Union made at the Feira Summit to develop a common European security and defense policy. It will strengthen Europe's ability - and responsibility - to act in times of crisis. It will improve cooperation between the European Union and NATO. It will advance European unity while maintaining the vitality of the transatlantic alliance. I look forward to early implementation of the agreed steps, including the establishment of NATO-EU working groups and regular meetings with non-EU Allies.

I also welcome the EU's commitment to create a standing roster of police officers who can be deployed to support peacekeeping missions. As we have seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, there is a critical need for international civilian police who can fill the gap between local police and military peacekeepers in countries emerging from conflict. We will continue to work with Europe to ensure such forces can deploy rapidly when they are needed.

30-30-30

HAITI

June 19, 2000

CONTEXT: On May 21 Haitians went to the polls in record numbers to cast ballots in local and legislative elections. The elections were largely peaceful. The post election period, however, has been marked with difficulties. The Organization of American States (OAS) Observer Mission review of the tabulation process revealed a serious error in the counting method for the Senate vote. The method used by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) clearly favored a first round victory for former President Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party candidates. The Government of Haiti has so far refused to accept the OAS recommendation to recount the vote. Aristide also is unwilling to compromise and has declared the OAS recommendation an "electoral coup d'etat." The opposition parties are calling for an annulment and boycott of the second round.

On June 15 President Preval summoned the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and demanded its endorsement of the flawed May 21 elections results. CEP President Leon Manus refused to acquiesce and fearing for his safety sought refuge with the German Ambassador. On June 17 Manus and his wife transited through the Dominican Republic en route to the United States. He is currently in Boston where his daughter resides.

NSC Senior Director Arturo Valenzuela and Haiti Special Coordinator Don Steinberg are in Haiti. They will meet with President Preval, former President Aristide, and opposition party leaders to try to resolve the electoral crisis.

What can you tell us about the flight of election chief from Haiti over the weekend? Was his life in danger?

* It is our understanding that the President of Haiti's Electoral Council left Haiti on Saturday and is presently in the United States. I have no information about threats to his personal safety.

Does this mean that the elections are invalid?

* The Organization of American States observer mission's review of the election

results revealed a serious error in the way the Senate vote was counted. The OAS is working with the GOH to rectify this error. It is our belief that once this problem is resolved then the elections as a whole will be validated.

[IF ASKED] Has the Administration sent a mission to Haiti to deal with the election crisis?

* NSC Senior Director Arturo Valenzuela and Haiti Special Coordinator Don Steinberg are in Haiti for high level meetings that will deal with the elections and other issues important to our bilateral relationship.

DRAFT
CUBAN MIGRATION TALKS
June 20, 2000

CONTEXT: The Cuban government informed the USG late last week that it wishes to postpone the upcoming round of biannual migration talks with the US, scheduled for June 27 in New York. The talks are held twice a year under the migration accords signed in 1994 and 1995 by the US and Cuba as part of a bilateral effort to curb illegal migration from Cuba and to promote safe, orderly, and legal migration.

Has the Government of Cuba canceled the upcoming round of biannual migration talks with the US?

* Late last week, the Cuban government informed us that they are postponing the upcoming round of migration talks scheduled for June 27. They cited their preoccupation with the return of Elian Gonzalez as the primary reason for the postponement.

* We were fully prepared to proceed with the talks as scheduled, and will press the Government of Cuba to provide us with another date for the talks.

* Cuban Interests Section officials reaffirmed their commitment to continued implementation of the migration accords, which are designed to facilitate safe,

legal, and orderly migration from Cuba. The U.S. will continue to vigorously enforce U.S. laws on illegal migration and uphold the migration accords.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Austin, Texas)

For Immediate Release June 19, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Since last September, when I announced the measures being implemented today to ease sanctions against North Korea, North Korea has maintained its moratorium on missile tests. These measures are supported by our close allies in the region and are part of the process of close coordination between the United States, Japan and South Korea recommended by former Secretary of Defense William Perry. We will continue to build on these efforts and on the recent North-South summit to achieve additional progress in addressing our common proliferation concerns.

30-30-30

TAIWAIN: PRESIDENT CHEN'S STATEMENTS

June 20, 2000

Does the Administration have a position on Taiwan President Chen's statements at his June 20 press conference?

* Continue to stand for exclusively peaceful resolution of differences between Taiwan and PRC and continue to urge both sides to resume cross-Straits dialogue without delay.

