

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Mary DeRosa to Fulton Armstrong. Subject: FW: Cuba Package #8044. (8 pages)	01/04/1999	P1/b(1)
002. email	Michael Orfini to Richard Saunders. Subject: FW: Cuba Package. (7 pages)	01/05/1999	P1/b(1)
003. email	Theodore Osius to Richard Saunders. Subject: Prescott Meeting Paper. (11 pages)	01/24/1999	P1/b(1)
004. email	David Sandalow to Theodore Osius and Richard Saunders. Subject: Prescott / Climate Change. (12 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)
005. email	Theodore Osius to Richard Saunders. Subject: Prescott bilateral paper. (16 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)
006. email	Theodore Osius to Richard Saunders and Leslie Davidson. Subject: Prescott meeting paper -- updated. (16 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/16/1998-01/26/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 12/16/98 9:44:07 PM
FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT December 16 Berger Press Briefing on Air Strikes in Iraq
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
Malinowski, Tomasz P.
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Press Briefing
December 16 Berger Press Briefing on Air Strikes
in Iraq

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 16, 1998

PRESS BRIEFING BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER

The Briefing Room

7:18 P.M. EST

MR. BERGER: You've heard a good deal over the last hour or so from the President, Secretary Cohen, General Shelton, Secretary Albright. I want basically take your questions.

Let me simply reconstruct some recent history and take you back to November 14th when the President decided to pause to halt the military strike when Saddam Hussein essentially caved into the demand that we had made that he full cooperate with UNSCOM.

At that time, as you recall, Saddam, the Iraqi officials sent a letter to the Security Council indicating that they would commit to full and uncondit

cooperation with UNSCOM. And the President on November 15, when said he was pausing or staying the military action, was very clear that he wanted to t whether or not Saddam Hussein would, in fact, comply with the commit he had made. And he outlined five criteria with which that would be judged.

And I would point out that on the night of November 14 -- 13, I guess -- the last thing that we put in place was a phone call at 3:00 a.m. in the morning to Secretary Annan to make clear that these were the -- these five eleme

compliance were the same way in which he saw compliance. And he sai that that was, in fact, the case. And they involved resolving all outstanding issues with UNSCOM, giving inspectors unfettered access, turning over all relevant documents, acceptance of all WMD resolutions and non-interference with the weapo inspectors. And Prime Minister Blair and the President on the 14th and made it very clear that they needed then to test that proposition.

On the 17th of November, UNSCOM began to test Iraq's cooperation. I timetable for that effort was established by UNSCOM and its Chairman, Richard Butler. It completed its work on Sunday and reported to the Council yesterday. UNSCOM's conclusion is unambiguous. Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November. They wrote -- the report noted that, "Iraq's conduct en

that no progress was able to be made in the field of disarmament." And finally, perhaps most significantly, that "the Commission's not able to conduct i substantive disarmament work." In short, the Commission has essentially said it's not able to function. It has been essentially eviscerated.

Under these circumstances, the President, I believe had no choice but to military action. He proceeded on the recommendation of all of his national security advisors, and in particular, the recommendation of his military advisors, that if he acted he should do so swiftly with the least possible warning and the greatest degree of surprise for the greatest degree of effectiveness of the strikes themselves.

Now, the President and the Secretary have outlined the objectives here. objectives of this military action are to attack his weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery production capability and to attack his military capability to threaten his neighbors and, in so doing, to degrade both. And the mission will continue until such time as we believe the objectives have been completed.

Q If I could follow up on that, the President said, talking about timing, as one of the reasons for acting today, he wanted to avoid initiating a military strike during Ramadan, or words to that effect. Does that suggest, since Ramadan will start in four or five days, that this will be completed, or can you coordinate a military strike during Ramadan?

MR. BERGER: Well, there is no artificial deadline for this action. The President expressed the sensitivity that we have to the holy month of Ramadan and said in particular that he understood that initiating military action during that period would be particularly offensive. But, as I say, there is no -- I'm not going to specify how long this will go on.

Q Then you're suggesting that it might be continued then, by emphasizing that the initiating was the key word.

MR. BERGER: I would not rule that out.

Q Sandy, would you respond to this, which has already been reported, that the air strikes, that the attack itself will end before Ramadan begins -- that's reported -- and I want to ask you how you can conceive of this as more than a so-called slap on the wrist or pin prick -- how it can be possibly equated with what was advertised a month ago as a massive strike severely punishing Saddam? You can't do it in three days, can you?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think that this is a substantial military action. I don't want to discuss the details of it. It is no less than what we had contemplated.

in November.

