

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. emails	Charles Allen to James Baker. Subject: RE: Email to SRB RE: Helms Letter to Albright on "Christmas Warning." (2 pages)	08/18/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Mara Rudman to James Baker and John Dowling. Subject: RE: EMAIL to SRB RE: Helms Letter to Albright on "Christmas Warning." (3 pages)	08/18/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	James Covey to Donald Bandler. Subject: RE: EMAIL to SRB RE: Helms Letter to Albright on "Christmas Warning." (2 pages)	08/18/1998	P1/b(1)
004. email	Sharon Storey to John Dowling, Glyn Davies, Donna Dejbani et al. Subject: RE: EMAIL to SRB RE: Helms Letter to Albright on "Christmas Warning." (2 pages)	08/19/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/05/1998-08/19/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5657

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 8/5/98 9:00:25 AM

FROM DeRosa, Mary B.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)

DATECLASSIFIEDON 08/03/1998

DECLASSIFYON 08/03/2008

SUBJECT FW: Action Memorandum to the President [CONFIDENTIAL]

TO Sanders, Robin R.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

I didn't think it was necessary to add the stuff about the U.S. Legal Permanent Residents to the POTUS memo, but if you think it is that's fine. I don't see any new language in the POTUS memo, though.

I notice a new sentence in the SRB memo about how UNITA's friends on the Hill will react. Don't you mean they would react negativeley to the designation, not the licensing. The designation brings them within the sanctions, the licensing relieves them of the sanctions.

-----Original

Message-----

From: Sanders, Robin R.

Sent: Tuesday, August 04,
1998 5:49 PM

To: DeRosa, Mary B.

Subject: FW: Action Memorandum
to the President [CONFIDENTIAL]

need to add same language to SRB's
memo to POTUS not just to Gayle's memo to SRB. (see input to
"execorderunita."doc

in bold - tks)

-----Original Message-----

From: DeRosa, Mary
B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

5/16/2017

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 12 NARA, Date 2/2/2019

2006-1363-F (3)

Sent: Tuesday, August 04, 1998 4:41 PM
To: Sanders, Robin R.
Subject: FW:
Action Memorandum to the President ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

I combined your
changes and mine. Changes in the document below.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Sanders, Robin R.
Sent: Tuesday, August 04,
1998 4:35 PM
To: DeRosa, Mary B.
Subject: FW: Action Memorandum
to the President ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Mary - pls play with the language
on licensing. I took a crack at it, but I am not sure it meets
the legal standards. It should appear in bold on your screen - tks
- rrs

-----Original Message-----
From: DeRosa, Mary B.
Sent: Tuesday,
August 04, 1998 10:44 AM
To: Sanders, Robin R.
Cc: @AFRICA - African
Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @MULTILAT -
Multilateral
and Humanitarian Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: FW: Action
Memorandum to the President ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Robin -- legal clears,
with changes to both documents. I'm still not clear on the process,
though. Have you heard from Mac Reed about whether/when this will
be circulated? We can't send it on to the President until it has
been cleared through the OMB process. (In fact, usually OMB sends
it on to the President after circulating and getting sign-offs from
everyone, including NSC. They'd probably be ok with us doing the
memo, but you should clarify with Mac exactly how the process
should
work in this case.)

-----Original Message-----
From: Sanders,
Robin R.
Sent: Monday, August 03, 1998 1:00 PM
To: @LEGISLAT -

Legislative Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor; @MULTILAT -
Multilateral
and Humanitarian Affairs

Cc: @AFRICA - African Affairs

Subject: Action

Memorandum to the President ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

Eric, Mara, Mary

- memos on additional sanctions on UNITA. We are trying to move
this forward before SRB goes on vacation - tks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT unitasanctions.doc

July 31, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GAYLE E. SMITH

FROM: ROBIN R. SANDERS

SUBJECT: Executive Order Implementing Additional Sanctions on
UNITA

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending
that he signed
the attached proposed Executive Order and Report to Congress on
implementing
additional sanctions on UNITA in accordance with United Nations
Security Council
Resolution 1173. Additional sanctions are being imposed on UNITA
for its failure
to implement its remaining obligations under the Lusaka Peace
Accord signed in
November 1994. UNITA's failure to implement the remaining aspects
of the Lusaka
Accords has stalled the peace process, escalated tensions in Angola
and risks
returning the country to full-scale war. These additional UN sanctions
seek to
increase pressure on UNITA in an effort to reinvigorate the peace
process and
allow the government of Angola to extend state administration to the
remaining
key towns in the central region.

Although it should not affect consideration of the Executive Order, you should be aware of a potential problem in the implementation of these sanctions. The UN Security Council is preparing a list of the senior UNITA officials whose assets they seek to have frozen. Two people who are being considered for this list (and the spouse of one) are legal permanent residents of the U.S. DOJ has alerted us that freezing the assets in the United States of legal permanent residents of the U.S. could raise constitutional, primarily due process concerns. Therefore, it is possible that we will not be able to implement fully the UNSC-mandated sanctions against these individuals if their names end up on the list. The most likely outcome, if their names are on the list, is that Treasury will designate them as senior UNITA officials, but will immediately grant them a license to protect their constitutional rights.

UNITA continues to have some friends on the Hill, particularly Senator Helms and Representative Menendez. In the past, State has discussed UNITA's intransigence on the Lusaka Protocol and both Members and their staffs are aware of the additional sanctions required by UNSC resolution 1173. However, they will likely react to the [designation?]licensing of the two UNITA legal permanent residents.

Concurrence by: Mary DeRosa, Mara Rudman, Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Executive Order on UNITA Sanctions

Tab B Report to Congress

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 07/31/08

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT execorderunita.doc

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEINSUBJECT: Executive Order Implementing Sanctions on the National
Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

Purpose

To sign the Executive Order and Report to Congress to implement additional sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1173.

Background

On September 26, 1993 you declared a national emergency with respect to the actions and policies of UNITA, and issued an Executive Order implementing UN Security Council Resolution 864, which prohibited the sale of weapons, military materiel, and petroleum products to UNITA. On December 15, 1997 you issued a second Executive Order taking additional steps against UNITA to

implement UN Security Council Resolution 1127. These steps included closing UNITA's U.S. office and prohibiting (1) the sale of any aircraft or components to UNITA; (2) insurance, engineering, or servicing of aircraft owned or controlled by UNITA; (3) the granting of permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly the United States if it is destined to land in or has taken off from prohibited territory in Angola; and (4) engineering and maintenance servicing and other services to certain Angolan aircraft.

In the face of UNITA failure to implement the remaining aspects of the Lusaka Peace Protocol, the UN Security Council has issued Resolution 1173, which requires member states to impose additional sanctions. This Executive Order would implement Resolution 1173 by: (1) freezing the assets of UNITA and UNITA senior officials and their immediate adult family members; (2) prohibiting the direct or indirect importation into the U.S. of all diamonds exported from Angola that are not controlled by the Certificate of Origin regime of the Angolan government or exported from areas under the control of the Angolan government; (3) prohibiting the sale or supply of equipment used in mining in Angola, other than through a specified point of entry; (4) prohibiting the sale or supply of motorized vehicles, watercraft, or spare parts for the foregoing to Angola, other than through a specified point of entry; and (5) prohibiting the sale or supply of mining services or ground or waterborne transportation services to persons in specified areas of Angola.

Since the June death of Maitre Beye, the UN Special Representative (UNSRSG) for Angola, the situation on the ground in Angola has increasingly become more tense with both the government and UNITA stepping up military movements and propaganda. We are examining ways to reinvigorate the Lusaka Peace process and

are looking
at a combination of enhanced diplomatic efforts to include our Troika
partners
(Russia and Portugal) and the UN in order to end the stalemate and
move forward
toward peace. From all accounts, UNITA bears the brunt of the
responsibility for
the stalled peace process for not allowing state administration to
proceed in the
three key remaining towns, thus additional UN sanctions are being
imposed. The
government is not totally blameless as it has intimidated and harassed
UNITA
supporters and increased its anti-UNITA rhetoric.