What is the U.S. position on Taiwan President Chen's invitation for PRC President Jiang to meet with him, just as North/South Korea leaders have met?

* Up to Taiwan and PRC to work out best means of resuming cross-Straits dialogue. Most important that both sides resume dialogue without delay.

Any response to Chen's suggestion that the U.S. play a more active role in cross-Straits issues?

* United States has a strong interest in resumption of cross-Straits dialogue to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.

* We are trying to facilitate an environment that will be conducive to productive dialogue.

* Up to Taiwan and PRC to take tangible steps toward resumption of dialogue.

Are you willing to mediate?

* We are not seeking to mediate. Our view is that the parties should engage in dialogue directly with each other.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 20, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

MEETING WITH THE DALAI LAMA

His Holiness, the XIV Dalai Lama, met at the White House this afternoon with the President and the National Security Advisor to discuss Tibet. The President welcomed the Dalai Lama's commitment to nonviolence and declared his strong support for the Dalai Lama's steadfast efforts to initiate a dialogue with the Chinese government. The President pledged his continued support for the Dalai Lama's effort to encourage dialogue and expressed his hope that the Chinese government will respond favorably. The President reiterated the strong commitment of the United States to support preservation of Tibet's unique religious, cultural, and linguistic heritage and to the protection of human rights of Tibetans. The President and the Dalai Lama agreed on the importance of strong and constructive U.S.-China relations.

MOROCCAN STATE VISIT

June 19, 2000

Core Points:

- * King Mohammed VI's visit is an important opportunity for his Majesty and the President to discuss a range of bilateral, regional and international issues.
- * On the bilateral level, Morocco and the United States have been close friends from the beginning. In 1777, Morocco was the first country in the world to recognize the United States of America. In 1877, our two nations approved a treaty of peace and friendship which today remains the longest unbroken treaty of its kind in our history. Today, King Mohammed VI is engaged in a courageous effort to expand human rights and political freedoms, setting Morocco as a model for the region. The President will want to express his strong support for these steps, including through concrete manifestations of assistance.
- * On the regional level, our two nations have a strong interest in stability in North Africa. This means moving forward with better relations between the countries of the region and toward a fair solution to the Western Sahara conflict. The two leaders will exchange views on these issues.

* We also are entering a crucial moment in the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. It is the responsibility of the international community as a whole to lend its support to the difficult decisions both Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat will be called upon to make. Given Morocco's tradition of leadership on the peace process as set out by the late King Hassan, and given Morocco's enduring influence and prestige in the Moslem world, King Mohammed will have a central role to play in the weeks and months ahead.

JERUSALEM EMBASSY ACT

June 19, 2000

Core Points:

- * Six-month renewal of waiver.
- * Should not prejudice issues that are related to final status negotiations.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Houston, Texas)

For Immediate Release June 19, 2000

June 16, 2000

Presidential Determination

No. _____ 2000-24 _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Suspension of Limitations Under the Jerusalem Embassy Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 7(a) of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-45) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that it is necessary to protect the national security interests of the United States to suspend for a period of 6 months the limitations set forth in sections 3(b) and 7(b) of the Act.

You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this determination to the Congress, accompanied by a report in accordance with section 7(a) of the Act, and to publish the determination in the Federal Register.

This suspension shall take effect after transmission of this determination and report to the Congress.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

#

LEBANON: UN VERIFICATION AND LEBANESE REJECTION
June 20, 2000

What is the status of the UN's verification of the Israeli withdrawal? Are the Lebanese still rejecting the UN's withdrawal line?

* Israel has withdrawn from Lebanon, and the UN Secretary General has confirmed the withdrawal in accordance with UNSCR 425. On Sunday, the Security Council endorsed Secretary General Annan's report confirming the withdrawal.

* Kofi Annan is now in the region. He has made clear to all parties that the identification of a withdrawal line was the sole responsibility of the United Nations pursuant to Security Council Resolution 425 and that both sides must respect the line as identified.

* The Secretary General has also made clear that any claims of violations of the UN line should be reported to the United Nations and that UNIFIL will have the

responsibility for investigating these claims.

Comment on Lebanese President Lahoud's statement that Israeli forces must cease their violations of the Lebanese border before UNIFIL can move in. Are the Israelis holding up the process?

- * As I said, the UN has confirmed that Israel has withdrawn from Lebanon.