Q In duration?

MR. BERGER: I'm not going to discuss duration. Nor did we discuss duration in November. But I believe this will be a substantial strike, and I believe, hopefully, it will accomplish its objectives. Now that UNSCOM is not c

ground to help detect WMD and to be a deterrent against WMD reconstitution, we will seek to do, through air strikes, some of that work. It's obviously not good as UNSCOM, but there is certainly a diminution in his capability t we can effectuate. And, by hitting his military infrastructure, we can reduce his ability to threaten his neighbors.

Q Is this the end of UNSCOM, then? Are you talking about, now, a poli military containment? And if not, what are you looking for from Saddam this point?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think it's very important to recognize -- let me s: this first. If, at some point, Saddam Hussein were to decide to allow UNSCC back in and to cooperate with it fully, that would be a welcome development. I t it is a highly unlikely development.

But the fact of the matter is, UNSCOM has been ineffective for some tir And that's what Richard Butler said on Tuesday. He said, we can't do our job And for UNSCOM, it can stay in Baghdad, but it's a sham, is essentially wha

saying, because of the deception; because of the tactics and techniques t have been escalating, particularly over the last year. It is ineffectual; it is not able to do its job by its own judgment. And therefore, to have a Potemki UNSCOM in Iraq doesn't make much sense. It doesn't provide much deterrence agz WMD activity.

Q But I don't understand how this will. I mean, can military containmen provide an effective means to limit his building of weapons of mass destruction?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think there have been several elements to a containment policy. I think there have been basically four. One has been the economic sanctions, which we will endeavor to maintain in place. Those have dep

Saddam Hussein of \$120 billion that he would otherwise have to reconstruct his military. Not just WMD; his tanks, everything else. Unless he's in full compliance with the resolutions, and there's no -- that doesn't seem to be over the horizon, we will seek to maintain the sanctions.

Number two, we've sought to maintain UNSCOM as a mechanism to help detect and deter the reconstitution of his WMD program. Number three, we've had credible threat of force, which says, basically, if you act recklessly; if you threaten your neighbors, we're going to act. And number four, we've tried to hold together the support from the region and from other key allies.

If UNSCOM is essentially ended by Saddam Hussein, and if we take no action as a result, two of those four elements have been destroyed -- UNSCOM and threat of force. Because the threat of force will be meaningless if, under these circumstances, the President did not act.

Q Sandy, had you had the plan already set up that, if Butler's report came back as you probably expected that it would come back, that this attack could at this time? It didn't take you very long to start the attack. Was this already in the planning stages?

MR. BERGER: We began planning for this on November 15th, after the episode. We did so by putting our forces in a position and in a posture that could act very quickly. We knew soon thereafter that there would be a series of inspections roughly during this week. I don't know that we had a judgment to whether Saddam Hussein would comply. I mean, one would think that at the end of this, had there been full cooperation, there would have been a comprehensive review in the U.N. to look at all of his compliance that maybe for three weeks he could have figured out a way to comply.

It suggests to me, and it suggests to the President, that he has no intention of complying. Even when three weeks down the road had he complied and cooperated,

he would have had a comprehensive review, which would have looked at
of the
issues.

Q What do you say to the Republican critics who are spitting mad about
they think it's to distract from impeachment. Eagleburger said it smells t
high
heaven. Trent Lott is against it and so forth. I mean, is there -- can you
appease them in any way?

MR. BERGER: Well, I could only say this, that this in an action taken b
President solely on the basis of his best judgment of what is in the nation
security interest of the United States, both with respect to the action and
swiftness with which he acted after Butler's report. It is an action that w
supported by all of his national security advisors, military, foreign polic
and
otherwise. And no other factor was permitted to alter that.

Q Does that include that his best judgment is that his impeachment is no
the
best interest of the United States?

MR. BERGER: No, I think -- I don't even know what that question mea
It's
kind of cute, but anyhow -- it means that that was not a factor in the
President's decision-making.

Q Sandy, when did it become apparent that a decision about military for
was
imminent? And when did the actual final decision get made?

MR. BERGER: I think that it became clear, John, on Tuesday, when we
we had
some indication of Butler's conclusions as early as, I think, Sunday. But
had
basically had his final conclusions on Tuesday, I think -- that we were o
plane, literally coming back from the Middle East.

