

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 05/31/2000 3:51:09 PM

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT State Department Press Guidance -- May 31, 2000 [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Beardsley, Tyler S. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H. (VP)
Fuerth, Leon S. (VP)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Roberts, Michael W. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Woolston, Ann E. (VP)
Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)

Matthews, Sonyia (SPCHW)
Sleder, Nicholas A. (NSCCOMM/INTERN)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY****TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT**

05-31-00 Final Guidances.doc
PRESS
GUIDANCES CONTENTS WEDNESDAY, MAY 31, 2000

STATEMENTS Consular Affairs -- Availability of Diversity Visa
Lottery Numbers

AFRICA Ethiopia/Eritrea -- Situation Update/Ethiopia Withdrawal/
Eritrea Withdrawal/
Zimbabwe -- Police Action to End Invasion of White-
Owned Farms
Sierra Leone -- Situation Update/WAfrican Communique/
West African Force/US Role/Sankoh/
RUF Control of Diamond Mines/Peace-
Keeping Mandate
Horn of Africa -- AID Assistance for Drought (AID Release)

EAST ASIA Japan -- Visit of Under Secretary Pickering/Mtgs
Fiji -- Situation Update
North Korea/China -- Plight of North Korean Migrants in China

EUROPE EU -- US-EU Summit
Turkey -- Ambassador's Travel to Southeast Turkey
Russia -- Deputy Secretary Talbott Travel/Mtgs
-- Boris Berezovsky's Break with Putin
-- Senator Helms Threat To Cut Aid
Russia (Chechnya) -- Update on Situation/Explosion in Grozny

MIDDLE EAST Peace Process -- Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations/Clinton-

Barak Meeting
Israel -- Security Assistance/Lebanon Withdrawal
Israel -- Western European and Others Group
(WEOG) accept Israel as Member
Syria -- Acceptance of UN Sec Gen's Report
On Lebanon
Iran -- Election of Temporary Speaker of
Parliament Mahdi Karrubi
Iraq -- Update on No-Fly Zone

SOUTH ASIA Region -- Under Secretary Pickering Mtg with
Afghanistan Taliban
Sri Lanka -- U/S Pickering on Military Assist.

-MORE-

WESTERN Mexico -- July 2 Elections/OAS Observer Mission
HEMISPHERE Peru -- Presidential Elections
-- US OAS Ambassador Statement at
Special Session of Perm Council
Cuba -- Illegal Migrant Interception
-- Elian Gonzales Case/Expense
Region -- OAS General Assembly/US Delegation

MISC Arms Control -- Tactical Nuclear Warheads

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release May 31, 2000
2000/634

STATEMENT BY PHILIP T. REEKER, ACTING SPOKESMAN

Availability of Diversity Visa (DV-2000) Lottery Numbers

Individuals registered for the DV-2000 lottery who wish to obtain an immigrant visa will need to act quickly to obtain their visas before the end of the fiscal year on September 30, 2000. This is because 5,000 fewer DV numbers will be available for DV-2000 than previous programs. The Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NCARA) passed by Congress in 1997 stipulates that, 5,000 of the 55,000 annually-allocated diversity visas be made available for use under the NCARA program. The annual reduction of the limit to 50,000 will begin with DV-2000 and will continue in future DV programs. As a result, DV numbers for fiscal year 2000 could be exhausted before the end of the fiscal year.

Very heavy demand for diversity visa numbers, particularly at Immigration and Naturalization Service offices in the United States, might cause allocations of available numbers to reach the annual limit prior to the end of the fiscal year. Any DV-2000 registrants processing their case through a U.S. embassy or consulate overseas who have not returned their initial set of application forms to the National Visa Center should do so immediately. We encourage DV-2000 registrants who have received their immigrant visa appointment notice to ensure that their paperwork is in order and medical examinations are completed by the time of their final visa interview. If during the final interview, applicants are instructed to supply additional documentation, they should return with it prior to the end of the month or risk not receiving one of the limited remaining available visas.

Drafted:CA/P:NBudig
Clearances:CA/VO:M Patterson (ok)
CA/VO/F/P:G Chapman (ok)
CA/VO/F/I:COppenheim (ok)
CA/VO:J Coe (ok)
CA/NVC:R Sherman (ok)
CA/EX:F Moss (ok)
PA:

AF Press Guidance

May 31, 2000

ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

* OAU-SPONSORED PROXIMITY TALKS CONTINUE IN ALGIERS.

Q: What is the situation in Ethiopia/Eritrea today?

A: THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS OVERNIGHT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SITUATION ON THE VARIOUS MILITARY FRONTS REMAINS CALM. PROXIMITY TALKS, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, ARE ONGOING IN ALGIERS.

Q. Can we confirm that Ethiopia has in fact withdrawn from western Eritrea?

A. WE RECEIVED INFORMATION INDICATING THIS, BUT CANNOT INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRM IT.

Q: Your May 30 statement said the United States has confirmed Eritrea's withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1998. How have you confirmed this?

A: WE DO NOT DISCUSS THE METHODS AND SOURCES WE USE TO CONFIRM SUCH MATTERS.

Background: The situation on the various fronts remains calm. Proximity talks, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, are ongoing in Algiers. Former National Security Advisor and Presidential Envoy Anthony Lake is leading the USG delegation participating in the Algiers meeting. The purpose of the meeting is to try to reach agreement on the detailed plans for implementation of the OAU peace package.

Both Embassies Addis Ababa and Asmara are closely following security issues and military developments. Embassy Addis Ababa is operating normally, but Embassy Asmara has been placed on Ordered Departure status owing to the proximity of heavy fighting and potential deterioration of conditions in Asmara. Our

embassies will assure that Americans are fully informed of evolving circumstances and new security considerations that may follow. Consular travel warnings recommend that travelers consider deferring travel to Ethiopia and avoid travel to Eritrea. Americans in Eritrea have been advised to depart.

DRAFT: AF/E:SEIRIZ X6-4644
Ethiopia-Eritrea 00031

Clear: AF/E:JMillington
P:KAlbrecht

Press Guidance
May 31, 2000

ZIMBABWE

- * U.S. welcomes police action against some farm invaders, but the Government of Zimbabwe has not called for war vets to leave farms.
- * Farm occupations continue, but violence may be abating. At least 24 Zimbabweans have been killed over the last two months. Almost all were opposition supporters.
- * Mugabe has made land reform central campaign issue, pushed through a constitutional amendment that allows the GOZ to seize land without paying full compensation, and approved implementing legislation using Presidential Powers Temporary Amendment Act (since parliament was dissolved April 11).
- * U.S. protesting violence privately at highest levels and publicly through statements, guidance. U.S. suspended aid to land reform, sending election monitors.
- * The U.S. will fund international and domestic observers for June 24-25 parliamentary elections.

Q: Do you have any facts or comment on the report that the Zimbabwean police have acted for the first time to end the invasion of a white-owned farm?

A.

* WE WELCOME POLICE ACTION AGAINST ILLEGAL FARM OCCUPATIONS AND AGAINST THE LOOTING, INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE THAT HAVE ACCOMPANIED MANY OCCUPATIONS.

* WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE HAS NOT CALLED FOR AN END TO THE OCCUPATIONS AND IT CONTINUES TO IGNORE COURT ORDERS CALLING ON POLICE TO EVICT ALL SQUATTERS.

* WE CALL ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE TO RESTORE THE RULE OF LAW BY IMPLEMENTING COURT ORDERS, TO RETURN TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE 1998 DONORS CONFERENCE ON LAND REFORM, AND TO END THE POLITICAL INTIMIDATION AIMED PRIMARILY AGAINST OPPOSITION SUPPORTERS.

CONTEXT

* About 950 commercial farms are currently occupied.

* Ruling party (ZANU-PF) supporters, led by war vets, are targeting farmers and laborers suspected of supporting opposition MDC party.

* 24 Zimbabweans, primarily supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) have died in the past two months.

* Mugabe called for end to farm violence 5/12, but it continues, especially in provinces near Harare.

* The Government of Zimbabwe announced on May 15 that parliamentary elections will be held June 24-25.

- * Electoral rules provide advantages to the ruling ZANU-PF party.
- * ZANU-PF supporters have assaulted opposition supporters and broken up opposition rallies and meetings.
- * Mugabe contends Movement for Democratic Change employs violence, but almost all victims are MDC supporters.
- * USG intends to provide \$300,000 to fund international election monitors in Zimbabwe.
- * The National Democratic Institute (NDI) released a 16 page report on May 22 stating that current conditions do not allow credible democratic elections in Zimbabwe.

Drafted: AF/S:Cgurney

Cleared: AF:NPowell
AF/S:DBooth
P:Kalbrecht
DRL:Phhiggins
NSC:NDempsey (info)
AF/RA:LdiPalma
AF/RA:LSegasvary

AF PRESS GUIDANCE

May 31, 2000

SIERRA LEONE

SUMMARY POINTS

- * Freetown quiet.
- * Embassy open; Ambassador Melrose and core staff in Freetown.
- * Foday Sankoh in custody of Sierra Leone authorities at undisclosed location.
- * Last United Nations peacekeepers taken hostage by rebels released 5/29; 23 remain surrounded by rebel forces; 13 dead including 4 presumed dead. Two companies of UN Indian troops remain in a stand-off with RUF forces in the southeast.
- * Commend pledge of regional states (Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS) in May 29 Summit Communique of 3,000 troops for United Nations peacekeeping force. U.S. will actively consider request for logistical support to United Nations and regional troops.
- * Decisions on whether Foday Sankoh should be removed from Sierra Leone will be made by the Government of Sierra Leone in consultation with the regional states.

- * Government of Sierra Leone and regional guarantors of the Lome Peace Agreement will decide whether it should be amended so rebels no longer have control of diamond areas.
- * No decisions so far on whether United Nations mandate should be strengthened from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

Q: What is the situation in Sierra Leone today?

A:

* FREETOWN REMAINS QUIET.

* THE U.S. EMBASSY IS OPEN. AMBASSADOR MELROSE REMAINS IN FREETOWN WITH A CORE STAFF.

* GOVERNMENT FORCES NOW CONTROL LUNSAR EAST OF FREETOWN AND MAY BE ADVANCING TOWARDS MAKENI FURTHER EAST.

Q: Do you have comment on the Communique issued May 29 by the West African states after their Summit Meeting in Abuja, in which they agreed to send troops to Sierra Leone and to take Foday Sankoh out of the country?

A:

* WE COMMEND THE STRONG LEADERSHIP AND SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT

OF SIERRA LEONE SHOWN BY THE MAY 29 COMMUNIQUE FROM THE WEST AFRICAN HEADS OF

STATE. THE CONTRIBUTION OF REGIONAL TROOPS COULD BE HELPFUL FOR PEACEKEEPING IN

SIERRA LEONE.

* DECISIONS REGARDING THE LOCATION, MOVEMENTS AND JURIDICAL DISPOSITION OF FODAY

SANKOH WILL BE MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE

REGIONAL STATES. WHEREVER SANKOH IS HELD, THE U.S. INTEREST IS IN SEEING THAT THE PEOPLE OF SIERRA LEONE CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT PEACE IS ACHIEVABLE AND

JUSTICE WILL BE DONE.

* EXECUTIVE SECRETARY KOUYATE OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES ANNOUNCED LATE MAY 30 THAT THE REGIONAL GROUP IS NOT INSISTING THAT SANKOH BE REMOVED FROM SIERRA LEONE, ONLY THAT HE BE KEPT IN A SECURE PLACE.

Q: What will the size and mandate of the West African force be? Under whose aegis will it fall?

A:

* WE UNDERSTAND THE REGIONAL STATES HAVE PLEDGED AN ADDITIONAL 3,000 TROOPS. THE COMMUNIQUE STATES THAT "TROOPS SHOULD BE PROVIDED FROM THE SUB-REGION TO BEEF UP THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL.)" THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE AND THE PARTICULARS OF THE COMMAND STRUCTURE UNDER WHICH IT WOULD OPERATE HAVE YET TO BE DETERMINED.

* THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, MUST AUTHORIZE ANY INCREASES OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE'S SIZE AND COMPOSITION. THE COUNCIL IS STILL CONSIDERING THE ABUJA PROPOSAL.

Q: What role will the U.S. take with regard to this force?

A: AS WE HAVE ANNOUNCED BEFORE, WE WILL ACTIVELY CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR LOGISTICAL AND OTHER SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED NATIONS AND FROM THE REGIONAL FORCES.

Q: Do you agree that Foday Sankoh should be removed from Sierra Leone?

* A: DECISIONS REGARDING THE LOCATION, MOVEMENTS AND JURIDICAL DISPOSITION OF FODAY SANKOH WILL BE MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE REGION. WHEREVER SANKOH IS HELD, THE U.S. INTEREST IS IN SEEING THAT THE PEOPLE OF SIERRA LEONE CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT PEACE IS ACHIEVABLE AND JUSTICE WILL BE DONE.

Q: Was Sankoh's removal a concession to Charles Taylor?