UN Secretary-General Annan has dispatched Lakhdar Brahimi as an
interim Special
Envoy to the region in the hopes of encouraging both sides to step
back from the
brink of war and move forward on the completion of the Lusaka
Protocol. We are
also encouraging the UN to name a permanent replacement to
UNSRSG Beye as soon as
possible. We believe that a permanent UNSRSG for Angola would
provide the
continued high level engagement needed to maintain pressure on both
the
government and UNITA.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached executive order at Tab A.

That you sign the Report to Congress at Tab B.

Attachment

Tab A Executive Order on additional UNITA sanctions

Tab B Report to Congress

2

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ cc: Vice President
Reason: 1.5(d) Chief of Staff
Declassify On: 07/31/08

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 8/5/98 2:01:12 PM
FROM Sanders, Robin R.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 08/05/1998
DECLASSIFYON 08/05/2008
SUBJECT FW: Action Memorandum for NSC ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Battenfield, Pat A.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/707
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 7/20/2004
2006-363-F (3)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

first part of pkge on UNITA sanction. this are the changes with
clearance from all. not yet save on g:drive. pls put pkge together.
sending other memo by separate e-mail. tab a is the executive order
which you put on the g:drive yesterday and tab is the report to
congress
which you put on the g:drive yesterday as well - tks

-----Original

Message-----

From: Sanders, Robin R.

Sent: Wednesday, August 05,
1998 1:56 PM

To: Sanders, Robin R.

Subject: Action Memorandum for
NSC ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT unitasanctions_.doc

July 31, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: GAYLE E. SMITH

FROM: ROBIN R. SANDERS

SUBJECT: Executive Order Implementing Additional Sanctions on UNITA

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he signed the attached proposed Executive Order and Report to Congress on implementing additional sanctions on UNITA in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1173. Additional sanctions are being imposed on UNITA for its failure to implement its remaining obligations under the Lusaka Peace Accord signed in November 1994. UNITA's failure to implement the remaining aspects of the Lusaka Accords has stalled the peace process, escalated tensions in Angola and risks returning the country to full-scale war. These additional UN sanctions seek to increase pressure on UNITA in an effort to reinvigorate the peace process and allow the government of Angola to extend state administration to the remaining key towns in the central region.

Although it should not affect consideration of the Executive Order, you should be aware of a potential problem in the implementation of these sanctions. The UN Security Council is preparing a list of the senior UNITA officials whose assets they seek to have frozen. Two people who are being considered for this list (and the spouse of one) are legal permanent residents of the U.S. DOJ has alerted us that freezing the assets in the United States of legal permanent residents of the U.S. could raise constitutional, primarily due process concerns. Therefore, it is possible that we will not be able to implement fully the UNSC-mandated sanctions against these individuals if their names end up on the list. The most likely outcome, if their names are on the list, is that Treasury will designate them as senior UNITA officials, but will immediately grant them a licensing order

to protect their constitutional rights.

UNITA continues to have some friends on the Hill, particularly Senator Helms and Representative Menendez. In the past, State has discussed UNITA's intransigence on the Lusaka Protocol and both Members and their staffs are aware of the additional sanctions required by UNSC resolution 1173. However, they will likely react to the licensing of the two UNITA legal permanent residents.

Concurrence by: Mary DeRosa, Mara Rudman, Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Executive Order on UNITA Sanctions

Tab B Report to Congress

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 07/31/08

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 8/5/98 5:23:14 PM

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K.
Addonizio, Elizabeth
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Allen, Charles A.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Bader, Jeffrey A.
Baker, James E.
Bandler, Donald K.
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Barnett, Cheryl E.
Bartlett, L. June
Bartsch, Bryan W.
Battenfield, Pat A.
Bayley, Douglas C.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bell, Robert G.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bobbitt, Philip C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Braden, Susan R.
Brainard, S. Lael
Branscum, Sean D.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Broadwick, Bonnie
Brown, Keirn C.
Bryan, Dave L.
Budig, Nyda N
Burrell, Christina L.
Busby, Scott W.
Butler, Lawrence E.
Campanella, Anthony
Caravelli, John M.

Carteret, Charles L.
Chastain, George M.
Clark, Bronya H.
Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, James B.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Cosgriff, Kevin J.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Covey, James P.
Crowder, Stevan D.
Crowell, Thomas R.
Crowley, Philip J.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, Mary K.
Dean, Susan W.
Dejban, Donna D.
DeRosa, Mary B.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dixon, Ralph
Dobbins, James F.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Edwards, Joan K.
Elkind, Jonathan H.
Elkon, Nicole L.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Erdahl, Douglas M.
Farrar, Jay C.
Ficklin, John W.
Figueredo, Orlando
Flanagan, Stephen J.
Ford, Robert G.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Fung, Mark T.
Gagnon, James M.
Gallucci, Gerard M.
George, Christopher L.
Glick, Bonnie L.
Gobush, Matthew N.
Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E.
Gray, Wendy E.
Green, Charles A.
Greer, Jason H.
Gregory, Susan J.
Hachigian, Nina L.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Halperin, David E.

Harding, Bruce D.
Harold, Evetta M.
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Hawley, Leonard R.
Hendricks, Lori A.
Higgins, David B.
Highsmith, Newell L.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
Hillman, Thomas W.
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Hurwitz, Marc I.
Jansen, Christian P.
Johnson, Anthony
Johnston, William T.
Jones, Felicia A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Jordan, Kristine A.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kiernan, Gerald P.
Kingsley, Neil R.
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Klein, Brian P.
Knepper, Charlotte
Kunin, Daniel L.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
Leavy, David C.
Lee, Malcolm R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marsh, Thomas S.
Marshall, Betty A.
Marty, Joseph H.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McClellan, Christina L.
McEldowney, Nancy E.
McGee, Jenny A.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Metzl, Jamie F.

Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Moller, Catherine A.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Naplan, Steven J.
O'Brien, Penelope R.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Pascual, Carlos E.
Payne, Raymond H.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Porter, Pete
Porterfield Patrick C.
Prendergast, John P.
Prise, Edith M.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rice, Edward A.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Rinaldi, Steven M.
Roach, Darren S.
Rogers, Elizabeth B.
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly
Rudman, Mara E.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sandalow, David B.
Sanders, Robin R.
Sapiro, Miriam E.
Schrader, Joel M.
Schulte, Gregory L.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Sherman, David J.
Sibley, Matthew W.
Sigler, Ralph H.
Silva, Mary Ann T.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Sisson, Charlotte A.
Smith, Gayle E.
Smith, James A.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Soubers, Richard R.
Spence, Matthew J
Starks, Tali T.

Storey, Sharon V.
Tarver, J. Sean
Thier, J. Alex
Thompson, Kathleen C.
Todd, Gwennyth E.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Unrue, Michael
vonLipsey, Roderick K.
Wadsworth, Valon J. (Val)
Ward, JoAnn
Ward, Steven R.
Wasserman, Elaine P.
Wechsler, William F.
Weinstein, Jeremy M
Weiss, Andrew S.
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted)
Williams, Mary C.
Wippman, David
Witkowski, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Joseph (Larry)
Yokum, Jeffrey G.

CARBON_COPY

Babbitt, James F.
Babcock, Douglas W.
Black, Steven K.
Bolan, Christopher J.
Boulton, Darrien D.
Davidson, Leslie K.
Fuerth, Leon S.
Hamel, Michael A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Hilty, Joanne M.
Johnston, William T.
Jordan, Donald L.
Norris, John J.
Orfini, Michael H.
Roberts, Michael W.
Saunders, Richard M.
Woolston, Ann E.

TEXT_BODY

Please review and forward your updates to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Thursday, August 6. Thanks.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

aug05gui.doc

NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

August 5, 1998

Germany/Schroeder Meeting

South Africa/Mbeki Visit

Iraq

Czech Republic/Havel's Health

Colombia/Guerrilla Attacks

Northern Ireland

ABM

CTBT

Defense Appropriations

Cuba/Caribbean

Sanctions Policy

Kosovo

Japan - Yen

Japan - Rubin/Miyazawa phone call

Iraq - Smuggling oil to Turkey

India-Pakistan-Kashmir

Rwanda/DROC

Sudan

Angola

Military Readiness

North Korea/Rumsfeld

Saudi Arabia/King Fahd's Health

Israel/Berger-Barak Meeting

Israel/Killing of Settlers

Israel/Knesset

MEPP - prisoner release

Russian Financial Situation

ICC

Cambodian Elections

Encryption

GERMANY: SCHROEDER MEETING

August 5, 1998

Isn't the President's meeting with Schroeder today a slap at Chancellor Kohl?