We had a conference call on the plane, secure conference call. The Secr
and
myself were on the plane with the President, the Vice President, the
Secretary of
Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs,
my Deputy, Jim Steinberg, and Don Kerrick -- Deputies -- and Leon Fu
the
Vice President's National Security Advisor, were on the phone here. We
talked it

through. We went around the horn and asked everybody what their recommendation was. The recommendation was unanimous the President should go forward.

Q Can I have a follow up on what Helen said? Senator Lott has questioned the timing; he has also questioned the intensity of the attack. And Senator John McCain, who usually backs any military action, has also questioned whether this is just a pinprick action or whether you'll go much farther and really deal with Saddam Hussein.

MR. BERGER: Well, I think it's a little premature to judge the intensity of the action, which has been going on for two and a half hours.

Q But their question is whether it will be --

MR. BERGER: So let's make that judgment after the fact, rather than before the fact.

Q Well, what I was saying was Trent Lott and John McCain basically were saying --

MR. BERGER: Questioned the timing. Let me walk through the timing consideration again, because it is certainly a question that we knew would

be raised. It was the very strong view of the military people, when we began thinking about the prospect of this after November 15th -- after the President basically laid down the marker, the word of the United States, that if he didn't comply we would act -- that if we acted, we should act swiftly. We've learned from previous episodes that the longer the time between CNN reporting that we're thinking about acting and actually acting, the more time Saddam Hussein has to disperse his forces, the more time he has to move things that we would like to be moved.

And, therefore, the element of surprise here, of tactical surprise, was extremely important. And that should Butler come back and report, I think we didn't anticipate it would be as stark as it is. But should he come back and report clearly that there was a problem, that we should act as swiftly as is militarily possible. And that basically was a 24-hour period.

Q There's no visible sign of support from anybody but the British. A month ago you had a lot of people lined up. Where is everybody else?

MR. BERGER: Well, based on the phone calls that all of us have made -- the Secretary of State, myself, Secretary of Defense, the President -- I think there is a good deal of support in the world --

Q They're not out there publicly.

MR. BERGER: Well, if I could finish. We made a conscious decision and went back in February we put together a coalition of several -- three, four dozen countries that all had participated in the arsenal that was prepared. That is a time consuming process. You have to fit in the extra plane* so that it interfaced with the rest of the operation. It takes weeks to do that. You lose the element of surprise. We decided that we would act with the British, ourselves, with the support of many other countries, but not necessarily with their participation because the process of securing that participation in and of itself would have taken us days and now weeks.

Q How about just an endorsement?

Q Do you know where Saddam Hussein is, and do you care whether he is alive or dead?

MR. BERGER: I suspect we will see that.

Q Sandy, do you care if --

MR. BERGER: Let me just say -- excuse me, Bill -- that yesterday the Cooperation Council, which consists of all of the Gulf countries, issued a statement saying in terms very similar to the statement that they issued in the second week of November, that if Saddam Hussein did not comply with our cooperation, the consequences of his actions would be his responsibility alone. And I take that to be quite a forthcoming statement.

Q Sandy, do you know where Saddam is?

Q Did you specifically seek the support of the congressional leadership? Did you get their support? And are you surprised or dismayed by Lott's reaction?

MR. BERGER: We talked through this period with the congressional

leadership,
both in the House and in the Senate. Obviously, we would like the support of all
members of Congress. It's a judgment they have to make. I noticed that
Senator
Helms just issued a statement in support of what we did. I believe there
other Republicans and Democrats in the Congress that are supportive.

Q Sandy, do you know where Saddam Hussein is? And does the
administration care
if he is alive or dead?

MR. BERGER: I just got a quick factual correction. The GCC statement was issued
last
week, not yesterday.

Q Do you know where Saddam Hussein is at this moment and does the
administration
care if he is alive or dead?

MR. BERGER: Well, I think I've set forward the objectives of the mission
that
is, to degrade his military capability and to degrade his WMD and missile
delivery capability and I'm not going to go any further in terms of --

Q The Russian Duma is scheduled to vote within the next 10 days or so
START

II. Given Russia's obvious attitude toward this military action, do you expect
what's going on right now to delay START II even further or even kill it?

MR. BERGER: Well, I would hope not. START II is very much not only in the
the
interest of the United States, it's very much in the interest of Russia. And I
would hope the members of the Duma would act in the best interest of the
Russian
Federation.

Q What is your expectation.

MR. BERGER: I have no expectation with that. I think it was hard to predict
before this; we certainly would hope that they would do that.