A: WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO INDICATE THIS IS THE CASE.

(If pressed):

A: WE REFER ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, WHICH ASKED PRESIDENT TAYLOR TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES WITH THE REBELS TO HELP SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HOSTAGES.

Q: Will Sankoh be charged with crimes committed since the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement?

-- THERE HAVE BEEN NO DECISIONS ON THIS ISSUE. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THERE MUST BE BOTH PEACE AND JUSTICE. THAT MEANS THERE SHOULD BE ACCOUNTABILITY.
-- ANY CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT SINCE THE LOME PEACE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED ARE NOT COVERED BY THE DOMESTIC AMNESTY. WE ARE IN CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE, REGIONAL STATES, THE UN, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO REVIEW POSSIBLE STEPS TO BRING THE PERPETRATORS OF ANY CRIMES TO JUSTICE.

Q: Is the RUF going to retain control of the diamond mines under the Agreement?

A: NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE GUARANTORS OF THE LOME AGREEMENT AS TO ANY AMENDMENT OF ANY TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

Q: Does the U.S. believe the UN mandate should be toughened from peacekeeping to peace enforcement?

A: WE EXPECT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE UP THIS QUESTION IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF SECRETARY GENERAL ANNAN'S FOURTH REGULAR REPORT ON SIERRA LEONE, ISSUED MAY 22. NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ON ANY CHANGE IN THE UN MANDATE IN SIERRA LEONE, OR ON CHANGING THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

Drafted:

AF/W:BWDalton/SMcIlvaine/LSegesvary, 7-2214
J/Press guidance/sierra leone/pg 00-05-31

Cleared:

AF:HFJeter
AF/W:SPWilkinson
AF/W:SMcIlvaine ok
AF/W:KList ok
P:KAlbrecht ok
AF/RA:LSegesvary-ok
S/WCI:PProsper ok
IO/PHO:JBuelow ok
IO/UNP:HThomas ok
DRL:DDearborn ok
USUN/W:GHarris

EAP PRESS GUIDANCE
May 31, 2000

JAPAN - VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING

Q: What is the purpose of Under Secretary for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering's visit to Japan?

A: -- U/S PICKERING IS CURRENTLY IN JAPAN TO ATTEND THE G-8 POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING IN MIYAZAKI FROM MAY 31 TO JUNE 1. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS ARE MEETING AS PART OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE G-8 SUMMIT IN OKINAWA FROM JULY 21 TO 23.

Q: Will he have any bilateral meetings with Japanese officials?

A: U/S PICKERING IS SCHEDULED TO HAVE SEVERAL BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH JAPANESE OFFICIALS, INCLUDING IN TOKYO, TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR THE G-8 AS WELL AS

A

RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES.

*****CONTEXT: After completing a trip to South Asia, Under Secretary Pickering arrived in Japan on May 30. The main purpose of his trip is to attend a series of meetings of the G-8 Political Directors in Miyazaki from May 31 to June 1. He is scheduled to depart Japan on June 2 and return to Washington. In addition to the multilateral G-8 meetings, U/S Pickering will also hold a bilateral meeting in Miyazaki with Deputy Foreign Minister Kato, a dinner in Tokyo with Vice Foreign Minister Kawashima and a breakfast in Tokyo with a group of former Japanese diplomats and academics to discuss China and Taiwan.

Drafted:MKeller 7-4741 05/31/2000

P:\Press\PickeringJapan

Cleared: EAP:SRoth

EAP/J:RWhite (ok)

EAP/P:KBailes (ok)

P:HSmith (ok)

D:TCynkin (info)

S/P:MPalmer (ok)

EAP PRESS GUIDANCE

May 31, 2000

FIJI - THREAT TO DEMOCRACY

Q: Can you provide an update on the situation in Fiji?

A: -- THE SITUATION REMAINS UNSETTLED AND UNCERTAIN.

-- OVER THE WEEKEND PRESIDENT MARA RESIGNED AND THE HEAD OF THE ARMED FORCES,

COMMODORE FRANK BAINAMARAMA, ANNOUNCED HE HAS SUSPENDED THE CONSTITUTION, DECLARED MARTIAL LAW, SAID THAT HE HAD TAKEN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, AND NAMED A NEW "INTERIM" PRIME MINISTER.

-- ETHNIC FIJIAN BUSINESSMAN GEORGE SPEIGHT CONTINUES TO REJECT ALL PROPOSALS TO END THE HOSTAGE SITUATION. THE ARMED GROUP HE LEADS CONTINUES TO HOLD A NUMBER OF HOSTAGES, INCLUDING PM CHAUDHRY, IN THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING.

-- THE UNITED STATES IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE OVERTHROW OF DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED GOVERNMENTS BY FORCE. WE REMAIN VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN FIJI, INCLUDING THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

-- WE CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL PERSONS BEING HELD HOSTAGE AND FOR THE RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN FIJI.

WE CONTINUE TO URGE THAT AMERICANS DEFER TRAVEL TO FIJI. WE HAVE UPGRADED OUR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO A TRAVEL WARNING. IT WARNS U.S. CITIZENS AGAINST TRAVEL TO SUVA, FIJI'S CAPITAL, AND ADVISES THAT WE HAVE AUTHORIZED THE DEPARTURE OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN NON-EMERGENCY POSITIONS AND THE DEPENDENTS OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

-- MOST EMBASSY DEPENDENTS HAVE NOW LEFT FIJI. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, ALL AMERICAN CITIZENS STILL IN FIJI ARE SAFE.

Q: There are reports that the military has just rescinded their appointment of Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, son-in-law of President Mara, as the new Prime Minister,

due to objections from George Speight. What is the U.S. government's reaction?

A: -- WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS TO THAT EFFECT. THE SITUATION IN FIJI IS STILL IN FLUX.

-- WE REITERATE OUR CALL FOR A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

Q: What do you think of moves to scrap Fiji's 1997 multi-ethnic constitution and replace it with one that guarantees a dominant role for indigenous ethnic Fijians?

A: -- DEMOCRACY BY DEFINITION CANNOT EXCLUDE A SPECIFIC GROUP OF A SOCIETY'S PEOPLE FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS ON THE BASIS OF RACE, ETHNICITY, OR RELIGION.

-- AS WE INDICATED ON MONDAY, WE LOOK TO FIJI TO PRESERVE A MULTI-ETHNIC DEMOCRACY, AND WE CALL FOR A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE.

Drafted:EAP/ANP:THalstead

05/31/2000 6-4683

P/P/ANPPressGuidance/FijiUpdate5-31

Cleared:EAP:SORoth

EAP/P:KBailes

P:DSields

DOD/ISA/AP:CO'Connor - info

CA/PA:CLamora

DRL:MSchall

PRM Press Guidance

May 31, 2000

DPRK and PRC: PLIGHT OF NORTH KOREAN MIGRANTS IN CHINA AND INCREASED DEPORTATIONS

Q: What is the US doing to help the thousands of North Koreans immigrants in China?

A: WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DESPERATE SITUATION MANY NORTH KOREANS FACE. MANY CROSS INTO CHINA TO FIND WORK OR FOOD THEN RETURN TO NORTH KOREA. SOME REMAIN IN CHINA FOR A LONGER TIME.

* THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) AND SEVERAL NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE ASSISTING THESE PEOPLE BY GIVING THEM FOOD, AND THE US SUPPORTS THOSE EFFORTS BOTH AS A DONOR AND AS A PARTNER.

IF ASKED ABOUT NUMBERS:

* THERE ARE NO RELIABLE REPORTS CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF NORTH KOREANS IN CHINA AT ANY GIVEN TIME. PEOPLE WHO CROSS THE BORDER DO SO CLANDESTINELY IN SMALL GROUPS.

* THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT ESTIMATES THERE ARE 10,000 TO 30,000 SUCH PERSONS IN THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA. CHINA STATES THERE ARE ONLY A FEW HUNDRED; WHILE KOREAN NON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS CLAIM THERE ARE BETWEEN 50,000 AND 300,000.

Q: Has the U.S. remained silent on this matter, as the article insinuates?

A: WE TAKE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES SERIOUSLY AND EXPECT ALL MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ABIDE BY THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER, THE 1951 CONVENTION ON REFUGEES, AND THE UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

* WE HAVE KEPT IN CLOSE CONTACT ON THIS ISSUE WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS EXPRESSED A STRONG INTEREST.

* IN CHINA, WE ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, BOTH AS A DONOR AND AS A PARTNER, TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE NEEDS OF GENUINE ASYLUM SEEKERS ARE MET.

* WE SUPPORT THE POSITION OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AGAINST REFOULEMENT, WHICH IS THE FORCIBLE RETURN OF A PERSON TO A PLACE WHERE HE OR SHE FACES PERSECUTION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE 1951 CONVENTION ON REFUGEES.

* WE HAVE ALSO RAISED OUR CONCERN FOR THE STATUS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS AND OUR SUPPORT FOR THE UNHCR WITH CHINESE OFFICIALS AT A HIGH LEVEL.

ONLY IF ASKED: DOES THIS SITUATION HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO BE AN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE CRISIS?

AS STATED BEFORE, MANY OF THE 22 MILLION PEOPLE LIVING IN NORTH KOREA ARE IN DESPARATE STRAITS AND SUBJECT TO PERSECUTION BY THE CURRENT REGIME. IT IS NOT WORTHWHILE, HOWEVER, TO SPECULATE ABOUT A REFUGEE CRISIS.

Background: New York Times May 31 edition carries an article describing the dire situation of North Koreans who are staying in China clandestinely. The article notes that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has "quietly

expressed concern..." but that "Most Western nations... have remained mum."

In mid-January, wire stories reported that China returned to the DPRK a group of seven North Koreans to whom the UNHCR had granted refugee status when they entered Russia a month earlier. The seven were "not considered refugees" according to Chinese officials, the news stories reported, and were returned to the DPRK after Russian authorities expelled the seven across its border with China near the small area where Russia's borders meet both the PRC's and the DPRK's. The Washington Post in a page one follow-up February 19, conducted interviews with ethnic Koreans in Northern China and UN officials about the subject.

In general, China turned a blind eye to the many North Koreans who have traveled across its borders in search of relief from the chronic famine in the DPRK, although it maintains an agreement with the DPRK to return North Korean citizens when they are captured. A large population of ethnic Korean Chinese nationals makes the border area an attractive destination to those in the DPRK willing to risk flight. Harsh treatment and even death may await those who are returned, according to numerous accounts by defectors.

The NYT reporter appears to have synthesized much of the recent reporting on this issue. She then focuses on a few of the North Koreans in China, apparently having interviewed them in Yanji, a city in the PRC near the DPRK border.

Drafted: PRM/AAA Joseph Bracken 3-1063

H: PRM Offices/ AAA/ East Asia DPRK PRM Press Guidance 31 May 2000

Cleared: EAP/K: DGreenberg

EAP/K: DShear

EAP/CM: BWeber

C: M Storella

DRL/BA MDSchall

PRM/ AKreczko

EUR PRESS GUIDANCE
May 31, 2000

U.S.-EU SUMMIT RESULTS

Q. What was achieved at the U.S.-EU Summit in Portugal?

* STRONG DECLARATION ABOUT TRANSFORMING SOUTHEAST EUROPE INTO A MORE STABLE REGION. THE U.S. AND EU ARE FULLY ENGAGED IN BOTH THE STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTHEAST EUROPE AND THE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS THERE. ALSO AGREED ON NEW MEASURES TO APPLY MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO THE SERBIAN REGIME.

* JOINT INITIATIVE ON COMBATING HIV/AIDS, MALARIA, TUBERCULOSIS, AND OTHER INFECTIOUS DISEASE, ESPECIALLY IN AFRICA.

* AGREED TO ESTABLISH A CONSULTATIVE FORUM TO REVIEW AND ASSESS THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY. COMPLEMENTS GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT TALKS THAT BEGAN EARLY IN 2000 TO ADDRESS, AMONG OTHER TOPICS, UNRESOLVED MARKET ACCESS ISSUES.

* TAKEN STEPS TO CONCLUDE A "SAFE HARBOR" DATA PRIVACY ACCORD. EU MEMBER STATES, MEETING IN BRUSSELS TODAY, APPROVED THE ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT BETWEEN U.S. AND THE COMMISSION. NOW GOES TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FOR CONSIDERATION.

* AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES TO FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION. THIS AGREEMENT, UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MADRID PROTOCOL, WILL SAVE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR U.S. COMPANIES.

DRAFT: EUR/PD:RHILTON, 7-5252, 05/31/2000

CLEARED: EUR/ERA:WLUCAS
EUR/ERA:JHEG
EUR/ERA:HSULLIVAN

EUR PRESS GUIDANCE
TURKEY
MAY 31, 2000

NEW U.S. PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY?

Q: IS THE U.S. OPENING AN OFFICE IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY?

* THE UNITED STATES IS NOT OPENING A BUREAU OR OFFICE IN DIYARBAKIR OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY.

