

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Malley to James Dobbins and Jeffery DeLaurentis. Subject: Cuba. (6 pages)	02/04/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Robert Kyle to Malcolm Lee. Subject: Action Memorandum for NSC. (8 pages)	02/05/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	Robert Malley to James Baker. Subject: Cuba. (6 pages)	02/05/1998	P1/b(1)
004. email	Mara Rudman to Malcolm Lee. Subject: FW: Final Clearance: Gum Arabic. (10 pages)	02/06/1998	P1/b(1)
005. email	Robert Kyle to Malcolm Lee. Subject: Action Memorandum for NSC. (7 pages)	02/06/1998	P1/b(1)
006. email	Mary DeRosa to Robert Malley. Subject: FW: Cuba. (8 pages)	02/08/1998	P1/b(1)
007. email	Malcolm Lee to Dwight Bemisderfer. Subject: Action Memorandum for NSC. (7 pages)	02/09/1998	P1/b(1)
008. email	Dwight Bemisderfer to Malcolm Lee. Subject: Action Memorandum for NSC. (7 pages)	02/09/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
 OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F
 vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/3/98 9:14:42 PM
FROM Lee, Malcolm R.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Japan Civair: FedEx, American, Delta, Continental Agree on Slot Transfer
[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Davies, Glyn T.
Dejban, Donna D.
Friedrich, Mary K.
Helweg, M. Diana
Kale, Dora A.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Malley, Robert
Millison, Cathy L.
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L.
Storey, Sharon V.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Please pass to Jim and Sandy:

State and DOT report that Federal Express reached agreement with our non-incumbent passenger carriers (Delta, American and Continental) on the transfer of Federal Express' underutilized Narita slots. Still seeking details on how many slots, but DOT believes they are sufficient for each of the passenger carriers to begin one new daily service to Narita by the end of February. DOT reports they are pleased with the outcome.

This had been the most contentious issue in the closing days of the negotiations, with Delta and American accusing Federal Express of asking an unreasonable price, and Delta in particular qualifying its support for the overall agreement. They apparently have now come to terms.

Japan and DOT do not want to spotlight this unprecedented transfer, so our carriers, who were prepared to issue a joint release, did not do so.

On the congressional front, it is now unclear whether Senator Helms will proceed with hearings on the agreement. A/S Larson said he had a very positive conversation with Admiral Nance just prior

to the Friday signing. I will keep you apprised.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Malley to James Dobbins and Jeffery DeLaurentis. Subject: Cuba. (6 pages)	02/04/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/4/98 11:37:34 AM
FROM Bouchard, Joseph F.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Oceans conference memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Orfini, Michael H.

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Mike,

I clear for NSC.

Personally, I'm strongly in favor of the National Conference being a White House Conference on the Oceans and having the President speak at it. A White House Conference makes eminent sense from both a policy and a political perspective. The Commerce-led Working Group that put together the proposal has identified a rich menu of substantive deliverables from which to choose. CEQ (David Sandalow and Sally Erricson) have confided in rare moments of candor that the only reason they do not support the proposal is because they are too busy with other issues (Kyoto and Clean Water Act) to devote time to a White House Conference on the Oceans. I find that a pathetic reason for not supporting an otherwise commendable proposal. OSTP is neutral only because Jack Gibbons is leaving soon. From my perspective, either CEQ or OSTP could take the lead.

The official NSC position is that a White House Conference on the Oceans is fine as long as it does not interfere with efforts to gain Senate advice and consent to ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Part of the legislative strategy for UNCLOS ratification is to avoid having the Convention become a "liberal" cause. (We don't want environmental activists telling Senator Helms "Ratify the treaty to save the baby seals.") Emphasis in the legislative strategy is on national security grounds for ratification (and, to a lesser degree, commercial benefits). The proposed White House Conference on the Oceans is focused on environmental issues, exploration, education and commercial uses of the ocean. So, NSC does not want UNCLOS to be linked with it and NSC does not want to take the lead on the conference.

Joe Bouchard

-----Original Message-----

From: Orfini,

Michael H.

Sent: Wednesday, February 04, 1998 9:12 AM

To: Bouchard,

Joseph F.; Behring, Deanna M.; Jordan, Donald L.

Subject: Oceans

conference memo [UNCLASSIFIED]

<< File: ocean conf.doc >> CEQ

already given draft. OSTP pls pass to Don P. Your comments please.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/5/98 10:57:43 AM
FROM Ryu, Rexion Y.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Additions to the Iraq guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Rubin, Eric S.

CARBON_COPY Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Countryman, Thomas M.
Greer, Jason H.
Grummon, Stephen R.
Marty, Joseph H.
Riedel, Bruce O.
Ryu, Rexion Y.
Todd, Gwentyth E.

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT feb4guide_.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

February 4, 1998

Blair Visit

Iraq

Russia-Iraq

Cuba/Food and Medicine

Iran

MEPP

Northern Ireland

BLAIR VISIT
February 4, 1998

Q. What is latest on Prime Minister Blair's schedule here?

A. The Prime Minister arrives tonight around 5 p.m. at Andrews. We understand he is hosting a small dinner at Blair House. Tomorrow he is breakfasting with a number of members of the Congress at Blair House. I believe the focus is on Northern Ireland.