Q Sandy, half a dozen senators have sent a letter to the President saying
time to get serious about implementing the Iraq Liberation Act and urging
that
Saddam Hussein be indicted for war crimes. Is indicting Saddam Hussein
something
the administration is considering?

MR. BERGER: Well, first of all let me say, as the President said on
November

15th, we -- and he said again today -- in the interim we have to contain Saddam

Hussein, all the elements that I mentioned to Claire, in terms of sanction terms of use of military force where necessary.

But over the long-term we agree with the Congress that the solution here is a government in Iraq that respects its own people. We intend to proceed on

Iraqi Liberation Act. We have already done a number of things -- most importantly is to change what's called our declarative policy with respect to Iraq, that is, what our stated goals are.

We will work very actively with the opposition. We've already met with them in

London. one of the things that's important is to try to bring the opposition groups together in a more coherent, cohesive operation. Right now they're quite

divided. We will do -- I think as Secretary Albright has said that we won't support and incite Iraq campaign, Radio Free Iraq. This is something that we

to be seen as a long-term goal; we have to proceed in a practical, prudent, effective way -- but we have to keep our eye on the goal and be steady about it.

And I think we are moving toward that objective.

Q Sandy, on many occasions in the past when Saddam Hussein broke his promises

the United States refrained from taking military action. This time Clinton takes

action the very eve of his impeachment vote, which is expected against him and

effectively delays that vote. How can you say that this doesn't at least have the perception of "Wag The Dog"?

MR. BERGER: Well, I can't deal with perceptions; I can only deal with realities. The fact is, in those previous instances, what happened was the United States built up our military capability, we threatened force, and he backed down.

Now, in this situation -- having backed down on November 15th, and on setting

criteria -- he violated those commitments that he made on November 14th. And the

President was very clear on November 14th and 15th of what would happen if he did not fully cooperate.

And what the United States says matters in the world. And the credibility of our word, and the fact that we will carry out what we say we will do, is important. So all I can tell you is that this was -- we have spent countless

hours on this over the last two weeks, and certainly over the last several days.

And the President has been extremely firm and steadfast in making it clear that

the criteria here, that he was going to make a decision on, was what is in national security interest, and that the fact of the congressional debate would not alter what he saw was his responsibility as President.

Q Sandy, was the attack actually launched last night? Did you start the process

-- was the trigger pulled last night? And if so, what was this morning for? What was the meeting this morning about?

MR. BERGER: We just like each other, we like to meet at 7:00 a.m. when we

arrive home at 1:00 a.m. I don't really want to get into too many details.

timelines here. In a situation like this, the President essentially makes a decision, which he made -- initially last night, but there are points in which as we know from November 14th, where he can turn the key off. And there was a

point today in which the real decision as to whether or not to go forward

to stop going forward, I guess, is the best way to put it -- arose.

The President -- we had a principals meeting at 7:00 A.M. The President joined

us down in the situation room. We went back through it again; we told him where

things were with respect to UNSCOM evacuation; with respect to notification of

allies; with respect to support from the region. And, you know, we sort of went

around the table again and everybody had their say.

Q Sandy, could you clarify on briefing congressional leaders -- did you do that

today? Did you do it last night? Or are you just saying you talked to them in general, after November 15th? And what did they say to you when you asked

them for their support or for their opinion about the wisdom of going forward?

MR. BERGER: I have stayed in touch with former Speaker Gingrich; Speaker-elect

Livingston? What is the title -- Speaker Livingston --

Q Congressman Livingston.

MR. BERGER: Congressman Livingston; Congressman Gephardt; Senator

Daschle and
Senator Lott through this period to basically just keep them abreast of what
was
happening -- inspections were going to take place; Butler was going to go
forward; this was basically the timetable.

So I have talked to them a couple of times a week during this period.
Yesterday, Secretary Cohen -- since he was here, and we were on planes
with lousy
phones -- spoke at length to Mr. Livingston, Mr. Lott and Mr. Gingrich.
President, last night, when we got back home at about 1:00 a.m., called
Gephardt and Mr. Daschle. And then today, he spoke to, I think, all of the
leaders this afternoon, before the action commenced.

Q And told them that it was underway, or about to be underway?

MR. BERGER: Told them that he -- today he told them that he intended
proceed, obviously.

Q And did you get support from the Republican leadership there?

MR. BERGER: Well, I don't think it's fair for me to characterize their view.
They will speak to that themselves.