* THE AMBASSADOR IS TRAVELING TO THE SOUTHEAST TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION (GUNSIAD) AND DISCUSS WAYS TO STRENGTHEN COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

* ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS THE MOST CRITICAL NEED FOR THAT REGION AT PRESENT. WE WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO IT, AS WELL AS SUPPORT US BUSINESS.

* POSSIBLE U.S. ACTIVITIES INCLUDE MORE FREQUENT COMMERCIALY-ORIENTED TRIPS TO THE REGION, IN COOPERATION WITH THE SOUTHEASTERN TURKEY BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION, AND POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THAT ORGANIZATION AS MUTUALLY AGREED.

DRAFTED: EUR/SE:JJEFFREY

CLEARED: EUR/SE:TRUGGLES
EUR/PPA:SELBOW

S/NIS PRESS GUIDANCE
May 31, 2000

Russia: Talbott to Moscow

Q: What is Deputy Secretary Talbott going to do in Moscow?

A. -- DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT IS TRAVELING TO MOSCOW, BRUSSELS, TALLINN. HE DEPARTS TONIGHT.

-- WHILE IN MOSCOW JUNE 1-2, TALBOTT WILL CONTINUE OUR ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIA ON ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION, AND REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES.

-- HE WILL MEET WITH HIS COUNTERPART, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV, AND OTHER RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS FOLLOW UP TO HIS MEETINGS IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK TO DISCUSS ISSUES ON THE AGENDGA FOR THE SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENTS PUTIN AND CLINTON.

05-31 Talbott to Moscow
Drafted eur/rus:jfriedman

Cleared eur/rus: DARUSSELL ok
Nsc: aweiss info
P:SWHITE ok
D:TKaidanow
S/P: MPalmer ok
S/nis:jbeyrle

S/NIS PRESS GUIDANCE
MAY 31, 2000

RUSSIA: Berezovsky break with Putin

Q: Comment on Boris Berezovsky's break with Putin and his criticism that Putin is demolishing some democratic institutions?

A: -- HAVE SEEN BEREZOVSKIY'S CRITICISM OF PUTIN'S PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE STRUCTURE OF RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND FEDERATION COUNCIL, THE UPPER CHAMBER OF PARLIAMENT.

-- DUMA PASSED THESE BILLS AT FIRST READING TODAY (May 31st).

-- DUMA WILL HAVE TWO ADDITIONAL READINGS TO PROPOSE CHANGES. FEDERATION COUNCIL MUST APPROVE.

-- WOULD REQUIRE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY OF DUMA TO OVERRIDE FEDERATION COUNCIL NO VOTE.

-- UP TO RUSSIAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE HOW TO STRUCTURE GOVERNMENT.

-- IMPORTANT THAT PROCESS CONSISTENT WITH RULE OF LAW AND RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC

INSTITUTIONS.

-- WILL JUDGE RUSSIA'S PROGRESS IN BUILDING MORE DEMOCRATIC, PROSPEROUS
FUTURE
BASED ON EXTENT TO WHICH ACTIONS RESPECT THESE PRINCIPLES.

Background: Russian "oligarch" Boris Berezovsky published a letter in the newspaper "Kommersant" criticizing President Putin's proposed government reforms. Putin has proposed changing how the Federation Council, Russian parliament's upper house, is elected. Currently, the directly elected regional governors automatically have seat on federation council. Putin's proposal is for the governors and regional legislatures to each select one representative. The two regional representatives would be subject to approval of the regional legislature.

Putin also proposed empowering the presidential administration with the authority to remove governors and local leaders who violate the federal constitution. Putin has indicated no intention to change direct election of regional governors, one of the important achievements of Russian democracy.

U:\RUS\PRESS GUIDANCE\Press Guidance 2000\05-31 Berezovski break with Putin.doc

Draft: EUR/RUS:JFriedman 7-6763

Cleared: EUR/RUS: DARussell ok
DRL: wsilverman ok
P: Swhite ok
D: TKaidanow ok
S/P: MPalmer ok
S/NIS: Jbeyrle

H PRESS GUIDANCE
MAY 31, 2000

RUSSIA - SENATOR HELMS' THREAT TO CUT ASSISTANCE

Q: -- Did Senator Helms announce a cut in U.S. assistance to Russia because of the Odjanic visit to Moscow?

A: -- UNDERSTAND SENATOR HELMS CONSIDERING AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN OPERATIONS BILL.

-- BILL CURRENTLY IN HOUSE. HAS NOT REACHED SENATE.

-- PROPOSES REDUCING ASSISTANCE BY AMOUNT OF ENERGY SALES TO SERBIA.

-- ALSO PROPOSES REQUIRING U.S. TO OPPOSE FURTHER LOANS TO RUSSIA BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

-- SECRETARY MADE CLEAR RUSSIA'S OBLIGATIONS ON DEALING WITH INDICTED WAR CRIMINALS WHEN SHE MET WITH FM IVANOV IN LISBON LAST WEEK; IVANOV HAS SINCE SAID THE OJDANIC VISIT WAS NOT COORDINATED GOVERNMENT POLICY.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT DECISIONS ABOUT ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA, WHETHER BILATERAL OR FROM THE IFI'S, SHOULD BE BASED ON OUR NATIONAL INTEREST, INCLUDING OUR INTEREST IN RUSSIA MAKING REAL PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC REFORM.

Background: ON MAY 25, SENATOR HELMS RELEASED A STATEMENT REVIEWING HIS CONCERNS OVER SERBIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ODJANIC'S OFFICIAL RECEPTION IN RUSSIA DURING HIS MAY 7-12 VISIT.

IN IT, SENATOR HELMS DISCUSSES AN AMENDMENT WHICH HE INTENDS TO INTRODUCE TO THE

FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS BILL, WHICH IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE HOUSE AND IS NOT YET ON THE SENATE FLOOR, PROVIDING FOR A REDUCTION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT OR TO RUSSIAN ENTITIES WHICH HAVE SOLD ENERGY OR PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO SERBIA. THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE COMMENSURATE WITH THE ENERGY SALES OR LOANS. THE AMENDMENT WOULD ALSO SEEK TO REQUIRE THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST LOANS OR ROLLOVERS OF LOANS TO RUSSIA BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND SUSPEND OPIC AND EXIM PROGRAMS FOR RUSSIA.

DISAPPROVAL OF GENERAL ODJANIC'S RECEPTION IN RUSSIA IS NOT THE ISSUE HERE. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS, AT HIGH LEVEL, OUR CONCERNS OVER ODJANIC'S RECEPTION AND THE LOANS AND OIL SALES ANNOUNCED IN MOSCOW.

WE DO DIFFER FROM SENATOR HELMS ON THE MERITS, FROM THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE, OF U.S. AND MULTILATERAL PROGRAMS INVOLVING RUSSIA. AS YOU KNOW, U.S. BILATERAL PROGRAMS DO NOT, OVERWHELMINGLY, ASSIST THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT BUT RATHER PROVIDE SUPPORT AT GRASS-ROOTS LEVEL FOR DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION, OR PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE SAFE DISMANTLING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO U.S. SECURITY. THESE ARE U.S. INTERESTS, JUST LIKE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY WHICH HAS BEEN A KEY INTEREST IN DEBT RESCHEDULINGS FOR RUSSIA.

WE APPRECIATE SENATOR HELMS' POSITION BUT BELIEVE HIS POLICY CONCLUSION IS PREMATURE. HIS DRAFT AMENDMENT WOULD LEAVE IMPORTANT U.S. INTERESTS AT

RISK.

DRAFT: H:TLynch/EUR/RUS:JFriedman

Clear: EUR/RUS: PQuanrud

P:Swhite

D:TKaidanow

S/P:Mpalmer

S/NIS:JBeyrle

S/NIS PRESS GUIDANCE

May 31, 2000

Russia: Chechnya Update

Q: Comment on bombings in Chechnya and Volgograd that Russians are blaming on Chechen rebels?

A. -- SEEN REPORTS SERGEY ZVEREV, RUSSIAN DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE TO CHECHNYA WAS KILLED IN EXPLOSION IN GROZNY.

-- ALSO SEEN REPORTS SIX RUSSIAN SOLDIERS KILLED IN EXPLOSION IN VOLGOGRAD IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA.

-- CONTINUED FIGHTING REINFORCES OUR VIEW -- NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT
IN CHECHNYA.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON WILL RAISE SUBJECT IN MOSCOW.

-- URGE CHECHENS AND RUSSIANS TO AVOID EXTENDING THE FIGHTING; MAKES MORE DIFFICULT TO FIND POLITICAL SOLUTION .

-- URGE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TO FIND POLITICAL SOLUTION; OPEN MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE
WITH RESPONSIBLE CHECHEN LEADERS.

-- URGE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON COMMITMENTS TO FACILITATE RETURN
OF OSCE ASSISTANCE GROUP TO CHECHNYA.

Background: Press reports indicate that Russian Deputy Representative to Chechnya Sergey Sverev was killed in an explosion in Grozny today. Spokespersons from the office of Nikolay Koshman (Sverev's superior) denounced the killing as a terrorist act.

Separately, six Russian soldiers were killed and seven injured in an explosion in Volgograd when they marched past a radio-controlled bomb tied to a tree. Chechen rebels ambushed Russian troops in Ingushetiya, killing 16.

05-31 Chechnya
Drafted eur/rus:jfriedman
Cleared eur/rus: DARUSSELL ok
EUR/PRA:MMISHRA OK
EUR/RPM:AFeatherstone ok
Nsc: aweiss
Drl:WSILVERMAN OK
S/WCI:BBLASCHKE OK
P:SWHITE OK

D:TKaidanow OK
S/P: MPalmer OK
S/nis:jbeyrle

NEA Press Guidance
Wednesday, May 31, 2000

PEACE PROCESS: ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS, CLINTON-BARAK MEETING

Q: Can you confirm reports that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators will resume negotiations today at an undisclosed location in the region? Who will be representing each side? Will you be involved?

-- IT'S OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS WILL BE RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS SOON. I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO THE DETAILS OF WHERE, AND WHEN AND WHO.

Q: Does that include travel by Dennis to the region? Will you be going to participate in these talks?

-- AMBASSADOR ROSS WILL BE JOINING THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THEIR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BARAK IN LISBON ON THURSDAY.

-- HE'LL BE RETURNING HERE. I WOULD EXPECT HIM TO BE GOING OUT AGAIN SOON.

Q: Comment on the letter from Interior Minister Sharansky to Prime Minister Barak criticising Israel's supposed compromises to the Palestinians, which would mean forcibly moving 40,000 to 50,000 settlers?

-- WE'VE SEEN REPORTS OF THIS LETTER, AND WE'VE ALSO SEEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSE TO IT.

-- THESE REPORTS CONCERN THE SUBSTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES,

AND
THAT'S A SUBJECT WE JUST DON'T GET INTO.

Q: Preview for us the Clinton-Barak meeting tomorrow. Why was it switched from Berlin to Lisbon? Will they be discussing a three-way summit with Arafat, and when do expect such a summit will take place?

-- I'D REFER YOU TO THE PARTY FOR QUESTIONS ON SCHEDULING AND LOCATION.

-- THIS MEETING, WHICH WAS RESCHEDULED AFTER PRIME MINISTER BARAK WAS COMPELLED TO CANCEL HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRIME MINISTER BARAK TO DISCUSS PROSPECTS FOR REACHING AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT ON PERMANENT STATUS. THEY WILL ALSO ASSESS THE SITUATION FOLLOWING ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND EXCHANGE VIEWS ON HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP.

-- AS WE'VE MADE CLEAR, WE'RE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN ANY WAY THAT WE CAN IN THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE IT CLEAR FOR SOME TIME THAT HE'S PREPARED TO HOST A SUMMIT FOR THE LEADERS WHEN HE FEELS THE BASIS FOR SUCH A MEETING HAS BEEN LAID.

Q: Any truth to reports in the Israeli press that Secretary Albright is planning to travel to Israel next week?

-- WE'VE SEEN THIS REPORT. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT FOR YOU NOW. I EXPECT TO HAVE SOMETHING SOON.

NEA Press Guidance

Wednesday, May 31, 2000

ISRAEL: SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Q: Explain what assistance the U.S. is providing to Israel to support its withdrawal from Lebanon? How much are we providing? What for? Is it new money?

-- IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS, THE UNITED STATES WILL MAKE AVAILABLE UP TO \$50 MILLION IN EXISTING FOREIGN MILITARY FUNDING (FMF) TO ASSIST WITH SECURITY COSTS IN NORTHERN ISRAEL RELATED TO THE WITHDRAWAL.
(if pressed)

-- THIS DECISION DOES NOT INVOLVE NEW MONEY. THE FUNDS WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM EXISTING (PRINCIPALLY FY00) FMF RESOURCES ALREADY APPROPRIATED FOR ISRAEL.

-- WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO LOOK AT WAYS TO SUPPORT LEBANON AS IT DEALS WITH THE COSTS OF RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH.

IO Press Guidance
May 31, 2000

ISRAEL'S MEMBERSHIP IN WEOG

Question: What is the Department's reaction to the decision by the "Western European and Others Group" (WEOG) to accept Israel as a temporary member?

Answer:

* THE DEPARTMENT IS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE DECISION.

* SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE, HAVE WORKED TIRELESSLY TO BRING IT ABOUT.

* THE ACTION REVERSES A SERIOUS INJUSTICE WITHIN THE UN THAT HAD PERSISTED FOR NEARLY FIVE DECADES.

* ISRAEL'S UN AMBASSADOR DESCRIBED THE DECISION AS A "HISTORIC TURNING POINT" IN HIS COUNTRY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UN. WE AGREE WHOLEHEARTEDLY.

IF NEEDED:

Why are there limitations on Israel's membership?

* THE CONDITIONS GUIDING ISRAEL'S TEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP IN THE GROUP WERE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE GROUP MEMBERS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND ARE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE.

IF NEEDED:

Does this really amount to much?

* SECURING TEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP IN THIS UN REGIONAL GROUP FOR ISRAEL WAS AN ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT STEP.

* WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH ISRAEL AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF WESTERN GROUP TO ENSURE THAT ISRAEL IS ABLE TO PARTICIPATE MEANINGFULLY IN ALL ASPECTS OF UN ACTIVITIES.

Background/Context: After a long effort led primarily by the U.S., the UN's Western European and Others Group ("the WEOG") has invited Israel to join the group as a temporary member until Israel is able to assume its rightful place in the Asia Group. Israel has accepted membership for an initial four-year period, subject to certain conditions (including a limitation to New York-based activities and a commitment by Israel to respect current rotation WEOG schedules for positions on UN bodies). Securing temporary WEOG membership for Israel has been a priority for the Administration and the Congress for some time.

Drafted: IO/UNP:GROlson:X7-0042
005/31/2000

Cleared: IO:WBWood
IO/UNP:WASanton
USUN/W:JMarty
NEA/IAI:SSeldowitz
P:LArreaga

NEA Press Guidance
Wednesday, May 31, 2000

SYRIA: ACCEPTANCE OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ON LEBANON

Q: Your reaction to Syria's acceptance of the Secretary General's report on implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. Do you welcome it? Does this mean that the Shebaa Farms issue is resolved and no longer a stumbling block on the issue of Israel's withdrawal?

-- AS WE'VE MADE CLEAR, THE ISSUE OF SHEBAA FARMS WAS COVERED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MAY 22 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL

RESOLUTIONS 425
AND 426.

-- WE'VE SEEN REPORTS OF THE STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL
ENVOY
THAT SYRIA FULLY ACCEPTS THIS REPORT.

-- THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A POSITIVE STEP, WHICH WE WELCOME.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFIRMING ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL
SHORTLY
AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MOVING QUICKLY TO REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY IN
THE
SOUTH.

NEA Press Guidance
Wednesday, May 31, 2000

IRAN: ELECTION OF TEMPORARY SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT

Q: Do you have any comment on the election of Mahdi Karrubi as temporary speaker
of Iran's Parliament?

-- WE AND MANY OTHER NATIONS HAVE WATCHED WITH INTEREST AND
ENCOURAGEMENT AS THE
IRANIAN PEOPLE HAVE EMBARKED ON A PATH TOWARD GREATER FREEDOM AND
DEMOCRACY.

-- THE NEW MAJLES HAS BEGUN ITS WORK IN A TIMELY AND LEGAL MANNER. THIS IS
AN IMPORTANT INDICATION OF STABILITY AND STRENGTH FOR IRAN'S DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS.

-- WE CONSIDER THIS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR IRAN AND FOR THE REGION, AND

WE
WISH THE NEW PARLIAMENTARIANS WELL.

Context: Iran's new parliament (majlis) was seated on May 27. On May 30 Mehdi Karrubi, a reformist leader, was elected as temporary speaker of the parliament. The temporary speaker was elected to run parliament before a final decision is made once the legislature becomes fully operational next month.

Drafted:NEA/NGA:MSCHMIDT

Cleared:NEA/P:AERELI
NEA/NGA:PDIBBLE
NEA/NGA:DBLOME

NEA Press Guidance
Wednesday, May 31, 1999

IRAQ: NO FLY ZONES

Q: Can you give us an update on activity in the No Fly Zones?

-- ON MAY 29, 30 AND 31, OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH AIRCRAFT WERE FIRED UPON BY
IRAQI ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY IN THE VICINITY OF BASHIQAH.

-- RESPONDING IN SELF-DEFENSE, COALITION AIRCRAFT DROPPED MUNITIONS ON
ELEMENTS
OF THE IRAQI INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.

Q: Did Coalition strikes result in the injury or death of civilians?

-- EVERY EFFORT IS TAKEN TO AVOID ANY COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO CIVILIANS AND

CIVILIAN
PROPERTY. ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY, HOWEVER, LIES WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.

(IF ASKED)

Q: When was the last attack in the Southern No Fly Zone?

-- THE LAST TIME IRAQI FORCES FIRED AT COALITION AIRCRAFT IN THE SOUTHERN NO
FLY
ZONE WAS MAY 21.

-- RESPONDED IN SELF-DEFENSE, ON MAY 22 COALITION FORCES DROPPED PRECISION
GUIDED
MUNITIONS ON AN IRAQI MILITARY RADAR SITE AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SITES.

(IF PRESSED)

-- SADDAM HUSSEIN OPTED TO CHALLENGE COALITION AIRCRAFT ENFORCING THE NO
FLY
ZONES, PUTTING HIS OWN PEOPLE IN HARMS WAY. AS HE CONTINUES TO TARGET
COALITION
AIRCRAFT, THE IRAQI PEOPLE WILL CONTINUE TO BE AT RISK.

-- FURTHER QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

Context: U.S. European Command has confirmed three recent strikes in the Northern
No Fly Zone (May 29, 30, and 31). U.S. Southern Command has confirmed that the
most recent strike in the South took place on May 22. Iraq usually claims that
civilian deaths have occurred as a result and the Department of Defense never
confirms these reports.

S/CT PRESS GUIDANCE
Wednesday, May 31, 2000

TALIBAN: PICKERING TALKS

Q: In talks with Under Secretary Pickering, did the Taliban offer to turn over Usama bin Ladin in exchange for US recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan?

A: -- THE TALIBAN MADE NO SUCH OFFER.
-- UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1267 REQUIRES THE TALIBAN UNCONDITIONALLY TO
TURN OVER USAMA BIN LADIN TO A COUNTRY WHERE HE WILL BE ARRESTED AND
BROUGHT TO
JUSTICE.

Drafted:S/CT:JReap
X78682

Cleared:S/CT:EHull
SA:LScensny

SA PRESS GUIDANCE
May 31, 2000

SRI LANKA: PICKERING ON ARMS AID

Q: Did U/S Thomas Pickering rule out US help to Sri Lanka for arms purchases?

A: DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN SRI LANKA ON MAY 29, UNDER SECRETARY
PICKERING
SAID THAT HE DISCUSSED WITH SRI LANKAN OFFICIALS THEIR GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST

IN
MILITARY EQUIPMENT PURCHASES FROM AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS. HE SAID THE THE
ISSUE
OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAY FOR SUCH PURCHASES DID NOT COME UP.

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT PROVIDE ARMS ASSISTANCE TO SRI LANKA BUT WE HAVE
SELECTIVELY APPROVED LICENSES FOR COMMERCIAL SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
AFTER
CAREFUL REVIEW TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS.

WE ALSO HAVE HAD A MODEST PROGRAM OF SMALL-SCALE MILITARY JOINT EXERCISE
AND
TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

Drafted:SA/RA:LScensny
\sara\publicaffairs\srilanka\0531Usmilhelp.doc
Cleared:
SA:KFInderfurth
SA/INS:GUsrey
P:JCStevens

WHA PRESS GUIDANCE (TAKEN QUESTION)
May 31, 2000

MEXICO: ELECTIONS

Q: What is the USG view of the claim that a framework does not exist in Mexico to
ensure the July 2 elections are free and open? Does the US support an OAS
observer mission for Mexico's elections?

A: --MEXICO IS IN THE MIDST OF THE MOST OPEN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN ITS
HISTORY, AND POLLS SUGGEST

A TIGHT RACE.

--THE AUTONOMOUS FEDERAL ELECTORAL INSTITUTE (IFE) HAS DONE MUCH TO LEVEL THE POLITICAL PLAYING FIELD IN MEXICO AND ENSURE A FREE AND FAIR VOTE.

--THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT, THE IFE, AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEMSELVES HAVE WELCOMED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS-- A NUMBER OF WHOM HAVE ALREADY APPLIED FOR AND RECEIVED VISAS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

--WE ARE SUPPORTING OBSERVATION EFFORTS ORGANIZED THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE. THEY WILL BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH OTHER MEXICAN GROUPS OBSERVING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

--WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY REQUEST BY MEXICO THAT THE OAS FIELD OBSERVERS DURING THE ELECTIONS.

Q. WHY ARE WE SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION ACTIVITIES IF WE THINK THE VOTE WILL BE FREE AND FAIR?

--INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION HAS BECOME A STAPLE OF ELECTIONS IN MANY COUNTRIES; IT DOES NOT PREJUDGE THE FAIRNESS OF THE PROCESS, BUT IS A USEFUL MEANS TO VERIFY AND ILLUSTRATE THE TRANSPARENCY OF AN ELECTORAL PROCESS. IN THE CASE OF MEXICO, I NOTE AGAIN THAT IT IS THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF, AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES, WHO ARE ENCOURAGING THESE EFFORTS.

Drafted:
WHA/MEX - WMCILHENNY x78112

Cleared:
WHA/MEX - KWHITAKER OK
DRL - RWARD OK
USOAS - CROE (info)

Searamex/press/pg elections may 31 00

WHA Press Guidance
May 31, 2000

Peru: Reaction to Election Results

Q: Any further information on U.S. response to Sunday's presidential elections in Peru?

A: WE HAVE NOTHING NEW TO REPORT. AS WE STATED YESTERDAY, WE BELIEVE THAT, IN VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO ACCOMMODATE THE WELL-DOCUMENTED CONCERNS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES THAT THE PROCESS COULD NOT BE FREE AND FAIR, THAT SUNDAY'S ELECTORAL PROCESS WAS OBVIOUSLY FLAWED.

* WE BELIEVE OUR DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT THE TRANSPARENCY AND FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTIONS ARE SHARED BY OTHER COUNTRIES AND WE PLAN TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH OUR HEMISPHERIC PARTNERS. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IS HOLDING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL TODAY TO RECEIVE A REPORT FROM EDUARDO STEIN, DIRECTOR OF THE OBSERVER MISSION. WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THAT REPORT.

Q: Is the U.S. contemplating sanctions?

A: WE ARE CONSULTING WITH OUR PARTNERS IN THE HEMISPHERE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS. NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE AT THIS TIME. WE ARE NOT PRESENTLY CONSIDERING TAKING UNILATERAL ACTIONS.

Q: We understand representatives of Alejandro Toledo are in town. Is anyone in the Department meeting with them?

A: WE DO PLAN TO MEET WITH TOLEDO'S REPRESENTATIVES; WE HAVE NOT YET SET UP A MEETING.

Context: The Organization of American States will hold a special session of the Permanent Council today, beginning at 10:00, to hear reports from its election observer mission.

Searaand/andpe00/press guidance/May 31 update

Drafted: WHA/AND: E Weigold 7-4177 05/31/2000

Cleared: WHA/AND: P Chicola ok

DRL: P Higgins ok

USOAS: L Lauredo ok

P: L Arreaga ok

S/P: T Piccone ok

D: R Gilchrist ok

NSC: D Avery ok

WHA: W Brownfield

Statement by Ambassador Luis J. Lauredo
Special Session of the OAS Permanent Council
Concerning the OAS Electoral Observation Mission to Peru
May 31, 2000

The United States congratulates the OAS Electoral Observation Mission in Peru for the professionalism, courage and clarity with which it has carried out its objectives. In careful accordance with OAS procedures, the Mission set out to verify that the election process fulfilled basic international standards and norms of legitimacy and transparency. It made a series of recommendations to enhance confidence in the process and ensure that the election would represent the authentic will of the people. Unfortunately, the Peruvian authorities decided to proceed with elections without addressing the well-documented concerns of the OAS Electoral Mission and other international missions, including from the European Union. As a result, the Mission found the conditions did not meet basic international standards of fairness and transparency and that it could not in good faith monitor the results.

In particular, we express our appreciation for the role played by ex-Foreign Minister Eduardo Stein. From the beginning, he confronted situations of extreme political tension. He maintained the credibility and independence of the Mission, patiently working to bring differing parties to terms for improving democratic processes. This experience has called world-wide attention to the critical role played by the OAS in promoting and upholding democratic standards.