* The President's meeting today with Mr. Schroeder is a continuation of their brief encounter in Berlin in May.

* U.S. contacts with leading German, and other country, opposition political figures are normal. We have done this routinely during this Administration, as was the practice in previous ones, including during prior German national election campaigns.

* The President met Oscar Lafontaine, and Tony Blair, in the spring of 1996 when both were newly selected leaders of opposition parties.

* The President received Rudolf Scharping in April 1994 at which time he was the SPD chancellor candidate, similar to Schroeder today.

* Worth noting that Helmut Kohl met with Bob Dole in May 1996 here in Washington.

* * * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 29, 1998

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President to Meet with Gerhard Schroeder

Gerhard Schroeder, Minister President of the German state of Lower Saxony, has accepted the President's invitation to come to Washington. The President will receive Mr. Schroeder at the White House on August 5. The two plan to continue the exchange begun at their May 13 meeting in Berlin during the President's visit to Germany.

#

SOUTH AFRICA: MBEKI VISIT

August 5, 1998

What can you tell us about South African Deputy President Mbeki's visit here?

* South Africa's Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki [taBOH emBECKee] arrived in Washington this morning.

* He will meet with the President late this afternoon. Tomorrow he and the Vice President will co-chair an executive session of the U.S.-South African Binational Commission (BNC).

* This will be the fifth meeting of the BNC. The last planned meeting, in South Africa in February, was cancelled at the height of the Iraq crisis after the President requested the Vice President to remain in the United States.

What will they discuss? Will the talk about Congo (DROC), the falling rand and/or the African Growth and Opportunity Act?

* The President will discuss a broad range of international, regional and bilateral issues with Deputy President Mbeki.

* We anticipate that the BNC meetings tomorrow will address some of those same issues in much greater detail, as well as the status of the BNC committees' work.

* There will be a press availability with the Vice President and the Deputy President following their meetings at 2:30 p.m., Thursday, in the Indian Treaty Room at the Old Executive Office Building.

D R A F T D R A F T D R A F T

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

August 5, 1998

Visit of South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki

South Africa's Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, arrived in Washington today. He will meet with the President late this afternoon, and will co-chair, along with Vice President Gore, an executive session of the U.S-South Africa Binational Commission, on Thursday, August 6.

We value this opportunity to discuss a broad range of international, regional and

bilateral issues. We look forward to continuing to explore with Deputy President Mbeki and his delegation ways to improve and expand our partnerships with South Africa and the continent, including tackling persistent conflict, increasing stability and democracy, and expanding trade and economic opportunities for Africans and Americans.

IRAQ

August 5, 1998

Does the Administration plan to move any additional forces into the region?

* We currently have no plans to move additional forces to the region in the wake of recent events in Iraq. Forces currently deployed in the Gulf are capable of executing contingency operations if needed and are sufficient to demonstrate the continued commitment of the United States toward ensuring regional stability and protection of other friendly nations in the region.

* We have the forces in place to respond to a number of different scenarios. When we drew down our forces earlier this summer, we left in place a force that is more powerful than the one that existed before last Fall's build-up with double the cruise missile force. These forces can also be rapidly reinforced on short notice should it become necessary.

CZECH REPUBLIC: HAVEL'S HEALTH

August 5, 1998

How is Havel's health? Will he still visit?

* President Havel continues to recover from follow-up abdominal

surgery conducted
on July 26. We are following reports of his progress and wish him a
full and
speedy recovery.

* If asked. There is nothing at present to suggest President Havel will
not be
able to visit in September.

[FYI Havel is still in intensive care. His condition has stabilized
though he
is still not out of the woods after yesterday's scare.]

COLOMBIA: GUERRILLA ATTACKS

August 5, 1998

What reaction does the USG have to the heavy guerrilla attacks
throughout
Colombia? What effect will they have on President-elect's Pastrana's
efforts to
make peace?

* The United States is dismayed by news that the guerrillas have
launched another
series of attacks against unarmed Colombian civilians, as well as
Colombian
police and military units, including those involved in counternarcotics
missions.

* During his meeting with President Clinton on Monday, President-
elect Pastrana
expressed his hopes for ending Colombia's long-standing civil
conflict, and
conveyed his commitment to cooperate fully with the United States to
combat the
traffic in illegal drugs.

* The United States supports the development of a peace process in
Colombia, of
the type that has helped resolve civil conflicts elsewhere. Ultimately,
any
peace process will have to be created for Colombia by Colombians,
but the United
States is prepared to help.

* Prospects for such a peace process will depend upon the willingness
of

Colombian insurgent and paramilitary groupings to cut their links to narcotrafficking, and renounce terrorist methods. The United States will insist, in particular, on the release of American hostages, and a full accounting of Americans missing in Colombia and presumed kidnapped.

* The goals of U.S. policy in Colombia are to expand our efforts against the drug trade, promote human rights and the rule of law, reinforce democratic institutions, and encourage economic development. We are prepared to support any peace plan to the extent it is compatible with these objectives.

* Current events in Colombia only reinforce the need for a serious effort by all sides to support a meaningful peace process.

IF ASKED: Is the United States government assisting the Colombian military in repelling these attacks?

* The U.S. Embassy in Bogota has authorized the use of State Department helicopters stationed in Colombia for counternarcotics purposes in search and rescue missions associated with rebel attacks against counternarcotics facilities.

NORTHERN IRELAND August 5, 1998

Is the White House worried about the renewed violence in Northern Ireland in advance of the President's visit?

* The people of Ireland, north and south, supported the Good Friday Accord as providing the means for resolving political differences. We categorically condemn and reject Saturday's bomb attack in Banbridge, and the series of arson attacks the past week, just as we condemned the parade-related violence in July. The President intends for his visit next month to demonstrate American faith and conviction in the peace process and in the new institutions created by

the April
10 agreement. In particular, he is looking forward to meeting the
leaders and
members of the new Assembly.

Is the President going to invite Irish Americans to accompany him to
Ireland?

* We have no plans for a private delegation with the President this
trip.

Reaction to yesterday's announcement of a deal for the August 8
(London)derry
parade?

* We commend the common sense and spirit of innovative dialogue
displayed by the
parties to this arrangement.

ABM
August 5, 1998

How do you respond to charges like those in today's WSJ that the
ABM Treaty is
responsible for stifling America's missile defense programs?

* It is certainly a novel claim to argue the ABM Treaty is in some way
responsible for problems with the THAAD program. That claim,
however, has no
basis in reality.

* Under the ABM Treaty, the United States is proceeding -- as fast as
it
prudently can -- with all of its planned programs for theater missile
defenses
(TMDs).

* All of our TMD programs have been certified as compliant with the
ABM Treaty.
The agreements the administration has negotiated in this area make it
clear that
our TMD programs are consistent with the Treaty.

* It is simply not true to claim that our TMD programs are being

hampered by the
Treaty.

* As for our program for National Missile Defense (NMD), it too is
being
developed as fast as it can prudently proceed.

CTBT AND REPORTED COMMENTS BY HANS MARK August 5, 1998

Background. In an article printed in the August 2 European Stars and
Stripes,
Hans Mark reportedly said he is convinced the CTBT will not work in
its present
form, and said the Treaty should be revised to allow the United States
to conduct
at least one or two underground nuclear tests each year to ensure the
workability
of its nuclear arsenal after completion of the ongoing drawdown by
treaty with
Russia. Mark reportedly said that, without such testing, America's
enemies would
know that its remaining nuclear arms were suspect, since the
radioactive
components of nuclear weapons have a limited shelf life.

What is the Administration's reaction to the reported comments by
Hans Mark
stating the CTBT will not work in its present form?

* The views attributed to Dr. Mark were taken out of context and do
not represent
his position on this issue or those of the Administration.

* Dr. Mark supports the CTBT as negotiated.

* We are confident we can meet the challenge of maintaining a high
level of
confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent under a
CTBT
through a science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program without
conducting nuclear
explosions.