Q How worried are you that what you've outlined is essentially, as you put it,
a
policy right now of military containment, and then in the long-term, perhaps
a
new regime. But in between, how do you monitor the weapons of mass
destruction
program effectively because the case you all have made over and over again
is
that without UNSCOM you can't do that.

MR. BERGER: I come back to my answer to your earlier question. You
assume that
UNSCOM was alive and well and functioning --

Q No, no, I don't --

MR. BERGER: What Richard Butler said yesterday was, UNSCOM is still
and
ineffective. And I think that it's been their judgment over the past several
months that they have become increasingly unable to perform their
functions. So
when they reach that judgment that they can't do their job, they can stay
Baghdad and stay at the Baghdad Hilton or wherever they stay and go on
from time
to time. But in terms of effective work, what they have said is that they
do effective work.

Now, what we can do -- so we have to recognize that fact, what we can militarily is to destroy some of the facilities that relate to WMD* and the missile systems. We can monitor -- we have, obviously, our own means of intelligence. And to the extent we have any information that -- we have information that they are reconstituting, any of their WMD* programs, reserve the right to take military action again.

Q You said earlier that it would be a positive development, although you certainly didn't expect it, if Iraq were to allow UNSCOM back in and completely. Is there anything that Iraq could now say or do that would encourage the administration to consider bringing to an end more quickly this current series of attacks? Is there anything they can say or do that would cut any ice with now?

MR. BERGER: I think the -- I think we will conduct and complete the mission as planned.

Q Sandy, going back to the "Wag the Dog" theory real quick -- I know you don't like it, but nonetheless, you have Republicans talking against this timing issue, but you also have friends --

MR. BERGER: Let me just interrupt you for a second. Let's let all the rest come in. I suspect by the end of the night you will see some very prominent -- excuse me, if I can finish -- you'll see some very prominent Republicans being supportive. Senator Helms, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is obviously someone whose views matter.

Q Sandy, but going back to some of the Democrats and some of the friends of the President, Reverend Jesse Jackson just came out less than a half an hour and said that especially now that he's going to be holding this rally tomorrow said that the motive was clear, but the timing is suspicious.

MR. BERGER: Well, he's wrong. And I'm a great friend and admirer of Reverend Jesse Jackson, but he's just wrong.

Q You're basically saying that the U.S. will be in a kind of state of war with Iraq from now on until --

MR. BERGER: No, listen -- understand we have had a policy of contain for seven years. This is not the first time we've used military force. The Bush administration used military force after the Gulf War. In 1992 we have used military force once when they -- we learned that they had attempted to assassinate President Bush. We deployed military force when they started to move towards Kuwait.

I think the fact of the matter is that so long as Saddam Hussein is there, he has to be contained. If he believes that there is a credible threat of force, he is less likely to act recklessly. Had we not acted today in view of the conclusion of UNSCOM that it had been rendered ineffective, we would not have eliminated the credible threat of force. Saddam Hussein unrestricted or unimpeded by the fear of force is a danger to the region.

Thank you.

Q Thank you.

END

7:50 P.M. EST

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/8/99 9:21:31 AM
FROM Andreasen, Steven P.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: SRB Carnegie speech [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Highsmith, Newell L.
Halperin, David E.

CARBON_COPY Samore, Gary S.
Bell, Robert G.
Allen, Charles A.
Baker, James E.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.
Tavlarides, Mark J.
@SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Blinken, Antony J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gray, Wendy E.
Halperin, David E.
Malinowski, Tomasz P.
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)

TEXT_BODY Newell -- I understand your points, and from a "legal" point of view, India, Pakistan and North Korea are also required to "act" in order for the Treaty to enter into force. But the diplomatic reality is that NONE of these countries will act unless the Senate acts first, and we happen to believe it true that IF the Senate acts, at least India and Pakistan will find it very hard to "duck" the commitments they made at the UN last September not to obstruct the Treaty's EIF. In short, at this point in time, failure by our own Senate to act IS the key impediment to EIF, and we should not shirk making this claim. We do not want to buy into the arguments of Senator Helms and Lott (that is, even if the Senate acts, the Treaty is unlikely to EIF, so why bother). That said, I'll take one last look at the language. Steve

-----Original Message-----

From: Highsmith,
Newell L.
Sent: Friday, January 08, 1999 9:00 AM
To: Halperin,
David E.
Cc: Samore, Gary S.; Andreasen, Steven P.; Bell, Robert
G.; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs;
@PLANNING
- Strat Plan & Comm
Subject: FW: SRB Carnegie speech [UNCLASSIFIED]

As
indicated in the attached, I have a problem with the new para on
CTBT entry into force by 9/99. Steve will have a better sense of
what we've said on this score in the past, but it seems to me that
this para's effort to create pressure for US ratification is misleading.
I'm not wedded to the language I offered, but I think it conveys
the right concept. I'd be happy to discuss.