The formal part of the program starts tomorrow at 11 a.m. with the welcoming ceremony outside, weather permitting, followed by a short reception for the welcoming delegations inside the White House.

The President and Prime Minister will then have a private meeting over lunch in the Oval Office, starting around 1 p.m. (note for briefer: pool spray at the top). This will give the leaders a chance to discuss pressing topics on the agenda -- I expect Iraq and the Northern Ireland peace process will be dealt with in depth. This will be followed by an expanded meeting in the Cabinet Room, which will focus on G-7/8 and broader U.S.-UK and transatlantic issues. I imagine that the Asian situation will occupy a fair amount of time, as well as questions of employability, environment, law enforcement cooperation and trade. This is scheduled to wrap up shortly after 2 p.m.

The President and the Prime Minister will travel together to Montgomery Blair High School for an event with students, faculty and parents there.

The Prime Minister has calls on the Hill leadership later in the afternoon.

The Official Dinner takes place in the evening.

Friday morning the Vice President is hosting a breakfast for the Prime Minister

at the State Department. The Prime Minister will come over here for the 11 a.m. press conference.

Early in the afternoon the leaders will take part in a discussion at Blair House focussing on public policy questions. (Sid Blumenthal has developed a press line on this for use)

Late in the day, the President and Mrs. Clinton and the Blairs will go to Camp David. (comment on the radio address, VPOTUS participation??) The Prime Minister will depart fairly early Saturday morning.

IRAQ
February 4, 1998

GENERAL MESSAGE POINTS

- * Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.
- * No decision has been made concerning the use of force, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out.
- * Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:
- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

HARD Q'S AND A'S

Q: Secretary Cohen said that the U.S. would prefer Israel not respond to an attack by Iraq. Is the U.S. prepared to defend Israel in this case?

A: Israel, as any other country has the absolute right of self-defense.

The United States has an ironclad commitment to Israel's security. An attack by

Saddam on any of Iraq's neighbors would be met with a swift and forceful response.

Q: But did the U.S. ask Israel not to respond to any attack out of concern for loss of Arab support for U.S. military action against Iraq?

A: We do not get into the details of our diplomatic exchanges. Israel has the right to defend itself.

Q: Has the U.S. provided any equipment to Israel to help in its civil or military defense?

A: The U.S. supports Israel's efforts to defend itself in a variety of ways, including in these areas. For operational reasons, we will not provide details of the precise nature of such support.

Comment on Yeltsin saying that use of force in Iraq would lead to a world war?

* The Russian government has sought to clarify those remarks since the initial media reports.

* The President and Secretary of State have talked directly to President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Primakov in recent days. We have a good understanding of the Russian government's views.

* If Saddam Hussein complies with the UN resolutions, there will be no need for military force.

* If the use of force were to become necessary, it would be intended to reduce the chance that weapons of mass destruction could be used in the region.

Any reaction to Bibi rejecting Secretary Albright's urging of restraint?

* Should Saddam take any action against any country in the region, he can expect a swift and significant response .

* Our broad goals remain to thwart his ability to develop and use weapons of mass destruction and threaten his neighbors.

Secretary Albright claims she got strong support during all of her meetings in the region yet the head of the Arab League said today that the Arab world is united against the use of force. How do you reconcile?

* Secretary Albright has completed close consultations with Arab leaders throughout the region and is in a good position to characterize their views.

* Clearly, our friends in the region favor a diplomatic solution. So do we. There is also a consensus that Saddam has precipitated this crisis through his non-compliance and that the current situation is unacceptable.

* We believe that there will be broad international support for whatever steps are necessary to resolve this crisis.

Today's Washington Times says that members of the JCS are angry with a White House-designed bombing campaign because it doesn't target Saddam's security forces or his top aides. They say there is no strategy, only a list of targets - comment?

* The story is not true. However, I'm not in a position to discuss the status of our military planning.

Will the Saudis allow you to base/bomb?

* Will not comment on specific countries or operational details, but believe we will have the cooperation we need to use our forces if necessary.

Some are saying we won't take any action during the Olympic games - has this been a factor in the discussions?

* We don't have any timelines or deadlines. We'll take the steps we need to

protect our interests and achieve our objectives.

* The threat to peace in the region is a result of Iraq's non-compliance with the will of the international community.

What is your reaction to the flurry of diplomatic initiatives - the Russians, French, Turks and others are engaged in efforts at diplomacy?

* There are, and have been, a number of initiatives. I don't want to comment about any specific diplomatic efforts.

* But let's be clear here - there is nothing to negotiate, no half measures and no compromise. Saddam must fully comply with UN resolutions and give UNSCOM inspectors unfettered access to all sites, period!

* The purpose of diplomacy should be for achieving full compliance by Saddam Hussein. Given Saddam's history of misleading and concealing at every opportunity, we are understandably skeptical.

Do you think a Senate "all necessary means" resolution would be helpful? Is it necessary before a use of force?

* We welcome expressions of support from Congress.

* We had good consultations with key members of the Senate yesterday and will continue consultations on the Hill in the coming days.