* The President directed the implementation of such a program almost
five years

ago, and it is being implemented by the Department of Energy with the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* The program also has the strong support of our three nuclear weapons lab directors, who personally briefed the President in February and said:

"We are confident that the Stockpile Stewardship program will enable us to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing."

SALE OF SHIPS IN DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS August 3, 1998

Background for Briefer: Refer questions on ship sales to Greece and Turkey to DOD. The process of arranging the ship sales to Greece and Turkey started several months ago and has been proceeding through the normal approval process ever since. It was not at all driven by the prospect of accruing a financial windfall for DOD, which is a relatively recent development. This is clearly an issue that should be referred to DOD.

Does the White House support the language in the Defense Appropriations Bill allocating the funds generated by sales of surplus ships to the defense budget?

* The Administration strongly supports this provision. It will help alleviate pressure on the defense budget and therefore is consistent with Administration efforts to ensure the readiness of U.S. Armed Forces, such as our request to fund operations in Bosnia as a non-offset emergency supplemental appropriation.

CUBA/CARIBBEAN August 3, 1998

Background: Fidel Castro is in Grenada on the final leg of a weeklong Caribbean trip. He has also visited Jamaica and Barbados, receiving full honors at each stop. He has portrayed the trip as a victory over U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba and as evidence that his government is a welcome member of the Caribbean family of nations.

What do you make of Castro's big Caribbean tour? Isn't the warm reception he's

getting at each stop a slap in the face of the United States?

* The Caribbean is a region of democracies that share our commitment, reaffirmed

at the Summit of the Americas and other hemispheric venues, to the promotion of

democracy and respect for human rights.

* While welcoming Fidel Castro may give some the impression of condoning his communist regime and dismal human rights record, we expect that our Caribbean

friends -- whose systems are fundamentally different from Cuba's -- are urging

the Cuban leader to take concrete steps toward democracy, human rights, and a

free economy.

* We have no reason to doubt Grenadian Prime Minister Mitchell's remarks to

reporters that the visit was not intended as a "rebuke" to the United States.

Are Caribbean leaders doing this because we have reduced aid to the region,

opposed them on the EU's banana regime, and generally ignored them?

* Our relations with the Caribbean are strong. We are bound by common traditions

and values. When differences of opinion arise -- which is rare -- all sides have

repeatedly demonstrated commitment to resolving them with equanimity.

* The President attended a Summit with Caribbean leaders in Bridgetown in May

1997. The Secretary of State participated in regional summit in Port of Spain

last April and has committed to holding similar consultations on a yearly basis.

* The Administration continues to work with the Congress to obtain passage of legislation enhancing the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which will help pave the way for increased U.S.-Caribbean trade.

SANCTIONS POLICY

July 31, 1998

Is the Administration re-evaluating sanctions policy? Have you decided to forego sanctions as a tool of foreign policy?

* Have been working with Members of Congress to ensure that sanctions decisions are made rationally and carefully.

* Our efforts are guided by several principles:

* Used judiciously, sanctions can be an effective tool of foreign policy, but they are generally most effective when they are imposed multilaterally and after traditional diplomatic means to affect behavior of foreign states are exhausted.

* Recognize that, at times, we must act unilaterally to impose sanctions -- to exercise leadership that will encourage others to act and to make a moral statement.

* But also need to recognize that unilateral sanctions -- especially if they seek to impose third party boycotts -- may not always be the best course, as they often --

* hurt U.S. agriculture or industry, while having little impact on offending state, due to its capacity to find suppliers elsewhere;

* aggravate allies and undermine our efforts to forge common diplomatic ground with them;

* limit our ability to engage and influence the practices of the offending government.

KOSOVO

August 5, 1998

* We strongly condemn the Serb offensive over the past several weeks that has driven thousands of people from their homes. This type of repressive violence is indefensible; the international community will not allow a repeat of the humanitarian disaster of Bosnia.

* We have reiterated these points to Milosevic in the clearest possible terms. Milosevic must immediately stop these attacks and take steps to allow the safe return of people to their homes.

* We are also stepping up efforts to address humanitarian needs in Kosovo. We are working with international relief organizations to meet the needs of the displaced population. Since the crisis began, we have stepped up assistance by \$9 million and are encouraging other international donors to do the same.

* Meanwhile, NATO contingency planning continues and is now very advanced. A broader range of options is being examined in view of the current situation.

If asked about possible mass grave in Orahovac:

* We have seen reports about a possible mass grave in Orahovac. We take very seriously the possibility of atrocities in Kosovo. International diplomats, including Ambassador Hill, will be going to Orahovac in the next few days to assess the situation.

* Any information that we or others in the international community have on possible atrocities would be passed on to the International Criminal Tribunal,

who has jurisdiction for war crimes investigations in Kosovo.

JAPAN - YEN
August 4, 1998

The yen has now fallen to the level it was at before the U.S. intervened. Was the intervention a failure?

* We do not comment on currency markets.

* In the long run, what is important is that the new Japanese government move quickly with bold and decisive action to strengthen the banking system and restore robust domestic demand-led growth.

Are you prepared to intervene again?

* It is a long-standing practice not to comment on currency markets or intervention. We have no intention of breaking with that tradition.

Are you encouraged by Obuchi's call for permanent tax cuts?

* What's critical now is that Japan take early steps to ensure substantial and sustained fiscal stimulus as well as decisive actions to strengthen its financial sector. Japan should also continue to deregulate and open its markets.

* It is clear that Japan has a critical role to play in helping to restore financial stability in Asia. Japan needs urgently to restore its own economic growth and thus contribute to restoring growth and stability in the countries most affected by the Asian crisis.

JAPAN - RUBIN/MIYAZAWA PHONE CALL
August 4, 1998

Can you provide a readout of the phone call between Secretary Rubin and Japanese Finance Minister Miyazawa?

* We understand that Secretary Rubin and Finance Minister Miyazawa spoke on the phone Monday night and agreed to meet soon. Can you confirm and do you have details?

* We can confirm Secretary Rubin and Japanese Finance Minister Miyazawa spoke by phone late Monday night. Secretary Rubin congratulated Minister Miyazawa on his recent appointment. They agreed it would be useful to meet but no meeting has been scheduled.

If Asked Further Questions:

* I have no more information on this call. You should check with the Treasury Department for any more details.

IRAQ: SMUGGLING OIL TO TURKEY August 4, 1998

Background: There is considerable oil smuggling out of Iraq both to Turkey and to the Arabian side of the Gulf. The Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) exists in the Gulf to prevent oil from reaching the UAE. It is much harder to stop the smuggling in the north. Note also that the oil Iraq exports to Jordan has been "acknowledged" by the UN sanctions committee, while that to Turkey has not.

What is the U.S. view of oil being smuggled into Turkey from Iraq?

* The U.S. strongly supports enforcing UN sanctions on Iraq, which have cost Saddam \$15 billion a year since 1990s.

* Turkey is a valued member of the Gulf War coalition and has suffered

economically from sanctions imposed on Iraq.

- * It has played a major role in containing Iraq.

- * It is true, as the NY Times alleges, that there is some smuggling of oil into southeastern Turkey.

- * We have raised this issue and our concerns with the Turkish government. They have expressed their willingness to work on bringing the illicit trade under the UN sanctions regime.

- * Our preference would be to bring all of Iraq's illicit exports under the oil-for-food program. Turkey supports this approach.

So, you are turning a blind eye?

- * No, as I said, we have raised the matter with the Turks.

- * A look at the map, however, would indicate how different this situation is than smuggling through the Gulf. While the MIF work actively to curb smuggling in the Gulf, no parallel interdiction force exists in land-locked northern Iraq.

Have you raised the matter with the sanctions committee to "except" Turkey the way the UN "excepts" Jordan?

- * We have not, for further information, I would direct you to the sanctions committee in New York. (IF PRESSED, the issue is before the committee but has not been addressed.)

How much oil are we talking about?

- * The amount smuggled varies, but is in the neighborhood of approximately 45,000 barrels per day (B/D) or about \$100 million/year. (FYI: Turkey contains about 675,000 B/D, so this is not a great portion of Turkey's needs)

Is it true that Barzani is profiting from this oil trade?