<< File: SRB ceip
nonpro.doc >>

-----Original Message-----

From: Halperin, David
E.
Sent: Thursday, January 07, 1999 11:18 PM
To: @NONPRO - Export
Controls; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;
@NESASIA
- NE/South Asia; @TRANSNATIONAL - Transnational Threats; @VP - VP
Nat'l Security Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia; @ASIA
- Asian Affairs; @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm
Cc: @PRESS - Public
Affairs; @EUROPE - European Affairs; Sutphen, Mona K.; Hachigian,
Nina L.
Subject: SRB Carnegie speech [UNCLASSIFIED]

Draft for
SRB Carnegie speech, set for early Tuesday morning. Because some
offices did not respond, I decided to review/hold the draft overnight
rather than send to front office. I tried to incorporate everyone's
edits as best I could. If you wish, review again.

Still would
like input/review from: NESA, Transnational, Asia, VP and perhaps
Europe.

Will need to cut substantially.

Would like to get
this to SRB ASAP Friday. Thanks.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/12/99 6:47:22 AM
FROM Black, Steven K.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 01/12/1999
DECLASSIFYON 01/12/2009
SUBJECT Memo re LKE [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Caravelli, John M.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/17
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 2/7/2017
2006-1363-E(3)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT State Dept letter to Billingslea.doc
To:
Leon ____
Rick ____
Jan 7, 1999

Subject: State Department Letter to Senator Helms

From: Steve

The attached is the third iteration of a letter from the State Department to Senator Helms providing the required notification for commercial space launch activities (Lockheed-Khrunichev-Energiya) to be conducted through the end of April of this year. Please review the arguments presented in this memo and let me know what your response is, today if at all possible.

Background. It has changed somewhat each time as Marshall Billingslea and the State Department have each altered the text and negotiated through their differences. As in the two previous versions, Billingslea is trying to get the Administration to do more than it is actually required to do under law, such as voluntarily agree to consult with Congress. The State Department, for

its part,
is trying to find areas in which the Administration can cede some
ground in less
important areas and preserve Executive branch prerogatives where
they are most
important.

This time, the issue revolves around the last sentence of the fifth
paragraph at
the bottom of the first page (highlighted), which as proposed reads:

Furthermore, the Administration will discuss with the Committee any
proposal to
increase Russia's space launch quota thirty days before such an offer
is made.

Argument against the proposed language. Thirty-day notification to
Congress is
not required by law and could complicate any efforts to encourage the
Russians if
we ever see evidence of nonproliferation behavior we would like to
reward. This
commitment to Helms could be construed as moving forward by thirty
days the date
by which we need to see improvement in Russian nonproliferation
behavior in the
run-up to the Primakov visit in late March. It means that we would
have to tell
Senator Helms around 23 Feb that we would like to reward Primakov
in late March
with an announcement of a launch quota increase. Why should the
Administration
cede to Congress any of its legitimate authority and needlessly
complicate
interagency and bilateral discussions?

Argument in favor of the proposed language. Jim Timbie is a good
horsetrader and
it is his judgment that we have gotten all we can get out of Billingslea.

Irrespective of how the law reads, practically speaking, we need
Congress to
approve this export license and Senator Helms is going to maintain his
hold on it
until he gets what he wants, which is more involvement in the process.
Timbie
argues that any Executive branch decision to increase Russia's space
launch quota
will not be made quickly, and the thirty days' advance notice to
Congress is

insignificant in the light of the interagency process involved.

This letter has gone to NSC Nonpro and NSC RUE. I requested that USTR, OSTP and NSC Leg all look at it as well. Nobody has gotten back to me with their votes yet, except OSTP, which is opposed to the language. OSTP would instead recommend not specifying how far in advance notice would be given to Congress. But that path has already been traveled; Jack Caravelli and Jim Timbie, who have been conducting the negotiations with Billingslea, do not believe that Helms will give any more ground on this point, and think that we gain the more important point of the verb "discuss" rather than "consult."