(if pushed)

* We believe the President has the authority under the Constitution and the laws of the U.S. to undertake all operations under consideration.

Is it appropriate for members of Congress to travel to Baghdad?

* This is a judgment individual members have to make.

* But let's be clear here - what is necessary is that the UNSCOM inspectors have unfettered access to all sites. There is nothing to negotiate.

* The purpose of diplomacy is to achieve full compliance by Saddam Hussein.

Have we changed our policy to use nuclear force against Iraq, as is reported by Newsday?

* The press reports that the US is planning to use nuclear weapons to destroy chemical and biological storage facilities in Iraq have no basis in fact. The US has no plans or intentions of using nuclear weapons.

* If any country were foolish enough to attack the US, our allies, or our forces with chemical/biological weapons, our response would be swift, devastating and overwhelming.

* We have worked hard to fashion non-nuclear responses to the threat or use of WMD, in order to give military commanders and the President a range of responses from which to choose.

* As Secretary Perry said in 1996, we are able to mount a devastating response without using nuclear weapons.

* Nevertheless we do not rule out in advance any capability available to us. I stress that these policies have to do with the situation in which the US, our allies, and our forces have been attacked with chemical or biological weapons.

Does this position contradict the 1978 US negative security assurance?

* No, it does not.

What would we do if Iraq used WMD against the US?

* Our response would be swift and overwhelming.

RESOLUTION 986/OIL FOR FOOD/SANCTIONS POLICY

SecGen Annan is proposing an increase in Iraqi oil sales to \$5.2 - more than twice the current limit. Do you support this degree of expansion of

986?

* We are generally prepared to support an expansion.

* We will look very closely at the specific details of Secretary General's recommendations to make sure that the Iraqi people get the food and medicine they need.

* The U.S. understands that the Iraqi people are suffering under the Saddam Hussein regime and his expenditures on lavish palaces and military resources. We do not wish to see Iraqi people sick and hungry because Saddam Hussein sees food and medicine as his lowest priorities. The President, our government, and the U.S. people have no quarrel with the Iraqi people and we will look to support efforts to give them the food and medicine that Saddam Hussein denies them.

* UN sanctions ALWAYS permitted Iraq to purchase food and medicine. U.S. proposed the original oil-for-food deal and fought for it for five years, against Iraqi opposition. We proposed 986 to do the same thing. Have consistently said we'd like to find ways to make it work better.

* Saddam opposed 986 and its predecessor. He's the one using people as political pawn and devoting his nation's resources not to caring for Iraqis but to build WMD and lavish palaces. The Secretary General's report clearly states that Iraq is responsible for the delays in implementing 986 up to this point.

ISRAEL/MEPP

Israel has asked the US to give it warning if we strike Iraq - will we do this?

* Won't get into details of possible military operations.

Has the US asked Israel to foreswear retaliation in the event of an Iraqi strike against Israel?

* I won't discuss hypotheticals.

Isn't Netanyahu's position/stalemate in peace process, harming your ability to assemble a coalition?

* We pursue peace process because it's in the interest of the US, Israel, the Palestinians and Israel's neighbors. Stalemate in peace process something we're trying to overcome/but doesn't diminish the danger to the region posed by Saddam's pursuit of WMD or our resolve to deny him the capacity to threaten his neighbors.

DIPLOMACY

Isn't the diplomatic string running out/Are there any other options left/What is the purpose of the Albright trip?

* The President has made clear that Saddam cannot be allowed to defy the will of the international community and have unfettered opportunity to develop weapons of mass destruction.

* No decision has been made concerning the use of force. The window is closing -- but it is not yet shut. Ambassador Butler has made clear that under the current circumstances he cannot carry out his mandate. That is unacceptable.

* Secretary Albright has been meeting with counterparts from the UK, France and Russia and with our friends in the region. Ambassador Richardson will also be consulting with other members of the Security Council in Europe, Africa and Latin America. Secretary Cohen is traveling to the region this week. They will explain our views of the situation and discuss next steps.

* The President is also discussing the situation with key world leaders. He has spoken to Blair, Chirac, Chretien and Kohl. PM Blair will be coming to Washington this week on a long-planned state visit.

What diplomatic options are left? Do you plan to introduce/support another resolution in the Council? Would you consider additional sanctions? What are you waiting for?

* The international community has spoken clearly and unanimously that Saddam must respect the Security Council Resolutions and allow the inspectors to do their work unimpeded. We are now focusing on the discussions that Secretary Albright will be conducting in the coming days. We have no plans to introduce a resolution. We believe existing Council resolutions give us all the authority we need to take whatever action we deem necessary.

While Vedrine appears to be no longer ruling out the use of force, Primakov is still emphasizing Russian insistence that diplomatic methods be applied - are you encouraged by your progress with the French, discouraged by apparent lack of progress with the Russians?

* Reference to Albright's successful meeting w/Vedrine and also reference meeting w/Primakov

* We all share the same objective: to thwart Iraq's efforts to develop WMD or threaten its neighbors. The international community is united in its view that it Saddam must give the inspectors the access they need to do the job. As the President said, we are determined that he not be free to develop weapons of mass destruction unhindered.

* Vedrine's and Primakov's statements should speak for themselves.