Free, fair, and open elections are the foundation of a democratic society. The attacks on democracy today are more subtle than ever, and therefore, more dangerous. The thing that unites us is our common embrace of democratic values and our shared responsibility to defend them when they are threatened.

The issue we face now is, how will the OAS respond to the situation in Peru? Given the importance of the issue presented, the United States believes the matter should be addressed by the Foreign Ministers in Windsor during the upcoming session of the General Assembly. In Article 3 of the Charter, the American States proclaimed as a guiding principle of the OAS that "the solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy." We believe that the proper context in which to analyze the issue under consideration is Resolution 1080, which was established in 1991 by the Foreign Ministers precisely for the purpose of discussing and addressing threats to democracy.

Resolution 1080 is the existing mechanism within the OAS framework for addressing an interruption of the democratic political institutional process. Resolution 1080 calls for the Permanent Council to "decide on and convene an ad hoc meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or special session of General Assembly" to examine the events and adopt any decisions deemed appropriate. We believe the present situation involving the flawed electoral process in Peru warrants examination by the Foreign Ministers in Windsor in this context. Accordingly, the United States proposes the convening of an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Windsor for the purpose of appropriate debate on this subject.

WHA Press Guidance
May 31, 2000

Cuba: Illegal Migrant Interception

Question: Details of the Coast Guard interception of illegal migrants? What happened to the Cubans?

Answer:

* WE REFER YOU TO U.S. COAST GUARD FOR THE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT ITSELF.
* WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO SAFE, LEGAL, AND ORDERLY MIGRATION FROM CUBA TO THE U.S.

* ON JUNE 27 WE WILL MEET WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IN NEW YORK, AS WE DO PERIODICALLY, TO REVIEW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING MIGRATION ACCORDS. THESE TALKS ARE TECHNICAL IN NATURE AND DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH MIGRATION MATTERS.

Context: U.S. Coast Guard District Seven released video footage yesterday from a Cuban migrant interdiction case that took place on May 24th that involved some use of force to compel the vessel to stop. The 12 migrants aboard a homemade raft were apparently unwilling to stop and hurled rocks at Coast Guard personnel and fended-off the Coast Guard's boats w/ bamboo poles as they attempted to approach the raft. The Coast Guard utilized Pepper Spray and fire hoses to compel compliance from the migrants.

Drafted by: N Torres 5/31/00 7-5224

Cleared by: WHA WRBrownfield(ok)
WHACCA CSShapiro (ok)
PA L Rodriguez (ok)
C SLSnyder (ok)
P L Arreaga-Rodas(ok)
CA C Lamora(info)
NSC C Hollis (ok)
INS J Jones (ok)
INR/ENT Kschultz (info)
USCG CCarter (ok)

WHA Press Guidance
May 31, 2000

Cuba: Elián

Question: How much has State spent on the Elián González issue?

Answer: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS HAD NO EXTRANEIOUS EXPENSES WHILE WORKING ON THE ELIÁN GONZÁLEZ CASE.

Context: The Miami Herald ran an article today stating that the federal government's tab for the Elián González case has reached nearly \$1.2 million -- including \$606,000 on security.

Drafted by: N Torres 05/31/2000 7-5224

Cleared by: WHA WRBrownfield(ok)
WHACCA CSShapiro (ok)
PA L Rodriguez (ok)
C SLSnyder (ok)
P L Arreaga-Rodas (ok)
CA C Lamora (info)

WHA Press Guidance
May 31, 2000

OAS: Head of Delegation to General Assembly

Q: Who is going to head the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Windsor, Ontario, Canada, June 4-6?

A: THE HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL BE KENNETH H. MACKAY, PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE AMERICAS.

* OTHER KEY MEMBERS WILL BE AMBASSADOR PETER F. ROMERO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS AND AMBASSADOR LUIS J. LAUREDO, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

Searaoas 00 GA Press Guidance on Head of del

Drafted: WHA/USOAS: JCTodd Ext 64764 5/31/00

Cleared: WHA/USOAS: RDGodard ok
WHA/PA: AKoss
WHA/FO: LGutierrez ok

AC Press Guidance
May 31, 2000

Tactical Nuclear Warheads

Q: Is the U.S. omitting tactical nuclear weapons from its arms control agenda?

A: --No. The U.S. and Russia have taken great strides to reduce deployed tactical nuclear weapons since 1991-92.

--While the so-called presidential Nuclear Initiatives are not legally binding, we remain firmly committed to them, as does Russia, according to FM Ivanov at the NPT Review Conference.

--We are exploring, as part of START III, "confidence building and transparency measures" relating to tactical nuclear weapons.

--At the NPT Review Conference, the U.S. and Russia agreed to "further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons ... as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process."

--The 1987 INF Treaty eliminated an entire class of non-strategic nuclear missiles.

Context: An op-ed piece in the International Herald Tribune calls on us to

legally codify the 1991-92 presidential nuclear initiatives (PNI's) with Russia and further address tactical nuclear weapons. Russia restated its PNI commitments at the just-concluded Non-Proliferation Treaty Revue Conference at the UN.

Press: tac nukes

#95316

Drafted: AC/SNI: TMcCudden 7-8368

Approved: AC: SVance - ok

Cleared: AC/PA: BWaters

T: JTimbie

EUR/PRA: AFriedt

AC/ST: RGromoll

AC: LFischer

AC/JCIC: AKuehne

81

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/09/2000 10:47:31 AM
FROM Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 06/09/2000
DECLASSIFYON 06/10/2010
SUBJECT Docs [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2007
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 2/7/2009
2006-1363-F(3)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Steve:

Hope this is what you want. If not, let me know.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Questions and Answers Arms Control.doc
Arms Control Questions and Answers

Principles Document

Q:

"Strategic stability ... mutual deterrence" - sounds a lot like the kind of
"old
think" that dominated the Cold War. What's new here?

A:

* Principles document is forward looking - talks squarely about new
threats to
our security, and the need to address these threats, including the
consideration
of changes to the ABM Treaty.

* At the same time, both the U.S. and Russia believe it is important to
preserve
the foundation for reducing the nuclear legacy of the Cold War.

* Strategic stability and mutual deterrence still matter in managing the strategic relationship between the world's two largest nuclear powers.

Q:

Aren't you locking in the next President to outmoded concepts by signing this document today?

A:

* These are not outmoded concepts, but important building blocks for managing our strategic relationship with Russia, today and in the future.

* Next president will obviously be free to pursue whatever policies he determines to be in our national interest.

* Expect the next President will also value a stable strategic relationship with Russia.

Cooperation

Q:

Did you discuss President Putin's proposals for cooperation?

A:

* The Presidents did discuss both U.S. and Russian proposals for working together to address ballistic missile threats.

* Dialogue has been ongoing for some time. U.S. has made wide-ranging proposals to work cooperatively with Russia on the missile defense issue. Russia has also made proposals. Intend to continue that dialogue.

* Hope to be able to move forward with further steps in the future. Signature of Shared Early Warning agreement is a good example.

START / ABM

Q:

Was there any progress made on the central issue of ABM adaptation or START III?

A:

* Good discussion; have agreed to intensify our discussions on both START III and ABM. Both sides interested in further defining the basic elements of START III.

* Expect dialogue to continue at Okinawa.

Treaty line

Q:

When, exactly, would the U.S. cross the ABM Treaty line with construction activity on its ABM?

A:

* We are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

Q:

If the President decides to go forward with NMD construction later this year, won't he have to notify U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty?

A:

* We are examining what options would be available to the President, should this question arise. We have not made any determination on this point.

Q:

Was the question of when the U.S. might cross the Treaty line discussed with Russia at the summit? What was their reaction?

A:

* We discussed this issue in general; however, I would not suggest to you they had a reaction on this point, as we have not made any determinations, or informed Russia of any conclusions.

Shared Early Warning

Q:

What is the objective of the shared early warning agreement?

A:

* Important agreement. Will strengthen strategic stability by further reducing risk that ballistic missiles might be launched based on false warning of an attack.

* Will also increase mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic missile early warning systems of both sides.

Q:

Is there a linkage between implementation of shared early warning and NMD/ABM?

A:

* No. Moreover, the type of information that would be shared would not be useful in guiding NMD interceptors.

2

2

6/3/10:30

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Supplementary Points on Arms Control.doc
Supplementary Points on Arms Control

Q:

Why should the Russians do ABM when Senator Helms says any agreement would be "dead on arrival" in the Senate?

A:

* Think an agreement to adapt the ABM Treaty to permit a limited

NMD, as well as
an agreement to reduce further nuclear arsenals, would be recognized
by our
Senate as being in our national interest.

Q:

Why are you so intent on concluding an agreement on ABM when
your presidency is
almost over?

A:

* The American people elect presidents for four-year terms, and they
are expected
to conduct foreign policy and act in the national interest for their
entire term.

Q:

Isn't a boost-phase intercept system, such as that proposed by
President Putin, a
better way to deal with the threat?

A:

* There are some advantages to a boost-phase system, as it can
intercept missiles
before they dispense countermeasures.

* But we don't think such a system can be a substitute for our NMD
program, which
is still the fastest, most affordable, and most advanced technology for
NMD.

Q:

But isn't their evidence that the tests for the current system were
rigged?

A:

* No there have been some allegations, but I'm confident I will get an
accurate
assessment of the system's technical feasibility prior to making any
decision on
deployment.

Q:

Why should Putin negotiate with you on START and ABM when Governor Bush is offering unilateral reductions in our nuclear arsenal?

A:

* I don't think an offer of unilateral action in this area is necessarily reassuring to anyone.

* Governor Bush's approach is basically a "do whatever you want" approach to managing strategic affairs, both on offense and defense.

* That's been tried before, and it led to an arms race that we are still trying to throttle down.

* The approach we have put forward would ensure that reductions in offense, as well as deployment of a limited NMD, would preserve stability, and enhance both sides' security.

Q:

Did you discuss technology sharing with the Russians? Is Russia one of the "civilized countries" you are prepared to share technology with?

A:

* We had a good discussion of the possibility for cooperation in this area. We have each made proposals, and we have asked our experts to look at this and report back to us at Okinawa.

Q:

But are you prepared to give your NMD to Russia?

A:

* What we need to do is look at the proposals we now have on the table, and see what we can agree to pursue. I think we can agree on more initiatives, like shared early warning, that will enhance both countries security.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/09/2000 1:38:18 PM

FROM Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: VP Arms Control/NMD Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Cullom, Philip H. (DEFENSE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (DEFENSE)
Metzinger, Erin M. (DEFENSE)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Witkowski, Anne A. (DEFENSE)

TEXT_BODY Matt -- call it an "unexpected windfall," but I have tacked on to the end of this most of the q/a's that we prepared during the President's trip to Europe ... Steve.

-----Original Message-----
From: Gobush,
Matthew N. (VP)
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2000 13:05 PM
To: @DEFENSE
- Defense Policy
Subject: VP Arms Control/NMD Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

Hans/Steve
- Could you please review the attached guidance on NMD for the VP?

He is interviewing with the NYT editorial board soon and we wanted to update his package. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT Arms Control-NMD PG 6-12-00.doc
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
CORE POINTS

- * Our policy on NMD and arms control seeks to further reduce Cold War nuclear dangers and address new threats to our security. Must deal with both of these challenges.
- * We are committed to development of a limited NMD system designed to counter the emerging ballistic missile threat from rogue states but does not jeopardize strategic stability with Russia. Expect the President to make a decision on NMD deployment later this year, taking into account four criteria: technical feasibility, threat, cost and national security, including arms control.
- * Our NMD program is designed to protect all 50 states from emerging ballistic missile threat from states like North Korea, Iran Iraq. Our proposed NMD is the fastest, most affordable and most technologically mature approach.
- * We are pursuing a START III agreement that will dramatically reduce deployed strategic arsenals -- an 80-percent reduction from Cold War peaks.
- * Nuclear unilateralism will hinder, not help, arms control. We must address new threats and continue to reduce Cold War arsenals in a way that preserves strategic stability and does not ignite a new global arms race. That means reductions through verifiable and reciprocal arms control agreements with the Russians, and modifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, not scrapping it, if at all possible.

TOUGH ISSUES

Why not a Star Wars-type missile defense to protect Americans from all nuclear attacks?

- * A Star Wars-type national missile defense would threaten strategic stability with the Russians and could ignite a new arms race, making American less, not more, secure.

* Moreover, the technology for a Star Wars-type missile defense does not currently exist, would take billions to develop, and could not be deployed in time to meet the threat from attack by rogue states.

Why not make unilateral reductions in our nuclear arsenal to show the Russians we mean no harm in going forward with a national missile defense?

* We have made substantial progress in reducing the nuclear threat since the end of the Cold War - removed 8,000-9,000 warheads from deployed status in the U.S. and Russia; destroyed over 2,000 missiles along with over 2,000 missile silos, submarine launchers and bombers; removed over 3000 nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan; detargeted missiles; brought START I into force, nearing entry into force of START II, and won agreement on a bold outline for START III.