Recommend you approve the proposed language. I'm persuaded by Timbie's argument that this language is okay, especially if accepting this version of the letter will move the issue off dead center. First, I think it's unlikely that we will be in a position to offer the Russians a launch quota increase in March in any event. Secondly, this language does not preclude discussing the issue with the Russians, including possibly making a suggestion that things have been looking much better lately and that we may be able to make an offer in the next several months (hypothetically speaking). Your knowledge of Congress in general and of Senator Helms in particular may lead you to some other conclusion, but I recommend you approve this proposed language.

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/15/99 9:32:42 AM
FROM Rudman, Mara E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Cuba Helms-Burton [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Millison, Cathy L.
Rice, Edward A.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Bartlett, L. June
Brown, Keim C.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Jacobson, Tracey A.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kerrick, Donald L.
Millison, Cathy L.
Rice, Edward A.

CARBON_COPY Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Burrell, Christina L.
Farrar, Jay C.
Rudman, Mara E.
Tavlarides, Mark J.
Dames, Victoria J.
Ficklin, John W.
Kaplan, Dean M.
Marsh, Thomas S
Porter, Pete
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Starks, Tali T.

TEXT_BODY

Never mind ill will from the Hill -- The Secretary of State has been

adamant that she does not/not want this out until late Friday, and does not/not want Hill calls to start before NOON today.

We need
to put a hold on this -- if not, we will need to alert SecState,
who is having lunch with Senator Helms today!

-----Original Message-----

From: Abercrombie-Winstanley,
Gina K.

Sent: Friday, January 15, 1999 9:27 AM

To: Millison, Cathy

L.; Rice, Edward A.; Armstrong, Fulton T.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary

Cc: @PRESS

- Public Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @WWD - West Wing
Desk

Subject: RE: Cuba Helms-Burton [UNCLASSIFIED]

Importance: High

Uh,
can it be held until later today? We and State have not done preview
calls and do not intend to until after noon. If it goes up earlier,
we've got even more ill will from the Hill than we're already going
to have as a result of making heads-up calls on a friday afternoon.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Millison, Cathy L.

Sent: Friday, January 15,
1999 9:21 AM

To: Rice, Edward A.; Armstrong, Fulton T.; @EXECSEC
- Executive Secretary

Cc: @PRESS - Public Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative
Affairs; @WWD - West Wing Desk

Subject: RE: Cuba Helms-Burton [UNCLASSIFIED]

Clerk's
office just called to say that this has been signed by the President
and will go to the Hill today. Clerk's Office also plans to release
the text of the letter as a standard press statement.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Rice, Edward A.

Sent: Tuesday, January 12,
1999 5:10 PM

To: Armstrong, Fulton T.; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary

Subject: RE:

Cuba Helms-Burton [UNCLASSIFIED]

Fulton - Will keep an eye on it.

-----Original Message-----

From: Armstrong, Fulton T.

Sent: Tuesday,

January 12, 1999 5:06 PM

To: @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary

Subject: Cuba

Helms-Burton [UNCLASSIFIED]

Ed: Heads-up ... may need your muscle pushing package 0077 (extending suspension of provisions of Helms-Burton Title III) for Presidential approval. Letters to Hill MUST be signed and delivered on Friday. We would like, of course, it earlier so Hill and press calls can be made in advance. --Fulton

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 1/19/99 5:11:51 PM

FROM Weiss, Andrew S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT FW: Revised Defense Writers Questions [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Crowley, Philip J.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Hammer, Michael A.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Leavy, David C.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Andreasen, Steven P.

CARBON_COPY Andreasen, Steven P.
Bell, Robert G.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Langley, Janice M.
Mulligan, George D.
Peterman, David (Brian)
Pimentel, Betsy J.
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Barnett, Cheryl E.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Kaufman, Stuart J.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Segal, Jack D.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Weiss, Andrew S.

TEXT_BODY One small change to START II question.

-----Original Message-----

From: Andreasen,
Steven P.
Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 1999 5:09 PM
To: @PRESS -
Public Affairs
Cc: @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @RUSSIA - Russia/Ukraine;
Greer, Jason H.
Subject: Revised Defense Writers Questions [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

P.J.

--

Includes comments by Bell and clearance from Greer. Steve.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Defense Writers NMD, CTBT and START.doc
Defense Writers Q/A - NMD, CTBT and START

NMD

Was the President prepared, as has been reported, to announce a decision to deploy a U.S. NMD system in the State of the Union before the latest Russian delay in ratifying START II led to a decision to can that announcement? Why did he back off doing that?