* Skeptical that more additional diplomatic efforts will work. But while window closing, not yet closed.

Do you support another Primakov mission to negotiate with Saddam?

* Posuvalyuk has been in Baghdad - what is important is that Saddam

gets the
clear and unequivocal message that he must comply with Security
Council
Resolutions and allow the inspectors the access they need.

Do you have a deadline?

* No deadline, but it is clear that the diplomatic string is running out.
Sec
Albright, Amb Richardson, and Secretary Cohen are discussing next
steps with
Security Council members and friends in the region this week.

MILITARY PLANNING/USE OF FORCE

What will be purpose of the use of force/what targets/how can you
eliminate WMD
through a bombing campaign/won't the use of force simply guarantee
that the
inspectors are thrown out and Saddam will have won?

* No decision has been made with respect to the use of force, but the
President
has made clear that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop and
use WMD.

* Not going to comment on the possibility or nature of military
targets. Can say
however that whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will
be designed
to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

* UNSCOM inspectors have achieved remarkable results; have
always said that the
best outcome is for the inspectors to be able to carry out their work.
But as a
practical matter, Saddam has now put their mission to an end. Our
goal is to
thwart his capacity to develop WMD, by restoring the inspectors or
whatever
other steps may be necessary if the inspectors cannot carry out their
work.

* Meanwhile, we will insist that sanctions remain so long as he
refuses to
comply; sanctions are important tool in depriving him of the resources
to develop

and use WMD and threaten his neighbors.

- * Should the use of force be necessary, our objective would be to diminish substantially Iraq's WMD capability and its ability to project force and threaten its neighbors.

What are you planning to do after a military strike has taken place, assuming one does?

- * We don't discuss the specifics of our military operations and planning, but let me be clear on our objective - Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop WMD.

- * Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise, will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

Many prominent foreign policy experts have called on you to change your policy from one of containment to one of getting rid of Saddam/can you ever be confident you've gotten rid of WMD while Saddam is still there?

- * Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD and threaten his neighbors; we have said that we look forward to the day when Iraq has new leadership that would allow it join the family of nations. Desert Storm demonstrates that it would take hundreds of thousands of ground troops to remove the current leadership by force; our current policy - preventing Saddam from threatening the region -- serves the objectives and interests of the US, our friends and the international community at an acceptable level of risk.

Is the Administration in synch/ is the Pentagon out ahead on the use of force?

- * The President's advisors - civilian and military - are in firm agreement/meeting daily to guide the work. Meeting regularly with the President and Vice

President.

Isn't Saddam tying the hands of military planners by placing women and children in or near likely targets and forcing you to choose between key targets and inflicting heavy "collateral damage" that world community would not accept?

* Not going to comment on any possible targets. We don't telegraph our punches.

* But Saddam's use of "human shields" is further proof of his utter contempt and disregard for his own people.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Butler allegations/BW warheads on missiles.

* Not going to comment/leave it to Butler to characterize UNSCOM's findings.

Phyllis Oakley and others say that we really don't know the nature of Iraq's WMD capability - how can we draw up military options without this information?

* That's why it is so important for UNSCOM to be able to do its job unfettered.

MISCELANEOUS

What do you make of Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Said El-Sahaf's statement that Iraq is considering asking the International Court of Justice to complain about U.S. military threats?

* The International Court of Justice only has jurisdiction to hear a suit by one government against another where both sides have in some manner consented to have the court hear a case. The United States has not consented to ICJ jurisdiction here.

* This is just another attempt to divert attention from the real issue, with is

Iraq's duty to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction and to comply immediately with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

* The United States has a lot of respect for the International Court of Justice, but this is not an appropriate case to go to the Court.

What will be purpose of the use of force/what targets/how can you eliminate WMD through a bombing campaign/won't the use of force simply guarantee that the inspectors are thrown out and Saddam will have won?

* No decision has been made with respect to the use of force, but the President has made clear that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop and use WMD.

* Not going to comment on the possibility or nature of military targets. Can say however that whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

* UNSCOM inspectors have achieved remarkable results; have always said that the best outcome is for the inspectors to be able to carry out their work. But as a practical matter, Saddam has now put their mission to an end. Our goal is to thwart his capacity to develop WMD, by restoring the inspectors or whatever other steps may be necessary if the inspectors cannot carry out their work.

* Meanwhile, we will insist that sanctions remain so long as he refuses to comply; sanctions are important tool in depriving him of the resources to develop and use WMD and threaten his neighbors.

* Should the use of force be necessary, our objective would be to diminish substantially Iraq's WMD capability and its ability to project force and threaten its neighbors.

What are you planning to do after a military strike has taken place, assuming one does?

- * We don't discuss the specifics of our planning, but let me be clear on our objective - Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to develop WMD.

- * Whatever actions we take, diplomatic or otherwise, will be designed to achieve our goals:

- * thwart Iraq's capacity to develop and use WMD
- * limit his ability to threaten his neighbors.

RUSSIA-IRAQ February 4, 1998

- * We are aware of Yeltsin's comments. His spokesman has indicated that some of them may have been mistranslated.

- * We believe UNSC members all still have same goal, to assure full, effective Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions and keep Saddam from developing WMD.