* We have achieved these reductions through verifiable, reciprocal, and legally-binding agreements. It is critical that we continue to reduce nuclear stockpiles in this manner to preserve strategic stability.

* The Russians are unlikely to reduce their arsenals if our unilateral cuts are combined with a Star Wars-type missile defense, which the Russians view as a threat to their deterrent. On the contrary, the Russians are more likely to respond by taking steps to modernize and increase its nuclear force levels.

What's wrong with Putin's proposal for a European missile defense system?

* We are studying the Russian proposal now.

* We do want to cooperate with Russia and other states to combat missile threats, and we are prepared to continue to explore how that might be done. Have already put forward a number of proposals - like shared early warning - that was agreed

to last weekend in Moscow.

* We see Russia's proposal as a supplement to - not a substitute for - our NMD program.

What about China? Wouldn't a limited NMD neutralize their nuclear deterrent and possibly start a new arms race that could spread to India and Pakistan?

* Our NMD is not directed against China. It is directed against the emerging threat from states like North Korea, Iran or Iraq.

* China already plans to modernize its nuclear forces. Therefore, we do not believe that our NMD will negate China's deterrent.

* A Star Wars-type missile defense, however, would threaten the Chinese deterrent, and could ignite a regional nuclear arms race.

Q:

Why should the Russians do ABM when Senator Helms says any agreement would be "dead on arrival" in the Senate?

A:

* Think an agreement to adapt the ABM Treaty to permit a limited NMD, as well as an agreement to reduce further nuclear arsenals, would be recognized by our Senate as being in our national interest.

Q:

Why are you so intent on concluding an agreement on ABM when your administration is almost over?

A:

* The American people elect presidents and vice-presidents for four-year terms, and they are expected to conduct foreign policy and act in the national interest for their entire term.

Q:

Isn't a boost-phase intercept system, such as that proposed by President Putin, a better way to deal with the threat?

A:

* There are some advantages to a boost-phase system, as it can intercept missiles before they dispense countermeasures.

* But we don't think such a system can be a substitute for our NMD program, which is still the fastest, most affordable, and most advanced technology for NMD.

Q:

But isn't their evidence that the tests for the current system were rigged?

A:

* Know there have been some allegations, and we are reviewing those. But we intend to get an accurate assessment of the system's technical feasibility prior to making any decision on deployment.

Q:

Why should Putin negotiate with you on START and ABM when Governor Bush is offering unilateral reductions in our nuclear arsenal?

A:

* I don't think an offer of unilateral action in this area is necessarily reassuring to anyone.

* Governor Bush's approach is basically a "do whatever you want" approach to managing strategic affairs, both on offense and defense.

* That's been tried before, and it led to an arms race that we are still trying to throttle down.

* The approach we have put forward would ensure that reductions in

offense, as well as deployment of a limited NMD, would preserve stability, and enhance both sides' security.

Q:

Did the President discuss technology sharing with the Russians in Moscow? Is Russia one of the "civilized countries" you are prepared to share technology with?

A:

* There was a discussion of the possibility for cooperation in this area. We have each made proposals, and we have asked our experts to look at this and report back at Okinawa.

Q:

But are you prepared to give NMD to Russia?

A:

* What we need to do is look at the proposals we now have on the table, and see what we can agree to pursue. I think we can agree on more initiatives, like shared early warning, that will enhance both countries security.

Q:

The Principles Document agreed to in Moscow talks about "Strategic stability ... mutual deterrence" - sounds a lot like the kind of "old think" that dominated the Cold War. What's new here?

A:

* Principles document is forward looking - talks squarely about new threats to our security, and the need to address these threats, including the consideration of changes to the ABM Treaty.

* At the same time, both the U.S. and Russia believe it is important to

preserve
the foundation for reducing the nuclear legacy of the Cold War.

* Strategic stability and mutual deterrence still matter in managing the
strategic relationship between the world's two largest nuclear powers.

Q:

Aren't you locking in the next President to outmoded concepts by
signing this
document?

A:

* These are not outmoded concepts, but important building blocks for
managing our
strategic relationship with Russia, today and in the future.

* Next president will obviously be free to pursue whatever policies he
determines
to be in our national interest.

* Expect the next President will also value a stable strategic
relationship with
Russia.

Q:

Was there any progress made on the central issue of ABM adaptation
or START III
in Moscow?

A:

* Good discussion; have agreed to intensify our discussions on both
START III and
ABM. Both sides interested in further defining the basic elements of
START III.

* Expect dialogue to continue at Okinawa.

Q:

When, exactly, would the U.S. cross the ABM Treaty line with
construction
activity on its ABM?

A:

* We are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

Q:

If the President decides to go forward with NMD construction later this year,
won't he have to notify U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty?

A:

* We are examining what options would be available to the President, should this
question arise. We have not made any determination on this point.

Q:

Was the question of when the U.S. might cross the Treaty line discussed with
Russia at the summit? What was their reaction?

A:

* We discussed this issue in general; however, I would not suggest to you they
had a reaction on this point, as we have not made any determinations, or informed
Russia of any conclusions.

Q:

What is the objective of the shared early warning agreement?

A:

* Important agreement. Will strengthen strategic stability by further reducing
risk that ballistic missiles might be launched based on false warning of an
attack.

* Will also increase mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic
missile early warning systems of both sides.

Q:

Is there a linkage between implementation of shared early warning and NMD/ABM?

A:

* No. Moreover, the type of information that would be shared would not be useful in guiding NMD interceptors.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/16/2000 10:56:41 AM
FROM Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT June 16 Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

CARBON_COPY Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
Brzezinski, Mark F. (RUE)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Fishel, Eugene (Gene) M. (RUE)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Massey, Stephen M. (RUE/INTERN)
Medish, Mark C. (RUE)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)

TEXT_BODY Debt rescheduling, Pope, Gusinskiy. B

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT RUSSIA.doc
RUSSIA/GUSINSKIY ARREST
June 16, 2000

BACKGROUND: Vladimir Gusinskiy was formally charged with large scale fraud under Article 159 of the Russian Criminal Code. Investigators said he would not be released from jail. Russian President Putin said that Gusinskiy should be

covered by the recent amnesty for people decorated by the state for their services. Putin also reiterated his view that the media boss should not have gone to jail, but said he has no influence over the prosecution service.

Any comment on the formal charging of Russia media magnate Gusinskiy with large scale fraud? Any comment on Putin's observation that Gusinskiy might be eligible for amnesty? Is the Kremlin trying to muzzle Russia's nascent free press?

* Our Embassy in Moscow is in touch with Russian authorities and Media-MOST officials about Gusinskiy's arrest and incarceration. Gusinskiy has been charged and is being held in Moscow prison.

* Many Russian political figures and business leaders are saying Gusinskiy's arrest was politically motivated. We do not know all the facts yet, but at first glance, the Gusinsky arrest suggests an attempt at intimidation, not the rule of law.

* As President Clinton said yesterday, people should not "be arrested solely because of what they say in exercising their role as members of the press. ... the United States has to take a very firm position on that."

* President also pointed out that democracy is not "weakened by dissent even if it is unfair and sometimes even if it's false."

RUSSIA/EDMOND POPE

June 16, 2000

BACKGROUND: U.S. CITIZEN Edmond Pope is being held in Moscow on espionage charges. Mr. Pope's wife, Cheryl, has been a vocal critic of what she views as insufficient State Department efforts on her husband's behalf. Mrs. Pope has enlisted the assistance of US representatives Curt Weldon and John Peterson in pressing State for more action.

Any response to the claims by the wife of Edmond Pope, Cheryl Pope, that the State Department isn't doing enough on her husband's behalf?

* Concerned about Mr. Pope's situation and understand the frustration of his family that their loved one is incarcerated in a faraway place.

* Familiar with Mr. Pope's case and know that our Ambassador and other senior officials are raising the issue appropriately with Russian authorities.

* Refer any further questions to State Department for response.

RUSSIA/DEBT RESCHEDULING

June 16, 2000

BACKGROUND: In 1999, the U.S. and other Paris Club creditors reached agreement to reschedule debt payments on Russia's Soviet-era debt coming due in 1999 and 2000. Each creditor committed to negotiating and signing a bilateral agreement with Russia to implement the terms of the Paris Club rescheduling. The bilateral agreement with Russia which the U.S. signed on May 26, 2000 implements the Paris Club rescheduling agreed to by all creditors in 1999. In letters to President Clinton and the Secretary, Senator Helms and Rep. Gilman have announced that they

are placing a hold on our bilateral agreement with Russia to implement the terms of the 1999 Paris Club debt rescheduling. Unless these holds are lifted so the agreement can go into effect before July 1, 2000, Russia will have to make a \$155 million Lend-Lease payment that will, in effect, violate the terms of the 1999 Paris Club agreement, or lose its normal trade relations status (NTR).

Any comment on Senator Helms letter to Secretary Albright, and Rep. Gilman's piece in the Washington Post (06/16/2000) objecting to a debt rescheduling agreement for Russia?

* The U.S. has agreed to reschedule - not forgive - certain Russian debt payments in order to maximize the prospects for repayment of the debt Russia owes us.

* The bilateral agreement is not a new initiative; rather, it is a necessary step to implement an international commitment made to the Paris Club in August 1999 to reschedule those payments.

* A stable, democratic Russia with a market economy will contribute to our national security in many important ways.

* Debt rescheduling should not be used as a tool to punish Russia. Rather, a reasonable and considered approach to rescheduling Russia's indebtedness helps to advance Russia's economic stability overall by stabilizing its financial situation.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 06/19/2000 11:54:23 AM

FROM Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT June 19 NSC Press Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Anderson, Brooke D. (NSCCOMM)
Brown, Katherine A. (PRESS/INTERN)
Crowley, Philip J. (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hoelzer, Jennifer I. (PRESS/INTERN)
Stockwell, David B. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CARBON_COPY Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Beardsley, Tyler S. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H. (VP)
Fuerth, Leon S. (VP)
Gobush, Matthew N. (VP)
Hinckley, Steedman (VP)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Roberts, Michael W. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Woolston, Ann E. (VP)
Bayley, Douglas C. (WHSR)

Blackburn, John (WHSR)
Bresnahan, Gary E. (WHSR/STP)
Broadwick, Bonnie . (WHSR)
Crowder, Stevan D. (WHSR/STP)
Erdahl, Douglas M. (WHSR)
Fuchs, Joachim D. (WHSR)
Heyer, Scott C. (WHSR)
Laskowski, Gregory J. (WHSR)
McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)
Porterfield, Patrick C. (WHSR)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Reyes, David (WHSR)
Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
Rogers, Elizabeth B. (WHSR)
Sibley, Matthew W. (WHSR)
Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)

TEXT_BODY

@COMM: Please send attached ASAP to Joe Lockhart and Brooks
Bash - both travelling with the President. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

jun19gui2000_.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

June 19, 2000

RUSSIA/NIS

Russia/Gusinskiy Arrest (draft/updated)

Russia/Debt Rescheduling (new)

EUROPE

Montenegro/Draskovic Shooting

Deal on Milosevic (new)

INTERAMERICAN

Haiti (new)

AFRICA

Ethiopia/Eritrea (updated-SBTP)

ASIA

North-South Korea Summit

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

Iraq/No Fly Zones

TRANSNATIONAL

Cuban Boy (new)

Geneva Protocol (new)

LEGISLATION

Bill on International Criminal Court

DEFENSE

ABM Treaty

DRAFT

RUSSIA/GUSINSKIY ARREST

June 19, 2000

BACKGROUND: Vladimir Gusinskiy was formally charged with large scale fraud under Article 159 of the Russian Criminal Code, and on July 16 he was released from jail. Gusinskiy signed an agreement not to travel in exchange for his release. Russian President Putin said that Gusinskiy should be covered by the recent amnesty for people decorated by the state for their services. Putin also reiterated his view that the media boss should not have gone to jail, but said he has no influence over the prosecution service.

Any comment on Gusinsky's release from prison?

- * Pleased that Mr. Gusinskiy has been released.

- * It is an encouraging sign that President Putin and his government appear to be taking steps in the right direction to close this troubling chapter.

Any comment on the formal charging of Gusinskiy with large scale fraud? Any comment on Putin's observation that Gusinskiy might be eligible for amnesty? Is the Kremlin trying to muzzle Russia's nascent free press?

- * Concerned about any steps to intimidate the press. Our Ambassador in Moscow has been in touch with senior Russian officials and Media-MOST representatives about Gusinskiy's arrest.

- * As President Clinton said Wednesday, people should not "be arrested solely because of what they say in exercising their role as members of the press. ... the United States has to take a very firm position on that."

- * President also pointed out that democracy is not "weakened by dissent even if it is unfair and sometimes even if it's false."