* Several of the groups in this part of northern Iraq are profiting from the trade.

Did Barzani in fact double cross the U.S. by inviting Iraq into the North?

* Then, as now, we oppose the introduction of any destabilizing force in the Kurdish-controlled areas as of northern Iraq. Barzani is aware of our position.

Have you pressed the Iranians about the resumption of smuggling of Iraqi oil through Iranian waters?

* The Sanctions Committee will soon receive a brief from the MIF on this activity. We will join others in pressing Iran to end this smuggling.

INDIA-PAKISTAN-KASHMIR

August 5, 1998

What is happening in Kashmir? What effect is this having on the Indo-Pakistani talks?

* Heavy artillery and small arms exchanges across the Line of Control separating Indian and Pakistani-held portions of Kashmir have decreased since the weekend, although shooting incidents are still occurring, resulting in military and civilian casualties.

* Following the murders of 38 civilians in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, near the border with Kashmir, another attack on civilians yesterday in southern Kashmir, left 19 villagers dead.

* We condemn the groups that commit acts of terrorism and those

who provide support of whatever kind to them. They are crimes against humanity and make the Kashmir conflict more, not less difficult to resolve.

* The volatility of Kashmir is a stark reminder of the pressing need for India and Kashmir to resolve their differences.

* This is particularly true now, following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests which have significantly raised the stakes in their dispute.

* We urge the two countries to resume their senior-level dialogue as soon as possible and to approach the talks imaginatively and constructively.

* (If asked for the U.S. position on Kashmir) The United States has long held the position that the Kashmir dispute must be resolved through negotiations between India and Pakistan taking into account the views of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

What is the status of the President's trip to India and Pakistan?

(The President's trip to South Asia remains under review.

(Although the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests have raised questions as to the utility of such a trip, no final decision has yet been made.

**SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
AND PRESENCE OF RWANDAN TROOPS
August 5, 1998**

Can you provide and update on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC)?

* The situation on the ground in the DROC remains very fluid, and we are still

evaluating the impact of the changing circumstances.

* There continues to be fighting in the eastern region of the Congo and sporadic gunfire in Kinshasa. No Americans have been hurt in the clashes, and we have advised all Americans to stay at home. An ordered departure of American citizens from Kinshasa will begin today. The airport is open.

Has the Rwandan Army invaded DROC?

* Several days ago the Rwandan government denied involvement in the fighting and claimed that its troops were not in the Congo, but there are credible reports and eyewitness accounts of Rwandan troop presence in Eastern and southwestern Congo in support of an internal Congolese military rebellion against DROC President Laurent Kabila

What are you telling the DROC government?

* We are urging the government of the Congo to seek to resolve the internal rebellion by peaceful means and to respect the rights of all Congolese citizens.

IF ASKED ONLY

What are U.S. military activities in DROC and Rwanda?

* There are no US forces presently in the DROC except the Defense Attaché, nor have there been military relations since President Kabila took power.

* There is a 22-person team from the European Command, with a State Department representative, conducting an assessment of the current insurgency inside Rwanda. Additionally, there is a ten-member Joint Combined Exercise Training team, or JCET, in Rwanda.

Where are both the teams now?

- * The JCET team has finished its mission and is returning to the European Command in Stuttgart.

- * The assessment team is now in Kigali and is continuing its mission of assessing the Rwandan military's ability to address the insurgency in the Northwest.

What is the purpose of these two teams? Are they there to assist the Rwandans?

- * The United States is committed to doing everything in its power to prevent the recurrence of genocide in the Great Lakes region. The assessment team was tasked to look at the ability of the Rwandan military to address that issue, given the current insurgency in Northwest Rwanda. The assessment team is there to follow-up on the U.S. pledge to help prevent another genocide in the Great Lakes Region. The team arrived in Kigali on July 29 and has almost completed its work.

- * The Joint Combined Exercise Training Team, or JCET, is designed to enhance the military training capability of US Army Special Operations Forces. Overseas deployments provide US service members the opportunity to enhance special operations skills in foreign countries, improve indigenous language ability, and become familiar with the customs and norms of the host country.

SUDAN
August 4, 1998

Does the announcement by the Government of Sudan of a cease-fire in the south

affect famine relief efforts?

* The Government and rebel SPLA had already agreed to a cease-fire in famine zones of southern Sudan. This announcement, though welcome, will have no additional value in relief to those areas. The most important next step is for the Government and the SPLA to agree to cease-fire monitoring modalities during the peace talks that are being held in Addis this week.

What is the U.S. view of the peace talks?

* We strongly support the peace initiative sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), led by the Kenyan Government. We have provided resources to help underwrite the talks, and have sent Ambassador Richard Bogosian to attend the latest round of talks that are occurring this week.

Is the U.S. providing covert aid to overthrow the Government of Sudan?

* No. We are providing a small amount of non-lethal, defensive military equipment to neighboring states of Sudan that are victims of Sudanese-supported terrorist organizations. For example, we provide backpacks and radios to the Government of Uganda to better defend civilian populations from the atrocities of the Lord's Resistance Army.

If the U.S. policy of isolating the Sudan Government has not worked, will you pursue expanded dialogue and engagement with Khartoum?

* We are committed to our policy of isolating the Sudan regime and containing the threat it poses to the international community through its support for terrorism and to its own people through its massive human rights abuses. We believe the policy is doing what it intended to do: deny hard currency and aid to the

Government to pursue its war strategy, restrict arms sales to the regime, maintain the spotlight on the actions of the Government that have led to this famine, and force Khartoum into making concessions at the peace talks currently underway. We continue to have regular dialogue with the Government through bi-weekly visits to Khartoum by our Chief of Mission credentialed to Sudan.

Do you support the idea of sending a high-profile American negotiator to help make the cease-fire permanent and to broker a peace accord?

* We are working closely with the British and other countries to extend the cease-fire. We also are increasing our support for the African-led peace process under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The IGAD Peace Initiative has made more progress at the negotiating table during the last few months of talks than any other initiative has made during the previous fifteen years of war. We are considering a number of options of how to bring greater support and attention to the Sudanese crisis, but sending a high level negotiator now would only undermine the current talks and provide Khartoum with a way to sidestep the international consensus that has built up in support of the IGAD Peace Initiative and the fundamental issues of the conflict on which this Initiative has focused the warring parties' attention.

ANGOLA
July 31, 1998

* The US is committed to remaining engaged in the peace process in Angola and is encouraging UNITA to fulfill its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, in particular, the extension of government control to key remaining towns.

- * We are concerned that the current peace process is stalled and are doing everything possible, along with our Troika partners, to get the peace process back on track.
- * We have seen reports about the increase in military movements on the ground by both sides and have continually told both parties that peace and stability are in the best interest of the Angolan people and that we would not accept a return to war
- * We are discussing within our government and with our Troika partners (Portuguese, and Russians) and the United Nations additional steps we can take to ensure that Angola continues on the path to peace and that UNITA meets its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol.
- * We welcome the naming by Secretary General Annan of a Special Envoy for Angola, Lakhdar Brahimi. Brahimi will be traveling to the region soon to engage both parties and to underscore the UN's determination to work to resolve the current impasse and move toward peace.

If asked (reports on recent massacre):

- * We have seen these reports that approximately 105 people have been killed in Angola's remote mining area in the North, but we have no confirmation as to who actually committed the killings.
- * We note a Radio Portugal statement that in a preliminary report from the Joint Commission (the independent body monitoring the peace process) that there is no evidence at present that suggests that UNITA perpetrated these attacks.

MILITARY READINESS: PERSONNEL ISSUES AND BUDGET
August 4, 1998

We are hearing lots of bad news on readiness. Is there a readiness crisis in our Armed Forces?

* No. Our military is fully capable of carrying out our national military strategy and meeting America's defense commitments around the world.

* Today, more than at any time in our past, it is essential that we remain engaged with our friends and allies around the world. By doing so, we continue to safeguard for America the benefits of peace and prosperity. Under the awesome burden of these responsibilities, we have worked diligently within the parameters established by the Balanced Budget Agreement to preserve and provide for the readiness of our armed forces while meeting priority military challenges established in the 1996 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

* In the QDR, we struck a fine balance between near-term readiness, long-term modernization and quality of life improvements for our men and women in uniform. A key element of this balance was our decision that, a half decade after the end of the Cold War, we could design the force so that "first-to-fight" forces would be maintained at high readiness levels while follow-on forces would be kept at lower, but still acceptable, levels. Anecdotal references to a readiness crisis are, quite broadly, based on reports of the challenges faced within these follow-on forces.