CUBA February 3, 1998

Background: The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) has announced a humanitarian relief initiative which would authorize delivery of donated food and medicine to the Cuban people. Senator Helms supports the proposal and is drafting legislation that would also include USG food aid to Cuba. The CANF/Helms initiative would keep all current restrictions in place on the sale of

food and medicine. Meanwhile, there are two bills pending before Congress providing embargo exemptions for the sale and transport of food and medical exports to Cuba. The Administration has taken no official position on any of these proposals. On Monday, Fidel Castro strongly rejected the CANF proposal because of its "humiliating conditions." Yesterday, the U.S. Catholic Conference came out in favor of the pending legislation lifting restrictions on the sale of food and medicine.

What is the Administration's reaction to Fidel Castro's remarks rejecting the humanitarian assistance proposal by the Cuban American National Foundation?

* We are aware that Castro discussed the Cuban American National Foundation's humanitarian relief proposal during a four-hour speech he made Monday evening.

* Unless Castro knows more about this proposal than we do, his rejection seems a bit premature.

* For our part, we are withholding further comment pending further information on the proposal from its Congressional sponsors.

What is the State Department's reaction to the statement issued by the U.S. Catholic Conference asking the Administration to support pending legislation that would allow the direct sale of food and medicine?

* We have seen the statement issued by the U.S. Catholic Conference.

* The U.S. continues to believe that maintaining pressure on the Cuban government through our embargo is fundamental to encouraging systemic, democratic change.

* At the same time, strengthening Cuban civil society through increased information flows and humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people is a key factor in our ongoing efforts to promote a peaceful transition to democracy

in Cuba.

IRAN

February 4, 1998

* The President communicated with the Iranian people last week in his Id al Fitr message. He reminded them that the United States regrets the estrangement of our two nations. He noted that we have real differences with some Iranian policies, but that we believe these are not insurmountable. He expressed hope that we have more exchanges between our peoples and that the day will soon come when we can once again enjoy good relations with Iran.

(IF ASKED)

* Our openness to a dialogue with the government of Iran still stands. Although President Khatami's comments suggest that might not happen right away, we remain willing to participate in such a dialogue.

MEPP

February 4, 1998

What were the results of Secretary Albright's recent trip to the Middle East?

Would you characterize the trip as a success or a failure?

* The trip had two goals:

* First, to explain to Security Council members and our allies in the Gulf our views on Saddam's continued defiance of Security Council resolutions, his obstruction of UNSCOM weapons inspections, and the threat he poses to the region, and,

* Second, to get the Middle East peace process back on track by building on the President's meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat.

* As the Secretary announced, both the Israelis and the Palestinians

will be
sending representatives to Washington late next week to continue our
discussions.

* We continue to stress that hard decisions need to be made by both
parties. Our
discussions has focused on sharpening the outstanding issues and re-
invigorating
the peace process with trust and confidence from both the Israelis and
the
Palestinians.

What is the next step? What are our expectations?

* We expect to have further discussions next week.

* As the President urged Netanyahu and Arafat when he met them,
both sides to
need to examine the outstanding issues and consider the ideas the
President put
forth.

* We hope that both sides are preparing to make the tough decisions
that will

make the process forward to permanent status negotiations.

Any comment on Israel's claim that Palestinian terrorists remain free
or have

been released from prison?

* Palestinian security commitments remain one of the key outstanding
issues.

* We understand Israel's concerns and the President urged Chairman
Arafat, when

they met, to fully comply with the agreed-upon Palestinian security
obligations.

What are about reports that Israelis are increasingly pessimistic about
the peace
process?

* As we have said in the past, we are committed to moving the peace
process

forward. Both parties want peace. We intend to push the Israelis and
the

Palestinians to make the tough decisions needed to move toward
permanent status
negotiations.

IRAQ AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Is the Iraq crisis impeding your ability to achieve progress in the
peace
process?

* These two highly important issues both need attention.

* Saddam Hussein has threatened the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Israelis
- he is a
threat to Arabs and Israelis alike.

* The Middle East peace process is in the interest of every person,

every nation
and every community in the region. The peace process presents a
challenge that
can be overcome only if Israelis and Palestinians work together to
come to
agreement.

Will Israel retaliate if Saddam attacks Israel? Have we asked Israel to
fore swear such retaliation?

* We have discussed this issue with Israel.

* Let me just say that our commitment to Israel's security is
unshakable. Such
an attack by Saddam would be met by a swift and resounding
response.

Given our forceful demands of Iraq and our simultaneous
unwillingness to push

Israel to meet its previous commitments, how can the United States
credibly push
the peace process forward?

* There is no comparison between these two issues.

* The crisis in Iraq stems from Saddam's unwillingness to fore swear
weapons of
mass destruction -- an unwillingness which thus threatens its
neighbors
throughout the region.

* The Middle East peace process is a complex challenge that has
existed for a
considerable time. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians have invested

substantial time, energy and commitment to achieve long-lasting
peace.

NORTHERN IRELAND

February 4, 1998

Are you optimistic for progress in the peace talks?

* Yes. As a result of the IRA cease-fire, these historic talks now
include Sinn
Fein along with the other major political parties in Northern Ireland
committed
to seeking, by peaceful means, a just and lasting settlement of the
conflict.