RUSSIA/DEBT RESCHEDULING

June 16, 2000

BACKGROUND: In 1999, the U.S. and other Paris Club creditors reached agreement to reschedule debt payments on Russia's Soviet-era debt coming due in 1999 and

2000. Each creditor committed to negotiating and signing a bilateral agreement with Russia to implement the terms of the Paris Club rescheduling. The bilateral agreement with Russia which the U.S. signed on May 26, 2000 implements the Paris Club rescheduling agreed to by all creditors in 1999. In letters to President Clinton and the Secretary, Senator Helms and Rep. Gilman have announced that they are placing a hold on our bilateral agreement with Russia to implement the terms of the 1999 Paris Club debt rescheduling. Unless these holds are lifted so the agreement can go into effect before July 1, 2000, Russia will have to make a \$155 million Lend-Lease payment that will, in effect, violate the terms of the 1999 Paris Club agreement, or lose its normal trade relations status (NTR).

Any comment on Senator Helms letter to Secretary Albright, and Rep. Gilman's piece in the Washington Post (06/16/2000) objecting to a debt rescheduling agreement for Russia?

* The bilateral rescheduling agreement in question is not a new initiative. It is part of the implementation of the commitment by all Paris Club members in August 1999 to reschedule payments falling due in 1999 and 2000.

* In this connection, the U.S. has agreed to reschedule -- not forgive -- certain Russian debt payments in order to maximize prospects for repayment of the debts Russia owes us.

* For the record, note that these are Soviet-era Paris Club debts. Russia is servicing debts to the Paris Club incurred since the Russian Federation was formed.

DRASKOVIC SHOOTING IN MONTENEGRO

June 16, 2000

CONTEXT: This morning's Washington Post reports on the Thursday shooting of Serbian opposition leader Vuk Draskovic at his vacation home in Montenegro. Draskovic was reportedly slightly injured when unknown assailants shot into his apartment. According to the report, the wounds are not life threatening and he is recovering. This is the second apparent attempt on Draskovic's life; last

year he narrowly escaped injury when his car was run off the road by another vehicle. It is also the second shooting of a prominent figure in Montenegro in the last few weeks. Last month, Goran Zugic, security advisor to Montenegrin President Djukanovic, was murdered by unknown assailants. The article does not accuse the Milosevic regime of responsibility, but notes that this attack follows a number of assassinations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over the last few months.

What is your reaction to the attempted assassination of Serbian opposition leader Vuk Draskovic?

* First of all we wish Mr. Draskovic a speedy recovery. We understand the wounds are not life threatening.

* The shooting is indicative of the climate of violence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that Milosevic has fostered.

* There have been a number of unexplained murders in Serbia over the last several months. In addition the Milosevic regime has launched a harsh crack down on the political opposition. Those who have spoken out against Milosevic have been arrested; students demanding democratic change have been beaten.

* This latest incident should be thoroughly investigated to determine who was behind the attempted assassination, but it is clearly part and parcel of the climate of fear and violence Milosevic has created.

DEAL ON MILOSEVIC

June 19, 2000

Context: The New York Times reports this morning that the U.S. is exploring with

some of its NATO allies and Russia the possibility that Milosevic be permitted to leave office with guarantees for his safety. The article acknowledges that the U.S. is not preparing any offer to Milosevic and will not make one, but speculates that the Administration would have to think hard about saying no to such a deal if one emerged. (FYI. State is adding in to their background section that it is natural there would be speculation of this kind as the signs multiply that the Milosevic regime is beginning to come to a close.)

Are you willing to entertain a solution that removes Milosevic from power without having him face trial in The Hague?

- * U.S. policy has not changed. Milosevic should be brought to justice in The Hague.

- * The news report itself makes clear that the U.S. is not preparing any deal.

Have you discussed this with other countries?

- * The U.S. has certainly discussed Milosevic and the situation in the FRY with its NATO allies and with Russia. These conversations, however, have focused on ways of bringing Milosevic to justice and democracy to Serbia.

- * Milosevic's rule has been disastrous for the Serbian people; GDP is half of what it was a decade ago, independent media is being curtailed, and the attack on opposition leader Draskovic last week is indicative of the climate of violence that Milosevic and his regime have fostered.

Would you rule it out if it were presented as a fait accompli?

- * We're not going to get into hypotheticals. We want to see Milosevic in The Hague, not in the United States.

(if asked) Have other countries floated this idea past you?

- * We have not seen any proposals along these lines from other countries.

HAITI

June 19, 2000

CONTEXT: On May 21 Haitians went to the polls in record numbers to cast ballots in local and legislative elections. The elections were largely peaceful. The post election period, however, has been marked with difficulties. The Organization of American States (OAS) Observer Mission review of the tabulation process revealed a serious error in the counting method for the Senate vote. The method used by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) clearly favored a first round victory for former President Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party candidates. The Government of Haiti has so far refused to accept the OAS recommendation to recount the vote. Aristide also is unwilling to compromise and has declared the OAS recommendation an "electoral coup d'etat." The opposition parties are calling for an annulment and boycott of the second round.

On June 15 President Preval summoned the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and demanded its endorsement of the flawed May 21 elections results. CEP President Leon Manus refused to acquiesce and fearing for his safety sought refuge with the German Ambassador. On June 17 Manus and his wife transited through the Dominican Republic en route to the United States. He is currently in Boston where his daughter resides.

NSC Senior Director Arturo Valenzuela and Haiti Special Coordinator Don Steinberg are in Haiti. They will meet with President Preval, former President Aristide, and opposition party leaders to try to resolve the electoral crisis.

What can you tell us about the flight of election chief from Haiti over the weekend? Was his life in danger?

* It is our understanding that the President of Haiti's Electoral Council left Haiti on Saturday and is presently in the United States. I have no information about threats to his personal safety.

Does this mean that the elections are invalid?

* The Organization of American States observer mission's review of the election results revealed a serious error in the way the Senate vote was counted. The OAS is working with the GOH to rectify this error. It is our belief that once this problem is resolved then the elections as a whole will be validated.

[IF ASKED] Has the Administration sent a mission to Haiti to deal with the election crisis?

* NSC Senior Director Arturo Valenzuela and Haiti Special Coordinator Don Steinberg are in Haiti for high level meetings that will deal with the elections and other issues important to our bilateral relationship.

ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

June 15, 2000

BACKGROUND: The Ethiopian Prime Minister announced on Wednesday that, given formal approval by the Council of Ministers, Ethiopia officially accepts the OAU proposal for a cessation of hostilities, negotiated by the OAU in proximity talks with both parties earlier this month. Eritrea accepted the proposal on June 10. Special Envoy Tony Lake participated in the Algiers talks on behalf of the United States and at the request of the OAU, as did the EU Special Envoy. Algeria has informed us that the formal signing of the cessation agreement will be on Sunday morning, June 18. Lake will attend the signing, and the next round of negotiations, expected to begin immediately thereafter. The State Department is not/not issuing a new statement on the Ethiopian acceptance. We do plan to issue a POTUS statement timed to the actual signing.

In terms of further background, some important points to note:

The OAU has been leading the international effort to end this conflict for almost two years. The United States has been involved since the conflict began in May, 1998, and when A/S Rice led a shuttle diplomacy effort with Rwandan governments (the Ethiopians and Eritreans requested our joint involvement at the time).

For the last year, the OAU effort has been led by the Algerians (current Chair)

and entailed the personal involvement of President Bouteflika as well as untiring efforts by the former Prime Minister and now Minister of Justice, Ahmed Ouyahia.

Tony Lake became involved at the request of the President in October 1998, and has since made at least 8 trips to the region and/or Algiers, including to engage in shuttle diplomacy. He was in Algiers for the round of talks leading to the cessation agreement, which ran for two weeks. He will now depart for Algiers to attend the signing and in support of the next round of OAU-led negotiations on a comprehensive peace agreement.

The cessation agreement includes an end to hostilities, provisions for Ethiopian withdrawal, and the creation of a peacekeeping mission. The Algiers talks were led by the OAU, with the strong support of the United States and the involvement of the EU's Special Envoy (Italian Minister Serri), and were conducted by proximity between delegations led on both sides by the parties' foreign ministers.

The State Department issued a statement on June 10 welcoming Eritrea's acceptance of the OAU proposal for a cessation of hostilities agreement, expressing hope that Ethiopia would promptly accept, praising the Algerian role, and noting that given the stated commitments of both parties, the U.S. sees no justification for continued fighting. Fighting has continued, however, though we hope and expect that it will now cease.

Message: The acceptance by Eritrea and now Ethiopia of the OAU's proposal for a cessation of hostilities marks significant progress in a two year effort to peacefully resolve their conflict. This mutual acceptance is also an important step towards final resolution of the dispute. This important step means that the two parties have committed themselves to stopping the violence and killing, and that they can now get to work on resolving remaining issues peacefully and through political means.

Core Points:

- * Following a meeting of their Council of Ministers on Wednesday, Ethiopia has

announced its formal acceptance of the OAU's proposal for a cessation of hostilities. With Eritrea already having accepted, this means that we have real progress in a two-year effort to resolve the conflict between these two countries.

* This comes after two weeks of very intense negotiations in Algiers and there's more work ahead.

* This breakthrough means that the two sides have committed themselves to stop the killing. The cessation agreement could pave the way for a final, peaceful settlement.

* The OAU, and particularly the government of Algeria and its lead mediator, Minister Ahmed Ouyahia (WHOA-YHA-YHIA) deserve an enormous amount of credit for their persistent and dedicated efforts to end this tragic war.

* The U.S. has been actively involved in efforts to end this conflict since May 1998 when, at the request of both governments, Assistant Secretary Rice led a shuttle diplomacy effort with a Rwandan team. We have strongly supported the OAU's involvement and each round of mediation. We have worked closely with Minister Ouyahia on an almost daily basis over the last 12 months.

* Tony Lake was present in Algiers in support of the OAU proximity talks that led to the proposal for a cessation of hostilities, and will return to Algiers for the signing, and to support the next round of negotiations.

* The OAU is aiming for the two parties to formally sign the cessation of hostilities agreement in Algiers this weekend, and then negotiations on the peace agreement will begin.

* The next stage of negotiation will build on the areas of agreement reached over the past two years, including Eritrea's acceptance of the OAU's Technical Arrangements last July, and the understanding reached between Ouyahia and Lake with the Ethiopians in March. Differences remain, however, and will have to be negotiated during the next round.

Why has the fighting continued if the two sides now agree to cease hostilities?

* The United States has made clear that we see no justification for continued fighting.

What does the agreement include?

* The agreement includes provisions for the full cessation of hostilities, for Ethiopian withdrawal, and for a security zone and UN peacekeeping mission, and provisions for demining.

What are the issues in the next phase of negotiations?

* The most significant issues are a formal ceasefire and the formal delimitation and demarcation of their common border, mechanisms for arbitration of compensation claims, and an investigation into the origins of the conflict.

* The next stage of negotiation will build on the areas of agreement reached over the past two years, including Eritrea's acceptance of the OAU's Technical Arrangements last July, and the understanding reached between Ouyahia and Lake with the Ethiopians in March. Differences remain, however, and will have to be negotiated during the next round.

Will the U.S. support a new peacekeeping mission as part of the agreement? How big will it be? Is it true that it includes a buffer zone?

* The agreement does call for the creation of a security zone.

* The particulars of a peacekeeping mission must be considered by the UN and the OAU.

* The OAU's plans have always assumed the need for some sort of peacekeeping operation. The United States intends to consider ways we can help to consolidate and support implementation of the agreement between the two parties.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 18, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today in Algiers, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed an agreement to cease hostilities. This is a breakthrough which can, and should end the tragic conflict in the Horn of Africa. It can, and should permit these two countries to realize their potential in peace, instead of squandering it in war.

I commend the Organization of African Unity, and especially its chair Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, for leading the negotiation of this agreement. I am grateful to my envoy, former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, to Assistant Secretary of State Susan Rice and to my senior advisor on African Affairs Gayle Smith for their tireless pursuit of a peaceful resolution to this conflict. The United States has supported the OAU in this effort and we will continue to do so. I have asked Tony Lake to return to Algiers to work with the OAU as we enter the next round of negotiations.

I hope this commitment by Ethiopia and Eritrea to stop the fighting also signals their commitment to build the peace. I urge them to use the next round of talks to produce a final, comprehensive, lasting agreement, so they can get on with the work of pursuing democracy and development for their people. Ethiopia and Eritrea are America's friends. If they are ready to take the next step, we and our partners in the international community will walk with them.

#

NORTH-SOUTH KOREA SUMMIT
June 14, 2000

The presidents of North and South Korea met in Pyongyang for a second day of talks. What was the results of these talks? When does the President plan to finalize the lifting of sanctions that you announced last fall? Is his decision tied to a successful summit?

* We understand that President Kim Dae-jung and his counterpart General Kim Chong-il met yesterday (June 14 Korea time) and spent more than 3 hours in talks. They have agreed in principle to a number of issues to pursue, but I would refer you to the South Korean Embassy for those details. We are very pleased with the conduct of the summit and congratulate both leaders for their bold decision to meet.

* Believe dialogue between the North and South is key to reducing tensions.