* But again, I can assure you that our military is fully capable of carrying out our national military strategy.

So, you're saying there are no readiness problems?

* We are facing challenges in several areas. For example, the continued robust U.S. economy, which is clearly a great benefit for our country, increases the challenge of recruiting and retaining the top-notch personnel we need.

* However, we have made readiness a top priority. We have done much to support readiness: in both this fiscal year and the next, we have reallocated roughly one billion dollars to high-priority readiness accounts.

Why does this seem to be a recurring issue?

* The President and our military leadership have a process in place that constantly reevaluating the readiness of our forces and attacking problems in individual readiness areas as they arise.

* Although we are doing much to support readiness, we can't do it alone. We need Congress' help in several areas:

* Recently, during commissioning ceremonies for our newest aircraft carrier, the USS HARRY S TRUMAN, the President called upon Congress to approve, before going on vacation, an important reprogramming package that sends nearly a billion dollars to readiness-related accounts.

* By passing FY99 non-offset emergency funding legislation for Bosnia, Congress will ensure that key readiness and training accounts do not have to be used to offset the costs of this critical deployment.

* By approving our FY99 budget request without adding unrequested procurement or research and development programs, Congress will allow the Defense Department to maintain the necessary balance between readiness and modernization essential to achieving QDR goals.

* Congress must also act to authorize two additional rounds of base closure. Without this authority, we remain burdened with the task of

maintaining excess
military infrastructure at a cost that invariably comes at the expense of
readiness.

RUMSFELD REPORT: NORTH KOREAN UNDERGROUND FACILITIES

July 29, 1998

What is your reaction to the July 29th Washington Post article quoting
claims by
Rumsfeld Commission members that North Korea has built extensive
underground
factories for the production and testing of ballistic missiles?

(We have been aware for some time that several nations, including
North Korea
and Iran, use underground facilities for purposes related to weapons of
mass
destruction. The Rumsfeld Commission was briefed on this issue by
the
Intelligence Community.

(This is a matter of concern to us, and there is no doubt that
underground
facilities pose a challenge to intelligence collection and analysis. Our
intelligence agencies have a focused effort aimed at obtaining
information about
them.

(By their very nature, underground facilities are of limited size and
are used
for specific purposes. Obviously, I cannot comment on what
intelligence we may or
may not have about individual installations.

(As the DCI noted earlier this month, monitoring foreign attempts to
develop
ballistic missile systems continues to be a top priority for our
intelligence
agencies. We are committed to ensuring that the Intelligence
Community has robust
capabilities for tracking this threat.

SAUDI ARABIA -- KING'S HEALTH

August 3, 1998

What can you tell us about reports that King Fahd is in the hospital?

* We have seen these press reports, but are not in a position to comment on King Fahd's health. We wish King Fahd well.

ISRAEL: BERGER-BARAK MEETING

August 5, 1998

* SRB met with Israeli opposition leader Ehud Barak for 30 minutes Tuesday.

* Barak emphasized he did not come to criticize or support the GOI's negotiating approach. He does want the USG and American people to know that the majority of the Israeli public wants the peace process to move ahead. Berger and Barak discussed the state of play in the peace process. Berger affirmed that the US will continue to push for a breakthrough. If this proves impossible, we are prepared to offer a public explanation.

* They discussed the peace process in the context of the broader developments and security issues facing the region, including proliferation on the subcontinent; Iraqi and Iranian efforts to develop WMD and ballistic missiles; Caspian oil.

IF PRESSED:

* We are not able to provide additional details about a private meeting.

ISRAEL: KILLING OF SETTLERS

August 5, 1998

Reaction to shooting deaths of two Israelis near Nablus?

* We have seen the press reports, and have confirmed that these shootings occurred.

* We strongly condemn such terrorist acts and extend our deepest sympathies to the families of the victims.

* Such incidents underscore the need for continued improvement in security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian authority to ensure that such events do not recur.

What about Bibi saying that he would allow the victims' settlement to expand?

* The Palestinians and Israelis agreed that settlements are to be discussed in permanent status negotiations. We support that agreement.

* We believe settlement activity- particularly at this delicate juncture of the peace process - is unhelpful.

* For progress to be possible in the parties' negotiations, both sides should avoid actions that undermine mutual confidence. That includes settlement activity.

ISRAEL: VOTE ON DISSOLUTION OF KNESSET July 30, 1998

Any comment on the Knesset vote to dissolve itself?

* This issue is entirely one of Israeli domestic politics. We understand that this vote is preliminary in nature and that additional votes would be required to actually dissolve the Knesset.

MEPP: UPDATE/PRISONER RELEASE August 4, 1998

Palestinians are saying there is little reason to have another round of meetings with the Israelis -- is this phase of the peace process over?

* No. There has been direct engagement between the parties. We are now in touch with both sides to see if it is possible to reach an agreement.

So are you going to continue with this set of talks?

* We are in touch with both sides. We will make a judgment about whether it is possible to reach an agreement.

What about the possibility of a prisoner release by the Israelis?

* We understand there has been no decision on this issue yet.

* We support any measure which increases trust and confidence between the two sides. We would welcome this humanitarian gesture. It would help create a more positive atmosphere for the negotiations.

RUSSIAN FINANCIAL SITUATION July 29, 1998

(Russia has embarked on a major reform effort supported by the IFIs. It's a strong and ambitious program.

(Major thrust of the reform is getting Russia's fiscal house in order. This will create the foundation for a return to growth.

(Markets looking carefully at program and Russia's ability to implement it. Understandable that there is market uncertainty given international market volatility.

(As Russia itself has noted, performance is key to building investor confidence.

Prime Minister Kiriyenko affirmed his government's commitment to enact and implement its reform program during Vice President Gore's visit. This is the right next step for Russia.

If Asked -- Given all the promises the Russians have broken in the past on economic reform, why should we believe that this time will be any different?

(Need to put Russian reform process in context. Over the past seven years, Russia's economy has undergone a major transformation. Process of change always a difficult one.

(Program Russia is now pursuing is one devised for Russian purposes and they are acting on it because they believe it is good for Russia.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT July 24, 1998

What is your reaction to the comments by Senator Helms during a hearing that the United States should withdraw from all foreign peacekeeping activities and reopen our Status of Forces Agreements with other countries given the final text of the ICC treaty?

(We do need to assess the implications for U.S. policy of adoption of the ICC treaty and have begun the process of doing so. At the same time, we note that the treaty will not enter into force until 60 countries have ratified it. This will take some time. We need to make judgments in this area judiciously and will do so in the weeks and months ahead.

What is the U.S. reaction to the final text of the treaty relating to the International Criminal Court?

(We are disappointed with the final text of the treaty. While we have always supported the establishment of a permanent court and continue to support the concept of such a court, we are concerned that this treaty's provisions could make persons, including U.S. citizens, who are involved in critical international activities -- like peacekeeping operation, humanitarian relief and enforcement of sanctions -- vulnerable to unwarranted prosecution before the court.

(In particular, we do not support the way in which the court's jurisdiction may be extended to the citizens of States that are not parties to the treaty. Under the treaty as drafted, the court may assert jurisdiction over a person if it has only the consent of the state where an alleged offense occurred. This means that U.S. citizens and others involved in international activities even though their countries may not be parties to this treaty -- could be hauled before the court without the agreement of their country of nationality. This violates basic principles of treaty law and could greatly inhibit the ability of the United States and others to participate in these sorts of operations.

(We find this jurisdictional provision particularly troubling because, in essence, it provides a shield to those who abuse human rights inside their own borders while making vulnerable others who are engaged in overseas activities.

(We have several other problems with the treaty, including the inclusion within the court's jurisdiction of the crime of aggression.

(We will be digesting the treaty over the next several days to determine what our response will be.

Will the U.S. actively oppose the establishment of the court?

(We are not prepared to answer that question at this time. We are studying the treaty to determine how to respond.