* Progress has been slow, and there remain deep divisions over
important
substantive issues. Making the negotiations succeed will require
leadership,
perseverance, and a spirit of compromise.

* The United States shares with both London and Dublin the conviction that the multi-party talks are beginning to show real promise and represent the best hope for peace in Northern Ireland.

What is your view of the recent violence?

* We condemn all sectarian attacks, and in particular the recent ones directed at nationalists. The President has called on the people of Northern Ireland not to give in to the splinter groups trying to block progress towards peace. We urge the IRA and the key loyalist groups to maintain their cease-fires.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Robert Kyle to Malcolm Lee. Subject: Action Memorandum for NSC. (8 pages)	02/05/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Robert Malley to James Baker. Subject: Cuba. (6 pages)	02/05/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/11/98 10:32:01 AM
FROM Braden, Susan R.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: Urgent guidance requests from McCurry [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Rubin, Eric S.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY No, not in any detail.

-----Original Message-----

From: Rubin,
Eric S.
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 1998 10:10 AM
To: @CEE -
Central/Eastern Europe; @LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs
Cc: @PRESS
- Public Affairs
Subject: Urgent guidance requests from McCurry
[UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

Following guidance (based on
questions from McCurry's 0930 session with reporters) needed ASAP
to @PRESS:

CEE: Did Stoyanov and POTUS discuss Iraq?

LEGIS:

Response to Senator Helms vow to block foreign affairs legislation
over family planning issue

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	Mara Rudman to Malcolm Lee. Subject: FW: Final Clearance: Gum Arabic. (10 pages)	02/06/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F
vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/6/98 3:57:39 PM

FROM Dollar, Carolyn J.

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT Document2 [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Dean, Susan W.
Ficklin, John W.
George, Christopher L.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Leary, William H.
Marsh, Thomas S
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian T.
Neil, M. Elise
Porter, Pete
Prise, Edith M.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Smith, Michael P.
Soubers, Richard R.
Starks, Tali T.

CARBON_COPY Simon, Steven N.
Dollar, Carolyn J.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Roundtree, Beverly

TEXT_BODY THE ATTACHED LIST REFLECTS FOLDERS WHICH
REQUIRED NO FURTHER ACTION
BUT WHICH HAD NOT BEEN RETURNED TO FILE. PLEASE
ENSURE ALL DOCUMENTS
HAVE BEEN CLOSED OUT OF THE SYSTEM.

PLEASE ALSO COPY ALL FOLDERS
RELATING TO PAN AM 103 AND/OR TERRORISM AND
RETURN THE COPIES TO
MR. SIMON FOR HIS FILES. THANK YOU

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

Doc2.doc
VERIFICATION OF STATUS
NSC DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT: RECORD ID

0279 LTR FM COALITION FOR AMERICAN LEADERSHIP
9600339
ABROAD RE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET UNDERMINING
US ABILITY TO CARRY OUT FOREIGN RESPONSIBILITY

0452 LTR TO LAKE FM RESULTS RE SUPPORT FOR INTL
CHILDREN PROGRAMS WITHIN US FORN ASSISTANCE
9600452

0465 US SUPPORT FOR INTL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT - IFAD 9500465

0535 CC CY TO LAKE / LTR RE SANCTIONS AGAINST
LIBYA FM MOTHER OF VICTEM OF PANAM 103 9600535

0701 MEMO TO POTUS RE PROPOSED ADMIN APPROACH TO
KENNEDY LIBYA AMENDMENT 02/09/96

0932 LTR TO LAKE FM ABHYANKAR OF INTL FUND FOR
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT URGESUS
REPLENSIHMENT
PLEDGE FOR \$90M OVER NEXT 3 YRS 9600932

1515 LTR TO PRES FM SEN SPECTER RE INTL TERRORIST
9501515

1632 PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE PANAM 103
FAMILIES 04/03/96

1675 TERRORISM WARNING FM TASK FORCE ON
TERRORISM
& UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 9501675

1729 NATO COUN FOR INTERNATL HEALTH PRES LTR RE
REQUEST FOR PRES VETO OF HELMS-GILMAN BILL 9601729

2470 COALITION FOR AMER LEADERSHIP ABROAD LTR RE
FORM POLICY REORG 9502470

2502 CY RPT RE S 735 / COMPREHENSIVE TERRORISM
PREVENTION ACT OF 1995 9602502

2528 CLAUSEN ET AL LTR RE FORM ASSISTANCE
LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS 9502528

2545 SEN HELMS LTR RE POSSIBLE UN EMBARGO
ON LIBYAN OIL EXPORTS 9502545

2589 PRES OF VICTIMS OF PAN AM 103 REQUEST
THAT PAN AM 103 BECOME MAIN POINT IN
RESOLVING TERRORISM 9602589

2623 LTR ASKING PRES TO ENCOURAGE PM TANSU
CILLER OF TURKEY TO BUY HELIOS FROM US 9502623

2624 SEN HALMS LTR RE LIBYAN OIL EMBARGO 9502624

2635 PRES RADIO ADDRESS TON THE NATION,
ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA 4/20/96 04/18/96

2640 ENROLLED BILL S-735 ANTITERRORISM &
EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT 9602640

2757 LTR TO MCLARTY RE AMER PRISONERS IN IRAQ
SINCE GULF WAR & A REQUEST FOR THEM TO
ATTEND PRES SIGNING OF TERRORISM BILL 9602757