* On sanctions, as we mentioned last week in Tokyo, we have been working to change the regulations that will allow the sanctions easing measures we announced last September to become effective. The work is almost finished and the results will be announced shortly. The decision to ease sanctions was made last September and is not related to the North-South summit currently underway.

Are we satisfied that President Kim will satisfactorily address U.S. concerns about missile and nuclear issues? In light of the Summit, are we concerned that our engagement with North Korea will be put on the backburner?

* The President has complete confidence in President Kim and does not have any concerns on any of the issues of common concern we share with South Korea. What do we think of Putin going to North Korea?

* We welcome reports that Russian President Putin will visit North Korea. We all share the desire for a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula and are confident that President Putin's trip will contribute to that goal.

If pressed] Do we think he'll try to do something that will forestall the North Korean threat and thereby make NMD unnecessary?

* Can't speculate on any the specifics that might be addressed during President Putin's visit to North Korea.

Can you confirm that you will be easing sanctions on North Korea on June 19?

* The President announced his decision to ease some sanctions against the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea), administered under the Trading With the Enemy Act, Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations in September last year.

* He took that action in order to pursue improved overall relations with North Korea, support the Agreed Framework, and as a result of U.S.-North Korean discussions in Berlin September 7-12, 1999.

* In Berlin, the North Koreans assured us that it will continue to refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind as both sides move toward more normal relations.

* Since Berlin we have been working on an interagency basis to put the necessary regulatory changes in place. We are close to finishing that work and would expect that we will be able to implement the President's decision soon.

* No comment on a specific date, that will depend on when we actually finish the necessary work. When it is finished it will be published in the Federal Register.

[If pressed for details on what the sanctions mean]

* The easing of sanctions will allow most consumer goods to be available for export to North Korea and will allow the importation of most North Korean-origin goods into the United States. To support this easing of sanctions in the trade of goods, most personal and commercial funds transfers will be allowed between U.S. and North Korean persons. The relaxation of transportation restrictions will allow commercial air and sea transportation between the U.S. and North Korea for passengers and cargo, subject to normal regulatory requirements.

* This easing of sanctions does not affect our counterterrorism or

nonproliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibit exports of military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of U.S. assistance. Statutory restrictions, such as U.S. missile sanctions, will remain in place. Restrictions on North Korea based on multilateral arrangements also will remain in place, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 15, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The historic summit between President Kim Dae-Jung and Chairman Kim Chong-il marks an initial, hopeful step toward peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. I welcome the agreements the two leaders reached on humanitarian and economic cooperation and on a future summit in Seoul, and hope that both sides will continue down this promising path. I applaud Kim Dae-Jung's persistence and wisdom as he has moved, soberly and realistically, to improve relations with the North. President Kim and I have consulted very closely on this issue, and I look forward to supporting his future initiatives toward lasting peace and full reconciliation.

#

IRAQ: NO FLY ZONES
June 16, 2000

Why does the U.S. maintain No-Fly Zones over northern and southern Iraq?

- * Coalition aircraft enforce the No-Fly Zones to prevent the Iraqi regime from using air power against its civilian population - which they did with great brutality to crush popular resistance to the regime in the years after the Gulf War.

What is the legal basis for the No-Fly Zones?

- * Coalition aircraft enforce the No-Fly Zones pursuant to UNSC Resolution 688 which demands that Iraq cease the repression of its people.

Are the No-Fly Zones serving any purpose?

- * Yes. Before the NFZs were established Iraqi aircraft often attacked civilian targets. The NFZs now prevent them from doing so.

Why are you bombing in the No-Fly Zones?

- * Since Operation Desert Fox, Saddam has ordered his air defense forces to try to shoot down one of our planes enforcing the No-Fly Zones.

- * When Iraqi forces threaten our aircraft our pilots defend themselves.

- * These skirmishes could end tomorrow if Iraq stopped shooting at Coalition aircraft.

What about these stories of civilian casualties?

- * Coalition pilots enforcing the No-Fly Zones take extraordinary measures to avoid civilian casualties. Our pilots never initiate attacks - they only respond to Iraqi threats. Targets are carefully chosen so as to minimize the possibility of civilian casualties. Precision-guided munitions and other weapons specifically designed to minimize collateral damage are used to achieve the maximum possible accuracy once the targets are chosen.

* On the other hand, the Iraqi regime goes to great lengths to cause civilian casualties. They position air defense equipment near civilian-inhabited areas and then fire at our aircraft to try to increase the probability of civilian casualties.

* The Iraqis also exaggerate the civilian casualties caused by our responses, and often blame our responses for casualties caused by their own forces.

* For example: On May 17, 2000 Iraqi officials accused Coalition aircraft of causing the civilian casualties near An Najaf (reported in the Post story). No Coalition aircraft expended any ordnance that day. Any casualties on that day could only have been caused by Iraqi fire.

* On many other occasions when Iraq has asserted the existence of civilian casualties in populated areas, we were able to track precisely each dropped in response to Iraqi provocations and determine with certainty that all munitions hit valid military targets.

* For example: On May 29, the Iraqis claim that civilian casualties were caused by ordnance dropped by Coalition aircraft against targets near Bashiqa. We know that all munitions dropped in response to Iraqi threats on this day landed in the immediate vicinity of valid military targets. Any casualties on that day could only have been caused by Iraqi fire.

(If Presed)

* I would refer you to the Pentagon for additional details.

CUBAN BOY

June 15, 2000

CONTEXT: Yesterday, the Miami relatives of Elian Gonzalez announced their intention to ask the full 11th Circuit court of appeals to review the decision issued two weeks ago by a three-judge panel of that court. In that decision, the court ruled that the INS had acted within the bounds of its discretion in determining that Elian's father has sole legal authority to speak for his son in

immigration matters. The petition for rehearing must be filed by today.

What's your reaction to the decision by Elian's Miami relatives to seek rehearing of the appeals court ruling by the full court?

* This is, of course, part of our legal process. What is most important is that Elian has been reunited with his father.

What do you make of their legal arguments in their petition?

* Justice will be reviewing the petition once it is filed. I would direct you to the Justice Department for more information.

Isn't it time for Elian and his family to go to home to Cuba?

* We are pleased that Elian has been reunited with his father and hopeful that the legal proceedings will be resolved soon.

When will injunction on Elian's family returning to Cuba be lifted?

* We refer you to the Justice Department on that issue.

GENEVA PROTOCOL

June 16, 2000

Who hasn't joined the Geneva Protocol or the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions? What is the Administration doing to deal with this problem?

* Today, some seventy-five years after it was first opened for signature, 145 countries are parties to the Geneva Protocol, which outlaws the use in war of chemical and biological weapons.

* The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention has 143 parties and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention has 135 parties. These agreements build upon the Geneva Protocol by extending the ban on use to include development, production and possession.

* We believe that it is in the national security interest of all countries to join these three agreements, which together create an absolute ban on all offensive chemical and biological weapons activities.

* Many countries of proliferation concern have joined these important nonproliferation agreements.

* We continue to urge all countries to do so, particularly those countries in regions such as the Middle East that are underrepresented in these agreements.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 17, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Seventy-five years ago today, June 17, 1925, the international community took a major step toward protecting the world from the dangers of weapons of mass destruction by concluding the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In the aftermath of the terrible casualties caused by poison gas in World War I, the Geneva Protocol banned the use in war of chemical and biological weapons.

More recently, the international community has worked to build on this achievement. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) banned the development, production and possession of biological and toxin weapons, and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) did the same for chemical weapons. Today,

135 countries are parties to the CWC, and 143 are parties to the BWC. The United States has ratified both agreements, and our commitment to them has enjoyed strong bipartisan support.

Today, one of the greatest threats to American and global security is the danger that adversary nations or terrorist groups will obtain and use chemical or biological weapons. The international agreements we have reached banning these weapons are a critical component of our effort to protect against this threat.

In my 1998 State of the Union address, I called on the international community to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention with a new international inspection system to help detect and deter cheating. Significant progress has been made in Geneva at the Ad Hoc Group of BWC States Parties toward achieving this goal. We urge all participants in this process to work toward the earliest possible conclusion of a BWC Protocol that will further strengthen international security.

On this 75th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol, I call on the countries of the world who have not yet done so to join the Geneva Protocol, CWC and BWC. I call on all parties to strictly adhere to these agreements and to work to strengthen them. It is more urgent than ever that, true to the words of the Geneva Protocol, their prohibitions "shall be universally accepted.... binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations."

#

BILL ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT June 15, 2000

CONTEXT: A bill is expected to be introduced today in Congress that would bar all US cooperation with the ICC, including arrests, extradition, intelligence sharing and financial and technical assistance, unless the Senate ratifies the treaty that establishes the ICC. The bill would prohibit military aid to any

country that has ratified the treaty, with exceptions only for NATO and a few key US allies. It would also require that the ICC grant immunity to US personnel in order for them to participate in any UN peacekeeping mission. The bill will be introduced by Helms and Warner in the Senate and by DeLay and Spence in the House. Ninety-seven countries have signed the treaty; 12 have ratified to date.

What is your comment on the GOP bill that would bar U.S. cooperation with the ICC unless the Senate ratifies the Treaty establishing the Court?

* The U.S. is actively pursuing the very objective that is of such concern to Members of Congress: We are seeking to ensure that personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces are not subject to surrender to the Court while the U.S. is a non-party to the Rome Treaty.

* A. U.S. delegation is currently pressing this objective at the UN Preparatory Commission negotiations in New York. These negotiations, the latest in a series convened on the ICC, last through June 30.

* We would be concerned about any legislation that could impose non-cooperation with the ICC, especially if the Preparatory Commission adopts provisions that address our fundamental concerns about the Treaty, which our delegation to the Commission is actively striving to achieve.

* Provided we reach agreement on the non-surrender of U.S. military personnel while the U.S. is not a party to the Treaty, we envision that there will be circumstances in our national interest where we would want to seize the opportunity to lend appropriate support to the International Criminal Court.

What is the substance of the U.S. proposal regarding the ICC?

* The U.S. proposal for the ICC would allow the Court to request the surrender of a non-party national acting under the overall direction of his state and whose action is acknowledged by such state, only if the non-party state consents to such surrender or under certain other conditions.

* Our proposal does not amend the Treaty. Our proposal would be part of an international agreement between the United Nations and the Court that is required by the Rome Treaty. It pertains only to procedures of the Court.

What does the international community gain if the U.S. proposal is accepted?

* If our proposal is adopted, and if a bill such as the one being introduced in Congress today does not pass, we would be able to become a "good neighbor" to the Court. That means a lot of the support we provide to the existing ad hoc international criminal tribunals could be made available to the ICC, even though the U.S. would not be a party to the Treaty. That support will be critical if the ICC is to be an effective court.

* (If asked:) Such support could include enforcement (including apprehension of suspects), information-sharing, witness relocation, expert personnel, voluntary financial contributions, and diplomatic support.

ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION

June 15, 2000

CONTEXT: The NYT is reporting that Administration lawyers have advised President Clinton that he could begin work on an ABM radar in Alaska without violating the ABM Treaty.

BACKGROUND ONLY: Administration lawyers have advised senior policy makers that a continuum of options are legally available, but policymakers, including the President, have not made a "determination" regarding which option to adopt.

Core points

* We have not made a determination as to when work on an ABM radar in Alaska

would violate the ABM Treaty. We do not need to confront this issue at this time.

- * The Treaty itself does not provide a definition of what constitutes "breach," so it is prudent for us to examine what the possible interpretations might be.

- * There are a range of interpretations available; but no decision has been made.

Did the White House request a legal review on NMD implications for ABM treaty?

- * Everyone who is working on this issue agrees this analysis is necessary to inform a decision on NMD deployment; and we have been looking at this for some time.

- * Indeed, we are looking at all of the relevant factors within the four criteria we have outlined -- technical feasibility, cost, the threat, and national security, including the implications for arms control and various treaties.

When, exactly, would the U.S. cross the ABM Treaty line with construction activity on its ABM?

- * We are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

Was the question of when the U.S. might cross the Treaty line discussed with Russia at the summit? What was their reaction?

- * We have had preliminary discussions on this issue; however, I would not suggest to you they had a reaction on this point, as we have not made any determinations, or informed Russia of any conclusions.

Isn't it a moot point what our legal interpretation is if the Russians reject it?

Wouldn't Russia's rejection mean the U.S. would be in breach of the Treaty?

* Underscore again we have not made any determinations, or informed Russia of any conclusions.

* Our focus is to continue to work with Russia to adapt the ABM Treaty to allow for the deployment of a limited NMD.

* Not going to speculate on "what ifs."

Has the President been briefed on this analysis by the lawyers?

* Not going to comment on who has been briefed; as I said, we are examining this issue, but have not made a determination.

If the President decides to go forward with NMD construction later this year, won't he have to notify U.S. intent to withdraw from the Treaty?

* We are examining what options would be available to the President, should this question arise. We have not made any determination on this point.