- * We expect both sides to honor the withdrawal line as determined by the United Nations and endorsed by the Security Council.

- * It is up to the United Nations and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to determine if there are any violations of the UN line. UNIFIL must deploy to the south in order to carry out its responsibilities under UN Security Council Resolution 425.

- * It is essential that all sides cooperate to facilitate investigation of claims of violations.

SYRIA

June 20, 2000

Comment on the appointment of Bashar al-Asad as head of the ruling Ba'ath Party. What happens next?

- * Bashar Al-Asad's selection as General Secretary of the Ba'ath Party is an internal Syrian matter.

- * Preparations are underway to select a new Syrian President and we want to wait to see what the process and the Syrian people decide. The process seems to be proceeding in a peaceful and orderly way.

LEGAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER SECURITY

June 19, 2000

BACKGROUND: On June 21 the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), in cooperation with The Virginia Bar Association, The College of William and Mary, and the Justice Department's National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) will host a legal conference to explore ways of enhancing Internet security and protecting US cyber systems.

The NSC helped to organize this event.

What is the purpose of this conference?

- * The conference is intended to encourage all parts of the Virginia legal community - law schools, leading practitioners, judges, and legislators - to systematically begin addressing the legal issues raised by growing threats to information systems security, and the need for increased cyber-security.

- * While there have been other legal discussions about cyber-security, this conference is the first intended to bring together all facets of the Virginia legal community to address these issues.

Why is the conference focused on Virginia?

- * This conference is intended to be a pilot for other state legal communities to follow. Representatives from the ABA and other state legal associations will be attending. Other states have expressed interest in organizing similar events.

How does this relate to the President's cyber-security meeting earlier this year?

- * With the President's leadership in this topic, the Federal Government has been working to build a close partnership with the private sector and to create a national agenda for protecting critical information systems. In January the

President released Version 1.0 of The National Plan for Information Systems Protection. This conference is one facet of that larger agenda, as was the President's February meeting with executives of leading Internet firms.
BILL ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
June 15, 2000

CONTEXT: A bill is expected to be introduced today in Congress that would bar all US cooperation with the ICC, including arrests, extradition, intelligence sharing and financial and technical assistance, unless the Senate ratifies the treaty that establishes the ICC. The bill would prohibit military aid to any country that has ratified the treaty, with exceptions only for NATO and a few key US allies. It would also require that the ICC grant immunity to US personnel in order for them to participate in any UN peacekeeping mission. The bill will be introduced by Helms and Warner in the Senate and by DeLay and Spence in the House. Ninety-seven countries have signed the treaty; 12 have ratified to date.

What is your comment on the GOP bill that would bar U.S. cooperation with the ICC unless the Senate ratifies the Treaty establishing the Court?

* The U.S. is actively pursuing the very objective that is of such concern to Members of Congress: We are seeking to ensure that personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces are not subject to surrender to the Court while the U.S. is a non-party to the Rome Treaty.

* A. U.S. delegation is currently pressing this objective at the UN Preparatory Commission negotiations in New York. These negotiations, the latest in a series convened on the ICC, last through June 30.

* We would be concerned about any legislation that could impose non-cooperation with the ICC, especially if the Preparatory Commission adopts provisions that address our fundamental concerns about the Treaty, which our delegation to the Commission is actively striving to achieve.

* Provided we reach agreement on the non-surrender of U.S. military personnel

while the U.S. is not a party to the Treaty, we envision that there will be circumstances in our national interest where we would want to seize the opportunity to lend appropriate support to the International Criminal Court.

What is the substance of the U.S. proposal regarding the ICC?

* The U.S. proposal for the ICC would allow the Court to request the surrender of a non-party national acting under the overall direction of his state and whose action is acknowledged by such state, only if the non-party state consents to such surrender or under certain other conditions.

* Our proposal does not amend the Treaty. Our proposal would be part of an international agreement between the United Nations and the Court that is required by the Rome Treaty. It pertains only to procedures of the Court.

What does the international community gain if the U.S. proposal is accepted?

* If our proposal is adopted, and if a bill such as the one being introduced in Congress today does not pass, we would be able to become a "good neighbor" to the Court. That means a lot of the support we provide to the existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals could be made available to the ICC, even though the U.S. would not be a party to the Treaty. That support will be critical if the ICC is to be an effective court.