3125 LTR TO LAKE PRAISING EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF
KIKHIA BUT CRITICIZING INITIATIVE TO
IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA FOR PAN AM
103 BOMBING 9503125

3200 BAKER LTR RE ESTABLISHMENT OF CREDIT UNIONS
IN RUSSIA & UKRAINE 9503200

3250 HIRSCHHORN & MCKELVAIN LTR RE ICOTT
OPPOSITION TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO
COUNTRIES SUPPORTING TERRORISM 9503250

3294 SCHOEBERG LTR RE LIBYA SANCTION RE PAN 103
9503294

3299 OMB REQUEST FOR VIEWS RE S-735 COMPREHENSIVE
TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 95 9503299

3464 LTR FM EPHRAIMSON-ABT RE KLA FLIGHT 007 9503464

3551 LTR FM GLOY OF WESTCON INTL PUBLIC AFFAIRS
CO RE SUBSTANTIAL CUT IN FORN AID BUDGET
IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE 9503551

3591 LTR TO PRES FM COM ON AGRICULTURAL SUSTAIN-
ABILITY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES RE
CONGRESSIONALLY-MANDATED BUDGET CUTS 9603591

4214 LTR TO KING HUSSEIN ON LIBYA'S PROPOSAL
FOR TRYING THE PA 103 SUSPECTS IN THE HAGUE 6/18/96

4423 REQ STATE ISSUE STATEMENT RE ANTITERRORISM
ACT OF 1996 9604423

4506 LTR RE AIRCRAFT FIGHTER PROGRAM IN UAE
9604506

4764 EXCLUSION OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
PRES LILIC FM PRES FORN LEADERS
RECEPTIONS AT OLYMPICS 9604764

4766 SECRET SERVICE PROTECTION FOR PRES LILIC
OF FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 9604766

4822 RPT OF COMMISSION ON AMER NATL INTERESTS
9604822

4896 REQUEST NSC RECOMS ON SEC CHRISTOPHER LTR
ON FORM OPERATION BILL 9504896

4977 PRES CLINTON RADIO ADDRESS TO NATION 7/20/96

4981 CONCERN OVER FUTURE OF INTL LABOR
ORGANIZATION / ILO IN FORN AFFAIRS BUDGET 9504981

5121 OMB REQUEST FOR VIEWS RE HR-1710 - 505121
COMPREHENSIVE TERRORISM ACT OF 1995

5266 PRES MSG RE ECONOMIC RPT 9600678

5458 STATE & CIA PROPOSED AGENCY VIEWS RE
HR-1710 - COMPREHENSIVE ANTITERRORISM ACT
OF 1995 9505458

5471 RE ANTITERRORISM PROPOSAL THAT WAS
FORWARDED TO JIM LINDSEY 9705471

5554 LTR FM GSA ADMINISTRATOR JOHNSON RE
HEIGHTENED LEVEL SECURITY AWARENESS SINCE
BOMBING IN OKLAHOMA 9505554

5753 **REVISED** PROPOSED STATEMENT OF ADMIN

POLICY RE S-961 FORN AID REDUCTION ACT 9505753

-- ARMS SALES LETTERS 4/96

6116 LTR TO LAKE FM REP OBERSTAR RE CREATION OF
BLUE
RIBBON PANEL ON AVIATION SECURITY 9506116

6981 LTR TO PRES FM REP CUNNINGHAM PROPOSES SALE
OF 11 F-16 AIRDCRAFT ORIG COMMITTED TO
PAKISTAN TO PHILIPPINE GOVT INSTEAD 9506981

7074 LTR TO LAKE RE 1996 FORN AID SPENDING
PRIORITIES 9507074

7292 ASSESSMENT OF FACILITIES TO WARN OF THREATS
TO NATL SECURITY 9507292

7649 CHAIR OF ADVISORY COM ON VOLUNTARY FORN AID/
ACVFA LTR RE FUTURE OF US FORN ASSISTANCE 9507649

7973 REQUEST NSC RECOMS ON WOLFENSOHN LTR TO
PRES RE FUNDING FOR IDA 9507973

8194 LTR RE CUTS FOR USAID OPERATIONS 9508194

8325 CABINET AFFAIRS MEMO FWDS FAA
CONSIDERATION OF DROPPING AIRPORT ALERT
LEVEL FM LEVEL III TO LEVEL II - REQUESTS
COMMENTS 9508325

8668 REVISED AID PROPOSED TESTIMONY ON RULE OF
LAW & DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 9508668

8669 STATE PROPOSED TESTIMONY ON RULE OF LAW
& DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 9508669

8731 REVISED - JUSTICE PROPOSED TESTIMON ON
RULE OF LAW & DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
9508731

8852 LTR FM FATEE RE ECONOMIC SECTORS OF
CROATION 9508852

9119 REQUEST NSC DRAFT REPLY FOR BOSNIAN
FRIENDSHIP PROJECT 9509119

9191 STATE PROPOSED RPT RE HR-15671 / AMER
OVERSEAS INTERESTS ACT OF 1995 9509191

10012 TAFT LTR RE FY 1996 BUDGET 9410012

20121 MEMO RE SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF
DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON LIBYA
SANCTIONS 20121