* No. The President never intended to announce a decision to deploy an NMD in the State of the Union because we have not yet made a decision on whether to deploy such a system, and will not address such a decision before the Summer of 2000.

* We did announce earlier this month that we have decided to include funds in the Pentagon's next 6-year budget that would be necessary should we later decide to deploy a limited NMD system; however, none of these "deployment dollars" are in Fiscal Year 2000.

How mature is the technology?

* Very difficult to generalize, as there are a number of technologies involved and most of the key flight tests still lie ahead. Moreover, it is not just a question of individual technologies, but system integration.

* But, it is fair to say that DOD, as well as outside experts, continue to assess our NMD program as "high risk." We should not underestimate the

challenge.

Since you have slipped fielding the system by two years to 2005, why do you think you can still make an operational decision in the summer of 2000?

* We hope to conclude the necessary tests to inform a first decision checkpoint on deployment in the summer of 2000. If the test program slips, or there are key test failures, we might have to slip the deployment decision: but we are not assuming failure.

Do you think the threat is now there to justify the fielding of a limited NMD system? If so, then are you not committed to the fielding of a limited NMD? It is no longer a question of if, but when, right?

* Given the recent evolution of the threat from rogue state ballistic missile programs, we now expect a deployment decision to be based largely on issues associated with technical feasibility and affordability.

* We will not make a decision on deployment until the year 2000, at the earliest, after we have concluded a number of tests and examined various deployment architectures.

* While it is too simplistic to assert that NMD deployment is simply a question of "when, not if?", it is clear the threat is evolving in a way that gives added urgency to our NMD program.

* However urgent the threat is assessed to be in 2000, though, it would do us no good to respond by deploying an NMD that has yet to demonstrate it will work.

CTBT

Will India and Pakistan sign the CTBT this year?

* During the UN General Assembly session last September, both Prime Minister Vajpayee of India and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan expressed

their intention
to adhere the CTBT by September of this year.

* While both commitments were somewhat qualified, we are cautiously optimistic both will sign by September.

Will the U.S. ratify CTBT this year?

* President asked the Senate to act on CTBT without delay in the State of the Union, and we intend to make this a top priority.

* We will obviously need to work closely with Senator Lott, Senator Helms, and others to ensure that this Treaty gets a fair hearing in the full Senate this year, and we intend to do that.

Will the President visit South Asia this year?

* The President has long wanted to visit South Asia -- a region not visited by a U.S. President since the late 1970s.

* The visit scheduled for last November was postponed due to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests last May.

* The President hopes that sufficient progress will be made with regard to our non-proliferation agenda to permit him to visit South Asia later this year.

START

Will the Duma ratify START II? If not, will you reduce below the START I levels anyway?

* There is no question that START II ratification, as well as START III, is in Russia's interest, as well as our own. Important that Yeltsin government moves promptly to secure approval by the Duma.

* In the context of preparing its FY 00 budget, the Administration has been carefully reviewing both the costs and the policy implications of

continuing to
add funds to the Defense budget to sustain the START I strategic
force posture.

Final decisions have not, however, been made.

* Once the FY 00 budget is finalized and submitted to Congress in a
few weeks we
will consult closely with Members on this issue.

Are you willing to consider some form of unilateral de-alerting?

* It is important to remember that both the United States and Russia
have already
removed thousands of warheads from systems that are being
eliminated under START
I, and have already committed to discuss deactivating thousands more
on systems
that will be eliminated under START II once that Treaty has been
approved by the
Duma.

* We are also moving directly to address the danger of accidental or
unauthorized
launch through the shared early warning initiative agreed to by
President's
Clinton and Yeltsin this past September.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Theodore Osius to Richard Saunders. Subject: Prescott Meeting Paper. (11 pages)	01/24/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/16/1998-01/26/1999]

2006-1363-F

vz5662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	David Sandalow to Theodore Osius and Richard Saunders. Subject: Prescott / Climate Change. (12 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/16/1998-01/26/1999]

2006-1363-F
vz5662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	Theodore Osius to Richard Saunders. Subject: Prescott bilateral paper. (16 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/16/1998-01/26/1999]

2006-1363-F

.vz5662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Theodore Osius to Richard Saunders and Leslie Davidson. Subject: Prescott meeting paper -- updated. (16 pages)	01/26/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/16/1998-01/26/1999]

2006-1363-F
vz5662

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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