Why would the U.S. vote against this treaty while all of our chief allies supported it?

(The United States plays a unique role in maintaining international peace and security and we wish to ensure that we can continue to play such a role without undue interference. We are concerned that the treaty as drafted could jeopardize activities associated with this role.

CAMBODIA - THE ELECTIONS August 5, 1998

What is your reaction to the official preliminary election results released by Cambodia's National Election Commission?

* Cambodia's citizens, with the help of the international community, have exercised their right to vote and provided Cambodia with an opportunity to achieve the lasting peace and representative government envisioned by the Paris Peace Accords.

* The National Election Commission's "official" preliminary results indicate that no single party received sufficient votes to win the two-thirds of the National Assembly seats needed to form a government.

* Currently investigations are underway into allegations of election irregularities. We have urged the Cambodian election authorities to investigate these charges thoroughly to ensure that the results of the election reflect the will of the Cambodian people.

* The final results of the election will be announced by the Constitutional

Council later this month. Until the alleged irregularities are resolved and the final results announced, it still is premature to assess the electoral process.

ENCRYPTION

August 5, 1998

Issue: Keyworth Editorial in Wall Street Journal "Computer Security Doesn't Hamper U.S. Security"

Keyworth alleges that encryption controls risk crippling the Internet. Assuming widespread uncontrolled encryption, he acknowledges that the law enforcement agencies will suffer delay in access to sensitive encrypted information during a wiretap. Instead of controlling exports of U.S. encryption in the face of foreign competition, he proposes that the US instead invest wisely in communications and code breaking technologies.

Comments: Law enforcement, when investigating criminal activity, must have timely access to plain text communications and data. The mathematics associated with encryption technology currently on the market can block decoding of the communications for the rest of our lifetime. While Keyworth's idea for investment in the area of code breaking is not new (and is already on-going within the federal government), it will not be a sole solution for law enforcement because of the need for timely access.

The Administration believes there are other ways, in addition to key recovery, that products and systems can be designed to assist law enforcement access. Thus the Administration continues a cooperative dialogue with industry to help find solutions to encryption for law enforcement.

If asked to comment on editorial:

* We understand that strong encryption can block, potentially forever, law enforcement access to criminal communications.

* The Administration continues to support a balanced approach to encryption and remains committed to preserving law enforcement's ability to protect the public safety.

* Thus, we continue to engage in a cooperative dialogue with U.S. industry to find other technological solutions, in addition to key recovery, that may assist law enforcement.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 8/12/98 4:09:45 PM
FROM Bouchard, Joseph F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: call from Commander Johnson [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Allen, Charles A.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Chuck,

Here's my memo to Admiral Preuher and a background memo on the ratification effort I attached to it.

Joe Bouchard

-----Original
Message-----
From: Allen, Charles A.
Sent: Wednesday, August 12,
1998 3:21 PM
To: Bouchard, Joseph F.
Subject: FW: call from Commander
Johnson [UNCLASSIFIED]

Joe, do you want me to look at the memo before I call Kurt back? Kurt is Deputy SJA and was probably tasked by the CINC or his front office to deal with it.

-----Original
Message-----
From: DeRosa, Mary B.
Sent: Wednesday, August 12,
1998 3:13 PM
To: Allen, Charles A.
Subject: call from Commander
Johnson [UNCLASSIFIED]

from Cincpac legal, 808-477-6372. He'd like to talk to you about an August 11 memo from Captain Bouchard.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

LOS-Prueher-1.doc

August 11, 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL PRUEHER

FROM: Captain Joseph F. Bouchard, USN
Director for Defense Policy

SUBJECT: Ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

Admiral, Colonel Jay Farrar (NSC Legislative Affairs) relayed to Chuck Allen and me a question from Marty Dupont concerning what you could do to support the Law of the Sea (LOS) treaty ratification effort. Chuck, Jay and I have been helping coordinate the interagency ratification effort. A summary of where the effort stands is attached. Please keep it close hold as its description of our ratification strategy is sensitive. We discussed Marty's question and came up with the suggestions that follow. We fully understand that you will need to coordinate any actions you take with CJCS and OSD, so this memorandum is strictly informal suggestions based on our view of where your involvement would have greatest impact.

Senator Helms told Secretary Cohen and General Shelton on 24 June that he would hold hearings on the LOS treaty, but did not commit to a date. What we need to do now is get the hearings scheduled as early as possible in September. Here are the obstacles we face:

* The calendar. If Senator Helms has other issues he insists on addressing in September (or if his staffers or other SFRC members have issues and convince him of their importance), LOS will not get on the SFRC calendar. I see a State push developing to get its FY-99 budget increased to fund greater security measures at its embassies. That probably would shoot to the top of the SFRC agenda (I can't imagine the Senate ceding initiative on embassy security to the Administration,

nor can I imagine Senator Helms leaving it to the Appropriations Committee without SFRC engaging on the issue. That would make it hard to get time for LOS hearings in September.

* The rear guard action being fought against the treaty by Patty McNerney and Marshall Billingslea of the SFRC Staff. They are not attempting to dispute the national security grounds for ratification; rather, they have focused their efforts on two points: (a) the "transfer of wealth" issue, and (b) the criticism that the treaty creates new UN organizations, further swelling an already bloated, ineffective UN bureaucracy that is devoted to socialist principles contrary to US values and interests. Countering the "transfer of wealth" argument requires strong endorsement of the treaty from the industries most affected by it. We have those endorsements and should be able to win that point. The anti-UN argument is harder, but we have effective arguments to counter it and have prepared contingency language for the Senate resolution of advise and consent that reiterates the Administration position on the need for UN reform.

Although we currently have the high ground on the national security issue, I see the pieces falling into place for a renewed attack on the treaty on national security grounds. Here's my reasoning:

* Conservative critics constantly chastise the Clinton Administration for viewing treaties, diplomacy and the rule of law as an alternative to military power for protecting American interests. They further argue that this view has led to precipitous downsizing of US military forces and neglect of their readiness. This line of argument is shaping up as an issue in the fall election.

* Frank Gaffney fired a shot across the bow of the LOS treaty on June 30 when he wrote:

"Against the possibility the United States might somehow retain the means with which to project power effectively, the administration is subordinating the nation's freedom of action to myriad international arrangements. These include: ...embracing a Law of the Sea treaty that will imperil, not protect, American interests in freedom of navigation and use of international waters;..."

* The Navy briefed OSD in April that its shipbuilding budget will not support the 300-ship fleet called for in the QDR beyond FY-05. Navy is only building 6-7 ships a year, must begin building at least 9 a year no later than FY-04 to stay at 300. I drafted a memo that Sandy Berger sent to the President in June explaining the issue to him. This will be a major issue in the FY-00 budget next year. I predict that it will leak to Congress before the fall election.

* The conservative argument will be that the Clinton Administration strategy is to rely on the rule of law -- the Law of the Sea treaty -- rather than naval power to protect American interests in freedom of navigation and use of international waters. That readily leads to many examples of why such a strategy will fail with great harm to U.S. national security.

* We must assume that this line of thinking will occur to, or be brought to the attention of, McNerney and Billingslea, and that they will feed it to Helms.

Admiral, pre-empting and countering this argument is where you can have the greatest impact. You have great credibility speaking of the continued importance of naval power in protecting American interests in freedom of navigation and use of international waters. The key point that needs to be made is that, far from being an alternative to naval power, the Law of the Sea treaty is a critical foundation for effective use of American naval power to protect the full range of

our vital national interests overseas. It does not weaken our naval forces, it empowers them. I know that Steve Horton could develop this argument much better than I. Illustrating this argument with examples from the Pacific Theater would be particularly effective.

Chuck, Jay and I feel strongly that your support for the ratification effort could make a crucial difference and suggest the following actions:

- * Offer to testify at the SFRC hearings on the LOS treaty. Have Marty Dupont lay the groundwork by calling his Legislative Affairs counterparts at the Joint Staff and DOD with your offer. He should also call RADM Ryan at OLA and inform him of the offer (OLA has been leading the charge on LOS ratification and will have the best advice on how to proceed).