20335 TRAVEL REQUEST FOR STEVEN SIMON
LUXEMBOURG - SHARM EL SHEIKH FOLLOW-UP
ANTITERRORISM MINISTERIAL 04/08/96

20395 DEP SECDEF REQUEST FOR DC MTG ON
ARMS TRANSFER TO TURKEY 9620395

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. email	Robert Kyle to Malcolm Lee. Subject: Action Memorandum for NSC. (7 pages)	02/06/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Mary DeRosa to Robert Malley. Subject: FW: Cuba. (8 pages)	02/08/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. email	Malcolm Lee to Dwight Bemisderfer. Subject: Action Memorandum for NSC. (7 pages)	02/09/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 2/9/98 11:57:57 AM
FROM Maxfield, Nancy H.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT NATO Enlargement event on 2/11 [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Crowley, Philip J.
Dehqanzada, Yahya A.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
Rubin, Eric S.
Wozniak, Natalie S.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY Per Steve Flanagan, here is the memo you requested.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

0909 - SRB on Feb 11.doc

February 6, 1998

ACTION**MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER**

FROM: DONALD BANDLER/STEPHEN FLANAGAN/MARA
RUDMAN/
TONY BLINKEN

SUBJECT: February 11 Event on NATO Enlargement

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President describing the February 11 event, at which the President will announce his transmittal to the Senate of the protocols of accession to NATO for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The event will be in the Franklin Room, eighth floor of the State Department, at approximately 12 noon. The Vice President has agreed to serve as emcee. The Foreign Ministers of the three invited states will be in the audience,

along with
a group of about 150 composed of: the national security team, foreign
policy
elites, members of Congress, leaders of supportive interest groups,
and NATO
ambassadors.

The key question now is the participation of Senators Lott and
Daschle or,
alternatively, Helms and Biden. We prefer them to participate in a
speaking role
in order to send a message of early Senate support. Larry Stein is
working to
secure their participation. If they do not participate, we would instead
feature
remarks by Secretary Albright and the Vice President. After the
President
offers his remarks, he would then sign the request for advice and
consent. If we
secure congressional participation, the President would be flanked
during the
signing by the leadership as well as by his national security team.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Remarks (To be provided by speechwriters)

2

0909

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 0909 president2.doc

NATO ENLARGEMENT RATIFICATION ROLL-OUT EVENT
DATE: February 11, 1998
LOCATION: Roosevelt Room, State Department
TIME: TBD

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER
LARRY STEIN

I. PURPOSE

To formally request advice and consent of the Senate for the protocols of accession that will add Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the NATO Alliance.

To underscore the continued leadership of the United States in fulfilling your vision for NATO enlargement and stability across the European continent and demonstrate your personal commitment to fighting for passage.

II. BACKGROUND

This event will formally launch congressional deliberation on ratification of NATO enlargement and will be crucial in framing the tone and message for the upcoming debate. It will showcase your full engagement in the effort to obtain favorable Senate advice and consent on the protocols and will increase the chances of a clean, early vote, perhaps as soon as mid-March. The likely participation of Senators of both parties in the event will demonstrate substantial, bipartisan Senate support as well.

The Vice President and Secretary of State will emcee. We are seeking to have Senator Lott and Senator Daschle (or alternatively Helms and Biden) on stage with you; each would make brief remarks stressing their support. You will close the program, setting out the case for ratification in the context of our broader European security strategy. Finally, you will sign the letter of request to the Senate, with your national security team and members of Congress standing behind you.

The Foreign Ministers of the three invited states will be in attendance. You will have already had a brief photo-op with them, and your remarks

will note
their presence. The audience will also include: your national security
team
(except Secretary Cohen, who will be traveling); former national
security
officials and retired military officers; former government officials;
leaders of
veterans, ethnic, and other groups that support enlargement; Senate
and House
members; and other NATO ally ambassadors.

Although prospects for ratification look good, we still face the
likelihood of
difficult amendments, such as a mandated pause on future rounds of
enlargement,
as suggested in the NYTimes op-ed on Wednesday by Senator Nunn
and General
Scowcroft. To build momentum for our final push on this issue,
Secretary
Albright will deliver a speech on Monday, February 9, both she and
Secretary
Cohen will testify before Senator Helms on February 24, and we have
an extensive
campaign underway to generate supportive editorials, op-eds, and
endorsements.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Albright
Deputy Secretary of Defense Hamre
General Shelton
APNSA Berger

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open Press

V. SEQUENCE

Scenario to be provided by ExecSec.

Attachment

Tab A Remarks (to be provided by speechwriters)

2

0909

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. email	Dwight Bemisderfer to Malcolm Lee. Subject: Action Memorandum for NSC. (7 pages)	02/09/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97-Jan 01) ([Senator Helms])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[02/03/1998-02/09/1998]

2006-1363-F

vz5651

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]