* (If asked:) Such support could include enforcement (including apprehension of suspects), information-sharing, witness relocation, expert personnel, voluntary financial contributions, and diplomatic support.

US SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE SCIENTISTS
June 20, 2000

BACKGROUND: Today's New York Times has a story by Judy Miller on the U.S. program to engage former Soviet BW scientists. The article discusses both the nonproliferation benefits of this program and the risks.

Isn't the United States taking a risk by funding collaborative research at Russian institutes that played a key role in the former Soviet Union's biological warfare program?

- * Efforts to engage former Soviet BW scientists and institutes can make a major contribution to our nonproliferation objectives.

- * We believe the benefits of this program far outweigh the risks; it is critical to continue our efforts to engage and redirect former Soviet weapons scientists and institutes toward peaceful activities.

What has been done to reduce the risks?

- * All projects submitted for funding are subjected to a stringent interagency review process to ensure that no offensive BW work is taking place.

- * Grant payments are deposited directly into scientists' accounts to guard against funds being diverted for other purposes.

- * Financial and technical monitoring are conducted to determine if the projects are being carried out in accordance with agreed work plans.

- * Additional oversight is achieved through site visits and verification of deliverables.

What are the benefits of this program?

- * As a result of this program, we have gained access to over 30 former Soviet BW facilities that would otherwise not have been available.

- * The transparency and access we have gained have significantly increased our confidence that the institutes with whom we are working are not engaged in

offensive BW activities.

- * Officials from at least 15 of these institutes have stated that they have refused offers from countries of proliferation concern to engage in questionable activities because of the U.S. program.

- * In addition, the world's largest anthrax production and weaponization facility - in Kazakhstan -- is being dismantled and new research is taking place that may help combat some of the world's deadliest diseases.

NMD: VARIOUS POINTS

June 19, 2000

Core Points:

- * Emerging threat. Prudent to explore appropriate response

- * Can and if possible should be done consistent with adapted ABM treaty. Treaty provides for adjustments

- * Working with Russians who acknowledge threat but disagree over response.

- * Decision later this year whether to move forward next spring

- * Four criteria (threat, cost, technology, overall security including arms control)

- * Prepared to share appropriate technology with Allies and Russia

- * Welch Report

- * Valuable contribution which provides independent assessment

- * Key findings

- * Important progress in the last year

- * The program is technically feasible to meet the Phase I requirement (up to a dozen or two warheads with simple decoys), but further attention is needed to the

problem of discriminating decoys from real warheads for Phase II.

- * Meeting the schedule remains high risk, but Welch does not recommend changing the schedule at this point

- * Perry, Shali, etc/Boost phase:

- * Open-minded about boost phase approach-but technically not available by 2005 when threat projected to emerge

- * Could be valuable supplement to our architecture; prepared to discuss with Russians and others; our negotiations with Russians to permit our Phase 1 would not preclude further agreed amendments to accommodate this approach.

- * Reinterpretation of ABM Breach

- * No decision yet on deployment

- * Treaty does not define what constitutes breach/range of interpretations possible

- * Only prudent that lawyers review possible interpretations

- * Legal consideration/treaty interpretation one of many factors that President will take into account (feasibility, cost, threat, overall security including arms control

- * Hill arguments in favor of postponing decision and deferring negotiations with Russians

- * Have been pursuing NMD development program for a number of years

- * President's responsibility is to do what he believes is necessary and appropriate for our security

- * Will consult closely with Congress, but ultimately President must decide what is appropriate

- * No decision yet

- * Korean Summit/undercuts need/urgency for NMD

- * Welcome summit - important and historic; hope it leads to real reduction of

tensions on Korean Peninsula

- * Appreciate KDJ raising nuclear and missile issue, important to reducing regional tensions

- * Too early to say what changes summit will bring in terms of DPRK behavior; will watch closely

- * Missile testing moratorium also an important step; that's why we lifted some sanctions; but some aspects of program continue

- * Hope that missile talks will lead to real end to DPRK missile program (indigenous and exports)

- * Postol/Decoys

- * Pentagon reviewing allegations, but appears that at least some of the charges based on incomplete understanding of test program

- * Program accepts need to discriminate decoys (although this is more a factor for Phase II than Phase I)

- * Welch panel noted important progress and accepted basic approach, while cautioning that schedule should reflect actual technical progress, not artificial deadlines, and urged further attention to the problem of decoys.