- * Write Senator Helms endorsing the LOS treaty, noting his agreement to hold hearings (which has been reported in the press) and asking that they be held as early as possible after the Senate returns from recess in September. Extend an offer to testify at the hearings and offer to meet with him to discuss the treaty. A meeting with Senator Helms during the August recess would be best, but may not be possible because he is recovering from surgery to replace both his knees.

- * Call SFRC Staff Director Bud Nance (202-224-4651) and speak with him "admiral to admiral" about the treaty. Pretext is giving him a heads up on the letter and offering to fax him a copy. Reiterate the key points in the letter and emphasize the offer to testify at the hearings.

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at 202-456-9191, Jay Farrar at 456-9171 or Chuck Allen at 456-9111.

Very respectfully.

Attachment:
Update on Law of the Sea Treaty Ratification Effort
4

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT LOS-Mem-8.doc

Ratification Strategy

The Law of the Sea (LOS) Treaty ratification strategy emphasizes national security grounds for ratification. DOD and Navy have the lead and have been very successful in gaining support. Our other primary effort has been to point out commercial grounds for ratification and to correct lingering misconceptions about seabed mining. Commerce has had the lead here and has had great success. Secondary effort has been to counter opposition to anything with "UN" in the title and threat of the treaty being portrayed as "internationalism that sacrifices U.S. interests" by pointing out the significant leverage that the treaty gives the United States in international affairs, particularly in ocean policy.

Background on the Ratification Effort

* On October 7, 1994, President Clinton submitted the LOS treaty and the Seabed Mining Agreement to the Senate for advise and consent to ratification. The SFRC held an initial round of hearings on the treaty and agreement that fall, but the Republicans won control of the Senate in November and the SFRC has taken no further action since then. Administration efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to the LOS treaty ceased due to higher priority ratification efforts (the Chemical Weapons Convention, in particular).

- * PDD-36, "United States Policy on Protecting the Ocean Environment," signed by the President on 5 April 1995, set ratification of the treaty as the Administration's top ocean policy objective.
- * The State Department's June 1997 letter to Senator Helms on Administration treaty priorities listed the LOS treaty in the highest priority of treaties.
- * In June-July 1997, the Ocean Policy Interagency Working Group (IWG) agreed to renew the LOS treaty ratification effort with DOD taking the lead and emphasis on national security grounds for ratification.
- * On 27 August 1997, CNO hosted RADM James W. (Bud) Nance, SFRC Staff Director, for lunch to discuss the LOS treaty. Nance invited VADM Ellis to brief the SFRC staff, particularly Marshall Billingslea, on DOD and Navy views on the treaty.
- * Beginning in November 1997, DOD and Navy briefed Helms' Chief of Staff (Bud Nance), the staffs of key Republican Senators (Lott, Stevens, Lugar, McCain, Warner, Murkowski and Snowe) and Senate Democrats' staffs. All went very well.
- * On 14 November, Secretary Cohen sent a letter to Senator Helms urging ratification on national security grounds.
- * In December 1997, a State/Commerce/Navy briefing team began a series of briefings to staffs of key Senators and Committees on national security and economic reasons for ratification.
- * On 2 March 1998, Sandy Berger, Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen agreed on a strategy that gives DOD the lead in the effort to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification of the LOS treaty by 1 October.
- * In March and April 1998, Under Secretary Pickering spoke with Senators Stevens, Murkowski, Warner and Snowe, and Under Secretary Slocombe spoke with Bud Nance and Senators McCain and Warner.

- * In April, Secretary Cohen spoke with Senator Lott. Senator Lott agreed to speak with Senator Helms at the appropriate time about moving the treaty out of Committee.
- * Secretary Daley spoke with Senators Stevens, Murkowski and McCain in April and wrote to Senator Helms in May.
- * Secretary Dalton held a meeting with former Navy Secretaries in April, urging Senators Chafee and Warner to support ratification of the treaty.
- * On 13 April, Sandy Berger, Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen discussed LOS ratification and coordinated calls to Senators Lott and Helms.
- * On 20 April, the Commerce Department held an event at the National Press Club to brief industry on the treaty. The event went very well.
- * On 5 May, a letter co-signed by Senators Chafee, McCain, Murkowski and Snowe was sent to Senator Helms supporting the treaty and urging him to schedule hearings on it. This letter helps provide the political cover Helms needs to move on the treaty.
- * In May, AT&T and the Chamber of Shipping of American sent letters to Senator Helms emphasizing the importance of the treaty to American commerce and industry.
- * In May, Senator Stevens spoke with Senator Helms, urging him to hold hearings on the treaty. He has offered to speak with Senator Helms again after Secretaries Albright and Cohen call.
- * In May and June, Fred Ikle and Jeanne Kirkpatrick stated they would not oppose the treaty. Heritage Foundation indicated it would support the treaty.
- * DOD and Navy briefed Senator Lott's staff on 4 June to help prepare the Senator for his approach to Senator Helms.
- * On 24 June, Senator Helms (accompanied by Bud Nance and Patty

McNerney) met with Secretary Cohen and General Shelton to discuss the LOS treaty. The meeting went very well and Senator Helms stated that he would schedule hearings on the treaty. Bud Nance left a list of questions and objections to the treaty (prepared by Patty McNerney) and asked DOD to provide answers to the questions. The questions focused on the "transfer of wealth" issue and the treaty's expansion of UN authority and bureaucracy.

* On 8 July, RADM Ryan (Navy OLA) delivered to Bud Nance written answers to the questions on the treaty that were given to DOD at the 24 June meeting. Nance agreed to a briefing for SFRC and Helms staffers by OSD (Frank Miller and RADM Smith) on 14 July. This briefing was described by Nance as a prerequisite for hearings on the treaty. Unfortunately, the meeting was cancelled and has not yet been held. DOD and Navy will try to reschedule it after the August recess.

* State has asked Ed Hall to work with Bud Nance on setting a date for hearings. Hall agreed to help.

* The first week in July, all seven living former Chiefs of Naval Operations sent a letter to Senators Lott, Thurmond and Helms urging the Senate to act promptly to ratify the treaty.

* Senators Murkowski and Chafee hosted a luncheon briefing on the treaty in the Russell building on 9 July. Briefers included VADM Ellis (CNO's staff), Paul Kelly (American Petroleum Institute), John Norton Moore (expert on ocean law), and Reed Harrison (AT&T). 20 Senate staffers were present, including Patty McNerney (SFRC) and Wayne Boyles (Helms). Tom Lippman (Washington Post) also attended. Event organizers believe it was very productive.

* DOD, Navy, State and Commerce have launched a public affairs effort, including submission of op-ed pieces to key papers, briefings for reporters, and

meetings
with editorial boards.

* DOD is seeking letters to Senator Helms supporting the treaty from former Secretaries of Defense Cheney, Weinberger and Rumsfeld. State is seeking similar letters from former Secretaries of State Schulz and Baker.

* Commerce, supported by DOD and Navy, is seeking a letter supporting the treaty from President Bush. They have requested NSC assist with approach via Scowcroft.

* Rep. Weldon is circulating a "Dear Colleague" letter to Senator Helms among Republicans in the House urging timely hearings on the LOS treaty and support for its ratification. This letter will help provide the political cover Helms needs to move on the treaty.

* At the 20 July Albright-Berger Cohen (ABC) lunch, Secretary Albright agreed to call Senator Helms soon after the Senate returns from recess to urge him to schedule hearings on the treaty as early as possible in September.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. emails	Charles Allen to James Baker. Subject: RE: Email to SRB RE: Helms Letter to Albright on "Christmas Warning." (2 pages)	08/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/05/1998-08/19/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5657

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Mara Rudman to James Baker and John Dowling. Subject: RE: EMAIL to SRB RE: Helms Letter to Albright on "Christmas Warning." (3 pages)	08/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/05/1998-08/19/1998]

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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	James Covey to Donald Bandler. Subject: RE: EMAIL to SRB RE: Helms Letter to Albright on "Christmas Warning." (2 pages)	08/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/05/1998-08/19/1998]

2006-1363-F

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	Sharon Storey to John Dowling, Glyn Davies, Donna Dejbani et al. Subject: RE: EMAIL to SRB RE: Helms Letter to Albright on "Christmas Warning." (2 pages)	08/19/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/05/1998-08/19/1998]

2006-1363-F

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